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No. 372, dated Fort William, 31 January 1871. 140453

From *A. Mackenzie*, Esq., Officiating Junior Secretary to the Government of Bengal, to Officer in Charge, Telegraph Office, Calcutta.

I AM directed by the Lieutenant Governor to request that you will be good enough to send a copy of all telegrams from Cachar or Sylhet which may arrive for the Lieutenant Governor, or Mr. Eden, the Secretary to this Government, direct to the Secretary to the Government of India, in the Foreign Department, immediately on receipt.

2. These telegrams, when received, should be sent on to the Lieutenant Governor, or to Mr. Eden, according as they may be addressed, by a special peon, without a moment's loss of time.

No. 373, dated Fort William, 31 January 1871.

Endorsed by the Government of Bengal.

COPY forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of India, in the Foreign Department, for information.

No. 721, dated Fort William, 30 January 1871.

From Lieutenant Colonel *A. H. Paterson*, Officiating Inspector General of Police, Lower Provinces, to Honourable *A. Eden*, Secretary to the Government of Bengal.

I HAVE the honour to forward copies of letters received this day from the District Superintendent of Police, Sylhet, Nos. 10 T. and 13 T., dated the 23rd and 24th instants respectively, written from his camp on the frontier, containing an account of the raid lately committed by Looshais in the territory of the Raja of Independent Tipperah.

No. 10 T., dated Camp Adumpore, F.G., 23 January 1871.

From *James Patch*, Esq., District Superintendent of Police, Sylhet, to Personal Assistant to the Inspector General of Police, Lower Provinces.

IN continuation of my letter No. 8 T., dated the 22nd instant, from Allynuggur, I have the honour to report that on my arrival here yesterday afternoon I found that considerable alarm prevailed among the villagers residing here and the inhabitants of the outlying Kookee villages, who all appeared to be in hourly expectation of an attack from a party of raiders who have within the last few days made their appearance in the territory of the Raja of Independent Tipperah, where they have been burning villages and killing and wounding the villagers.

2. As the scene of these depredations is not far from the boundary of this district, the villagers occupying lands in our territory were impressed with the belief that the raiders would visit them as well as their neighbours residing in Hill Tipperah, and, consequently, all our Kookies residing near here deserted their "poongees" and fled to the plains, camping in large bodies close to this guard for protection.

3. Just before dusk, last evening, the whole country about here was seized with a most unaccountable panic, and the people came rushing in hundreds towards the guard, shouting that they were being killed and wounded. The guard at once turned out and went a considerable distance in pursuit of the supposed enemy, but finding there was no cause for alarm returned to the stockade. Their turning out, however, had the effect of reassuring the frightened people.

4. Early this morning I proceeded with a guard to one of our outlying Kookee villages which had been deserted; the villagers showed us the way, and were rejoiced to find that everything was as they left it, and that no raiders had visited it during their absence: they were the more especially glad at this, because last evening smoke was perceived in the direction of their villages, and doubts were entertained as to whether it had not been burned down.

5. I have not been able to ascertain who these raiders actually are, but I think it highly probable that they are the "Howlongs" alluded to by the Commissioner of Chittagong: they have not, however, done anything in our territory, but appear to have scrupulously confined their acts of depredation to the subjects of the Tipperah Raja, many of whom have taken refuge within our boundary. Where these raiders are it is quite impossible

but I think it highly probable that they may turn up near Kumberghat, and, unless anything fresh occurs to-night, I shall proceed to Allynuggur Frontier Guard to-morrow.

6. The people here are becoming gradually reassured, and I fancy a few day smore will see them tranquilly settled down again in their respective villages (poongees).

7. While writing this, three men, belonging to a khedda working in the Hill Tipperah, have just come to my camp from their khedda, which, they informed me, was attacked last Saturday at a place called Lootmachurra, distant from this place about a day and a half to the south. They say that the men belonging to the khedda have been dispersed in various directions. They further stated that yesterday the raiders burned down a Kookee village of the Raja's, named Baingbarree. This poongee is distant from here about half a day's journey to the south, and it was the smoke from this village that gave rise to the suspicion that the poongee to which we proceeded this morning had been burned down.

8. The khedda men say that the raiders number about 200 or 300 men. They describe them as tall, strong, and stout men, and in appearance much resembling ordinary Kookies; another party of that khedda, with five or six elephants, are camped near the guard.

9. Any further information that I may be enabled to obtain will be promptly communicated.

No. 13 T., dated Camp Adumpore, 24 January 1871.

From *J. Patch*, Esq., District Superintendent of Police, Sylhet, to Personal Assistant to Inspector General of Police, Lower Provinces.

In continuation of my No. 10 T., of yesterday's date, I have the honour to submit the following information regarding the late raid on the villages belonging to the Tipperah Raja, which I have obtained from a man named Orjoon Ram Deb, a Kookee interpreter.

2. This person came to my camp last night and informed me that he had seen and conversed with a Kookee of Dharabaree, one of the villages in our territory, and that that man had told him that he had been to Komulpore, in the Raja's country, to make inquiries as to what had become of some friends of his residing at a village named Pooyarbaree which had been looted and destroyed by the raiders, and that he met there an inhabitant of the destroyed village, named Churun, who told him the following story:—

3. On Saturday last, viz., the 21st instant, at about 1 p.m., the raiders attacked, looted, and burnt his village, killed one old woman, and captured six prisoners, one of whom was Churun himself. The raiders took their prisoners to a place called 'Matrabbeel," in the Raja's country, distant from here about half a day's journey to the south.

4. The following day, viz., the 22nd, the raiders went away, taking with them five of the prisoners. They left behind them Churun, who was sick, and two of their men to guard him, as well as their booty; the two guards went to fish, and Churun, taking advantage of this, effected his escape, and came to Komulpore.

5. In consequence of the above information I postponed my intended departure for Allynuggur, and directed the Interpreter to go to Komulpore and endeavour to induce Churun to come to me, in order that I might personally question him regarding the raiders.

6. In accordance with my instructions the Interpreter went to-day to Komulpore, where he met with Churun, but could not bring him in to me, as the Raja's people would not allow him to come, saying that the Raja would not approve of it.

7. The Interpreter, however, closely questioned Churun, and found that the statement made to him by the Dharabaree Kookee was correct. He further elicited from Churun that while he (Churun) was in the custody of the raiders, he entered into conversation with them, and from what they said he gathered as follows:—

8. That they are the followers of one Darool Raja, a cousin of Sookpilal, who resides at a place about seven days' distance to the south-west of Sookpilal's residence. They described their Raja's residence as being situated near a very large river, the water of which is saltish. They stated that they had come to raid only in Independent Tipperah, and had no intention whatsoever of trespassing on British territory.

9. Churun also stated that the raiders expressed their intention of remaining at that "Bhell" for six days, in order to give the Raja's people an opportunity of coming out and fighting them, but that if no one came to fight them they would conceal themselves somewhere, and when the people thought that they had gone away they would come back again suddenly, and attack Komulpore.

10. The men, so Churun says, are about 300 in number; they are nearly all armed with guns, spears, and das.

If the above statement is true, which I have no reason to doubt, I think it highly probable

probable that these men came from Chittagong way, and may probably be the "Howlongs" alluded to by the Commissioner of Chittagong; their allusion to the large river, the water of which is saltish, goes far to bear out this supposition. Anyhow, I do not think that we need be under any serious apprehension of their attacking our villages; still, however, as long as such a large number of untamed savages are lurking about so close to our boundary, it is very necessary that a sharp look-out on their movements be kept, and this will be strictly seen to.

No. 766, dated Fort William, 31 January 1871.

From Lieutenant Colonel *A. H. Paterson*, Officiating Inspector General of Police, L.P., to Honourable *A. Eden*, Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department.

In continuation of my letter No. 721, of yesterday's date, I have the honour to submit copies of communications received this morning from the district superintendent of Sylhet, containining further accounts of the movements of the raiders, and of the counter-measures adopted.

2. I attach also in original a telegram just received, and a demi-official letter that accompanied the above reports, both from the same officer.

No. 14 T., dated 25 January 1871.

From District Superintendent of Police, Sylhet to Personal Assistant to the Inspector General of Police, Lower Provinces.

In continuation of the previous correspondence,* I have the honour to forward herewith translation of two vernacular reports for the information of the Inspector General.

*No. 10 T., of the 23rd January. No. 13, of the 24th instant.

2. The Looshais, it is reported, have made their appearance near Chargoolah, for which place I leave early to-morrow morning. The magistrate is here; I have consulted with him; 100 men of the 44th Native Infantry have been sent towards Chargoolah.

Translation of a Report from Inspector *Abasin Rajab*, dated Chargoolah, 22 January 1871.

At about 3 p.m. to day Mookund Sing, Munnipooree, informed me that after the coolies of the Government Keddah had arrived on their way up at a place called "Fanai Churra," to the north of a hill called "Goomboozallah," the Looshais attacked and fired at them. Two coolies, named Bateer Mahamood and Moonshee Meah, fell and the rest ran away to different directions. Of those that ran away, how many are killed, and how many are still alive cannot at present be ascertained. This took place at about 2 p.m. to-day.

The scene of this occurrence is about two or three "prohurs'" distance from the Chargoola guard within the hills.

I left immediately for that place, with Sub-Inspector Latooram, Head Constable Sew Lall Doobey, and 16 constables, but was obliged to return to the guard from a place called Dorsharbad, as it became dark when we arrived there. We could find no trace of the Looshais at that place.

One of the Khedda coolies, named Kabil Mahomed, tells me that about 300 Looshais have come to the direction of Chargoola. They may probably attack some of the villages near this guard, or the place where the Khedda is being worked, either to-night or to-morrow morning.

I will start again to-morrow morning with a guard for that place (where the Khedda people were attacked!).

I hope you will personally come here soon, and order a bugler to be sent here with some more constables armed and equipped. I have sent a report to the head quarters office also.

Translation of a Report from Inspector *Abasin Rajab* of D. Division, Latoo, dated the 24 January 1871.

The Looshais made an attack yesterday in a Cachary village in the hills to the east of a village called "Shondjaha." They have burnt down the Cachary village, and killed two villagers. They then went to attack another Cachary village named "Binda Cacharies Parah." Sub-inspector Latoo Ram with 16 constables, and one head constable, left for that place immediately to fight with them; and I with 14 constables was in charge of the guard when another batch of the Looshais attacked a village named "Shanga-halam," quite close to the guard, at 7 a.m. this day, and then had made a rush towards this guard also. We immediately turned out and commenced firing at them, and then they left. The

Looshais have killed two Kookies in this village also. We fought with them for nearly an hour. They were in the eastern bank of Singla River, in the jungles, we were on the western bank. I could not ascertain how many of the enemy's side are wounded and killed, but I am certain that some of them must have been wounded.

The scene of the occurrence was about two "hals" from the guard, *i. e.*, on the other side of the river.

The Looshais have now gone into a hill to the east of the guard, and are divided into little bands. I don't know what more will take place. I hope that a reinforcement may be sent with as little delay as possible. I am with 14 constables only in the guard.

Translation of a Report from Head Constable *Shumbhoonauth Surmah*, of Ratabaro, dated 23 January 1871.

To-day, at 11 a.m., Norva Chury, Chowkeedar of Mouzah Putwah, Pergunnah Agavshutie, came and said that that morning Looshais having found the woodcutters (Bukumlahs) of the village Nadha, in the hills east of Shuryanuggur, killed them. He heard this from the Kookies. He also heard that the Looshais had surrounded the Kookies living to the east and south of Shuryanuggur. The head constable sent information to the inspector who is at Chargoola, and started himself for the spot.

No. 399, dated Fort William, 1st February 187

From *A. Mackenzie*, Esq., Officiating Junior Secretary to the Government of Bengal, to *C. U. Aitchison*, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

No. 70, dated 26th January 1871.
No. 84, dated 27th January 1871.

In continuation of endorsement No. 384, of this date, I am directed to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of endorsements, with enclosures as per margin, from the Assistant Commissioner of Cachar, regarding the Looshai raids.

I am to remark that the Lieutenant Governor considers that the injunctions to secrecy in respect to the anticipated raids which were conveyed in Mr. Edgar's letter of the 20th ultimo were ill-judged. Mr. Edgar's object, no doubt, was to prevent a panic among the coolies of tea-gardens, and he was evidently unaware of the numbers and warlike qualities of the raiders. But it would have been more judicious had he directed the authorities in Cachar privately to warn the managers of gardens in exposed situations. It will be evident, however, from Mr. Clementson's letter that Mr. Edgar's note arrived too late to have any real effect upon the conduct of affairs. Raiding had begun before it reached.

No. 69, dated Cachar, 26th January 1871.

From *W. R. Clementson*, Esq., Assistant Commissioner, Cachar, to Commissioner of Circuit, Dacca Division, Dacca.

In continuation of my Report No. 68, of 24th instant, I have the honour to inform you that the following disposition of force has been made by me:—

2. Fifty sepoys and 100 constables are now at the disposal of Metcalfe and Savi, and to-morrow 20 more constables will join them; 15 sepoys and 15 constables at Loharbund; 15 sepoys and 22 constables at Monierkhall; 13 constables at Deedarkhosh; 18 at Mynadhur; 20 sepoys at Luckipore.

3. Mr. Metcalfe was at Katticherra on 24th and 25th; Mr. Savi reached Luckinuggur on 24th, at 3 p.m.; remained in readiness for attack all night; would push on to Katticherra next morning.

4. These Howlongs do not appear to have adhered entirely to the usual tactics; they have not disappeared immediately after completing their attack; but, on the contrary, they are, as Savi says, "all over the hills here."

5. In the ruins of the Kachari Poonjee, which was the first to suffer, 12 or 14 bodies were seen by Metcalfe, who went direct to it from Hylakandy station on receipt of the news.

6. In the attack on the Alexandrapore,* which followed next, Mr. Winchester, his little girl, and 12 coolies were killed, and many wounded; Sellar has escaped. The attack there served to warn Bagshawe just in time for him to detect some Looshais stealing up to his bungalow; they fired; Cooke and Bagshawe returned the fire and drove them away; another party killed five of his coolies and wounded more next; Cooke and some Caboolies went

* Sic in orig.

went over to Alexandrapore and brought away the body of Winchester and several wounded coolies to Katlicherra.

This all occurred on Monday 23rd.

7. Mr. Metcalfe passed the night under arms in Luckinuggur tea house. Savi employed it in marching to his relief from Silchar.

8. On morning of 24th a second attack was made upon Katlicherra; 30 or 40 Looshais, it is said, charged up to the bungalow; were gallantly received by Bagshawe and 10 constables, and I presume by Mr. Cooke also, though that is not stated; and, after some firing, were eventually driven off, without inflicting any damage.

9. The last letter I received from Mr. Edgar is dated 20th Changsil; he was with Sookpilal; knew of the intended raid, and was confident; proposed to try and cut them off on their return.

10. The Raja's agent at Luckipore rode over on Wednesday morning, 25th, to inform me that some villages had been attacked, and that the two majors were in pursuit.

11. I have sent you many telegrams.

12. Mr. McWilliam and Mr. Daly left here on Friday, the 20th, to visit the Mikir villages in north Cachar hills. Many messengers have been sent after them.

Memorandum No. 70, dated Cachar, 26 January 1871. Endorsed by Assistant Commissioner of Cachar.

COPY forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal for information.

No. 83, dated Cachar, 27 January 1871.

From *W. K. Clementson*, Esq., Assistant Commissioner of Cachar, to Commissioner of Circuit, Dacca Division, Dacca.

IN continuation of my letter, No. 69, of 26th instant, I have the honour to report that the complete report of the attacks on Alexandrapore and Katlicherra Gardens and of Winchester's death arrived on Tuesday evening, 24th. I gave order for a subadar and fifty men of the 4th to proceed and place themselves under the orders of the civil officer, Mr. Metcalfe. They started in morning and went *viâ* Dowarbund, that being the most direct road to where Mr. Metcalfe was likely to be, viz., in south portion of Hylakandy. A messenger on pony went in advance to Metcalfe to inform him of the approach of the sepoys, so that he might send some one to meet them and conduct them to him; they would arrive on 26th.

2. The guards, as my telegrams have informed you, have all been strengthened. I have withdrawn 30 sepoys from Luckipore leaving 20 there. Now that Kanai Sing is in custody, there is little necessity for a guard there. Sepoys are on guard at jail and treasury.

3. I have sent messengers in the track of Mr. McWilliam, but no news of him; they intended to visit the villages of Mikir, north of Goonsra, or Kallain, or somewhere.

Memorandum No. 84, dated Cachar, 27 January 1871.

From *W. K. Clementson*, Esq., Assistant Commissioner of Cachar.

THE accompanying copy forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, in the Judicial Department, in continuation of Memorandum No. 70, dated 26th January 1871

No. 1230, dated Fort William, 30 January 1871.

From Colonel *H. K. Burne*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to General *Bourchier*, Shillong.

I AM directed to acquaint you that a telegram to the following effect has this day been dispatched to you:—

"Please proceed to Cachar or Sylhet as you may find most expedient, as the Viceroy wishes you to be in the immediate neighbourhood of the disturbed tracts."

Nos. 1238-39, dated Fort William, 30 January 1871.

From Colonel *H. K. Burne*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to Officer Commanding at Cachar and Dacca.

I AM directed to acquaint you that a telegram to the following effect was yesterday dispatched to you:—

"Please comply as far as may be practicable with any requisitions for troops from the station under your command. Report to me direct by telegraph any movements of troops."

These telegrams are sent in consequence of certain disturbances on the frontier, and with reference to the present position of Mr. Edgar and his expedition.

No. 1264, dated Fort William, 30 January 1871.

From Colonel *H. K. Burne*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to Agent, Eastern Bengal Railway Company.

I AM desired to ask whether, if needed, the Eastern Bengal Railway Company could quickly provide for the transport of about 200 native soldiers from Dacca to Cachar by steamer, and on what terms?

2. A very early reply is solicited.

No. 1267, dated Fort William, 30 January 1871.

From Colonel *H. K. Burne*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to Officer Commanding at Dacca.

I AM directed to acquaint you that a telegram to the following effect has this day been dispatched to you:—

"You are to keep all available men of the wing at Dacca in readiness to move by steamer if General Bourchier requires them, only leaving recruits and sufficient men for protection of the lines.

"Government is aware that 100 men are going up with the Commissioner at once."

No. 1270, dated Fort William, 30 January 1871.

From Colonel *H. K. Burne*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to General *Bourchier*, Shillong.

I AM directed to acquaint you that a telegram to the following effect has this day been dispatched to you:—

Precedence.—"The Governor General in Council wishes you to understand that the Government considers the first object is to provide for the safety of Mr. Edgar.

"One hundred men of 4th Native Infantry are going from Dacca by steamer with the Commissioner to Cachar.

"If you think more men requisite, arrangements will be made to send them by another steamer from Dacca, but telegraph your wishes to me."

TELEGRAM, dated 31 January 1871.

From Secretary, Colonel *Burne*, Calcutta, to Officer Commanding at Dacca.

IN continuation of message of yesterday, please say at once how many men you would require transport for from Dacca to Cachar, deducting men already going in steamer with the Commissioner.

No. 33, dated Fort William, 1 February 1871.

From Colonel *B. E. Bacon*, Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to Quartermaster General.

I AM desired to request that instructions may be given to the officer commanding the Presidency district to dispatch a company of a native regiment made up to 70 men of all ranks under the command of an European officer to Chittagong by the British India Steam Navigation Company's steamer "Moulmein," leaving for that place on the 3rd instant.

2. The company should be supplied with tents and full service proportion of ammunition.

3. The

3. The officer commanding should be instructed to acquaint the Commissioner with his arrival, and to comply with the wishes of that officer, as far as possible, in regard to disposition and movements of his detachment, and to furnish frequent reports to the Brigadier General Commanding the Presidency district for the information of Government.

No. 54, dated Fort William, 2 February 1871.

From Colonel *H. K. Burne*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to Quartermaster General.

As the Commissioner of the division is understood to be absent, I am directed to request that, in modification of the instructions conveyed in paragraph 2 of my letter, No. 33, of yesterday's date, the officer in command of the company of Native Infantry proceeding to Chittagong in the Moulmein may be directed to comply, as far as possible, with the wishes of Captain Lewin, Deputy Commissioner of the hill tracts of Chittagong, and be prepared to move into these tracts as soon after his arrival at Chittagong as possible.

TELEGRAM, dated 29 January 1871.

From Quartermaster General, Gowhatty, to Military Secretary to the Government, Calcutta.

DEPUTY Commissioner, Cachar, telegraphs on 28th to General Bourchier:—

"The raiders are in considerable force to south-west of station within 11 miles of it; troops all out; assistance urgently required; quiet on western side since 24th."

From Shillong, officer commanding telegraphs:—

"To-day just received telegram from Bourne, reports the whole frontier threatened, and Looshais in great force. Reported Mr. and Mrs. Bagshawe killed, and children carried off. Asks for reinforcements. Shall send 200 men on Tuesday to Sylhet. Bourne further reports that Ghargola was attacked and the Looshais repulsed.

"Preparing to renew the attack. Communication difficult.

"Commander in Chief, in anticipation of Government sanction, has directed all 44th to Sylhet from Shillong and company at Sylhet to be pushed on also.

"Two companies of 43rd from this to Shillong."

TELEGRAM, dated 29 January 1871.

From Quartermaster General, Gowhatty, to Secretary to Government, Military Department, Calcutta.

FOLLOWING message from officer commanding Shillong just received by General Bourchier, 29th:—

"Officer commanding, Cachar, reports rear-guard detachment, 4th Regiment, attacked yesterday; six men killed; baggage carried off. Looshais in considerable force."

TELEGRAM, dated 2 February 1871.

From *McWilliam* to Secretary, Bengal Government, in Judicial Department, Calcutta.

No prisoners were taken, and the bodies of the slain were in every case carried away by raiders; clothing consists of a long *khesh* completely covering body from head to middle of calf, and a puggree. A few of them had black *kheshes*, but the majority white. Behaviour very different to that of raiders of 1869. Sepoys at Monierkhall say that there are old mutineers amongst raiders. I heard from Looshais last year that there were some old mutineers in the villages of Boota, Vonolell's son.

No. 235P., dated Fort William, 3 February 1871.

From *Charles Girdlestone*, Esq., Officiating Junior Under Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Hon. *Ashley Eden*, Political Secretary, Bengal.

WITH reference to the telegram of Mr. McWilliam to the address of the Bengal Government, dated the 2nd instant, intimating that no Looshai prisoners have been taken, and that the bodies of the slain have in every case been carried away by the raiders, I am directed by the Viceroy and Governor General in Council to state that it is of the utmost importance that the clothes and the marks on the bodies of the raiders should be examined and accurately described. I am to request that you will instruct Mr. McWilliam and such other officers on the spot as you may deem desirable to this effect by telegraph, and that you will impress on them the necessity of complying with the wishes of his Excellency in Council.

TELEGRAM, dated 30 January 1871.

From *McWilliam*, Cachar, to Commissioner of Dacca, Dacca, and Secretary to Government of Bengal, in Judicial Department, Calcutta.

DALY has come on from Monierkhall, leaving 40 police and sepoys. Raiders retired during night of 28th. Daly reported that it was quite impossible to attempt to follow raiders into forest with men who could not face them in the open garden. Police behaved with great courage. Eglington, who was in the stockade from first to last, thinks that raiders lost about 30 killed and wounded.

TELEGRAM, dated 1 February 1871.

From *McWilliam*, Cachar, to Commissioner of Dacca, Dacca, and Secretary to Government Bengal, in Judicial Department, Calcutta.

BROWN reports that raiders, supposed to be Looshais, took away 40 heads and 20 captives from a village south-east of the Munnipore valley. Troops are out after them. Brown thinks the raid is on account of Vonolell's death.

TELEGRAM, dated 1 February 1871.

From *McWilliam*, Cachar, to Secretary, Government of Bengal, Judicial Department, Calcutta.

YOUR telegram of 30th. Communications still open. Letter from Edgar at Chundle dated 25th, by Julnacherra, about to start for Looshai Haut on Sonai by new road shown by Sookpilal's Muntrie. Sookpilal seems most friendly. Looshai Haut is at least 10 marches from station, and Chundle 14. If he has to return, he may by Dullessur, which is open, or Rengti Pahar, or Bongkong, or by Sonai. Raiders have undoubtedly left district. If Sookpilal be treacherous, no military force could arrive in time to assist Edgar on march across. His principal danger lies in the possibility of meeting the very strong party of Monierkhall raiders on their way home. No force going by Sonai or Bongkong could overtake them now before they reached Looshai Haut. A force marching along the Rengti must miss him, unless he chooses to return that way. I have sent four picked men, who know the Sonai well, with a letter and some russud to Looshai Haut *viâ* Monierkhall where there is a large supply to follow. These men will be safe, as they are days behind the retreating party. I have just opened letter to Lieutenant Governor, which came in to-day, on chance of finding some clue to the route Edgar will take, but find none. Under circumstances, a column taking one of four routes would most likely miss him. Khedda was unmolested.

TELEGRAM from Bengal Secretary, Calcutta, to Deputy Commissioner, Cachar.

EMPLOY trustworthy scouts to follow the track of retreating raiders, and see what route they take.

No. 27, dated Dacca, 30 January 1871.

From *F. B. Simson*, Esq., Commissioner of Dacca, to Honourable *Ashley Eden*, Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Political Department.

I PRESUME Mr. McWilliam's telegram of the 28th instant, in which he reports attack on Monierkhall on the 27th, destruction of Demiakhall, and attack on Nugdissam, and his arrangements, has been also received by Government.

2. I do not know the position of Demiakhall; Nugdigram or Nugdissam is a large and flourishing village quite in the plains of civilised Cachar, about 16 or 18 miles only from Silchar, with which it is connected by a good road; if it is true that it has been attacked the effect and consequences will be most disastrous.

3. I have never known regular troops attacked before, but Monierkhall, which I know well, is naturally a very strong position, most easily defended, it was protected by 35 sepoys of the 4th Native Infantry, it is said this has been attacked, but the result is not stated. Mr. McWilliam, however, evidently thinks it should be reinforced and has moved sepoys from Hylakandy Valley eastward.

4. I am always inclined to look on the reports from Monierkhall as exaggerated, and trust they may be so in this instance.

5. Th

5. The rising of the Looshais with the exception of those families immediately under Sookpilal's control, appears to be more general and widespread than usual. No Howlongs or Syloo could have almost simultaneously attacked the whole line of frontier from Adampore in Sylhet to Monierkhall in Cachar, and even if every credit be given to Sookpilal, it is clear that his influence has a very trifling effect among the scattered tribes taken collectively. Mr. Edgar, with Sookpilal's men, is entirely within and south of the whole line of marauders, and if a detached party can without signal failure attack 35 regular soldiers in a stockaded outpost such as Monierkhall, the position of Mr. Edgar, isolated and protected only by 40 or 50 police, is critical in the extreme.

6. It is remarkable that this extensive rising has followed so immediately on the failure of Major Graham's advance to meet Mr. Edgar, and there can be no doubt that the circumstances connected with Messrs. Edgar and Graham were well known to all the tribes; information, too, to a certain extent, of the preparation for the present raids was given to all the authorities in Chittagong, Tipperah, and Cachar, therefore there is a considerable amount of concert and some not wholly defective means of conveying speedy information exercised by these hill tribes generally.

7. The answer to this letter and any instructions for me should be sent (by telegraph if necessary) to Sylhet. I shall be on my way there by steamer before this letter reaches Calcutta, unless I receive orders delaying me.

P.S.—Since writing the above, other telegrams have arrived. I shall start in the "Juboona" as soon as 100 men of the 4th Native Infantry can be got on board.

TELEGRAM, dated 1 February 1871.

From Quartermaster General, Gowhatty, to Secretary, Military Department, Calcutta.

GENERAL BOURCHIER telegraphs to-day, 31st. Murder of Bagshawe officially contradicted. Looshais left Monierkhall; Daly of the police got back to Cachar; 160 men, 4th Regiment, in Cachar station. Time being precious, Commander in Chief has directed General Bourchier to telegraph to you direct. His Excellency leaves for Debrooghur to-morrow morning.

TELEGRAM, dated 1 February 1871.

From General *Bourchier*, Shillong, to Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, Calcutta.

WITH 100 men from Dacca, have for present ample troops. Shall to-morrow have 200; more of 43rd here ready to march if wanted. Have sent 100 men by forched marches to Cachar. Another 100 will follow to-morrow, and there is 100 with magistrate, Sylhet, at Chargola. The whole of 44th have left Shillong, and on 3rd will be at Sylhet. I will carry out to utmost the order of Government for relief of Mr. Edgar, and am only waiting to hear to-day what is being done at Cachar, to decide what measures to take. I leave Thursday for Sylhet; reach Friday morning. Pray let all movements of troops be made, if possible, through me.

TELEGRAM, No. 60, dated 3 February 1871.

From Secretary Colonel *Burne*, Calcutta, to General *Bourchier*, Sylhet.

YOUR message of 1st received. Government is quite satisfied to leave you to carry out such measures as you deem best towards providing for the safety of Mr. Edgar and for protection of district.

Quartermaster General's Camp Office, Army Headquarters, Gowhatty, the 28 January 1871.

TELEGRAM, dated 24 January 1871, 4½ o'clock, p.m.

From Officer Commanding at Gowhatty.

THE following just received from Shillong from the officer commanding:—

"Please forward to the Brigadier General Commanding the district. Metcalfe reports from Hylakandy, Cachar, that a Poongee, due west of Ainerkhall, has been attacked by Looshais. Many people cut up.

"The Howlongs attacked and burnt three villages in Independent Tipperah, one hour's journey from Sylhet frontier. Many men cut up. Keddah attacked and men killed east of Singla Nuddee. I start in two hours for Lungai valley, with officers in charge of Keddah, placing myself in communication with troops in Cachar, so as to shut up Looshais on the Chatterchoora range.

"Have ordered supplies to Kurreemgunge."

The above telegram received from Lieutenant Bourne this day at 2.30 p.m., 24th.

No. 17, dated on board Yacht "Rohtas," River Burhmaputra, 26 January 1871.

From Brigadier General *G. Bourchier*, Commanding Eastern Frontier District, to Quartermaster General, Army Headquarters.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of the Right Honourable the Commander in Chief, copy of a telegram I received last night reporting raids made by the Howlong Kookies and Looshais in the Cachar district and Independent Tipperah, near the frontier of the Sylhet district.

With reference to this information, I have the honour to report that I have telegraphed to the officer commanding at Gowhatty to send back the Government elephants to Cachar and Shillong from Gowhatty, where they had been assembled in anticipation of the march of his Excellency's camp across the Cossyah hills. The animals will soon reach their respective stations, and be in readiness in the event of any movements of troops being ordered.

TELEGRAM, dated 25 January 1871.

From Officer Commanding at Cachar, to Brigade Major, Gowhatty.

Fifty-eight men, 4th Regiment, started for Hylakandy to join magistrate; 15 men start this evening for Monierkhall to reinforce police.

TELEGRAM, dated 26 January 1871.

From Officer Commanding at Shillong, to Officer Commanding at Gowhatty.

REPEAT this message to General Bourchier from Commissioner at Dacca.

Village west of Ainerkhall in Cachar, not far from Chargola in Sylhet, attacked by Looshais, and many people killed. Send company of the 44th to the nearest Sylhet outpost to the village and another to Sylhet, or make such arrangements as seem fit to you. I have ordered a company of the 4th from Silchar to be sent to the nearest advisable spot in that district, and have recalled (Edgar) Deputy Commissioner, who is in the hills.

Shall send a detachment of 44th as soon as carriage is available.

TELEGRAM, dated 28 January 1871.

From Officer Commanding 44th, Shillong, to Brigade Major, Eastern Frontier District, Gowhatty.

FOLLOWING telegram just received from Deputy Commissioner, Cachar:—

"Please send a 100 men to Silchar, the station is almost denuded of troops."

Have already sent one company, 100 strong, under Lieutenant Bourne to Sylhet, another company of same strength marches to-morrow. If I send a third company of same strength, shall be left with 180 effective men, before sending wait orders.

No. 21, dated Her Majesty's Yacht "Rohtas," Gowhatty, 28 January 1871.

From Brigadier General *G. Bourchier*, Commanding Eastern Frontier District, to Colonel *P. S. Lumsden*, Quartermaster General, Army Headquarters.

IN continuation of my letter, No. 17, of the 26th instant, I have the honour to forward further telegrams just received from the officer commanding at Shillong, relative to the movements of troops consequent on the Looshai raids, and to report that, in addition to the two companies, strength 100 each, already sent from Shillong to Sylhet, I have ordered Colonel Hicks, commanding 44th Regiment, Native Infantry, Shillong, to send a third company of the same strength to Cachar under command of an European officer.

TELEGRAM, dated 2nd February 1871.

From Officer Commanding at Cachar to Secretary to Government of India, Military Department, Calcutta.

FOURTH Regiment, 103 men, on outpost. 165 of all ranks serviceable in station. One company ready to move towards Mr. Edgar when route known.

TELEGRAM, dated 3rd February 1871.

From General *Bourchier*, Sylhet, to Secretary to Government of India, Military Department, Calcutta.

ARRIVED here Friday; have sent orders to officer commanding, Cachar, to organise a force to move to meet Mr. Edgar when the route by which he is returning is known. All 44th at Sylhet and Cachar. Raiders reported as having left district of Cachar. I shall await the Commissioner's arrival and then proceed to Cachar.

From Lieutenant Colonel *A. H. Paterson*, Officiating Inspector General of Police, Lower Provinces, to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department, No. 1033, dated Fort William, the 9th February 1871.

I HAVE the honour to submit for the information of Government, copy of a Report from Mr. Daly, District Superintendent of Police, Cachar, on the attack made by Looshais or other border tribes on the frontier post of Monierkhall, and the steps taken by him to relieve and defend it.

2. Mr. Daly appears to have acted with the energy and gallantry which might have been expected from him. Three hours after hearing of the attack on the stockade, he was on his way to assist with what force could be spare from Cachar, and the party with him reached in safety, although the road was occupied by the Looshais.

3. I cannot blame Mr. Daly for his gallant attempts to drive the enemy from the positions they were occupying near the stockades. Had his followers shown anything like the determination and coolness of their leader, the result would probably have been different. As it is, it is very possible that the attack made on them had much to do with the retreat of the enemy at night.

4. Mr. Daly makes no mention in his report of the loss of a portion of the rear-guard of his party, cut off so far within an out-post as Nugdigram. No doubt further particulars will be reported. I will reserve further remarks until then, merely observing that the statement referred to in the 29th paragraph regarding Rutton Sing, said now to be a follower of Vonpilal, appears to be worthy of inquiry.

COPY of a LETTER from the District Superintendent of Police, Cachar, to the Personal Assistant to the Inspector General of Police, Lower Provinces, No. 24, dated the 1st February 1871.

WITH reference to my telegrams of 27th and 31st ultimo, I have the honour to submit a report of what has occurred since my first hearing of the Looshai or Howlong outbreak. On the afternoon of the 26th ultimo, at a distance of two marches from the station in the North Cachar direction, where I happened to be travelling with the Officiating Deputy Commissioner, I received information that a Cachari village and two tea gardens had been attacked and several people killed.

2. I at first thought that my best plan would be to go on at once and march into the station, but we had been marching all day. The Deputy Commissioner and myself came to the conclusion that it would be better to halt for the night and proceed on our way to the station by torch light in the morning. This we did, after a journey on foot of about 16 miles, and on horseback of 12. We arrived at the station at about noon.

3. Before we had determined as to where my presence was most required, and at about 5 p.m., news was brought in that the Monierkhall guard had been attacked, and was surrounded by some hundreds of Looshais; the informant mentioned six or seven hundred.

4. At 8 p.m. I left the station with 1 havildar, 2 naicks, and 27 sepoys of the 4th Native Infantry, and 4 head constables and 7 constables of the police. As the coolies accompanying my party could not keep up with me, and as I was of opinion that I was bound to hurry out to the relief of the guard with as much speed as possible, I left the baggage coolie with a guard of one havildar, seven sepoys, and one constable, with orders to go as far as Nugdigram that night, and proceed on their journey through the jungles by daylight on the following morning.

5. I at once pushed on with the men, and after marching all night, "with the exception of a halt of one hour and twenty minutes, *i. e.*, from 3 to 4·20 a.m., made to rest the military," came upon a strong Looshai piquet posted in the forest road between Dharamikhall and Monierkhall, and about a mile from the latter place.

6. My advance guard, composed of the small party of police with me, kept up a fire on the retreating piquet, and although they, "the Looshais," made a slight attempt to make a stand twice, we were by continuing at the double enabled to get out of the forest and into the open garden before the enemy could get to our rear.

7. I must mention here that it was with the greatest difficulty that I could get the party of military with me to keep at the double. Whether the march of 22 miles from the station had fatigued them too much I cannot say, but both my men and myself were greatly astonished at finding a party of soldiers showing no inclination to hurry after an enemy in front of them. One of the Looshai piquet was, I think, shot by the police before getting out into the open garden.

8. Heavy firing heard at the stockade for some time before my arrival.

9. On arrival in the open plantation, I opened my men into skirmishing order and proceeded to the relief of the stockade, keeping up a fire on stragglers of the retreating piquet. On reaching the stockade about 6.30 a.m., I relieved the men who had marched out with me, and took out a party of one jemadar, 4th Native Infantry, and about 25 sepoys and constables who had passed the night in the stockade. I was advancing at the head of these men, and had just fired a shot at a single Looshai, whom I saw in front of me, when about 15 to 20 men suddenly rose from behind the base of a teelah and fired at me. On this I gave orders to crouch down under some cover close at hand; instead of doing this, the jemadar and his men commenced to retire, and then, on a great number of Looshais rushing towards us shouting, retreated in a most disgraceful manner. The men of the police with me of course followed, and although I did my best by shouting halt mut bhago, bhaitjao, &c., the jemadar did not stop until he arrived in the stockade Teelah.

10. Seeing that the military showed far less courage than my own men, and that they looked on the Looshais as very formidable foes, I ordered the whole party back in the stockade; and having allowed the men who had marched out with me during the night to rest and refresh themselves, I made another sortie at 9.45 with a party of three head constables and 16 constables, one havildar, "Pulwan Sing," and eight sepoys 4th Native Infantry. Before leaving the stockade I warned the men that I would shoot any one I saw running away.

11. I advanced with this party in skirmishing order towards a position "just over the brow of a teelah" taken up by the Looshais, and sent a second party of military and police under the command of the havildar, "Deendial Sing," to work round the right of the enemy and to draw part of their attention off ourselves. The Looshais kept up a very steady fire, while my men had strict orders from me to only fire when they had a good chance of hitting some one.

12. When we had worked up to within about 25 yards of the Looshais' position, I ordered the men to fix bayonets and charge; but this order was not obeyed. About the same time we heard a shouting on our left, and found that a party were getting round our left flank; and seeing this the men began to retire without orders, and the Looshais to rise from all directions and in great numbers. My small party, at seeing such numbers, seemed to lose heart and began to retreat, the Looshais coming after us in swarms, and others keeping up a fire from positions taken up in a teelah.

13. The party sent by me to the right were attacked, and retreated as fast as they could towards the stockade. I again did my best to cause my men to halt, but only succeeded in getting about 12 men to make a slight stand. The Looshais came on in great numbers, however, and the retreat became a sheer run for life. I cannot speak in too strong terms against the men of the 4th Native Infantry, as they were always the first to run and the last to turn out of the stockade. In this sortie from the stockade I lost one head constable and three constables, and two sepoys killed, and one havildar 4th Native Infantry, "Deendial Sing," wounded. There was also a coolie killed, who attached himself to the force of his own accord, armed with a bow and arrows. Looshais lost four.

14. During our retreat to the stockade, a party posted in a teelah kept up a steady fire, and to judge from the number of balls falling near me, seemed to be particularly anxious to hit me before my arrival at the stockade. On arrival, I determined not to send another party out, but merely to hold the stockade.

15. Shots

15. Shots were fired at the stockade until evening, but at about 7 p.m. everything was quiet, and the hum of the voices of the Looshais could not be heard. No attack was made during the night, and I took the opportunity of sending a note * to the Deputy Commissioner by constable Jutta and two Bengalees who were to take the boat down the Sonai. These men left the guard at about midnight, and as I have since heard reached in safety. * Copy attached.

16. On the morning of the 29th I sent a party to look for the bodies of the killed, and they were all found, with the exception of that of the coolie already alluded to. I think there can be no doubt that this man was killed, as I saw him stop close to my side when we were retreating and shoot an arrow at a party of the enemy not a dozen yards distant, and who were in full pursuit.

17. At about 9.30 a.m., and just when a party of men were employed throwing the dead bodies into river, a number of russud boats were seen coming down stream. They turned out to be boats with provisions for Mr. Edgar, and which had been ordered to return. The arrival of these boats enabled me to get provisions. They, "the boatmen," had seen no Looshais, but had heard a great noise during the night.

18. I remained at the guard during the 29th, but we were not molested, and the Looshais seemed to have left the place.

19. In the evening I went with Mr. Eglinton to see what damage had been done, and found that a stable of four ponies had been killed, and also about 20 or 30 cows and calves, saddles removed, and that nearly every thing moveable had been taken. No building had been set fire to, however. The majority of the coolies had been removed from the garden before the attack was made, and the few who had remained were kept safely in the stockade.

20. The attack was first made at about 8 a.m. on the 27th instant, and from what I hear from the native officer and a Mr. Eglinton who was with guard from first to last, seems to have been made from several points. Five men were wounded before my arrival, one head constable and one constable, two sepoys and one coolie jemadar.

21. These men were, with exception of one, not wounded fighting outside, but were either surprised near the river, when the attack was first made, or got wounded while inside the stockade. The one man alluded to was shot in the knee when the attack was first made and when he ran outside to assist those attacked near the river.

22. I think the men of the police behaved on the whole very well, and I am of opinion that had I had police only and no military, we might have inflicted greater punishment on the enemy.

Before making the second sortie, and when we were preparing, some of my men even asked me not to take any of the sepoys, but to go out with police only, and drew my attention to their conduct when the first sortie was made.

23. The following men behaved particularly well, and I would like to reward them with good conduct stripes:—

Constable Dalbeer Thappa.
" Indrajit Sing.

Amongst the military, havildar Pulwan Sing behaved with great courage.

24. Mr. Eglinton, proprietor of the Dharamikhall Garden, behaved with great courage; this gentleman remained with the men in the stockade from first to last, and helped to defend it. He also assisted in driving a party away from a building not far from the guard, and which was being plundered on the 27th.

25. At about 2 p.m. of the 29th I sent the wounded down to the station in a boat. On the morning of the 30th I examined the position which we had found it so difficult to dislodge the Looshais from. I found it particularly well selected, just over a brow of a teelah. All the tea bushes had been cut down, and there happened to be numbers of logs behind which to fire from. I found a good deal of blood behind some of these logs, which shows that several had been wounded by us. Beyond this, and to the south, was the forest, only 30 yards distant. Their camp was in the forest.

26. At about noon, and accompanied by Mr. Eglinton and three constables, I left the guard and arrived at the station at about 5 p.m.

27. On arrival at Nugdigram I found that my rear guard had been attacked on the morning of the 28th, and that one naik and five sepoys had been killed and one sepoy wounded. One sepoy and one constable only escaped.

28. Some of the men of the 4th Native Infantry affirm that on the 27th, when the attack was first made, they observed men, who seemed to be Hindoostanees, amongst the Looshais. They are of opinion that they must be old mutineers.

29. Another man, wearing a red pugrie, was recognised by the garden coolies as a man named Ruttun Sing, formerly a coolie on a tea plantation, and now a dependent of Vonpilal.

30. I think that from the time the attack was first made up to when the Looshais retired, their loss in killed and wounded must have been about 30.

31. Another report will be submitted, giving details of the other outrages committed.

Monierkhall Stockade,
My Dear McWilliam, 28 January 1871, 4 P.M.

AFTER marching all last night, I arrived here about 6.30 a.m. I found that the Dharamikhall Garden had not been burnt, but that a lot of property had been carried away.

Soon after passing Dharamikhall we came upon a piquet of the enemy. It did not show fight, and we followed it at the double down to Monierkhall, firing the whole way. On arrival at Monierkhall I found several parties of Looshais. We went at one of these parties; but when I got within about 15 paces, several shots were fired at me. The military behaved most shamefully, turning round and bolting as hard as they could. Of course, I had to run for my life to the stockade. About an hour later I got a party of military and police together, and after warning the men that I would shoot any one bolting, made another sortie. The result was that we had to retire leaving seven (7) killed and one wounded; the latter is now in the stockade. The retreat was most disgraceful. I can do nothing with the force I have. Our supplies will only last to-morrow, *i.e.*, the sepoys. Eglinton, who is here, and myself have nothing to eat. The coolies, with the traps of the men who came out with me, have not arrived, and I fear that they must have been attacked; there was a guard of one and eight with them. The men killed to-day are four constables, one cooly and two sepoys; one havildar wounded. I cannot understand what the devils mean by staying so long, but it is a fact that about 400 are in the garden still, and a man can't show himself outside without getting a shot.

Send provisions. Europeans and natives, with *strong guard at once*; also boats for wounded. Please tell my bearer to send me clothes, food, and drink. I feel thoroughly exhausted, as I have had no rest since leaving Samaltot.

Send out by to-morrow evening. It is true that four or five were killed at Nugdiparra.

Yours, &c.
(signed) *W. W. Daly.*

OFFICE MEMORANDUM from *H. Le Poer Wynne*, Under Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 350 P., dated Fort William, the 16th February 1871.

WITH reference to the docket from the Military Department, No. 697, dated 14th February 1871, giving cover to a report from Brigadier General Bourchier, of occurrences since he first received intimation of the outbreak and raids upon British territory of the Howlong Kookies and Looshais, the undersigned is directed to request that an expression of the satisfaction with which His Excellency in Council has received this account, showing the energy displayed by the military authorities, may be communicated to General Bourchier through the proper channel.

From Colonel *H. K. Burne*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Quartermaster General, No. 1045, dated Fort William, the 18th February 1871.

IN continuation of my docket, No. 698, of 14th February 1871, forwarding, for the information of the Right Honourable the Commander in Chief, copy of a report by Brigadier General G. Bourchier, C.B., commanding eastern frontier district, of his proceedings on learning of the raid of the Looshais on the frontier, I am now directed to request that, under His Excellency's orders, an expression of the recognition by Government of the energy he displayed on the occasion may be conveyed to Brigadier General Bourchier.

From Brigadier General *G. Bourchier*, C.B., Commanding Easting Frontier District, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 38, dated Cachar, the 9th February 1871.

I HAD the honour to receive this morning telegram from the Private Secretary to His Excellency the Viceroy, asking what steps had been taken to secure Mr. Edgar's safety; to this telegram I replied at once, promising more by post.

I have now the honour to report that I yesterday received information from the Deputy Commissioner, Cachar, that on the 31st January Mr. Edgar was a few hours south of Looshai haut. The man who came in and gave this information had been one of Mr. Edgar's party, and had been sent to Looshai haut for provisions, which he expected were there. He stated that, having met returning raiders, he was unable to return to Mr. Edgar, and not finding the provisions had come to Cachar *viâ* Monierkhall, that he had on his journey down the Sonai met some hosts [boats?] going up with food to Mr. Edgar, but was obliged to bring them back, as they came upon parties of Looshais whom they could not pass. He stated that, when he left Mr. Edgar, he had only food for four days for his party. My chief object clearly was to send food under a strong guard to Mr. Edgar's neighbourhood, hoping that he might receive information from the scouts who accompanied the boats, that assistance was at hand. The most expeditious mode of effecting this was up the Sonai. Expedition was of paramount importance (30 boats were ready laden at Monierkhall, those which had returned on meeting Looshais), and supplementing the provisions for Mr. Edgar with rations for 60 sepoys for three weeks under Captain Lightfoot. The detachment started within eight hours of their departure being decided on.

I confess there is some risk in sending so small a detachment by a long river route beyond our frontier, but I have great confidence in Captain Lightfoot's intelligence, and have warned him to be most careful against surprise at nights from the river banks. A second party under Lieutenant Bourne of 55 men, will leave to-morrow in support of Captain Lightfoot, when the boats are ready at Monierkhall. They will have also provisions for three weeks. My orders to these officers are to hang about Looshai haut, or wherever they may hear of Mr. Edgar, as long as their provisions last, or until recalled by orders from me.

The land route, in a military point of view, *viâ* Bankong, the salt spring Lermutan, Joang Wahib, to Looshai haut, would have been safest, but the only carriage available would have been cooly carriage, and each man would carry little beyond what he would himself eat *en route;* and I consider the necessity for immediate action justified my running the risk of sending the detachment by the river route. I have directed Captain Lightfoot to be most careful by his scouts to impress on the Looshais that he has merely come with stores for Mr. Edgar's party, and not as an aggressor. I feel terribly anxious for Mr. Edgar's relief, which is a most delicate operation. Experience has taught me that it is absolutely necessary to guard convoys most carefully; and the very fact of armed parties approaching the Looshai villages, even by the river route, may rouse their supicions and form a source of danger to Mr. Edgar. Moreover, the uncertainty of his locality makes it doubtful whether our supplies will reach him. In conjunction with Mr. McWilliam and Mr. Simpson, from whom I obtain every assistance, I will not let an opportunity slip of sending Mr. Edgar relief, but, while I see the difficulties, have confident hope that they will be overcome.

I should be obliged if you would send a copy of this despatch to the Deputy Quartermaster General, Calcutta.

TELEGRAM from General *Bourchier*, C.B., Cachar, to Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, Calcutta, No. 4855, dated 18th February 1871.

LIGHTFOOT'S detachment, and Lieutenant Bourne's, have returned to within two days of Monierkhall, after having proceeded to within eight hours of Looshai haut, at which latter place he met his scouts returning. They reported that a red flag with chungahs of rice was planted in the river. The interpreter

stated this to be a prohibition to advance further on penalty of attack. When Captain Lightfoot and Bourne left Cachar no opposition was anticipated, and the party sent down Sonai by Edgar stated that he was following. The armed party was sent to protect the stores and to encourage the boatmen, who would not go otherwise. Government has full information regarding the difficulties of the country and the lateness of the season. From Edgar's not following his party down the Sonai, I fear he may be in danger. I am collecting carriage both by land and water, and solicit early orders as to an expedition to attempt his release.

TELEGRAM from Secretary Colonel *Burne*, Calcutta, to General *Bourchier*, C.B., Cachar, dated 19th February 1871.

Precedence.—Your message of 18th.

Viceroy entrusts you with full authority to take any measures you think desirable for securing the safety of Mr. Edgar.

Viceroy considers it to be now mainly a military operation, and relies fully on your prudence. You must consider the advanced period of the season and the state of the country, but no effort should be spared to rescue Mr. Edgar in case it should turn out that he has fallen into the hands of the Looshais.

His Excellency the Commander in Chief will doubtless give you every advice and support. If you desire further assistance in the shape of reinforcements or supplies, ask for them at once.

Show this message to the Commander in Chief, to whom the Viceroy has also telegraphed direct.

TELEGRAM from Secretary Colonel *Burne*, Calcutta, to Brigadier General *Bourchier*, C.B., Cachar, No. 97, dated 20th February 1871.

YOUR message of 19th.

The Viceroy is much gratified by news of Mr. Edgar's safety.

TELEGRAM from Viceroy, Calcutta, to Secretary of State for India, London No. 107, dated 28th February 1871.

EDGAR has arrived in Cachar Settlements.

TELEGRAM from General *Bourchier*, C.B., Cachar, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, and Military Secretary to the Viceroy, Calcutta, No. 211, dated 28th February 1871.

MR. EDGAR has arrived.

No. 73 of 1871.—Military Department.

To his Grace the Duke of *Argyll*, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

My Lord Duke, Fort William, 1 March 1871.

IN continuation of our Despatch No. 67, dated 22nd February 1871, we beg now to forward copies of further Papers regarding the disturbances on the north-eastern frontier, and the measures taken for the coercion of the raiders.

2. The difficulties opposed by the nature of the country, and by the habits of these wild tribes, to any prompt and satisfactory settlement of this unfortu-

nate

nate affair are necessarily very great; but we have every confidence in Brigadier General Bourchier's judgment, and trust that the measures that will be taken will be in due time completely successful.

We are, &c.
(signed) *Mayo.*
J. Strachey.
R. Temple.
J. F. Stephen.
B. H. Ellis.
H. W. Norman.

(No. 38 of 1871.)

Government of India.—Foreign Department.—Political.

To his Grace the Duke of *Argyll*, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

My Lord Duke, Fort William, 8 March 1871.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of a correspondence with the Landholders and Commercial Association, on the subject of the recent raids in Cachar.

Memorial from the Landholders and Commercial Association, dated 15th February 1871.
Letter to Secretary to the Landholders and Commercial Association, dated 1st March 1871, No. 429 P.

2. WE have thought it expedient in our reply to enter into a very full exposition of the policy which has guided us in organising measures for the defence of the eastern frontier.

We have, &c.
(signed) *Mayo.*
John Strachey.
R. Temple.
J. F. Stephen.
B. H. Ellis.
H. W. Norman.

MEMORIAL, dated Calcutta, 15th February 1871.

From Landholders and Commercial Association of British India, and of Others interested in the Cultivation of Tea in the Province of Cachar, to his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General of India.

THAT your Memorialists, who, on the strength of pottahs granted by Government, have invested their money to a large amount in the cultivation of tea in the district of Cachar, view with deep distress and alarm the present raid upon that district by the hill tribes.

That your Memorialists were beginning to hope that, after years of struggling against obstacles and discouragements of all kinds, the success of their enterprise was almost attained, and that the cultivation of tea in Cachar would become a source of profit to themselves and of benefit to the redundant population of other districts. It is with the deepest disappointment that they find, that from no fault of their own, the whole interest has been imperilled, their hopes frustrated, and the value of their property depreciated to an extent which it will take years of peace and security to recover.

One European has been killed and others have had to fly for their lives; a large number of coolies and villagers, with their women and children, have been murdered, and others carried into captivity. Those who have escaped have been subjected to great peril, and are in such a state of abject panic that the managers, from motives of humanity, have been obliged, at great expense and loss, to remove them to gardens remote from the scenes of massacre.

Bungalows, tea-houses, and coolie lines have been burnt, and your Memorialists fear that, especially in outlying gardens, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to induce the labourers to return.

In addition to the immediate heavy losses inflicted on their property, your Memorialists have great reason to fear that the costly efforts made for years past to render employment in tea gardens acceptable to, and to promote the comfort of, the coolie population, will be rendered useless. The fear of losing their lives or liberty will deter coolies from going to Cachar, or from renewing their agreements, if already there, and the additional expense thus thrown upon your Memorialists will be most serious.

This is not the first attack of a similar nature from which your Memorialists have suffered; gardens were burnt and many coolies murdered in January 1869, and in November

of the same year your Memorialists petitioned the Government of Bengal, setting forth the losses they had sustained, and praying for efficient protection. No such protection was afforded, although your Memorialists hoped that as the expedition organised for the punishment of former incursions had failed, and as the predatory habits of these tribes, and the very slight reliance to be placed on any treaties they might make were well known, the Government of Bengal would have considered it a duty to protect the lives and property of its subjects on this exposed frontier.

Your Memorialists respectfully, but earnestly, urge their conviction that had the protection prayed for in the annexed correspondence been granted, the present lamentable loss of life and destruction of property would not have occurred.

Your Memorialists now humbly, but urgently, pray that your Excellency in Council will at once pass such orders as shall for the future permanently protect the district of Cachar from further inroads, and the property of those who have invested their capital in it from destruction.

Your Memorialists would further respectfully beg that your Excellency would favour them with early information as to the steps proposed to be taken to secure this object.

And your Memorialists, as in duty bound, will ever pray.

Dated Calcutta, 26th January 1869.

From *A. Wilson*, Esq., Officiating Secretary, Landholders and Commercial Association, to Honourable *A. Eden*, Secretary to the Government of Bengal.

Copy of letter from Messrs. Balmer, Lawrie & Co., agents, British Indian Tea Company (Limited) dated 22nd instant, to the Officiating Secretary, Landholders and Commercial Association.

Copy of letter from A. Odling, Esq., Manager of the Company's Tea Garden, to Messrs. Balmer, Lawrie & Co., dated 14th instant.

Copy of letter from P. Bury to Messrs. Balmer, Lawrie & Co., dated 18th instant.

I AM instructed by the committee to forward the accompanying correspondence, as per margin, for the consideration of his Honor the Lieutenant Governor, respecting the late serious raid perpetrated in Cachar by some of the neighbouring hill tribes, causing loss of life at some tea gardens, besides inflicting much damage from looting the tea houses, destroying the cattle, and carrying off the garden implements. Many coolies, through fear of being attacked by the marauders, appear to have run away from some gardens situated close to the frontier, and much anxiety is felt by the planters for the future.

The committee would, therefore, esteem it a favour to learn that his Honor has taken the necessary measures for the protection of life and property in that district, and that such arrangements will be made as will secure good order on the frontier, and put a stop to any future disturbance or inroad into our territories by these savage tribes.

No. 141, dated Calcutta, 22nd January 1869.

From Messrs. *Balmer, Lawrie & Co.*, Agents, British Indian Tea Company (Limited) to *A. Wilson*, Esq., Officiating Secretary, Landholders and Commercial Association.

WE enclose copy of a letter we have received from one of the Company's managers in Cachar, relative to the raid recently made on some of the gardens in the province, by the hill tribe of Luckees.

The letter in question speaks for itself; but we should be glad to know whether the association has addressed the Bengal Government upon the necessity of sending up a sufficient body of troops to protect these gardens, which, being near the frontier, are the more likely to be attacked, should another raid take place.

Dated Dwarbund, 14 January 1869.

From *A. Odling*, Esq., Manager, British Indian Tea Company, (Limited) (demi-official), to Messrs. *Balmer, Lawrie & Co.*, Agents, British Indian Tea Company (Limited) Calcutta.

EARLY on Sunday morning, the 10th instant, at about half-past six o'clock, the Norbund Garden, about one mile and a half from this garden, was attacked by the Luscii, a savage hill tribe, inhabiting the jungles to the south of this garden; the raid was most successful, they managing to collect and carry away all the garden implements, even the zinc lining to the tea bins was torn off and carried away. The bungalow, tea house, and lines were burnt to the ground, seven coolies were killed, four wounded, and it is believed some were taken prisoners; the Luscii were attacked and driven back to the jungles by the police, stockaded a short distance off.

My coolies were much alarmed at seeing the Norbund coolies flying through the lines, and also fled in every direction towards the station: as yet I have not been able to bring all the coolies back; last night 68 men were missing, and I have sent men in every direction to hunt them up.

At present I have a guard of eight police and one havildar posted in the lines, besides

I have

I have been supplied with 12 guns, with which my coolies are armed, and watch is kept all night.

I am of opinion that the Luscii will come down again after this late success, unless Government takes some steps against them, and if so, this garden would be probably attacked, and I think that you, on behalf of this company, and the other parties interested, namely, the East Indian Tea Company and Messrs. Robert & Charriol, should petition the Lieutenant Governor to do something in the matter.

I will write you further particulars in a few days.

On the 10th instant there was a most severe earthquake, but not much damage has been done to this garden.

Dated Cachar, 18th January 1869.

From *Percival Bury*, Esq. (demi-official), to Messrs. *Balmer Lawrie & Co.*, Calcutta.

I BEG to inform you that on Friday last, the 5th instant, Monai Khall, the property of Messrs. Jardine, Skinner & Co., was attacked by a tribe of Looshais; a number of coolies killed and wounded, the manager and assistant fled for their lives, the guard of sepoys were driven into their stockade. No intelligence has as yet been had of the extent of loss of life or property; it is said every building has been looted and burnt; the Assistant says he saw five killed upon the road as he ran away. The panic this has occasioned here and at Sildoobie is immense. I have in vain endeavoured to keep my coolies together, but finding this impossible, gathered all the women and children together and sent them to Sildoobie; I am now with 16 men and six guns keeping watch over this property, expecting an attack every moment. As this garden is in the centre of the jungle, nothing less than a guard of 25 police will calm the coolies, and recall them to the garden, as the very first rumour will scatter them like a flock of sheep. It is a very anxious time for me, no work can be carried on, and with this small force, I need scarcely say an attack would be serious. Trusting steps may be taken to induce Government to come to my relief.

No. 604, dated Fort William, the 28th January 1869.

From *A. Mackenzie*, Esq., Officiating Junior Secretary to the Government of Bengal, to the Landholders and Commercial Association.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your Officiating Secretary's letter, dated the 26th instant, on the subject of the late outrages committed on the Cachar frontier by some of the neighbouring hill tribes, and, in reply, I am to state that the Lieutenant Governor has ordered reinforcement of troops and police to the district of Cachar, and that the local officers have been doing and will do everything that the circumstances permit, with a view of punishing the offenders and protecting our frontier from further outrages.

2. It must, however, be borne in mind that the Looshai Kookies, which is supposed to have been the tribe concerned in these raids, live a long way from Cachar, in a country covered with dense jungle, and hitherto quite unexplored, and that, therefore, there must be serious difficulty in reaching them even when it is ascertained, which is not yet the case, who was the precise chief whose tribe have offended, and the part of the country in which he is likely to be found.

Dated Calcutta, 28th January 1869.

From *A. Wilson*, Esq., Officiating Secretary, Landholders' and Commercial Association (demi-official) to Messrs. *Balmer Lawrie & Co.*

I HAVE to acknowledge receipt of your favour of the 22nd instant with its enclosures, and have the pleasure to send you herewith copy of a letter received from the Junior Secretary to the Government of Bengal, in reply to mine of the 26th instant, forwarding to his Honor the Lieutenant Governor the correspondence you sent me in connection with the late raid into Cachar by some of the neighbouring hill tribes, which will, I hope, be considered satisfactory.

I return you herewith Mr. Bury's original letter, dated 18th instant.

Dated Calcutta, 5th November 1869.

From *A. Wilson*, Esq., Officiating Secretary, Landholders' and Commercial Association, to Honourable *A. Eden*, Secretary to the Government of Bengal.

I AM directed by the committee to bring to the notice of his Honor the Lieutenant Governor the serious apprehensions entertained by some of the managers of tea gardens, situated on or near the frontier of Cachar, of their being again subjected to another raid by the Looshais and other wild tribes during the approaching cold season, and to beg that his Honor will be pleased to favour them with some information as to the measures Government propose to adopt, to prevent, if possible, a recurrence of the outrages of last year, and protect the lives and property of the managers, and the coolies stationed at these outlying gardens.

The following extract of a letter from Mr. T. Burland, the manager of the Dedur Kosh Tea Garden in Cachar, has been forwarded for the information of the committee:—

"Nothing has been done to protect the frontier, except adding a few policemen to each of the old posts. Dedur Kosh, Bowalea, and Benacandy, are totally unprotected, as the police guard at Monie Khall and Dhubeedhur do not, in any way, cover them. The Looshais can get at any of these three gardens without going near Monie Khall or Dhubeedhur. Of course, every garden cannot have a guard, but I think we ought, as it was considered requisite last year, to place two guards of Native Infantry on this and the adjoining gardens, and the danger is more imminent this cold weather, for the Looshais must have gained confidence after the failure of the expedition last year. I very much fear we shall have very serious trouble this season."

The alarm felt by the manager of the Dedur Kosh Garden, is shared in fully by the managers of the neighbouring gardens, and by their coolies, and the committee would strongly urge that such steps be immediately taken by Government as would effectually protect the frontier from any further raids by these wild savages, as well as restore confidence throughout the province that life and property are secure.

No. 5972, dated Fort William, 11th November 1869.

From *A. Mackenzie*, Esq., Officiating Junior Secretary to the Government of Bengal, to *A. Wilson*, Esq., Officiating Secretary Landholders' and Commercial Association.

IN reply to your letter of the 5th instant, on the subject of the apprehensions entertained by some of the managers of tea gardens in Cachar, of their being subjected to another raid from the Looshais, and other wild tribes, during the approaching cold season, I am directed to forward herewith, for the information of the association, a copy of a letter this day addressed to Messrs. Begg, Dunlop & Co., in reply to a communication which had been received from them on the same subject.

No. 5973, dated Fort William, 11th November 1869.

From Honourable *A. Eden*, Secretary to the Government of Bengal, to Messrs. *Begg, Dunlop & Co.*

IN reply to your letter of the 30th ultimo, I am directed to state that the Lieutenant Governor does not clearly understand the grounds upon which the panic, apparently existing in your tea gardens in Cachar as to an anticipated attack from the Looshais, is based. His Honor does not suppose that your manager, or his labourers, can have any direct communication with the Looshai country, and he should doubt whether they have any more reliable means of ascertaining the intentions of the Looshais, or of forming a more trustworthy opinion as to their probable movements than the local officers who, from such information as to the feelings and intentions of the Looshais as they have been able to obtain, do not see any ground for sharing the manager's apprehensions. Indeed, the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar is hoping to hold a friendly meeting shortly with some of the Looshai chiefs. If anything is likely to bring down an attack of Looshais, or of mischievous persons not belonging to that tribe, it is, in the opinion of the Lieutenant Governor, the panic of those who might be expected to set an example of courage and self-reliance to the people under them. He would urge on your consideration that it seems very desirable, on public grounds, to warn those in your employ, of the mischief which they may do by spreading apprehensions, founded on the merest surmise amongst the natives. The Deputy Commissioner of Cachar will no doubt supply a guard of armed police, at the cost of the gardens, on application, and you may rest assured that every reasonable precaution which suggests itself to Government, or its officers, as calculated to preserve the peace of the frontier is being carried out.

2. The

2. The Lieutenant Governor would much like to have an opportunity of perusing the evidence, which, from the 5th paragraph of your letter, you seem to have collected as showing "that danger is imminent," as this view is not in accordance with the reports submitted by the local officers.

3. The attention of the Government of India will be again requested to the supply of muskets for the use of your gardens.

No. 6163, dated Fort William, 25th November 1869.

From *A. Mackenzie*, Esq., Officiating Junior Secretary to the Government of Bengal, to *A. Wilson*, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Landholders' and Commercial Association.

In continuation of previous correspondence, I am directed to forward for the information of the association, a copy of the papers noted marginally, relative to the steps taken for the defence of the southern frontier of Cachar.

Letter from Commissioner of Dacca, No. 335, of 16th November 1869, with enclosure.

No. 335, dated Decca, 16th November 1869.

From *F. B. Simson*, Esq., Commissioner of the Decca Division, to Secretary to the Government of Bengal.

I have the honour to forward herewith a copy of letter, No. 761, of the 11th instant, from the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar, and its enclosures, for any orders his Honor the Lieutenant Governor may desire to pass.

2. I consider it very possible that the proposed interview may have been postponed by the hill tribes till they heard of Mr. Edgar's return to Cachar, and that the same reason may account for similar delay with reference to Munnipoor.

3. As long as such negotiations are on foot, and for some time, at all events, with reference to last year's occurrences, I do not anticipate any hostile movement from the south-east against Cachar, and I shall only be too glad to know that Sookpilall joins with Vunpillall's tribe in desire for amicable relations. This would ensure peace for the whole Cachar and Sylhet frontier. But as all this is conjectural, Mr. Edgar has done the only proper thing in strengthening the outlying points as far as his resources will admit.

4. I think no guard of ours need be stationed at Tipai Mookh.

5. I regret to add that Mr. Edgar's health has been very indifferent since his return from leave.

6. Reinforcements of police from Assam and Rajshahye have been ordered to Sylhet. Reports as to the disposal of these will be made when they arrive. I am anxiously waiting to see if any muntrees from the tribes, really empowered to make any conditions, are really going to present themselves to the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar.

No. 761, dated Cachar, 11th November 1869.

From *J. W. Edgar*, Esq., Officiating Deputy Commissioner of Cachar, to *F. B. Simson*, Esq., Commissioner of Circuit, Dacca Division, Dacca.

I have the houour to submit a brief Report of the steps which have been taken for the defence of the southern frontier of this district, and of what I propose to do during the ensuing cold weather.

2. Police guards have been posted at Kattecherra and Dedarkhosh, in addition to those already stationed at Dulldhur, Monie Khal, Nowarbund, and Jhalna Cherra. The number of guards, therefore, will be one in excess of the number sanctioned by Government in letter, No. 3090, dated 3rd may 1869, to bring the outposts up to their sanctioned strength. I have been obliged to ask Major Stephenson to take the station guards for the present, and it would materially increase our strength if this arrangement were allowed to continue throughout the cold weather, as the additional guard is required for the protection of a very important portion of the frontier. I hope that it may be sanctioned.

3. Soon after my return from leave, Mannoo Sing, one of the Munnipoories, who has been amongst the Looshais of Vonpilall's villages during the rains, came back, stating that the muntree of several chiefs are preparing to come in to see me, but that they are unwilling to start until they hear of my return from leave. Munnias and Puna Sing have gone back to tell them of my return, and they expect to be at Silchar with the muntrees about the end of this month, in which case I propose to go down with a small

escort of about 50 men, and have a meeting with as many of the chiefs as I can induce to come to some point on the hills above the Sonai River.

4. If I find the chiefs friendly and inclined to trust me, I should like to advance towards the more southern clans, carefully feeling my way as I went along, and always taking with me influential men from the chief villages to my rear. In this way I hope to be able to gain much valuable information about all the clans to the south, and possibly to form relations with their chiefs which may have a lasting and beneficial effect. I shall write more fully on this subject in a few days.

5. I do not think that there is any danger at present of an attack on our villages and gardens to the east, and it is very improbable that Sookpilall will do anything against Cachar; indeed, my messengers all say that his muntrees will accompany those of the eastern chiefs when the latter come to Silchar.

I have received a telegram from the Commissioner of Chittagong to the effect that the Syloo Looshais were preparing for a raid. Even should they be, it is not likely that they will come in this direction.

*No. 106, dated 20th October 1869.

6. I have also received from the Political Agent at Munnipoor a letter,* of which I append a copy. I cannot support the Rajah's proposal that we should post a guard at Teepai Mookh. There is a guard at present at Moniadhur, a garden on the barrack several miles below Teepai Mookh, and this guard affords more protection to the exposed gardens on the barrack than any one higher up could do. Besides, as you know, I strongly object to posting weak guards at distant points in the jungles, without roads to them, or villages near. Such a guard might be cut up to a man without our knowing anything of it for days, or even weeks. Now, Teepai Mookh is exactly such a spot; the only way of getting to it is by water. I do not suppose that a dozen boats go up to it in the course of a year, and there is not a human habitation within several miles of it.

7. With reference to the Political Agent's remark about the non-appearance of the muntrees expected at Munnipoor, I may mention that Puna and Manonoo Sing say, that they heard while at Vunpilall's village that muntrees from the villages of Poiboy and Vonolal were to go into Munnipoor, at the same time that the muntrees from Impanee, Devuti, and Sookpilall were to come in here, and that when the former heard that the latter would not start for Silchar until after my return from leave, they too said that they would put off their start for Munnipoor until my return.

It is not impossible that there may be some truth in this story, and it shows where our greatest difficulty lies. The Looshais, feeling that they deserve punishment from Munnipoor, as well as from us, put little faith in our promisses of forgiveness, and imagine a snare in every advance we make to them. If I can get over this difficulty, and make them believe that our professions of friendliness are honestly meant, there will not be much trouble in dealing with them afterwards.

No. 106, dated Munnipoor, 20th October 1869.

From Dr. *R. Brown*, Political Agent, Munnipoor, to *J. Ware Edgar*, Esq., Deputy Commissioner of Cachar.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that I had an interview yesterday with the Rajah, and discussed with him the probability of renewed disturbances on the part of the Looshais.

2. At present absolutely nothing is known regarding them, but I expect information very shortly. This much is certain, that the deputation that came into Munnipoor about 2½ month ago with a promise of restoring the guns, &c., taken from Munnipoories, and who said they would return with them in a month and a-half from that time have not done so.

3. In the course of arranging for the defence of the hill country of Munnipoor, the Rajah proposes establishing a strong post at a place about two days south of the Government road called Tankanlong. This post, he says, will command three of the most frequented paths leading from the Looshai country to Munnipoor territory. The Rajah also stated, in addition, that a force stationed at or near Tepai Mookh would effectually close all the roads leading to Munnipoor, and the exposed gardens on the barrack, leaving only the route by the Sonai River open, and asked me to communicate with you on the subject of your placing a guard at that point.

4. This I now do at his request, not giving any opinion in the matter myself, as you are better able to judge of the advisability of placing troops, or police, at the place mentioned than I am.

Dated Calcutta, 4th December 1869.

From *A. Wilson*, Esq., Officiating Secretary Landholders' and Commercial Association, to Honourable *A. Eden*, Secretary to the Government of Bengal.

I AM directed by the committee to acknowledge receipt of the Officiating Junior Secretary's letters, Nos. 5972 and 6163, dated 11th and 25th ultimo, with enclosed correspondence in connection with the apprehended raid by the Looshai tribes on the Cachar district, and to thank his Honor the Lieutenant Governor for the information he has placed at their disposal regarding the steps taken by Government for the protection of the province which they think satisfactory.

The committee have every confidence that the Deputy Commissioner, Mr. Edgar, will do all he can to strengthen the frontier posts with the resources placed at his disposal, and they are in hopes that the proposed interview with the different native chiefs, may result in his being able to form such relations with them as may have a lasting and beneficial effect throughout that province and the adjoining districts.

The committee, however, desire me respectfully to point out to his Honor that the letter of the Secretary to the Bengal Government, No. 5973, of 11th November, addressed to Messrs. Begg, Dunlop, & Co., a copy of which was sent as a reply to the association's letter of the 5th November, referred to a communication from these gentlemen, dated 30th October, the nature and contents of which were unknown to the committee; and they do not therefore quite understand his Honor's remarks as to the bad effects which were likely to be produced by the panic felt by those who might have been expected to have set an example of courage and reliance to the people under them. The committee would respectfully submit that the information obtained by the Deputy Commissioner as detailed in his letter No. 761, of the 11th November, and addressed to the Commissioner of the Dacca Division, in a manner confirms the information placed at the disposal of the committee, and justifies the apprehensions entertained by the managers of tea gardens situated on the Cachar frontier, that the Looshai tribes were preparing for another raid, supposed to be towards the Chittagong district, although in Mr. Edgar's opinion not likely to extend to Cachar.

The committee respectfully beg to point out to his Honor that these rumours of an expected outbreak by the frontier tribes appear to have been pretty generally known throughout the province of Cachar, and they are humbly of opinion that there was sufficient cause for very considerable alarm to be felt by those managers of tea gardens situated near the frontier, especially for the safety of their coolies, who had already suffered from the effects of a visit from these wild tribes last year. At the same time the committee can see nothing in the acts of the planters to which the term panic can be with justice applied, nor have they reason to suppose that the managers of tea gardens have, in any way, communicated to their native labourers the fears that they quite justly entertained, and in consequence of which their representations to their employers and agents in Calcutta were made.

(Nos. 429 P.—430 P.)

The Secretary to the Government of India to *A. Wilson*, Esq., Secretary to the Landholders' and Commercial Association of British India.

Sir, Fort William, 1 March 1871.

I HAVE received and laid before the Viceroy and Governor General in Council the memorial, dated the 15th instant, received through you from the Landholders' and Commercial Association on the subject of the recent raids in Cachar.

2. The occurrence of these raids, resulting in a deplorable loss of life and some destruction of property, has caused his Excellency in Council the deepest regret.

3. For the last two years, the difficult question of the defence of the Eastern frontier from Cachar to Arracan has been a subject of special and anxious consideration on the part of the Government of India, in communication with his Excellency the Commander in Chief, the Government of Bengal, and the Chief Commissioner of British Burmah. The tribes occupying the country between our settled districts and Burmah are split into many minute sections owning no common authority. The country they inhabit is in some places absolutely unexplored, and for the most part very imperfectly known. Those parts of it that have been visited by Europeans, have been found to consist of hills of varying altitude, covered with almost impervious jungle, traversed only by paths used principally by wild elephants, and as the war tracks of the tribes. The expeditions which have on several occasions been sent to punish the tribes for marauding in our territories, have not added much to the available information either regarding the country or its people. It has been the object of his Excellency in Council, in communication with the Government of Bengal, by the deputation from time to time of intelligent officers both from the side of Cachar and of Chittagong, to acquire full information regarding the country and its inhabitants, the wants of the tribes, and the causes and objects of their raids.

As yet his efforts have only been attended with partial success; and for all practical purposes the country can only be described as a dense and unexplored jungle, deadly to European life for a great part of the year.

4. The defence of districts bordering for several hundreds of miles on a country of this kind, is an undertaking of no ordinary difficulty. Neither can a state of insecurity which has existed for ages be remedied in a day. Those who settle there must not be unprepared to face to some extent the dangers usually incident to pioneers in all parts of the world. His Excellency in Council is convinced that it is mainly by the co-operation of those gentlemen who hold lands and have commercial interests in the disturbed districts that any measures taken by Government can succeed. His Excellency in Council is disposed to believe that in some cases tea gardens have been pushed further into the jungles than was prudent, and have been established in exposed situations beyond what would have formed the most eligible line of defence. But be that as it may, his Excellency in Council is of opinion that the defence of an extensive and scarcely defined frontier extending into unexplored territories is a responsibility which the Government cannot accept, and that the first step towards the permanent defence of the border and the protection of our partially settled districts from attacks such as those which have recently occurred in Cachar, is to define clearly the limit within which the Government is prepared to establish, maintain, and enforce its authority, and beyond which it will not at present undertake the responsibilities of administration and protection.

5. Such a line it has been the object of his Excellency in Council to lay down. Its definition in no way affects the question of the imperial frontier boundary, the accurate delineation of which has not yet been attempted. I am to send, for the information of the association which you represent, the enclosed papers,* being selections of the most important portions of the correspondence with the Bengal Government and the Chief Commissioner of British Burmah on this subject. This correspondence will speak for itself, and will show that, while there may be some difference of opinion on some minor points of policy, both the Government of Bengal and the Government of India have given their most earnest and prolonged attention to this question, and are fully prepared to carry out energetically such practical measures for the security of the border as may be considered suitable.

* From Bengal Government, No. 4983½, dated 17th August 1869.
To Ditto, „ 1338, „ 18th September „
From Ditto, „ 6569, „ 17th December „
To Ditto, „ 315P, „ 17th February 1870.
From Ditto, „ 1236, „ 10th March „
To Ditto, „ 542P, „ 24th „ „
„ Ditto, „ 2512, „ 24th May „
„ Ditto, „ 1126P, „ 30th June. „
From Ditto, „ 4449, „ 28th September „
„ Ditto, „ 4709 „ 20th October „
„ Ditto, „ 5089 „ 18th November „
To Ditto, „ 2043P, „ 28th „ „
„ Ditto, „ 2166P, „ 12th December „
„ Military Department, „ 2165P, „ 12th „ „
From Chief Commissioner, British Burmah, No. 11–8, dated 27th June 1870.
To Chief Commissioner, British Burmah, No. 1562P, dated 2nd September 1870.
From Chief Commissioner, British Burmah, No 74–2P, dated 22nd July 1870.
To Chief Commissioner, British Burmah, No. 1565P, dated 2nd September 1870.

6. As already observed, the first and essential step is to define the limits beyond which direct administration is not to be attempted. Such a line has been suggested in Arracan, and measures for its definition will be speedily undertaken. It will be continued through Chittagong in front of the present out-posts. In Cachar a line has been generally indicated from the borders of Munnipore to Hill Tipperah, including all the present tea gardens. It was one of the chief objects of Mr. Edgar's present visit to the Looshai country to determine the boundary line definitely. As soon as this is finally settled, it is the intention of his Excellency in Council to open up such cleared tracks as may be necessary for defence. At suitable intervals posts will be established and held by a sufficient force. The boundary between the posts will be constantly patrolled. An additional expenditure of 37,000 rupees a year has been sanctioned for the frontier guard of Chittagong, and his Excellency in Council is only awaiting the views of his Excellency the Commander in Chief, after his visit to Assam, before finally deciding on similar measures for Cachar. By this means his Excellency in Council is not without hope that the recurrence of raids will be prevented; or, if they take place, that the force in charge of the out-posts will be enabled to inflict on the offenders summary and severe chastisement.

7. His Excellency in Council looks to permanent results more from a policy of watchful and vigorous defence than from retaliatory expeditions. The experiences of former expeditions on the north-east frontier of Bengal, as in other parts of the imperial frontier, have led his Excellency in Council to doubt whether such retaliatory warfare does much permanently to remove the real causes of disorder, although it may produce temporary quiet. Circumstances may occur to render expeditions of the kind indispensable for the punishment of those who commit wanton outrages on the lives and property of our fellow subjects, to vindicate our honour, and deter from future violence. But such expeditions into a barbarous, difficult, unhealthy, and unknown country are always to be deprecated, and seldom produce any lasting effect, if they are unaccompanied by measures of a more humane and politic character.

8. In addition, therefore, to guarding the boundary in the manner above described, his Excellency in Council considers it essential that the district officers on the frontier should endeavour by all legitimate means to win the confidence of the tribes living beyond our line of defence, and establish a salutary personal influence over them. For this purpose, his Excellency in Council has directed that all district officers on the frontier shall encourage

encourage frequent and friendly intercourse with the chiefs and tribes, visit them occasionally, induce them to enter our service and resort to our markets, endeavour in a friendly way to settle any differences or disputes with our subjects, and adopt all means calculated to establish a permanent personal influence among them. So far as this policy has yet been tried, Government has no reason to doubt its ultimate success.

9. The measures, then, which his Excellency in Council has commenced to carry out for the defence of the frontier are briefly these; to determine clearly the line up to which Government will enforce its direct authority; to establish friendly relations and influence among the tribes beyond; so to strengthen the defences by the establishment of military or police posts and by patrolling the boundary that the tribes shall be deterred from attempting outrages within the restricted limits, but if violence is attempted, that severe and summary punishment shall be secured. It would be unreasonable, however, to expect on such a frontier the same security and protection as in places where law and order have been long established. It behoves those, therefore, who settle in exposed parts to be ever ready to defend themselves, and to co-operate with the authorities in warding off sudden and unforeseen attacks, which, as in the recent instance, neither the local officers nor the residents may anticipate, nor the guards be able entirely to prevent. His Excellency in Council acknowledges with pride and satisfaction the gallant behaviour of the tea-planters and managers of the gardens which were attacked, and deeply regrets that, notwithstanding the determined resistance made by them and by the police in defence of the stockades, the marauders should have succeeeded in doing any damage. There are now nearly 2,000 men of the police and regular troops assembled in the districts of Cachar; the Governor General in Council has no doubt that the measures adopted will have the effect of restoring confidence to all British subjects, both European and native. His Excellency in Council is deeply interested in the success of British enterprise in the districts of Sylhet and Cachar, and the memorialists may be assurred that the Government will do all that is possible or reasonable to encourage its development and ensure its safety.

I have, &c.
(signed) *C. U. Aitchison.*

CORRESPONDENCE RELATIVE TO TEA CULTIVATION IN CACHAR.

EXTRACT from Proceedings of Lieutenant Governor of Bengal during June 1869. Revenue Department.

From *T. B. Lane*, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Board of Revenue, Lower Provinces, to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, No. 1668 A., dated Fort William, 17 May 1869.

THE Secretary to the Bengal Tea Company has submitted an application to the Board, requesting to be allowed to obtain in fee-simple a piece of about 600 acres of land in Cachar, adjoining the company's grant, No. 25, and now held on a rent-paying tenure only.

2. It appears that the land when applied for was understood to be entirely rice land, and as such could not be given in fee-simple. It was, however, subsequently ascertained that the land in question was almost entirely hilly land, and well adapted for the growth of the tea plant.

3. The local officers have now reported the land to be really hilly, and, as to a great portion of it, at present under tea cultivation.

4. The application of the Bengal Tea Company cannot be granted under any rules which have yet been passed; but as the local officers have no objection to granting the company's request, I am to recommend that, as a special case, it may be granted.

From Officiating Under Secretary to Government of Bengal, to Officiating Secretary to the Board of Revenue, Lower Provinces, No. 2169, dated Fort William, 2 June 1869.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 1668 A., dated the 17th ultimo, and, in reply, to state, for the information of the Board, that, on their recommendation, the Lieutenant Governor sanctions the grant in fee-simple to the Bengal Tea Company, of a piece of land in Cachar, consisting of about 600 acr

EXTRACT Report on Land Revenue Administration of the Lower Provinces for 1868-69.

Grant of Waste Lands under the Old Rules.

	In 1868-69.				Altogether to End of 1868-69.			
Districts.	Number of Grants.	Area in Acres.	Present Income.	Eventual Maximum Income.	Number of Grants.	Area in Acres.	Present Income.	Eventual Maximum Income.
Cachar - - -	- -	- -	- -	- -	170	3,64,076	- -	1,30,525

Sales of Waste Lands.

	In 1868-69.				Altogether to End of 1868-69.			
Districts.	Number of Lots Sold.	Area in Acres.	Price Realised.	Price Remaining to be Realised.	Number of Lots Sold.	Area in Acres.	Price Realised.	Price Remaining to be Realised.
Cachar - - -	1	184	46	415	13	5,414	10,036	3,513

Note.—It is not known how much of this Return relates to land taken up for Tea in Cachar, and how much for other cultivation.

From *F. B. Simson*, Esq., Officiating Commissioner of the Dacca Division, to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Revenue Dapartment, No. 169, dated Dacca, the 15th June 1869.

As the Annual* Tea Report is long overdue, and has been called for, and as legislation is now going on with reference to labour, and as the Report of the Tea Commissioners is also matter of constant correspondence, I have not delayed to compile a separate Report or to copy the Reports submitted, the chief of which was received only yesterday; but I have the honour to submit herewith, in original, Reports of the district officers, requesting that they, or copies of them, may be returned for record in this office.

2. The Report from Cachar is eminently satisfactory; the statistics have been actually obtained for the first time. Mr. McWilliam has been co-protector of labourers, and has thereby greatly aided Mr. Edgar in all duties connected with the administration of the tea gardens in Cachar. As the Looshai expedition took both officers away from ordinary duties for a great part of the season when supervision would have been most active, and as arrears of business accumulated, the late submission of the Report will, I hope, be pardoned.

3. Mr. Edgar's experience in tea matters and management of planters is invaluable to the Government. He takes the greatest interest in every detail. He has a little Government tea garden connected with the jail, in which refractory labourers still are kept at the work they are best fitted for, and the tea he made was by many considered the best in Cachar, and sold well. There is nothing worthy

* No regular Report of Tea cultivation in Cachar, or statement of produce, has been received at the India Office.

worthy of remark regarding Sylhet and Dacca reports. I have visited a large number of gardens in Cachar, some in Sylhet, and one in Dacca. In Cachar the planters are hopeful, and with the one exception (Colvin's) their behaviour has been excellent. The health of the Europeans has been good, and that of the labourers better than hitherto. I never saw a more contented set of employers and employed, till the Looshai attacks began; if these are repeated, the frontier gardens cannot be kept up. Mr. Edgar makes no mention of the raid, but they have been fully reported to Government; and their effect on the gardens attacked, and those in their immediate neighbourhood, must have been disastrous.

4. The earthquake, too, has not been mentioned. It was very severely felt in many gardens. Tea-houses and bungalows were in most places much injured. It happened on the 10th January, and at that season work was slack and labourers available for repairing damages; but this tremendous convulsion of nature must in most gardens have increased the outlay of the year considerably.

TEA STATISTICS for the District of *Sylhet* for the Year 1868–69.

1	2	3	4	5			6			7			8			9			10
Number according to the List of Tea Gardens.	Name of Tea Gardens and the Names of their Proprietors.	Cultivation when commenced.	Area.	Area in Acres under Cultivation in			Out-turn of Tea in lbs. in			Yield of Tea Seed in Maunds in			Average Number of Local Labourers employed in			Number of unposted Labourers in			Remarks.
				1867.	1868.	1869.	1867.	1868.	1869.	1867.	1868.	1869.	1867.	1868.	1869.	1867.	1868.	1869.	
			A. R. P.							M S.									
1	Lullee Cherra	1857																	
	Otergatch	1858																	
	Poteecherra	1862	2,117 2 32																
	Kaleepool	1862		300	200	—	2,400	40,000	—	—	—	—	None.			None.			These gardens are all but abandoned; all the coolies have left, and I believe they have now been sold.
	Amee Cherra	1863																	
2	Futtehpore	1862	728 1 12																
3	Tillanugur	1863	101 0 0																
4	Malnee Cherra — Sylhet Tea Company	1860	1,911 0 0	330	330	330	29,480	35,200	44,000	10 0	10	10	117	101	115	81	71	52	
5	Tellaghur — East India Tea Company "Limited"	1859	1,100 0 0	250	250	250	25,200	34,560	48,000	20 0	20	5	150	160	200	53	49	—	
6	Cherragonge — Messrs. Jennings and	1860	1,832 0 0	420	420	430	39,280	38,866	48,000	None.			Uncertain.			250	160	100	
7	Burra Cherra — Brothers		1,055 0 0																
8	Chicknagool — Mr. G. A. Walker	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	The proprietor has left the country.
9	Lukaloorah — C. K. Hudson, Esq.	1862	1,500 0 0	220	240	270	15,832	27,748	36,000	22 0	18¼	15	125	150	180		None.		
11	Durrabhur — Durrabhur Tea Company	1864	900 0 0	400	300	300	12,369	20,960	28,000	3 30	—	6	99	109	150	—	—	—	
12	Mourapore — C. H. Holmes, Esq., Agent	1864	2,020 0 0	300	230	230	14,000	32,000	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	125	51	—	
13	Shabazpore — for Land Mortgage Bank		2,500 0 0	110	110	110	2,054	2,054	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
14	Pathareeah A — G. Smith, Esq., manager for Messrs. Davidson and	1863	5,015 3 35	—	—	426	448	701	900	—	—	—	—	—	—	230	256	—	
15	Ditto B — Brothers		1,765 2 4																
16	Chota Duniee — E. S. Pullan, Esq.	1864	2,800 0 0	80	80	65¾	—	4,320	9,600	—	3½	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
17	Meetinga —		2,200 0 0																
22	Gummaree — C. K. Hudson, Esq.	1862	600 0 0	80	80	100	3,690	3,500	600	6 0	5	4	45	46	50		None.		
	TOTAL	—	28,144 8 139	2,490	2,490	2,511¾	1,44,693	2,39,909	2,15,100	61 30	56¾	40	536	566	695	739	587	152	

W. KEMBLE,
Officiating Collector.

From *W. Kemble*, Esq., Officiating Collector of Dacca, to the Commissioner of the Dacca Division.—(No. 70, dated Sylhet, 21 April 1869.)

I HAVE the honour to submit my annual report on the progress of the cultivation in this district. The annexed table shows the quantity of land which has been under cultivation every year since 1865, the actual out-turn of tea from 1865 to 1868 inclusive, and the estimated out-turn this year.

2. The quantity of land under cultivation has again decreased. This is owing to the total collapse of the Sylhet and Cachar Tea Company, whose gardens I last year stated were almost entirely closed.

3. The estimated out-turn of the tea last year was 173,000 lbs., considerably below the estimate for this year, 215,100 lbs. The actual out-turn last year was 239,000 lbs., exceeding the estimate, 66,000 lbs. I hope the result this year will be equally satisfactory and that it will be found that though less land is under cultivation more tea will be made by the few solvent proprietors which have pulled through the crisis of 1867 than was made last year on every garden in Sylhet, whether the owner was solvent or insolvent. One of the great mistakes made during the first years of tea planting was bringing too much land under cultivation at first.

YEAR.	Area under Cultivation.	Out-turn of Tea in lbs.	Tea Seeds in Maunds.	LABOURER.	
				Imported.	Local.
1865 - - - -	3,644	112,276	196	890	1,295
1866 - - - -	3,145	172,130	98½	999	379
1867 - - - -	2,210	169,600	72	575	466
1868 - - - -	2,458	239,000	56	587	566
1869 - - - -	2,511¾	215,100	40	152	695

From *J. Ware Edgar*, Esq., Officiating Deputy Commissioner of Cachar, to the Officiating Commissioner of the Dacca Division.—(No. 238, dated Cachar, 7 June 1869.)

WITH reference to Government letter, No. 1070, dated 16th March 1869, forwarded with your memorandum, No. 1650 C. of the 24th idem, I have the honour to submit my report on the progress of tea cultivation in Cachar during the past year.

2. The submission of the report has been delayed for the crop and clearance returns of a few gardens, which have only just been received. In all previous reports many of the statistics were conjectural, for in no year were returns received from all the gardens in the district. I am glad to say that they have been received from all this year, so that for the first time I am able to submit a report with some pretensions to completeness. There are still many elements of error in the statistics contained in the report, as will be explained hereafter. I think, however, that it will be found to be less incorrect than any previous one.

3. As mentioned in my last report, there were at the end of the official year 1867-68 179 lots, originally applied for under the old Assam Rules, still retained by the grantees. Applications have been made to commute 34 of these to fee-simple holdings, and one has been divided into three grants, of which one has been commuted. Consequently, there are actually 146 grants now held under the Assam Rules. But tea is cultivated in only 67 of these grants. Many of the remaining 79 are unfitted, either by their situation or soil, for the cultivation of tea at a profit, while the scarcity of labourers in the district makes it very desirable that no new gardens should be opened for a long time to come.

4. All the 67 opened grants have been surveyed, and almost all defined by permanent marks. The area of 63 of these has been ascertained to be 1,57,995 acres. The exact area of the other four has not been received from the surveyor, but I compute it to be 4,240 acres. Consequently, the total area of the 67 grants is 1,62,235. But many of these grants are subject to revision under the clearance clause of the Assam Rules, as modified by the new rules 12 B. and 4, Sections 5 and 6., chapter 26 of the board's rules, and several of the grantees have applied to be allowed to relinquish portions of these lots, while others contemplate doing so. It is likely that this will make a re-survey necessary in many cases. I am at present carefully considering the questions, and shall hereafter submit a special report upon it.

Very few of the unopened grants have been surveyed. Their total area may be roughly estimated at 2,25,000 acres.

5. There have been 35 applications for commutation of Assam rule holdings to fee-simple. The total area of these applications as surveyed is 69,735 acres; but this area will probably have to be revised, as a portion may be ultimately relinquished under rule 12 B., Section 5, of the Waste Land Rules.

Owing to this, there is some uncertainty about the amount to be finally paid on commutation, but it is estimated at 1,85,833 rupees, of which 1,26,186 rupees have been paid already. The balance bears interest at 10 per cent. per annum.

6. There were at the beginning of the year 13 fee-simple estates held by grantees.

During the past year one of these was resumed for arrears of interest. On the other hand, one new grant was made, so that the number of fee-simple estates is still 13. Their area is 5,414 acres, for which 10,036 rupees have been already paid, and 3,513 rupees are still due.

7. There have been 75 estates granted to Europeans on the usual cultivation leases of the district; 64 of these leases will expire in 1879. The area of the grants is 31,268 acres.

The remaining 11 leases are for 30 years, from the dates of the grants, and the area of the land is 4,175 acres.

All the estates held on local tenure were not taken up for the cultivation of tea, and much of the land is rice land or bheel. I have no means of ascertaining with accuracy how much is included in tea-gardens, but it may be roughly estimated at 20,000 acres.

8. The total area, therefore, of all the estates upon which tea is cultivated is at present about 2,70,000 acres. It is probable that more than 70,000 acres of this will be relinquished before the end of 1870, and that ultimately the area retained for the actual cultivation of tea, and for purposes connected with it, will be somewhat less than 2,00,000 acres.

9. The area actually under the tea plant appears from the returns to be 24,376 acres, and the number of factories, 118. In 1868 it was 25,469 acres, and there were 115 factories. There has been, therefore, a decrease of 1,093 acres of cultivation in the district, and an increase of three in the number of factories. An analysis of the returns shows that there was an increase of 617 acres on 12 estates, against a decrease of 1,710 acres on 13 estates. The increase is, in some instances, due to fresh clearances, and in others to the re-cultivation of land which had been temporarily abandoned. The decrease is chiefly in lands which have been found unfit for tea cultivation, or where in consequence of the faulty way in which the garden had been made, the plants had never thriven.

10. A large proportion of the land nominally cultivated with tea has been of this unprofitable kind, and managers, naturally unwilling to abandon an acre of land won from the jungle, have, until lately, gone on year after year carefully hoeing these barren spots, and filling up the numberless vacancies with young plants, which were eaten up by ground crickets, if they did not die for want of nourishment a few days after they were planted.

However, at last most people have learned the uselessness of these desperate attempts to fight against nature, and to remedy the irreparable mischiefs resulting from previous mismanagement.

They have found out that the bad parts of a garden, like Pharoah's lean kine, eat up the profits of the good parts. Consequently, during the last two years, many acres nominally under tea plants have been thrown out of cultivation. But even still there is much money and labour thrown away on land, which will never repay the expenditure upon it.

Of the 24,376 acres returned as under cultivation, probably more than 3,000 are of this kind.

11. On the other hand, the greater part of the remainder is very good.

I should say that there are more than 12,000 acres, out of the whole area of the Cachar gardens, in which good land is well filled in with healthy, productive plants; while there are eight or 9,000 acres, somewhat inferior to the best class, either in soil or plant, but still capable of yielding enough tea to give a good profit on the cost of production. Unfortunately land of this kind is generally found in the same garden very good, and very bad are not often to be found in the same estate as the worthless sort I have described above, and the profits of the better parts of the garden are lost in the fruitless cultivation of the worst.

12. The error made in continuing to cultivate unprofitable lands has done something to neutralise, and much more to hide the advantages derived from the great improvements which have been made of late in tea cultivation. The most scientific method of cultivation will not make up for unsuitability of soil, or absence of tea plants, while almost every improvement involves an increased expenditure; consequently, as long as worthless land is included in the cultivated area of a garden, the effect of improved systems of cultivation will

will be to increase the cost of production of tea without increasing the out-turn from the barren land.

On the other hand in good, and still more in the middle sort of tea lands, the increased cost of cultivation is far more than repaid by the increased productiveness of the plant. Of course some of the profits obtained in this way go to make up for the cost applying the improvements to inferior land.

In spite of this, the advantages of the recent advance in tea cultivation are very marked, and every year will make them more and more apparent.

13. The most important of the changes to which I allude are, first, the extensive use of manures; secondly, the adoption of measures to prevent or remedy the injury done by the rain washing away the soil from the roots of trees planted out on the sides of hills; and, lastly, a careful and scientific treatment of the plant, both in pruning and plucking.

In the last matter there is still much room for improvement, and I fear that sufficient attention is not yet paid to it; but great advances have been made on the rude and simple ways of treating tea plants, which prevailed a few years ago, and many of the most intelligent managers have spent much time and thought on the subject.

14. The amount of tea produced last year was 40,06,835 lbs., which is at the rate of about two maunds to the acre. But the rate of production varied very much on different estates, sometimes being more than four mands, and sometimes less than one maund to the acre. Parts of some of the gardens whose out-turn was low, have not yet come into full bearing; in others the acreage is merely nominal; some suffered severely from hail, blight, or red spider, but I cannot help thinking that more care and intelligence in management would have changed the result in many instances.

15. The out-turn of this year is estimated at 50,51,220 lbs. I am inclined to suspect that this estimate is too high, for some of the gardens do not seem to me to be likely to make as much as their managers hope. On the other hand, I think that some of the estimates are rather under the mark. There is also some danger that an error which has vitiated the statistics of past years may have crept into some of the present returns.

The returns were stated to be for the year 1868-69, that is, for the official year; but it happens that many people have adopted a tea year, which I believe commences in November and ends in October; consequently, the tea season of 1868 falls into the tea year 1867-68, and into the official year 1868-69.

Some managers send in their returns for the official, some for the tea year; so that unless great care be taken, the statistics must be composed partly of the actual out-turns of one season, and partly of the estimates made for the next. In my last report this led to an enormous error in my statistics, which I did not find out till too late for correction; but I have done all in my power to avoid it this year, and in future I shall ask that the returns be made for the calendar year.

16. The improvement in the manufacture of tea, which I remarked on in my last report still continues. There were great variations in the quantity of the teas made by different gardens, but on the whole the prices realised for the last year's tea were very favourable, compared with those obtained in one or two of the years previous to 1867, and I see from a recent circular of Messrs. J. and H. Thompson, that the improvement in some of the teas made in Cachar last season has been remarked by the London brokers. Great attention is being paid to the manufacture this year, and I have reason to believe that the average quality of this season's out-turn will be much better than it has hitherto been. There have been lately many attempts to improve the processes of manufacture, and some of these attempts seem to be very successful, notably a rolling table, invented by Mr. McMackin of Dudpathli, and a system of withering leaf devised by M. S. Davidson of Berkhota.

17. It will be seen from the above very imperfect sketch of the present state of tea planting in this district, that much progress is being made both in the cultivation of the tea plant, and in the manufacture of tea, and I am glad to say that the present aspect of the labour question is even more cheering.

There is, of course, still a labour difficulty, and there will be one for many years to come; but the difficulty has ceased to be one threatening the very existence of tea planting. There were according to the returns submitted under Act VI., 14,076 labourers employed under that Act on the 31st December 1868. Out of these, 855 had re-engaged in the district after the terminations of their original agreements. From statistics collected by me, it appears that, besides the above, there were 12,991 imported labourers not under Act III. of 1865, on the gardens which were visited during the half year, but on some few gardens which were not visited there were about 1,200 more; so that there were at least 15,000 imported labourers working in the district from choice, deliberately made after becoming personally acquainted with the kind of life led on tea gardens, and with the work to be done in them. The majority of these labourers mean to settle in the district. Many of them coming up here while mere children, and growing up in the tea-house, and plucking field have become of a kind of necessity tea labourers, and nothing else.

The cultivation of tea is now to them what the cultivation of rice is to the Bengali native of the district.

The work to be done has become so familiar to them, that they do it with more ease than they can do any other work. Consequently, it is both more pleasant to them, and more profitable. Then the life on tea gardens seems to them, ignorant as they are of any others, to be the only natural and happy one.

In this way there is growing up here a class of labourers skilled in cultivating and manufacturing tea, and almost as dependent on the gardens for their subsistence as Lancashire operatives are upon the factories in which they are employed.

I have always done all in my power to encourage this state of things, for I feel convinced that the success of tea planting mainly depends upon our being able to create and retain permanently in the district a special class who will look on tea as their only way of earning a livelihood, and who will be entirely distinct from the agricultural class by whom their food will be produced.

I have from time to time, in my reports on the working of Act VI., gone more fully into the facts and statistics, which lead me to believe that the labourer's difficulty has been much lessened, and in time will be overcome in the manners above described; and I now call attention to the subject, because it is of great importance that in any future legislation affecting imported labourers, the existence of this large and increasing body of permanent labourers should not be lost sight of.

18. The amount remitted by supply bills to this district during the year for purposes connected with tea cultivation was 18,88,847 rupees. In addition, notes to the amount of 96,110 rupees were cashed at the Treasury. I do not believe that money to any very great amount was sent up, except in these two ways; so that the amount expended in tea cultivation in the district during the year was about 20 lakhs. Besides this, there were expenses in Calcutta and at home, the amount of which I have no means of estimating.

All the tea which was made last year has not yet been sold, and the price of much of that already sold was not known when the returns were sent in to me; but as far as was then known the average price realised was slightly over 13 annas a pound. As prices at home have been rather unfavourable of late, the average may, when all last year's teas have been sold, turn out to be under 13 annas. But if it should be even as low as 12 annas, which I think very improbable, the total value of last year's crop would be more than 30 lakhs of rupees, giving a profit of over 33 per cent. upon the actual expenditure in the district.

19. The prospects of this year's season are good. Hitherto the weather has been, on the whole, favourable, and the yield above the average. I have not yet heard a whisper about blight, and though there have been complaints of the injury done by the red spider, still the gardens that seem to have suffered the most are, in spite of this drawback, doing unusually well.

From *H. S. Beadon*, Esq., Officiating Under Secretary to the Government of Bengal, to the Officiating Commissioner of the Dacca Division.—(No. 2,640, dated Fort William, 10 July 1869.)

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 169, dated the 15th ultimo, with its enclosures, and in reply to request that you will be so good as to convey the thanks of the Lieutenant Governor to Mr. Edgar, the Officiating Deputy Commissioner of Cachar, for his very full and interesting report on the progress of tea cultivation in Cachar during the year 1868-69.

2. The enclosures of your letter in question are herewith returned as requested.

(EXTRACT.)—SECTIONS 65 to 114 of Act No. II. of 1870.

(Received the Assent of His Honour on 9th September 1869, and of the Governor General on 16th March 1870.)

AN ACT to consolidate and amend the Law relating to the Transport of Labourers to the Districts of Assam, Cachar, and Sylhet, and their Employment therein.

Penalty on engaging emigrant contrary to such order.

65. Any person who shall knowingly engage any native inhabitant so to emigrate while such emigration shall be so prohibited, shall be liable to a fine not exceeding 50 rupees for every labourer who may have been so engaged.

Power to fix daily tasks.

66. It shall be lawful for every employer to fix the daily tasks to be executed by the labourers employed by such employer, and to frame a schedule of such daily tasks, and to publish

publish the same by posting a copy thereof in the Bengalee language upon the door of each place of payment of the labourers employed by such employer, and by sending a copy thereof in the English language to the inspector.

Inspector may submit schedule to a committee.

67. If at any time the inspector shall consider such schedule of daily tasks or any part thereof to be unreasonable, he shall refer the consideration of such schedule to a committee consisting of the inspector, of some employer to be nominated by him, and of some person to be nominated by the employer whose schedule is to be considered, or in his default by the inspector.

Committee to revise schedule.

68. In case the said committee, or the majority in number thereof, shall be of opinion that the daily tasks in such schedule contained, or any of them, are unreasonable, they shall modify and reduce such daily tasks in such manner as they shall deem reasonable, and such schedule so modified shall be published in manner aforesaid, and every schedule published as aforesaid shall have effect as between the employer and labourers in substition for any former schedule.

Maximum amount of labour to be required.

69. Save as hereinafter is provided, no labourer shall be bound to serve under his contract for a longer period than three years from the time at which he shall have arrived at the place where he is to be employed, nor to work on more than six days in one week, nor for more than six hours consecutively, nor for more than nine hours on any one day.

Copy of abstract to be sent to magistrate of district where service is to be performed.

Abstracts and copies to be evidence.

70. The superintendent shall send by post a copy, authenticated under his hand, of every abstract entered by him, as in Section 37 provided, to the magistrate of the district in which the service under such contract is agreed to be performed. Every such copy shall be dispatched by the superintendent within seven days after the entry of the abstract. Every abstract and every such copy shall, without further proof thereof, be receivable as primary evidence in every court, whether civil or criminal, as fully as the original contract might or could be.

Contracts to be a charge on and to pass with the land.

71. Every contract made with any labourer in pursuance of the said Acts III. of 1863 and VI. of 1865, passed by the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal in Council, or of this Act, and all arrears of wages under any such contract, shall be a charge upon the lands upon which such labourer shall have been engaged to work. All such arrears of wages shall also be recoverable on a summary application before a magistrate by a warrant of distress under the hand of such magistrate, under which a sufficient portion of the moveable property of the owner of the lands aforesaid may be distrained and sold to pay the amount of the arrears decreed, and the costs of application and of executing the distress. Any summons issued by the magistrate on such summary application as aforesaid may be directed to the employer for the time being in charge of the lands. And the owner of such lands for the time being shall have all rights and remedies against such labourer as if such owner for the time being had been originally the party executing such contract as employer. Provided that no greater arrears of wages than four months shall be recovered under this section, and no person, after he shall have ceased to be owner of such lands, nor his property nor effects, shall be in anywise liable or responsible for any breach of such contract which may have occurred after he shall have ceased to be such owner.

Sufficient house accommodation, &c. to be provided.

72. Whenever any labourers shall be employed in any of the said districts, there shall be provided for them sufficient and proper house accommodation, water supply, sanitary arrangements, and rice.

Power to make rules defining house accommodation, &c.

73. It shall be lawful for the Lieutenant Governor to make rules defining the nature of the house accommodation, water-supply, and sanitary arrangements, and rice to be provided for such labourers, and from time to time to alter, vary, and revoke such rules; and when, and so soon as such rules shall have been published in the "Calcutta Gazette," all house accommodation, water supply, sanitary arrangements, and supply of rice which may not be in accordance with the terms of the rules which for the time being may be in force, shall be deemed not to be proper nor sufficient.

Powers of inspector as to house accommodation, &c.

74. It shall be lawful for any inspector or assistant inspector who is himself a magistrate, to institute within his jurisdiction, on the lands in charge of any employer, or at some place within his jurisdiction not more than 10 miles distant from such lands, an inquiry whether such employer has provided for his labourers sufficient and proper house accommodation, water supply, sanitary arrangements, or rice. On the complaint of any inspector or assistant inspector, a similar inquiry may be made by any magistrate. Any such inquiry, whether conducted by an inspector or assistant inspector, or before a magistrate on the complaint of an inspector or assistant inspector, shall be dealt with and conducted as a case triable by a magistrate under the criminal procedure code.

Punishment for gross neglect as to house accommodation, &c., and for wilfully omitting to comply with the order of the magistrate in such respect.

75. If the employer is convicted of gross neglect in not having provided sufficient and proper house accommodation, water supply, sanitary arrangements, or rice, such employer shall be liable to a fine not exceeding 500 rupees. In any case where proper or sufficient house accommodation, water supply, sanitary arrangements, or rice, be found not to have been provided, the magistrate may order the employer to provide such proper and sufficient house accommodation, water supply, sanitary arrangements, and rice. If the employer wilfully omits to comply with such order, he shall be liable to a fine not exceeding

ing 100 rupees a day for every day that such omission continues. In default of payment by the employer of the last mentioned fine, the person on whose account such employer has been acting shall be liable to pay the fine.

Hospital, medicines, and medical officer to be provided for labourers.

76. There shall be provided for all labourers such sufficient hospital accommodation, and such medicines of such quality and descriptions, and according to such scale, as shall from time to time be fixed by the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal; and if 300 or more labourers shall be employed by any employer, it shall be the duty of such employer to place in medical charge of such labourers a medical officer holding a medical diploma from some Indian or European collegiate institution authorised to grant diplomas, or an officer for the time being licensed by the local Government to act in such medical charge of labourers.

Penalty for breach of last section.

77. Wherever such hospital accommodation, or medical charge, as required by the last preceding sections, or medicines of such quality and descriptions and according to such scale as aforesaid, shall not have been provided, the employer or other person through whose wilful default the same shall not have been provided, shall be liable to a fine for every week during which any such default continues.

Appointment of inspectors and assistant inspectors, and powers of inspectors.

78. It shall be lawful for the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal to appoint, in any district in which this Act may be in force, so many inspectors and assistant inspectors of labourers as he may think proper, and to define, by notification in the "Calcutta Gazette," the local limits within which each such inspector and assistant inspector shall exercise the powers and authorities conferred, and perform the duties imposed on him, by this Act. Such inspectors and assistant inspectors may be by the said Lieutenant Governor vested with all or any of the powers of a magistrate.

Establishment of inspectors and assistant inspectors and powers of assistant inspectors.

79. It shall be lawful for the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal to assign to such inspectors and assistant inspectors as may be requisite such establishment as may be thought fit; and such assistant inspectors shall perform all the duties and exercise all the powers of an inspector, which they shall be authorised in writing by an inspector to perform or exercise.

Return of labourers to be sent in half-yearly by employer, &c., to inspector.

80. Every employer shall, on or before the last day of January and the last day of July in each and every year, make out in writing, and deliver to the inspector of labourers of the district, a return of the number of labourers employed by such employer on the last day of the preceding month, and a return of the sickness and mortality among the labourers during the preceding six months, and such returns respectively shall be in such form as may from time to time be prescribed by the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal by an order to be published in the "Calcutta Gazette."

Penalty for refusing or omitting to send in return, or sending in incorrect return.

81. If any employer shall refuse, or wilfully omit, duly to send in any such return as mentioned in Section 80 of this Act, or shall knowingly send in an incorrect return, such employer shall on conviction thereof before a magistrate be liable to a fine; and a certificate under the hand of the inspector to whom such return ought to have been sent, stating that such return has not been sent or is incorrect as aforesaid, shall be received as *primâ facie* evidence of the truth of the facts stated in such certificate.

Yearly rate payable to provide for expenses of Act.

82. It shall be lawful for the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal from time to time, by order published as aforesaid, to fix a yearly sum, not exceeding 1 rupee per labourer, for the purpose of defraying the expense of carrying out the purposes of this Act, and the sum or rate so fixed shall be paid half-yearly by each employer on the last day of July and the last day of January in each year, according to the return next before such payment shall be due.

Employer failing to send in the rate in due time, how to be dealt with.

83. If any employer shall fail to comply with the provisions of the last preceding section it shall be the duty of the collector to notify such default to him; and if within one month from the receipt of such notification, or such longer period as it may, under special circumstances, appear to the collector reasonable, such employer shall not so comply, the collector shall, by distress and sale of any moveable property which may be found in the possession or under the charge of such employer, levy the sums so payable.

Power to sue for rate.

84. If there shall be no such moveable property or insufficient moveable property so found, the amount shall be recoverable by a civil regular suit, from the person for whose benefit the labourers in respect of whom the same may be payable shall have been employed. In every such suit the Government shall be named as plaintiff, and the cause of action shall be taken to have arisen within the limits of the jurisdiction of any court having jurisdiction at any place where any such labourers may have been employed by such employer.

Books to be kept, and periodical visits and reports made, by inspector.

85. Every inspector of labourers shall, once within each of such periods as may be fixed for such purpose by the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, visit all lands within the limits of his authority, on which there shall be employed any labourers, and inspect every hospital, tent, camp, or building in any way used by any such labourer, and investigate the condition of the labourers employed; and for such purpose the inspector may require that any labourer shall be produced before him with his contract, and may make such inquiries as may to him seem proper. Every such inspector shall keep books, in which, from time to time, shall be entered the number of labourers then under contract with each employer,

employer, the number who shall then be sick or missing, or who shall have complained of ill-treatment, the particulars of such complaints, and such other particulars regarding the labourers as the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal shall from time to time direct. Each inspector shall annually make a written report to the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, through the commissioner of the division, of the aforesaid particulars; and every such report, as regards the labourers under any particular employer, shall, at all reasonable times, be open to the inspection of such employer or any person by him appointed in writing in that behalf, and the person so inspecting shall be entitled to take a copy of the report so far as it relates to such labourers.

Magistrate, or person authorised by him, may inspect any estate at any time.

86. It shall be lawful for any magistrate exercising jurisdiction in the district, or any person authorised by him in writing in that behalf, at any time to enter and inspect any hospital, tent, or building, wholly or partially used by or for labourers; and to require that any labourer shall be brought before him, and to make any inquiries which he may think proper touching the condition or treatment of any labourer.

Penalty on person obstructing inspection, &c.

87. If any employer, or other person acting for or under such employer, shall wilfully obstruct or impede any entry, inspection, or inquiry made under either of the two preceding sections, such employer or other person as aforesaid shall be liable to a fine not exceeding 500 rupees for each such offence.

Inspector may suspend contract of any labourer temporarily unfitted for labour.

88. It shall be lawful for the inspector of labourers, within the local limits of whose authority any labourer may be employed, to suspend, for such period as he shall consider advisable, the contract of such labourer, or any particular term thereof, if such labourer shall be, in the judgment of such inspector, temporarily unfitted for the performance thereof by reason of sickness, pregnancy, or other sufficient cause. Provided that every such suspension shall be endorsed by the inspector on the contract. Provided also that every such labourer shall, during such incapacity, receive such subsistence money from his employer as shall be considered sufficient by the inspector, and that the time during which the suspension continues shall not be reckoned as part of the term for which the labourer is bound to serve.

Penalty for compelling labour to perform work for which he is unfit.

89. If it shall be found that any labourer has been compelled to perform any species of labour for which he was at the time unfit, the employer by whom he was so employed shall be liable to fine.

Power to discharge labourers permanently unfitted for labour.

90. If, in the opinion of the inspector of labourers, any labourer shall be permanently unfitted for the performance of his contract or any material part thereof, the inspector shall certify to that effect in writing, and deliver such certificate to the employer of such labourer or some one on his behalf, and from the date of such certificate the contract of such labourer shall wholly cease and determine. The inspector shall make a return of all such cases of determination of contract in his report under Section 85 of this Act. Every labourer, whose contract shall have been determined as aforesaid, shall be entitled to receive from his employer such sum, not exceeding three months' wages, as the inspector may award, and such sum shall be recoverable before a magistrate in the manner hereinafter provided for the recovery of wages.

Labourer who has completed his contract to be permitted to have such completion registered.

91. Every labourer who shall have completed the term of his contract, shall he forthwith permitted by his employer to appear before the inspector, to have the completion of his contract registered. If such employer shall detain such labourer after the completion of his contract, or shall fail to give notice of such completion to the inspector within one month after the date of such completion, such employer shall be liable to fine.

Power to redeem contract.

92. If any labourer shall be able and desirous to redeem the unexpired term of his contract of service by payment of a sum equivalent to the value thereof, such labourer may demand to be taken or allowed to go before the inspector of labourers within the local limits of whose authority he may be employed, and on his depositing such sum in the hands of such inspector, such inspector shall give notice to the employer that such labourer requires him within one week to show cause why the contract of such labourer shall not be released; and in case no sufficient cause shall be shown, such inspector shall require the production of the contract of such labourer and endorse thereon a certificate of release by purchase, and shall hold the sum in deposit on account of the employer of such labourer. If any employer, or other person authorised to act for the employer, shall neglect to comply with such demand as aforesaid, such employer, or other person as aforesaid, shall be liable to fine. The value of the unexpired term of contract shall be deemed to be the aggregate amount of 1 rupee for every month of the unexpired portion of the first year, of 3 rupees for every such month of the second year, and of 5 rupees for every such month of the third year, of the original term of the labourer's engagement.

A certificate to be given to labourer whose contract has determined or been completed, or who has purchased release therefrom.

93. Every labourer whose contract shall have been completed, determined, released by purchase as aforesaid, or rescinded by the mutual assent of the parties thereto, shall be entitled to receive forthwith from the inspector a certificate of release in such form as may from time to time be prescribed by the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal by an order to be published in the *Calcutta Gazette*.

If labourer desire to complain, employer to give notice to inspector.

94. If any labourer shall state to his employer, or to any person acting for such employer, that he desires to make a complaint to the inspector of labourers of personal ill-usage or breach of any provision of this Act on the part of such employer or other

person, the person to whom such statement shall have been made shall, within 48 hours, send notice thereof in writing to the inspector, and, in default of so doing, such person shall be liable to fine.

Inspector how to proceed on receipt of notice of complaint.

95. Whenever any inspector of labourers shall receive such notice in writing as aforesaid, or whenever any complaint of personal ill-usage or breach of any provision of this Act as aforesaid, shall be made to him by any labourer against his employer or any person acting for such employer, or whenever the inspector shall have other reasonable grounds for believing that any such personal ill-usage or breach of any provision of this Act as aforesaid has been suffered by a labourer, such inspector shall forthwith, if the place in which such offence has been committed is not situate within the limits of his own authority, give notice thereof in writing to the inspector within the limits of whose authority such place is situated; and if such place be situated within the limits of his own authority, then such inspector shall, so soon as conveniently may be, proceed to some place not more than 10 miles in a direct line from the principal place of business of such employer, and make full inquiry into the matter complained of.

Inspector may summon the complainant and his witnesses. Penalty for obstructing service of, or obedience to summons.

96. For the purposes of such inquiry, it shall be lawful for any inspector, if he think fit, to summon such labourer as aforesaid, as well as any witnesses; and if any employer shall in any way obstruct the service of, or obedience to, such summons, or if any witness summoned shall neglect to attend, such employer or witness shall be liable to fine.

Inspector how to proceed if the complaint be untrue or frivolous.

97. If, upon such inquiry made on the complaint of a labourer, the inpector shall be of opinion that the complaint is untrue or frivolous, he shall enter in his book the particulars of such complaint, and a short statement of the grounds of his opinion respecting it, and shall dismiss the complaint; and in such case shall endorse on the employer's copy of the contract of such complainant the number of days during which such complainant has been absent from work in consequence of such inquiry, and such number of days shall be added to the period for which such complainant had contracted to serve, and every such endorsement shall be conclusive evidence that such labourer has absented himself from his labour without sufficient cause during the number of days which shall be so endorsed.

Inspector how to proceed if the complaint be well founded.

98. If, upon inquiry as aforesaid, the inspector shall be of opinion that the complaint is well founded, he shall, if a magistrate, dispose of the case according to due course of law. If the inspector shall not be a magistrate, he shall without delay send the complainant and his witnesses to the nearest magistrate, and such magistrate shall thereupon dispose of the case in due course of law.

Recovery of wages. Compensation to be given if wages for more than two months are due.

99. If, upon the complaint of any labourer, it shall be proved to the satisfaction of the magistrate that the wages of such labourer are in arrear to an amount exceeding the total of such labourer's wages for two months, it shall be lawful for such magistrate to award to such labourer the amount which shall appear to be then due to him; and also, by way of compensation, such further sum, not exceeding that amount, as shall appear to the magistrate to be just; and, in case of default, the collector shall, upon the requisition of the magistrate, levy the entire sum in the manner prescribed in Section 83.

Contract to be cancelled if employer be convicted by the Court of Session, or be twice convicted by a magistrate, of an offence against the labourer, or if wages be not paid for more than four months, or if labourer have been ill-used.

100. If any employer, or any person placed in authority over any labourer by such employer, shall be convicted of any offence causing injury to the person or property of such labourer triable under the Code of Criminal Procedure by the Court of Session; or if any such employer, or other person as aforesaid, shall be twice convicted of any such offence against such labourer triable, under the said code, by a magistrate; or if it shall be proved before a magistrate that the wages of such labourer are in arrear to an amount exceeding the total of such labourer's wages for four months; or if a magistrate shall, on the report of the inspector and after due inquiry, upon oath, in the presence of the parties, be satisfied that any labourer has been compelled to perform any labour while he was unfit for it, or has been subjected to ill-usage by such employer or any other person placed in authority over the labourer by such employer, it shall be lawful for the magistrate, if he think fit, on the application of the labourer, in each of such cases, to cancel the contract of such labourer, and to award to him compensation not exceeding 30 rupees, and every such cancelment shall be certified by the magistrate on the back of such contract.

Penalty on labourer for absenting himself without sufficient cause.

101. Any labourer, who shall absent himself from his labour without sufficient cause, may on conviction, be sentenced to lose all claim to wages or allowances during the period of such absence, and also to forfeit to his employer a sum not exceeding 4 annas for each day during which such absence shall have continued; and in case such absence shall have exceeded seven days, or in case such labourer shall have been already convicted of the same offence within a period of three months, such labourer shall be furthermore sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for fourteen days.

Labourer deserting may be apprehended without a warrant.

Proviso.

Further proviso.

102. If any labourer shall desert or attempt to desert from his employer's service, such employer or any other person acting in his behalf may, without first procuring a warrant, and without the assistance of any police officer (who, nevertheless, shall be bound to give such assistance if called upon to do so), apprehend such labourer wherever he may be found. Provided, nevertheless, that if such labourer be found in the service of another employer, he shall not be arrested without a warrant. Provided also that such employer or other person shall, within a reasonable time from the time of such apprehension, give

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the said labourer in charge at the nearest police station, and there enter the charge upon which he shall have apprehended such labourer.

Labourer when made over to the police, to be taken before the nearest magistrate.

103. Any labourer so given in charge shall be conveyed, without delay, to the nearest magistrate; and if the place from which such labourer is charged with having deserted be within the jurisdiction of such magistrate, he shall himself adjudicate upon the charge; but, if not, he shall forward the said labourer, under custody, to the magistrate within whose jurisdiction such place may be situated, who shall adjudicate upon such charge.

Punishment for desertion.

104. Every labourer who shall desert from his employer's service shall be liable, upon conviction, to rigorous imprisonment, which may extend to one month; and every labourer, who, after having been convicted of desertion shall again desert from his employer's sesvice, shall be liable to rigorous imprisonment which may extend to two months; and every labourer who, after having been twice convicted of desertion shall again desert, shall be liable to imprisonment which may extend to three months.

Cancellation of contract by desertion.

105. Whenever any labourer shall have actually suffered imprisonment amounting in the whole to six months for desertion from his employer's service, it shall be lawful for the inspector (and he is hereby required) to cancel the contract of such labourer; and every such cancellation shall be by the inspector certified on the back of the contract, and such labourer shall then be at liberty either to enter into a fresh contract with any employer or to return to the district from which he was recruited.

Provisions regarding desertion and unlawful absence to apply to desertion in transit.

106. All the provisions of this Act regarding the desertion or unlawful absence of labourers shall be held applicable to labourers who shall desert while in transit to the district in which they have contracted to labour for hire; and such labourers may be tried either in the district in which they may be apprehended, or in the district in which, under their contracts they are bound to labour for hire.

Penalty for enticing away, harbouring, or employing labourers under contract to another person.

107. Any person who shall knowingly and wilfully entice away, harbour, or employ, or attempt to entice from his employment, any labourer, before such labourer shall have been lawfully released from his contract, shall be liable to a fine, the whole or any portion of which may be awarded to the employer of such labourer.

Portion of sentence may be cancelled if employer apply for return of labour.

108. It shall be lawful for the employer, or any person authorised to act for the employer, of any labourer imprisoned for any offence under this Act, to apply to the magistrate, at any time previous to the expiry of such sentence, that such labourer be made over to him for the purpose of completing his contract; and the magistrate may, if he see good cause, make over or forward such labourer to his employer, and in that case the magistrate shall cancel the remainder of the sentence passed on him, and shall endorse on the contract of such labourer a memorandum signed by him of such cancellation.

Expense of restoring a deserting labourer to be borne by his employer.

109. Every employer who shall obtain an order for the return or forwarding of any labourer who may have deserted, shall pay the expense of the return or forwarding of such labourer, and shall, before the order is issued, deposit with the magistrate such sum as such magistrate may in his discretion deem to be sufficient for defraying the expense of such return or forwarding.

Conviction not to operate as a release, but on expiry of sentence labourer to be made over to employer.

110. On the expiry of any sentence of imprisonment for any offence under this Act, save as is provided in Section 105, it shall be the duty of the magistrate to make over such labourer to any person appointed on the part of his employer to receive charge of him; and no conviction under this Act, or imprisonment under such conviction, shall, save as aforesaid, be held to operate as a release to any labourer from the terms of his contract. Provided, nevertheless, that the period of imprisonment shall in no case be prolonged by reason of there being no person present on the part of the employer to take charge of the labourer at the expiry of his sentence; but such labourer shall, in that case, be sent to the principal place of business of such employer, and the expense of such conveyance shall be levied from the employer in the manner provided under this Act for the recovery of the rates imposed under this Act.

Time of unlawful absence and of imprisonment to be included in term of labourer.

111. The duration of every unlawful absence from labour, of which any labourer may be convicted, and every sentence of imprisonment for any offence under this Act, shall be endorsed on the contract, at the time of its being passed, by the officer passing it; and no such period of imprisonment or unlawful absence so endorsed shall be reckoned as part of the term for which the labourer is bound to serve, but such term shall extend to such further period as shall be equivalent to the aggregate amount of the imprisonment and unlawful absence so endorsed.

If the inspector believe any estate or part thereof to be unfit for habitation, a committee shall be summoned.

112. If an inspector of labourers shall at any time have reason to believe that any estate or portion of an estate situated within the limits of his jurisdiction is by reason of climate or situation unfit for human habitation, such inspector shall give notice in writing of his opinion to the magistrate of the district, and such magistrate shall forthwith summon a committee to inquire into the fitness of such estate or portion thereof for human habitation. Such committee shall consist of the magistrate, the inspector of labourers, the medical officer of the district, and at least one employer of labourers resident in the district. Such committee shall proceed, with as little delay as possible, to inquire into the healthi-

ness of the estate or portion thereof to which the inspector's report has reference, and shall hear such evidence on the subject as the owner of such estate or portion of the estate as aforesaid, or the employer or inspector, may desire to place before it; and if such committee, or the major part in number thereof, shall be of opinion that such estate or any portion thereof is unfit for human habitation, it shall record a finding to that effect; and the contract of every labourer who shall have contracted to serve on such estate shall thereupon be null and void as regards such estate or such portion thereof as may be found unfit for human habitation. Provided, however, that every such contract shall continue valid with regard to any other portion of such estate, or to any other estate of the same employer.

Penalty on permitting labourers to reside on unhealthy estates.

113. Every employer who shall cause or permit any labourer to reside upon any such estate or portion of an estate as, under the provisions of the section last preceding, may have been found to be unfit for human habitation, shall be liable to fine. Provided always that in case it shall appear to the inspector that any such estate, or portion of an estate, or any part of such portion, has become fit for human habitation, he shall give under his hand a certificate of such fitness, and no employer shall be liable to fine by reason of his causing or permitting labourers to reside in any place respecting which such certificate of fitness shall have been given.

Penalty for any offence not specially provided for.

114. For every offence against the provisions of this Act, for which no special penalty or amount of fine is hereinbefore appointed, the offender shall be liable to a fine not exceeding 200 rupees. Wherever in this Act no special term of imprisonment is appointed in default of payment of the fine, the offender shall be liable to imprisonment, simple or rigorous, for a term not exceeding one month.

EAST INDIA (CACHAR).

COPIES of CORRESPONDENCE between the India Office and the Government of *India* on the subject of the Irruption of HILL TRIBES into *Cachar*; of MEMORIALS presented to either the Home or Local Government; and, RETURNS of the Quantity of LAND Sold by the Government of *India* for TEA Planting in *Cachar*, the Price paid for it, and the Rent reserved; &c.

(*Mr. Magniac.*)

Ordered, by The House of Commons, *to be Printed*,
1 *August* 1871.

398.

Under 6 *oz.*

EAST INDIA (CACHAR).

RETURN to an Address of the Honourable The House of Commons, dated 7 February 1872;—*for*,

"COPY of Further CORRESPONDENCE on the Subject of the LOOSHAI RAIDS and the consequent Hostilities (in continuation of Parliamentary Paper, No. 398, of Session 1871)."

India Office,
22 April 1872.

J. R. MELVILLE,
Assistant Secretary, Political Department.

(*Mr. Magniac.*)

Ordered, by The House of Commons, *to be Printed*,
28 *May* 1872.

BOMBAY BRANCH
OF THE
Royal Asiatic Society.
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COPY of Further CORRESPONDENCE on the Subject of the LOOSHAI RAIDS and the consequent Hostilities thereon (in continuation of Parliamentary Paper, No. 398, of Session 1871)."

(No. 53, of 1871.)

Government of India.—Foreign Department.—Political.

To His Grace the Duke of *Argyll*, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

My Lord Duke, Fort William, 22 March 1871.

IN continuation of the correspondence forwarded with our Despatch, No. 28,* dated 8th February 1871, relating to the recent Looshai raids in Hill Tipperah, Cachar, and Munnipoor, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a further collection of papers on the subject, as specified in the accompanying Abstract of Contents.

* Given in previous Return.

2. It is gratifying to us to state that, as already intimated to your Grace by telegraph, Mr. Edgar has arrived safe at Cachar.

3. Information is accumulating which, when it is complete, will probably enable us to pronounce with certainty as to the tribes who committed this series of outrages.

4. Recent attacks have been made by the Looshais on the outpost of Jhulnacherra, in the south of Cachar, and on a village near the post of Alinuggur, in the east of the Sylhet District, but they were repulsed in both quarters. In the latter place many of the raiders were wounded. At first only one body was recovered, which was to be photographed for the purpose of identifying the tribe. Since then two more bodies have been discovered.

Nos. 69 and 76 of the Abstract.

No. 77 of Abstract of Contents.

5. Nos. 81 to 86 in the Abstract relate to raids committed, subsequently to the above, in Hill Tipperah, to the east of Comilla.

6. Lastly, it will be seen from the entry, No. 75 in the Abstract, that the Political Agent of Munnipoor has reported an extensive raid on the north of Munnipoor, by Kutcha and Angamee Nagas.

We have, &c.
(signed) *Mayo.*
Napier of Magdala.
&c. &c.

From *J. W. Edgar*, Esq., Deputy Commissioner, Cachar, on Special Duty, to *F. B. Simson*, Esq., Commissioner of Dacca.—No. A.; dated Camp Changsil, 21st January 1871.

I HAVE the honour to submit an account of our proceedings since we left Cachar on our present tour, relating in detail what has occurred since my arrival here, but noting very briefly the chief features of the route by which we came, as Mr. Burland is preparing a careful record of it.

2. When a deputation from Sookpilal visited Silchar during the rains, two of the Muntrees promised that they would return in November and guide me to this place by the Rengtiphar route, which was quite unknown to all my people. I found, however, from reports brought down by traders, that the Looshais were not likely to keep their word, as they thought that if they remained away I should either come up by the Dullessur or by the hill route which we took last year; I therefore resolved to attempt the Rengti route without guides. But in order to excite as little suspicion as possible in the minds of the Looshais,

I sent a man by river to this place to inform them that I was coming by the Rengtipahar, and to ask them to send on men to meet me and guide me over the latter part of the way. Mr. Burland joined me on the 1st December, and was employed in making preparations for our march. This was a matter in which considerable care and forethought was required; for as we were entirely ignorant of the time our march was likely to take, and had to take all our supplies with us, it was of great importance that our coolies should carry the greatest amount of provisions possible.

3. On the 11th we started. The greater part of our coolies reached Dwarbund that evening; but as some did not come in till next morning, we had to halt a day at the garden. On the 13th we left the cultivated portion of the district, and got into forest. The country at first was quite flat, and we had to cross a small stream, the Jalingacherra, very often. We encamped at night on its bank. The necessity of bridging this stream in so many places would greatly increase the cost of the proposed new road if it were carried along our route; but, as I shall explain hereafter, I am now inclined to doubt the advisibility of adopting a starting-point so far north as Dwarbund. Next day our march lay across low but very steep ranges of hills. At night we encamped on the bank of the Kalacherra, at the foot of Rengtipahar. Here, some years ago, an attempt to open a tea garden was made. The unfortunate manager died in a few months, and the insane undertaking was abandoned. On the morning of the 15th we commenced the ascent of the Rengti, which we found tolerably easy; and there was a clear path cut for Mr. Davy, the revenue surveyor, some years ago. We halted at night on the side of the survey camp, which I consider to be the summit of the Rengti hill.

4. From this point to the peak, marked L. 12 in Major Macdonald's map, the route was tolerably level, and we had little difficulty in following up the old Kookie path. But at L. 12 the Rengti range seemed to come suddenly to an end, and we had to get down a pretty steep descent on the west side of the hill. At last we came to a neck connecting the range we were leaving with one to the west. We had then to ascend the latter, and I believe got to the summit of the peak marked D. in the map. From this hill we could see a spur running apparently right down to the Dullessur, the valley of which we could see clearly about 10 miles off. The spur I conjecture to be one which General Nuthall reached, but did not cross, in 1869. If this be the case, and if a tolerable track should be found along the top of the spur from the Dullessur to peak D., that would be clearly the best possible route into these hills. Before spending our money on the road from Dwarbund, I should like to have the country between the Dullessur and the high hills explored. I have asked Mr. McWilliam to do this, and he has written that he will make an attempt after Lord Napier's visit to Silchar in February next.

5. From the summit of peak D. the route was tolerably level, until we reached the point at which we crossed the range last year. After we had gone some way further south, the path-cutters, who were in front, came upon two armed Looshais, who asked whether we had come as friends or enemies. Our people said that we were friendly. The Looshais then fired in the air, and ran off into the forest. On going a little further we found that some more, probably four, had been eating by the roadside, and had also run away on hearing the shots, leaving their food behind them. We followed in the track of these people until we came to a considerable stream, over which was a remarkably good camping ground. Up to this we had come, as we have since learnt, by the best possible route; but on the following day, the 21st, we made some mistake, and missing the line along the high ridge got entangled in the spurs which run down from it to the Dullessur. At last, on the 23rd, we came out on the river at a point which we knew, and we marched along its banks during that day, encamping on a pebbly bank in its bed at night.

6. Next morning, as we were about to start, Rajkishen, the man I had sent to tell the Looshais that I was on the way, came up the river, and with him the provision boats. He gave the following account of himself:—He arrived at Changsil on the 15th, and at once sent up to inform the nearest village. Next day a Looshai, whom we had seen last year, came down to a place close to this, and sent for some Munnipooree traders who were here. He told them that he was afraid to come down to Rajkishen's boat, and asked the latter to go to him. Rajkishen went, and found the Looshai sitting on a rock with seven armed men round him. He said that Ruttungpi had sent up messengers to all the chiefs on this side to inform them that the Deputy Commissioner of the Chittagong Hill Tracts had taken two chiefs prisoners, that he was going to attack more, and that I was going to seize all the chiefs on this side. The Looshai said that the people believed this, that the women and children had been hidden in the forests, and that the men were prepared to fight in case of an attack.

Rajkishen did all he could to persuade him that Rutton Pooea's story was false, at least as far as I was concerned; but this had no effect, and the Looshais went off. Next day Rajkishen sent the traders to the village. They returned with probably an exaggerated account of the rage and terror of the Looshais. Rajkishen thought it best to go down the river, turn back with the provision boats, and open communication with me by the route we had taken in crossing from the Sonai last year. Fortunately he had not gone very far when he saw the smoke of our camp fires on the hills over the river, and so he waited for us.

7. We all then came on to this place, nearly three miles higher up the river, and 2½ north of our encamping ground of last year. As the river south of this is rather difficult,

and

and as this place is very well suited for a camp, we resolved to remain here. Next morning, the 25th, several Muntrees from the chief villages round, headed by one from Sookpilal, came in; they told me that they had found out that Rutton Pooea's message was a lie; that Sookpilal had then sent them on to meet me, and that they had gone along the ridge until they found our track; but that seeing we had gone in the direction of the river, they had come down here as fast as they could. They said that they had heard that the Deputy Commissioner of the tracts had been in Rutton Pooea's village, and that the Syloos had gone or were going to him; but they did not know whether he had got any further. They promised, however, to send to inquire about his movements, and to give him all the aid in their power to get from the boundary of the Syloos to this place; but they said they could do nothing whatever to help him as long as he was among the southern people.

They told me that they did not think Sookpilal would come here as he was getting very feeble; but that he would send his eldest son, Lallchung, who is to succeed him in the western villages, and whom I had not yet seen. I said that I could only discuss the important points that we had to settle with Sookpilal in person, and that, if he could not come to me, I should not object to go to him. His muntree then said, he would go to Sookpilal and tell him all this; but as he was footsore, he asked for a day's rest; he finally started on the 27th.

8. The Muntree Rowa did not return till the 6th. He said that he had been sent by Sookpilal to Rutton Pooea's village to find out all about the Chittagong party, and that he had heard that they had returned from the village of Lalgnooru, Savoong's son, after satisfactory interviews with several of the principal chiefs. Rowa at first feared about Sookpilal's coming, but, after a little, acknowledged that he was on the way.

Up to this time there had been an evident uneasiness in the minds of all the Looshais we had seen. We had allowed some traders to accompany us, and they had established a bazaar a little way down the river. The Looshais had to pass through our camp to get to this. They used to come in considerable numbers, but they always went straight through, and when we sometimes called up one or two to give them cheroots, they were plainly in the utmost terror until they had got out of our reach.

One day Mr. Burland and I started to trace out the land route to Beparibazar. In trying to get this, we stumbled on the path leading to the villages. We had gone along this for one or two miles, when we met two Looshai traders coming in with rubber. The first came on us so suddenly that he had no time to think, but the other, who was behind, threw down his basket and ran away. We made the first man put both loads into his basket, and return with us. Next day, after selling his rubber, he went back to his village, and found that his companion had gone back as hard as he could to report that they had met us on our way to destroy the village; that we had taken one of them prisoner, and would have taken both if he (the other) had not run away. Altogether I had reason to fear that the confidence I had been at such pains to inspire last year had been entirely lost. I attributed this chiefly to the intrigues of Rutton Pooea, another in the long list of injuries he has done to us.

9. Even before Rowa's return, however, there was some improvement, and very soon after all trace of suspicion disappeared. First, the men began to hang about us, wondering at us and at everything we did or said, in the same child-like way they did last year. Then boys came in, at first big ones; then troops of youngsters under the charge of a monitor; then perfect mites appeared by themselves to get a bottle, or what they seemed to like even better, a newspaper.

After this we had visits from a few old women. They seemed to have given such a good account of their reception, that numbers of younger women induced their husbands to bring them in, and now very little girls constantly make their appearance.

In the evening a party generally comes and sits round our fire, talking, smoking, singing songs, and sometimes, when there are many boys, they get up wrestling matches or acrobatic and gymnastic performances.

Their agility is surprising, and would excite the envy of many a trained acrobat.

In the daytime they are constantly with us, and even as I write there is a crowd around me, looking on with wonder and admiration; for they appreciate the advantages of being able to write, and some of them have even asked about the possibility of getting their children taught. They said that they could not send them to Silchar, and that they could not pay a teacher to come up and live amongst them; but with characteristic ingenuity they suggested that a man might come and live here, where they would give him all the facilities possible to trade, on condition of his teaching such children as they might send to him.

Hurry Tagore is very anxious to make the experiment, but I think it premature at present. Next year possibly I may see my way more clearly.

10. On the 14th, Sookpilal came to the hill which overhangs our camp. I did not see him on that day or the next, as I wished, before doing so, to have all the terms of the Sunnud fully explained to him, and the question of the boundary settled.

I therefore sent Hurry Tagore to discuss the different points. He found that Sookpilal and his muntrees, although they claimed Pauchpir-ka-mokam as the boundary previously fixed by us, had no very strong desire for any land north of Byrubbicherra, and after a little talk they said they would be satisfied to take the latter as the point where the

boundary should cross the Dullessur. They agreed to observe all the conditions of the Sunnud, but, with reference to the clauses about referring disputes to the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar, they asked what had been done in the matter of a complaint which they had made to me last year against some Poitoo Kookies living in Hill Tipperah. They also asked whether we should be willing to assist them by giving them ammunition in case of their being pressed hard by the tribes to the south and east. They seemed very much pleased with the assurance that they were not to be interfered with as long as they kept the conditions of the Sunnud; and, in talking about this, Sookpilal incidentally mentioned that nothing but the dread of our interference in their internal affairs has hitherto prevented his people from moving to the north.

As his feet had suffered very much in the journey from his village, and the descent of the hill is very steep, Hurry Tagore promised to ask me to meet him on the top. This I at once consented to do.

11. On the following day Mr. Burland and I, with Inspector Dost Mahomed, and Hurry Tagore, went to the top of the hill. Here we found Sookpilal surrounded by his muntrees. He was dressed rather better than last year, and had in his turban a silver ornament with a plume of bhumraj feathers rising out of it. His head Muntree had a smaller and less handsome plume in his turban. Sookpilal looked much older and feebler than he did last year, but his intelligence did not seem at all lessened. After some mutual compliments, I had the Sunnud read, and explained clause by clause. I was very particular in explaining the boundary, and I think he is perfectly satisfied with it. But he told me that he only accepted the boundary, and responsibility for its safety, from Chutercherra to the Sonai; that he had no authority east of the Sonai; and that for that part of the district I must arrange with the eastern chiefs.

When I came to the clause about the reference of disputes, I explained to him that arrangements were being made with reference to Hill Tipperah, and that as soon as ever they were completed, inquiry into his complaint would be made. He and all his muntrees expressed themselves perfectly satisfied with this. They said that they had feared that I had let the matter drop. When we got to the clause about preventing raids from the east and south, I said that, if they fulfilled all the conditions of the Sunnud, and showed clearly that they really meant to behave well, we should, in two or three years, take into consideration the question of helping them with arms and ammunition. I said that at present we could not think of such a measure, as they had never before been really friendly towards us, and frequently had been guilty of gross misconduct; that I had only seen Sookpilal twice; that they had been well-behaved for only one year, and that I did not consider this is a sufficient guarantee for the future. Sookpilal laughed at this, and nodded his head at me saying, "Right, very right;" and he and his people were evidently much pleased at the conditional promise. After I was satisfied that they thoroughly understood the Sunnud, and accepted the conditions, I signed it, and handed it to Sookpilal. The head muntree suggested that Hurry Tagore should sign as witness, and when this was done, it was packed up carefully in a bamboo choonga, and made over by Sookpilal to the head muntree. We then made some arrangements calculated to facilitate trade and to protect traders. I gave Sookpilal a railway rug and some other things. He gave me a cloth of the kind worn only by chiefs. We drank to one another, and then I went off, after getting Sookpilal to appoint two of his muntrees to act as guides to the Sonai.

12. I think there are good grounds for hoping that Sookpilal and his people will keep the conditions of the Sunnud, but there is also reason to fear that they may attempt to play the game which Ruttunpai has found so paying in the Chittagong hill tracts. Just before Sookpilal came in, I got a message from him to the effect that a party of Sylhoos from the village Savoong, had gone along the Hachok range in the direction of Adumpoor. He afterwards sent word that they had gone in the direction of Hill Tipperah, although I did not put much faith in this report. I asked Mr. McWilliam to send information to Sylhet and Chittagong. Again, on the day after Sookpilal left, a man was produced who said that he had been sent from the Sonai to give me information that a raiding party, headed by Lenkom, the son of Vonolel, were on their way northwards, that at present they were south of Dallong, that they meant to cross the Sonai and march down the Rengtipahar into Cachar, but that all the eastern chiefs were preparing to oppose them. I sent notice of this to Cachar, and at the same time proposed to start at once with my guard and cut up the raiders. The muntrees said that I had better wait for further information; and next morning I was informed, as I expected, that the raiders had been dispersed by the eastern chiefs. Next day, however, news came in that the dispersed raiders had again collected together and, making a détour by night, had got on the Rengti so far north as to be beyond reach of my pursuit. It was now pretty clear that the whole story was a falsification; however, I said that Cachar was in no danger, as I had already given warning to the guards, and directed them to disperse and follow up the raiders, while I should take my guard to the top of the hill and so catch them as they retreated. Of course, next morning news came in that the chiefs had overtaken the raiding party and finally dispersed them with a great loss.

The man who brought this news said that he had come more than 20 miles that morning, and asked to be rewarded with a soda-water bottle. I did not refuse it. Although I did not believe at any time that there was much in these rumours, still I had to give warning to the Cachar authorities at the risk of exciting much uneasiness in the district. But what I dislike most in the matter is the likeness these raiding parties bear to the probably equally mythical raiders so frequently traced back to Ruttonpai. However, the Looshais saw

plainly

plainly that I did not believe them, and they are not likely to make any profit out of the transaction.

13. On the 18th, Lallchung, the eldest son of Sookpilal, paid me a visit. This was the most satisfactory interview I have had yet, for Lallchung came boldly to my bungalow with only a few attendants. He seemed a little nervous at first, but in a few minutes became quite self-possessed, and discussed all the conditions of the Sonnud in a very intelligent manner. I asked him about the raiding parties. He said that he knew nothing about them, that he had heard the same story as I had, but that he could not say whether it was true or false. He very much admired a revolver I showed him, and did not show any nervousness when I fired a round. He asked for the empty cartridges to keep as curiosities. But he seemed to understand the mechanism at once, and like all the Looshais, was greatly taken with the central-fire principle. I once saw a man who was shown a Snider of Mr. Burland's for the first time; after examining it carefully, turned round and explained to his companions how the cartridge was made to explode. After Lallchung, came the relatives and representatives of some other neighbouring but unimportant chiefs.

14. The impetus that has been given to trade with the Looshais by the arrangements made last year has been considerable. More than 1,000 maunds of a single article, India-rubber, have been exported to Cachar within the last ten months. The value of this in Silchar was much over 30,000 rupees, and I believe in Calcutta the price has been far higher. The traders who accompanied me to this place returned two days ago, having sold all that they had brought with them, and taken down instead 211 maunds of rubber, besides ivory, wax, cotton, and some other things. Since they left, more than 40 maunds of rubber have been brought into camp, in one corner of which I found to-day a kind of scratch bazar held by a Munnipooree, who, in coming to see me on business of his own, had the forethought to provide himself with some necklaces, a Kookie jungle-cutter, and one of our Looshai guides who had collected a small store of odds and ends by continually begging from us. These three men had taken several hundred rupees' worth of rubber in a few hours.

One very important result of the rubber trade is the partial abandonment of the salt springs. Some, indeed, seem not to be worked this year. This was not expected by our traders, who, in consequence, were not able to supply the demand. On their arrival here they sent down for large additional quantities, but these also have proved insufficient. I have sent notice of this to some traders whom I expect to meet on the Sonai, and advised them to invest chiefly in salt. The profit made by both parties on this article is enormous. A Looshai who was aked why he had given up salt-making, said that he could not manufacture so much in three months as he gets here in exchange for the India-rubber he has collected in one month. The trader, on the other hand, makes at least a hundred per cent. on his salt. I have tried all legitimate means to get the Looshais a large share of the profit arising out of the transactions, but they cannot be made in any way to understand the exchange value of their rubber.

It is quite amusing, when one remembers the fallacies on the subject of values which were so lately current in the civilised world, to find these people unable to comprehend any standard except the cost of production, unless in the case of monopolies, the disturbing effects of which they are fully alive to.

At present they appear able to collect rubber with so little labour that they seem scarcely to think of producing anything else; but this state of things cannot last for more than a few years. In the meantime it must be our object to encourage a trade in other articles, which may take the place of rubber when the supply of the latter decreases. Besides forest products, such as ivory, wax, lac, &c., I can only at present think of cotton and potatoes, and neither of these seems to me very hopeful. The cotton the Looshais now grow in their farms is of a very inferior description, and even this, before being brought to market, has had all the longer staple picked out for home purposes. From this it will be seen that they have not yet come to look upon it as an article produced exclusively, or even chiefly, for the purposes of trade. This of course increases the difficulty, always great with hill men, of inducing them to adopt an improved system of cultivation. The Cotton Commissioner has, however, been asked for any information he can give about the culture of cotton under similar conditions. In introducing the potato, I hope rather that it may prove a resource, in case of the failure of a year's rice crop in the hills, than expect it will become an important item in our trade with the Looshais.

15. We hope to start for the Sonai either to-morrow or the day after. The muntrees promised to take us by a new route, which they say is the shortest and easiest of all.

One of our chief objects, after reaching the Sonai, will be to open communication, if possible, with the chiefs on the east and south.

Poiboi sent in muntrees during the rains with a pair of tusks. I advised the muntrees to make terms with the Raja of Munnipoor, and gave them a letter to the Political Agent.

Bhoota is, I have reason to believe, anxious to send representatives to me, but he feels nervous about it. In spite of the reports about Lenkom mentioned above, I think that he, as well as the other sons of Vonolel, will be found willing to be on good terms with us, as they are at present very hard pressed by the Shindoos, or some other tribe to the east of the watershed.

From *H. H. Metcalfe*, Esq., Assistant Commissioner of Hylakandy, to *O. G. R. Mc William*, Esq., Officiating Deputy Commissioner of Cachar, No. 18; dated Hylakandy, 11th February 1871.

In supplement to my Report, No. 15 of the 3rd instant, I have the honour to forward the statement of a female coolie who was taken by the raiders, but effected her escape. It has many details connected with the retreat of the hill-men, and with reference to their force, arms, and costume.

Statement of *Shalutri Culini* of Alexandrapoor Garden.

On a Monday, at about five o'clock in the morning, I was in my house in the lines when three Looshais entered my house and dragged me out of it and tied me up. Of the three men, one had a gun and the others dhows. They took me off with my child, aged three years, into the forest hill south of the garden. With me were taken off—

I saw the camp indications at the spot.

Gurwa Beharra.	Chotto Mitta.
Makund.	Dukhi.
Maunia.	Godai.
Mussumut Sari.	Mussumut Bimola.
„ Sudari.	„ Bubar.
„ Chotta Maughi.	„ Chotta Pooni.
„ Zelladi.	„ Thakuri.

Wife of khansama of Mr. Sellar.

Illegitimate daughter of Mr. Winchester.

Boy, Beni.	Boy, Son of Shookram.
„ Margra.	„ Harbalia.

Girl, daughter of Oullwa.

Probable, from the small force in which raiders attacked gardens.

Subsequently contradicted by deponent.

Probably wounded and died on the journey back, otherwise the bodies would have been disposed of at once.

This child is said to have been very fair, and the raiders probably thought it a full European.

Contradicted afterwards.

They took us off to the hill and the raiders were about 60 in number. Thirty of these remained in charge of us, and the other 30 went and attacked Katlicherra.

These latter went to the attack immediately after leaving us prisoners in the forest. They brought back from Katlicherra three prisoners, one a boy and two women. In the attacking party in Katlicherra three men were killed and brought back dead by companions. The raiders took the corpses two days' journey into forest, and then severing the heads from the bodies, threw the remains into different spots in the forest. They first placed fire in mouths of the corpses and then disposed of them. As they carried us prisoners off, the raiders drove us along, uttering the words *droo-droo*. They took us on eight days' journey from the garden, and gave us nothing at all to eat, but they fed Mr. Winchester's child thrice a day with boiled rice mixed with molasses. I did not ask for anything to eat, on the fear of being killed if I did so. On the first day's march eight other Looshais joined our party. I did not see any Cachari prisoners amongst us.

The first day of our journey no prisoner was killed, but the second day Mr. Sellar's table servant's wife was killed by the raiders. This was done because the Looshais demanded her clothes from her, and she refused to yield them on the ground that she would die from cold. The third day the Looshais shot Chotto Mitta, because owing to his suffering from tight bonds, he requested himself that they would kill him. No prisoners were killed on fourth, fifth, sixth, or seventh day. They only killed the persons I have just defined.

Up to the eighth day I had nothing given to me to eat, nor had any of us food except Mr. Winchester's daughter; we picked and ate the forest fruit "chotta." The Looshais during the night time kept us prisoners tied by both hands, and in the day they took us along by a rope tied to our left hands. At mid-day of each day the Looshais fed Mr. Winchester's child with an egg. On the night of the eighth day I bit through the ties on my hand with teeth and escaped. In escape I returned through the forest, and not by the road the Looshais had brought us. I went on for four days in this return in a north-westerly direction, and in my flight the sepoys of the guard discovered me. They found me four days ago.

Re-Examination.

This was the real time of the attack on garden.

Probable, from a piece of cloth I picked up on the trail. This piece was stiff and discoloured with grease and dirt and perhaps smoke.

One of the men who fired at us at the poonjee had a cloth round his head.

When I was seized by the Looshais in the lines, I had awoke from my sleep to prepare my meals and lit a fire, and the hour might probably be between 12 and 2 p.m. The day we were seized, the Looshais kept on a forest hill behind the garden's bungalow for the night, and in the morning 30 of the raiders remained in guard of us, and 30 set out and attacked Katlicherra. It was on this second day that the three dead Looshais were brought in. In the force of the 60 Looshais, about 10 had guns, and the rest spears and dhows. The Looshais wore coortas long and loose down to the thigh and coloured black from smoke. The coortas were short sleeved. They had cloth cummerbonds on round the waist, and no head clothes or "paigrees." They had each a bag suspended at the back, with tie across the forehead, and the bags were similar to a fukeer's bag; they were made of cloth; they

they had no underclothes on, but were naked. Their guns were single barrelled and had bayonets like Katlicherra guns. The Looshais were short men, and there were no Deswalis or up-country men amongst them. The females were not maltreated or raped. The Looshais had no shoes on their feet. They had no ornaments on either throats, hands, or feet, or ears. They had no goats' hair suspended round their necks. Their powder flasks were made out of buffalo horns. They wore long hair down to their waists, and had it tied in knot on the top of their heads. They let their hair down when they bathed. They cooked in earthen bowls, very thick in material, and which they had brought from their own country, and they cooked dâl inside bamboo choongas. The road we were taken lay south along top of the hill range for seven days, and we always followed the hill tops.

An embellishment or mistake, for in meeting the Looshais none of us saw a single bayonet.

The second day the Looshais also killed Secku Dosad and a woman Sari, and also Chotta Maugbi.

(signed) *H. H. Metcalfe.*

Hylakandy, 9 February 1871.

Examined again.

On the fourth day's journey from garden we came upon some four huts erected under the hill on which the path ran. They were made of bamboos, and thatched with plantation trees, and had Machans inside. We found them unoccupied when we entered them. The raiders smoked tobacco rolled up into chirruts.

Sketch and Looshais spear dropped by raiders.

Shaft, a white hard wood, said to be tea wood.

No. 119 T., dated Cachar, 15th February 1871.

COPY with enclosures submitted to the Government of Bengal for information. The undersigned believes all that the woman said was substantially true; at present it is hard to make out either the tribe which raided, or the locality the woman escaped from. But the party was small for such havoc as was made.

(signed) *F. B. Simson,* Commissioner.

No. 780, dated Fort William, 21st February 1871.

COPY submitted to the Government of India, in the Foreign Department, for information with the intimation that Major Graham, late Officiating Deputy Commissioner of the Hill Tracts of Chittagong, and Captain Lewin, the Deputy Commissioner, have been asked whether the woman's description of the raiders tallies with any of the Looshai tribes in the Hill Tracts.

No. 472 P., dated Fort William, 7 March 1871.

COPY forwarded to the Military Department for information.

From *H. LePoer Wynne,* Esq., Under Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Honourable *A. Eden,* Secretary to the Government of Bengal, No. 471 P.; dated Fort William, 7th March 1871.

WITH reference to your Office docket No. 780, dated 21 February 1871, and its enclosure, containing the statement of a female coolie (Shahstri), who was carried off from the Alexandrapoor tea garden, and effected her escape from the raiders, I am directed by the Viceroy and Governor General in Council to request that the authorities at Chittagong may be instructed to make every inquiry regarding Mr. Winchester's little girl Mary, who is alleged to have been carried away, and to take a careful note of any rumours in the Chittagong side of a girl answering to her description being in the hills.

TELEGRAM dated 22nd February 1871.

From Captain *T. H. Lewin,* Deputy Commissioner, Hill Tracts, Chittagong, to Honourable *A. E. Eden,* Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Calcutta.

ON the 7th, silver forks, &c., were brought for sale to Kassalong, by Syloo Kookies. They say that plunder was obtained from Sookpilal and Lalboora, and also that these chiefs raided on Cachar, killed one Englishman, and that two Englishmen were captured, and are in Sookpilal's villages. This is rumour only.

Letter will follow.

From *H. L. Harrison*, Esq., Junior Secretary to the Government of Bengal, to *C. U. Aitchison*, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, No. 896; dated Fort William, 1st March 1871.

WITH reference to the telegram dated the 22nd ult., from the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar, regarding the silver forks, &c., brought for sale to Kassalong by Syloo Kookies, and which are believed to have been plundered by the Looshais in the late raids on Cachar tea gardens, I am directed to state, for the information of the Government of India, that the articles in question have been received with the accompanying copy of a letter, No. 267, dated 22nd idem, from the Officiating Joint Magistrate of Chittagong. Mr. Bagshawe, the manager of the Katlicherra garden (adjacent to Alexandrapoor, and also attacked by the raiders), who is now in Calcutta, has seen the plundered articles, but though he thinks they came from Alexandrapoor, where Mr. Winchester was murdered, he is unable to identify them. They are now being dispatched to the Commissioner of Dacca, who is now at Cachar for identification, if possible.

From *F. W. R. Cowley*, Esq., Officiating Joint Magistrate in Charge, Chittagong, to Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department, No. 267; dated Chittagong, 22nd February 1871.

I HAVE the honour to report that I have this day forwarded to you by steamer letter post in a registered cover, two table forks, one dessert fork, one teaspoon, one saltspoon, one knife rest, two bangles, and one piece of a silver ornament, received from the Deputy Commissioner of the Hill Tracts. That officer states that these articles had been brought for sale to the Kassalong Bazar, by Looshais of Saboonga's village, who said that they had obtained them from Sookpilal. They are sent with a view to obtaining their identification, I believe.

From Captain *T. H. Lewin* (Demi-Official), to *S. C. Bayley*, Esq., Officiating Secretary to Government of Bengal, Judicial Department; dated Rungamutiee, 21st February 1871.

SOME men of Saboonga's village (Saboonga is a chief among the Syloo class of the Looshai, and very powerful), have brought into our Kassalong bazar for sale the following articles:—

1	Plated knife rest - - - - - -	English.
2	„ table forks - - - - - -	
1	„ „ spoon - - - - - -	
1	„ saltspoon - - - - - -	
1	Bangle - - - - - - - -	Bengalee.
2	Bits of bracelet - - - - - -	

The Looshais, in whose possession these things were found, state that their Chief Saboonga bought them from Sookpilal. Now Sookpilal is the chief with whom Edgar of Cachar was last heard of, and these forks would suggest some uncomfortable doubts as to his safety. On the other hand, the finding with these articles of European manufacture, of bangles and bracelets unmistakably of Bengalee make, leaves one to believe that they have been obtained by Sookpilal in barter, and formed part of the plunder obtained in the late Cachar raids. We know that a bungalow was plundered when poor Winchester was killed, which would account for the forks, &c. I have kept the property, and shall forward it through Raban to you for identification by the Cachar authorities. The Looshais in whose possession these things were found, I have released, seeing no reason to doubt their story, and knowing that only harm could result by my detaining them (by so doing their clan would probably attack our villages to capture men in exchange), I have asked Raban to telegraph to Government, if he thinks it necessary. I do not think the matter of importance sufficient to telegraph, save only as it relates to Edgar.

P.S.—The Kookies say that Sookpilal and Lalboora were the chiefs who raided on Cachar, that they killed an Englishman there, and that two more Englishmen were made captives, and are now in Sookpilal's village.

From *H. LePoer Wynne*, Esq., Under Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Honourable *A. Eden*, Secretary to the Government of Bengal, No. 475 P.; dated Fort William, 8th March 1871.

WITH reference to the docket from your Officiating Junior Secretary, No. 912, dated 1st March 1871, giving cover to a letter from Captain Lewin, regarding the offer for sale by some man of Saboonga's village of certain English forks, spoons, &c., and a few articles of native jewelry, supposed to have formed part of the plunder obtained in the late Cachar raids, I am directed by the Viceroy and Governor General in Council to request that a copy of Captain Lewin's letter may be forwarded to Mr. Edgar for his opinion in the matter.

TELEGRAM, dated 24th February 1871.

From Captain *T. H. Lewin*, Deputy Commissioner, Hill Tracts, Chittagong, to Hon. *Ashley Eden*, Secretary, Bengal Government, Calcutta, and Commissioner, Dacca.

RUTTUN POOEA has come in personally and sent for me to report that the Looshai chiefs, Saboonga, Lalboora, Rantsanga, and others are preparing to make a heavy attack on the district of Cachar by the Dalai stream. They are going in force to avenge the death of the men of their tribe who were killed in the late Cachar raids. Copy sent to Dacca Commissioner.

TELEGRAM, No. 407 P., dated 24th February 1871.

From *C. U. Aitchison*, Esq., C.S.I., Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, to Captain *T. H. Lewin* Deputy Commissioner, Hill Tracts, Chittagong.

YOUR telegram of to-day to Bengal Government. What is precise stream by which it is said Looshais intend to attack Cachar? Name Dalai not known here? Who is Rantsanga? Send immediately, by telegraph, all the information you can.

OFFICE MEMORANDUM, No. 408 P., dated Fort William, 24th February 1871.

From Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Military Department.

IN forwarding copies of the enclosed telegrams regarding an intended raid on Cachar by the Looshais, the undersigned is directed to request that the information may be communicated to General Bourchier by telegraph. The undersigned is further directed to express the hope of his Excellency in Council that every effort may be made, by scouts and otherwise, to procure information of the movements of the Looshais, and should there be any symptoms of an intended attack, that such steps may be taken as will ensure the punishment of the raiders. Additional assistance should be sent to General Bourchier, if required.

TELEGRAM, No. 410 P., dated 24th February 1871.

From Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, to Deputy Commissioner, Hill Tracts, Chittagong.

Clear the Line.—WITH reference to Ruttun Pooea's report, say by telegraph whether you think there is a possibility of raids being made in your direction instead of towards Cachar, which is now strongly occupied.

TELEGRAM, dated 27th February 1871.

From Deputy Commissioner, Hill Tracts, Chittagong, to Secretary, Bengal Government, Calcutta.

FOREIGN SECRETARY'S two telegrams received. The stream Dalai is supposed to be the Dullessur. Rantsanga is a chief of the Howlong clan. The Chittagong district is sufficiently protected. No raids are anticipated here. Scouts are out. Any information received will be communicated by telegraph. Letter will follow.

TELEGRAM, dated 25th February 1871.

From Lord *Napier of Magdala*, Commander in Chief, Cachar, to Lord *Mayo*, Viceroy, Calcutta.

Precedence.—RECEIVED telegram of (25th). General Bourchier has, I think, made the best practicable arrangements for protecting Cachar and Sylhet. At Monierkhall are (100) men (4th) Regiment, up the Sonai (106) men (44th) operating for Edgar's safety in two detachments, one under Lightfoot (54) men at Looshai Haut, the other under Bourne (62) men, moving up in support. At Nowarbund (76) men of (4th) under Lieutenant Smith at Dhurumkhall, (40) men (4th) under native officer. Colonel Hicks with (100) men (44th) is moving between Nowarbund and Jhulnacherra. A mounted messenger was (24) hours in bringing information of attack on Jhulnacherra to Cachar (50) miles. Three hours after

receipt of news, Lieutenant Williams, with (120) men (44th) and police, marched yesterday at (10) a.m., and arrive to-night. All detachments ordered to attack and follow up marauders. The country is so destitute of roads that success in pursuit is very doubtful. Rutton Pooea's information was received last night. Unfortunately indicated an unknown river.

TELEGRAM, No. 6774, dated 26th February 1871.

From General *Bourchier*, C.B., Cachar, to Secretary to Government, Military Department Calcutta.

CONSEQUENT on intelligence of anticipated raid on frontier, it is necessary to move troops to Cachar frontier. Head quarters and wing 4th are ordered to Cachar, two companies 42nd from Shillong to Sylhet, and 100 men from Gowhatty to Shillong. My great want is an intelligence department. I am organising detachment of 30 mounted men to communicate with detachments above, with sanction of Commander-in-Chief.

TELEGRAM, No. 6836, dated 26th February 1871.

From Commander-in-Chief, Cachar, to Lord *Mayo*, Calcutta.

HAVE I your authority to order clearance by ordinary labour of such roadways as I find necessary, and when I can employ troops can I give them sapper working pay?—less will not do.

TELEGRAM, No. 104, dated 27th February 1871.

From Viceroy, Calcutta, to Commander-in-Chief, Cachar.

YOU have full authority to cause such roadways and tracks to be opened as you may think necessary for the protection of the district, or the punishment of the marauders.

You can authorise sapper working pay, if necessary, as a temporary measure.

TELEGRAM, dated 5th March 1871.

From General *Bourchier*, Cachar, to Quartermaster General and Secretary to Government, Military Department, Sylhet and Calcutta.

DHABAI River, in Sylhet, near Allynugger. *See* Map.

From *F. B. Simson*, Esq., Commissioner of the Dacca Division, to Honourable *A. Eden*, Secretary to the Government of Bengal, No. 182 T.; dated Cachar, 24th February 1871.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that information was received early this morning that Jhulnacherra Garden had been attacked at 6.30 a.m. on the 23rd, yesterday, and assistance was asked for.

2. It was said in one of the letters that the raiders had been repulsed; and as messengers had been sent to Mr. McWilliam and to the district superintendent of police, Mr. Daly, and to Mr. Metcalfe, at Hylakandy, it is probably true that the attack of the raiders failed.

3. Mr. Metcalfe had called in the guard from the Chuttachoora range; Mr. Savi, assistant superintendent of police, was with him. Most of the outlying gardens have small detachments of police stationed in them. Mr. Daly starts at once with 40 police, who were ready; he takes a detachment of the 44th also, under Captain William, to Jhulnacherra.

4. There is a detachment of some 75 men of the 4th Native Infantry at Nowarbund. Possibly a large proportion of this force has already proceeded to Jhulnacherra, if so, Nowarbund will be strengthened to-day by some of the party accompanying Daly.

5. There is also a detachment of the 4th in the Monierkhall stockade. The detachment which returned to Monierkhall with Lieutenant Bourne, of the 44th Regiment, will again ascend the Sonai as a support to Captain Lightfoot, who went to Looshai Haut.

6. The Sylhet frontier is quite fully guarded with a company of the 4th at Chargola, and of the 44th at Alinuggur, and police posts at full strength; though, of course, it is quite impossible to have a detachment at every possible point.

7. A detachment

7. A detachment of troops will also be located in the neighbourhood of Claverhouse Garden. Thus all that can be required for defence has been done, and there are ample reserves both at Silchar and Sylhet.

8. Since writing the above, I have received a letter from Mr. Edgar, and enclose copy for the perusal of his Honor the Lieutenant Governor; it is not exactly official.

From *J. W. Edgar*, Esq. (Demi-official), to *F. B. Simson*, Esq., Commissioner of Dacca; dated Camp Punchung Kar, 21st February 1871.

MANY thanks for your note and letters from the 18th January to 15th February, and for all the anxiety and trouble you have taken about us. I got the first news from the station on the 20th, yesterday, and immediately set to making rafts for the trip down. I had heard much truth and lies from the Looshais, and have been employing myself in getting information, and, if possible, making arrangements for the furtherance of any measure that may be decided on for next year. I do not think that anything can be done now. My information, consistent all through, tends to show that the Katlcherra raid was made by Graham's friend, Saboonga; and I am in hopes, not very great, of being able to do something for the little girl. I think you will approve of what I have been doing since I came here. I cannot take any decisive measures, but I have done my best to make matters as smooth as possible with the people against whom we have no proof, and at the same time to clear the way for whatever action Government may take in the case of the undoubted offenders. I have also been careful not to say or do anything that could possibly pledge Government to any line of policy. My rafts are not ready, and I want to wait for a man whom I expect to-morrow with some information about the Hylakandy raiders. I think it will turn out that a very old friend of ours, Mischoilal, was some way connected with them. I shall certainly start on the 23rd, and then go as fast as I can, night and day, to Monierkhall. I may be in on the 28th; if I can, I shall.

P. S.—The Looshais say they lost 57 men at Monierkhall.

From Dr. *R. Brown*, Political Agent, Munnipoor, to *C. U. Aitchison*, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.—No. 12; dated Camp Meitheiphum, 25th January 1871.

I HAVE the honour to report for your information, that I have received news from Munnipoor of an attack having been made on a village situated in the hills south-east of the valley on the night of the 15th instant; the village was destroyed, 40 men, women, and children decapitated, and about 20 carried off.

2. Immediately on receipt of information troops to the number of 250 were at once despatched to the scene of the raid, but too late to be of service. They are still out in the hills trying to come upon traces of the raiders.

3. Although this raid has been made further to the east than any former attack by the Looshais, the Munnipoorees say that they are almost certain that that tribe are the perpetrators. I expect further information shortly, which will be communicated to you on receipt.

4. In spite of the above unfortunate event, attempts are still being made to open communications with the Eastern Looshai chiefs, with a view to arranging a meeting between them and myself.

No. 433 P., dated Fort William, 2nd March 1871.

Endorsed by Foreign Department.

COPY forwarded to the Government of Bengal for information.

From Dr. *R. Brown*, Political Agent, Munnipoor, to *C. U. Aitchison*, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, No. 16; dated Munnipoor, 8th February 1871.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that I yesterday forwarded to your address the folowing service telegram:—

"*All quiet in Munnipoor since 15th January. Reports of* Cachar disturbances received. *Nothing known here of movements of* Edgar and Burland. Rumoured that eastern *Looshais are fighting among themselves. Also that the* Shindoos and Kamhows have attacked and cut up two villages, one belonging to Vonolel's brother, the other to his son, killing many and carrying off captives."

2. The additional information I have been able to obtain regarding the raid to the south-east of the Munnipoor Valley, as reported in my letter No. 12, of 25th January 1871, does not amount to much, and still leaves the question uncertain as to what tribe of Kookies committed it; it is as follows.

3. Two villages were nearly simultaneously attacked in the early morning, one was a Khongjai village named Lengton; in this case the inhabitants were alarmed in time and all escaped; the village was afterwards destroyed. The other village named Anal Namfaw was surprised, 20 people killed and 50 carried off; 12 of this number have, it is said, since escaped; they have been sent for. The number of hill men who attacked the villages are estimated at about 1,000, and they were well armed with muskets.

4. Six Munnipoorees, three of them armed with muskets, and three with spears, of the village of Shoogoonoo, hearing of the disturbance, started to reconnoitre; on proceeding a short distance from the above village, they came upon an advance party of Looshais, and exchanged shots, one Looshai and one Munipooree being shot, and one Munipooree wounded with a spear (since dead); apparently concluding that the village was on the alert, the Looshais fell back.

5. The report of the officer in charge of the troops sent out, is to the effect that he followed up the traces of the retreating hill men, but saw nothing of them; he states also that their retreat was in the direction of the Looshai country. Troops remain close by the hills; in the event of disturbances being renewed, they will be ready to act. On the arrival of the escaped villagers, I hope to be able to identify the tribe that committed the raid.

From Dr. *R. Brown*, Political Agent, Munnipoor, to *C. U. Aitchison*, Esq., C. S. I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, No. 32; dated Munnipoor, 20th February 1871.

I HAVE the honour to submit, for the information of Government, the following account of Sawai Jamba, Major, Munnipoor, who has recently returned from Kheddah work to the south-west of Munnipoor, as it bears reference to the recent raiding by the Looshais in the Cachar District.

2. The Major states: "About 20th December last, while employed in Kheddah work close to the Barak river, about one and a half day's journey from the Government road, and near the Cachar frontier, I was informed by some Munnipooree traders belonging to the Cachar district, that about 20 armed Looshais had crossed the Barak into Munnipoor, but whether to raid or hunt they could not say; other armed bodies of Looshais had also been observed on the south of the river. Fearing disturbances, I wrote to the Rajah's agent at Luckipoor to ask Mr. McWilliam if anything should be done, as I thought a raid was intended. The reply, which arrived on the 1st January, was to the effect that Mr. McWilliam considered there was no danger, and as Mr. Edgar was in the Looshai country, no raiding would take place, and nothing should therefore be done.

"On the 30th December, one Naga and one Munnipoorie came to the Kheddah from the Kala Naga Thannah, two days' journey to the north-east of it; they reported that the Nagas of the Kala Naga village, while looking after their patches of cultivation a little way to the south, had come upon traces of the Looshais, but had not seen any of them. I told the Naga to return to his village, and not to desert it, as he said the villagers proposed doing, as I would see that they were protected, I, now anticipating more strongly that disturbances might occur, stockaded myself in a portion of the Kheddah.

"About eight days after this (8th January), 18 or 20 Looshais came down the river on a bamboo raft, and landed near the Kheddah; the Kookies with me also observed numbers of Looshais at this time in the jungles on the opposite side of the river. The men who disembarked from the raft called to the Munnipoorie Kookies, who could partly understand their language, and asked "What are you doing here; and why have you so many men and muskets?" The Kookies told the Looshais that they were there catching elephants. The Looshais were asked to what villages do you belong. They replied to Vonpilal and to Vonpilal's mothers' villages; immediately after this, the Looshais again got on their raft and went up the river.

"One day after this, I sent Kookies south of the Barak to ascertain if the Looshais seen in the jungle were still there; they reported that all had gone apparently in the direction of their own villages.

"On the 10th January I sent nine Munnipooree sepoys and one havildar in dinghies, with orders to go up the river as far as Tipai Mookh, about four days' journey up stream, and gain what information they could about the movements of the Looshais; they were only provided with one musket among them, as in the event of their meeting any hostile Looshais, their object was to make them understand they were only out on Kheddah work. These men returned on the 16th January, and reported as follows:—

"At a place named Kamundur, 3½ days after leaving the Kheddah, they first saw the Looshais, about 50 of them, all armed as if for a raid. They were comparatively friendly, though suspicious. When first seen they were on the Munnipoor side of the Barak; but on meeting the Munnipoorees, they at once crossed over to their own side. They said that they

they were out looking for indiarubber, and belonged to the villages under the chiefs Vonpilal and Poiboi. Continuing their journey to Tipaimookh, the Munnipoorees saw numerous bodies of Looshais in varying numbers, but amounting in the aggregate to some 200 or 300, all fully armed with musket, spear, and dao, as if out for a raid. From Tipaimookh they went to the newly established bazaar close by, which they found occupied as usual by Munnipoorees from Luckipoor, &c., and Looshais.

"On seeing the Munnipooree sepoys, the Looshais all left the bazaar. The Munnipooree traders informed them (the sepoys) that they carried on their business in the bazaar during the day; but at night they all slept in dinghies on the river, being afraid that the Looshais would attack them. After this visit to the Looshai bazaar, the Munnipoorees returned without further delay to the Kheddah.

"Three days after the return of the above (19th January) I received the news from Munnipoor of the burning of the Lengtong and Anal Namfaw villages to the south-east of the Munnipoor Valley.

"Seven days afterwards (26th January) news was received of the disturbances in Cachar, and of the murder of a European tea planter. During this interval of seven days no Looshais whatever were observed at or near the Kheddah. On the night of the 26th several shots were heard from the direction of the tea-garden of Dobeedurh, near the Kheddah; men were sent to inquire as to this, but it was found that the firing was not caused by any attack having been made on the place.

"The Kheddah after this was broken up, and I and my party left for Munnipoor on the 6th February, all being quiet on the road, the last news I heard before leaving being that Mr. Daly with his police had returned from Monierkhall to the station."

3. Such is the narrative of the major, which I have inquired into very carefully, verifying the dates given from the major's own diary, as they are important with reference to the Cachar outbreaks that towards Hylakandy, in which Mr. Winchester, of Alexandrapoor, was killed, taking place on the 23rd and 24th of January, and that on Monierkhall on the 27th and 28th, during which period the Looshais, who had collected in large numbers clearly armed for a raid either on Munnipoor or Cachar, having completely disappeared from the vicinity of the Kheddah, where the major was stationed. The major is of opinion that a raid on Munnipoor hill territory, close to the British frontier, was clearly contemplated, and that the fact of his being where he was with a considerable force, numbering 400 men, disconcerted the Looshai plans, and caused them to give up the idea. I have to add, that the above information has only now been communicated to me, I having been absent on duty to the north during the occurrences narrated.

4. I have no further information to afford regarding the raid on Munnipoor of the 15th January; but I am daily expecting the arrival of two women who escaped from the villages of the hill men by whom they were captured; their evidence will probably set at rest the point as to what tribe committed the outrage.

5. A copy of this letter has been forwarded to the Officiating Deputy Commissioner of Cachar for his information.

No. 514 A.P., dated Fort William, 14 March 1871.

COPY forwarded to the Government of Bengal, with a request that Mr. McWilliam may be called upon to report as to the truth or otherwise of the statement made by Sawai Jamba as to the communication made to and the reply received from him.

From *H. Le Poer Wynne*, Esq., Under Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Dr. *R. Brown*, Political Agent, Munnipoor, No. 514 P.; dated Fort William, 14 March 1871.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter (No. 32, dated 20th February 1871) forwarding an account given by Major Sawai Jamba, which bears reference to the recent raids in the Cachar district.

2. In reply, I am to convey to you the thanks of the Government of India for the information therein furnished.

From Dr. *R. Brown*, Political Agent, Munnipoor, to *C. U. Aitchison*, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, No. 34; dated Munnipoor, 22nd February 1871.

I HAVE the honour to report, for your information, the occurrence of a rather serious raid committed on Munnipoor territory by Nagas to the north of the Gordon and Bigg's line of 1842, comprising the following villages: Papalongmai, immediately north of the line, Konomah, Nachachoomah, and Rackoomah, situated, I understand, further north.

2. The deputation which arrived in Munnipoor with the information are from the Mow village of Wheelong, situated south of the Barak River, and not far from the line of 1842. Their account is, that villagers from the above-named attacked their village on the 10th of January, killing 13 and wounding severely three of their number. The raiders fired seven houses in the village, and carried off all the property and cattle they could lay their hands on. The Wheelong deputation also state that they believe many others have been killed outside the village, but they have not yet ascertained how many.

3. Another village close by, named Lemta, was looted by the same party, the villagers escaping into the jungle: the village was not fired. The village of Intoe, situated a considerable distance to the west, was also attacked, and it is said two men were killed. Redeemah, north of the Barak River, was also attacked and one man killed.

4. A report of the above has been sent to Lieutenant Butler, Deputy Commissioner of the Naga Hills Division, with a request that he will take steps to punish the perpetrators of the above raid.

5. The Munnipooree authorities have from time to time pointed out to me the bad state of feeling existing amongst the tribes of Kutcha Nagas, whose villages lie between the Assam watershed and the line of 1842, which feeling has been increased since last year when, under the orders of Government, I directed the Munnipoorees to restrict themselves for the future, pending final orders, to the south of the line of 1842; in fact, the tribes in the tract above mentioned have come to the conclusion that they may now consider themselves as independent of all authority, either British or Munnipooree. Some of the villagers last year, during the visit of Lieutenant Butler and myself, openly stated that now that the Munnipooree authority was removed, they would commit raids on its territory; and this year the above officer informed me that the village of Beremah, which last year was apparently very friendly, was this year apparently closed against him, the villagers, to the number of 50, turning out armed with spears to oppose his progress. By a timely show of firmness, he caused them to retire, and entered the village.

6. I am informed also by the Munnipooree authorities that the above tribes are well supplied with fire-arms, which they conceal in their villages. They (the Munnipoorees) dread very much any combination amongst them, which they state would be a matter of even greater seriousness than the late disturbances to the south. In the event of any combined attack, the province of North Cachar would almost certainly be involved, and great damage done, as, according to a Munnipooree estimate, these tribes could collect without any difficulty about 2,000 fighting men.

7. The question of fire-arms amongst the northern tribes of Nagas is one of daily increasing importance. In conversation with Lieutenant Butler this year on this point, he informed me that he was well aware that the Angamee Nagas especially were accumulating fire-arms. As an example of how this desire for their possession is increasing, I am informed by the Munnipooree authorities on the most positive information, that the number of muskets known to be in the Angamee Naga village of Kohemah has increased within the last two years from 25 to 95. According to my information, the import of arms, gunpowder, and caps has been very active during the past year amongst the above, the chief source of supply being Assam.

From *H. Le Poer Wynne*, Esq., Under Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Honourable *A. Eden*, Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Political Department, No. 559 P.; dated, Fort William, 20th March 1871.

* No. 34, dated 22nd February 1871.

IN forwarding for the information of the Lieutenant Governor a copy of a letter* from the Political Agent, Munnipore, giving details of a raid of Nagas on that territory, I am directed by the Viceroy and Governor General in Council to inquire whether his Honor cannot suggest any additional precautions for preventing the importation of arms, gunpowder, and caps into the Naga tract from Assam.

TELEGRAM dated 28th February 1871.

From *H. C. Sutherland*, Esq., Sylhet, to Honourable *A. Eden*, Secretary to Government, Bengal, Calcutta.

ROBERTSON, with 20 sepoys of 44th and 15 police, had a skirmish with Looshais on 27th at 10 a.m. near Alinuggur, one of my frontier outposts. Looshais attacked a Kookee village; Robertson repulsed them. Many wounded, but carried off; one body secured, and in the station now. Shall photograph it, and keep carefully everything about it to identify tribe. No one wounded on our side.

TELEGRAM dated 5th March 1871.

From *H. C. Sutherland*, Esq., Sylhet, to Secretary of Bengal Government, Calcutta.

CAPTAIN ROBERTSON reports from Alinuggur outpost on the 4th instant. Raiders left immediate vicinity; gone right and left on range of hills to east of this.

They were Sookpilal's men. Lal Shoonga Sookpilal's son recognised by Kookies here.

Two more raiders' corpses found in jungle.

Captain Butler followed with a company of the 43rd, hoping to intercept the raiders on their retreat.

From *H. Le Poer Wynne*, Esq., Under Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Honourable *A. Eden*, Secretary to the Government of Bengal; No. 476 P., dated, Fort William, 8th March 1871

WITH reference to the telegram from Mr. Sutherland to your address, dated 5th March 1871, containing intelligence received from Captain Robertson from the Alinuggur outpost regarding the raiders, I am directed to request that a copy of the message in question may be forwarded to Mr. Edgar for report on the allegation regarding Sookpilal.

TELEGRAM dated 3rd March 1871.

From Lord *Napier of Magdala*, Cachar, to His Excellency Lord *Mayo*, Calcutta.

NOTHING has been heard of Looshais here since their repulse at Alinuggur, where they lost considerably, but there have been raids into Munnipore and Tipperah. It is the general opinion of the civil authorities here, in which I concur, that an expedition against the offending hill tribes next season is absolutely necessary to deter raiders.

From Honourable *A. Eden*, Secretary to the Government of Bengal in the Judicial Department, to *C. U. Aitchison*, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, No. 1044; dated Fort William, 9th March 1871.

IN continuation of previous communications, I am directed to submit herewith a copy of the papers noted in the margin, containing further information regarding the Looshai raids in Cachar, Sylhet, and Hill Tipperah.

1. From Commissioner of Dacca, No. 231 T., dated 1st March, with Enclosure, regarding raid at Julnacherra.
2. From Commissioner of Dacca, No. 236, dated 1st March, promising to carefully observe all marks, cloths, &c., to identify raiders.
3. From Magistrate of Sylhet, No. 136, dated 1st March, giving particulars of the repulse of raiders by Captain Robertson's party.
4. From Magistrate of Dacca, No. 334, dated 3rd March, reporting dispatch of a detachment of 4th Native Infantry to reinforce Hill Tipperah.

2. The Lieutenant-Governor has directed the issue of general instructions to the local officers, impressing on them, with reference to the repetition of raids in different parts of the frontier, the necessity of increased vigilance and continued exertions to obtain reliable information of the movements and doings of the hill tribes, and evidence as to those implicated in these outrages, and prompt action in checking and meeting future attacks.

3. These raids seem now to be more or less extended along the whole eastern frontier; they have, however, been checked with some loss to the raiders on two or three occasions; and his Honor has every confidence in the vigilance and activity of the local officers and of the military detachments that have been stationed at different parts of the frontier, in positions most suited to repel, or to aid in repelling, further attacks, under the personal direction of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

4. It does not seem possible to do more at present, and the Lieutenant Governor will defer making any further suggestions on the subject until his Excellency the Commander in Chief arrives, when the whole question as to what punishment should be inflicted on the offending tribes, and what measures should be adopted for the future protection of the frontier, will have to be considered in communication with the Government of India.

5. The thanks of Government will be conveyed to Khajeh Ashanoollah of Dacca through the Commissioner, for his promptitude in placing his steamer, "*Star of Dacca*," at the disposal of Government, to convey the detachment of the 4th Native Infantry from Dacca to Daoodcandy, *en route* to Comillah to reinforce the police in Hill Tipperah.

6. Captain Lewin, the Deputy Commissioner of the Hill Tracts, and Major Graham, the late Deputy Commissioner, have been requested to report whether, from the description given by Mr. Sutherland of the size, cloths, &c., of the Looshai killed by Captain Robertson's party at Alinuggur, they can say with any certainty to what tribe the man belonged. It is obviously of the greatest importance to ascertain, as far as possible, the names of the chiefs whose people have been engaged in these raids, and the extent to which they may be believed to have been acting in concert.

From *O. G. R. McWilliam*, Esq., Officiating Deputy Commissioner of Cachar, to Commissioner of the Dacca Division, No. 191; dated Cachar, 23th February 1871.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that I received yesterday demi-official letters from Messrs. Metcalfe and Daly, relating to the attack on Julnacherra, on the 23rd February.

2. It appears that early in the morning a party of 120 raiders, armed with daos and spears, supported by about 80 with guns, crossed the river from the western bank immediately under the coolie lines, which are at a considerable distance from the stockade. A patrolling party of five police, who were in the lines, fired upon the raiders, who retreated after killing three persons and wounding three others.

3. Messrs. Metcalfe and Savi, on hearing of the attack, started at once for Julnacherra, with a party of police collected from the gardens, on their road from Hylakandy, and including a party of 30 men who were stationed on the Chatterchoora range, and arrived at Julnacherra at eight or nine on the evening of the 23rd (24th?), and next morning Mr. Metcalfe crossed the river, and examined the trail of the raiders.

4. He followed a path in a southerly direction, evidently leading to the Chatterchoora range; the path showed signs of a rapid flight,—daos, fuel, rice, &c., being found on the ground, and blood marks were conspicuous in many points of their retreat.

5. Captain Williams and Mr. Daly, with a party of the 44th, and 40 of the police, arrived at Katlicherra on the evening of the 25th. Mr. Daly intended to leave 20 police at Katlicherra, and I believe a party of the 44th were sent to the Chatterchoora range to replace the party taken thence by Mr. Metcalfe.

This arrangement would leave 90 men of the police at Julnacherra.

From *F. B. Simson*, Esq., Commissioner of the Dacca Division, to Secretary to the Government of Bengal, No. 236 T.; dated Cachar, 1st March 1871.

WITH reference to the concluding paragraph of your letter, No. 796, dated the 22nd ultimo, requesting my report as to the identification of the tribe of Looshais, who are supposed to have been murdered in a jungle near Monierkhall, I have the honour to report, for the information of the Lieutenant-Governor, that in every possible case attention will be directed to all marks, clothes, &c., on Looshais, who may be shot, and whose bodies can be examined; that all clothes, ornaments, weapons, &c., obtained will be preserved, and every endeavour made to identify the tribes to which raiders may belong.

2. Mr. Edgar asserts that he knows the names of most of the chiefs who conducted the late raids and the villages they inhabit; all this will be reported in detail as soon as I can obtain the information in writing.

MEMORANDUM No. 137, dated Sylhet, 1st March 1871.

From *H. C. Sutherland*, Esq., Magistrate of Sylhet.

FORWARDED to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, for information.

From *H. C. Sutherland*, Esq., Magistrate of Sylhet, to Commissioner of the Dacca Division, No. 136; dated Sylhet, 1st March 1871.

I HASTEN to give you fuller details of the raid near Alinuggur which I telegraphed to you last night.

2. The police report, which is more circumstantial than Captain Robertson's, is to the effect that information was received at 8 a.m., on the morning of the 27th, of an attack by the Bamaleah Kookies on a punji of the Humurung Kookies at Naldhuri, at a little distance north-east of the outpost.

3. Immediately on the receipt of this information, Captain Robertson went out with 20 sepoys, 15 constables, one head constable, and the sub-inspector in charge of the outposts of

of Alinuggur and Adumpoor. Our force was just in time to prevent the raiders, who are said to have been some 300 strong, from escaping to the hills.

4. The raiders immediately opened fire, which was returned by our force, who succeeded in wounding many of the raiders. The wounded men were carried off at once by their brethren, as has always happened in the Looshai raids. One raider, however, was killed by head constable Shilai Thopa, who succeeded in bringing in the dead body, together with the gun, two Kookie daos, and about 10 or 12 guns belonging to the raiders.

5. I shall make further inquiries into the statement made by the head constable of his own achievements. If, on inquiry, it is proved to be true, I certainly think that the head constable deserves some substantial reward, and I trust that his claims will not be overlooked in the police department.

6. The most important success in this attack has been the capture of a dead Looshai, and of so many as 10 or 12 guns. I trust that we shall now be able to identify the tribe to which the raiders belong. From what I saw of the corpse last night, the raiders, whoever they may be, are certainly not the Howlong Kookies, of whom the Commissioner of Chittagong telegraphed when the raids first began. The Howlongs are said to be tall men, dressed in long black tunics or coats coming down below the knees. The dead Kookie in the station appears to be dressed in a white cotton jacket, and has a chudder exactly like the Munipooree chudders sold in the bazaar here. I shall give you fuller particulars on all these points in another letter. I am anxious to catch this morning's post to Cachar.

7. I think it would be as well if we give up speaking in future of Looshais, a name given to these hill tribes for the first time I believe by Mr. Edgar. Looshai is the name given to the hill tracts occupied by the men whom Mr. Edgar, and no one else, calls Looshais. These men are all called kachaks, having very possibly been corrupted into Kookie. Not a single man in the whole of the hill tracts knows whom we mean by Looshais. They know of Sookpilal's Kachaks, or Bonpilal's Kachaks, or, as in the present case, of Bameleah Kachaks. To perpetuate the mistake of speaking of Kachaks as Looshais, will only impart no small confusion into any ethnological inquiries which will be made some day in the hill tracts between Sylhet and Cachar on one side, and Chittagong on the other.

P.S.—I have just shown the dead body to Kunhai Sing, who must know perfectly well who the man is. But Kunhai Sing will say nothing about him.

From *D. R. Lyall*, Esq., Officiating Magistrate of Dacca, to Secretary to the Government of Bengal, No. 334, dated Dacca, 3 March 1871

In the Commissioner's absence, I think it right to communicate to you directly the following facts:—

2. Yesterday morning the assistant to the Commissioner received a telegram from the magistrate of Tipperah, reporting that there were Kookies in Hill Tipperah on the Goomtee, about 40 miles east of Comillah, and that they had fired on 10 men out wood cutting, of whom three were missing. He also applied for help.

3. I telegraphed for orders, and kept the part of the regiment here ready to start at once. I also telegraphed to Comillah to have carts ready at Daoodkandy. Last night, about seven, I received your telegram, ordering me to communicate with the Commissioner, which I did; and about half-an-hour later I got a telegram from the Government of India, ordering the troops to be sent off at once. I had sent for boats, but in the present unsettled weather there would have been considerable delay in crossing the Megna.

4. This delay has been obviated by Khajeh Ashanullah having placed his steamer the "Star of Dacca" at the disposal of Government, and I have this morning sent off the whole available strength, consisting of one subadar,* &c.

* 1 Subadar. 1 Jemadar. 4 Havildars. | 3 Naiks. 46 Sepoys, and 8 Camp followers.

5. As there was some doubt as to whether the steamer could quite reach Daoodkandy, I requested the district superintendent to accompany the men so far, and Mr. Weatherall started on half-an-hour's notice.

6. I have sent with them provisions for one month, and requested the magistrate of Tipperah to provide the necessary land carriage.

7. There being no caps in the magazine, I directed the district superintendent to supply 4,000 from his stock, which he did.

8. This morning a telegram arrived from the magistrate of Comillah, informing the Commissioner that 500 Kookies were reported on 1st March east of Chagalnaya, and that there were 80 police at that place. From this it would appear the men are moving south, and they may be merely the Cachar raiders in retreat. No further violence is reported.

9. If necessary, a police force can be also sent from here; but unless the magistrate of Tipperah asks for further help, I consider the men of the 4th Native Infantry sent will be sufficient. I have also done what I could towards expediting the progress of an officer to take command of the detachment by telegraphing to Mr. Pearce at Goalundo. It was impossible to do more on so short notice.

10. I hope you will bring to the notice of his Honor the Lieutenant Governor, the prompt manner in which Khajeh Ashanullah placed his steamer at the disposal of Government.

OFFICE MEMORANDUM, No. 554 P., dated Fort William, 17 March 1871.

From *H. Le Poer Wynne*, Esq., Under Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Military Department.

THE undersigned is directed by his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General in Council to forward to the Military Department a copy of a letter from the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, dated the 9th of March 1871, No. 1044, submitting a copy of further correspondence relative to the raids by the Looshais in Cachar, Sylhet, and Hill Tipperah, and to invite the attention of the Military Department to the statement made by the officiating magistrate of Dacca in his letter, No. 334, dated 3rd ultimo, that there were no percussion caps in the magazine at that place.

(No. 72 of 1871.)

Government of India.—Foreign Department.—Political.

To His Grace the Duke of *Argyll*, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

My Lord Duke. Simla, 9 May 1871.

IN continuation of our Despatch, dated the 21st December last, No. 257, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of the further papers enumerated in the accompanying abstract of contents, relative to the defence of the Chittagong frontier.

2. Our orders on this subject are contained in our Foreign Secretary's letter, dated the 17th April, No. 17 C.P. (forming No. 16 of the Abstract).

We have, &c.

(signed) *Mayo.*
Napier of Magdala.
&c. &c.

From the Honurable *A. Eden*, Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department (No. 789); dated Fort William, 21st February 1871.

IN continuation of my letter, No. 5614, of the 26th December last, I am directed to state that a copy of your letter, No. 2166 P. of the 12th idem, conveying the decision of the Government of India as to the policy to be observed in regard to the defence of the Chittagong frontier, was communicated to the Commissioner of the Chittagong Division, with the instructions, of which a copy* is forwarded herewith. I am now to submit, for the consideration of the Government of India, a copy of the Commissioner's reply,† giving cover to a sketch map and a letter from the Officiating Deputy Commissioner of the Hill Tracts, together with a later communication‡ received direct from the latter officer, in which he gives very important information regarding the recent raids in Cachar, and the state of the tribes supposed to be concerned in them.

* No. 5598 of the 23rd December 1870.
† No. 2002, dated 28th January 1871.
‡ No. 39 of the 5th February 1871, with enclosures.

2. The Lieutenant Governor desires again to urge strongly on his Excellency the Governor General in Council the very great importance of establishing the proposed advanced post in Rutton Pooea's village, near the Demagiri Falls. It is probable that, as Lord Ulick Browne surmises, his Excellency's disapproval of the measure was founded on a misapprehension of the object with which it was proposed. His Excellency considers it impolitic to extend our direct jurisdiction beyond the limits within which it is now exercised; but I am to say that it was never in the contemplation of the Lieutenant Governor that the establishment of the advanced post should in any way affect our civil administration,

or

or bring any fresh tract within the jurisdiction of the court of the officer in charge of the Hill Tracts. The duties of the officer in charge of the post would be entirely of a political and military character, though no doubt he would in time be able to exercise a considerable influence over the chiefs of the adjacent tribes. It will also be seen, from the accompanying copy of a memorandum by Captain Lewin, that the post will not be more than 20 miles in advance of the point up to which our joomeahs have already carried their cultivation.

3. The Lieutenant Governor entirely concurs with Lord Ulick Browne that this advanced post forms a most vital feature in any complete scheme of frontier defence on the Chittagong side. And it now seems to be no less important as a means of preventing future raids in Cachar and Sylhet by the tribes to the north-east of Chit agong. It is essential, in order to secure our hill subjects from frequent outrageous raids, to menace the strongholds of the hostile tribes, and to confirm and establish an ally, who, having once felt our power, is willing to preserve our goodwill, but who is within the reach of more powerful tribes, ready to visit on him the consequences of any evil wrought them by his means or through his information. We have for years tried to conciliate these tribes in vain. We have in vain established defensive posts to protect our joomeahs from their inroads. Their inroads still continue. One part of the Hill Tracts has indeed been free from their incursions owing to the moral effect caused by demonstrations of force; but away to the south, even as far as Arracan, and now to the north in Cachar, these war parties slay, plunder, and carry captive, without our being able either to prevent or punish them. For these reasons, the Lieutenant Governor considers it to be of the greatest importance to establish the advanced post proposed; and there seems the less objection to it, because, if Major Graham is correct in his assumptions, it is in accordance with the wishes of Rutton Pooea himself that this post should be established. The post must, of course, be a really strong and effective one, capable of maintaining itself against any combined attack of the hill tribes, and also capable of becoming a real standing menace to the Howlongs and Syloos. There seems much reason to believe that if such a post had existed during the past cold season we should have had no raids in Cachar, for the tribes would scarcely have dared to leave their villages in force, having a strong post within a day or two days' march of their villages.

4. As far as the Lieutenant Governor can see, the proposal is open to one objection, and that is this. There seems to be little doubt that the opposition of the Syloos to the advance of Major Graham in his late expedition, and possibly also the late raids, are the result of an honest and not unnatural conviction in the minds of the chiefs that the object of our explorations, and of our determination to open communications with them, arises from a desire to obtain possession of their territory. The Commissioner, to persuade them that we had no intentions of the sort, pointed to our relations with Rutton Pooea as an evidence of our disinterested policy. If we now go and take up a position in Rutton Pooea's village, the suspicion of the chiefs will receive strong confirmation, and will probably only be removed by judicious management on the part of the officer selected to command the post. Before the late raids, the Lieutenant Governor would have attached much force and weight to this objection; but in the face of what has lately occurred, he thinks that the British Government is compelled to adopt a policy which shall effectually defend our frontier, irrespective of such considerations as these. The tribes have forced us by their own acts into taking up an advanced position, and have forfeited all claims to be heard in the matter.

5. As regards the boundary line suggested in the 12th paragraph of your letter of the 12th December, it seems quite clear that, before such a line can be finally determined, the country must be carefully examined and surveyed. The Lieutenant Governor would draw the line to the west of the Sychul range if there was any possible means of doing so; but he understands from Major Graham this is absolutely impossible, the land to the west of that range being a series of broken and irregular spurs. If this be so, his Honor would open a good broad road down Demagiri range to the proposed new outpost in Rutton Pooea's village, and continue it along the blue line marked in the accompanying map down the Sychul range. He would not attempt at present to advance the outposts to this line, but would leave them where they are, connecting each post by two paths, one taking a north-eastern, the other a south-eastern direction, with the line of road. If this were done, and the posts themselves were connected by paths, the Lieutenant Governor thinks that a system of patrols could be kept up, which would render raiding very difficult, if not impossible. During the raiding season, parties should be kept constantly patrolling the line of road. The road could eventually be carried on to Cachar along the Demagiri range.

6. Major Graham (who is now in Calcutta) has been directed to put himself in immediate communication with the inspector general of police in respect of raising men for the frontier guard already sanctioned. A copy of the instructions issued on this subject, as well as on the question of the captives claiming our protection, is forwarded herewith for the information of the Government of India.

From the Honourable *A. Eden,* Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department, to the Commissioner of Chittagong (No. 5598); dated Fort William, the 23rd December 1870.

WITH reference to previous correspondence, I am directed to forward the accompanying copy of letters* addressed to the Government of India, on the question of the defence of the Chittagong frontier, and of the orders thereon.

* No. 4449, dated 28th Sept. 1870. No. 4709, dated 21st October 1870, with three enclosures, including Schedule (C). No. 2166 P, dated 12th December 1870.

2. The Government of India, it will be observed, has approved of the establishment of a line of defence along the frontier, and in this view has sanctioned a reorganisation of the police force in the hill tracts as a frontier guard, and an augmentation of its strength as shown in Schedule C of the letter above quoted, No. 4709, dated 21st October last.

3. It is the wish of his Excellency the Governor General in Council that Major Graham and Major Macdonald should give special attention to the question of determining the best line of defence. I am to request, therefore, that those officers may be informed that it will be their duty, on their return from their journey to the north to meet Mr. Edgar, to lay down a clear and defensible boundary line for the east and north-east of the hill tracts, the line to commence from the termination of the Arracan line, north of Talukmee, and to extend to the borders of Hill Tipperah. It will be their duty also to settle the situation of the posts which should be located upon this line and connected hereafter by cleared jungle paths. The main object to be kept in view in the determination of the boundary is to secure a well-defined line of defence, though at the same time care must be taken not to curtail unnecessarily the recognised jooming grounds of our tribes. The Joomeas must, however, be clearly warned that they are not to look for protection if they go beyond our posts.

4. As soon as the line has been locally settled, Major Macdonald should return to Calcutta. It will then remain for Major Graham to organise, in communication with the Commissioner and the inspector general of police, the frontier guard, special attention being given to the question of getting the hillmen to enlist. The improved status of the force will, it is hoped, operate as an inducement to men of this class to enter the service. In any case, all who enlist should be made clearly to understand that they will have to make their own stockades and posts, and be required, moreover, to construct roads, and do all the work of a corps of pioneers. A good broad road all along the frontier is very desirable. And it appears to the Lieutenant Governor that, with an available force of upwards of 500 pioneers, a first-rate system of frontier roads should in time be established, with strong stockaded posts. It will be a question for the inspector general of police, Lower Provinces, and Major Graham, to settle whether, now that the men are all to get pay at the rate of 10 rupees a month, it will be necessary to give them any special working pay. If working pay must still be given, it will be for the inspector general and the deputy commissioner to draw out rules on the subject, remembering that the contingent and other expenditure of the force must be kept as low as possible. Working pay should, in any case, be confined to road work, and should certainly not be given in connection with the erection of the necessary police buildings and stockades.

5. Major Graham's plans, including an estimate of the cost of paths, should be submitted with your opinion through the inspector general of police.

6. As regards the other points of policy, the system of annual mêlas should be continued and developed as far as possible. The tribes should be also encouraged to resort to our markets, and it would be well if the local officers took special care to see that they were protected from the imposition of traders. As to the question of the recovery of captives, the views of the Lieutenant Governor, as expressed in paragraph 8 of the letter to the Government of India, No. 4449, dated 28th September last, which have been concurred in by his Excellency the Governor General in Council, must be acted upon.

(No. 5599.)

COPY of the correspondence forwarded to the Officiating Inspector General of Police, Lower Provinces, for information and guidance.

From Lord *H. Ulick Browne*, Commissioner of Chittagong, to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department; No. 2002, dated Calcutta the 28th January 1871.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 5598, dated the 23rd December 1870, enclosing a copy of a letter No. 2166 P., dated 12th December 1870, from the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, sanctioning an increase to the police force of the hill tracts, and communicating orders as to the policy to be adopted towards the savage tribes of the eastern frontier, and the establishment of a line of boundary which shall be both the limit of our jurisdiction and the line of our frontier posts.

In reply, I beg to enclose a copy of a letter, No. 423, dated the 5th instant, from the deputy commissioner of the hill tracts, and to submit the following remarks. A rough sketch map is also enclosed.

2. I observe that the advanced post proposed to be established at the site of Rutton Pooea's old village has not been approved by the Government of India.

In communicating the orders to the deputy commissioner I wrote thus:—

"The advanced post at or near the site of Rutton Pooea's former village is not sanctioned. It is not quite clear how far this is owing to a misunderstanding that appears at the beginning of paragraph 12 of the letter of the Government of India, No. 2166 P., dated the 12th instant, as to our having intended to extend our civil jurisdiction with the advanced post, or, in other words, to extend it over the Kookies, which of course was never intended. I will notice this when writing to Government, as I think the advanced post the most important feature of all the revised arrangements; and it will then rest with the Lieutenant Governor to represent the matter to the Government of India or not, as his Honor thinks fit."

It was never intended by me, and I believe I am correct in thinking that it was never intended by the Lieutenant Governor, that our jurisdiction should be extended to the point where it was proposed to establish the advanced post. I intended our jurisdiction to be in no way altered or extended, and my object in recommending the establishment of that and similar posts was, that I thought its comparative proximity to the tribes, and specially to the Howlong tribe, as compared with the position of our present post, might aid in effecting the object of Government by deterring the Kookies from raiding in our territory; and also that in case, at any future time, it should be determined by Government to punish the Howlongs, the post would give us a good nucleus of men, and would at once establish the base of operations about four days nearer to the tribes to be attacked than our present base would be.

I do not know if the Governor General in Council's disapproval of the proposal was solely founded on the misunderstanding as to our intentions in the matter of jurisdiction; but I bring the matter to the notice of the Lieutenant Governor, especially as the Howlongs* have just committed another raid in the hill tracts, and several in the north. Major Graham's paragraph 2 refers to the proposed advanced post.

At the same time, if either the yellow or the blue line range referred to in paragraph 4 of this letter be adopted as a line of posts, the latter would be very much nearer the Howlongs and Syloos than our present posts. But then they would lack the strength suggested for the advanced posts.

3. As regards the captives, the orders received appear to be partly directed to the point that I especially referred for instructions, and partly to the general question of the recovery of the captives in the hands of the frontier tribes; as I wrote to the deputy commissioner, "I think it will be necessary for me to ask for some further orders on the point where the letters of the Governments of India and Bengal seem to be in conflict, though the views of the Lieutenant Governor have been in the main approved by the Government of India, viz., that in the event of the escaped captives reaching our officers in or near Kookie villages, on the one hand, the captives are neither to be ransomed nor given up, and, on the other, no collision is to be provoked, or cause given to the Kookie chiefs, &c., for reasonable dissatisfaction or grounds of excuse for committing raids."

In respect of the general question, I understand that our interference is not to be pushed at present, and that the recovery of the captives must be postponed till we have got into a better position with the savage tribes; but I submit that it is only fair to officers in the position of the deputy commissioners to give them definite orders as to the course they are to adopt in the case put in paragraph 18 of my letter No. 179, dated 25th August 1870, viz., when the deputy commissioner is at or near a Kookie village, a captive may manage to reach him, and then a refusal on the part of the deputy commissioner to either ransom or give up the captive would be very likely to provoke a collision at the time, or might provoke a raid afterwards; so I trust that definite orders will be issued as to what an officer is to do in such a case. The fourth and fifth paragraphs of the deputy commissioner's letter are on this subject.

4. Paragraphs

* The identity of the raiding tribe is not established as yet, but there is, from various circumstances, strong presumption that they were Howlongs.

4. Paragraphs 7 to 19 of the deputy commissioner's letter relate to the line of our civil jurisdiction and of our frontier line of posts, which it is intended by Government should be identical. Owing to the failure of the attempt of Majors Graham and Macdonald to get through the Syloo country, Major Macdonald had returned to Calcutta before the Government orders were received, and his opinion could not be taken at Chittagong on this subject. As he only saw a small portion of the hill tracts, viz., a part of the country to the north of the Kurnafoolee, he will scarcely be in a position to give an opinion founded on local knowledge or inspection of the country, as regards the greater part of the line.

The yellow line marking the Ohepoom range to the south of the Kurnafoolee in the sketch map enclosed, is the one that seems best calculated to meet the object of Government; but it is desirable that we should explore it, and the blue line marking the Seychal range to the south of the Kurnafoolee, before coming to a decision. I therefore recommend that these explorations be now made with special reference to the facility with which a road or good path can be constructed to the existing places suited for posts as regards the proximity of a sufficient supply of water, to the accessibility of the ranges from the streams running parallel to them and to their west, and by means of which the posts would be supplied. The streams must also be explored to see whether canoes can ascend them at all seasons. On all these points we know scarcely anything at present. If the blue line be eventually selected as regards the country south of the Kurnafoolee, I think the yellow line will have to be followed to the north of that river, as I believe there are Syloo villages on that part of the blue line. Major Graham can say how this is.

There will probably be considerable difficulty and some increased expenditure in keeping these posts supplied on either range.

5. In paragraphs 20 to 24 the deputy commissioner discusses the strength and position of the posts as he would have them at present, *i.e.*, until the Seychal and Oheepoom ranges have been examined. I concur in his proposals generally.

As I am about to take furlough, I submit a few general observations on the subject of the future guarding of the frontier by means of posts. It is probable that sites may be selected down the yellow or blue line from the north to the south of the hill tracks. A point opposite Gungaram post in the north would be the extreme point at which a post would be required for hill tracts purposes in that direction.

As regards the south, even if the line were extended to Tulukmee in the Akyab hills, it is a question whether this would sufficiently defend the south of the hill tracts about Phalaindong, near which the Khijaparah raid was committed, and whether the tributary Koomees of the Arracan hills will be prevented from raiding there, as on the last occasion they, I believe, came from the south of Tulukmee. At the same time if there are not enough police to have posts at Philaindong, Khamong, and Singophatye, as well as on the line drawn from Tulukmee, those posts should not be established.

I confess I have some doubts whether the increased force will be adequate to man a sufficient number of posts, to enable them to effect the object of Government in every respect, viz., to hold a post and to send out a party after raiders. I think 40 men is the very lowest number that would be equal to these two objects, and then only if the raiders were from 60 to 150 men.

6. Paragraphs 25 to 35 of Major Graham's letter deal with the organisation and pay of the increased police force. I concur with him as to the proposed reduction in the pay of various grades of the existing force being very inexpedient, as it would make the officers now in the district dissatisfied. On this point I would recommend that the existing force of every grade be paid exactly as at present (for even Major Graham's proposals would involve a decrease in some cases), and that the rest of the force—*i.e.*, all the *additional* force now sanctioned—be paid at the rates recommended by the deputy commissioner, except that I am in favour of extending our present system of three grades of sepoys or constables, at 9, 10, and 11 rupees, to the additional force, with a view to excite emulation.

I would change the nomenclature from police to military, as the force would like to be called subadars, sepoys, &c.

7. As regards extra pay for special work, the deputy commissioner makes no specific proposals. I am inclined to recommend that nothing but road work be treated as an extra, and for that I would give three annas a man a day.

8. *The Composition of the Force.*—The enlistment of Goork has being prohibited, I would enlist the north-west races mentioned in paragraph 42 of the deputy commissioner's letter in their stead. But the deputy commissioner's detailed figures provide for the advanced post, which has not been sanctioned.

I think that very few more of our own hill men can be enlisted with advantage. A certain number of them is necessary, and that number we have now, but they are not fighting men.

9. No estimate of the cost of making the paths can be submitted till the two ranges have been explored. The estimates should be made simultaneously with the explorations.

10. As regards the projected main road or path between the hill tracts and Baparee Bazar, it will be perceived from the reports just submitted of the result of Major Graham's trip to the Syloo country that he was able to examine the country for a short distance only. But from the nature of the top of the range, marked yellow, Major Graham says he thinks

that for a considerable distance it will be very suitable indeed for a path. I recommend that the range be explored as far as within sight of Sookpilal's villages, if, as is supposed, they lie between that line and Baparee Bazar. It seems doubtful if it would be psssible to avoid passing through Sookpilal's country, except perhaps by a much longer and much more difficult route from Gungaram.

Neither the inspector general nor Major Macdonald has yet been consulted, it will be observed; but as I am about to leave the country, I submit this report at once.

From Major *J. M. Graham*, Officiating Deputy Commissioner of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, to the Commissioner of the Chittagong Division, No. 423, dated Kassalan, the 5th January 1871.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 323, of the 31st ultimo, with enclosures from the Governments of India and Bengal, bearing on the subject of the reorganisation of the police stationed on the eastern frontier; and I have now, as requested, the honour to reply on the various points noticed by you.

2. Adverting to your 3rd paragraph, I entirely concur with you in thinking the establishment of a strong post on the Oheepoom range, the most important feature in all the revised arrangements, and would even go further and say that, without this post, matters as regards the Kookies will, notwithstanding the increase now sanctioned, remain much as they are at present; and, indeed, so strongly do I feel this, that sooner than not see this post established, I would recommend the whole of the increase now sanctioned being thrown into it, and the posts of Pharrooah and Gungaram abolished, so as to enable us to increase the strength of those remaining.

3. Regarding the case of the captives alluded to in your 5th paragraph, you state that, "in the event of escaped captives reaching our officers in or near Kookie villages, they are not to be ransomed nor given up," and on the other hand, that no collision is to be provoked, or cause given to the Kookie chiefs for reasonable dissatisfaction.

4. I would be glad to learn whether the fact of our communicating with captives of whose whereabouts we are well aware, and suggesting to them the feasibility of their escaping to our posts or even to points where they would meet with our patrols, would be considered by Government as provoking a collision or giving reasonable grounds of dissatisfaction to the chiefs.

5. Retaking a captive who may seek our protection from or near a Kookie village will almost certainly lead to collision, and as such a case is by no means unlikely to happen, and has happened before, I think it would only be fair to the officer who might be concerned that we should have a more distinct statement of the views of Government than we have at present.

6. I now come to the points on which my opinion is more particularly requested by you.

The Boundary Line.

7. If it be determined that the line of administrative jurisdiction and the line of our police posts must be one and the same, it is clear that our line of posts must be much farther in advance than it is at present, for if it be not so, not only would recent forest conservancy propositions fall to the ground, but our own hillmen who are now jooming in advance of our present line of posts, would be hampered in their cultivation, and a large portion of country given up to the Kookies, which they do not now claim.

From a perusal, however, of paragraph 12 of letter No. 2166 P., from the Secretary to the Government of India to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, I believe the intention of his Excellency the Viceroy to be, that a proposed line of defence, running past Rutton Pooea's old village on the Loongsein range, should be abandoned, and that a line farther westward, commencing from the termination of the Arracan line north of Tuluknee, and thence running in a northerly direction towards Hill Tipperah, should be adopted.

8. As regards the portion of the districts lying north of the River Kurnafoolee, I have no doubt but that this line is the best which can be taken up; it would commence its course at the point the Kurnafoolee severs the Demagiri and Oheepoom ranges, and run northwards along the former range up to "Sicthang Tlang," or thereabouts. It would be a short distance (half a day's journey) behind the few villages belonging to Rutton Pooea which remain north of the Kurnafoolee, and, while holding in check the Syloo villages lying a long day's journey farther east on the next range, that is, on the range on which the "Bhooejam" and "Khotheer" peaks are shown, it would not interfere with them.

9. I would establish a strong post of at least 200 men on the Oheepoom range, immediately above the Demagiri falls, on a site lately inspected by Major Macdonald and myself, and from this post I would patrol the country, and make the paths leading to the north along the Demagiri range.

10. Our posts of Khurkhurrea and Gungaram, as you are aware, lie at a considerable distance further westward behind this line, but at present I am not prepared to recommend their removal farther east, to what I may call the Demagiri and Oheepoom line; and my reason for this is, that whereas at present these posts are supplied by means of water carriage, were they removed to the more advanced range, it would be impossible that they could be supplied without immense labour and expense. And this is indeed the real difficulty in the way of making our line of posts and our line of jurisdiction one and the same.

11. For the present then, and as regards the north of the Kurnafoolee, I would leave our posts of Khurkhurrea and Gungaram where they are at present, and either keep each of them at a strength of 40 men, or Khurkhurrea alone at a strength of 60 men, so as to save the expense of sending supplies to Gungaram, and to enable it to patrol the road lying between it and Gungaram.

12. I would also connect the road running along the Demagiri range with Khurkhurrea by two paths, one running from Demagiri Tong (marked at 2,731 feet), and the other from a point on the Demagiri range, about 10 miles farther north. These paths would command the Howlong and Syloo roads, which lead to Khurkhurrea and Southern Tipperah. Eventually it will probably be found possible to connect the Demagiri line with a road running nearly directly west to Gungaram.

13. We have no certain information as to how the roads ought to run north of Sirthay Tlang towards Hill Tipperah or Cachar, but this is a point which may safely be left until after future exploration, as, even were we aware of a line now, we could not well construct a path until the one farther south is finished.

14. As regards the southern portion of the district, our line might run south along either the Oheepoom or Seychal ranges, and I have reason to believe that a path can be constructed along either, and more especially along the latter.

15. The only objection at present known to the former line is that of its running near Rutton Pooea's present villages, to which, however, he makes no objection, and even goes the length of saying that he wishes it. In any case, however, I think it probable that next year he will remove to his old lands lying farther eastward, on the Loongsein range.

16. The Seychal line is not open to the objection of being too near the Kookies; but although we may make either of these lines our line of jurisdiction and patrol, it is an open question as to whether it is practicable to establish posts on them.

17. For the present then, and until we can speak with greater authority as to the relative merits of the Oheepoom and Seychal ranges, I would leave our posts to the south pretty much where they are now, making sub-alterations in their strength, as will be hereafter noticed.

18. I have marked the lines of jurisdiction and patrol which I would recommend in yellow on the map, and also the connecting roads lying to the north; but I am not as yet prepared to say where our connecting roads lying to the south should run, and think it would be a pity to come to a hurried decision regarding them.

19. For instance, it may yet be found possible to provision posts stationed on either the Oheepoom or Seychal ranges by the river "Theja," although I doubt it; and with posts on either of these lines, the four posts to the westward might, perhaps, be abandoned, and our line of defence and jurisdiction be the same.

Strength and Position of Posts.

20. The strength of the posts lying to the north has already been noticed, and that of Kassalong might be reduced to 40 men of all ranks, were the posts on Oheepoom established.

21. I would allot the men now sanctioned as follows:—

	Men of all Ranks.		Men of all Ranks.
Belaisurree	40	Khurkhurrea	40
Pharrooah	40	Kassalong	40
Pyndao	50	Cox's Bazar	10
Chimah	60	Ramghur	20
New Post near the Kharsakheong	50	Manikcherry	15
Bunderbun	30	Chanderghona	15
Gungaram	40		

22. This

22. This, after deducting 32 dâk runners, would leave for duty at head quarters, &c., in reserve, 163 men of all ranks, from which, however, would have to be deducted a heavy per-centage on account of sick leave, and other contingencies.

23. The number of women and children contained in our posts is, there can be no doubt, an obstacle to their efficiency, and the main argument for their families being there is, I believe, the idea that the hillmen will not enlist if not allowed to keep their women and children by them. Such an idea is, doubtless, quite correct; but I think that with our increased force this difficulty may, perhaps, be obviated, and that a system of more frequent reliefs may induce the men to leave their incumbrances at head quarters. How greatly such an arrangement would increase the efficiency and discipline of the posts need hardly be detailed.

24. A main post stationed on the Oheepoom range would, I believe, be healthy; and although at one time inclined to recommend the withdrawal of this post during the rains, I am now of opinion that, were even a half retained there during the rains, all other posts might be withdrawn during the rainy and unhealthy season; and the benefits to discipline and the health of the force which would result from such an arrangement are obvious.

Composition and Re-organisation of the Increased Force.

25. In paragraph 4 of Mr. Eden's letter, No. 5598, of the 23rd instant, to your address, I find it remarked that the improved *status* of the force will, it is hoped, operate as an inducement to hillmen to enter it.

26. The following table will show how the matter stands; and, so far as pay is concerned, I think it must be allowed that the force has gained a loss:—

	Average Pay of Ranks in Present Force.				Average Pay of Corresponding Ranks in proposed New Force.		
	Rs.	*a.*	*p.*		*Rs.*	*a.*	*p.*
3 Inspectors, average pay	166	–	–	7 Subadars	100	–	–
Sub-Inspectors (80), at 70, 60, 50 rupees	65	–	–	7 Jemadars	50	–	–
				7 Havildar-Majors	17	–	–
Head Constables (higher grades), at 15, 20, 25 rupees	20	–	–	35 Havildars			
				35 Naicks	12	–	–
Lowest grade	12	–	–	14 Buglers	10	–	–
Buglers	10	8	–	560 Sepoys	10	–	–
Constables on 9, 10, 11 rupees	10	–	–				

27. From this table it will be seen that inspectors and sub-inspectors are reduced to the lowest pay of their respective grades, and that the three higher grades of head constables are reduced from an average pay of 20 rupees to one of *Rs.* 17. 8.; that there is no difference between the pay of the lowest grade of head constables and the naicks, while the average of constable and sepoy pay remains as it was.

28. Under these circumstances, I think there must be some misunderstanding when it is said that the *status* of the force has been improved.

29. It may possibly be intended to respect existing rights, but even if it be so I think the inducements held out, and more especially those for the grade of havildar, are far below what they ought to be.

30. A havildar of a regiment of the line, with comparatively easy duty, and in the enjoyment of a healthy station, is, if I mistake not, paid 14 rupees a month; while here, in an unhealthy climate, and on constant duty of one kind or another, building their own posts, &c., the same rank is only to be paid 15 rupees, and the 20 and 25-rupee grades are to be abolished.

31. Under these circumstances I am constrained to report that the change in the *status* of the new force will most certainly not be appreciated either by the men now present or by the hill tribes, and, indeed, I am further of opinion that an attempt to reduce the present pay of the force will lead to many resignations, and will assuredly be looked on as a breach of faith.

32. Did, however, the constables of the first grade continue to draw their pay at 11 rupees until they are absorbed, and the lowest grade kept at nine rupees until this is done, I think that 10 rupees might eventually be made the only pay for sepoys.

33. It may also be remarked here that out of the 560 sepoys allotted, 32 are employed as dâk-runners, and it appears needless to pay men 10 rupees a month for what can be done as efficiently at nine rupees.

34. The following scale of pay is what I would propose:—

No.	Rank.	Rate of Pay.	Rank.	Monthly Cost.
		Rs.		*Rs.*
1	Subadar-Major, at	150	Subadar-Major	150
3	Subadars, at	120	Subadars	360
3	Ditto, at	100	Ditto	300
3	Jemadars, at	70	Jemadars	210
4	Ditto, at	50	Ditto	200
7	Havildar-Majors, at	25	Havildar-Majors	175
15	Havildars, at	20	Havildars	300
20	Ditto, at	15	Ditto	300
35	Naicks, at	12	Naicks	420
14	Buglers, at	11	Buglers	154
528	Sepoys, at	10	Sepoys	5,280
32	Dâk-runners, at	9	Dâk-runners	288
	TOTAL *Rs.*	592	TOTAL *Rs.*	8,137

	Rs.
Yearly cost of men of all ranks	97,644
Ditto - force proposed by Colonel Paterson	94,500

35. From the above it will be seen that the difference between the cost of what I now propose and that advocated by Colonel Paterson in his scheme only amounts to 3,144 rupees per annum, and even this small addition would, I believe, make the new force much more popular. I consider it a great point to give the men something to look to in the higher grades, and, with all due deference, I must say that this appears to me not to have been sufficiently provided for in Colonel Paterson's scheme.

36. The next question to be considered is that of working pay, alluded to in paragraph 4 of Mr. Eden's letter of the 23rd instant.

37. I am clearly of opinion that the men should not be paid for the erection of stockades or the buildings contained in them, but I think some assistance should be given in the erection of the larger and new substantial barracks which will be required at head-quarters.

38. Road-making, and the jungle-clearing connected therewith, should, I think, be paid for, but I will not pay the men for clearing in or round about their lines or stockades.

39. Perhaps the rates of working pay given in the Punjaub pioneer regiments may form a precedent; but as I am not aware as to what these rates are, I would rather not give a further opinion on this point.

40. It will, probably, however, be found most profitable to pay the men by the job, and hitherto path-clearing has cost on an average of 33 rupees per mile, exclusive of cost of implements, &c., while road-making has cost a good deal more; and that we ought to make the roads, and not merely be contented with clearing them, there can be no doubt.

Composition of the Force.

41. Supposing the full force for the hills sanctioned, that is, the post on Oheepoom, in addition to the force now sanctioned, I would recommend its being composed as follows:—

Hillmen, including Tipperahs.

Mughs, Chukmas, Kookies, Nagas, Sonthals, and Coles	400
Goorkhas	300
Pathans	100
Majhee, Seikhs, and Dogras	150

42. Should, however, only 665 men be sanctioned, these proportions can still be adhered to, and it will be observed that in either case much more than two-thirds of the force will be composed of hillmen accustomed to hills and jungle.

43. A force of this kind would, I think, both fight and work well; and when raising it I would recommend that, instead of picking up men who may come to the hill tracts attracted by the rumours of good pay, regular recruiting parties should be sent out, and good men *selected* and enlisted.

44. The printed letters and maps are herewith returned.

From Major *J. M. Graham*, Officiating Deputy Commissioner, Chittagong Hill Tracts, to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal; No. 39, dated Rungamuttee, 5th February 1871.

WITH reference to your telegrams inquiring as to the identity of the Cachar raiders, I have the honour to state that Kumul Churn, a Karbaree of Dewan Eshan Chunder of Kassalong, who with others is now in the Kookie country, ostensibly for trading purposes, but in reality to gain information, writes to say that a large body of the Howlong clan, under the chiefs Lal Saboola (son of Lal Poitang) Mong-poom, and Seipooya, assisted in the recent outrages in Cachar.

2. Lala Pah, one of the people of Saboonga (chief of the Syloos), also confirms the above report, and I feel quite convinced of its truth.

3. Mr. A. Rattray has succeeded in getting a Khoomee chief to follow up the Gulungeah raiders, and although information, both as to the north and south, will only be obtained slowly, still I have no doubt but that within two or three months it will be precise. Reticent at first, the Looshais, in the end, cannot resist publishing their warlike deeds.

4. Rutton Pooea is now quarrelling with the Syloos, and is most anxious that a powerful guard should be established on the site proposed in late correspondence, on the Ohepoom range.

5. Formerly, there was enmity between Vanolal's people and the Howlongs, but now they, the Syloos, and the Howlongs, act together, and I cannot help thinking that it will eventually be found that all three have been concerned in the outrages, whether committed, in Hill Tipperah, Cachar, or Munipore.

6. I annex a statement showing approximately the strength of the three Looshai tribes, more immediately connected with this district, which may be of use at the present juncture. This statement was originally compiled from information given by persons who had seen the villages, and it has now been checked, and comparisons made with the number of houses, &c., in certain villages which have come under my own personal observation, so that, for all practical purposes, I believe it may be taken as correct.

7. At my request the Ranee Kalindee has called out from 300 to 500 of her armed Chuckma hillmen, and Mr. Rattray is doing what he can to infuse a fighting spirit into the Mughs in the south; but, as I have just learned that a re-inforcement has been sent from Calcutta, I shall be glad to dispense with the services of the hillmen, the season for cutting their jooms having arrived, and as keeping them from their work entails great hardship. In calling out the Chuckmas, I had no great dependence on their fighting powers, and my object was more to make some little show of power, and to test the good will of the Ranee and her people, and I am glad to say that both have promptly answered the call made on them.

Howlong Clan of Looshais.

CHIEFS.	RELATIONSHIPS.	Houses in Village.	Males.	Females and Children.	Total Population of Village.	Fighting Men.	Muskets.	REMARKS.
Vandoolah Chief	- - - -	360	720	1,660	2,380	220	76	
Seipooeya	Younger brother of Vandoola	230	460	1,150	1,610	150	46	
Koseiya	Cousin of Vandoola	360	720	1,660	2,380	220	76	
Vansanga	" Bandoolah	80	160	400	560	53	12	
Vantoonga	Son of Koseiya	200	400	1,000	1,400	130	40	
Van-ie-sumah	Half-brother of Bandoolah	200	400	1,000	1,400	130	40	
Laloorah	Brother of Vantonga	200	400	1,000	1,400	130	40	
Cheka	- - - -	53	106	250	356	33	6	
Lal-poi-tang	Cousin of Vandoolah, brother of Koseiya.	360	720	1,660	2,380	220	76	
Sungboonga	Son of Lal-poi-tang	With Lal-poi-tang	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	Married to Rutton Pooea's sister.
Ngura	- - - -	130	260	650	910	86	26	
Thong-doota	Brother of Koseiya	600	1,200	3,000	4,200	400	130	
Lal Saboola	Son of Lal-poi-tang	With Lal-poi-tang.						
Ja-thoma	" "	260	520	1,300	1,820	172	140	
Lal-looba	Brother of Vandoola	260	520	1,300	1,820	172	140	
Lal-tang-bhoom	" "	160	320	750	1,070	100	33	
Sa-boota	- - - -	66	132	325	457	40	12	
Tara	- - - -	53	106	250	356	33	6	
Tooneira	- - - -	100	200	1,000	1,200	400	160	
Tang-pooea	- - - -	100	200	1,000	1,200	400	160	
Lal-ro-pooea	- - - -	53	106	250	356	33	6	
Nguena	- - - -	100	200	1,000	1,200	150	75	
Dar Kema	- - - -	100	200	1,000	1,200	150	75	
Mong-poom	- - - -	66	132	325	457	40	12	
Tang-boola	- - - -	46	92	130	222	80	25	
Tie-mo-ga	- - - -	100	200	1,000	1,200	150	60	
Lal-tona	Son of Koseiya	160	320	750	1,070	100	33	
Khool-thanga	- - - -	60	120	300	420	80	25	
Lal-ona	- - - -	53	106	250	356	33	15	
Vantonga	- - - -	66	132	325	457	40	20	
Bateira	- - - -	53	106	250	356	33	15	
Tek-pooea	- - - -	40	80	200	280	60	25	
Lal-too-anga	- - - -	53	106	250	356	53	30	
Sun-koo-tee	Brothers	53	106	250	356	53	30	
Sun-keiya	Brothers	53	106	250	356	53	30	
Pa-bela	- - - -	53	106	250	356	53	30	
Min-levana	- - - -	53	106	250	356	53	35	
Dari-loota	- - - -	46	92	130	222	80	53	
Dar-e-ma	- - - -	53	106	250	356	53	35	
	Total - - -	5,033	10,066	26,765	36,831	4,436	1,848	

Silhoo Clan of Looshais.

Saboonga	- - - -	400	800	2,000	2,800	270	93	
Lalgnoora	Son of Sabong	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Lal-jecka	" "	240	480	1,030	1,510	113	34	
Vanoyah	Cousin of Sabong	160	360	860	1,220	106	34	
Vanoonah	Doubtful Cousin of Saboonga	160	360	860	1,220	106	34	
Vanpoolal	- - - -	66	120	360	480	40	12	
Roomah	- - - -	52	106	260	366	34	12	
Van-loola	- - - -	67	120	240	360	35	16	
Lal-chooma	- - - -	52	106	260	366	34	12	
Van-koa	- - - -	52	106	260	366	34	12	
La-oo-ra	- - - -	52	106	260	366	34	12	
Do-tuna	- - - -	130	260	660	920	86	34	
Rung-oo-ra	- - - -	52	106	260	366	34	12	
Van-thoma	- - - -	100	200	415	615	66	20	
Lem-si-long	- - - -	12	24	56	80	8	3	
	Total - - -	1,595	3,254	7,781	11,035	1,000	340	

Rutton Pooea's Clan of Looshais.

Rutton Pooea	- - - -	166	333	899	1,232	219	100	
Ban-Pooea	- - - -	53	106	266	372	66	33	
Pa-Koonga	Brother of Rutton Pooea	66	133	333	466	80	40	
Moora	- - - -	40	80	200	280	53	25	
Rotomah	Brother-in-law of Rutton Pooea	26	53	133	186	26	13	
Loolah	Uncle of Rutton Pooea	33	66	166	232	40	20	
Lem-pooe-lal	- - - -	20	40	100	140	26	13	
Si-do-pha	- - - -	26	53	133	186	26	13	
Vanoonah	- - - -	20	40	100	140	26	13	
Lal-Chinga	- - - -	13	26	66	92	13	6	
Boola	- - - -	In Rutton Pooea's village.						
Tong-Boya	- - - -	39	80	200	280	53	26	
Ngurah	- - - -	28	56	135	191	28	14	
Lengnora	- - - -	27	54	140	194	28	14	
	Total - - -	557	1,120	2,871	3,991	684	330	

NOTE on the Looshai Question by Captain *T. H. Lewin*, Deputy Commissioner of Chittagong Hill Tracts.

THE country occupied by the Looshai horde is comparatively small and circumscribed. It may be roughly described as the country forming the water-shed of the streams which run into Cachar, Chittagong, and Arracan.

This country presents very great difficulties to the movements of any military force, viz., the density of the jungle, our ignorance of the topography, the extreme difficulty of procuring labour for transport and commissariat purposes, the insalubrity of the climate during certain seasons, the heavy rainfall which turns each streamlet into a torrent, &c.

No great armed or organised resistance is to be feared from the inhabitants. The habitual mode of warfare of the Looshai is of the lowest savage type, viz., by night surprise, and their interior polity, recognising as they do no one chief or head, but being divided and sub-divided into innumerable small village communities, renders any combined action on their part unlikely, especially if any punitive measures on our part were directed against specifically mentioned chiefs.

With reference to the late raids of the Looshai into Cachar, it would doubtless create a more marked impression upon them were retribution meted out promptly; the savage mind is always more influenced by swift retributive justice than by tardy, slow-moving punishment, but we are not ready to act; the approaching February rainfall in the hills, and the fast advancing hot season, are averse to us, and it is, in my humble opinion, far preferable to postpone any punitive measures rather than to risk a failure. Should any column of troops enter the hills, they should do so in as light marching order as possible, and with but few camp-followers or transport coolies. To effect this it will be necessary to push out store depôts, to stockade and garrison them, and then at our leisure to accumulate the provisions and material for the support of any column which might be directed against the Looshai.

The transport duties of such a column should, as far as possible, be performed by Bengalee coolies and by elephants. Our tributary hill tribes of the Chittagong frontier are utterly demoralised, and liable at any time to a "stampede." In the event of a panic of this sort, they are *able* to desert, leaving the column helpless, for they know the highways and bye-ways of the country round; while Bengalee coolies could not run away, for the simple reason that, by doing so, they would lose themselves in the jungle and starve.

Any column entering the hills should remain there at least three months, destroying all the villages, the inhabitants of which it might be necessary to punish, together with all granaries, household stock, and domestic animals belonging thereto, and dispersing any armed bodies of men who might show even the semblance of a front against us. An expedition should start at the latest on the 1st of December, and on leaving the hills at the end of February should leave behind, in a well chosen and commanding position, a stockaded entrenched post garrisoned by at least 200 men with two guns, under command of a specially selected officer. I would suggest as the position for such a post the site of the Chief Rutton Pooea's old village (now abandoned by him) on Sirthay Tlang, a hill range running between Burra Hussin Khal and Tipui Doong (tributaries of the Kurnafoolee river), and extending almost without a break to the Cachar streams.

It would be easy to cut a path along this ridge and open communication with Cachar, while the Kurnafoolee river gives a safe and always practicable route to Chittagong. It would be quite possible also, I think, to lay a line of telegraph, and so connect Cachar with Chittagong.

The position which I recommend on Sirthay Tlang is only 20 miles, as the crow flies, from our own actual jurisdiction, as the tributary Chukmas and Tipperahs of Chittagong have for many years cultivated the slopes of the Burkhul Hill, the next range to the west.

The officer in charge of such a post would exercise no administrative interference with the tribes, although he would doubtless gain considerable personal influence over them; he would be able to gain information of any raids directed against our territory either in Cachar, Chittagong, or Arracan, and he would be able to convey speedy intelligence thereof to the authorities, as well as by his position, to act against any raiders either in flank or rear. The Looshai also would be disinclined to start upon any marauding expedition, leaving their homes defenceless, with an enemy within a day's journey of their villages.

The hill tribes live wholly by cultivation of the hill-slopes on which they dwell, and the establishment of an armed body of men within easy burning distance of their standing crops would speedily induce them to seek friendly relations with us, and would, I think, finally put a stop to all raids on British territory. Another advantage of such a post would be that such of the Looshai as are disposed to be friendly towards us would gain confidence by the near presence and armed protection of their ally.

At present their answer to all requests on our side for assistance has been that we are far off, and that if they make enemies of their neighbours by either actively assisting us, or giving us information, they would be left defenceless in their hour of need against any hostile combination.

Any officer, however, placed in such a position would have to be carefully selected, for the post requires a man of special qualifications and abilities. He would doubtless be subject to attack for the first year or two; but vigorous action when necessary, combined with unvarying kindness, good faith, and abstention from interference with their affairs, would soon render him the friend and adviser of a large proportion of the chiefs.

We must be careful not to undervalue the character and fighting qualities of the Looshai. In the attack and capture of the Munipoor stockade some time ago, when not a man of the garrison escaped alive, they showed considerable powers of strategy; while recently in Cachar, if the telegrams are to be believed, they advanced four times, in the most determined manner, to the attack of a stockaded post manned by three Europeans and 35 policemen.

Any expedition against the Looshai then should, I think, be made by regular troops, the police force acting merely on duty as escorts and for keeping open the lines of communication, &c. The post on Sirthay Tlang should be garrisoned by picked men, either Sikhs or Ghoorkas, as these castes stand the hill climate better than others.

In sending any expedition into the hills it should be remembered that, upon the loftier hill ranges, there is a perceptible change of climate, and the men's clothing, &c., should be regulated accordingly.

In the event of any expedition being determined upon timely notice and instruction should be given to district officers in order that all measures may be taken for the organization of transport and intelligence departments, which would doubtless fall to their supervision.

Briefly recapitulated, the measures I would advise are as follows:—

1. Ascertain clearly what tribe and what chiefs have committed the late outrages in Cachar.

2. Organise an expedition to punish these tribes, the said expedition to start at the end of November 1871.

3. The permanent establishment of a post of observation in the Looshai country at the close of the punitive expedition.

I do not presume to touch upon the causes of, or increased frequency in, occurrence of the raids, as to do so would be to review the whole policy of Government for the last 20 years.

From the Honourable *A. Eden*, Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department, to Lord *H. Ulick Browne*, the Commissioner of Chittagong; No. 790, dated Fort William, the 21st February 1871.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 2002, of the 28th ultimo, on the question of the Chittagong frontier defence, and to forward herewith, for your information, a copy of a letter* this day addressed to the Government of India on the subject.

* No. 789, dated this day.

2. Major Graham has been instructed to put himself at once in personal communication with the Inspecior General of Police, and draw up, for the approval of Government, a complete scheme for the constitution of the frontier guard already sanctioned, showing the details of expenditure under all heads. They should endeavour to keep within the limit of cost sanctioned by the Government of India, adjusting the pay of the rank and file as seems to them best. No time should be lost in getting together the material of the force, so that it may be in position by next November at the latest.

3. With reference to the 8th paragraph of your letter, I am to say that the Lieutenant Governor is not aware of any absolute prohibition to enlist Goorkhas. No recruiting parties can be sent to Nepal, but any Goorkhas offering their services in British territory may, the Lieutenant Governor believes, be engaged. The Lieutenant Governor, however, understands that the best men would probably be recruited from among the Sonthals, Coles, and Bhunhars of Chota Nagpoor, and that there would be no difficulty whatever in raising men there; and it seems to him that both for the climate and work these men would be better qualified than any other class. It would also be worth inquiring whether any of the old sappers and miners are still available and unemployed in Darjeeling. They would be very useful as skilled road-makers. The Inspector General of Police's attention will be called to this.

4. The Lieutenant Governor is not disposed to agree with Major Graham that the Gungaram guard should be abolished. It seems to him to be in a very important position.

5. His Honor thinks that, during the non-raiding season, the posts or many of them may be withdrawn to head quarters, where the men could be disciplined and drilled. If this could

could be done, and Major Graham seems to be of opinion that it could, there would not be the same necessity as now for allowing the men to be encumbered with their wives and families in the stockades. Certainly, their presence there is likely to interfere with proper patrolling.

6. As regards the question of captives raised in the third paragraph of your letter, I am to say that all that Government intends is this, that its officers are not at present *to induce captives to desert*, but they are certainly not to give up any that may escape, whether they may think this likely to lead to collision or not. As, however, the views of Government on the subject are well known to the chiefs, the Lieutenant Governor does not think it probable that our following a well-known line of action would lead of itself to any collision. The chiefs would no doubt try to keep their captives out of the way; but if the latter managed to get off, they would probably make no stir about them lest they should be punished for having had them in their possession.

(No. 791).

COPY of this letter, and of the correspondence noted below, forwarded to the Officiating Inspector General of Police for information and guidance, in continuation of the memorandum from this Office, No. 5599 of the 23rd December last:

From Commissioners of Chittagong (No. 2002) of the 28th January 1871, and Enclosures. To Government of India, Foreign Department, No. 789, dated 21st February 1871.

(No. 792.)

COPY forwarded to Major Graham for information and guidance.

From the Honourable *A. Eden*, Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department; No. 799, dated Fort William, the 22nd February 1871.

IN continuation of my letter, No. 789, of the 21st instant, I am directed to submit, for the information of the Government of India, the accompanying copy of a letter* from the Commissioner of Chittagong, forwarding, with his remarks, a report from Major Graham of the result of the journey lately made by him into the Syloo country.

* No. 29, dated January 1871.

2. This expedition was undertaken with the double object of advancing our friendly relations with the Syloos by visiting them in their own villages; and of discovering, if possible, a road or path between the Chittagong hill tracts and Baparee Bazar, the most southern point attained from the Cachar side, and of meeting Mr. Edgar at that place.

3. Major Macdonald of the Survey Department was deputed to accompany Major Graham in view to making a reconnoissance of the Looshai country from the Chittagong side, so as to complete to some extent the work done by him in the previous year in company with Mr. Edgar. A copy of Major Macdonald's report† is also forwarded herewith.

† No. 130A, dated 21 December 1870.

4. Although the attempt to meet Mr. Edgar at Baparee Bazar failed, and the expedition had to turn back without penetrating much beyond points already reached in former years, the Commissioner of Chittagong is of opinion that much has been done by this visit towards improving our relations with the Syloos. The Lieutenant Governor sees much reason to doubt the correctness of this conclusion. It will be observed that the Syloos showed themselves determined not to let Major Graham through their country. Their great Chief Saboonga would not give him an interview. They expressed the most intense jealousy of his intentions. It is also understood that Major Graham himself, now reading their conduct in the light of the late raids on Cachar, preparations for which were probably going on while his party was in the hills, and in which the Syloos were not improbably concerned either as active participators or as abettors, is of opinion that his visit was productive of no good whatever, and may possibly have done harm.

5. The conduct of Rutton Pooea in connection with this expedition was far from satisfactory. He has persistently, but after all very naturally, sought to prevent our dealing directly with either Syloos or Howlongs. No doubt it gives him a material advantage in influence and pecuniary profit to be the sole medium of communication between the British Government and the outer tribes. The Commissioner recommends that he should be pardoned his misbehaviour towards Major Graham, or rather that he should be merely reprimanded, in consideration of his having given information afterwards of the intended

raids of the Howlongs. This is perhaps the most politic course at present. But the Lieutenant Governor thinks that our position towards Rutton Pooea is eminently unsatisfactory. We cannot be sure that even his warnings of raids are not kept back until it is just too late to take any effective steps to prevent them; and indeed, in the existing circumstances, anything better can hardly be expected of him in his isolated position, surrounded by hostile and powerful tribes, who would be sure to retaliate on him any injuries which they may receive at our hands, it is almost impossible that he should prove as staunch to our interests as he might; and the Lieutenant Governor is convinced that the only remedy for this unsatisfactory state of things is the establishment of the advanced post in his village, which was recommended again in my letter cited above.

From Lord *H. Ulick Browne*, Commissioner of the Chittagong Division, to the Secretary to the Governmentof Bengal, Judicial Department. No. 29, dated Chittagong, the 26 th January 1871.

With reference to Government letter, No. 4208, dated 16th September 1870, I have the honour to enclose a copy of a letter No. 422, dated the 27th ultimo, and of its enclosure, from the Deputy Commissioner of the Hill Tracts, reporting the result of his trip in company with Major Macdonald into the Syloo Kookie country. A brief note of the result was submitted demi-officially as soon as the Deputy Commissioner returned.

2. The object of the expedition was, it will be remembered, two-fold; *first*, to advance another, and that a considerable step, in our friendly relations with the Syloo Kookies or Looshais, by visiting them in their own villages; and, *second*, taking advantage of the intended visit of the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar to Baparee Bazar, the most southern point attained from the Cachar side, to discover the best line for a road or path between the hill tracts and Baparee Bazar, and to meet Mr. Edgar at that place.

3. As regards the first of these objects, Major Graham has been decidedly successful. During a visit of nine days in the Syloo villages, 14 chiefs in person, and the karbarees or henchmen of 13 others, out of a total of 41 chiefs of the tribe, came to meet him; and crowds of the tribe, the great majority of whom had never seen Europeans before, flocked in from various villages. Though Major Graham was not successful in seeing Saboonga, the principal chief of the tribe, I scarcely expected that, on the first occasion of our officers' visiting any Kookie tribe, they would have attracted so many chiefs and karbarees; and I think much has been done to improve our acquaintance and relations with the tribe in general, and to attract them to our frontier stations to see more of us. Indeed, we had a proof of the success attained in the results that followed at the Kassalong annual Kookie meeting and fair, which took place very soon after the Deputy Commissioner's return. Three Syloo chiefs, the karbarees of 16 others (including Saboongas), and about 80 other Syloos, attended the fair and appeared well pleased at the amusements and entertainments provided, some of them even joining freely in the races and games.

4. As regards the second object, Major Graham failed in getting through the Syloo country owing to the opposition of the chiefs who at last plainly said that they believed our object was to examine their country with a view to annex it. But the number of coolies that fell sick or deserted would have been alone sufficient to have prevented the party from reaching Baparee Bazar, as they could not have carried enough provisions for the number of days' march necessary to get there.

5. Though I thought the attempt worth making, I cannot say that I was at all sanguine of success as regards this object of the trip. From our experience of Kookies, and their ways, it would have been too much to expect that they would allow us to march right through the heart of their villages on the very first occasion on which a British officer visited their country. With Kookies these things can generally only be accomplished after firmly establishing a system of interchange of visits for years, and after inspiring thorough confidence; in short, only after reaching the stage we have reached with Rutton Pooea. It is possible that Major Macdonald may be right in thinking that, if Major Graham had arranged to stay for a long time in the Syloo country, and to spend a large sum of money in carriage for the extensive supplies that would have been necessary in consequence, he might have at last persuaded the Syloos to allow him to go through; but considering the light in which the Syloos viewed the expedition, I do not think they would ever have consented on that occasion; and to have stayed on for a long time would, in my opinion, have increased the unfavourable impression in their minds as to our ulterior object. The very most that I think would have been attained would have been a personal interview with Saboonga; but I do not think this would have been allowed in his own village, which is a long way in the interior of the Syloo country. All that was attained last year by waiting even for the 32 and 35 days at two places referred to by Major Macdonald was, that Mr. Edgar succeeded in seeing Sookpilall, but he was not successful in visiting him at his own village, nor was he even permitted to enter a single Kookie village anywhere.

6. I think that, putting aside the cooly difficulty, Major Graham was not only justified in returning when he did, but that he would have done wrong if he had persevered, when

when the Syloos told him their views, and said they would oppose his advance by force if necessary. To have persevered would have been to undo the gradual progress of friendliness with the Syloos that has been going on for the last two years.

7. On one point Major Graham's preliminary proceedings seem to me to have been defective. He failed to secure the receipt by Saboonga of an intimation of his (Major Graham's) intended visit and to secure a reply. He actually started on the expedition without having ascertained that Saboonga, or any other chief but Lemsilong had received the intelligence of his intended visit. This is an important preliminary in Kookie eyes; and if it had been carried out, I dare say Saboonga would have met him somewhere. There was time to have effected the necessary communication, and to have received a reply between the end of October, when Major Graham returned from leave, and when I asked him to send off a message at once, and the time when Major Graham started. It does not clearly appear when the first message was sent to Lemsilong; but from what is said, I gather that it was very shortly before the departure of the expedition.

8. As regards Rutton Poosa, I think his conduct was very unsatisfactory indeed. There is no room for doubt, further confirmation having been received afterwards, that he did his best to prevent the advance of the Deputy Commissioner, by frightening the coolies and telling them a force was assembling to attack the expedition. I think it very likely that he further gave the Syloo chiefs a hint on the subject, though we have no reliable information on that point. And lastly, he would not even show the way across the hill ranges to our Khurkunia guard post, but had the party brought back to their boats on the river.

9. His motive in all this was to prevent our having any direct communication with any Kookie tribe, and to force us to do everything through him, as this state of things raises his position, increases his influence, and makes him necessary and even valuable to us. When at Kassalong I expressed great dissatisfaction at what he had done, and told him that 150 rupees out of his usual cash allowance would be withheld until the result of the expedition and his conduct had been reported to Government. It will be remembered that he was fined 100 rupees for committing a kind of dacoity in a village of ours, but he afterwards restored the property; and as it is at present of considerable importance to keep on friendly terms with him, I do not like to fine him again. He has, since the Syloo affair, sent in expressly to give us important information as to two bodies of Howlongs having set out or being about to set out to raid, one towards the south and the other to the north. The receipt of this information was followed almost immediately afterwards (we had just time to warn the guards and villagers) by a raid in the south of the hill tracts; and about eight or ten days afterwards he sent in again to say that a large body of Howlongs had actually started towards the north to raid. This was followed by the several raids in the north. I recommend that Rutton Pooea be told that Government are much displeased with him for his opposition in the matter of the Syloo trip, but that he will be forgiven on this occasion in consideration of his sending in the information about the Howlong raiders.

10. No opportunity has been lost of endeavouring to establish direct friendly communication with the Syloos independently of Rutton Pooea. At the Kassalong fair I spoke to Lemsilong, to the other two chiefs, and to Saboonga's representative, explaining our wishes on this point, as we found that Rutton Pooea, could not be depended on to give our messages correctly. The Syloos (and especially Lemsilong, on my reminding him of Rutton Pooea having caused his village to be plundered by the Howlongs) expressed their willingness to communicate direct with us. It will now rest with the Deputy Commissioner to send competent messengers direct to the Syloos for the future.

11. I should add that I asked the Syloos why they had opposed the Deputy Commissioner's advance, under the idea that we wished to take their country, reminding them that we have now visited Rutton Pooea's country for years and yet had not taken any of it. Their reply, whether sincere or not, was a good one, viz., that they knew little of us when the Deputy Commissioner arrived at their villages; that they had now seen more of us since they had been at Kassalong; and that they now knew us better. Altogether, I think that considerable good has been effected as regards the Syloos by Major Graham's trip and the subsequent meeting at Kassalong.

12. As regards a path to the north, I will submit suggestions in continuation of the general correspondence on frontier measures and policy.

From Major *J. M. Graham*, Officiating Deputy Commissioner of Chittagong Hill Tracts, to the Commissioner of the Chittagong Division, No. 422; dated Camp Chittagong, the 27th December 1870.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith the diary kept by me while lately on a visit to the Syloo country. The diary shows my proceedings in detail, and I therefore think it only necessary to comment on them shortly.

2. The expedition to the Syloo country was, as you are aware, undertaken for several objects, the first of which was to endeavour to increase our knowledge of the tribe, and to

enhance our good relations with it; secondly, to visit its chief Saboonga; and lastly, if possible, to meet Mr. Edgar, the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar, in the village of Sookpilal or at Baparee Bazar.

3. At the last Kassalong fair the Syloos were apprised of our intended visit to their country, and expressed their assent, and on two subsequent occasions endeavours were made to communicate with them to the same effect; the first endeavour failing on account of the chief Lemsilong, who had been sent for, encountering Rutton Pooea on the road, and turning back in consequence; and the second also failing, in consequence of the messengers having remained drinking in a village above the Burkul Falls, instead of proceeding to Saboonga, so that it was only after the expedition had started that this failure became known.

4. From this it will be seen that although the Syloos had notice of our intentions last January, they had no immediate notice of our advance further than what we could send on the road, and to this fact may, I think, partially be attributed our failure to see Saboonga.

5. The manner in which Rutton Pooea behaved will also be seen from the diary, and there cannot be the slightest doubt but that the flight of nearly one-third of our coolies was owing to the sinister reports spread either by him or by those with him. The false intelligence which he gave connecting the acts of Lemsilong and the other Syloo chiefs, and finally the gross way in which he deceived us when endeavouring to find a road to Khurkhuria, clearly show the spirit by which he was animated, and his evident intention to retain if possible in his own hands the benefits arising from his more direct communication with us, and the influence which appertains to him from his being in a manner placed between us and the other tribes. Such a feeling on the part of Rutton Pooea is perhaps not unnatural, but such a state of affairs is nevertheless so detrimental to the interests of Government, and injurious to the prospect of our entering into more intimate relations with the other tribes, that every effort should be made to open direct negotiations with these tribes, and to communicate with Rutton Pooea only in so far as regards himself and his people.

6. This is a point which I urged strongly on the Syloos, and to which they seemed fully alive, and I trust that at the ensuing Kassalong fair (which the Syloos have promised to attend) more may be done in the matter.

7. The details of our march to the village of the Syloo chief Valoolah are given in the diary, and need not be reported here. We remained nine days in the Syloo country, and saw the chiefs and karbarees of 27 out of 41 villages, as also crowds of the people, and inspired, I believe, some confidence and a good spirit towards us, so that if in addition to this the Syloos come freely to the next fair, and we can manage to establish a permanent and direct communication with them, I trust that, although failing on two points, our efforts will not be considered to have been without some degree of success.

8. Had it not been for the flight of our coolies, it is possible that we might, by using some degree of pressure, have moved on, but, as I have already said in my diary, I do not think that I should have been justified in risking a rupture with a tribe with which we have been apparently at least on good terms for several years, and the more especially as any such misunderstanding would entirely have obviated any advantage which might have arisen from meeting Mr. Edgar or Saboonga. In short, I considered that leaving well alone, and endeavouring to pave the way to better understanding and relations in the future, was better than perhaps losing all by precipitate action for which the people were not fully prepared.

DIARY.

29*th November* 1870.—Reached Kassalong and found the following coolies and canoes ready:—

Coolies	148
Sirdars	6
Boats	45

Supplies for the whole party, which included 60 fighting men of all ranks, for 24 days, were ordered to be placed in the boats, and an arrangement made by which extra supplies were to follow us to the Demagiri Falls in from six to ten days.

30*th November* 1870.—Started by boat at about 2 p.m., leaving the coolies and boats to follow, and anchored for the night about half-way between Kassalong and Burkul.

1*st December* 1870.—This morning reached the foot of the Burkul rapids, and were soon joined by the coolies and boats with full supplies. Here it was necessary to unload the boats and to carry the supplies and baggage past the falls, to a distance of about 1¼ miles, after which, and after the coolies had cooked and eaten, they were sent back to pass the boats up the shallow water alongside of the rapids and through the pools, a work however

which

which could not be carried out by the evening. Camped for the night in the jungle above the rapids.

2nd December 1870.—This morning the remainder of the boats were passed up, and we were able to start on our further journey up the river by 11 a.m., going on till about 2½ p.m., and then halted on the left bank, clearing jungle and erecting sheds of bamboos and plantain leaves to serve as shelter for the night.

3rd December 1870.—Started at 7 a.m., and after passing four different sets of rapids, encamped on the bank of the river at a point about eight miles below the Demagiri Fall. While on the way, a report was brought in, which was to the effect that two Chukmas who had been sent to let the Syloos know of our coming had, instead of doing so, gone to their village above Burkul, and remained there ever since in a state of semi-intoxication, a most annoying circumstance, and the more so when it is remembered that the chief Lemsilong, who had formerly been sent for, and through whom it was intended to convey clear intelligence to the Syloos of our movements and its object, had turned back at Demagiri on meeting with Rutton Pooea. The ostensible cause of Lemsilong's turning back on this occasion was a slight illness, but I believe there is little reason to doubt that the true cause of his doing so was his meeting with Rutton Pooea through whose instigation he had recently been plundered by the Howlongs, and reduced, from comparative wealth, to almost a state of indigence. Be this as it may, the fact remains that in consequence of this *contretemps*, up to date the Syloo had no regular notice of our coming, and that it was on this notice, as well as that given them at the last moment, that I relied for the success of our expedition. Of course we had now nothing further for it than to take our chance, and three constables were at once sent on ahead to Lemsilong's village to let him know of our advent, and to convey intelligence of it to the Syloos.

4th December 1870.—Started at 7 a.m., and reached the Demagiri Fall. Sent the baggage and supplies by land, past the fall, and encamped about 200 yards above it. Sent for Rutton Pooea, who came in by the evening. He states that he is living in the jungle some way further up the river, as his village, as well as those of others of his people, are in transit from the Demagiri range north of Kurnafoolee river to the Dhepcom range south of that river. Lately, when at Kassalong, he had promised to furnish guides through his own country and into that of the Syloos, and on being asked in the evening to fulfil his promise, he said he would do what he could, but that there were difficulties, and that Kookie arrangements could not be carried out without delay. He further urged that we should not go over the hills through his country, but by boat up to the Kurnafoolee and into the Sajuck river which comes from the direction of the Syloo villages, and that we should halt next day to see if we could arrange about guides. Even this, however, was not said until after many excuses and a good deal of talk, and his wish to help us appears more than doubtful. He brought with him two Tipperahs accused of murder, who have escaped from our territory, and who have for the last five or six years resided under his protection, one of them having since added to his former crime by endeavouring to murder the Sub-Inspector, Mahomed Hossein, while on a visit to Rutton Pooea's village. His wish was that these men should be pardoned and allowed to go to our bazaars, to which modest request, as the affair was an old one, and I was not fully cognisant of the circumstances, I suggested his applying to the Commissioner at the Kassalong fair.

5th December 1870.—Had a slide of trees constructed along one side of the falls, and pushed 10 of the boats up it as also up some rapids further on, having the rest below, it being our intention to proceed as much as possible in future by land. Moved camp for about a mile and a half to the foot of a steep hill on which stands the village of , one of Rutton Pooea's chiefs, and over which we intended proceeding next day. From this point two coolies were sent back sick, and 17 absconded, after, it is reported, a conversation with Rutton Pooea, in which, on their asking him as to whether they should go on, he said significantly, they might please themselves, he would have nothing to say to the matter. In consequence of this, they ordered as heavy loads of supplies as they could fairly carry to be placed in each of the boats, so as to be ready to proceed in the morning with some coolies and a small guard *viâ* the Kurnafoolee into the Sajuck to meet us at Lemsilong's ghât. On Rutton Pooea being asked to give us a guide up to Ugurah's village, he declined to do so, saying the road led along the side of the hills and we could not miss it. Several other coolies down with fever.

6th December.—Moved at 7 10 a.m., the first part of the road leading for a mile up the bed of the Tongbon khal, after which we ascended the hill, which is very steep, for 1,100 feet to the village of Ugurah, which we passed through and found to contain 28 houses. It stands on the edge of a cliff 300 or 400 feet high, and is quite unassailable from the west. Shortly after this, and descending the eastern slopes of the hill, sometimes through forest and sometimes through a succession of jooms, showing evidence of heavy cotton and rice crops, we passed through the village of the chief Tongboya, containing 39 houses. The chief followed us and asked for a present, and was told to apply at Kassalong. Proceeding onward, passed close to the village of chief Linignura, containing 27 houses, and after five and a-half hours' walking reached Lemsilong's ghât on the Sajuck, and found that the boats which had been sent round had just arrived. On the road we fell in with Rutton Pooea, who said he would join us next day. Here I may mention that we discovered that

one of the Tipperah murderers before mentioned had the day before told the coolies that the Syloos and Howlongs were collecting to attack us at the mouth of the Sajuck, and hence the flight of some of them and the discouragement of the rest. Could this have been done without the consent or instigation of Rutton Pooea? The stream of the Sajuck is deep and torpid, and about 15 yards wide, and it is said to be easily navigable for at least two days further on, a statement I have no reason to doubt, and which it is of importance for us to be aware.

7th December.—In the morning it was found that 17 other coolies had deserted during the night, a circumstance which placed us in great difficulty with regard to the conveyance of our supplies, &c., so much so that we were obliged to leave a considerable portion of them behind with a guard of 20 men to look after them. Started early with the remainder of the party and supplies, and ascended the hill on the left bank of the Sajuck to the village (16 houses) of Moorah, a chief of Rutton Pooea, where we remained for a short time and thence proceeded further up to the hill to Lemsilong's village (12 houses) on the peak of Rhoee-jans at a height of about 2,600 feet above the sea, Rutton Pooea with the chief Rottomah, and some karbarees joining us on the road. Lemsilong was formerly under Pooea, but having been ill-treated by him is now with the Syloos. Here we encamped and found Lemsilong, who appeared glad to see us, and said he had sent on to give notice to the Syloos. The view from this point is very fine in all directions. In full view to the north and north-east lie the jooms of the Syloos, while on the sixth range eastward and to the east and south-east lie those of the Howlongs, some of them on mountains apparently 7,000 to 8,000 feet high. The blue mountain is also clearly in sight, at a distance of about 36 miles as the crow flies, while in the direction of Rutton Pooea's old village, and our posts of Khurkhurria and Gungaram, is spread a sea of forest extending as far as the eye can reach, and without a sign of habitation or trace of men. Through this village, viz., Lemsilong's, now runs a main route to the Howlong villages, the old one to the south by Rutton Pooea's old village having been abandoned; and taking into consideration a nullah along which it runs for a part of the way, it is, although steep, for a hill road fairly good, that is, a mail could travel over it with assistance in a few places. The road is evidently much used, and here and there had even bamboo bridges and steps.

8th December.—On rising in the morning nothing could be seen but a magnificent sea of fog about 1,000 feet below our feet, with the tops of the higher hills protruding from it here and there like so many islands. Halted to-day to rest coolies, and to get up further supplies, Major Macdonald volunteering to go back with 60 coolies and a small party for the latter, a task which he performed by the evening, but was still obliged to leave a certain quantity of supplies behind. I remained in camp to meet any Syloo who might arrive, and during the day two more of Lemsilong's men were dispatched to the next Syloo village to give notice of our coming. In the evening five men and a karbaree from Valoolah's villages were reported to have come in. Rutton Pooea sent the Kookie interpreter, Ram Money, to say that Lemsilong had sent 500 armed men, and that we had better keep a good look out. This we did not consider credible, but nevertheless kept on the alert. Rutton Pooea is very much against our going on, and says the Syloos will stop us, and; although doubtful of this, I hardly like moving without their assent. Fearing a possible row, cleared grass and jungle around camp so as to have a fair field. All quiet during the night.

9th December. This morning had a long talk with the Syloo karbaree, who came last night, and did all I could to show the harmlessness of our intentions: he either can't or won't assent to our going on, and wishes us at least to stay until the arrival of Valoolah's karbarees. Pointed out that Saboonga being old as the karbaree said, and unable to come to us, we went to him as promised at last Kassalong fair. After much talk halted for karbarees. Arranged with Lemsilong to send back some men to look after the remainder of the supplies left at the Sajuck, and to bring up the guard of six men left there. A report came in about evening that Saboongah was at Valoolah's village, so said we would go and meet him there next day so as to avoid further trouble. He was also said to have sent for Lemsilong, who we said would accompany us. Men went off to carry this news in advance.

10th December.—This morning sent on Rutton Pooea, Rotomah, Lemsilong, and Sub-Inspector Mahomed Hossien, and followed ourselves with about 20 men and a few coolies. The road was very fair indeed, principally along ridges, and would hardly have required making so as to allow a baggage animal to pass. On nearing the village of Valoolah, we were requested not to enter it, but to sit down and wait. Did so, and sent for Jemadar, who came at once, when it turned out that the report of Saboongah's presence was entirely false. Valoolah refused to show, or to allow any one to enter, his house, alleging as an excuse his fear of witchcraft. His karbaree came to us with a fowl of his own, and requested that we should remain on a hill facing the village, which is situated on the Bettye Hill, at an elevation of about 2,850 feet. The karbaree said it was impossible we could be allowed to go on, on which I refused to speak on the subject, excepting with Valoolah himself. They refused to allow our people to enter the village, and will not show the water, some of which we however found out for ourselves. In the evening, however, the villagers, old and young, male and female, came round us showing no fear but much astonishment, and what between exhibiting our arms and persons, we had really hard work throughout the evening. Major Macdonald's height and stretch of arm formed matter of peculiar wonderment, and the inspection made of our persons in general, if flattering from

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the minuteness with which they were made, and the expressions of satisfaction elicited, were certainly not without affording cause for alarm on contemplation of the filth of the persons who conducted them, and the manipulation attendant thereon. On the west and below us the course of the Sajuck can plainly be traced by the rising mist. A good deal of talk in the evening with the karbarees, but nothing satisfactory elicited.

11*th December.*—The people of Valoolah and Vantomah speak out this morning, and say that their chiefs are much afraid, and won't hear of our going on, and that they will fall on us if we do; but Rutton Pooea and Lemsilong asked to be allowed to go back, saying it is no lie this time, and that, if we try to go on, the Kookies mean what they say. That we could go on using force is perhaps true, but I do not think I shall be justified in adopting such a course towards a clan with whom we are at peace and have been so for so long. They say plainly that our real desire is to see the country, so that we may afterwards adopt measures for reducing it should we wish to do so. This being so, and the chiefs not being willing to see us, they say the best thing we can do is to go back; that they will supply rice for this day and the next morning. This was said by Valoolah; and his karbarees too had come to see us; the former is a downcast looking man, marked with small-pox, and looked very much like a trapped wolf. The people appear friendly enough, and all day long we have been obliged to exhibit ourselves and firearms, &c., and can fully realise the feelings of the giants and dwarfs at a fair, while under exhibition to a succession of audiences. Rutton Pooea is constant in his assertions that the Syloos mean mischief, but Lemsilong denies this strongly, and we are inclined to believe him. After dark a Tipperah coolie reported that the women and children were leaving the village, which looks suspicious, and as in addition we had seen a number of armed men arrive, we kept a sharp look out. The night, however, passing quietly. Thermometer 49° at night and in the day 59°. Coolies and some of the men suffering much from cold and fever.

12*th December.*—At about 9 a.m. Valoolah and two other chiefs came to see us. They had with them in the village about 150 guns. After a great deal of talk we arranged to send back for further supplies which would enable us either to go forward and meet Saboonga, who was said to be at Vantomah's village, or to await his arrival there. They said we could not be allowed to go to Vantomah's village, but that Saboonga might meet us in the jungle. To this, however, I objected: 1st., as it was contrary to Kookie custom; 2ndly, as it would still further divide our already weak party, which I did not consider advisable in the presence of the uncertain intentions and sometimes clearly false statements of the Syloos; and 3rdly, because I did not wish to make ourselves too cheap. They had deceived us already as to the presence of Saboonga, and I was by no means sure as to their motives for their wish to meet us in the jungle or that Saboonga was present at all, and this I judged from the statement of his particularly sharp arrival at Vantomah's village, an arrival somewhat suspicious, when it is considered the Syloos reported Saboonga as old and unable to move. If he would not come to us, I proposed to go to him at Vantomah's, and pointed out that it was somewhat extraordinary that Saboonga was so old and decrepit as they said he was, he could travel to meet us in the jungle, and yet could not come here. We, however, sent back for supplies, and the day passed in the usual manner, crowds coming to see us even from the village of Saboonga. The boys asked where Saboonga was, but they denied all knowledge of his whereabouts. There is a very clear view of the Howlong jooms from this, being due east, and apparently six ranges from us.

13*th December.*—Still at Valoolah's village. A considerable number of armed men left this morning, and others came in during the day. About 9 a.m. Rutton Pooea came to us and said he wished to leave, as he heard an attempt to seize him would be made by the Syloos. Said he might do as he liked, and shortly after he and his followers slipped away by the back of the camp. Talking to and exhibiting ourselves to crowds all day. At one time we had 37 men in our small hut. In the evening five karbarees came into camp, who said they were those of Saboonga and Lall Jeeka, his son. There is no doubt but that an immediate search was made by them for Rutton Pooea, with what intent it is impossible to say, and the first thing they said was that it was bad to have Rutton Pooea there. Told them that he had left, and that the only reason for his being there was to encourage our coolies, who were afraid in the jungle. Also pointed out that it was difficult for us to communicate with them, excepting through him, and this threw them under a great disadvantage when compared with Rutton Pooea's people. They appeared fully alive to all I said on these points, but were obstinate on the point of Saboonga coming in, and again mooted the jungle scheme, but could give no reason for its adoption. They may mean no treachery, but it is doubtful; and I do not care to give them a chance of being treacherous, or of causing a rupture, and, in short, do not choose to place my foot where I may not be able to withdraw it again. At 7 p.m. a message came from Rutton Pooea to say that Lemsilong's wife had been confined, which we did not believe at the time, but which afterwards turned to be true.

14*th December.*—The old story. Still camped at Valoolah's village. No sign of Saboonga, and we have little more than a day's supply left. The karbarees now suddenly change their story, and say that Lall Jeeka's wife having died, neither he nor his father Saboonga is able to come. This being so, and after further talk there appearing no hope of altering the position of affairs, I did not care to wait longer on a tribe with whom we have been so long intimate, so sent for what chiefs were present and told them that I could

could wait here no longer; but that if they wished to make further communication, or Saboonga wished to come, he could do so at Lemsilong's village, where I had left our supplies; that in the meantime I would give them some small presents, and send some to Saboonga, and that it was a great mistake his not coming. In reply to which they, dropping the old story of his weakness, said he could not possibly see us on account of the death of his son's wife; also told them about the fair and its date, and said we wished to see chiefs and not so much karbarees there, as direct communication prevented mistake. After this gave presents to the following chiefs and karbarees:—

Chiefs.

Lall Konga.	Hung-booka.
Vanloolah.	Sei-pooya.
Vanoonah	Lal Boonga.
Tulrooya.	Vanroma.
Tung-loo-aba.	Thoma.
Tow-wa-loa.	Dan-chona.
Lal-tung-Seiya.	Lemsilong.

Karbarees of

Saboonga.	Vanthoma.
Lien Goora.	Lalroma.
Lall Jeeka.	Tey Ugnura.
Van-oy-eh.	Tung Leya.
Lal Chuma.	Kan Ronga.
Lal Hoolien.	Dowtona.
Lal Ugnura.	

Many of these men had never been communicated with, or at all events, been seen before; and if we have failed to see Saboonga, our communication with them may not be without its use. Left after distributing the presents, and reached Lemsilong's village at 3½ p.m., where we found that Rutton Pooea had gone back to Moora's village. At night four men came in to say that Saboonga's karbarees were following us with a tusk sent by Saboonga, and it appears the zemindar, Mahomed Hashun, told them to do so, and they would be rewarded for bringing it on. Found about 30 coolies ill, which, with the 41 who have absconded, would have rendered our going on an impossibility. Although accustomed to lie out in their own woods in their present clothing, I suspect the cold of the hills has been too much for them, as well as the extra work entailed on them by the other coolies absconding.

15th *December*.—Halted at Lemsilong's. A number of karbarees came in with the tusk; they said it was from Saboonga, and demanded money and presents for six chiefs. Asked them if Saboonga had sent the tusk for sale, or as a present, and said I should not send presents or money to the chiefs, if only for the reason that I had not got anything to send. They appeared sulky, and had about 100 men with them, it appearing the zemindar had said the men who brought the tusk would receive a present. I said I would give 50 rupees to them and no more (tusk worth about 150 rupees). And once more I am somewhat afraid of a disturbance, as although in a stronger position now, demands lead to disputes, quarrels, in consequence; and now convinced as I am that Saboonga will not come to terms, I consider waiting longer calculated to raise suspicion and lead to mischief. The karbarees said they would go and consult about what I said, and at last agreed to my terms; but on the Jemadar going to pay the money they refused it, and at 4 p.m. reappeared, urging the first demands, and also fresh ones on behalf of Vanoyah. Told him that Vanoyah had refused to allow us to go on, and deserved nothing, and further that we had nothing more to give. They then wished to know if I would give them money at Kassalong, to which I replied that I could make no promises, and that I had no power to give or promise money. I did not know what the Commissioner might do, but that most probably he would be very angry at our not having been allowed to see Saboonga, after their promise that we should do so. They then demanded a burning glass, which they did not get. These grasping demands will, I fear, form an obstacle in future negotiations. The Syloos appear to expect everything and to give nothing, and from all I can make out now I believe the story of Saboonga's having been at Vantomah's village to be as much a lie as that of his having been at Valoolah's. Major Macdonald was desirous of surveying and exploring to the eastward, but seeing the grasping mood the Syloos are in, and fearing further complications, I do not think it prudent. Presents appear not to be asked for as a favour, but as a lawful demand on the part of the chiefs. I asked them what they would think were we to take presents from all persons going to Kassalong, and they remained silent. After further talk they took the 50 rupees, and went off. Gave Lemsilong a present of 100 rupees and a blanket, which he well deserves. He is, I believe, well affected, has done his best for us, and may form an useful go-between when joined by the Syloo chief, Lallcheema, who is to reside with him on Bhœ-junkong.

16th *December*.—Left Lemsilong village and marched to the old camp near the Sajuck. Left six maunds of rice, which we were unable to carry, with Lemsilong. Placed remaining

remaining rice, and as much heavy baggage as possible, on board the 10 boats left there, so as to leave the coolies lightly loaded for their march over the Demagiri Hill with us.

17th *December.*—At 7½ a.m., started the laden boats and guard by the Sajuck; and with the rest of the guard and coolies marched over the Demagiri Hill, falling in with the boats at 2 p.m., above the Demagiri rapids. Rutton Pooea was at Lunguna's village, and sent to say he would join us next day. Sent the 10 boats past the falls by the slide we had formerly constructed.

18th *December.*—Sent camp below the rapids and fall, and encamped there. With Major Macdonald, ascended the Oheepoom range to look at a place said to be eligible for a new post. Found it at about 1,300 feet above the level of the sea, 130 yards by 70 wide, and with water on two sides close by; one side nearly precipitous. A road from below the lower rapids could easily be made to this spot, which would make the post about a short hour's journey from the river. Going and coming, passed through the village of Seidopha, which is very populous, and contains 45 houses. Also passed through many rich cotton and rice jooms, in which the Kookies were thrashing out the grain. This is done by placing the full ears and a portion of the straw in a large sieve of from four to five feet in diameter, which is placed on a springy bamboo platform at about six feet from the ground. In the sieve are two men, who, catching hold of each other by one arm, dance violently amongst the straw and ears. By this dancing the platform is set in motion, and imparts an up-and-down motion to the sieve, while the men in the sieve at the same time dance forwards, backwards, and sideways, with their feet. The grain is thrashed and falls through the sieve to mats placed below in a wonderfully short space of time. The ends of bamboos, which project at the end of the platform, are split in a peculiar manner; and when the stage is in motion, keep up a monotonous clapping which keeps time with the dancing. The work must be rather hard, and certainly the hardest in which I have ever seen the men of the Looshais engage.

19th *December.*—Two men arrived this morning from Rutton Pooea, who said they had been sent by Rutton Pooea to show us the direct road to Khurkhurria from his old village on the Demagiri range. Asked them if they knew the way, and they said they did. Ascended Demagiri from the falls by an easy road, which might easily be made much easier, then along the ridge of Demagiri by an excellent path to the old village which Rutton Pooea has just deserted, on Demagiri Tong, then down the hill due west, by a difficult zigzag path along the face of a precipice, for about 1,400 feet. A short time after leaving the foot of the hill, perceived that the guides were leading us through the forest in a southerly direction, and, on asking about this, they replied that the road would further on lead up another nulla north-west into the Buna Huni khal. Went on for some time, and at last, when it was palpable we were again approaching the Kurnafoolee, the guides gave in, one saying he had never been to Khurkhurria, and the other that he had only once been there. One mile more, and we emerged on the Kurnafoolee. Not getting to Khurkhurria is no great matter, as the road, or a road, can be found at any time; and I am on the whole glad that, by behaving as he has done, in sending ignorant guides, Rutton Pooea in a manner corroborates what I have before said as to his unwillingness to assist us in obtaining a knowledge of the country or of the tribes.

20th *December.*—Reached Burkul.

21st *December.*—Kassalong.

22nd *December.*—Rungamuttee.

From Major *John Macdonald,* Officiating Superintendent of Revenue Surveys, Lower Provinces; on Special Duty, Chittagong Hill District, to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department, No. 13 A.; dated Kassalong, the 21st December 1870.

IN accordance with the instructions received from the Government of Bengal in their No. 4776, dated 29th October* last, I left Calcutta on the 25th November, reached Chittagong on the morning of the 27th, left it at noon the same day, and on the 28th met Major Graham, the Deputy Commissioner of the Hill Districts, who was to conduct an expedition to the Syloo Hills, and, if possible, reach Baparee Bazar, the point where I worked down to last March, from Cachar towards the south. Major Graham started with the hope and understanding that the Syloo Chief Sabonga would meet him and conduct our party through his own hills into the limits of Sook Pilal's lands. The Syloos are at feud with Sook Pilal.

* *Vide* your No. 605E, dated 9 November 1870.

2. We left Rungamattee (which is the head-quarters of the Hill Districts) on the morning of the 29th November, and, continuing to move up the stream of the Kurnafoolee as fast as we possibly could, we reached the water-fall of Demagiri on the 4th of December. I must mention that on the 1st December, when we reached the Bhurkal rapids, situated about

18 miles above Kassalong, we had been obliged to empty our 45 boats, and carry all our loads by a land-path to a point above the rapids, where we again loaded our boats, and travelled by river. Between Bhurkal and Demagiri we passed six rapids; none of them could be considered dangerous at that season, as not a single accident happened. At Demagiri we halted for two days to carry our stores to the foot of the Demagiri Hill, and load 10 boats which we had dragged up over the rocks at the side of the fall, intended to be filled with rice, which would be sent round by the Kurnafoolee up the stream of the Sajuck, to meet us at the path by which we should descend from the Demagiri Hill to cross the Sajuck, and then enter the Syloo Hills at a point which I have marked on the map as Lemsilong's ghât.

3. Major Graham had been informed on the 3rd of December that his messengers had not gone on to Saboonga, and consequently the Syloos could not then be aware of our intended immediate approach.

4. On the night of the 4th December, Rutton Pooea, the chief of the tribe that bears his name, came into our camp. Rutton Pooea is a Kookie chief, who has for many years been on close and intimate relations with the officers in charge of the Hill Districts. He has visited Chittagong, and is propably the only Kookie chief who has any certain knowledge of our power and position. He receives a yearly allowance from the British Government. He has always been the channel through which the officer of the Hill Districts has communicated with the other Looshai or Kookie chiefs, amongst whom he is a man of great influence as the chief of many villages; also for his interest with us. We are the givers of great gifts and rajahs of a great bazar at Kassalong, where all Kookie produce is easily sold. Rutton Pooea tried to dissuade us from going forward. He urged that the Syloos would attack us. During that night his followers were busy, frightening our coolies. Before the night of the 4th was over, desertion had commenced amongst them. Rutton Pooea stayed with us till the afternoon of the 5th, when he left us, saying, he would not remain if we persisted in going forward. We asked him to send two of his men to guide us over the Demagiri Hill to the Sajuck, but nobody came; and on the morning of the 6th we started without guides. It was quite easy to find the path, and at 1.30 p.m., we descended into the Sajuck, crossed it, and encamped on the base of the Rhaee Jan Klang on Syloo land. Of course we met with no opposition, though the day before, Rutton Pooea had declared we were to be attacked directly we appeared on the Sajuck, and that 1,000 Syloos had assembled for that purpose. But the mischief had been done. On the evening of the 6th, at the end of our first march, and when only really commencing our Syloo expedition, we found that 42 out of 138 coolies had deserted. We had then only 96 coolies to carry the baggage and food for 24 days for two English officers, 66 fighting men (natives), and eleven lascars and servants, in addition to their own food and bedding.

5. On the morning of the 7th, we started, leaving a guard of 30 men over the stores which we could not carry. We also left seven of the non-combatant natives, and with 36 fighting natives, four servants carrying food for six days, ascended the Syloo Hill. We passed one *poonjee on the road. At 1.30 we stopped at the poonjee of Lemsilong, a Syloo chief, situated at a height marked 2,912 on Mr. O'Donel's map. On arrival we heard that several Syloos had come in to meet us, and in the course of the night we were told that Saboonga's advisers were also coming in. I accordingly arranged to go back to the Sajuck the next morning with 60 or 70 of the best coolies, load them lightly with food, and return again in the course of the same day. Early on the morning of the 8th, I started with 66 coolies for our encampment of the 6th. I reached it before 10 a.m. I had the coolies laden, and returned with 23 of the guard and four native followers. We had then 10 days' provisions on the top of the hill, and we had still left 23 baskets of provisions under a guard of seven men at the bottom of the hill over Lemsilong's ghât. In the event of Saboonga's meeting us cordially, guiding us without delay through his hills, and in Kookie fashion providing grain for our party when under his conduct, we had ample stores to admit of our reaching Sook pilal's village, where we were to meet Mr. Edgar on the 15th December, who again on his part had promised to bring up flour, rice, ghee, and dhal.

* Kookie village.

6. On my return, on the afternoon of the 8th, we heard that Saboonga had actually come to a village called Beltye, under a chief named Valoolah, which we could see at a point five or six miles to our north on the range we were then encamped upon. We were invited to go there. We marched the next morning, the 9th, and reached it 1 p.m. We encamped on a hill at an elevation of about 3,300 feet. On our way to our camp we passed through Valoolah's poonjee, a very large one, containing 65 houses. Our camp commanded it within a distance of 200 yards. As we had not a sufficient number of coolies to carry baggage and food for all our party, we advanced to the position of Valoolah's village with only 32 fighting men of all ranks, 50 coolies, and seven lascars and followers. We took provisions for six days. We were then on the second range beyond the Bhurkul, Mr. O'Donel's limit of augular work in the regular survey operations.

7. The 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th passed in that fruitless talk that all savages delight in. Major Graham had not time to wait, week after week, as Mr. Edgar was able to do last January, February, and March in the villages of the Sonai and the Dullessur, when we spent 35 days at one place, and 38 at another, watching the Kookies, dawdling and drinking themselves

themselves into complaisance. We knew that the representatives of a great many Syloo villages and the chiefs of many others were present, so on the 14th December, when we had only two days' provisions left at our position on Valoolah's, Major Graham made up his mind to meet all those who were present, distribute the trumpery presents he had brought up, and return the next day to our encampment of the 7th and 8th, where we had left more than half the guard and about half the coolies. We had advanced 13 miles north into the Syloo country, and were 20 miles south of the point we wished to reach with Syloo aid. To have carried out our original plan, we must have had the means to transport at least 10 days' rations, and this was utterly impracticable with our reduced number of coolies. The eight days we had passed on those bleak hills had affected the health of our coolies, and 30 of them were quite unfit to carry a load. On the 15th we met the chiefs of 14 villages, and the representatives of 13 more, 27 out of 41 Syloo villages. After the meeting was over, we returned to Lemsilong's village, halted there on the 16th, and on the 17th we returned to the Sajuck on our way back to Chittagong. So weak were many of our coolies that they were unable to carry back the whole of the small remaining portion of the rice, though more than 26 maunds weight of provisions had been consumed since we ascended the hill on the 7th and 8th instant. We were obliged to leave five or six maunds of rice behind. We gave it as a present to Lemsilong, as he had been very obliging and useful.

8. I obtained a little useful additional work, and have been able to correct some of the names on the maps, seeing the high hills from the south has satisfied me that I placed them correctly on my sketch made last March. I could see from under my post the whole outline of the hill ranges which receive the drainage of the two eastern affluents from the north, which drain into the Kurnafoolee, and which also divert the lines of drainage which flow in a north-westerly course into the Barak, and the Gangetic system through the valleys of the Gootur and the Dulseree. I saw the whole length of the Howlong range from Long Leh, and I saw the course of the Koladyne drainage which flows to the south. What I saw confirms the opinion I expressed last March regarding the general accuracy of the positions assigned by Mr. O'Donel to the general run of the main mountain ranges which divide this intricate system of drainage. Of course, if I had continued my march to Lysree Klang over Rotung Klang, I could have shown everything with perfect accuracy, but I had no means in carriage or labour to enable me to advance, and not a single coolie could have been depended upon. Under these circumstances I returned with Major Graham to Chittagong, and now submit this report for your information, attributing the whole of our difficulty in obtaining the assistance of the Syloos, and the power to utilise our available means in food, and transport to the underhand intriguing of our paid vassal Rutton Pooea. I trust that his behaviour will be noticed by Government as it deserves.

9. Viewed merely as a visit, I saw infinitely more of Kookie life than in my trip last March down the valleys of the Sonai and Dulseree. We were on three ranges inhabited by Kookies; their women and children remained with perfect confidence in each of the seven villages we visited, and visited our camp in numbers, remaining in it from dawn till dusk. We were civilly and kindly treated, receiving presents of fowls and pigs. I feel certain that, if Major Graham had been able to take a sufficient supply of provisions to allow of our waiting until we had exhausted the patience of Sabourga, we should have been able to advance through the Syloo hills into the drainage of the Barak. Drink is a powerful element in Kookie diplomacy. Major Graham's supply was very scanty.

10. I also respectfully urge my opinion that for such expeditions a small number of soldiers would give more confidence to the coolies than double or even treble their number of policemen only. It is evident to me that the majority of the men of these hill tribes, such as the Mugs, Chukmas, and Tipperahs, even when enrolled in the police, are just as much afraid of the Kookies as are the coolies whom they guard. Amongst the 60 policemen who accompanied us as escort, 12 or 15 reliable useful men might have been selected, and in addition to a guard of one native officer, two havildars, four naicks, and 20 sepoys from a regular regiment would have formed a more efficient guard, with the advantage of requiring only half the same number of coolies for baggage and food.

11. Taking into consideration the facility offered by the Dulseree and Kurnafoolie Rivers, it would be quite easy to place 200 soldiers, respectively, at Baparee Bazaar, from the north, and at Demagiri from Kassalong, in six days, and from those points four days well employed would place the troops from the north and the south on the hills which harbour the centre of Kookie disaffection, on the head waters of the Tootdoong or Gootur River. Sookpilal and Rutton Pooea being faithful, a thorough punishment of the Howlong and Sylhoo tribes could be inflicted, all our captive subjects restored, and the Kookies cowed for ever.

From the Honourable *A. Eden*, Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, No. 858; dated Fort William, the 27th February 1871.

In continuation of my letter, No. 789, dated the 21st instant, relative to the question of the frontier defence of Chittagong, I am directed to forward, for submission to the Government of India, the Papers noted on the margin, on the subject of erecting block-houses inside each of the police posts in the Hill Tracts.

Extract (paragraphs 4 to 9) of the Administration Report of the Hill Tracts of Chittagong for 1869-70, with Commissioner's remarks.
Extract (paragraph 2) of the Government Resolution, dated 28th September 1870.
Letter No. 328, dated the 7th ultimo, with two enclosures and plans from the Commissioner of Chittagong.

2. It will be seen from the Papers that, in the Resolution of this Government, recorded on the annual Administration Report on the Chittagong Hill Tracts for the year 1869-70, the Lieutenant Governor was of opinion that each of the stockaded police posts should have a place of strength which might be used for refuge or defence on occasions when the outpost might happen to be weakened by the detachment of part of the garrison in pursuit.

3. In reply to this paragraph of the Government Resolution, the Commissioner now submits two designs for block-houses; the one by Mr. A. Rattray, Assistant Commissioner of the Sungoo Sub-Division; and the other by Major Graham, Officiating Deputy Commissioner. It will be seen that Lord Ulick Browne recommends the construction of two substantial masonry towers at the two most important posts, viz. Kassalong and Rungamuttea, the cost of which is estimated at 3,000 rupees each; while he is of opinion that, in consideration of the expense entailed, nothing beyond ordinary block-houses of rough timber posts, with wooden plank roofs, need be erected at the other outposts; the cost of these will be small, as the timber could be procured on the spot, and the work in great measure done by the police themselves.

4. Looking to the extreme importance of protecting this frontier more effectually, the Lieutenant Governor considers it his duty to support the proposals of the Commissioner, and he concurs with him and the Deputy Commissioner in the opinion that the important positions which we hold at Kassalong and Rungamuttea should be guarded by substantial buildings.

5. I am therefore desired to apply for a special grant of 6,000 rupees to meet the cost of the proposed buildings, the construction of which should be commenced as soon as possible.

6. The return of the original plans is requested.

Extract from a Letter from Major *J. M. Graham*, Officiating Deputy Commissioner of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, to the Commissioner of the Chittagong Division, No. 173; dated Rungamuttea, the 31st May 1870.

The Independent Frontier Tribes.

This was specially reported.

Para. 4. In writing the annual report for the year 1868-69, the first point touched on was the savage and unprovoked attacks made by the independent frontier tribes on the police outpost of Chima, and on several villages lying within the Hill Tracts District, and also on the River Koladyne. The present year has been distinguished by attacks on villages on the Koladyne, and by an attack on the Mugh village of Aumphroo Roajah, situated within half an hour's walk of the police post of Chima, which has been renewed since its destruction last year. It appears that the village was attacked during a dense fog, at about three o'clock on the morning of the 19th January last, by a body of from 40 to 50 men; that only two or three shots were fired, and that four women and six children were carried off. One man was mortally wounded, and a woman slightly so.

5. The loss of life would doubtless have been greater had it not been for the fact that the villagers, in anticipation of such an attack, had been in the habit of concealing themselves nightly in the jungle, and that the invaders were hurried in their movements, owing probably to their fear of an attack on the part of the guard, which, however, did not move so promptly as it could have done to the assistance of the villagers. The reason given by the officer of the guard for this was his having mistaken the few shots fired for the reports of burning bamboos, and that hence it was not until he again heard what he felt certain were the reports of firearms that he moved out.

6. In consequence of this want of promptitude on the part of the guard, Government has declared "it appears to have failed in its duty;" and I myself am inclined to think that the truth is that the post, which only numbered 30 men of all ranks, and contained besides a number of women and children, having before its eyes the experience of last year, was somewhat chary of sending out 15 or 20 men, the very fact of whose absence might draw an attack on the post while in a weakened state, and who might themselves have to attack

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an enemy which was certain to be twice or thrice their number, and might, for all they knew, be many times more so.

7. If, then, under these circumstances, the guard was somewhat stimulated in its belief that the few reports heard were those of burning hamlets, and not of musketry, it is perhaps hardly to be wondered at. Mention is made of this merely to draw notice to the situation in which any of our weak guards, encumbered as they are with women and children, may be placed if called to meet a body of Kukis even at a short distance from their post. In the instance of the first attack on Climo, a portion of the guard had moved out promptly on the rumour of a hostile body being in the neighbourhood, and the result was that the post was attacked and carried; whereas in the second and late instance, where the guard did not move out promptly, the post was saved, but the object of the enemy was effected, and a village plundered.

8. This being so, I cannot concur in a system which allows our posts to be filled with women and children, and which thereby not only increases their expense, but renders them inefficient.

9. Against this view, however, it may be urged that our hillmen will not enlist unless they are permitted to have their wives and children with them, and this is a position which cannot be denied; but at the same time I consider it equally undeniable that the present system is one only suited to times of peace, and that even then it may be said that if posts can be considered as useful in a semi-effective condition, they might perhaps be dispensed with altogether.

This is the great difficulty, and for the present it cannot be surmounted, as we must depend on hillmen, and for a great deal of work no others would be of any use. If the posts were strengthened to 60 men each, they could both send out and retain a sufficient number; but I do not think the 40 men proposed by Government would suffice for both purposes.

EXTRACT of a RESOLUTION by his Honour the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, dated Fort William, the 28th September 1870.

Para. 2. The Deputy Commissioner considers that the present system, under which the hill police are encouraged or allowed to settle their families round them, is open to objection, and tends to weaken the posts and render the action of the garrison inefficient. There may be some truth in this; but the practice was introduced because it was found that in no other way could service at these outposts be made palatable to the police, especially to the hillmen, who are averse to service at a distance from their homes, and whom we cannot retain against their will. It was believed, too, that gradually around each post the Joomeas would settle their families, till in time the police stockade became merely the centre of a considerable village well able to protect itself. This will no doubt eventually be the case. Meantime, however, what seems to the Lieutenant Governor to be required is, that each stockaded post should have a place of strength, a blockhouse loophold for musketry, or some such building, in which at times of disturbance, and when the garrison is weakened by detaching men, the rest of the force present may take refuge, in case of attack, with the women and children, and defend themselves till relieved. Some plan of this kind would probably reassure the police, and they should be helped and encouraged to construct rough defences of this class.

From Lord *H. Ulick Browne*, Commissioner of the Chittagong Division, to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department, No. 328; dated Chittagong, the 7th January 1871.

WITH reference to paragraph 2 of the Government Resolution on the Annual Administration Report of the Hill Tracts of Chittagong, received with your Memorandum No. 4454, dated 28th September last, on the subject of establishing blockhouses inside each police post, I have the honour to enclose copies of correspondence noted on the margin, with the plans referred to by the Deputy Commissioner and the Assistant Commissioner in original.

Deputy Commissioner's No. 388, dated 10th November 1870, with enclosure in original.

Assistant Commissioner of Sungoo Sub-Division's No. 57, dated 21st September 1870 (being the enclosure of the above), with enclosure in original.

2. Major Graham has, I know, been considering the subject at intervals for at least a year.

Mr. Rattray's plan will perhaps be thought too expensive.

Taking Major Graham's proposals, a tower or house of two stories could scarcely, I apprehend, be made with mud walls to stand firmly as regards the upper story, and I do not see how such a tower could be advantageously constructed without a roof of some kind, as rain would penetrate through the flat plank flooring of both stories, and arms and ammunition would suffer.

3. A masonry tower would answer every purpose, but it would require some kind of roof. I think a plank sloped roof might be made sufficiently watertight.

A masonry tower would cost some money at the sites of the police posts. I should estimate the cost of good lime delivered at Rungamuttea and Kassalong at 14 annas a

maund at least, and if delivered at some of the other sites at more than one rupee. Brick-makers, masons, carpenters, and sawyers would have to be brought up from Chittagong and would demand higher wages.

4. The assistant engineer considers the thickness of the walls, &c., suggested by Major Graham, too great, and an estimate of the cost of construction on the Deputy Commissioner's plan thus modified with a wooden roof comes to 2,000 rupees.

The interior space, however, though large enough for ordinary posts, would not suffice for Rungamuttea and Kassalong. I agree with the Deputy Commissioner as regards the importance of these places, and should estimate the cost of larger buildings of the same kind suitable for the two stations at 3,000 rupees.

5. As regards other posts, considering the chance there is of other places being selected for posts hereafter and the expense of masonry buildings, I recommend nothing but the ordinary blockhouse of rough timber posts with a wooden plank roof. The cost of these would be small, as everything but the timber and the sawing of it for the roof could be done by the police themselves from materials close by, and the guard could also renew the timber posts annually if necessary, while the roofing would last for a long time.

From Major *J. M. Graham*, Officiating Deputy Commissioner, Chittagong Hill Tracts, to the Commissioner of the Chittagong Division, No. 388 ; dated Rungamuttea, the 16th November 1870.

I HAVE the honour to reply to paragraph 2 of your letter of remarks on the Resolution of the Government of Bengal, which calls for report on instructions conveyed in the concluding portion of paragraph 2 of the Resolution.

2. The Lieutenant Governor is of opinion that a blockhouse loopholed for musketry, or some such building, which might be used as a place of refuge or defence, when our outposts happened to be weakened by the withdrawal of men, would probably reassure the police, &c., and that such a plan would be both efficient and practical there can be no doubt, and, indeed, at two places, something of this kind has already been attempted by the men themselves.

3. What remains, then, to be done, appears to be to consider the kind of building likely to be most practically useful, and at the same time cheapest in the long run.

4. The common blockhouse has perhaps the advantage on the score of cheapness, and in the possibility of its being erected by the police themselves, assisted by three or four carpenters, but it has its disadvantages, and these are so considerable that I am inclined to reject it in favour of buildings to be afterwards mentioned.

5. To make a blockhouse, straight, round logs are required, and if these cannot be procured, others must be squared and straightened, and even, under the best circumstances, unless particular kinds of wood can be procured, the house is not likely to last long. Further, fire can be applied either to the walls or roof of a blockhouse, and it is not easy to make it of two stories so as to contain a considerable number of people, and at the same time possess short lines of defence. That is to say, that a blockhouse having only a good floor 30 feet long by 15 feet wide, would have running walls of 90 feet to defend, while a brick or mud tower, 15 feet square, having two stories, would, while possessing the same superficial space inside, have only 60 feet of wall to defend, be less easy to carry, would contain the same number of people as the blockhouse, and could not be set on fire, as no thatched roof would be required.

6. It is a two-storied tower of this kind, either of brick or mud, 14 feet square inside, having each story 10 ft. high, and with walls 3 ft. thick, that I would recommend.

7. Entrance to these towers could only be obtained by means of a ladder and through a door in the upper story, and although they would cost more at first, I think they would be cheaper in the end, and would be immeasurably more to be relied on and easier of defence than the blockhouse.

8. The subject of the defence of our outposts is one which has had my attention for some time past, and I think that taking the features of the ground into consideration on which each post is built, we ought, in as far as possible, to have them of a uniform description, and I now enclose a rough plan of this kind.

9. The main difficulty about having square towers as now proposed, would be the expense of lime; bricks I think we could make at no great outlay, but lime would cost from 8 annas to 12 annas per maund. The ditch, breastwork, and palisade would be constructed by the police

10. Along the inner edges of the ditches I propose to plant hedges of prickly cactus, of which I have now a considerable quantity planted at Rungamuttea and Kassalong. A hedge of this kind, with a ditch in front, cannot well be carried by a rush, that is without injury and delay to the attacking party.

11. At

11. At Rungamuttea and Kassalong I have long thought that we ought to have buildings, in which not only could a stand be made in an emergency, but which (in the case of Rungamuttea at least) are absolutely necessary as magazines. The removal of head-quarters from Chundergonah to Rungamuttea has rendered the magazine at the former place of no avail, and what is more, we are obliged to keep a guard there to protect arms and stores, which, in the absence of magazine accommodation, we cannot store at Rungamuttea.

12. You are well aware of the importance of Kassalong and of ill effects which would ensue were it surprised by the hillmen, and I consider a strong tower or magazine there as of equal importance with the erection of one at Rungamuttea.

13. Mr. Arthur Rattray has forwarded to me a letter and well-executed plans in connection with this subject, and these I now forward for consideration.

14. The buildings shown in Mr. Rattray's plan would doubtless cost a good deal of money, I should say certainly 5,000 rupees each, but should it be impossible to obtain sanction for this sum, perhaps towers, somewhat larger than those proposed for the outposts, would answer our purpose.

FROM *A. Rattray*, Esq., Assistant Commissioner, Sungoo Sub-Division, to the Deputy Commissioner of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, No. 37; dated Rungamuttea, the 21st September 1870.

I BEG to forward for record, with a view to any future correspondence on the subject, drawings for a frontier post, as might be considered necessary at Kassalong for instance.

2. I trust the plans enclosed clearly detail every particular in connection with the building, so as to make a written specification unnecessary.

3. The importance of guard posts more substantial than the present bamboo and wood structures, which have to be renewed every two or three years at a great cost to Government, will be admitted, and it may hereafter be considered not unnecessary, that as an experimental measure the important position we hold at Kassalong should be guarded by a more substantial stockade than the present one.

4. It will be seen on reference to the drawings that the buildings designed, whilst capable of holding 40 to 50 men, can, in case of any sudden emergency, be defended by four or five men holding the main tower, thus enabling the bulk of the guard to follow in pursuit of raiders without having to wait for reinforcements, and without fear of the responsibility at present incurred, whereby the officer in charge of a post is liable to be censured for leaving his post weakly guarded, though he may have at the moment a portion of his men in pursuit of raiders much too small, however, for retaliation.

TELEGRAPHIC MESSAGES.

Dated 17th March 1871.

From Chittagong.	To Calcutta.
From Commissioner.	To Secretary to Government of Bengal.

LEWIN writes Rutton Pooea has sent urgently for help to protect his village from attack. Lewin thinks aid should be granted, and proposes to detach guard from Kassalong for one month, supplying its place. In case of advanced post or expedition being probable, it is essential to help him now; but help should be strictly limited to defence, and Rutton Pooea should feed the guard. More by post.

Dated 18th March 1871.

From Calcutta.	To Chittagong.
From Junior Secretary to Government of Bengal.	To Commissioner.

IF Captain Lewin thinks Rutton Pooea will be attacked, because he has supported or given information to our officers; police may go, but not otherwise. You must satisfy yourself that they can go; remain with safety, and provision themselves there. Also that they can return in a month.

From *H. L. Harrison*, Esq., Junior Secretary to the Government of Bengal, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, No. 1,234; dated Fort William, the 21st March 1871.

In continuation of endorsement No. 1194, dated 18th instant, I am directed to submit, for the information of the Government of India, in the Foreign Department, a copy of a demi-official letter, dated the 15th idem, with enclosures, from the Officiating Commissioner of Chittagong, bearing on the identity of the Looshai chiefs engaged in the late raids, and also giving information respecting the plunder by the raiders of the village of the friendly Looshai Chief, Lemsilong Raja, and his wish to settle in British territory, and the aid asked for by the Chief Rutton Pooea to repel a threatened attack of hostile Looshais.

Demi-official from *S. C. Bayley*, Esq., Commissioner of Chittagong, to the Honourable *A. Eden*, Secretary to the Government of Bengal, dated 15th March 1871.

I send you an important letter from Lewin, the blue marked part of which has perplexed me very much. As to the raiding tribes, I think the evidence as to the part taken by the Howlongs is complete, and I do not quite understand why Lewin doubts the part taken by Saboonga and the Syloos. The evidence of the spoons and forks is very much against him at present.

I see no objection to Lemsilong being allowed to settle within our jurisdiction, provided he be brought well inside the line of posts, and can be taken that he does not raid on his own account. The case, however, shows that friendliness to us is by no means pure gain to the Kookies, and that we are just as likely to be brought into collision with hostile tribes by having our neighbours friendly as by having no intercourse at all with them.

Thirdly, in regard to Rutton Pooea, I find myself in an awkward position. If there is to be an advance post, and if there is to be an expedition this year, I should give a complete assent to Lewin's proposal; but if the policy of narrowing our line of defence, and abstaining from any attempt to influence the tribes beyond our direct jurisdiction is to be followed, I should object to the proposal, and say we can only defend him if he settles within our lines; but I am in complete ignorance as to whether the proposed post and the proposed expedition are or are not to be undertaken. I have drawn up a sort of summary of the arguments which occurred to me *pro* and *con*, and, after some hesitation, have decided to take the responsibility of not disallowing what Lewin is doing. Either way, I must take the responsibility to be of any use; the move must be immediate. I hope that the mere fact of our coming to his assistance will be sufficient to prevent an attack; but both this business and Lemsilong's open out a new and very awkward phase in our dealings with Kookies, easily solvable if we are determined to punish for raids, but otherwise making the policy of personal influence, negotiation, and conferences almost hopeless. How can we expect to keep our neighbours friendly, if the result of our friendliness is to bring down upon them an attack from our enemies, when we do nothing to protect them? I can see how the policy hitherto advocated by the Government of India may work compatibly with absolute non-communication of any sort, and a system as close as that of Thibet; but not how it can be successfully carried out in combination with friendly visits, conferences, and presents. Overleaf you will find my *pros* and *cons*, such as they are; and, if I am considered to have come to a wrong conclusion, I trust my uncertainty as to an advanced post, and as to an expedition, will be considered. I should insist, anyhow, on the guard being merely a garrison, and acting strictly on the defensive. I do not know whom Lewin proposes to send in charge, and this point is harrassing.

I telegraphed to you immediately on receipt of Lewin's letter, but my telegram was returned, owing to a break between Comilla and Dacca. I have, however, sent it again.

Pro.	*Contra.*
Rutton Pooea has been consistently friendly (and the only Kookie Chief of any importance that has been so) for 10 years.	It is desirable to abstain from all interference in intestinal matters, as it is both uncertain what may have led to them and whither they may lead us.
He has given us information of intended raids, whenever possible.	
It is for these reasons that he is to be attacked.	
Having induced him to show us this friendliness, which exposes him to attack, we are bound both by *bonâ fides* and good policy to so stand by him.	[If we are to have an expedition, the latter objection falls to the ground, and the necessity of retaining Rutton Pooea's friendship is overwhelming.]

It

It is desirable to show that we can, if necessary, protect friends as well as punish enemies.	The Government of India's general line of policy is to withdraw from anything like direct interference.
In case of an advanced post, our taking up ground there thus early by Rutton Pooea's invitation is important; and both for the advanced post and for a cold weather expedition, it is very necessary not only to secure Rutton Pooea's friendship, but to retain him in a position to be of use to us.	Risk of failure. [If we keep strictly to the defensive, and maintain carefully our line of communication, this is slight.]
If we fail him he must of necessity make common cause with Syloos and Howlongs. Our way to them lies by his country. If we have to deal with him first, it will multiply our difficulties tenfold, whereas his alliance, on the other hand, will as greatly diminish them.	We provoke a direct attack on our own territory. [Not likely to take place now. An expedition in the cold season will do the same anyhow, and we have sufficient force to meet it.]

Demi-official from Captain *T. H. Lewin* to the Commissioner of Chittagong, dated Rungamuttea, 13th March 1872.

I HAVE received yours of the 11th with Simson's letter. I send you herewith a short statement, showing the different reports received as to the identity of the raiders. This is final, and after considering it carefully, you will, I think, agree with me that whoever else may have been concerned in the raids, there is no doubt but that the principal actors therein were Lalboora, Lalsaboola, Mongpoonga, and Saipoiya, all men of the Howlong clan. I confess that I am somewhat doubtful as to the part that the Syloo clan have taken in the matter, but think it highly probable that some of their number were concerned in the raids on Munnipore and Sylhet. Since I last wrote, affairs have marched. On the 9th, Lemsilong Raja, a Loosai chief, who has been consistently friendly to us, came in to me with a number of his men, and said that he and his village had been plundered by the Howlong tribe, because he had assisted in taking Majors Graham and Macdonald into the Looshai country. In proof of his assertion, he showed the marks of their cords on his wrists. He said that they plundered him in preference to Rutton Pooea, because he was not so powerful a chief, but that they, doubtless, would attack Rutton Pooea hereafter. His statement as to the identity of the raiders will be found in the comparative memorandum of information on the subject (enclosed). This chief, Lemsilong, was rewarded by Government in 1869 with a present of 500 rupees, for consistent friendliness and valuable information given, but then also the Howlong chiefs descended on him and stripped him of all he had received. Lemsilong said that he had now only his life left, and that, consequently, he asked permission to settle in Government territory with such men as he could collect. I gave him presents and food, promising all the assistance in my power.

It will be a very fortunate thing, in the event of an expedition, to have the services of this chief. He is a Looshai of the Looshais, and knows every path in the country. I shall do all in my power to attach him to me. He is the chief who named his son after me Tongloyn. To-day I have just received an express from Kassalong. Rutton Pooea has sent in haste to say that his village is in danger of being attacked, and asking for assistance from me. I consider that we are bound to give him the aid he asks for. I shall, therefore, move up the detachment of the 22nd Punjab Native Infantry to Kassalong, and detach the Kassalong Guard on duty for one month to Rutton Pooea's village. If you *disapprove* of my measures, send me an express; I shall make it a condition that Rutton Pooea supports the detachment, or at least finds them in rice and the bulker sort of *comestibles*.

Rutton Pooea further reported that the Shendoo tribe from Arracan had sent out a body of men to raid in the south of the Hill Tracts. This report must be taken *cum grano*. I have, however, sent an express to the guards in the south to give information of the probability of an attack, and have requested the Assistant Commissioner, Sungoo Sub-Division, A. Rattray, to warn the villagers to be on the alert. I have distributed 300 muskets with powder and ball to the three chiefs, Chukma Ranee, Burmese Bohmong, and Mong Raja.

Rutton Pooea has not, he says, been able to take any steps for the release of the European captive (Winchester's child?) on account of the unsettled state of the country.

P.S.—No further news from Tenny. I have sent out men to report.

STATEMENT of RAIDS committed in 1871.

Names of Chiefs.	Tribe.	Authority for Report of Raid committed.						Remarks.
		No. of Times mentioned.	Authority for supposing the Chief concerned in Cachar Raid.	No. of Times mentioned.	Authority for supposing the Chief concerned in Tipperah and Sylhet Raid.	No. of Times mentioned.	Authority for supposing the Chief concerned in Munipore Raid.	Total No. of Times mentioned.	
1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.
1. Lall Saboola -	Howlong - -	5	1. Mentioned as concerned in raid in Deputy Commissioner's No. 41, dated 5th February 1871, and Komul Churn. 2. Report of Saboonga, Head of the Syloo Clan - - - - 3. Statement of Chund Soils, escaped captive - - - - 4. Report of Sub-Inspector, Kassalong - - - - 5. Statement of Looshai, who brought in silver forks, &c. - -	1	1. Saboonga - - Doubtful. Proved.	–	1. Rutton Pooea on the 10th March 1871. Doubtful.	7	(Col. 4.) Attack reported on the 24th January 1871. Lallportang is dead. His village and men are still called his. Lolsaboola is his son, and his name has been substituted for that of his father, deceased.
2. Mong-poom -	- ditto - -	4	1. Mentioned as concerned in raid in Deputy Commissioner's No. 41, dated 5th February 1871, and Komul Churn. 2. Report of Saboonga, Head of the Syloo Clan. 4. Report of Sub-Inspector, Kassalong. 6. Rutton Pooea.	1	2. Rutton Pooea. Deputy Commissioner's No. 2, of 12th Jan. 1871.	–	- - - - -	5	
3. Sarpoiya - -	- ditto - -	3	1. Mentioned as concerned in raid in Deputy Commissioner's No. 41, dated 5th February 1871, and Komul Churn. 2. Report of Saboonga, Head of the Syloo Clan. 5. Statement of Looshai, who brought in silver forks, &c. - -	2 –	2. Rutton Pooea, and again by him on the 10th March 1871. Proved.	–	- - - - -	5	(Col. 6.) Reported by the Magistrate of Tipperah on the 21st January 1871.
4. Lall-boora -	- ditto - -	5	4. Report of Sub-Inspector, Kassalong. 5. Statement of Looshai, who brought in silver forks, &c. - - 6. Rutton Pooea. 7. Lemsilong - - - - - - - - - - - 8. Commissioner of Dacca, dated 3rd March.	– –	- - - - -	–	This is Rutton Pooea's brother-in-law.		
5. Vantsanga - -	- ditto - -	1	5. Statement of Looshai, who brought in silver forks, &c. - -	–	- - - - -	–	- - - - -	1	
6. Dookooma -	Syloo - -	1	7. Lemsilong - - - - - - - - - - -	–	- - - - -	1	1. Rutton Pooea - -	2	(Col. 8.) Raid committed about 27th January 1871.
7. Burkoya - -	- - -	1	7. ditto - - - - - - - - - - -	–	- - - - -	–	- - - - -	1	
8. Lalalooza - -	- - -	1	6. Rutton Pooea - - - - - - - - -	–	- - - - -	–	- - - - -	1	
9. Lallthong-bong -	- - -	1	6. ditto - - - - - - - - - -	–	- - - - -	–	- - - - -	1	
10. Rang Vroong -	- - -	1	6. ditto - - - - - - - - - -	–	- - - - -	–	- - - - -	1	
11. Laloo-ba - -	Howlong - -	–	- - - - - - - - - - - -	1	2. Rutton Pooea on the 10th March 1871.	–	- - - - -	1	
12. Laloora - -	ditto - -	–	- - - - - - - - - - - -	1	ditto - - ditto.				
13. Chong-loo-lian -	ditto - -	–	- - - - - - - - - - - -	1	Rutton Pooea.				
14. Bhootâiya - -	- - -	–	- - - - - - - - - - - -	–	- - - - -	3	1. Rutton Pooea - - 2. Sub-Inspector - - 3. Deputy Commissioner's letter, No. dated	– 3 1	This No. 14 is said to live near the Munipore frontier; he is not known, I think, on this side.
15. Saboonga - -	Syloo - -	–	- - - - - - - - - - - -	–	- - - - -	–	1. Rutton Pooea.		
16. Jatna - -	ditto - -	–	- - - - - - - - - - - -	–	- - - - -	–	1. ditto - - -	1	

From *H. L. Harrison*, Esq., Junior Secretary to the Government of Bengal, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, No. 1245, dated Fort William, the 21st March 1871.

In continuation of my letter No. 789, of the 21st ultimo, I am directed to forward the accompanying copy of a letter,* with its enclosures, from the Officiating Commissioner of Chittagong, and, with reference thereto and to that officer's demi-official communication and enclosures, a copy of which has been separately submitted to the Foreign Department, I am directed to say that the Lieutenant Governor is much disposed to agree with the Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner of the Hill Tracts that, as Rutton Pooea wishes it, the advanced post in his village should at once be occupied by Captain Lewin with 200 men, of whom the detachment of Native Infantry now on duty in the hills would form a part, the rest of the force being supplied from the police of the Hill Tracts and of the Chittagong district.

* No. 408, dated 10 March 1871.

2. Lieutenant Gordon might, for the present, remain in charge of the post, and measures should at once be adopted for improving the route both by river and road to the post.

3. The occupation of this advanced frontier would be very useful as forming a base for future operations if they should be determined upon.

From *S. C. Bayley*, Esq., Officiating Commissioner of the Chittagong Division, to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department, No. 408, dated Chittagong, the 10th March 1871.

I have the honour to submit copies of correspondence noted in the margin from the Deputy Commissioner of the Hill Tracts, stating the particulars of his interview with the Chief Rutton Pooea, and to state that, concurring as I do most fully in Captain Lewin's sixth paragraph of letter No. 83, dated 27th February 1871, I venture to hope that this may be communicated to the Government of India as furnishing the strongest possible support to the views urged in his Excellency in Council by Sir William Grey, in your letter No. 789, dated the 21st February 1871, regarding an advanced post in Rutton Pooea's country.

Deputy Commissioner's No. 82, dated 27 February 1871, and enclosure.

Deputy Commissioner's No. 83, dated 27 February 1871, and enclosure.

From Captain *T. H. Lewin*, Deputy Commissioner, Chittagong Hill Tracts, to the Commissioner of the Chittagong Division, No. 82, dated Rangamuttee, the 27th February 1871.

I have the honour to forward herewith for your information copies of telegrams sent to Government of Bengal by me, together with the replies received thereto.

2. I take this opportunity also of acquainting you with what passed between myself and the Looshai Chief, Rutton Pooea, whom I met at Kassalong on the 23rd instant.

3. The chief distinctly informed me that there was an Englishman held prisoner among the Looshais, but professed entire ignorance as to whose keeping he was in, saying merely that he thought he must have been made captive in the late Cachar raids.

4. Rutton Pooea further stated that the Looshai chiefs, Saboonga, of the Syloo tribe, and Vantsanga and Lalboora, of the Howlong clan, had started in another raid against Cachar to avenge the deaths of the Looshai who recently fell there during their last attack. He said he did not know what part of Cachar they meant to attack, but that their movement was in the direction of a stream called the Dulai (probably the Dulleser).

5. Rutton Pooea asked if he should take measures for the ransoming of the captive Englishman, saying that we could settle the amount of the ransom hereafter.

6. As there was not time to make any reference to you for instructions, I took it upon myself to authorise the chief to take steps to free the captive in question. He promised to let me hear from him again on the subject in a fortnight's time. He could not say anything certain sooner, as he would have to go himself to conduct the negotiation, which, being one of some delicacy, would probably take time. The Englishman's life, he added, was safe at present, but he could not answer for what might happen in future; neither could he, or rather would he, give me any information as to who the captive was, or where, or by whom, he had been captured. I shall not fail to communicate to you with all speed any further information on this subject that I may receive.

From Captain *T. H. Lewin,* Deputy Commissioner, Chittagong Hill Tracts, to the Commissioner of the Chittagong Division, No. 83; dated Rangamuttee, the 27th February 1871.

In continuation of my letter No. 82, dated the 27th instant, I have the honour to state further particulars of my interview with the Chief Rutton Pooea, having reference more particularly to our relations with the frontier tribes, and to the possible contingency of an armed expedition to be made next November from British territory against the Syloo and Howlong clans of the Looshai tribe.

2. Rutton Pooea stated that his position as intermediary between us and the hostile tribes had now become one of great danger, and that, unless we could assist him by placing an armed post in his vicinity, he should be compelled to relinquish his present friendly relations with us, and move nearer to the Howlong country.

3. He added that, in the event of our placing an armed force near him to support his village, he would do all in his power to assist us in procuring rice and other provisions; also that if such a post were determined upon as a permanent measure, he would aid us with all his force in any attack we might make against any of the hostile Looshai clans.

4. The above statements of the chief call for clear and definite answer from our Government, and I beg the favour of your communicating the facts, as above stated, to the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, with a request that I may be empowered to convey some decisive reply to Rutton Pooea on the points which he has referred to.

5. I would add, that I believe this to be the first occasion upon which Rutton Pooea has ever deliberately expressed his willingness to join us in offensive measures against the other Looshai clans.

6. In as far as my own experience goes, I am of opinion that the establishment of an armed and fortified post, garrisoned by at least 200 men in the heart of the Looshai country, is the most really effective measure that can be taken to put a stop to the continuance of the raids of the frontier tribes into British territory, and that the opportunity now afforded of obtaining the co-operation and active assistance of one of the most ancient chiefs among them is particularly favourable to our object, and should be made use of.

From *C. U. Aitchison,* Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Political Department, No. 17C—P; dated Cawnpore, the 11th March 1871.

I am directed by the Viceroy and Governor General in Council to acknowledge the receipt of the various letters noted on the margin, relative to the defence of the Chittagong frontier, and to communicate the following observations and orders in reply.

From dated 21 February 1871, No. 789.
" " 22 " " " 799.
" " 27 " " " 858.
" " 18 March " " 1194.
" " 21 " " " 1234.
" " 21 " " " 1245.

2. The Government of Bengal attaches great importance to the establishment of an advanced post in Rutton Pooea's village, on the grounds that that chief is in danger of an attack from the neighbouring Syloos, in consequence of having rendered assistance to officers of the British Government; that he has expressed a wish for such a post; and that he has threatened, in the event of its not being established, to abandon his friendly attitude, and to move nearer to the country of Howlongs.

No. 1194, from the Bengal Government of 18 March 1871.

3. As regards the present danger of attack, the Viceroy and Governor General in Council trusts that the temporary measures, sanctioned by the Bengal Government with the knowledge and concurrence of the Governor General in Council of sending a police guard to Rutton Pooea's village, under the conditions specified in your telegram of 18th March, to the Commissioner of Chittagong, will sufficiently meet the requirements of the case. It must, however, be distinctly borne in mind that the advance of the police to Rutton Pooea's village is merely a temporary movement, under the conditions set forth to meet a passing emergency, and is not to be understood as in any way authorising even by implication the permanent location of a post there. This latter question cannot, in the opinion of his Excellency in Council, be satisfactorily discussed apart from the wider question of the most convenient line up to which the jurisdiction of the British Government is to be exercised, and beyond which no direct authoritative interference on the part of frontier officers will be permitted, except so far as they may be able to conciliate the chiefs and tribes by personal influence. As the Bengal Government has rightly assumed, the line of outposts, whatever it may eventually be, and the line of jurisdiction must practically be identical, that is to say, the Government will assert its authority, and accept responsibility for the protection of life and property up to the boundary limit commanded by the outposts, but not further, and the Government will not sanction the establishment of any advanced post beyond this boundary line; it does not necessarily follow that the ordinary civil

civil administration shall be put in force up to such line. The question of the system of Government, which is most suitable for the country intermediate between that in which the regular administration now obtains and the most advanced line of outposts, is quite distinct and will receive separate consideration at a late period.

4. It appears to the Viceroy and Governor General in Council that further information is needed before deciding on the line of outposts which should be maintained. Accordingly, I am to request that the Lieutenant Governor will take such steps as his Honour may deem best for procuring, at the earliest possible date, sufficient information to admit of a definite decision being come to, and that the Lieutenant Governor will in due course report the result of the inquiries, and at the same time favour the Supreme Government with definite proposals. It must necessarily rest with the local authorities to supply the data required for the final settlement of the question.

5. It may be that on further inquiry the best boundary line will be still found to be through Rutton Pooea's village. In such case the Government of Bengal should, after carefully weighing all considerations, report whether it is prepared to recommend this line, and to maintain and hold it by the necessary chain of posts. It must, however, be borne in mind that the continuation of that line to Cachar will pass in its entire length through the Looshai country. Whether the construction of a road along the Demagiri range to Cachar may be a desirable or even a practicable measure, his Excellency in Council is not at present in a position to say. But, as at present advised, his Excellency in Council is not prepared to undertake the defence of the eastern districts of Hill Tipperah, the responsibility for the protection of which must rest with that State. The line to be selected should, therefore, if practicable, impinge on the southern boundary of Hill Tipperah.

6. To judge by the map inclosed in your letter, No 789, dated 21st February 1871, a good line might perhaps be formed by the Sychal range up to the Kurnafoolee, and afterwards by the range running through Kassalong and behind Khurkhurra and Gungaram. The practicability of this line, as compared with others, might be considered in the forthcoming examination of the country. But whatever be the boundary line eventually determined on, it will be essentially necessary that the outposts should be placed in advantageous positions from which the entire line can be successfully held and controlled.

7. The Viceroy and Governor General in Council is pleased to sanction the recommendation that a sum of 6,000 rupees should be expended in the construction of houses of refuge at Kassalong and Rangamuttee.

8. In the opinion of his Excellency in Council, the question of the defence of the southern corner of Chittagong and of the control of the Khoomies living within the limits of Talukme is one of internal police rather than of frontier defence. The Chief Commissioner of Burmah will be asked to suggest measures for preventing the tribes who live within the restricted boundary from committing outrages in Chittagong.

9. His Excellency in Council learns from the official memorandum on the north-eastern frontier of Bengal that formerly the defence of the country between Chima and Talukme was entrusted to the Bohmong Raja, who received on account of this service a remission of 2,600 rupees in his payment of revenue. In 1866, as he had completely failed in his duty, and as some of the people of the tract in question had abandoned their homes from a feeling of insecurity, his posts were made over to British police, but the remission of revenue was still allowed, on condition of the Raja giving ready aid and co-operation to check the inroads of savages, and meeting the wishes of Government. In the face of later evidence that he is incapable of defending this tract, I am to suggest, for the consideration of the Lieutenant Governor, whether it would not be desirable to stop his allowance, and devote the money to strengthening the police employed in this quarter.

(No. 17½ C—P.)

COPY paragraph 7 to Financial Department for information and the issue of the necessary orders.

(Political, No. 75.)

To His Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor General of India in Council.

My Lord, India Office, London, 15 June 1871.

Para. 1. Since the date of my Despatch in this Department, No. 146, of the 15th December 1870,* reviewing and approving your proceedings, previously reported, connected with the North East frontier of India, the letters of your Excellency's Government in the Foreign Department, of which the subjects, dates, and numbers are noted in the margin,† have been received by me.

* Given in previous Return.

† Letter, No. 245, 7th December 1870. North East Frontier. Mr. Edgar to revisit the Looshai country, accompanied by Mr. T. Burland, a tea planter, who is to receive 500 rupees per mensem from Government. Sunnuds to the chiefs. Boundaries not to be defined till Mr. Edgar's return.

Letter, No. 257, 21st December 1870. Eastern Frontier. Report from Commissioner, Chittagong, on defence of his frontier. Measures prescribed similar to those carried out towards North-East Frontier tribes. Consideration of Assam, Cachar, and Sylhet, postponed till after the visit of the Commander in Chief.

Letter, No. 28, 8th February 1871. North East Frontier. Raids of Houlongs, Kookies, or Looshais upon Hill Tipperah, Cachar, and Munnipoor. Mr Winchester, his little girl, and some coolies killed. Letters from Mr. J. W. Edgar. Retributive measures delayed, pending further reports. Police force strengthened by detachments of Native Infantry.

Letter, No, 38, 8th March 1871. Eastern Frontier. The Looshai Raid on Cachar. Memorial from the tea planters alluding to previous petition, and praying that steps may be taken to prevent these incursions. Government reply is a full exposition of the policy which has guided its frontier officers. Continuation of letter, dated 8th February (No. 28) 1871.

Letter, No. 53, 22nd March 1871. Eastern Frontier. Return of Mr. J. W. Edgar from his mission to Sookpilial, which occurred at the time of the Looshai raid. His memorandum will be supplemented by a further one by Mr. Burland. Further particulars as to the late raids.

Letter, No. 41, dated 15th March 1871. Eastern Frontier. British Burmah. Policy to be pursued as regards the defence of the Aracan Frontier. Government of India do not concur in General Fytche's view, that it would be better to relinquish control over these tracts; but sanction the proposals of Mr. St. John to have an European assistant, and to establish a salt mart.

2. To those dated in 1870 replies had been prepared, and were about to be despatched, when the telegram from your Excellency, of the 3rd February last, announcing the occurrence of the recent raid of Looshais and Howlongs on the Cachar frontier reached this office, and induced me to await further intelligence before communicating to you any additional instruction on the subject.

3. Her Majesty's Government have been anxiously expecting intelligence of later date from the North East Frontier. But, with exception to the papers relating to the proposed Chief Commissionership in Assam (which are reserved for separate consideration), no communication subsequent to that of the 22nd March, reporting (as you had previously done by telegraph) Mr. Edgar's safe return to British territory, has been received, and I am anxious to have an early intimation how matters are progressing in Cachar and Chittagong, and to learn whether fuller inquiry has shown the recent occurrences to be of such a character as in any way to modify your proposed policy towards the tribes on this border.

4. Since the above paragraphs were prepared, I have received the foreign letter of your Excellency's Government, noted in the margin,‡ which, however, does not affect the immediate subject of the present Despatch.

‡ Letter, No. 72, 9th May 1871. Eastern Frontier. Proposal of Commissioner, Chittagong, to strengthen his frontier by a line of forts. Memoranda by Majors Graham and Macdonald. Visit to Syloo country to meet Mr. Edgar. Major Macdonald and Captain Lewin suggest that force against Looshais should consist of regular troops with police guides. As to an European captive.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Argyll.*

(No. 87 of 1871.)

Government of India.—Foreign Department.—Political.

To His Grace the Duke of *Argyll*, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

My Lord Duke, Simla, 23 May 1871.

In continuation of our Despatch, No. 53, dated the 22nd of March 1871, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of the further documents specified in the accompanying abstract of contents, relative to the recent raids committed by Looshais in Hill Tipperah, Cachar, and Munnipoor.

2, Your Grace will observe that the bulk of the correspondence herewith sent relates

relates to the efforts which have been made to obtain a clue to the identity of the tribes who are supposed to have been concerned in these outrages.

3. The evidence hitherto collected on this point is reviewed in the letter which forms No. 38 of the Abstract, to which we beg to refer your Grace.

We have, &c.
(signed) *Mayo.*
Napier of Magdala.
&c. &c.

From Dr. *R. Brown*, Political Agent at Munnipoor, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, No. 36; dated Munnipoor, 5th March 1871.

I HAVE the honour to report, for your information, that the escaped female prisoners taken away by hillmen from Munnipoor territory in the raid of the 15th or 16th January last, and who managed to escape, have arrived here, and have been carefully examined by me with the view of ascertaining more particularly the tribe who committed the raid. The remarks within parenthesis in what follows are made by me to explain the narrative as i goes on.

2. Out of the women and children, numbering 51, who were taken away, 15 managed to escape, either on the way or after reaching the Looshai villages—(Looshais were the perpetrators of the raid). It appears from the accounts of the women examined, that they were taken, some of them, to villages under the chief Vonolel, others to those of Poiboi, and others to those of Vonpilal.

3. One of the male villagers who succeeded in escaping from the Anal Namfaw village when it was attacked states that the attack was made suddenly about 1 o'clock a.m. of the 16th January; the Looshais using firearms; the attack was accompanied, as is usual, by gong-striking and shouting out the names of their chiefs with the names of villages they had destroyed.

This villager says that the names of Vonolel, Lenkum, and Poiboi were thus shouted out. Twenty-two men of the village were killed, and nine muskets taken away out of it before it was destroyed; the Looshais losing one killed, one wounded by a spear, and four by arrows.

4. Although the escaped women were examined separately, their narratives may be given connectedly. (To account for so many managing to get away, it should be mentioned that, amongst the Looshais in cases of captives escaping, no one thinks of stopping them, but their immediate captor.) One woman observed that the Looshais had stores of rice provided for their return journey at every halting stage. This prisoner was in custody of a villager under Vonpilal (or rather his successor, or mother, Vonpilal being dead), and managed to free herself at night from her captor, while halting at the Looshai salt springs not far from the villages of the Vonpilal Looshais: getting away clear, she also managed to bring away her two children. This woman estimates the number of Looshais at about 1,000 men, one-fourth of them armed with muskets, the rest with daos and spears. They used dishes of copper and brass of Bengallee manufacture to cook their food, and they had a superior kind of rice only known to them amongst the hill tribes. (Tradition has it that Raja Jaee Sing, or Chingtung Komba, introduced this rice into the Looshai Hills from Munnipoor when he was forced to flee before the Burmese.)

5. In order to further identify the tribe engaged in this raid, the women were all separately interrogated as to the dress of the raiders. With trifling discrepancies they all described their costume as follows: A coat-shaped garment fastened with tape or string in front and reaching to below the knee; over this a sheet knotted over shoulder.

All the prisoners agree that the general colour was dirty white with a puggree of the same, but some had black coats and sheets, and a few, according to one, red coats; one or two, probably chiefs, had red puggrees; those dressed in black were few in number.

Muskets amongst them were comparatively few. (In connection with this description, I have examined the Munnipoor Havildar who went from the Munniporee Kheddah to Tapai Mookh, as mentioned in the account of Sawai Jamba Major in my letter to the address of the Foreign Secretary, No. 32, of date 20th February 1871, and he says that the majority of the Looshais seen by him were clad in whitish clothing agreeing with the women's description, and he observed that three or four of them had black clothing instead of white. Amongst the raiders at Monierkhall, in Cachar, I understand several thus clothed in black were seen.)

6. A woman, named Hoonchoom, states that she was taken to the Looshais' village of Sumfai under the Chief Vonolel. After remaining two days in the village, she with all the Looshai women and children were sent into the jungle to conceal themselves, as it was feared that an attack would be made by Kamhow Kookies belonging to the chief named Mombem. (The Kamhow tribe lie immediately south-east of the Looshais and close to Munnipoor;

Munnipoor; formerly they used to give trouble to Munnipoor, but within the last 12 or 14 years they have been friendly; they would appear to have been at feud with the Looshais for about a year and a half, and, although numerically inferior to them, can give them much trouble, as they are well supplied with firearms supposed to be procured from Burmah.) After the women were sent away, the men armed proceeded towards the south. After remaining in the jungle two days, she managed to make her escape.

7. The most important evidence as identifying the Looshais with not only the raid on Munnipoor, but also with that on Cachar, is given by one Bongboo. She states that she was taken to a village of Poiboi's, five days' journey. On the road she saw many armed men proceeding towards the west. They were Poiboi's men. These men were dressed as before mentioned. The village to which she was taken, and whose name she does not know, appeared secure, and was not guarded; but others to the south were fearing another attack from the Kamhow Chief Mombem, who, as the Looshais said (the tribe to which these women belong know sufficient of the Looshai language to understand, and be understood by them) had, while their fighting men had been out for a raid on Munnipoor and Cachar, entered the Looshai country, and killed and captured a large number of them. While kept in this village, she says a large body of Looshais returned from the north,—a larger number than attacked her village. (From various sources I have ascertained that the raiders detailed for an attack on Munnipoor were divided into three bodies; only one was successful; the others, finding the Munnipooree scouts on the watch, returned without effecting their purpose.) She also states that the Looshais wanted to separate them from their children, the women remonstrated, upon which their faces were slapped; otherwise they were not ill-treated (except in the case of two women with her who, being unable to keep up with the Looshais on the march, were murdered by them), and received food regularly.

After some more days' residence in this village, a lax watch being kept, she managed to steal away and escape.

8. My latest news from scouts and others is to the effect that the Looshais apparently anticipate an attack upon them, as they have sent all women and children away, and only men remain in the villages. It is thought likely here that another attack may be made on them by the Kamhows. Information has also been received that a large stockade has been erected above Looshai Bazaar, close to the Tipai River. On or about the 21st or 22nd of last month, heavy firing was heard from the direction of Mynadhur (now or lately a police outpost); but no information has as yet been obtained as to its cause. About a fortnight ago, at the request of the Deputy Commissioner, Cachar, the Raja sent Kookie scouts to ascertain the position of Mr. Edgar; these men have not yet returned. I have just heard, however, from a private source, that Mr. Edgar has been relieved.

9. A copy of this letter has been sent to the Officiating Deputy Commissioner of Cachar for his information.

From *C. U. Aitchison*, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Chief Commissioner of British Burmah, No. 744 P.; dated Fort William, 8th April 1871.

* Letter, No. 36, dated 5th March 1871.

In a report* recently made by the Political Agent at Munnipoor, which gives further particulars about the Looshai raid of the 16th of January 1871, it is stated that the Kookies of the Kamhow tribe, from whom the Looshais feared an attack, are well supplied with firearms supposed to be procured from Burmah. I am directed by the Viceroy and Governor General in Council to request that you will impress on the Court of Mandalay the importance of taking measures to prevent these savages from being supplied with weapons from Burmese territory.

From Captain *T. H. Lewin*, Deputy Commissioner, Chittagong Hill Tracts, to the Commissioner of the Chittagong Division, No. 76; dated Rangamuttee, 21st February 1871.

Cachar raids.

In continuation of my letter, No. 61, dated 16th instant, on the subject marginally noted, I have the honour to report that a large number of Looshais of the Syloo clan, principally consisting of men from the village of the Chief Saboonga, came to the bazaar at Kassalong (our extreme eastern frontier post) to buy and sell, as their habit is. Among other things they offered for sale the following articles:—

Two plated table forks One ditto - ditto spoon One salt spoon One knife rest	All of English make.
One bangle Broken pieces of two bracelets	Bengallee.

I have forwarded the above articles to you, through the medium of the magistrate of Chittagong, for identification by the Cachar authorities.

2. The

2. The articles in question were at once impounded by the jemadar in charge of the post, and were forwarded to me here together with the three men (Looshai) in whose possession they were found.

3. On being brought before me, they stated, in reply to my interrogations, that they had purchased the articles in question from Sookpilal's men, who had obtained them by fair right-of-war in the south.

4. They further stated that the following chiefs had banded together for the commission of the late raids in Cachar, viz.:

(1.) Bhootaiya (lives to the south-east of No. 2).
(2.) Sookpilal (well known to the authorities).
(3.) Lalboora, a chief of the Howlong clan, residence known, is related by marriage to Rutton Pooea.
(4.) Saipoiya, chief of the Howlong clan, residence known.
(5.) Lalporithang, ditto - - ditto.

Of these chiefs, it will be observed that Nos. 4 and 5 coincide with those already reported in my letter, No. 41, of the 6th instant, and the statement of these Looshais may consequently be taken as corroborative of the complicity in the raids of the chiefs referred to.

5. The Looshais before me also stated that they had heard that an Englishman had been killed in the Cachar raid, and that two more Englishmen had been taken captive and were at present in Sookpilal's house.

6. I hold the statements of these men to be true, in as far as they relate to the chiefs Nos. 1, 3, 4, and 5; but I quite disbelieve that Sookpilal had any hand in the matter. It is a matter of notoriety that the chiefs, Saboonga and Sookpilal, are at feud. I therefore disbelieve the statement that the spoons, &c., were procured from the villages of the latter chief. It is likely that Saboonga's men would try to throw blame and responsibility on the villages of a chief with whom they were at enmity.

7. In like manner, it is possible that two Englishmen may be in captivity among the Looshais, but I entirely discredit the statement that they are in Sookpilal's village.

8. Upon this subject, however, I shall make further inquiries, and report to you should I succeed in ascertaining anything further on the subject. Everything is quiet in the Chittagong frontier up to date.

P. S.—The escaped captive, Chanderloo, referred to in my letter, No. 61, dated 16th instant, paragraph 3, subsequently stated that he had heard, while in Rutton Pooea's village, that the chiefs, Bhootaiya and Lalboora, had assisted in the raid in Cachar. The former is a powerful chief to the south-east of Sookpilal's village, the latter a chief of the Howlong clan related by marriage with Rutton Pooea.

No. 381, dated Chittagong, 27th February 1871.

Endorsed by the Officiating Commissioner.

COPY forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department, with the remark that, putting this information, together with that conveyed in letter quoted in margin, No. 70T, of 12th instant, from Commissioner of Dacca, I have little doubt that the reported captivity of two Englishmen is either altogether mythical, or had its rise in the prolonged stay of Messrs. Edgar and Burland with Sookpilal.

"On the 7th of February Mr. Edgar, having missed an expected supply of provisions, sent messengers on rafts down the Sonai who reached Monierkhall on the 10th February.

"2. Mr. Edgar, ignorant of all this raiding, was proceeding also down the Sonai. Sookpilal's villages had given him rice, and he would meet the armed detachment proceeding up the Sonai with provisions. We hope to see Mr. Edgar on Tuesday, 14th February; at any rate he may be considered safe.'

From *H. LePoer Wynne*, Esq., Under Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Beng al, Political Department, No. 566 P.; dated Fort William, the 20th March 1871.

WITH reference to the Junior Secretary's endorsement, No. 1106, dated the 13th March 1871, and annexures, I am directed to request that you will submit at an early date a copy of Captain Lewin's letter, No. 64, dated the 16th February 1871, quoted in the postscript of his letter, No. 76, dated the 21st February 1871, reporting that some articles, plundered by the Cachar raiders, had been offered for sale at the bazaar at Kassalong by Looshais of the Syloo clan.

From *H. L. Harrison*, Esq., Junior Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, No. 1347; dated Fort William, the 27th March 1871.

In reply to your office letter, No. 566 P., dated the 20th instant, I am directed to inform you that the communication therein referred to from Captain Lewin regarding the articles plundered by the Cachar raiders, and subsequently offered for sale at the bazaar at Kassalong by Looshais of the Syloo clan, has not been received in this office. The Commissioner of Chittagong has been requested to submit a copy of it as soon as possible.

Telegraphic Message.

From Dacca.	To Chittagong.
From Commissioner.	To Commissioner.

Edgar and Burland reached Silchar on the 1st; Sookpilal behaved well; Saboonga and tribes friendly to him; committed the raids towards the west; the things are probably Winchester's.

Telegraphic Messages.

From Comillah.	To Chittagong.
From Magistrate.	To Commissioner.

Savages reported moved south on 3rd instant; tall, fair-bearded men armed with guns, javelins, and daos, Chukmas among them; may be intercepted at Ramgur; supposed to be from Chittagong Hills.

Savages burning villages in hills close to Chugoneiah; district superintendent and myself start at once with 15 constables; 50 sepoys remain here.

No. 405, dated Chittagong, the 6th March 1871.

Endorsed by the Personal Assistant to the Commissioner.

Copies forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department, for information. A copy of the telegram about the movement of the savages to the south has been sent to the Deputy Commissioner of Hill Tracts, and another to the magistrate of Chittagong.

From *H. L. Harrison*, Esq., Junior Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department, to the Officiating Commissioner of Chittagong, No. 1123; dated Fort William, the 14th March 1871.

With reference to your office endorsement, No. 405, dated the 6th instant, submitting a copy of two telegrams, without date, from the magistrate of Tipperah to your address, regarding the raids committed close to Chugonieah and describing the raiders, I am directed to request that you will be good enough to submit a full and careful report of these outrages.

2. I am also to again impress on you the absolute necessity of endeavouring, in communication with Captain Lewin, to clearly identify the tribes and persons concerned in the raids.

From Colonel *J. R. Pughe*, Inspector General of Police, Lower Provinces, to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department, No. 1544; dated Fort William, the 3rd March 1871.

In reply to the latter part of your No. 894, of the 1st instant, I have the honour to recommend that each of the constables named receive a money reward of 50 rupees. This will be accompanied by a certificate from this office, stating why it has been granted.

2. I have further directed the district superintendent to confer on them good conduct stripes; this will entitle them to a rupee a month extra pay.

3. The reward will be conferred upon them in as public a manner as possible.

From *H. L. Harrison*, Esq., Junior Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department, to the Inspector General of Police, Lower Provinces.—No. 1127; dated Fort William, the 14th March 1871.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 1544, dated the 3rd instant, and in reply to inform you that the Lieutenant Governor sanctions the grant of a money reward of 50 rupees each, to be conferred in as public a manner as possible on constables Dalbeer, Thoppa, and Indrajeet Sing, for good conduct in the defence of Monierkhall.

2. His Honor also approves of your granting the men certificates to say why the reward was bestowed, and conferring on them good-conduct stripes.

From Colonel *J. R. Pughe*, Inspector General of Police, Lower Provinces, to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department.—No. 1810; dated Fort William, the 11th March 1871.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of the Lieutenant Governor, a report, in original, from Mr. Daly, the district superintendent of Cachar, giving the particulars of an attack madeby a body of raiders upon the Jhalnacherra Tea Garden on the morning of the 23rd February.

2. The conduct of the police patrol who were on duty in the cooly lines appears to have been particularly good, and I would beg to recommend that a money reward of 50 rupees be given to the head constable Ram Bhudru Sing, with a certificate from this office, and that the constables named be placed in the grade above that in which they are now serving, and be furnished with similar certificates, Golab Sing and Dhani Ram receiving a further reward of 20 rupees each.

3. I have directed the district superintendent to inform Mr. Savi, inspector Fiaiz Bux, and sub-inspector Mechta Sing, that I have noted with much satisfaction the prompt way in which they came to the assistance of the parties attacked.

From *W. W. Daly*, Esq., District Superintendent of Police, Cachar, to the Personal Assistant to the Inspector General of Police, Lower Provinces.—No. 67; dated Cachar, the 6th March 1871.

WITH reference to my telegram of 24th ultimo, I have now the honour to explain how the attack was made by the Looshais, and repulsed by the police at Jhalnacherra.

2. At about 7 a.m., on the 23rd February, a number of Looshais were seen crossing the River Dullusser at the ford opposite, and close to the cooly lines. A patrol of one head constable and four constables, who happened to be in the cooly lines, opened fire at once, and checked the advance across the river, although they could not altogether prevent several men crossing.

3. The few men who crossed were not given time to loot many of the houses; as directly the firing was heard, relief came from the stockade, and the whole were driven back across the river.

4. I regret to have to record that the following were killed and wounded:—

One Bengalee boatman and two coolies; five coolies were wounded.

Very little plunder was taken, as the savages had only time to ransack the houses of the jemadar and baboo employed in the garden, and from those houses nothing of any great value seems to have been taken.

5. The police say that three men, "Looshais," were shot in the garden and carried across by their comrades, and that several were wounded while crossing the river. The latter seems to me nothing but natural, as the police had, after driving the enemy away, a large crowd to fire into, and even bad marksmen could not have failed to hit such a fair mark.

6. The conduct of the men of the patrol, viz., head constable Ram Bhudru Sing, constables Golab Sing, Dhani Ram, Man Bir Mistry, and Sunka Bir, is, I think, deserving of the highest praise and of some reward.

7. These men were entirely cut off from the stockade, and seem to have held their own against great odds. The manager of the garden calculates the number of Looshais at about 150.

8. Constable Golab Sing is reported by one of the cooly women to have kept off two or three Looshais, who were attempting to take her away, by clubbing his empty carbine and using the back end until constable Dhani Ram came to his assistance.

9. This same Dhani Ram fired at and wounded a Looshai who had dragged a woman to the opposite bank of the river. The woman, of course, seeing her captor disabled, made

her escape back, but not before another Looshai had taken the opportunity of throwing a spear at her and wounding her.

10. Sub-inspector Mechta Sing came very promptly to the assistance of the patrol; but the point of attack being about half a mile distant from the stockade, he was not able to do much more than fire into the retreating Looshais, and to drive away a few stragglers who still remained in the garden.

11. At about 10 p.m. at night, inspector Fiaiz Bux arrived at Jhalnacherra with a small force of one head constable and 24 constables. He had brought these men down from the Chottachurra range and from Kattlichurra. He seems to have lost no time whatever, but to have hurried down to the relief of the guard with great promptitude, and to have accomplished a hard march in a short space of time.

12. Mr. Savi, who happened to have been ordered to Hylakandy, the very day Jhalnacherra was attacked, and who heard of the attack on the evening of the 23rd, collected all the small police guards in the Hylakandy Valley, and marched up at once. He arrived at Jhalnacherra at about 8 p.m. on the 24th, having performed a march of 34 miles in about 24 hours.

13. On the following morning Messrs. Metcalfe and Savi crossed the Dhullussur, and followed the track taken by the Looshais. This track led towards the Chottachurra range, and, from the signs on the ground, it would appear that the flight of the savages had been most precipitate. Several pools of blood showed that they had not gone away unpunished.

14. On the afternoon of the 25th, the party of 44th, under Captain Williams, and the police under myself arrived at Kattlichurra, and we thought it better to remain at that place on the following day than to push on to Jhalnacherra.

15. However, on the evening of the 26th, another party of 44th arrived under command of Colonel Hicks, and this officer, ordering that we should move on to Jhalnacherra, the whole force marched the next morning and arrived there at about 4 p.m.

16. I am unable to give any information as to the particular tribe the raiders belonged to. They seem to have had a number of guns, while those without them were armed with the usual spear and dao. Several men wore red puggrees, and some wore a black *khesh*.

17. The police report that, while the attack was being made, a Looshai wearing a white puggree sat on the opposite bank of the river and urged the men on. When the savages were being driven across again, he was heard crying out *Bhote, Khoai*.

18. Mr. Walliker reported to me that he had observed a fire on the Chottachurra range two nights after the attack, and this leads me to believe that the raiders must have come down that range to a certain point, and, descending from it, came right across to the garden.

No. 1162, dated Fort William, the 16th March 1871.

Endorsed by the Government of Bengal.

COPY forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department for information, in continuation of endorsement, No. 913, dated the 1st instant, with the intimation that Captain Lewin has been asked to state if the description given of the raiders throws any further light on the tribe to which they belonged.

From *H. Le Poer Wynne*, Esq., Under Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Political Department.—No. 588 P; dated Fort William, the 23rd March 1871.

WITH reference to the communications forwarded with Mr. Junior Secretary Harrison's docket, No. 1162, dated 16th March 1871, reporting the successful repulse of a party of Looshais who attacked the tea garden at Jhalnacherra, I am directed to state that the Viceroy and Governor General in Council has received the account of the excellent conduct of the police on the occasion with the greatest satisfaction, and to express the hope of his Excellency in Council that the rewards recommended by the Inspector General of Police, Lower Provinces, may be immediately given.

MEMORANDUM from Colonel *P. S. Lumsden*, C.S.I., Quarter Master General, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.—No. 66 F-C; dated Dacca, the 9th March 1871.

SUBMITTED, for the information of Government, in continuation of Brigadier General Bourchier, Commanding Eastern Frontier District's telegram, dated 18th ultimo, to the address of the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

COPY of a LETTER No. 68, dated Cachar, the 18th February 1871, from the Officer Commanding Eastern Frontier District, to the Quarter Master General.

IN forwarding to you the accompanying copies of correspondence from Captain Lightfoot and Lieutenant Bourne, and a copy of a telegram just dispatched to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, I cannot but express my opinion that if the account given by the interpreters is true, Captain Lightfoot would have run excessive risk in advancing, however much his retrograde movement is to be regretted.

Since his detachment was dispatched, affairs have greatly changed.

The party sent down by Mr. Edgar then reported that he was following them down the Sonai, and no opposition was expected, and on this account I did not send off the land party. I have not even yet had time to consider how I can further move to assist Mr. Edgar, but I have requested the Deputy Commissioner to collect as much carriage for land and water as he can, in anticipation of orders to proceed with a column.

P.S.—This correspondence was only received three hours ago.

Much reliance is placed by the Deputy Commissioner on the evidence of Diwai Sing as detailed by Lieutenant Bourne.

LIST of ENCLOSURES:—

1.—Copy of letter, dated 16th February, from Captain Lightfoot, to the Brigade Major, Eastern Frontier District.

2.—Copy of telegram sent by General Bourchier, to the Secretary to the Government, on 18th February, at 4½ P.M.

3.—Copy of a private letter from Lieutenant Bourne, 44th Native Infantry, to Captain Thompson.

4.—Copies of the statements of the interpreters and scouts.

From Captain *E. Lightfoot*, Commanding detachment, 44th Native Infantry, to the Brigade Major, Eastern Frontier District; dated Silghur, the 16th February 1871.

WITH reference to your letter No. 36 of the 8th instant, directing me to proceed with a detachment of the 44th Regiment, Native Infantry, consisting of 62 of all ranks, to Looshai Haut, and on arrival there to obtain intelligence of Mr. Edgar's whereabouts, and to inform him of my presence with provisions for himself and party, I have the honour to report the following for the information of Brigadier General Bourchier, C.B., Commanding the Eastern Frontier District:—

1. I started from Cachar about 11 P.M. on the 9th instant and reached Monierkhall at about mid-day on the 10th instant, distance 22 miles. On the 11th instant I started with my detachment and 30 boats containing *russud* up the Sonai river at night fall. I bivouacked at a place named "Teama Mook." I was joined this day by Asool Mea Chowdree; Sham Sing, a Munipooree spy; and Roocepta muntri, Kookee spy; and Munnoo Sing, Munipooree spy, and Nazir Rajkissen who had left Mr. Edgar at Phoonsong, three and a-half hours' march outwards from Looshai Haut on the 6th instant. Munnoo Sing, Munipooree spy, was prostrated by fever brought on by terror and nervous excitement, and at the last moment refused to go on with my detachment. With reference to this man's conduct, the solution of it lies in the statement (copies of which I enclose) made by himself and Asool Mea Chowdree. Both these men are well known and trusted by Mr. Edgar and Mr. William, and have been so for years.

2. On the morning of the 12th, I left Teama Mook and bivouacked at night-fall at a placed named Kooliecherra, or rather about it.

3. On the morning of the 13th I proceeded on my journey and reached Runiapta Kal, and bivouacked there.

4. On the morning of the 14th I started at day-break at a place named Loolam Kal. I sent some spies towards Looshai Haut with a letter for Mr. Edgar (informing him that I should in all probability be at Looshai Haut on the 15th) which on arrival they were to take on to him. These men on promise of a reward undertook the task.

5. Hitherto I had not met with any signs of hostility. It is true that voices had been heard in the jungle on either side of the river at different times, and that men evidently on picquet duty were seen in machauns in trees. These men were far off the river banks, and could watch our every movement. I deemed it unadvisable to put my men through the heavy jungle in a futile attempt to capture them.

On my reaching at about dark a place,* somewhere about a mile below Asoo Mea Kal with my advanced guard, I was met by the spies sent on in the morning, who reported the river blocked at a place about a quarter of a mile further on. I returned to my boats and bivouacked without fires, and as silently as it could be done at a place called "Teem Hillee."

* Eight hours' boating to Looshai Haut

1st. I will now proceed to explain the manner in which the navigation of the river was blocked to the spies whose statements, delivered before me, I beg to enclose.

In the middle of the river, which is there very narrow indeed, was placed a bamboo in an upright position. On the top of the bamboo was placed a red flag made of saloo; on either side of the bamboo were *chungas* containing cooked rice, a portion of which had been eaten. Some of the rice also was strewn about on the adjacent boulders; the interpretation of these symbols is that any one crossing the bamboo, &c., will be considered an invader and opposed by force. All the scouts and men who are with me coincide in this opinion; one and all say that no consideration would induce them to cross, as they look upon it as certain death.

* I might say total loss.

7. Having ascertained that I could not without the probable* loss of most of my men proceed to Looshai Haut; and hampered with some 70 camp followers and 30 boats, I determined to retire, more especially as the river grew more and more narrow as we went up, the bank steeper and steeper, and the water more and more shallow. I might add also that I did not wish that any act of mine should give the Looshais any pretence for quoting that aggressive measures on my part had led them to declare war against our Government and making reprisals on Mr. Edgar's party.

8. On the morning of the 15th instant, I accordingly retired to Coolie Haut. I was unmolested, but spies followed us down the river banks.

9. At day-break of the 16th instant, Lieutenant Bourne joined me with his detachment. On consulting him and the guides, I determined not to proceed further up the river, there being no fit spot where to make a post of observation. I therefore retired to this place, which besides being favourably situated for a depôt in case of an expedition, has the advantage of being behind the Looshais' paths, and communication between this and Monierkhall is open and not liable to be interrupted.

10. I have promised 200 rupees to some spies to get me reliable news of what has happened to Mr. Edgar or his party; the men start to-morrow morning. I think myself that these men who know the Looshai in language and customs, and are personally known to many Looshais, have much more chance of procuring information than any one accompanied by a force. I speak with diffidence, but it is my opinion that armed intervention might precipitate the fate of Mr. Edgar and his party.

11. In the event of an expedition into the Looshai country, I should wish it brought to the notice of the Brigadier General Commanding that I do not consider it practicable for a column to move up the bed of the Sonai river at so late a season as the present. The river consists of a series of pools and shallows; over the latter the men have to get out and drag their boats across; this alone makes your line of march straggling; the more the number of boats the greater the difficulty of guarding them. Should opposition be offered to an advancing column by the Looshais, I am inclined to believe that the advantage would be theirs.

In conclusion, I would add that it is the conviction of all the scouts here, and of all the men who know anything of the Looshais, that it is an universal rising of the Looshai tribes, and that between the red flag and Looshai Haut as many as 2,000 men are ready to meet us; most of them with fire-arms; and I would urge that due weight be given to Sham Sing's statement. In my diary which I shall forward to-morrow, a detailed account of the marches made will be found.

DEMI-OFFICIAL from Lieutenant *J. H. Bourne*, to Captain *Thompson*, Brigade Major;— dated Silghur, the 17th February 1871.

I HAVE just sent through Lightfoot an extract from my diary up to the time of my joining him. As regards the rest of the facts they are as follows: Lightfoot, preceded by his scouts, went up the river two days beyond where I was. His scouts came on a red flag posted in the river, as his report will tell you. I have examined the scout who went up to the flag, and having got his statement I repeated what had occurred to Dewai Sing, the guide, with whom my party was furnished. This I did without their meeting, and elicited from him the following statement: That he had personally during 40 years' experience on this frontier, during which time he had constantly been in contact with the Looshais, never seen the red flag raised, but that he had often heard the custom spoken of and well knew its signification, namely, that all strangers were warned that passing that flag was a declaration of war, and an act which would be resisted by force of arms; moreover that the red flag was never raised by one tribe, but was the joint act of all the tribes of these hills. In fact it is a kind of Scottish Fiery Cross.

Under these circumstances Lightfoot consulted with me on the advisability of proceeding. I strongly dissuaded him from doing so on the following grounds:—

1st.—Between Monierkhall and the point I reached, four days up the river, there are only two points capable of defence; one, this place, Silghur, two days up from Monierkhall, which is capable of being made impregnable, and where I camped and threw up a breastwork on my way up; and a second place about a mile above Ram Luchan Tilah, which by considerable labour might be made tenable.

During

During the whole course of the river, I unhesitatingly state that there is no single point close to the river available for purposes of defence, and further that along the whole course of the river a force is completely at the mercy of any very small force that might choose to attack it. The river runs between high, often precipitous banks, covered by the densest jungle, and at points passes through narrow gorges. Every few hundred yards you come to shallows over which the boats have to be dragged in single file; in fact in hardly any place along the whole course of the river can boats proceed two abreast. In addition, seeing that a force could attack with perfect impunity, and considering the cramped position of the men in the boats, and that a single shot fired would produce utter confusion among the boatmen, I can only attribute our return to this place to the fact that we have not been attacked; had we been so, not a man could have escaped.

2nd.—Assuming that Edgar has been seized by the Looshais, of which I fear there is now no doubt, an act of aggression on our part would now probably, even if successful, have cost him his life, supposing him to be alive, which I fear is very doubtful.

3rd.—Assuming that the statement of the guides and their knowledge of the Looshais to be correct, I tried to ascertain to how many muskets we might expect to be opposed. The guides all separately stated, to not less than 2,000. I am inclined to agree with them, from my own observations both at Chargolah and at Monierkhall. Hence, to oppose such a force, even on equal terms, our force is distinctly inadequate, and, on the ground on which we are, could only result in the annihilation of our detachment. Lightfoot was most unwilling to retire, and I must say his retiring shows great moral courage. At the same time I am convinced he has pursued the right course.

Lastly, in the event of it being resolved on to take steps at once to ascertain Edgar's fate or position, either a political officer should be sent to treat with the Looshais, and, if alive, to secure his release at any cost, or such a force should be sent in as will enable us to meet the Looshais on fair terms; and for this purpose I do not think that this route is available, no matter how large the force. If it proceeds up the river, it will hardly be possible to keep open its communications, and in the course of a fortnight the natives lead us to expect the rains, and, after their commencement, this river will not be available for boat carriage, owing to the immense quantity of snags and loose timber.

Now I must conclude, apologising for troubling you with so long a letter, which I should have addressed to the General, had I not feared he would have considered it to be a liberty.

Endorsed by Captain *H. Thompson*, Brigade Major.

True copy of private letter received by Captain Thompson from Lieutenant Bourne, 44th Regiment, Native Infantry.

From Dr. *R. Brown*, Political Agent at Munnipoor, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.—No. 41, dated Munnipoor, the 20th March 1871.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the Raja of Munnipoor, having succeeded in ransoming a Looshai woman, who was taken captive recently by the Kamhow tribe of Kookies in a raid they made on the Looshais, I sent for her and examined her through Wonathong, interpreter, with a view to ascertaining still further the identity of the recent raiders on Munnipoor and Cachar.

2. This woman states that she is an inhabitant of a village containing about 200 houses under a chief named Thulal, an elder brother of the chief Vonolel. A large number of men from her village, including her husband and her son, went by order towards Cachar on a raid; while they were absent her village was attacked by the Kamhows, and numbers of the villagers killed and carried off; among the captives were the wife of Thulal Raja, his mother and daughter.

3. Questioned, this woman states, her village is south-west of those of Vonolel, about one day's journey. She knows there is a chief of the name of Sookpilal, but does not know how far off his villages are from hers. Many of the Looshai chiefs, including Thulal, went to Cachar, but she cannot give their names. The chief Vonolel is not dead. She is also very positive in stating that none of her people know the road to Cachar, and could only go there by having the paths pointed out to them by the villagers under the chiefs Sookpilal and Vonpilal.

4. The two Kamhow Kookies who brought this woman to Munnipoor say that the raid on Cachar was made by the chiefs Vonolel, Laloom, and Thulal, and that they went under instructions from the villagers of Sookpilal and Vonpilal, who acted as guides, showing them the paths. The raid on Munnipoor was conducted by the chiefs Poiboi and Lengkom.

5. A copy of this letter has been sent to the Deputy Commissioner, Cachar, for his information.

No. 38 C-P, dated, Camp Newulkan, the 17th April 1871.
Endorsed by the Foreign Department.

COPY forwarded to the Government of Bengal for information, with reference to previous correspondence on the subject of the Looshai raids.

From Colonel the Honourable *F. A. Thesiger*, C.B., Adjutant General, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.—No. 23 C, dated, Head-quarters, Camp Dacca, the 8th March 1871.

WITH reference to letter, No. 23 of 1st February 1871, from district superintendent of police, Cachar, to the address of the deputy commissioner, Cachar, forwarded under your endorsement No. 802, I have the honour, by direction of the Commander in Chief in India, to forward, for the information of the Governor General in Council, the accompanying proceedings of two courts of inquiry assembled by order of Brigadier General Commanding Eastern Frontier District, to inquire into the conduct of the detachment of the 4th Native Infantry in the engagement with the Looshais at Monierkhall, and also to investigate the circumstances which attended the attack of the rear guard of the same party, which resulted in the loss of six killed out of the eight sepoys composing it.

With regard to the latter occurrence, his Excellency is glad to be able to report that the conduct of the sepoys composing the rear guard appears to have been all that could be desired. They were attacked quite unexpectedly by overwhelming numbers, and fought bravely to the last, inflicting, as far as can be ascertained, a very considerable loss upon the Looshais.

With regard to the conduct of the detachment which accompanied Mr. Daly to Monierkhall, it is to be regretted that the Court of Inquiry should have conducted its proceedings so loosely as to throw but little new light upon the facts as narrated by that officer.

The members of the court having all left Silchar in command of detachments ordered to different posts on the frontier, it has been found impossible to re-assemble them for the purpose of obtaining further evidence on the numerous points which they have left unexplained.

Lord Napier, however, having personally visited Monierkhall, and examined carefully the ground on which the circumstances narrated in the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry took place, and having also questioned many of those who took part in the defence of the stockade, feels that he is in a position to supply Government with information on points in which the evidence elicited by the Court of Inquiry is deficient.

The charges of misbehaviour alleged against the sepoys of the 4th Native Infantry are as follows: viz., that when Mr. Daly came upon the Looshais between Dhurmikhall and Monierkhall, they would not continue at the double, although repeatedly ordered by him to do so; that on the occasion of his two sorties they were the first to retire, and would not obey his orders; and, lastly, that the sergeant's party which was ordered on the occasion of the second sortie, to move round and threaten the left flank of the Looshais, did not advance sufficiently in the proper direction, until a havildar of the 4th Native Infantry was sent from his own party to explain what his wishes were.

With regard to the first charge, it must be remembered that the detachment of the 4th Native Infantry at the movement when the Looshais made their appearance, had marched 24 miles over a very fatiguing and difficult road, on a moonless night, and had been nearly nine hours on foot.

There was no reason why any other cause but sheer fatigue should have prevented them hurrying on at Mr. Daly's call, as it is evident that their best chances of safety lay in getting clear of the forest and in reaching the protection of the stockade, which they must have known to be but a short distance ahead.

Mr. Daly contrasts on this occasion the conduct of the police with that of the military; but it must be remembered that the former are more accustomed than sepoys to prolonged pedestrian exercise through difficult jungle tracks, and were no doubt in much better walking condition on the occasion in question than the sepoys of the 4th Native Infantry, who are reported to have been out of condition owing to their journey by steamer through the Soonderbunds (during which they were days without cooking), and appear to have become foot-sore and tired owing to the unusually long and fatiguing march they had just made. Whilst giving every weight, therefore, to Mr. Daly's opinion that the party in question showed no inclination to hurry after the enemy, it may fairly be presumed that this officer was somewhat prejudiced against them from the first, and did not take sufficiently into consideration the physical condition of the men at the time, who, it appears by Mr. Daly's own admission in the 5th paragraph of his letter under report, did keep at the double, but were with difficulty got to do so.

In confirmation of this opinion it seems only necessary to call attention to the evidence of Havildar Dwarka Deen Tewaree, in which it appears that Mr. Daly in the early part of the march rebuked the sepoys for slow marching, which was caused by the coolies not being able to keep up, and by the impossibility of leaving them behind.

The Commander in Chief is therefore of opinion that, in this instance, the charge of misbehaviour cannot be substantiated.

With

With regard to the second and third instances of alleged misbehaviour, it is far more difficult to arrive at a sound conclusion. It will be observed that the evidence of the police and the military differ most materially on very important points, and the court unfortunately have made no effort to reconcile these conflicting opinions, or to obtain by cross-examination some explanation of these discrepancies.

The ground in front of the stockade, on part of which the attacks took place, is a space of about 600 yards square, bounded on the left by the Sonai river, on the right and front by dense forest.

With the exception of a narrow strip of level, running parallel with the river up to the forest in front of the stockade, and somewhat less than 200 yards broad, the whole ground is covered with a number of low isolated hills which touch each other at their base, and are arranged in almost parallel rows like the squares of a chess board.

The sides of these hills are extremely steep; the one on which the stockade is built is about the centre of the position and slightly dominates the whole.

Paths run round the base of nearly all these hills, and communicate in every direction. One path, rather broader than the rest, starts from the foot of the stockade and serpentines along the base of the centre rows of hills.

The first sortie, made with 25 sepoys and constables (a jemadar being in command of the former) was conducted by Mr. Daly along the level ground near the river, by a path which ran close under the hills. The party advanced for about 300 yards from the stockade, and were then fired at by some Looshais who had taken up a position on a hill which completely overlooked them. Mr. Daly ordered every one to kneel down behind a slight rise in the ground; but few, however, obeyed him, the remainder began to retire without orders, and shortly afterwards the whole party ran back to the stockade.

About two hours afterwards Mr. Daly took out another party from the stockade, the strength of which is not given. It appears, however, to have consisted of more constables than sepoys.

Mr. Daly conducted this party along the same ground as on the occasion of the first sortie, but appears to have extended them in skirmishing order. Seeing that this demonstration did not shake the firm attitude of the Looshais, who were apparently in the same position as before, he sent back a constable to order a havildar's party (strength not given) to move round and threaten the left flank of the enemy.

This party apparently misunderstood Mr. Daly's orders, or did not receive them correctly from the constable, and Mr. Daly was obliged to send a havildar of the 4th Native Infantry to explain to them what he wanted done, when the havildar immediately moved along the broad path already described, which led through the centre of the hills and at their base.

Both parties then advanced against the Looshais, Mr. Daly's evident intention being to turn them out of their position at the point of the bayonet.

Before, however (to use Mr. Daly's own words), "the party understood the order, there was tremendous shouting from another party of Looshais who had got round our left." On seeing this the whole party lost heart; they first began to retire, and then to run, and at last (again to quote Mr. Daly) "it became a run for life."

In this second sortie it is not clear how Mr. Daly can attribute misbehaviour to the sepoys, or contrast their conduct with that of his police. The left flank of the party was suddenly turned, and had not one and all retreated at best pace to the stockade, it is probable that most of them would have been killed.

Havildar Pulwan Sing, who appears to have behaved well and to have done his best to support Mr. Daly, says that Mr. Daly gave the order to retire firing.

The havildar's party on the right directly it understood Mr. Daly's wishes, moved in the required direction, and evidently came in contact with the enemy, as the havildar himself was wounded.

In the opinion of the Commander in Chief, therefore, no blame can be attached to the sepoys for their conduct in the second sortie.

The charge of misbehaviour, therefore, is really reduced to the one instance of the first sortie.

There can be no doubt that the party did not on this occasion show that steadiness and coolness which might have been expected. It must be remembered, however, that their numbers were very few, only 25 in all, including constables, and that they were acting under the orders of a commander who was an entire stranger to the sepoys. Mr. Daly does not appear to have explained to them what he wished them to do, and there can be no doubt that the line on which he advanced was not one from which he could expect any successful result by so small a force.

Had Mr. Daly allowed the reinforcement a short time to rest, and then moved out with his whole numbers (leaving a small guard for the stockade) along the centre row of low hills, he would have gained for himself that command of position which he gave to the Looshais; and would, no doubt, have been able to drive the latter back into the forest.

The Commander in Chief is unwilling to say anything which should appear to reflect upon Mr. Daly's judgment, as his Excellency considers that the courage and promptness with which he attacked the Looshais is deserving of the highest praise. As, however, this officer has condemned the conduct of the sepoys in such unmeasured terms, it is absolutely necessary, in justice to the 4th Native Infantry, whose reputation would necessarily suffer were such imputations to remain unanswered, to show that out of the four instances

of misconduct alleged against the detachment, only one can in any way be brought home to it, and that with regard to this single instance, the faulty dispositions of the commander have much to answer for.

One thing, however, is perfectly clear, viz., that the jemadar in command of the party did not come to the front and exert himself in the manner which his position demanded. It does not appear that he attempted to assist Mr. Daly in any single instance, or that in either sortie he made any effort to conduct the retreat of his party according to military rules. Lord Napier, therefore, whilst releasing from confinement the sepoys of the detachment in question, has given orders that the jemadar shall be brought to trial for misbehaviour.

In conclusion, I am directed to enclose the accompanying nominal roll of the men of the 4th Native Infantry who were killed or wounded in their encounters with the Looshais.

PROCEEDINGS of a STATION COURT of INQUIRY assembled at *Cachar* on the 13th of February 1871, by order of Brigadier General *G. Bourchier*, C.B., Commanding Eastern Frontier District, to take all Evidence procurable regarding a Charge of Misconduct brought against a Jemadar and party of Men of the 4th Regiment, Native Infantry.

Colonel W. J. Hicks, President,
Lieut. Colonel Duffin, 4th Native Infantry, } Members.
Colonel E. Ommanney, 44th Native Infantry, }

Interpreter.—There being no other officer available, Lieutenant Colonel Duffin acts as interpreter.

Assembly.—The Court assembles at 10.20 o'clock.

First Witness, Mr. *W. Daly*, District Superintendent of Police, Cachar, voluntarily states as follows:—

ON the morning of the 28th January 1871, I was in command of a party consisting of nine constables and a party of the 4th Regiment, Native Infantry; I had left the Dhurmikhall Tea Garden, and was going down the forest road to Monierkhall; when I got within about three-quarters of a mile of it, the police which were ahead of the party of the 4th Regiment, Native Infantry, by my order reported that they heard voices ahead; I was between the police and 4th Native Infantry; I gave the order to double and run ahead to the police; about the same time four or five Looshais showed themselves and ran away, calling out to some one; the police opened fire, and also one man of the 4th Native Infantry; I then saw a great number of Looshais collected in the path ahead of us; they were trotting off very reluctantly, I thought. Seeing that they were so reluctant and that they were turning round and calling out something, I gave the order to cease firing, remarking to the men near me that they might be friendly Kookies; my men objected to this idea of mine, but obeyed orders. About this time the Looshais faced about and fired at us; I gave orders to double on again, and went after them as before, firing as we went; as we advanced it was with great difficulty I could get the men of the 4th Native Infantry to keep up the double; I had to halt my men several times to allow them to come up. It was of great importance to get out of the forest into the open tea garden as quick as possible, and I am of opinion that, following the Looshais at the pace the men of the 4th followed, the Looshais would have surrounded them, and it was only by the sharp fire kept up by my men we were saved. By way of inducing the 4th to come on, I asked Dawaka Deen Tewaree, havildar, if he was not ashamed of himself and men, and whether he could not get them to come on.

We at length got to the open garden, and I advanced towards the stockade, firing at a few stragglers; I did not go into the stockade. Mr. Eglington and the men who had been in the stockade previous to my arrival came out; after congratulating Mr. Eglington I related to him the behaviour of the 4th; I ordered the jemadar, who had also come out of the stockade, to get his men out who had been in the stockade before my arrival, and sent the men who had come on with me into the stockade. A party of police, who also had been inside, I ordered out; I at once went off with these men in the direction where I supposed these Looshais to have gone. I was leading at the time, we were running; we got some distance from the stockade, along one of the garden roads, where I saw a Looshai in front of me about 20 yards off; I thought it was a woman, and remarked so to Head Constable Putro Sing; he said it was not a woman, so I fired at it, then he fired, then immediately a great number of Looshais rose from behind a hill, and fired apparently at me. Where we were standing at the time the hill was cut away to form a road; by kneeling, one could get out of this fire; I halloed out to the men to crouch down out of fire, in Hindustanee; a few men near me obeyed this order, of whom Head Constable Putro Sing was one, and Havildar Pulwan Sing, of the 4th, was another; the men behind these few, with the jemadar before the court, of the 4th Native Infantry, commenced to retire, and on a crowd of Looshais coming shouting towards us they ran away, and the few men with me of course followed, and I followed them calling on them to halt and not to run away. By the time I got up to them they had arrived near the stockaded hill; when they were near the

stockade

stockade they slackened their speed, and I got up with them. About that time I met Mr. Eglington, who had come out of the stockade with a few police; I abused the jemadar, and, amongst other terms of abuse, called him in Hindustanee, "an old woman;" I also drew Mr. Eglington's attention to what had happened, and said, "Is it not disgraceful and shameful for soldiers to behave in this way?" Seeing what had occurred I thought it useless to go against the Looshais again just then; I ordered the men back into the stockade and went in myself; I told all the tired men to take off their accoutrements and rest themselves as I intended going out again. At a little less than two hours after I got a party of men together, principally police, as one or two of my men asked me not to take the sepoys out, alluding to their conduct on the first occasion; I went out by the back door, and advanced towards the place where the Looshais seemed to be collected in skirmishing order. As we advanced they kept up a very steady fire on us, and when we got pretty close to their position, seeing that they made no signs of moving from their position, I sent a man back to the stockade, with orders to the jemadar to send a party round to my right; this party, came out from the stockade and commenced firing at about 300 yards, and would not advance although I called out to them to do so. At this period Pulwan Sing, havildar, 4th Native Infantry, volunteered to go across and make them advance; at great risk to himself he went across and made them advance, and then returned. When I had given them time enough (I could not see them), to arrive within a short distance of the Looshais' left, I gave orders to fix bayonets and charge; at the same time, and probably before the men with me understood the order, there was tremendous shouting from another party of Looshais, who had got round our left; at this the whole of the men seemed to lose heart and commence to retire, although my orders were to continue kneeling. From retiring they commenced to retreat, and the men on my left were overpowered; it thus became a regular run for one's life towards the stockade; I had to keep company with the men, doing my best to stop them. On our way back to the stockade, and while we were running through a swampy piece of land which checked the men, I got about 12 of them, principally police, to make a stand for about a minute; the Looshais came on in such numbers, and got so close, that the party commenced to run to the stockade again; we all got in the stockade, with the exception of two sepoys, four police, and one coolie who was armed with a bow and arrows, who were killed, one havildar was wounded. I wish to add, that when the jemadar retreated on the first occasion I stood a great chance of losing my life by being cut off by the Looshais.

Examined by the Court.

Q. On the first occasion of your opening fire, where you state one of the men of the 4th fired, what was that man's position relative to the police?—*A.* He was about three yards behind the man who called out to him, and there were other constables in front of him again.

When you ordered the 4th to double, did the non-commissioned officer in command second your authority, and was it from unwillingness that the men did not obey your order?—To the first part of the question, I think the non-commissioned officer did his best, and with regard to the second part, I cannot say; they did double a little, and then slackened their pace to quick, while my men were still doubling. My men carried 60 rounds of ammunition and most of them kookries.

When you ordered the party to crouch down, did the jemadar hear you, and understand you?—I think he must have done so, as he was only about nine paces off.

On the retreat after the second sortie, did your party, or the party to the right, return first to the stockade?—When I got to a bridge, which is the only means of reaching the stockade, both parties were mixed together. I cannot tell which reached first, as I was one of the last to arrive, but men of both parties had crossed before I got to the bridge.

When the party of the 4th at the second sortie commenced firing at about 300 yards from the enemy, and you shouted and signed to them to advance, do you think they heard you and understood your signals?—Yes, I think they must have understood and heard, as there were several voices shouting at them.

Did you make any remark to the non-commissioned officers with you and the party to your right after the second sortie on your arrival at the stockade?—I do not know; but I taxed one or two of the men with me of running away, and they replied, "What could we do; everybody else ran away?" I spoke to Mr. Eglington about the misbehaviour of the men. The Native officer of the 4th never suggested going out himself, nor did he go out on his own accord when I sent for a party.

Did the men commence to retreat before your left flank was turned?—No, not before the shouting commenced on the left flank.

[The Witness withdraws.

Second Witness.—Mr. *C. A. Eglington*, Tea Planter, Dhurmikhall, being called into Court, voluntarily states as follows:—

On the morning of the 27th January 1871, on my arrival at the stockade of Monierkhall I found it occupied by the whole of the jemadar's party and the police. They remained in the stockade until about one o'clock, p.m. Then a party of eight sepoys went up to the tea house, about 40 yards from the stockade, and opened fire on the coolie lines of the garden, which were occupied by the Looshais, turning several of the enemy out. They continued

firing for about half an hour and then retired to the stockade. The next morning I heard firing in the direction of Dhurmikhall, and concluded that it was Mr. Daly. I was in the stockade at the time, and proposed to several of the men near me, both police and sepoys, to go out and intercept these Looshais on their retreat; but no one seemed to second the proposal, so we kept up a fire on them from the stockade till Mr. Daly came in sight, then the door of the stockade was opened, and I went out along with several of the men to meet Mr. Daly. He then remarked to me about the conduct of the sepoys of the 4th Native Infantry, and told me that he was obliged to halt his own men several times to wait till the sepoys came up. He then left the men he brought up with him in the stockade, and took out the men who had been in the stockade previously, and went after the Looshais. I then asked if anyone would volunteer to go out with me, and five or six of the police came. I went about 200 yards from the stockade following the same road as Mr. Daly went to, where there was a small clump of jungle, and a turn in the road, so that I could not see at all ahead of me. Here I met the sepoys running back, and I heard Mr. Daly's voice in the distance, but could not make out what he said. When he came nearer I heard him call out to them to halt and not to run away; they then made a stand for a minute or so, and then retreated to the stockade without orders. At first I saw only sepoys running, and then the police and Mr. Daly. I cannot say where the Native officer was; I did not notice him.

About two hours after this Mr. Daly made another sortie, accompanied principally by the police, who asked him not to take any of the sepoys out. Presently Mr. Daly sent for a party to go out round the right side of the hill; the jemadar of the 4th, now before the Court, asked me how many men he should send. I then inquired how many men were left in the stockade; he told me about 25, meaning only his own men and not the police, leaving me to understand this was the total force in the stockade. About 20 sepoys said they would go out. I thought that the few remaining would not be enough to defend the stockade, especially as I had heard firing again in the direction of Dhurmikhall. He asked me if he should keep more men in the stockade, and I told him to let 15 go out and retain five. Fifteen went out, and I saw nothing more of them. The next thing I heard was the men in the stockade shouting, "They are coming," and saw the sepoys retreating over the bridge, and they arrived principally at the stockade first. There were only one or two of the police with them. When Mr. Daly arrived at the stockade, he mentioned to me how shamefully the military had behaved, and it seemed to me at the same time, from their retreating so hastily, that they had not behaved as they ought to do; and I think, from what I saw, that havildar Pulwan Sing behaved the best throughout among the military.

Examined by the Court.

Q. In your opinion, what was the number of the Looshais?—*A.* About 400, in addition to 70 or 80 that went in the direction of Dhurmikhall.

Who was commanding in the stockade, and how did the sepoys behave before the arrival of Mr. Daly?—The jemadar. I consider their conduct indifferent; they could have gone out of the stockade, and done more harm to the enemy without much risk to themselves. I did not suggest it to them.

When you first proposed a sortie to intercept the retreat of the Looshais, did you address the jemadar or the sepoys generally?—The sepoys generally, who remained silent. I did not notice where the jemadar was.

When you saw the body of sepoys running over the bridge, can you give a guess at their number?—From 15 to 20.

Did you see whether the jemadar went out or returned with Mr. Daly?—No, I did not notice him; but I heard Mr. Daly abusing him inside the stockade for running away.

Third Witness.—Head Constable *Putro Sing* voluntarily states:—

I started with Mr. Daly from the zillah (station) on Friday, between 7 and 7.30 o'clock p.m. When we reached between Dhurmikhall and Monierkhall, and a little beyond a khall and a teelah, we came upon 100 or 150 Looshais. I was on the advance guard with the police, and we opened fire upon these Looshais. They retreated, and my sahib came doubling up, and told us to double. We did so, and shortly after were halted to allow the soldiers to come up who were falling behind. The Looshais had assembled in numbers and fired on us; we were doubling up to them, and the sepoys were still lagging behind, and to whom we were calling out "Double, double." On our approach the Looshais bolted; we were there halted again for the military. When they came up we again advanced at the double till we came into the open, and then went on to the stockade. Then this gentleman (pointing to Mr. Eglington) came and met my master, and after a little talk, Mr. Daly took out a party of sepoys and police towards the Looshais. When we reached a teelah they began firing down from the top at us, and we laid down under cover and returned the fire. The sepoys who were in the rear called out "Ho! Ho!" and retreated. My sahib called out to them not to retire, but they never minded, and went away. The fire became very heavy on us, and we retreated, which being open and no cover we retired to the stockade. When we were in the stockade my sahib abused the soldiers for running away. Shortly after my sahib ordered out a fresh party of both; we advanced towards a teelah on which the enemy were; we came to within 25 or 30 paces and began firing. My sahib then sent for assistance into the fort, and directed they should be sent to the right round the base of a hill, instead of which they remained on our right rear and began firing. My sahib called out to them not to fire in the rear, but to come on, and ordering us to fix bayonets told us

to

to charge. At this time a great noise of "Hoo! Hoo!" was heard on our left, and the men on our right bolted, and all bolted except I and a few others, who remained with the sahib, and crossing a nullah tried to find cover, but finding none we retreated also, and were nearly cut off from the stockade which we reached with difficulty. The jemadar before the Court was with the sepoys during the first sortie.

Fourth Witness.—Head constable *Hussain Khan* voluntarily states:—

On the 27th of January 1871 I started with a party of sepoys and police, under Mr. Daly, towards Monierkhall. When we reached Nugdingaon we were ordered to load. We then went on till about 1.30 p.m., when a havildar of the military came up to say they were knocked up, and we halted for two hours. We then went on till we came upon four Looshais on whom I fired. We went on till we came on about 100 or 150 Looshais, and the sahib told us to double, firing at them. The military again lagging behind we were halted till they came up, and they, though in the rear, were firing. We doubled again after them, and the soldiers falling behind the sahib halted us, saying, "We are too few against so many, we must wait for them to come up." When they came up, we again doubled until we came into the garden. We were then ordered to skirmish, and the Looshais bolting right and left, we went towards the stockade. We who were tired were ordered to rest, and another fresh party taken out. I remained in the stockade. Shortly after I heard a row, and the sepoys in the stockade calling out, "The Looshais are on us." I went out with a couple of constables to where the sepoys' cooking place is, and I met the jemadar, now before the Court, and a number of sepoys running in; my sahib was in the rear at a distance with the police. About an hour or so after my sahib told Pulwan Sing, havildar, to choose 10 old sepoys, and told me to choose some good men of the police, and come out with him; we went out and began skirmishing toward the Looshais, but seeing a number of the enemy on the right, my master sent Pulwan Sing to get assistance. We, in the meantime, advanced to within 25 paces of the enemy, where we got under cover, and were told to fix bayonets and wait till the force on the right came up, so as to make a simultaneous charge. The party on the right fired high over our heads, and when the Looshais shouted, retreated, and four of our men being hit, and seeing the military retreat, we retreated also towards a jheel; but finding no cover, and as we were few and the enemy many, the sahib told us to get away back to the stockade. My sahib called out loudly to the soldiers to stop, and to halt, but they would not listen; so he said, "We are few, and they are many, so we can do nothing; we had better get back."

Fifth Witness.—Major *Mitchell*, Wing Officer, 4th Regiment, Native Infantry, voluntarily states as follows:—

On the evening of the 27th January 1871, from a requisition received from the civil authorities, I provided a detachment of 1 havildar, 2 naicks, and 27 sepoys, and ordered the non-commissioned officer to place himself under the orders of Mr. Daly, as requested by the Acting Deputy Commissioner. The men had 50 rounds of ammunition in pouch, and carried their great coats and haversacks.

Sixth Witness.—*Jemadar Chedar Tewaree* being brought into Court, and having had explained to him paragraph 7, section 22, of the Military Regulations, voluntarily states as follows:—

On the 27th of January 1871, I was in command of a detachment of my regiment at Monierkhall, in a stockade. I was attacked several times from 6 a.m. to 8 p.m. by some 8,300 Looshais, but they were repulsed. Next morning, hearing firing in the direction of Dhurmikhall, and recognising the sound of English muskets, I called out, "This is a party coming to our rescue," and seeing some 300 Looshais going that way, I opened fire upon them to prevent them going on, as I said they would stop our party coming up, and the Looshais retreated. About this time Mr. Daly with a party of my regiment, and the police coming in the open from the forest came into the stockade. He addressed me, and said, "Exchange these tired sepoys for the guard you have got with you, and let them come with me;" so I, a havildar, naick, and nine sepoys, and some police, accompanied Mr. Daly towards the Looshais. We advanced some distance, and when we saw the enemy open fire, the police were on the left, we on the right, and Mr. Daly in the centre. An immense number of Looshais came on with spears and other arms, and halloing. Mr. Daly then called out to retire, and he and a head constable and four police first retired, then the police on the left and my men began to retire. I called out to my men not to move, but they said, "Look, the sahib and the police are running away." I said, "Don't you run, but retire leisurely firing." We tried to find cover and make a stand twice, but the enemy coming down in greater number, we all retired to the bridge, and went on with the sahib to the stockade. About two and a half hours afterwards he sent for me and said, "I am going out again, pick out 10 good men to accompany me." I did so, and with these men and some police Mr. Daly went out towards where the Looshais were. About 20 yards from the police cooking place he began skirmishing, and sent back a constable to me to send out 15 men to the right of the hill, where a large body of the enemy were collected.

I picked out 10 sepoys and five police, and sent them out under havildar Dawaka Deen Tewaree. I was on an elevated spot and could see both parties advancing. I saw a large body of Looshais coming down on the left of Mr. Daly's party, when he and his party got up and ran into the stockade, On arrival he sent for me and told me to see if all the men were present. I found that two sepoys who had accompanied them had not returned, one of these was killed, and the other came back in about half an hour. Mr. Daly asked after the party that had gone to the right, and I said they had not returned. About a quarter of an hour after the arrival of Mr. Daly's party, the party on the right came back, two sepoys leading the havildar, who had been wounded, and the rest retired firing. I opened fire upon the enemy, to cover the retreat of the party, and the Looshais retired.

Seventh Witness.—*Havildar Pulwan Sing*, 4th Regiment, Native Infantry, being called into Court, and having had explained to him paragraph 7, section 22, of the Military Regulations, voluntarily states as follows :—

On the 27th of January 1871, I was in the Monierkhall stockade when we were attacked by a large body of Looshais; we repulsed them; when I saw a large number going into the coolies hut looting, and I volunteered to take out a party to drive them out. I went out with three sepoys and police, opened fire, and drove them away. Next morning Mr. Daly arrived in the stockade and took the jemadar of my regiment, myself, and some sepoys of my regiment and police out with him. We went to where the Looshais were under cover, and Mr. Daly told us to kneel down; we opened fire on them, and they opened such a tremendous fire upon us, that it is a wonder any of us escaped with our lives. We all simultaneously ran away into the stockade. Some three hours afterwards Mr. Daly went out again with a fresh party of sepoys and police, and I accompanied him. He sent back a constable to the jemadar to send out a party of 15 men to the right; we advanced till we got under cover. Mr. Daly said to me, "I don't see the sepoys on the right." I said, "Sir, they are coming on." He then sent me to see where they were, and to send them on. I went about 100 yards to the right rear, and saw them coming on, stepping short. I told them to move on and brought them on to the level where Mr. Daly was, and I then returned to the sahib. We fired at the enemy, and they at us, and Mr. Daly gave the order to retire, firing till we got into the stockade. The party on the right came in a little after ours with their wounded havildar in their centre.

Eighth Witness.—Havildar *Dawaka Deen Tewaree*, 4th Regiment, Native Infantry, being called into Court, and having had explained to him paragraph 7, section 22 of Military Regulations, voluntarily states as follows:—

I was ordered by Major Mitchell with two naicks and 27 sepoys on the night of the 27th to proceed with some police, and to place myself under the orders of Mr. Daly. I asked where I was going to, and he told me that the police would show me the way, and that Mr. Daly would come up and give his own orders. After going about two or three miles Mr. Daly overtook us, and asked me the strength of my party. I told him. He then said, "Is there no jemadar?" and I said that he was on ahead with the other party. After going some distance Mr. Daly called out to me, "Bring on the sepoys," and I replied, "The coolies with the baggage cannot keep up." Again Mr. Daly went on, and after some distance called out to me, "Why are the sepoys so far behind, why don't you bring them on?" and I replied, "What can I do, the coolies cannot keep up with their loads." Mr. Daly then directed me to leave the coolies and baggage under the protection of a naick and four sepoys in the open road. I replied that this guard would be too small, the coolies would bolt and baggage be looted. He then said, "Leave one naick and seven sepoys, and I will order a constable to remain with them." They were to go on to a village, the name of which I cannot remember, and go on next morning. He also directed the sepoys to put their great coats on the coolies. We then went on till we came on 20 or 30 men, on whom the police opened fire, and the sahib ordered us to double. I directed my men not to fire until they saw the enemy. We went on doubling till we reached the stockade, and there was no halting whatever. I reported myself to the jemadar, who told me to make the men take off their accoutrements and rest. After Mr. Daly went out the second time, I was ordered by the jemadar to take out 10 sepoys and five police to the right of the hill. We went out and going along a hollow way very slowly till we came to the hill. While there Pulwan Sing, havildar, came to me, and said, "Don't advance further, but remain here, and when the sahib's party begins to fire, you fire also." When I heard the firing on the left, I opened fire also about this time. I was wounded by a bullet through my cheek, and, giving my musket to Madho Tewaree, sepoy, to hold, and sat down under the shelter of a trunk of a tree. We heard a great row on our left, and a sepoy said to me, "Let us run away, havildar, the others have run away." I said I would not, when a policeman said, "My sahib with his party has retreated to the stockade." At this time the Looshais came down on us, and Madho Tewaree, saying, "You are wounded, come;" he took me by the hand, and we went together, the others retreated firing. As I jumped down into a hollow, I stumbled, and Chedah, sepoy, took me by the other hand and helped me in the stockade. The other party got in before me.

Examined

Examined by the Court.

Q. Did Mr. Eglington ask for any volunteers to go out with him after Mr. Daly's first sortie, and did he go out?—*A.* He did not in my hearing, neither did he go out; he was standing in one corner, and I in the other.

Ninth Witness.—*Hoolas Sing*, Naick, 4th Regiment, Native Infantry, being called into Court, and having had explained to him paragraph 7, section 22 of the Military Regulations, voluntarily states as follows:—

I accompanied the party under Dawaka Deen Tawaree on the night of the 27th January 1871. After leaving the coolies with the baggage, and giving them our great coats by order of Mr. Daly, we marched on stumbling on a very bad road. I was behind keeping up the men. When we met the Looshais the police fired. One of our men fired also, and I immediately gave him drill, and reproved him, saying, "What a fool you are to fire in the rear when the sahib and men are on ahead?" We were ordered to double, but four or five sepoys whose feet were cut with their shoes, lagging behind and unable to keep up; we were halted twice till we got to the garden when we opened out skirmishing, and then went into the stockade. I never left the stockade afterwards.

Examined by the Court.

Q. Did Mr. Eglington ask for any volunteers to go out with him, and did he go out?—*A.* Not in my hearing. I saw him behind an abutment, but I do not know whether he went out or not.

Which of the two parties, Mr. Daly's or the party on the right, reached the bridge first?—Mr. Daly's reached the bridge first, and the military and police mixed up, and the havildar's party came in about five minutes after.

Tenth Witness.—*Munnee Ram Awastee*, Naick, 4th Native Infantry, being called into Court, and having had explained to him paragraph 7, section 22 of the Military Regulations, voluntarily states as follows:—

I was with the party under the jemadar who went out with Mr. Daly on the morning of the 28th Januury 1871. We advanced a certain distance, and were ordered to kneel down, but not to fire; we then saw some Looshais and opened fire on them, at which a large number of Looshais armed with long spears and other weapons jumped down upon us within 20 yards, upon which Mr. Daly called out loudly to retire, and he first, and then a head constable, and then four sepoys retired, followed by the rest of us, every now and then turning round and firing a shot, until we got into the stockade, which I did not leave again. In the retreat the jemadar was in the middle of the retreating party.

I FORWARD these proceedings. The conduct of the jemadar in not attacking the raiders as they were driven into the garden by Daly was inexcusable. They might have been dislodged from a natural rampart, as they debouched on the plain at 40 yards distance. Had Mr. Daly's gallantry been tempered with a little more precaution, and had he explained his views to the jemadar more fully, the two parties, police and 4th, might have acted more in accord; but while there may have been too rash an advance on Mr. Daly's part to a distance of between six and 800 yards from his stockade, the men of the 4th, unless we can put aside Mr. Daly and Mr. Eglington's evidence, were far from showing that pluck which might have saved the garrison from so complete a rout. The conduct of Havildar Pulwan Sing deserves my especial notice as most meritorious.

(signed) *G. Bourchier*, Brigadier General.
Cachar, the 25th February 1871. Commanding Eastern Frontier District.

PROCEEDINGS of a STATION COURT of INQUIRY assembled at *Cachar* on the 14th February 1871, by order of Brigadier General *Bourchier*, C.B., Commanding Eastern Frontier District, to investigate the circumstances attending the cutting up of a Baggage Guard of the 4th Regiment, Native Infantry, and the loss of Government property on the 28th of January 1871.

Colonel *W. J. Hicks*, 44th Regiment, Native Infantry, President.
Lieutenant Colonel *F. Duffin*, 4th Regiment, Native Infantry, } Members.
Captain *E. P. Ommany*, 44th Regiment, Native Infantry, }

Interpreter.—There being no other officer available, Lieutenant Colonel Duffin, 4th Regiment, Native Infantry, acts as interpreter.

Assembly.—The Court assembles at 3 p.m., continuing its sitting.

First Witness.—*Goolzar Khan*, sepoy, 4th Regiment, Native Infantry, being called into Court, voluntarily states:—

WHEN Mr. Daly left the baggage with the guard I formed a portion of the guard. We went on and reached Nugderam at 3 a.m., where we halted till daylight. We started the next

next day at about 7 a.m., and went along till we met a body of men who gave a tremendous shout. Our party consisted of a naick and seven sepoys and a constable. I asked the latter who were these shouting; he gave me some answer which I did not understand, and fired and disappeared. We all then began to fire till we fired 10 rounds, away, and the naick called to me to take two packages of cartridges out of his pouch, and give him one and put one in my ball bag. I did so, and we kept on firing till we were nearly surrounded, when we retreated to the river's bank. We all took the lower road, and Seetul, sepoy, took the higher road and disappeared. We kept on firing till all my party was cut up, and I was wounded in the leg by a spear, when I jumped into the river and crossing over got into the jungle. I was very faint and could hardly walk, so I took off my pouch, ball bag, and turban, and went on till I fell down insensible. When I became sensible and seeing two men, I with difficulty, and by giving them a rupee, persuaded them to carry me to the road, where I met Seetul, sepoy, and was helped by them into the station the same day.

Second Witness.—*Seetul*, Sepoy, 4th Regiment, Native Infantry, being called into Court, voluntarily states:—

I was one of the guard, consisting of one naick, seven sepoys, and one constable, left in charge of the baggage by Mr. Daly. When we were attacked by the Looshais, we fired upon them until we were nearly surrounded; we then retreated to the river, firing. The rest of the party went below and I went above, where I got in some shelter, and kept up firing until the rest of my party were killed, and I saw Goolzar Khan crossing the river. I then went off to a village and got assistance, and with 25 men went back to see if I could recover the bodies of the men, or save any of the baggage. On the road we met the Looshais, who shouted at us; and as none of the villagers were armed, I retired with them firing, and on the road back I met Goolzar Khan, whom I assisted into the station.

Third Witness.—Constable *Manglo*, of the Cachar Police, being called into Court, voluntarily states as follows:—

On the morning when we left the village on which we had halted over-night, I proceeded with the sepoys and baggage coolies. After some distance I saw something in front, but I did not know whether they were sticks or men, when suddenly I saw them move and with great shouts came down upon us. The coolies at once bolted, and two sepoys with great difficulty got through the press and joined me and began firing. Our firing did not stop the Looshais, who still kept coming on, and we had to retreat. I kept along the road to the right, and the two sepoys went into the plain at the left towards the nuddee. I kept on retreating, and when the Looshais went away I went to where the sepoy had disappeared, and found five dead bodies naked. The other part of the guard I did not see, and they may have been carried away by the press of coolies when they bolted.

Fourth Witness.—Mr. *Daly*, District Superintendent, Cachar Police, being called into Court, voluntarily states:—

On the night of the 27th January 1871, on my way to Monierkhall with a party of the 4th Regiment, Native Infantry, and the police, finding that the coolies could not keep up, and being only seven miles from the station, I ordered the havildar of the party to tell off a naick and seven sepoys, and gave them a constable to form part of the guard and to show the road. I gave orders that they were to march that night as far as Nudgeram, and start for Monierkhall next morning after daylight. I then went on.

Examined by the Court.

Q. Before leaving the baggage guard, did you give the sepoys orders to leave their great coats with the coolies?—*A.* No; I have no recollection of having given any such order; and I wish to add that it is hardly reasonable to think that I should have given such an order, as my own men who were already carrying more than the 4th. Men carried their great coats with them to Monierkhall.

The certified lists of Government and private property marked A. B. and C. and attached to the proceedings are placed before the Court.

Opinion of the Court.

The Court is of opinion that no blame can be attached to any one for the loss, and that it was unavoidable under the circumstances.

Remarks by Brigadier General *G. Bourchier*, C.B., Commanding the Eastern Frontier District, dated Cachar, the 24th February 1871.

Havildar. 1
2 Naicks. 2
27 Sepoys. 27
10 Police. 10
40

In obedience to His Excellency the Commander in Chief's orders, I assembled a Court of Inquiry to investigate the cause of the cutting up of a baggage guard of the 4th Native Infantry on the morning of the 28th January 1871. The circumstances are briefly as follows: On the night of the 27th January, Mr. Daly, District Superintendent of Police, with a party of the 4th Native Infantry and Police as per margin, left Cachar to relieve the stockade at Monierkhall, distant about 22 miles. Seven miles from Cachar he left one naick,

naick, seven sepoys, one constable in charge of the baggage, and with orders that it was not to go beyond Naudegrawn until daylight the following day. Soon after leaving Naudegrawn the guard was attacked and overpowered.

Baggage Guard.
1 Naick.
7 Sepoys.
1 Constable.
9

1 naick, 7 sepoys killed.
1 sepoy wounded,
1 sepoy, 1 constable escaped.

Total - - - 9

Killed.
1 Naick.
5 Sepoys.
6

Wounded.
1 Sepoy.

Escaped.
1 Sepoy.
1 Constable.

The wounded and non-wounded eventually escaped and arrived at Cachar.

Then the news of an expected raid arrived. The guard at Monierkhall consisted of two head constables, 16 constables, which was increased by a detachment of one jemadar, one havildar, one naick, and 12 sepoys (total 15 men) started to strengthen this post. When the enemy attacked the garden, this body of men became besieged in the stockade. On the 27th Mr. Daly went to their relief. It was his baggage guard of the 4th which was cut up. I cannot, as far as the inquiry shows, throw any blame on the guard. They were apparently alert, guarding their convoy, and were overpowered by numbers. Neither do I blame Mr. Daly, who gave as many men as he could spare for the guard. His instructions to the non-commissioned officer in charge not to proceed beyond Naudegrawn showed forethought. It seems wonderful that he was not attacked while passing through the forest at night. Either they allowed him to do so, having watched him leave a small guard behind, or they may have been asleep.

The real mistake lay in both reinforcements sent to Monierkhall by Major Mitchel being so very small, and quite inadequate for the purpose required. He could easily have afforded a large guard and left Cachar protected. Major Mitchel has informed me that he objected to sending out such smch small detachments, but considered he was bound to obey the civil power. He was, as to meeting the requisition, not the strength; to effect the purpose required was his duty to detail. The wing was sent to Cachar with only one officer (European), and Major Mitchel did not feel justified in leaving the station himself. Had a European officer gone and a large detachment been sent, the result would not have been so disastrous.

FOURTH REGIMENT, NATIVE INFANTRY.

NOMINAL ROLL of Men Killed and Wounded in Action with the Looshais.

Regimental Number.	Rank and Names.	Company.	Date.	Remarks.
	Killed.			
1482	Corporal Ruhmut Ally - -	C	28 Jan. 1871.	
1947	Private Bhowanee Doobey -	A	„ „	
2235	„ Mattadeen Opudhya -	A	„ „	
1954	„ Gayadeen Ditchit - -	A	„ „	
1801	„ Kalka Sing, 1st - -	B	„ „	
1770	„ Seerundaz Khan - -	C	„ „	
1768	„ Mattabuccus - -	D	„ „	
2422	Sahibdeen Sing - - -	D	„ „	
	Wounded.			
1247	Serjeant Dwarkadeen Tewaree -	A	„ „	Severely; bullet in jaw.
2115	Private Goolzar Khan, 2nd -	C	„ „	Severely; spear wound through leg.
1855	„ Shewburn Tewaree -	D	27 „	Shot; wound in chest.
1713	„ Sewdeen Tewaree - -	A	„ „	Slightly; scalp wound by spent bullet. A knife cut on shoulder and ankle.

(signed) *W. C. Mitchel*, Major,
Commanding Right Wing, 4th Regiment, Native Infantry.

Cachar, 2 February 1871.

From *H. L. Harrison*, Esq., Junior Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department. No. 1252, dated Fort William, the 23rd March 1871.

In continuation of this office letter, No. 1044 of the 9th March 1871, I am directed to submit, for the information of his Excellency the Governor General in Council, copies of the letters marginally indicated from the Officiating Commissioner, Chittagong Division, referring to the raids in Hill Tipperah.

No. 414, dated 11th March 1871.
„ 421 „ 14th „ „

2. The Lieutenant Governor is of opinion that these reports certainly seem much more serious than most of the reports already received, and make the uncertainty still greater as to who the raiders are; but all the accounts agree in pointing to the Chittagong Hill tracts, or the hill tracts adjoining the Chittagong frontier, as the habitat of the raiders.

3. His Honor agrees with Mr. Bayley that no great reliance can be placed in the opinion expressed by the subordinates of the Maharaja of Hill Tipperah as to the tribes who have been engaged in these outrages, but every effort will be made by Captain Lewin to ascertain who they really are.

From *S. C. Bayley*, Esq., Officiating Commissioner of the Chittagong Division, to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department. No. 414, dated Chittagong, the 11th March 1871.

I have the honour to forward three letters noted in the margin, which were received here on the 9th instant, from the Maharaja of Tipperah. In reference to his letter of the 6th March, No. 94, I may say that I altogether discredit the statement of there being Chukmas among the raiders. In the first place Chuckmas have not beards; and, moreover, when I was at Rungamuttee a few days ago, I had an interview with the heads of the Chukma tribes, and from the inquiries I then made, and from what I learnt from Captain Lewin, I came to the conclusion that the supposition of the raid being committed by Chuckmas (which had been already telegraphed to me by Mr. Hime) was altogether without foundation.

No. 90, dated 3rd March 1871.
„ 93 „ 6th „ „
„ 94 „ „ „ „

The deposition of the Tipperah woman, who had been taken captive and escaped from the Kookies, is interesting, and points with far greater probability to the real marauders. I have forwarded a copy of the deposition to the Commissioner of Dacca, and have requested him to follow up the clue therein given, and to let me know if his inquiries bear out the supposition of the captive woman.

I have not heard yet of the raiders having actually entered our territory, having, in fact, received no definite information bearing a later date than the 5th instant; but at that time they were reported both from Chugulnaya (the south-east thannah of Tipperah), and from Ramghur (the north-west thannah of Chittagong on the Fenny), to be close on our borders.

Mr. Crouch went out from Rungamuttee on the 8th to patrol with a strong body of police from Kassalong and Kurkhurreah, a few days' march to the northward from the latter place, so that he may be in a position to intercept the Kookies should they return through Hill Tipperah towards their homes.

Mr. Hime should now be at Chugulnaya with about 100 policemen. As long as we have no power of direct interference in Hill Tipperah, I am not prepared to make any suggestions for attempting to prevent incursions of Kookies into the Maharaja's jurisdiction. We are ignorant of any causes that might justify such incursions, and of intrigues that may lead to them; but if through the Maharaja's inability to drive back these raiders from his own frontier they find a ready road through his territory into ours, it will be necessary, for the protection of our own people, to exercise some control over the Maharaja's system of frontier defence.

From *Raja Beer Chunder Manik Bahadoor*, Maharaja of Independent Tipperah, to the Commissioner of the Chittagong Division; No. 90, dated, Augurtullah, 3rd March 1871.

I beg to inform you that I have received a report from my Oodeypore police jemadar, stating that a raid had been committed by Kookies on the Toetelah Reang's *baree* on the 28th ultimo. This *baree* is situated close to the aforesaid thannah, and all the Tipperahs round about are coming down to Oodeypore.

Nothing has been mentioned in the report as who the Kookies are, but I presume they are not Looshais. I am sending a jemadar and 20 sepoys to Oodeypore, and instructions to the thannah jemadar to trace the parties and find out from whence they have come. If I should receive any further notice I will let you know.

I have reported the circumstance to the magistrate of Tipperah.

From *Raja Beer Chunder Manik Bahadoor*, Maharaja of Independent Tipperah, to *S. C. Bayley*, Esq., Officiating Commissioner of the Chittagong Division; No. 93, dated Augurtullah, 6th March 1871.

I HAVE just received a report from Doorga Churn Chatterjee, whom I deputed to Kumulpore to investigate into the matter of raid by Kookies into my territory, when they burnt seven villages and committed murder and other depredations. It would appear from this report, and the deposition of a woman named Pooran Chang, who was taken a prisoner and afterwards escaped under great difficulties and privations, that the parties who committed this raid consisted of the Dartong Kookies, who a few years ago were taken away by Banye Thung, the wife of Moorchoy Lall, and who formed a village near Sook Pillah, who is her brother. I enclose the deposition of the woman, Pooran Chang, for your perusal. I have sent instructions to send the woman here and to make further investigations. If I succeed in getting any fresh evidence I will let you know.

On first hearing the raid I dispatched scouts with my police and sepoys in all directions from Chowpoo, which is my southern thannah, to Kumalpore, to try and trace the movements of the Howlongs, who were reported to have come in a north-western direction; no traces have been found of them in my territory. From this I conclude that they did not go through it, and further proves that the raid into my territory was not committed by Howlongs, but by Kookies, who came from the east, as deposed by Pooran Chang.

DEPOSITION of *Sreemutty Pooran Chang*, wife of *Beng Tung Thye Ouzir*, Inhabitant of Moharbeer baree.

ONE day, in the month of Magh (I don't remember the date), about 12 o'clock, Lall Poohung and Netung Netem, who went to their jhoom to the north of their *baree*, saw some Kookies, who had been cooking and eating. These men, on seeing the Kookies, returned to their *baree* and told us all. On hearing this, I, with my son Cheepeenhak, and daughters, Cheepeen Jheem, Cheepeen Hye, and Cheepeen Chin, ran away to Gang Banga Chor, below Dhurye Churah, where there was some jungle, and hid themselves. About 12 o'clock at night of that day the Kookies, making a stockade of my *baree*, remained there. The day after, in the morning, I, with my children, went to a Bun Kamla's deserted *baree;* the Kookies seeing us there came towards us, when my son, Cheepeen hak, ran away into the jungle, they seized me and my three daughters, and then cut off the head of my daughter Cheepeen Jheem; afterwards they took us and the daughter of Lunggaree Thang, Meenan Mye, and the son of Boocah Kookie, named Kuma, to my *baree*, and they then bound us hands and feet, putting five Kookies on guard over us; then about 200 Kookies went westward, searching all the *barees;* the day after they returned with two Mussulmen and a quantity of loot; they then killed six or seven pigs, and eat them; after eating they fastened up all the things and told one of the Mussulman, who was blind of one eye, to take them up and follow them; he objecting, they shot him, and cutting off his head threw it away; they took up the things and set fire to the *baree*. They then took us six along Lungiai *tillah*, in a south-east direction through the jungle, five days' journey; on the night of the fifth day, on reaching a tillah, they said, as we have not had any sleep for some days, we had better go to sleep without fear; they then said that on their way home out of the six of us they would bathe one of us in pig's blood, and sacrifice him; and before the Ranee they would bathe another of us in the blood of Goboy and sacrifice him; saying this they eat the rice they had in their *moocha*, and putting us in the middle of them, all went to sleep. I, wishing to see if I could save my life, tied my daughter Cheepeen Hye on my back, and went down west side of the *tillah*, where there was jungle, and hid myself. Two of the Kookies went in search of me that night, the whole of next day and night; not finding me, I saw them returning back, I eating plantain (*thore*) and cane tops, with a latee in my hand, and walking slowly through the jungle, observing the sun and moon, I found my way to my *baree*, from whence I am come to this guard.

Replied to question first.—A man, good looking, with hair tied behind, without beard or moustache, khornoo in his neck, a white coat on his back, about 18 or 19 years of age, was called the Raja of the Kookies. This Raja, and about half of the Kookies, talked as the Dartong Kookies do, and the other half talked as Cachar Kookies. From this, and from what they said about bathing one of us in Goboy's blood before the Ranee, and sacrificing him, I recognised that they belonged to the Ranee Banye Thung, wife of Moorchoy Lall, who, with the Umbroy Duffa and Dartong Kookies, went and built a *baree* near to Sook Pillah's *baree*, and has adopted a son of Poor Hooah Raja; that son, with the above Umbroy Duffa and Dartong Kookies, with Sook Pillah's Khochaks, committed this raid.

Reply to question second.—All the Kookies were armed with guns, sabs and daos, and on their body koorias were of kesh cloth, a pugree on their head, hair tied behind, but no beards or moustaches; on the back of some of them were baskets. When I was taken away my husband had gone to cut bamboos. I did not see him.

(signed) *B. C. D.*

From Raja *Beer Chunder Manik Bahadoor*, Maharaja of Independent Tipperah, to *S. C. Bayley*, Esq., Officiating Commissioner of the Chittagong Division; No. 94, dated Augurtallah, 6th March 1871.

I BEG to inform you that a report has been submitted to me by my Oodeypore Khedda Mohurir, stating that he heard from Bunkumlah of Shonahmoorah that some two or three villages in the vicinity of that aforesaid station had been burnt down, and some 12 persons' carcases have been found out without heads; and also the Bumkumlahs, who had been up to the hills had returned, some of their party having been killed; they say that some of them saw the raiders personally; they had long beards and moustaches, and bearing a fair complexion, so they think that the parties who committed this raid were Kookies or Chuckmahs, who reside south of the Fenny.

From *S. C. Bayley*, Esq., Officiating Commissioner of the Chittagong Division, to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department, No. 421; dated Chittagong, the 14th March 1871.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for information of his Honor the Lieutenant Governor, a letter No. 181, dated 12th instant, describing what the magistrate of Tipperah has done in regard to the recent raids in Hill Tipperah.

2. I approve of all that Mr. Hime has done, and have requested him to have a careful inquiry made as to the real amount of destruction to life and property that has been caused.

3. At present it is impossible to say how much of the reported raiding is true, and how much is exaggeration due to panic. It is singular that Mr. Hime does not appear to have met with a single person who had with his own eyes seen the raiders.

4. The description contained in his second paragraph of the appearance of the raiders comes through the Maharaja, and is for various reasons not to be relied on; but especially for this that the description corresponds neither with that of Looshais nor of Chukmas, while it does not really appear that any one has had an opportunity of observing the raiders.

5. In speaking of "Chittagong hill tribes" I take Mr. Hime to refer to tribes beyond the borders of the Chittagong hill tracts, though of course the Chukmas are our own subjects, and it is exceedingly unlikely that they should have gone on such a raiding expedition. I have asked Captain Lewin to do his utmost to learn who the raiders were. In the meantime I am inclined to pay very little heed to the vague guesses at identification which come through the Maharaja's subordinates, and which may be the result either of insufficient observation, or of intentional mis-statements.

6. I would call the attention of Government to the final part of the 23rd paragraph of Mr. Hime's letter begging for the temporary retention of Mr. Larminie's services; such retention need only be temporary, as by the end of March I think all necessity for his remaining out will have disappeared.

7. The proposal contained in paragraph 4 of Mr. Hime's letter has much to recommend it. Without a Resident at Agurtullah, however, it would be impossible for us to interfere in the Maharajah's police arrangements with any effect; and even when such an officer is appointed, I am inclined to doubt if it will be expedient to take on ourselves the responsibility (for this is what the measure would practically amount to) of protecting Hill Tipperah from the inroads of the tribes to the north-east, while we should be unable to control the relations of the raja's subjects with these tribes, and should be ignorant of any provocation and intrigues that might lead to South inroads.

8. I certainly would take no measures for interfering in this matter till a Resident has not only been appointed, but has had time to make himself acquainted with the state of affairs in the Eastern part of the Maharajah's territory. In the meantime I think the Maharajah should be warned that he will be held responsible for taking such steps to protect his own territory as will effectually prevent marauding tribes from penetrating through it into our districts, and that a neglect to do so will render necessary the direct interference of Government in the administration of Hill Tipperah.

9. I will write to the Maharajah in regard to the necessity of the road spoken of in Mr. Hime's last paragraph after settling the best line for it to take.

From *R. D. Hime*, Esq., Officiating Magistrate of Tipperah, to the Commissioner of Chittagong; dated Comillah, the 12th March 1871.

I HAVE the honour to report that, as already communicated to you by the telegraph, a body of savages of unknown tribe, reported to number about 500, appeared on or about the 1st instant in Hill Tipperah, about 12 miles east of Oodeypore, a Tipperah village on the River

River Goomty, about 20 miles above Comillah. A similar body was reported by the police of Chagulnyah station to have made their appearance on the same date in the Tipperah hills about 20 miles east of that station. Both parties were reported to be engaged in plundering and burning the villages of Hill Tipperah. I myself met with some Bengalee wood-cutters who had been fired on above Oodeypore, and two others who had heard firing, and shortly afterwards came on two corpses, which they did not identify, one headless, and the other with a gun-shot wound in the neck, and the belly ripped up. The station of Comillah being almost denuded of police, the greater number of men fit for such duty being at the frontier thannas, I considered it advisable to telegraph for assistance from Dacca, the town and station of Comillah being only three miles from the frontier of Hill Tipperah, and within possible reach of a sudden raid. In reply I was advised of the despatch of a detachment of 50 men of the 4th Native Infantry, who reached Comillah on the forenoon of the 5th instant. On the same date I was advised by a Despatch addressed to the dewan of the Maharaja of Hill Tipperah at Comillah by the zemindar of the Maharaja, who with a body of 125 men, had occupied a post of observation east of Oodeypore on the path leading to Comillah, that the savages, after cutting up a Tipperah village of Riang Kookies, had broken up their camp and moved south, followed by the corps of observation.

2. The savages were described by fugitives as tall, fair-bearded men, armed with guns, javelins, and daos, and supposed, from the fact of their having Chukmas among their number, to be a Chittagong hill tribe. On the afternoon of the same day I received a Despatch from Chagulnyah thannah, reporting that the savages had descended there in force, and were engaged in plundering and burning villages in Hill Tipperah within a few miles of the frontier. On receipt of this intelligence I at once dispatched 15 constables to reinforce the 85 men already at Chagulnyah, and started myself, accompanied by the district superintendent, Mr. Larminie, the same night, reaching Chagulnyah on the night of the 6th instant simultaneously with 25 men from Noacolly who met as under the command of sub-inspector Tabdul Hossein at Dewangunge about noon. Moonsheekeel, a village about 16 miles north of Chagulnyah thannah, appearing from the thannah reports to be the point most immediately threatened, I despatched 15 men on the morning of the 7th to reinforce the 35 men posted in that village under the command of Sub-inspector Ishur Sing, and on receipt of a further Despatch from the outpost, stating that heavy firing had been heard close to the frontiers in the neighbourhood of the outpost, and that the sub-inspector had marched with 17 constables into the hills in the direction of the firing, started myself with the district superintendent and 20 constables for Moonsheekeel, which we reached at noon on the 8th instant. As is usual in these cases, we found the imminence of the danger much exaggerated.

3. There were no raiders within less than a day's march of the frontier, the sub-inspector had not by any means endangered his communications by the distance he had gone from their base, and the firing was probably either imaginary, or reports of Shekaree guns exaggerated by echo. Several fugitive Tipperahs came in, in the course of the day, stating that they had seen their *barees* burning from the thickets in which they had concealed themselves on the alarm of the approach of savages, but I met no persons who had come in actual contact with them. On the reports of the Tipperah fugitives at Moonsheekeel, I determined on a two days' march through the hills to the scene of the latest raids, but before my arrangements were completed, I received intelligence from the Maharaja's guard six miles further north-west that the savages were raiding in that direction. Proceeding thither with 40 constables, I found Pursoram Bazaar crowded with fugitive Tipperahs of both sexes and all ages, who, with their household goods, had taken refuge in British territory. I met none who had seen the savages, all having fled to the jungles on the report of their approach, whence they had seen their *barees* burning from afar. I am informed that no Tipperahs remain in the hills east of Chagulnyah jurisdiction, all having taken refuge either in British territory or in the spur running south-west to Juggurnathdigee and Chowdogoan, on the Comillah and Chittagong road. From the reports I gathered, it would appear that the savages are probably roving parties on their way back from the north to the Chittagong Hills, pressed westwards by hunger. There being no likelihood of surprising or overtaking any of these wandering parties in the forest, I judged it best to employ the force at my disposal solely in protecting the frontier villages, with which view I have established two strong outposts,—one at Moonsheekeel, the other at Pursoram Bazaar. These, with the force at the Chagulnyah thannah will, I hope, be able to secure the safety of the Chagulnyah frontier. There are now, including the Noacolly police, all of whom I have retained for the present, a force of 125 constables, four head constables, and three sub-inspectors in the Chagulnyah jurisdiction, disposed as follows: two sub-inspectors, two head constables, and 50 constables at Chagulnyah thannah; 55 constables, one head constable, and one sub-inspector at Moonsheekeel; 20 constables and one head constable at Pursoram Bazaar; the district superintendent, Mr. Larminie, remains in the Chagulnyah jurisdiction for the present, pending the arrival of his successor in the district. This change of authorities at the present juncture is very unfortunate. The duties at present devolving on the district superintendent are of a very arduous nature, require a knowledge of the district and the men under his command, and, above all, sound health, all of which Mr. Larminie possesses; and his successor, Mr. Masters, no one of them at present. I trust, therefore, that the supersession of Mr. Larminie will not take place during the present season.

4. As regards the measures to be adopted against the recurrence of these annual alarms, I beg to urge on Government the necessity of insisting on the establishment by the Maharaja of Hill Tipperah of strong outposts on his eastern frontier. These outposts should be under the control of the future Resident at Agartullah, and need only be maintained during the cold and hot weather. Such outposts would not only secure Hill Tipperah itself and our frontier, but also prove a serious obstacle to the march of the *Chittagong hill tribes* northwards to Cachar and Sylhet.

5. In conclusion, I beg to draw your attention to the want of communication between pergunnah Khundul, Chagulnyah jurisdiction, and the rest of the district, which was forcibly brought to my notice on my return journey to Comillah on the 11th instant. As the Maharaja of Hill Tipperah is permitted to hold the spur of the hills which intercepts the pergunnah from the body of the district, he should be required to make his possession of it as little detrimental to the public interests as possible by constructing a good bridle path across from Chowdagaon on the Chittagong road. A track, half path half water course, is all that now exists.

From *R. Deacon*, Esq., Civil Assistant Surgeon, to *H. C. Sutherland*, Esq., the Magistrate of Sylhet; dated Sylhet, 2nd March 1871.

I HAVE the honour to report that on Wednesday, the 1st of March last, I examined a body supposed to be that of a dead Looshai sent in from Allynugger, district of Sylhet, the evening before.

The savage was apparently about 17 years of age. He had been killed on Monday, the 27th February, at 10 o'clock a.m., in a skirmish between a body of raiders and a force of police and sepoys of the 44th Regiment Native Infantry, under Captain Robinson.

There were four distinct articles of clothing with the body; next his skin was a shirt, open in front all the way down, and tied at the neck with two pieces of string. The shirt was of finely-woven white strong doosooti, and was not of sufficient length to cover the generative organs, which were quite bare.

Next was a large chudder of the same kind of fabric as the shirt. The ends were crossed in front of the chest, but before I had an opportunity of seeing exactly how, it had been removed by the police. There were two other chudders, one coloured and the other plain; but they were not in any way attached to his person, and may or may not have been his own.

The countenance of the savage was of the Mongolian type; face flat, low forehead, eyes far apart, obliquely set, and neither large nor small, blue in colour, cheek bones high, nose flat, nostrils wide, mouth small, incipient moustache, no appearance of beard or whisker. Teeth even, regular, good. Incisors rather small and narrow from side to side, canine teeth not prominent, *Dentes sapientiæ*, had not appeared, chin prominent. Tongue large and flat. No ornaments in nose, none on arms, wrist, or legs; no marks either above or below the knee as if a garment had been fastened. A necklace of cornelians round the neck, strung on a piece of string, a large cornelian in right ear, called by a Munipooree present at the examination a *Nongthai*. There were no ornaments in the left ear, but as the lobe of the ear was torn, it is probable that there had been one. The hair was about 20 inches long, coarse, dark, slightly wavy, parted evenly in the centre like a woman's, brushed back from the temples and with a strong tendency to be down on each side; it was full of leaves, bits of straws, &c.; but all the tossing it had got, had not in the least disarranged the parting. The savage was about 5 feet 5 inches high, well built, legs rather bandy; prepuce long, hands and feet small, nails cut close, instep high, skin of sole of foot as hard as leather. His death was owing to a gun-shot wound. The bullet had entered in front, smashed the cartilage of the false ribs about 4 inches to the right of the middle line of the body, torn up the right lobe of the liver, passed through diaphragm and inferior lobe of right lung, and had made its exit posteriously, again smashing the ribs; he had also three bayonet wounds, one in left groin, one in right thigh, and one under right ear.

No. 49, dated 21st March 1871.

Endorsed by the Commissioner of Dacca.

COPY, with two photographs of the dead Looshai, submitted to the Government of Bengal.

From *H. L. Harrison*, Esq., Junior Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department, to the Commissioner of the Dacca Division; No. 1371, dated Fort William, the 27th March 1871.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 61, dated the 16th instant, submitting, from the Officiating Deputy Commissioner of Cachar (Mr. MacWilliam), a general report on the late Looshai raids in that district.

2. In reply, I am to request that you will be good enough to convey the thanks of Government to Messrs. Bagshawe and Cooke for their very spirited and gallant defence of the Cutlicherra Garden; this being, moreover, the second occasion in which Mr. Bagshawe has rendered himself conspicuous by his courageous behaviour.

3. The Lieutenant Governor is of opinion that the judgment and courage displayed by Messrs. Daly, Metcalfe, and Savi deserves high commendation, as also does the energy and promptitude of the Nazir of the Collectorate, Baboo Ram Rutton Enda, in collecting carriage and supplies for the large number of police and troops in the district.

4. The Lieutenant Governor is pleased to sanction the reward of 50 rupees proposed for each of two Cabulee fruitsellers who assisted Messrs. Bagshawe and Cooke in their defence of Cutlicherra. Separate orders will be issued regarding your recommendation to give a gratuity of six months' pay to the head constable and constables mentioned in the 47th paragraph of Mr. MacWilliam's letter; the Inspector General of Police having also recommended these men's services for substantial recognition.

From *S. B. Simson*, Esq., Commissioner of the Dacca Division, to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Political Department; No. 61, dated Dacca, the 16th March 1871.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a *résumé* of the raids and action taken at Cachar, drawn up by Mr. MacWilliam at my request; the list of killed, wounded, and missing is not complete, but 51 deaths are undoubted. Among the missing a few coolies may have run away, but there is little certainty of this; the rest were carried off into captivity, and some, as was shown by the evidence of the woman who escaped, were murdered by the Looshais on their return journey.

2. I support the proposal in paragraph 48, that the two fruitsellers from Cabul should receive 50 rupees a piece. I suggest that six months' pay should be given to the constables mentioned in paragraph 48, and that a separate letter of thanks from Government should be presented to Mr. Bagshawe, whose courageous behaviour was nearly as conspicuous in 1869 as it was in these late raids.

From *O. G. R. MacWilliam*, Esq., Officiating Deputy Commissioner of Cachar, to the Commissioner of the Dacca Division; No. 233, dated Cachar, the 11th March 1871.

I HAVE the honour to submit the following general report on the late Looshai raids in Cachar.

2. On the 15th January I received a letter from Mr. Edgar, dated 9th of the same month, in which he mentioned a rumour of a possible attack on Sylhet by the Hachuk range in the direction of Puldur, by Howlongs, who usually confine their raiding operations to Tipperah. I warned the magistrate of Sylhet, and a day or two afterwards received a telegram from Chittagong confirmatory of Mr. Edgar's rumour. As I considered that officer's friendly presence in Sookpilal's country a guarantee for the safety of the Cachar frontier, I had no hesitation in commencing a tour amongst the villages in the North Cachar hills. I left the station for the hills on Friday, 20th January, with Mr. Daly, district superintendent of police. We received no news of importance from the station till the evening of Thursday, the 26th, when a letter from Mr. Clementson, with many enclosures, giving news of the attacks on Alexandrapore and Ainarkhall, reached me near the mouth of the Kyang river. We reached the station at mid-day on the 27th.

3. I shall now briefly relate what had happened in the interim. Early in the morning of the 23rd the Cacharee Punji of Ainarkhall was burned, 25 persons killed, and 37 taken prisoners. On the morning of the same day Alexandrapore was destroyed by another body of Looshais. Mr. Winchester, a planter living there, was killed and his child captured.*

* The number of killed and missing will be reported hereafter.

4. Shortly afterwards Cutlicherra, the adjoining garden, was attacked by Looshais, who were apparently part of the body who were at Alexandrapore. Messrs. Bagshawe and Cooke opposed them most gallantly, and drove them away from the bungalow. Another party was attacking the lines, but was dispersed by Mr. Cooke and some coolies; they

were driven off, but not until they had killed five and wounded others, and were carrying off some women, whom they left on being threatened.

5. In the afternoon Mr. Cooke and some Cabulees and others went over to Alexandrapore, recovered Mr. Winchester's body, and brought back some wounded coolies.

6. During the night a small guard of nine policeman arrived from Jhulnacherra. At nine a.m. on the 24th a second attack was made on Cutlicherra bungalow by 30 Looshais, 15 of whom were armed with guns. Messrs. Bagshawe and Cooke, with the police and their armed servants, fired and disabled two Looshais, on which the whole body rapidly retreated.

7. On the 23rd Mr. Metcalfe, with eight Bengalee constables from the thannah, immediately on hearing of the attack at Ainarkhall, started for Lukhinuggur, where it appears that, shortly after the attack on Ainarkhall, a Bengalee had been speared by two Looshais, probably scouts from the main body. On reaching the Cacharee village, Mr. Metcalfe found some Looshais on the spot, and exchanged shots with them. This has been reported in detail in Mr. Metcalfe's report sent to you with my memorandum, No. 138, of 8th February.

8. On the night of the 23rd Mr. Metcalfe remained at Lukhinuggur, and next morning, with Messrs. Stuart, Cruickshank, Sellor, Barry, Edwards, Ponder, Towers, and Buchanan, started for Cutlicherra, which he reached shortly after the repulse of the second attack.

9. News of the attack on Ainarkhall reached the station on the evening of the 23rd, and Mr. Savi started for Hylakandy at 11 p.m. with a force of 60 policemen. He arrived at Cutlicherra (47 miles as he went) on the afternoon of the 25th with 20 men, 10 of whom were detached to Kukicherra. He had detached men at Lotakandy, Ainarkhall, and Lukhinuggur on his way.

10. On the morning of 24th a letter from Mr. Edgar, dated 20th January, directing that the guards at Monierkhall and Nowarbund should be strengthened, was received in the station. A copy of the letter was sent to you by Mr. Clementson. Mr. Clementson thought it referred to the attack on Cutlicherra. It really indicated an attack on Nowarbund and Monierkhall.

11. Mr. Clementson sent an additional force of police and sepoys to each of these guards, and at his request the station guards were taken by the men of the 4th Native Infantry. The strength at the principal outposts was then as follows: Nowarbund, 30; Monierkhall, 37; Deedarkoosh, 13; and 18 at Mynadhur. The Lukhipore guard of 50 men was reduced to 20; 50 sepoys of the 4th Native Infantry were sent to place themselves under Mr. Metcalfe's orders in Hylakandy on the morning of the 25th.

12. On the arrival of the sepoys at Monierkhall, the coolies were withdrawn from Denneekhall, with the exception of 10 or 12, who volunteered to remain with Mr. Eglington at the latter place, and a few who were in the stockade at Monierkhall.

13. Mr. Eglington remained with Messrs. Pearce and Shaw at Monierkhall on the night of the 26th. At 7.30 a.m., on the 27th, a body of Looshais came out from the jungle south of the garden, and, advancing along the low grounds between the telahs and the river, surprised some sepoys and police who were easing themselves; one sepoy was shot, and one wounded with a dao. The head constable in command of the police went out from the stockade with some men and fired upon the Looshais. He was wounded, but the whole party reached the stockade in safety. Messrs. Pearce, Eglington, and Shaw made for the stockade on hearing the firing. By this time the Looshais had advanced towards the cooly lines, and then the main body kept up a fire on the stockade, while the remainder looted the cooly lines, going backwards and forwards between the lines and their camp.

14. This went on till about mid-day. Mr. Eglington attempted to take out a small party of sepoys to drive the Looshais from the lines, but was obliged to retire. During the day Havildar Pulwan Sing, of the 4th, took out a party to the Modie's house, and brought in provisions, and also some water from the river. The fire of the Looshais was renewed in the afternoon, and kept up at intervals till evening.

15. At night a constable left the stockade and arrived in the station next morning, 28th, bringing news of the serious nature of the attack. Afterwards Messrs. Pearce and Shaw left the garden and went to Sildubi. At night the Looshais were seen moving about near the stockade with lights, probably to take away their wounded and slain. Two sepoys, two policemen and a cooly-jemadar were wounded.

16. While the attack was made on Monierkhall, a party of Looshais went on to the adjoining garden, Darmiakhall, and looted, but did not burn it. All the coolies escaped.

17. On my arrival at the station on the 27th, I found two letters from Mr. Edgar, reporting the possibility of an attack on Nowarbund. I directed the sepoys who had been sent to Hylakandy to return to Nowarbund, thus bringing up the force at that place to 80 men for the protection of the Chatlahowa gardens. I directed Mr. Metcalfe, who was about to follow up the raiders at Ainarkhall, to return to Hylakandy. I considered the additional

additional force of 60 men of the police, sent with Mr. Savi to Hylakandy, in addition to the force already there, sufficient for the protection of the sub-division.

18. On the afternoon of the same day news of the attacks on Monierkhall and Nugdigram reached the station. I directed Mr. Daly, with a force of 30 sepoys of the 4th Native Infantry to proceed to the assistance of Monierkhall. He also took with him nine men of the police.

19. Mr. Daly marched all night, and early on the morning of the 28th came upon a body of Looshais about a mile from Monierkhall. He drove them before him into the open garden and reached the stockade at about 6.30 a.m. He then went out with a force of about 25 men, but was forced to retire almost immediately. A second sortie was unsuccessful. It is unnecessary to give a detailed account of the second day's fighting at Monierkhall, as it is fully described in Mr. Daly's report, forwarded to you with my memorandum, No. 124, of the 4th February.

20. The Looshais left the neighbourhood of Monierkhall during the night of the 28th. Six Looshai bodies were some days afterwards found in the jungle in a state of putrefaction. I heard some time afterwards that a body, supposed to be that of a Looshai, was found on the river Barrak several miles below Silchar, at a place called Massimpore. I asked Mr. May, the assistant at that garden, who was the authority for the story, what grounds there were for it; he stated that he saw a body floating down the river, which was examined by his bearer and pronounced to be that of a man shot through the arm and chest. Mr. May, however, did not look at the body; and as I did not hear of it till three days after it passed Massimpore, I was unable to examine it myself. I think it very improbable that a body could float down the rapids and escape the snags on the Sonai river at this season.

21. The camp of the Looshais was a few hundred yards south of the clearance in forest jungle; it appeared to be capable of holding about 300 or 400 men. Between the jungle and the southernmost tilah in the garden is an open piece of well cleared ground completely protected by the tilahs from observation and fire from other parts of the garden, and especially from the stockade.

22. I must now return to the occurrences at Nugdigram on the 27th January. Shortly before noon on that day about 40 Nagas of the Sonaimukh village were working at their jhoom on the west bank of the Rukni, near the mouth of the Puniakhall. They were surprised by the sudden appearance from the south of 200 or more Looshais armed with daos and spears; some of them had guns. Two Nagas were shot, and others killed. The remainder, leaving nine of their number (four men, five women, and girls) behind them, escaped in the direction of Nugdigram, followed by a party of raiders as far as a solitary clearing made by a Bengalee named Kissun Ram, about five years ago on the river bank close to the Nugdigram road. Kissun Ram and one of his sons were away from home, and one child, six or seven years old, managed to escape. Kissun Ram's wife and two of his children were killed, and his little daughter Rashee, about five years old, was carried off. The *bari* was completely looted. Only two Looshais advanced beyond this point; they followed the road into the open rice land of Nugdigram. They both had guns. One of them seized a cooly woman who was near the road, and tied up her hands. The second shot another cooly, and struck the woman's child with the butt-end of a gun, and (he says) with a bayonet; but this last is very doubtful; the wound on the child's head is much more like a cut from a dao. About this time two khedda elephants came out of the jungle; their mahouts, in alarm, got off and left them; and the Looshais, thinking that the elephants were sent to attack them, rushed away into the jungle. The woman and child were saved.

23. Some days after, when the Nagas returned to their jhoom, they found the bodies of six of their party; two shot, two killed with daos, and two apparently beaten to death with a blunt instrument. All the heads were taken away, and one body (male) stripped naked. The body of another Naga (a woman) was found speared to death at the mouth of the Babonkhall, on the line of the Looshais' retreat. This leaves two Nagas, a young woman and a female child unaccounted for. Kissun Ram's little girl could not be found.

24. During the night of the 27th this body of raiders remained in the neighbourhood of Kissun Ram's *baree*, but there is no trace of their having cooked there. Mr. Daly's party of sepoys and police passed along the road within a short distance of them on their way to Monierkhall during the night apparently unobserved.

25. At about eight in the morning of the 28th, Mr. Daly's rear guard of eight sepoys and a constable with coolies carrying a few days' *russud* and the spare clothes of the sepoys, was attacked at the place where the new road enters the ko jungle south of Nugdigram. From this point to the Rukni the clearance is fully 30 feet wide. The Looshais are said to have been in great force. The sepoys made a stand, and gave time for the constable and coolies to make their escape. Two eye-witnesses, Russa Miyan and Dewan Miyan, of Nugdigram, describe the conduct of the sepoys as most admirable. They fell back step by step overpowered by numbers towards the Sonai River, the direction of which they probably did not know, and there they were, as it were, caught in a trap. Driven down the steep bank of the river they fell an easy prey to the raiders, and were shot or speared close to the water. One naik and five sepoys were killed; two sepoys made their escape. My

informants estimate the loss of the Looshais in killed and wounded at about 25; but every man who fell was at once carried off into the jungle by his companions.

26. On the same day an hour or two later some (10) wood-cutters on the bank of the Rukni, at a place called by Bengallees Hawaitong, a little north of Kullicherra, were surprised by 10 or 12 Looshais going south along the road opened by the expedition of March 1869. The wood-cutters at once swam across the river and gained the opposite bank, where one of their number was wounded by a spear thrown after him. They dispersed in the jungle, and nine of them found their way to Nugdigram during the next day; the wounded man, however, did not make his appearance till the fourth day. Some of them passed near Guzzulghât at evening on the 28th, and were much alarmed by the close proximity of an evidently large body of Looshais going south, who fortunately did not perceive the fugitives. The first party had no spoil; each man was armed, and carried a very small bundle on his back. Subsequent inquiries have shown that the larger party, met by the wood-cutters on the 28th, was the party which attacked the rear guard on the same day.

27. The Government Khedda was in the jungle between the Rukni and Sonai, south of the Poonia Bheel. The Khedda people (350 in number) heard firing in the direction of Monierkhall on the 27th; and as no messenger from Nugdigram came to them on the 28th or 29th, and expected supplies of food did not arrive, a small party left the Khedda to see what had closed the road. After going about four miles they came upon a smouldering fire, and the track of a large body of men who had apparently come from the north along the Khedda path up to this point, and then left it by a new path leading in a south-westerly direction towards Guzzulghât. A little further on they came upon the body of a Naga woman beheaded and scalped, the head being left near the body.

28. From this point to Nugdigram the road showed evident signs of the march of a larger body of men. Pantaloons and other articles belonging to the sepoys were found along the road. At the Bhiter Pooniakhall a large camp was found within a quarter of a mile of the Rukni tea plantation, which, strange to say, escaped untouched. The proceedings of this party of raiders show an utter ignorance of the country in which they were acting. Subsequent inquiries made by scouts show that their path left the Rengtipahar in an easterly direction across the Rukni towards the Bhiter Poonia Bheel by the road made by Mr. Daly last year, then to the north as far as Pooniamukh by the new Khedda path, thence to Nugdigram by the north bank of the Rukni. They returned by the same tract as far as the Bhiter Poonia; then they took the Khedda road down to the mouth of the Babonkhall, and thence by a new tract to the Rukni, where they found the road made by the expedition of 1869 past Havaitong to Kullicherra. I have attached a small sketch to illustrate the route.

29. The loss at Nugdigram amounts to Nagas, four men, two women, one child killed; one woman and one child captured. Bengalees, one woman, two children killed; one child missing. Coolies, one child wounded, one man short; sepoys, six killed, one wounded; total 17 killed, two wounded, three missing.

30. On the morning of the 28th, when the constable who left the stockade the night before came into the station, reporting that men in the stockade were short of ammunition, I had of course not heard of the attack on the Nugdigram rear guard. Major Mitchel and I determined to send on a small party (20 men, I think) with ammunition. This, however, never started, as the news of the attack on the rear guard reached us on the afternoon of the 28th, before the guard was ready to start.

31. On the morning of the 29th I induced a scout to attempt to take a letter to Mr. Daly through Deedarkhoosh, and thence by the east bank of the Sonai to the stockade, informing him of the attack at Nugdigram, and promising to send him supplies, if possible, by the same route. The supplies and ammunition were got ready, and a guard of 20 men was sent off for Deedarkhoosh. On the evening of the 29th a letter was received from Mr. Daly detailing the disaster of the previous day, and reporting that the Looshais were in great force, and still in the garden, after two days' fighting. After relieving the sepoys of the task of guarding the gaol and treasury, and reducing the station guards, there were 148 sepoys available for duty. There were said to be at least 400 Looshais at Monierkhall, and as many at Nugdigram, and we had reason to believe that these bodies were acting together. I knew that there was little difficulty in moving from Nugdigram through the jungle to Claverhouse, Durjumkhall, Silcoori, and Sildubi gardens, so we agreed to send a party of 80 men, with 8 or 10 elephants, which the khedda gomashta was good enough to lend me, thus leaving 68 men for the defence of the station, and to answer any call for assistance from the gardens west of the Nugdigram jungle. The plan was to reach Monierkhal next morning (30th), attack the Looshais with the whole body, which would then have aggregated 150 men, or thereabouts (including the police guard, intended to take provisions *viâ* Deedarkhoosh, which we had halted at Sonaimukh), and to return to Nugdigram or the station by the next evening.

32. But there was great delay in securing the elephants which were loose in the jungle, about four miles from the station, and guddies had to be made. The force was on the point of starting at five on the 30th, when Mr. Daly came in with the news that the Looshais had left Monierkhall and Nugdigram.

33. On

33. On the 29th I received a letter from Mr. Edgar, dated 24th, from Changsil, on the Dullessur, expressing his intention of starting soon for the Sonai. The stores which had been sent to meet him at Looshai Haut returned to Monierkhall on that day. It was, indeed, fortunate that the stores were recalled by Mr. Clementson on the receipt of Mr. Edgar's letter of the 20th January; for had they been at Looshai Haut at the end of January they might have been found by the returning raiders and probably burned, and the boatmen carrying them killed. As it was they came down to Monierkhal just after Mr. Daly's provisions had come to an end.

34. As I believed, on the 1st February that the road was now open to Looshai Haut, as I had good information that the Looshais had left the neighbourhood of Monierkhal on the night of the 28th, I made preparations for sending up provisions to Looshai Haut with some Bengalies with guns, not so much for defensive purposes as to give confidence to the men employed in the boats. I offered a reward to four men who went on ahead of the provisions with a small quantity of *russud* and a letter for Mr. Edgar. They left the station on the 1st of February.

35. The first reinforcement of two companies of the 44th Native Infantry arrived on 3rd February.

36. Asu Miyan Chowdry left Monierkhall on the 5th February with the provisions referred to in paragraph 34.

37. On the 4th February a Muninpooree came down from Poiboi's bazaar, near Tepai Mukh, stating that on the 30th January Ruttun Singh Muntri arrived from Kholel, and stated that about the 19th or 20th of January Boota's two sons, Dhowton and Rampun, with 400 or 500 men, had attacked a small village near Dollong, and, having killed 12 persons and captured some women, had started in the direction of Monierkhall by the road of the expedition of 1869. He added that Ruttun Singh was afraid to come into Cachar with such unwelcome intelligence.

38. On the 8th February, Munnoo Singh, who had left Mr. Edgar at Punchangkai, on the 31st January, to look for provisions, came into the station with the following story:— He said Mr. Edgar had reached the Sonai some distance above Looshai Haut, on the 31st January, with Rowa, Sookpilal's Muntri, and others. Munnoo was sent to see whether the *russud* expected had arrived at Looshai Haut. On his arrival there on the same day, he met five Looshais crossing to the westwards, whom he recognised as subjects of Vonolel, one of whom had something like human heads in a basket. They advised him to make the best of his way to Cachar, for they were in advance of their chief, who was returning from Cachar. He told them that he was looking for Mr. Edgar's provisions, on which the Looshais replied that they had stopped the provisions. Munnoo got down as far as Hatheekhall, which he reached on 3rd February. Here he met my scouts with my letter of 1st February, and four boats with provisions. They stayed there for a night, and they all turned back and went south on the 4th, reaching Kullicherra on the 5th. In the evening they went up a short distance and saw fires, which they believed to be those of Looshais. Once more they turned back, and met Asu Miyan with his 28 boats of provisions, just below Kullicherra. They heard three guns fired in the direction of Kullicherra, and all turned back for Monierkhall, which they reached on the 7th.

39. General Bourchier, who had arrived a day or two before, then sent up a guard to Monierkhall, under Captain Lightfoot, to escort the provisions which Asu Miyan Chowdry had not been able to take up. Captain Lightfoot started from Silchar on the 8th.

40. On the 10th, Lieutenant Bourne was sent up the Sonai to follow Captain Lightfoot.

41. On the 11th, a messenger reached the station with a report from Rajkissun Dutt, who had left Mr. Edgar at Punchunkyai, on the 6th February, with five constables, six coolies, a Kookie named Raipa, and a *peada* on rafts. He stated that Mr. Edgar's camp of 1869-70 had been burned, and that he saw many marks of footsteps and cooking. However, he came on, and arrived at Monierkhall on the 10th. He said that Mr. Edgar's party had received some rice from Darmaungpi Raja, and had been promised some more. Rajkissen met Captain Lightfoot and his provisions at Monierkhall.

42. Captain Lightfoot left Monierkhall on the 10th, with Asu Miyan Chowdry and Sham Singh as guides and interpreters.

43. On the 18th February, we heard Captain Lightfoot had reached a point not far north of Looshai Haut on the 14th, and had sent on ahead a letter and some provisions by Sham Singh, Munnipooree. They soon came back with information that a red flag was stuck up in the river a little above them. This was interpreted as a hostile signal. After consulting Asu Miyan and others, Captain Lightfoot decided on returning to Silghur, which he reached on the 16th, having met Lieutenant Bourne, who had followed him. On the 17th, Ruipa Muntri went on with four Meekir volunteers to take a letter to Mr. Edgar in consideration of a reward. On their way they met two policemen with coolies bringing a letter from Mr. Edgar, dated 15th February, from the same place, and reporting the road clear. Captain Lightfoot then went on with the provisions, and reached Mr. Edgar on the 22nd February. Mr. Edgar's letter reached the station on the 19th.

44. On the morning of the 23rd February, at 6.30 a.m., an attack was made on the coolie lines at Jhalnacherra by a party of Looshais, said to be about 120 in number, who crossed the river from the west. A patrol of one head constable and four constables was in the lines at the time; they at once fired on the raiders and repulsed them, but not until the Looshais had killed four persons and wounded three. The guard, who were in the stockade several hundred yards from the lines, came up, hearing the noise of firing. I have sent copies of the reports on this attack by Messrs. Metcalfe and Daly, in a separate cover.

45. Messrs. Metcalfe and Savi, with great energy and promptness, with about 26 policemen collected from the gardens which they passed through, arrived at Jhalnacherra on the evening of the 24th. Mr. Metcalfe next day took a party to find out the track by which the raiders returned; he found it led to the Chuttercherra ridge, and showed signs of a hasty retreat.

46. I have, in this report, only given a mere outline of those events which have been fully reported before in my letters, Nos. 83 of 27th, and 88 of 28th January, and No. 111 of 1st February, and in Mr. Metcalfe's letter, No. 29 of 2nd March 1871, and Mr. Daly's, No. 68 of 6th March, forwarded to you with my memorandum, Nos. 230 and 231 of 10th March, respectively. I have described at greater length the first attack on Monierkhall and that on Nugdigram, which have not been fully described before.

47. Mr. Metcalfe has already been thanked by the Government of Bengal for his conduct after the raids at Ainarkhall and Alexanderpore. He showed the same courageous energy and judgment on hearing of the attack on Jhalnacherra, in hurrying to the spot and afterwards following up the track of the retreating party. Mr. Savi, too, deserves great credit for the way in which he hurried on police reinforcements on both occasions. Mr. Daly's report shows how admirably the patrol at the Jhalnacherra lines behaved in the face of vastly superior force. I think the men, whose names are marginally noted, deserve some substantial reward for their conduct in this matter.

Ram Bhadra Singh, head constable; Golab Singh; Dhani Ram; Man Bir Mistry and Sanka Bir, constables

48. I should like to be allowed to give a reward of 50 rupees to each of two Cabulee fruit-sellers who assisted Messrs. Bagshawe and Cooke in their very spirited defence of Kutlicherra.

49. It is due to the experience and energy of Baboo Ram Ruttun Enda, the Nazir of the Collectorate, that there was no lack of carriage and supplies for the large number of police and troops in the district. It is unnecessary to add anything to what has been written before as to the merits of this useful and faithful servant of Government.

50. Major Mitchel, of the 4th Native Infantry, gave me every possible assistance with the troops at his disposal in the most ready and courteous manner.

51. I cannot close this letter without alluding once more to the gallant conduct of Messrs. Eglington and Bagshawe. Mr. Eglington has already received the well-earned thanks of Government for his services at Monierkhall, and Mr. Bagshawe's defence of the bungalow at Kutlicherra, on two successive days of attack, is a thing that every Englishman may well be proud of. In 1869, after the raids at Nowarbund and Monierkhall, he set an example of cool courage to the whole of the neighbouring gardens; and so, too, this year he remained with his wife and children at Kutlicherra, and when the time came, when he held his safety and that of his family in his own hands, when he had no one to whom he could look for help, he acquitted himself nobly and successfully.

52. I have not as yet been able to get the names of the persons missing from Kutlicherra and Alexandrapore, but I will send them as soon as I receive them.

53. I have appended notes on one or two points not discussed in the body of this letter.

Appendix No. I.

(1.)—Loss at Cachari Village at *Ainarkhall*, attacked January 23rd.

Killed.

Men - - - - -	9	Boys - - - - -	8
Women - - - -	5	Girls - - - - -	3

Missing.

Men -	3	Manick Ram Karna Singh Donanjoy	Girls -	16	Nanadi (1) Desoldi Sirota Nanadi (2) Nairungdi Jonungdi Khoolardi Rajjadi Potaidi (2) Moola Nanadi (3) Baboodi Sunamati Jonamati Gaidoodoe Doomdoodee
Women	10	Nowjingdi Otika Waroongdi Nogridi Potaidi (1) Laridi Joshaidi Khoombardi Laojuydi Khairungdi			
Boys	8	Ramdhun Nanadow Bhagiamati Bhodra Sing Ote Cachari Oolem Luardow Pitambur			

(2.)—Killed and Missing at *Kutlicherra* and *Alexandrapore* to be sent afterwards.

(3.)—Loss at *Monierkhall*.

Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.
	First Day.	
None.	Two sepoys. Two police. One cooly-jemadar.	None.
	Second Day.	
Two sepoys. Four police.	One havildar, 4th Native Infantry.	One coolie, Makhoo Khan.

(4.)—Loss at *Nugdigram*.

Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.
	First Day.	
Nagas— Four men. One woman. One child.	One coolie child.	Two Naga women and one girl. One Bengali girl, Roshi Doomni, aged 5 years. One of the Naga women was afterwards found killed.
Bengali— One woman. Two children. One coolie man.		
	Second Day.	
Six sepoys	One sepoy.	None.

(5.)—Loss at *Jhalnacherra*.

Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.
Two men. One woman One female child.	One man. Two women.	None.

(signed) *O. G. R. MacWilliam*,
Officiating Deputy Commissioner.

Appendix II.

Note on the alleged presence of *Rutton Singh* and mutineers at *Monierkhall*.

Mr. Eglington states that he saw a man amongst the Looshais with a red *pugree*. He believes this man was a coolie; it did not strike him at the time that it might be Rutton Singh, whom he recognises; but when asked afterwards he says it might have been him, for he did not examine the raider's appearance narrowly. Mr. Grace, the manager of Silcoori, general manager of Monierkhall, informs me that none of the coolies identified the man as Rutton Singh.

On the second day of the attack at Monierkhall, Mr. Daly wished the sepoys of the 4th Native Infantry to take off their red coats before leaving the stockade for a sortie. The havildar objected to do this, saying, "Sahib, there are bhagees among the Looshais who are afraid of red coats." On questioning the sepoys, I find that their only ground for supposing that there were mutineers among the Looshais was, that during the fight on the first day, a man addressed a sepoy in Hindustani, and that they exchanged abusive epithets in that language.

They then most likely heard from the police the well-known tradition in the district that a few of the 34th, who mutinied at Chittagong, are still alive and with the Looshais.

As to Rutton Singh having been at Monierkhall on the 27th, I think it is almost impossible. He was at Poiboi's bazaar, near the mouth of the Tipai, on the 30th January at noon. Such a journey might be possible to a Kookie, but not to a man of Rutton Singh's race and education.

(signed) *O. G. R. MacWilliam*,
Officiating Deputy Commissioner.

Appendix III.

Statements of Woodcutters at *Hawaitong*.

I examined eight of the ten men who met the retreating Looshais at Hawaitong, and afterwards at Guzzulghât on the 28th January. Amongst them was the wounded man.

There was no inconsistency in their statements. I append those of Krishna Ram, the wounded man, and Konok Ram, the most intelligent of the party.

(signed) *O. G. R. MacWilliam*,
Officiating Deputy Commissioner.

The Statement of *Krishna Ram Patnai*, son of *Gonai*, resident of *Nugdigram*, aged 35, woodcutter.

In *Magh*, I and Govind, and Konok, and Bijoy, Anai, Surbai, Bani Ram, Madab Asa Ram, Jodu Mahout went up the Rukni to cut wood.

One day, at about one *prohor* of the day, I was eating my dinner with them on the west side of the Rukni at Hawaitong, between Guzzulghât and Kullicherra, nearer the latter, ten Kookies, with some bundles tied up on their backs, came from the North by an elephant path. They gave an exclamation of surprise. They had only spears and *daos*. We saw them first about 40 cubits off. They were in cane jungle. The men who were with me swam across the river at once. About four spears were thrown, one of which passed through my right thigh, close to the groin, from behind. I was struck when I was at the other side of the river. Then I bolted through the jungle and got to Nugdigram. I crossed the Rukni a second time near the road. I was four days on. I also received a wound in the face from a spear.

We

We were a month and one day at Hawaitong. They did not come by the same road or we should have seen them. I arrived at Nugdigram on Tuesday, so we were attacked at one *prohor* on Saturday. The bundles were very small, and did not appear to be like loot, but only necessaries for journey. They were evidently in great spirits. They had coats made of kesh cloth, white, half way down the thigh. They all had *pugries*. I saw no guns.

(signed) *O. G. R. MacWilliam,*
Officiating Deputy Commissioner.

Konok Ram Patnai, son of *Debai Patnai,* resident of *Rangirghât.*

It was a little more than half *prohor*. I was eating with nine others. Suddenly 10 or 12 Kookies came out from the mouth of a path in a southerly direction. They shouted, and we crossed the river swimming. Then, from the other side, I saw that they were joined by a lot more on the other side. Their noise was very great. They had only small bundles (havresacks). They all had *daos* and spears. I saw only one or two guns. They took away our clothes and finished our dinner for us. I got out at Nugdigram on Sunday (next day,) at half *prohor* before evening, and found the village deserted. I passed Guzzulghât at evening on Saturday, and heard the noise of Kookies there. I was on west bank of the river, so were they. I heard their noise, but I did not see them. It was a little before evening. Bani Ram was with me, and Soda Ram and Bijoy. We escaped together.

(signed) *O. G. R. MacWilliam,*
Officiating Deputy Commissioner.

From *H. Le Poer Wynne,* Esq., Under Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Political Department; No. 710 P, dated Fort William, the 5th April 1871.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of the letter from your office, No. 1373, dated the 27th March 1871, submitting copy of the Officiating Deputy Commissioner of Cachar's general report on the late Looshai raids in that district, and of the orders of the Lieutenant Governor thereon.

2. I am to request that a copy of the telegram from Chittagong, referred to in paragraph 2 of Mr. MacWilliam's letter, No. 233, dated 11th March 1871, may be submitted, and that Mr. MacWilliam be asked to explain, for the information of the Government of India, why he did not report—and that by telegram for early orders—the warning he received on the 15th January 1871 from Mr. Edgar, to the effect that the Howlongs were likely to attack Sylhet.

3. As it appears that this warning was passed on to the magistrate of Sylhet, I am to report that that office may be asked to report what action, as precautionary measures, he took on its receipt.

From *Captain T. H. Lewin,* Deputy Commissioner, Chittagong Hill Tracts, to the Commissioner of Chittagong; No. 106, dated Rangamutiee, 9 March 1871.

With reference to your memoranda, No. 388, of the 1st of March 1871, and No. 460 of the 6th instant, forwarding, for report, papers, &c., on the subject of the identity of the perpetrators of the late Cachar raids, I have the honour to report that it seems clear, from the statement of the escaped captive Shabitri Culini (which seems to me to be substantially true), that the raiders are men of the Looshai tribe, but of what particular clan it is difficult to say. From reasons stated in former correspondence, I do not think that Rutton Pooeea has been concerned in the raid; and from inquiries I have made I am satisfied that neither the Reang Tipperahs nor any of our own subsidiary tribes have had anything to do with the matter. I have not obtained any fresh information on the subject since writing you my last letter, No. 76, of the 21st ultimo, but I expect in a week's time to obtain definite confirmation of the identificatory statements which have been already submitted to you.

2. I append hereto my remarks on the deposition of the escaped captive Shabitri Culini, as requested in your memorandum No. 388, under acknowledgment.

No. 433, dated Chittagong, 16 March 1871.

Endorsed by the Personal Assistant to Commissioner.

Copy, with copy of Enclosure, forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal Judicial Department, with reference to his endorsement, Nos. 779 and 904, dated respectively the 21st February and 1st instant.

EXTRACTS from Statements of Shabitri Culini of Alexandrapore Garden.

(1.) They brought back from Kattlichurra three prisoners; one a boy, and two women.

(2.) Of the attacking party on Kattlichurra three men were killed and brought dead by their companions. The raiders took the corpses two days' journey into the forest, and then, severing their heads from their bodies, threw the remains into different spots in the forest.

(3.) They first placed fire in the mouths of the corpses and then disposed of them.

(4.) As they carried us off prisoners, the raiders drove us along uttering the words "droo-droo."

(5.) The first day of our journey no prisoner was killed, but the second day Mr. Seller's table servant's wife was killed by the raiders; the third day the Looshais shot Chatta Mitta because, owing to his sufferings from tight bands, he requested himself that they would kill him.

(6.) The Looshais during the night time kept us prisoners tied by both hands, and in the day they took us along by a rope tied to our left hand.

(7.) At mid-day of each day the Looshais fed Mr. Winchester's child with an egg.

(8.) The Looshais wore *coortas* long and loose down to the thigh, and coloured black from smoke. The *coortas* were short-sleeved. They had cloth *cummerbunds* on round the waist, and no head clothes or *pugrees*. They had each a bag suspended at their backs with tie across the forehead, and the bags were similar to a fakir's bag. They had no under-clothes on, but were naked. Their guns were single-barrelled, and had bayonets. * * * The Looshais were short men, and there were no Deswalis, or up-country men, among them. * * * They had no shoes on their feet: They had no ornaments on either throats, hands, or feet.

They had no goat's hair suspended round their necks. Their powder flasks were made out of buffalo horn. They wore long hair down to their waists, and had it tied in a knot on the top of their heads; they let their hair down when they bathed. They cooked in earthen bowls very thick in material, and which they had brought from their own country, and they cooked *dol* inside bamboo *chungas*.

REMARKS by Deputy Commissioner, Chittagong-Hill Tracts.

(1.) The object of all Looshai raids is to obtain, first, heads; second, female slaves or boys who are young enough to be adopted into and strengthen the clan.

(2.) The Looshais always carry off their dead in this manner. It is considered the acme of disgrace should the heads of any of their clan remain in the possession of the enemy. The custom of carrying off the heads of their own slain is peculiar to the Looshai tribe only, and is not observed by men of other clans.

(3.) All dead bodies among the Looshais are dried over a slow fire previous to burying. Fire, therefore, occupies a place in their funeral rites.

(4.) In the Looshai tongue "kul-droo"—the first syllable short, the last accentuated—means "go; go on." "Hongro" means "come;" the last syllable, "ro," is an affix of the imperative mood.

(5.) See page 107, "The Hill Tracts of Chittagong," printed by Government at Bengal Printing Company, Calcutta, for a parallel account as to mode of disposing of troublesome captives.

(6.) When the Looshais capture hill people the rope is passed through the lobe of the ear—the hill tribes wearing enormous earrings; but Bengallee captives, who have escaped from the Kookies, state that they were bound and carried away exactly as is here described.

(7.) The Looshais eat at 6 a.m., at mid day and at nightfall.

(8.) The Looshais wear short *coortas* as described, but these garments are sleeveless. They wear over their *coortas* thick clothes or mantles of home-spun, and when about to run, fight, or make any physical exertion, they gird these mantles tightly round their waists after the fashion of a *cummerbund*. Every man carries slung on his shoulder a small bag or havresack of the sort described. Should this bag be weighty with plunder, the strap of the bag would be passed over the forehead, that being their manner of carrying all heavy weights. They wear nothing in the shape of a *dhotee* or waist cloth round their loins. I have never heard of any Looshai gun having a bayonet attached, unless they were guns which had been taken by them in their raids. They are short in stature, and habitually go barefooted when going to fight; no ornaments are worn by them. The powder flasks of the Looshais are made of the horn of the *gazelle*, or wild ox. A certain number of families among the Looshai wear their hair bound in a lofty knot over the forehead; of these are the Bunjoogee and Lunka clan, of whom there are a good many among the Looshais. The men of the Howlong and Syloo clans use earthen cooking pots of thick material as described

9. "The

described, which they make in their own villages; these pots must have been left in the half-way house, as they would not carry them on the war path.

(9.) "The road we were taken lay south along the top of the hill range for seven days, and we always followed the hill tops."

(9.) This is the usual mode of Looshai travelling in the hills.

(10.) On the fourth day's journey we came upon some four huts erected under the hill on which the path ran. They were made of bamboos and thatched with plaintain trees and had *machans* inside.

(10.) The huts as described are used in a war party when they have a long distance to go. No Looshai, save a chief, sleeps on a *machan*.

(11.) The raiders smoked tobacco rolled into cheroots.

(11.) This custom does not exist among Looshai tribes known on this side; all of them smoke tobacco out of bamboo pipes.

(signed) *T. H. Lewin*, Captain,
Deputy Commissioner.

From Colonel *H. Lewis*, Officiating Inspector General of Ordnance and Magazines, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

No. 1014 E, dated Fort William, the 24th March 1871.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge your No. 1033, dated 21st March 1871, directing me to report, for the information of the Government of India, why there were no percussion caps in the magazine at Dacca.

2. In reply, I have to state that there is no *ordnance* magazine at Dacca, and that this department has nothing to do with the ammunition kept in magazines, which are in charge of the Police Department.

3. It is, I conclude, the duty of officers of police to keep up their prescribed proportion of ammunition, and when indents for ammunition required by the Police Department are submitted to this office, they are passed in accordance with regulations; but no indent for caps for the use of the police at Dacca has been received.

From *C. U. Aitchison*, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Political Department.

No. 753 P, dated Simla, the 22nd April 1871.

WITH reference to your letter dated the 9th of March 1871, No. 1044, relative to the raids by the Looshais in Cachar, Sylhet, and Hill Tipperah, I am directed by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General in Council to forward a copy of a correspondence as noted on the margin, from which you will perceive that the failure to have a supply of percussion caps in the magazine at Dacca, as mentioned by the officiating magistrate of that place in his letter No. 334, dated 3rd March 1871, rested not with the military, but with police authorities.

To Military Department, No. 554P, dated 17th March 1871.
From ditto, ditto, No. 56, dated 3rd April 1871.

2. I am to request, therefore, that the police authorities may be called upon to explain why they did not indent for the caps when the supply falls short.

From *F. B. Simson*, Esq., Commissioner of the Dacca Division, to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Political Department.

No. 63, dated Dacca, the 20th March 1871.

IN continuation of my letter No. 42 of the 9th instant, I have the honour to forward herewith the details of Mr. Edgar's march from the Dhullessur to the Sonai, and of his return to Cachar. I suggest that the letter and its enclosures should be printed, and copies sent to the Commissioner of Chittagong and the Collector of Sylhet, as well as to his Excellency the Commander in Chief, who is anxious to obtain every scrap of information as to these hill tribes and their localities.

From *J. W. Edgar*, Esq., Deputy Commissioner of Cachar, on Special Duty, to the Commissioner of the Dacca Division, No. B., dated Cachar, the 6th March 1871.

In continuation of my letter, No. A., dated 21st January 1871, I have the honour to submit a report of our proceedings from the time we left Changsil on the Dhullessur till our return to Cachar, noticing, in the order in which I heard them, the accounts received from Looshais of the outrages on our territory and Munnipoor, and showing how far the statements made to me as to the perpetrators of these outrages have been corroborated by independent testimony. I shall, in a separate report, give some account of the geographical position and internal relations of the clans about which I have got reliable information, and shall attempt to describe the course of action which seems to me the best to be adopted in view of the recent raids.

2. On the 17th January I had written to Cachar to direct that supplies should be sent by boat up the Sonai to meet us at Looshai Bazaar. As we could not take more than 12 days' provisions with us, and boats frequently take 13 days from Silchar to Bazaar Ghât, I did not think it safe to leave Changsil until I had heard that my letter had been received, and that some boats had been sent off. I got this intelligence on the 25th, and on the 26th we started for the Sonai.

3. On that morning two elderly men from Mehtong's village came in, and said that they had been directed to accompany us across to the Sonai. We had besides a muntrie from Pibuk, and one from Sookpilal with us. We went during that day in a south-east direction for some miles over a capital path, until we got to the top of a pretty high hill situated some way to the south-east of our last year's camp of Beparee Bazaar. East of us, across a valley about three miles off, we could see the village of Mehtong on a steep hill, but much lower than our position. Behind rose the steep bare side of Sukkur Moe (the horse's mouth), a high precipitous peak on the Nungvai range. The position of this peak is shown incorrectly in all the maps. During our day's march we found several well-worn paths branching off from the main route. One of these led, as we were told, to Beparee Bazaar, and from there, of course, to Sookpilal's village. Another would take one by a somewhat circuitous way to the village of Lalchung; another went to Tonpilal's village. Soon after we arrived in camp, the head man of Mehtong came over with some armed men to see, as he said, that we did not want for anything. He spent that night in camp.

4. Next morning, after going a little way south, we descended the east face of the hill to the jooms. As we got opposite the village we could see a number of men in it, and some fired shots in the air. After we had passed the village we reached a very pretty joom, from which we had a good view of much of the country north and south of us. Here I began to see that all previous representation of the direction of the ranges was erroneous, an opinion fully borne out by all; saw subsequently, while we were going down the jooms, on one side, a troop of women and children had appeared out of jungles on the other, and we found them in the joom houses. They seemed to be very friendly, and we spent some time talking to them. We then went on for some way to the north-east, along uneven ground, till we came to a stream with a salt spring flowing into it. There were some men working there, but we were told that the manufacture had decreased considerably since the trade in rubber had commenced. From this place we went, at first, along a well-worn level path, and afterwards up the bed of a stream, till we reached our halting place early in the afternoon. Our coolies were very heavily laden, and our marches were consequently unusually short, in order to let the rear guard get up in good time.

5. Next day our road was almost entirely up hill, the direction still being to the north-east, till we got to the site of the village of Morah or Mullah, burned by Colonel Lister in 1849–50. This is a hill about 3,500 feet high, perfectly cleared from heavy jungle, so that we could see all the country round. On one side was the valley of the Dhullessur, on the other the valleys of the Sonai; south-west, a high hill was pointed out as Ryek Thlang, the site of Sookpilal's village. Many miles further, in the same direction, was a still higher hill, on which the village of Savoong, the chief of the Syloos, was said to be situated. South of us, beyond Sukkur Moe, we could see Dar Thlang and Moti Thlang, where are the villages of Pibuk, Sookpilal's mother, and of his sister Ruttungpi. Further south, the hills inhabited by the Howlongs were pointed out to us, and east of them villages said to belong to Pois. North of these, and a little to the north-east of the Howlongs, we were shown hills that were said to belong to Bhoota. Further east, in the far distance, was the country of Vonolel and his sons; north and north-west of which we saw the ranges of Poiboi, Vonpilal, and Impanee. Due north of us was the great round peak of Nisapui, which shut out from our view Lang Mohr, the hill identified by Major Macdonald with peak Z. of the Great Trigonometrical Survey.

6. We halted for the night at this place, and next day, after a little marching, we came upon a large party of Looshais cutting a new path through the jungle. The head men of the village of Dharmangpi, who had met us a little before, proposed that we should take this path. I said it was too steep, and we continued on the old route, which in a very short time took us right up to the village. From here we sent on our coolies to get ready our camp, and remained for some hours in a shady grove outside, surrounded by men, women,

women, and children. As I passed by the village, I remarked several guns in almost every house that I went near, and I think that many of them must have belonged to other villages, for Dharmangpi's is a poor village, and not likely to have the number I saw.

After we left, we went over the shoulder of Nisapui, and halted in a cleared joom. We had not been long there when we were followed by a crowd of women and children. After these left, I remarked that there were many armed men in the neighbourhood of the camp. I asked the muntries about them; they said some were men who had been hunting, some had been sent to the eastern people and were now returning, and that some had come down with us. Next day we met many more along the path as we went down. I was puzzled at this at the time, for I saw that their presence was connected with us, and it was quite evident, from the way in which they were placed, that they could not have contemplated either attacking us, or defending their village from us, in case we had attempted to attack it. Afterwards, when I knew what had happened in Cachar, I began to think that these men had been posted to protect us if we should happen to be in danger.

7. *Next day we went down some steep descents to the Sonai, which we reached at a place called Punchangkai. This was on the 30th.* I thought this a suitable place for our permanent camp, and finding that boats could come up, resolved to halt there. Next morning I sent down a Munipooree trader who was with me, one constable, and two coolies, to order our boats up from Looshai Bazaar, and sent two of the Looshais, who had come with us, to announce my arrival to the eastern villages. The Munipooree messenger did not return. It was he who took into Cachar the story about meeting five of Vonolel's people carrying heads. The Looshais came back in three days. They said that Vantang, son of Bhoota, had burned a village of Horatti Kookies, which I had seen two years ago, a few miles to the north-west of Moizal; that the whole of the eastern villages were in confusion, and that Morahs, Impanee's muntrie, who had gone south to make inquiries, would come to me in a day or two, and tell me everything. We now began to get uneasy about the non-appearance of our supplies.

8. On the 4th February we told some Looshais, who were going towards the village of Dharmangpi, that we should like to buy some rice, as we were very near the end of our supplies.

Next day Mr. Burland went down to Looshai Bazaar by a path along the hills to the east of the Sonai. He found that our hut of the previous year had been burned, and some of our men reported that they saw marks of blood there, and the remains of a kind of litter which had been tied with cane that grows only in the plains. Our position now looked very nasty. Our supplies were nearly consumed, so that if we attempted to make our way into Cachar overland, which I consider would have been the only safe way in cases of opposition, we should have run a risk of something like starvation. On the other hand, the delay in the arrival of our boats, the mysterious and shadowy rumours flying about, the absence of all the representatives of the eastern villages, and, above all, the suspicious circumstances reported from Looshai Bazaar, seemed to indicate as much risk in staying as in going. Fortunately, however, on that day, while Mr. Burland was away, people had come in from Dharmangpi bringing rice, edible roots, fowls for our table, which were very welcome, as all our private supplies were fast disappearing, and, I think, a small pig. The Looshais refused to take any payment for these things, and promised to bring more. I then resolved to remain where I was for the present, to send fresh messengers down the river, to get all the rice I could from Dharmangpi, to save as much of this as we could, so as to accumulate enough to take us down in case of an emergency, and meantime to find out all I could about the state of things in the east.

9. I therefore, on the morning of the 6th, sent Rajkissen, a reliable man, with five constables and some coolies, down the river on rafts, while Rowa, Sookpilal's muntrie, went to the villages of Dallong and Kholel on the 7th. I also sent up 10 rupees to Dharmangpi, with a message to say, that as the village has taken no payment for the things sent, I gave the money *pour boire.* It was returned next day with another present of rice, and a message to the effect that they could take nothing in return for what the village gave, but that henceforth individuals would come in and trade regularly in rice and other articles of food. Next day considerable quantities came in, and were bought by us. At first the Looshais took in exchange for their rice, red cloth, brass vessels, &c., but our stock of such things was quickly exhausted, and then we persuaded them to take money. But the rupees were not supposed to be accepted as final payment. They were looked upon as tokens that so much cloth, or some particular brass vessel, was owed by us to the holder. Some people preferred leaving their names and the amount due to them written in a book to the trouble and risk of taking away money. Our debts were to be paid on the arrival of our boats.

In this way we got considerable quantities of rice, and were able to lay some up for our return journey. Our coolies also poisoned the stream with the bark of a tree, which, when pounded and thrown into the water, had an intoxicating effect on the fish. We got several maunds in this way, which our people dried over wood fires. We were thus able to keep off anything like absolute privation. But at one time we feared that we should suffer from want of salt. There was a scarcity of this article in Dharmangpi's village, and though they gave us what they could spare, the supply was still insufficient. But when our coolies heard this, they made very light of the want. "Why," said one, "anyone make salt," and they burned split bamboos to ashes, which they collected in a bamboo tube with a small hole in the bottom. This was then filled with water which was allowed to drain through the hole into a pan placed below. The water when evaporated left a deposit of

salt which formed a substitute, though not a pleasant one, for common salt. Every day we had parties of coolies in the jungle searching for edible roots, leaves, &c., which the forest supplied in great quantity and variety.

10. Meantime, Mr. Burland did what he could to make our camp safe from a sudden attack, by clearing the jungle round it, and piling up the cut bamboos about breast high on the sides exposed to attack, in this way forming a barrier which could not be crossed without cutting the bamboos. Of course this made a surprise impossible.

On the 10th I sent a head constable and five men down the river, with directions to go as far as they could that day and return the next, carefully noting all traces observed along the bank. They came back late on the night of the 11th, and reported that they had been a considerable way down the stream without observing anything suspicious, and that they had put a mark on a bamboo to show how far they had gone. This was the mark which frightened the scouts who were with Captain Lightfoot.

11. On the morning of the 11th, Morah, a muntrie of Dallong, the village of Impanee, Vonpilal's mother, came in with several people of his village. They said that they had not come in before, because they had gone to the village of Lalboorah, son of Vonolel, to get back, if possible, 13 captives who had been taken from Tangtiloon, the Hratti village, which, as mentioned above, had been burned by Vantang, son of Bheeta. He said that he had succeeded in recovering three, and that 10 were still kept by Lalboorah and Vantang, who were represented as being closely allied.

This story seemed probable, as a few days before some of the Hrattis, who had escaped from the village, had passed through our camp with a few things which they had saved from the raiders. They were going to seek a temporary asylum in Dharmangpi's village. They told us that they had lost 21 killed, and 13 persons, who, they thought, had been taken to Vonolel's village.

12. While we were talking over all this and similar things with Impanee's people, I could see from their manner that there was something else which they had scarcely courage to tell, but at last they informed us that the rumours which we had heard were true; that an attack had been made on Cachar, and that three British subjects were captives in Lalboorah's village. During that day and next we learned much more from them, and by degrees we were able, by comparing various bits of information, learned, as was stated, from the people of Lalboorah's village, to put together a tolerably intelligible account of what happened. Many points, however, were obscure, and much was incorrect, as I have learned since my return; but, on the whole, the account is not without value. I shall give it nearly as I wrote it down in my diary at the time, merely adding some further information which I acquired afterwards while still at Punchangkai.

13. Lalboorah, son of Vonolel, and Tangdong his cousin, led a party of about 400 men against Cachar towards the end of January. This was the same party about which I had received information while at Chandsil, but my informants were in error in saying that it was led by Lenkom. The latter, who is Lalboorah's brother, led a party which is said to have destroyed some villages in Munnipore. The villages on the Sonai tried to turn the raiding party back, but it broke into two, and one party under Tangdong crossed the Sonai, and made for a hill on the Rengtipahar range, with the intention of attacking Nowarbund and some gardens south of the Chatla. They, however, failed to get the path along the top of the range, and got into the low land lying on either side of the Rukni. They seem to have found much difficulty in getting along through this, and mention is frequently made of the way in which their legs and bodies were torn by thorns as they pushed through the dense canebrakes. At least they fell in with a newly cut path, along which they went until they came to clearances near the mouth of the Rukni. Here they got six prisoners, but while they were carrying them off, elephants came up and soldiers to kill them. They were forced to let go three of their captives, and they made off with three, two Naga girls and a man. They then thought it dangerous to remain any longer, and they made for Bongkong, where they were joined by Lalboorah returning from Monierkhall.

14. The party of the latter had found the bungalow and coolie lines deserted, and were met with a heavy fire from the stockade. They attempted to plunder some boats filled with rice which were at the ghât, but were prevented by the guard, which also drove them from the bungalow. They talk of a gun in the stockade which did great execution, and seems to have frightened them much. While the main body was attacking the Monierkhall stockade, another party got to a new garden, which they also found deserted: here, however, they got some plunder. My informants say that they were shown, in Lalboorah's village, a gong, several hoes, and three boxes of papers, said to have been taken there. They were going to set fire to the bungalow and lines, and seem to have got frightened, and retired to Monierkhall.

Next day they seem to have made another attack on the stockade, but were apparently repulsed, after which the guard rushed out and fired at them as they were making their retreat into the jungle. Some of the Looshais, however, choosing what they call a good place, waited till they got the troops well within range and then fired a volley, which killed five men. Upon this they say the troops fell back, and the Looshais rushed upon the bodies to get their heads and weapons, which they secured at least partially. Then Lalboorah said that they could do no more, they therefore buried as many of their dead as they could find and went off to Bongkong. Next day they went to Lining Thlang, where some

some of their wounded died; another died at Bazaar Ghât, which they reached two days after, and some more died in the village. The total loss they put down at 57 killed in the raid or dead since of their wounds, besides many wounded but still alive. On their return they found that Kamhow, chief of Mollehem, had taken advantage of their absence to attack Tangdong's village, which he burned after killing many people, and taking many prisoners, among whom was the wife of Tangdong.

15. It is evident that the above story is a confused and inaccurate account of the attacks on Nugdigram and Monierkhall. Of course we could not expect accuracy of detail from people who professedly were not eye-witnesses, and who allege that the head people of Lalboorah's village attempted to conceal the real facts from them. But there are two points on which their evidence is important, if true; the number of the dead, and the identification of the villages to which the raiders belonged. All the Looshais whom we saw agreed in stating that the loss was over 50, and all who pretended to give an exact number put it at 57; and this came to us not only directly from the people who said they had been to the village, but in a roundabout way from traders who said the report had reached their villages. There can be no doubt that the loss was heavy.

16. The amount of independent evidence in corroboration of the charge against Lalboorah and Tangdong is very great. Munnoo Sing, the trader whom I sent down on the 31st, arrived in the station on the 8th. He stated that on his arrival at Bazaar Ghât on the 31st, he met five of Vonolel's Looshais, one of whom had some heads in a basket. They told him that their chief was coming down the hill and would kill him if he was found there. The constable who was with Munnoo Sing says, that he met five Looshais with blood-stained baskets, in one of which was something like heads. There can be no reasonable doubt that these men belonged to the raiding party, and I can see no reason not to believe Munnoo Sing's identification of them. He has for many years traded on the Sonai; he knows all the people living in its neighbourhood; and he could scarcely be deceived about the village to which the people he saw belonged. On the other hand, he could have had no imaginable reason for telling a wilful lie, and could not have known that the accusation against Lalboorah would be made some days later to me. Lalboorah is now the head of the Vonolel's village, consequently he must have been the chief mentioned as coming down the hill.

17. I have been informed by the Quartermaster General, that he heard from Colonel M'Culloch that some time since Kamhow, of Molbhem, sent four heads to the Raja of Munnipore, with a message to the effect that hearing that Vonolel's son had taken all his fighting men for a raid in the west, he, with his Soktés, had attacked and destroyed the Looshai village, killing many people, and carrying off 300 prisoners. Now Tangdong's village is frequently described as one of Vonolel's, and he is often called the son of that chief, though really his nephew. It can be shown that if he committed a raid on the west, it must have been in the direction of either Cachar or Tipperah. The story heard by Colonel M'Culloch, therefore, may be considered fully to corroborate so much of what I heard as related to Tangdong. But this is not all; a Munnipooree trader, who has just returned from Tipai Mukh, where he has been among the people of Poiboi, another nephew of Vonolel, states that he heard there of the raid on Monierkhall made by Lalboorah and Tangdong, and a very inaccurate version of the attack on the latter by Kamhow, who was said to have carried off 106 prisoners. The Looshais said that Poiboi was very much annoyed at the conduct of Lalboorah and Tangdong. But such assurances are a matter of course, and not of much value by themselves. The statement that Lenkow, the brother of Lalboorah, attacked Munnipore villages, has been confirmed by the Political Agent.

18. There is, therefore, independent evidence in corroboration of the charge made by the Looshais, who were with me, against each particular chief who, they said, was connected with the raids on Munnipore and East Cachar, and I think that there is considerable reason to believe that no other chief was directly connected with them. When I first heard of the raids, however, all this was of course unknown to me. I suspected that the villages on the Sonai might have had more to do with the outrages than they acknowledged, and I thought that the safest, as well as the worthiest course for me was not to conceal that suspicion. I talked the matter over with Mr. Burland, who took nearly the same view that I did. I then called up the muntries and told them that I suspected all the villages east of the Sonai, because they had not either prevented the raiders passing through their country, or sent warning into the station. They said that they could not have opposed the raiders successfully, for one of their own villages had been cut up by an ally of the chiefs who had attacked Monierkhall, and that they did not send information to the station because Pibuk, Sookpilal's mother, had sent me news of the intended raid. I said that the good conduct of the people on the west of the Sonai was no excuse for their failure to do their duty, and I told them that until they could clear themselves from this suspicion, I should not enter into friendly relations with them. I added that there were three British subjects, on their own showing, kept in captivity in a village east of the Sonai; that until these were accounted for I should not allow any traders up either the Sonai or Barak; and that hereafter it would be of no use for any chief to say that these captives had been sold to the Pais or other eastern tribes, for when the time came we should accept no excuse of this kind. I also refused to receive some muntries from Kholel, the nearest village to those of Vonolel's family, until I was satisfied that its people, and, above all, a Hindustanee named Rutton Sing, who resides in it, had nothing to do with the raid.

19. Upon hearing all this, the Looshais said that they would go away and collect all the chief men of their villages in order to devise some means of forcing Lalboorah to give up his captives and the plunder. I said that they might do what they liked, but that the one thing they should keep in mind was that some time or other the captives must be accounted for. The safety of these captives was the thing I was most anxious then to secure, and I think that I took the best measures in my power to attain that object. I may mention here, though out of chronological order, that several days afterwards some Looshais tried to find out whether I should be willing to make terms with Lalboorah, who was said to be frightened at the loss suffered in the attack on Monierkhall and in Kamhow's raid. I at once refused even to listen to any such proposals unless the captives and plunder were previously restored; then, I said, I might hear what they had to say, but they must distinctly understand that I did not promise that the result would be favourable even then.

20. On the 13th the eastern Looshais went away, saying that they would inform all the villages, which they represented as friendly, of my views. At this time, thinking that possibly a force might have been sent overland to look for us, I sent letters to the villages of Pibuk, Mehtong, and Dharmangpi, recommending them to the protection of the officer in command of the party, if it should reach any of them on their way to where we were.

On the evening of the 15th I determined, after great hesitation, to send two constables and two coolies with a letter to the station. I had already sent down six out of our little force, and it seemed almost folly to reduce it still further under existing circumstances. Besides, I was very unwilling to risk the lives of the little party, for I had heard that there were 10 raiders unaccounted for, and if they were lurking in the jungle they might have overpowered the two constables. However, I could not send more men, and the suspense and anxiety for news were fast becoming unbearable.

21. Meantime each day people came in from Dharmangpi's village with rice, fowls, roots, and now and then a little salt. Some of these brought in a rumour, at first shapeless and intangible, of the capture by Savoong of a European. By degrees we made out that a party of traders from one of Sookpilal's villages had been down to trade among the Syloos, and had there heard that a little girl had been taken captive in the west, but where Dharmangpi's people could not tell; neither did they know by whom the raid had been committed, but they said that they thought the child had been probably carried to the village of Savoong, the great chief of the Syloos.

On the 16th, Tangapa, an old Looshai on whom we placed much reliance, started off for the south to get what information he could about the western raid, and to find out if there were any chance of recovering the little girl.

22. We now felt our position getting more uncomfortable every day. The continued delay in the arrival of news from Cachar made us fear that our messengers might have been attacked and killed, or taken captives on the way down. We knew that this was in the highest degree improbable, but we could not account for the delay on any other hypothesis. If this conjecture had been correct, we should have had, in all probability, to fight our way down if we went by river, in which case the chances were that none of us would have escaped alive. On the other hand, I had not sufficient food for the land route. Besides this, if we had gone down, then the Looshais would have thought that we did so either through fear—an idea I was very unwilling they should conceive—or with the intention of returning in a hostile manner, in which case their best policy would have been to cut us off, if possible, on the way down. We had every reason to believe in the friendliness of the people of Dharmangpi and the other villages on the west. They were bringing in supplies daily, and we felt that, somehow or other, we must, in the long run, get intelligence from Cachar. All these things were in favour of our remaining where we were.

On the other side was the knowledge that Vonolel's tribe was hostile, and that we had thought it necessary to defy in a kind of way the other eastern clans. There was the cruel uncertainty about what had happened in the west, of which we knew scarcely more than that it must have been something very bad. We could not tell what pressure the south-western tribes might be able to bring on Sookpilal to betray us, or whether they were not strong enough to attack and cut us up, or (what I personally feared more) take us prisoners in spite of him. These seemed reasons for attempting to get back to Cachar at any risk.

I confess that I felt at this time considerable anxiety about our position. Fortunately I had three as brave and prudent advisers as a man could wish for in a case of difficulty, in Mr. Burland, Inspector Dost Mahomed, and Baboo Hurry Churn Surma. I talked over our position with them separately, and then resolved to wait for intelligence till the 22nd; and if we got no news by that time, to send for the headmen of the villages round, and inform them that we were going down to find out why intelligence and supplies had not come up, and then get back to Cachar as quickly as possible.

23. On the 20th, however, people from the eastern villages came in. With them was the muntrie of Sookpilal, who had left us on the 7th. He said that he had gone to the village of Lalboorah in the hope of being able to get back the captives; that he had failed in doing so then, but that he thought they would be sent to me if I went across to Tipai Mukh. He said that Lalboorah was anxious to make terms, but I refused, as I mentioned above, even to listen to any overtures while our subjects were in captivity. The muntries said that all the other eastern people were very anxious that I should go through their villages to Tipai Mukh, and that they would do anything I chose to demand in proof of their fidelity.

fidelity. They said that Khalkom, Sookpilal's son, would come to me at any place or time I chose to fix.

24. On the same day, some of the people I had sent to the south came in to say that they had ascertained that the little girl had been taken from a tea garden on the west of the Dhullessur; that the attack had been made by Bhenkui and Sangboong, sons of Lalpitang, a powerful Howlong chief; that the people of the Syloo chief Savoong had been concerned in it; and that it was in all probability organised by Gnurshailon or Mischoilal, son of Lal Chcklee, transported in 1845, a Poitoo chief, who is said to be at present living on the lands of Ali Ahmed Khan, a Sylhet zemindar. Their chief reason for suspecting him was that two of his muntries were known to have gone down to the Chittagong chiefs a short time before they started on the raid. The child was said to be in the village of Bhenkui's mother, the widow of Lalpitang, and to be treated with some kindness. It was also said that there were rumours that the chiefs were debating about sending her either to Rutton Pooeea or to Sookpilal, in order that she might be either taken to Chittagong or brought into Cachar, but it was thought that either chief would be unwilling to have anything to do in the matter lest he should be suspected of complicity in the raid. I sent down at once to Sookpilal to ask him to give any assistance in his power to recover the child, and if he could get her to send her down to Cachar as quickly as possible on a raft.

25. While I was still discussing these points with the Looshais, five messengers from Captain Lightfoot made their appearance. They had left him before he had met my messengers of the 16th. The men from Captain Lightfoot were led by Roipa Muntrie, a Khangum Kookie, who had done me right good service all through this tour. He had gone down with Rajkissen on the 6th, and had now, when Captain Lightfoot had found a difficulty in getting a man to take a letter to me, volunteered to make the attempt with four of my Meekir coolies, who had also gone down on the 6th.

On learning all that had taken place in the district, I resolved to give up my plan of crossing to the Tipai, and to return to Silchar as quickly as possible. I sent information of this to all the villages round, and sent to ask Khalkom to meet me at Looshai Bazaar on the way down.

26. On the 21st Captain Lightfoot arrived with 50 men of the 44th. I learned from him that when he had heard of my safety, and that the Looshais about me were friendly, he had ordered Lieutenant Bourne and some 62 men back to Monierkhall, thinking that the sight of a large party of troops coming up might frighten the Looshais who had shown themselves friendly, and perhaps embarrass me. In this I think Captain Lightfoot showed great judgment; as far at least as my position was concerned, nothing could have been better than the course he had adopted.

On the 22nd I got intelligence that a small party of Howlongs, without the consent of their chiefs, had started on a plundering expedition, and that it was probable they would attack some of the gardens east of the Dhullessur, in South Hylakandy. I sent off news of this to the station at once.

We started for Cachar on the morning of the 24th, and reached Looshai Bazaar during the afternoon.

27. That evening, after dinner, Khalkom came into our camp, and talked with us for a couple of hours. He said that all we had heard about the perpetrators of the eastern raids was correct; but that in addition to Bhenkui and Sangboong there was a third chief, a second Lalboorah, nearly related to Vandool, engaged in the raids on the west. He said that Savoong's people were almost certainly concerned in the raids; but he did not seem so satisfied of the complicity of Gnurshailon as all the people to the west apparently were.

Khalkom said, in reply to our questions, that the chief object of the raids was plunder, and that all other causes were merely secondly. We asked him what turn he thought affairs would now take. He said that he could not say much about the Howlongs or Syloos; but that he thought that Lalboorah was frightened at the position he was in, and that he would be glad to come to terms with us. In case we wished this, he said we should find Poiboi useful, for he was friendly to us, and had weight with Lalboorah. But Khalkom's own opinion was that we should not succeed in making any arrangement of a permanent nature with either the eastern or the southern Kookies until we had thoroughly frightened them, as he expressed it. In the event of our resolving to attack Lalboorah he offered to accompany the force in person, and to supply guides, and fighting men if required. He said that the routes from Tipai Mukh to the villages of Vonolel's sons are not difficult, and that elephants could get along them. He advised us to take the route along the Hatchuk, if we intended to attack the Howlongs and Syloos from the Cachar side; but he seemed to think that these tribes could be more easily reached from Chittagong, and he said that we should find a difficulty in getting water in some parts of the Hatchuk range. If, however, we chose to attack from this side, he undertook that his father and brother would supply us with guides. He informed me that if one force were to start from Tipai Mukh, and work down in a south-westerly direction through the villages of the sons of Vonolel, and another were to take a north-easterly line through the Howlong villages from the Chittagong Hill Tracts, they would meet in the villages of Bhuta.

Before he went away, I asked him again whether he had not heard some details of the

western raids. He said that he had heard scarcely anything except the names of the leaders, and that Savoong, and possibly Gnurshailon, had assisted in it.

28. If the statements made to me on the subjects were true, the authorities of the Chittagong Hill Tracts ought by this time to have heard something in corroboration of them. At present there is very little independent evidence. In a memorandum of the Commissioner of Chittagong, dated 14th January 1871, he states that a party of Howlongs under two chiefs, Mongpoong and Saipoiya, had started through the Syloo country to make a raid on the north-west. I cannot find the name of Mongpoong in any list of Howlong chiefs. Saipoiya is stated in one list to be the younger brother of Vandool, and it is possible that the southern Lalboorah may turn out to be his son. In a later telegram it was said that Syloos, who were seen selling forks and other things in one of the Chittagong *mélas*, said that they had got them from the people of Sookpilal and Lalboorah, who had themselves obtained them in a raid on Cachar. From this account it is impossible to say which Lalboorah is intended, whether the son of Vonolel or the kinsman of Vandool.

29. The Looshais I saw stuck all through to their original statement that the head of the western raiders was son of Lalpitang. The day after I left Changsil, a trader with salt arrived there from the station. He remained at Changsil for 17 days. During that time he saw great numbers of people from the villages of Sookpilal and the neighbouring chiefs. Some of these people told him that a raid had been made by people of a chief living to the south-west. He thinks they said the name was Lalpitang, but he does not remember accurately. The direction in which he says they pointed is certainly that of Sangboong's village, as shown to me from the site of Mora's poongi. They told him that they did not know exactly where the raid had been made, but that they thought it was in the direction of Sylhet.

30. Since I came back to the station, I have got a bit of intelligence which I am inclined to connect with Gnurshailon. Mr. Stuart, of Anwarkhall, tells me that some time before the raid on Kattlicherra, four Kookies had asked Mr. Bagshawe to allow them to look for a site for a new village on the range behind. He gave them permission, and they spent several days in the jungle exploring. A short time before the raid they are said to have appeared, and said they could not settle there unless supplied with guns. Upon Mr. Bagshawe's refusal they went away. After the raid it was discovered that a new path had been cut from the high range to the vicinity of one of the garden roads, and that the raiders had come by this path.

From Mr. Stuart's description of the Kookies, they are apparently Poitoos from Sylhet, and one of them is said to have told Mr. Bagshawe that he had accompanied the Sylhet expedition of 1869, and shown a note to that effect which he had received from Mr. Kemble. It is probable, therefore, that he was a man from the villages of Rungbhoom or Lalhoolieu, both of whom are related to Gnurshailon. We have telegraphed to Mr. Bagshawe, who is in Calcutta (I believe on his way to England), for the names of the Kookies, and full particulars of the whole affair, and it will be most carefully inquired into.

It may turn out that the story is incorrect, or that the circumstances had nothing to do with the raids. At present, however, I cannot help connecting it with the statement that two of Gnurshailon's muntries went down to the southern chiefs just before the raiders started. This man has been in some way mixed up with all the frontier troubles for years back, and I do not think it is likely that he has been idle this year.

31. Khalkom directed a muntrie of Sookpilal and two from the eastern villages to accompany us to Cachar, and to remain with me until I gave them leave to go back. They are here now.

Nothing worthy of notice occurred after Khalkom left us. I hurried on ahead of Captain Lightfoot and my own escort, and reached Monierkhall on the evening of the 27th. From Monierkhall I came in here across country, but Mr. Burland went on in a boat to Sonai Mukh. He has since told me that he found the banks of the river below Nagdigram lined with crowds of people, men, women, and children, Bengallees and Munnipoories, Hindus and Mussulmans, who had come to welcome him back, and to bring offerings of milk, sugar-cane, and the like. He had to get out of his boat about every half hour to answer their eager questionings. Invariably, he said, the first thing asked was whether everyone had got down in safety, and his answer was always received with shouts of joy, while many burst into tears at hearing the good news.

32. Mr. Burland has furnished me with descriptions of routes from Dearbund to Changsil, and from the latter place to Punchungkai. They have been drawn up with great care, and will be very valuable. They will be found appended to this Report. But useful as they are, they show very inadequately the great service Mr. Burland did in the expedition. It would not be easy to overrate what we owed to his cheerfulness, his courage, and a cool, calm, good sense, which never failed him when our prospects seemed darkest, and our perplexity greatest; and I think that the spirit which animated our party, and which kept everyone cheerful and confident, even when something like starvation threatened us on one side and death or captivity on the other, was greatly owing to the example of Mr. Burland. His kindness, his care for, and sympathy with, everyone, gave him great influence over all our people, and the Looshais who came to our camp seemed to take to him from the moment they saw him.

33. The

33. The conduct of my escort deserves the highest praise. During the whole time we were out, and notwithstanding the frequent difficulties of our position, I had scarcely ever the slightest reason to be dissatisfied with them. This was owing partly to the fact that they were all picked and well-trained men, but still more to the officer commanding them, Inspector Dost Mahomed.

Last year I had the pleasure of bearing testimony to the merits of this most deserving officer. The high opinion I then had of him has been greatly increased by what I have seen of his conduct this year. During the whole time we were at Punchungkai he never slept at night, and at whatever hour I happened to be awake, I could hear him going the round of our sentries, or inquiring into the cause of the slightest suspicious noise outside our camp.

Among the men he commanded there were five who deserve special mention; head constables Bhodde Khan and Bhandaree Ram, and constables Ron Bahadoor, Janabeer, and Huree Ram. Though all the men in the escort behaved well, the good conduct of these five was conspicuous.

On our way down, the duty of bringing up our rear was assigned by Captain Lightfoot to Dost Mahomed and my escort, in recognition of their excellent conduct during my tour.

34. The services of Baboo Hurry Churn Surma, in 1869 and last year, have been recognised; he has been rewarded by Government. He again accompanied me this year, and again gave most valuable aid. I can scarcely say how much I owe to his untiring zeal, his forethought, and his fertility in resources.

Baboo Raj Kissen Dutt, who went down on the 6th February to look for my boats, had been of great use to me up to that time, and seems to have behaved remarkably well afterwards, is certainly deserving of much credit.

I have mentioned above Raipa Muntrie's services in volunteering to carry a letter from Captain Lightfoot to me. He was promised 100 rupees for this, and the four coolies 100 more. But I think that Raipa ought to get something more than this. He did right good work for me this year; and, though not in the employment of Government, he has never failed, during the last 20 years to come forward and assist us whenever his services could be of use. I think that he would value an expression of the approbation of Government more than any pecuniary reward.

DESCRIPTION of ROUTE from DWARBUND to CHANGSIL, recorded by Mr. *T. Burland*, in December 1870.

The 13th December 1870.—From Dwarbund, a road to Loarbund garden; passed Noarbund garden on the left hand; entered jungle at east boundary of Loarbund garden. From Dwarbund to commencement of jungle, two miles; through level forests, crossing small stream frequently, to a point three miles from Loarbund. Camped. Water abundant. This stream might be avoided by a track being cut either to the north or south of it.

General course of march.
S. 45 E.
5 miles.

The 14th December 1870.—At one-fourth mile from camp commenced ascending range. The first ascent very steep to three-fourth miles; then easy rise to four miles. Gradual descent to five miles, to a stream called Kallacherra, running to eastward. Water very plentiful and good; knee deep at foot. Encamping ground very good.

General course of march.
1 mile S. 45 E.
3 miles S. 22½ W.
1 mile S. 22½ E.
5 miles.

The 15th December 1870.—Path up very steep hill to two miles; easy descent to two and a half miles, to a small stream which will probably always contain water at or near crossing place. At two and three-fourth miles, a spring of water to eastward of path. At three and one-fourth miles, crossed dry bed of water-course; ground much broken and stony. Camp at six miles. Springs to eastward of camp.

General course of march.
1 mile S. 11° 15″ E.
5 miles S. 20° W.
6 miles.

The 16th December 1870.—At two and a half from camp, found springs on both sides path. At three and a half miles, water to westward. Ascending gradually to five miles; the last mile very steep. Steep descent to six miles to Kallacherra, a small stream running to north-east; another small stream joins Kallacherra from north-west; water will always be found in this stream. Very good camping ground on both sides of it. Easy ascent to seven miles, then slight dip to another stream, "Roypacherra." From this stream, rising at first gradually, and then very steep hill, to a place called Koloseeb. Camped here. Springs on both sides camp, but not plentiful. Camping ground not good.

General course of march.
9 miles.
S. 10° W.

Descending to one-half miles, where a path branches to westward, leading to Byrabee teela and Pakwa Mukh. Continued descents to two half-miles. Rather steep rise to three miles, and gradual to six miles; descending to camp at eight miles. Springs on both sides camp. Water not plentiful. Camping ground bad.

General course of march.
8 miles.
S. 18 W.

The 18th December 1870.—Very steep ascent to one and three-fourth miles. At two miles, on summit of new range, one seen yesterday to south-east. To five miles nearly level, on gently undulating land. At five one-fourth miles, crossed stream running to south-east, named it Hurreecherra. Water good and plentiful, and encamping ground good on both sides. At six miles, a large spur running in from north-west joins range; at six and a half miles, very steep descent. At seven and three-fourth miles, level. Encamping ground not good, and water spring on both sides of path, but water not plentiful.

General course of march.
S. - - ¾ mile.
N. 22° 30″ W. 1 „
S. 10° W. - 6 miles.
7¾ miles.

The 19th December 1870.—To six miles, path on top of range nearly level, but rather broken and stony. At six and one-fourth miles godown teela, the point occupied by

General course of march.
9 miles.
S. 10° W.

Colonel Lister's force in 1849–50, and here he cut a track to Moorah's village, which he destroyed. At this place water plentiful to eastward of path. Springs and ground good for encampment. To nine miles, road uneven and stony, but in no place steep. Water to eastward of camp not very abundant, and ground not very good.

General course of march.
5 miles.
S. 15° E.

The 20th December 1870.—Immediately after leaving camp, ascended very steep rise for half mile, then gradual descent to five miles, to stream running to westward. Water plentiful, and camping ground to south of stream very good (Stockadecherra).

General course of march.
1 mile S. 45° E.
½ „ South.
½ „ S. 45° W.
3 miles South.
—
5 miles.

The 21st December 1870.—To one mile, slight ascent, then very steep decline to stream running south. Water ancle deep. Crossed stream, and down eastern bank for short distance; re-crossed to western bank, and ascended very steep hill. At two miles, crossed a small stream running to south-east. At four and a half miles, crossed another stream, running west, then ascended very steep hill, on top of which camped at five miles. No water here; brought up a supply in chungas. Camping ground bad.

(*Note.*—The track this march should have been cut due south, and bad ground and two streams would have been avoided.)

General course of march.
-½ mile S.S.E.
- „ S.W.
2 miles S.S.W.
3½ „ S.
—
6 miles.

The 22nd December 1870.—To four miles, path tolerably level. At five miles, crossed watercourse, with little water running east. At six miles, steepish descent to dry bed watercourse; then up very precipitous hill, and along top of spur to seven miles; encamped on top of hill overlooking Dhullessur River. No water at camp; got supply from river quarter mile distant. Camping ground not good.

General course of march.
-¼ mile S.
2 miles S.S.E.
1 mile S.S.W.
2 miles S.
—
5 miles.

The 23rd December 1870.—Very steep descent to River Dhullessur. At one-fourth mile on large pebbly chur on east bank river. River here running to north-north-west rapidly. Route along chur to southward to stream which joins river from eastward. Crossed stream, and ascended east bank river. To five miles path over very broken difficult ground; every 200 or 300 yards crossing streams or dry beds of watercourses; route nearly parallel to river. At five miles again struck river, on a chur similar to the one crossed this morning; crossed over to western bank; ford knee-deep and 30 yards wide. Up river on western bank 200 yards, then re-crossed at ford, same depth and width as last, to large chur on east bank, and on this chur made camp. At south end of this chur a large stream joins river.

The 24th December 1870.—By boats and rafts to Changsil; a large flat rock on east bank river. Time going up from last camp to Changsil, 1 hour and 30 minutes. (Distance measured on 6th January 1871, two miles and three furlongs.) Made permanent encampment here on east bank river.

Note.—On 2nd January 1871, measured distance between Changsil and Bepari Bazaar. Mr. Edgar's camp of last year (1869-70).

To	36 chains	S. 30 E.		
„	58 „	S. 10 E.		
„	83 „	S. 5 E.	Here north barrier.	
„	100 „	S. 20 E.	Rapid.	
„	123 „	S. 20 E.	Here barrier.	
„	150 „	S. 20 E.	Here south barrier.	
„	186 „	S. 45 E.		
„	220 „	S. Bepari Bazaar.		

Time from Dwarbund to Changsil 12 days, and distance 74¼ miles, as follows:—

1st March	- -	13th December 1870	- - 5 miles.
2nd „	- -	14th „ „	- - 5 „
3rd „	- -	15th „ „	- - 6 „
4th „	- -	16th „ „	- - 9 „
5th „	- -	17th „ „	- - 8 „
6th „	- -	18th „ „	- - 7¾ „
7th „	- -	19th „ „	- - 9 „
8th „	- -	20th „ „	- - 5 „
9th „	- -	21st „ „	- - 5 „
10th „	- -	22nd „ „	- - 7 „
11th „	- -	23rd „ „	- - 5¼ „
12th „	- -	24th „ „	- - 2¼ „
12 days.			74 miles.

It

It being quite impossible to take separate bearing of each turn in the path or to chain, the distances have been estimated by time, rate of walking, and line of country, and the general course by constant reference to compass.

After leaving Loarbund, the path goes through dense tree and bamboo jungle, with but one clear spot the entire route. There are many very steep places, up or down which baggage animals could not go; but it is almost certain that practicable roads could be made round such places after exploration. No less than ten running streams were found after leaving the first encampment, between that and the Dhullessur, besides many springs. Now that the road is known, the time required to perform the journey from Silchar to Changsil would be—

1st march	-	-	18	miles	- -	Silchar to Dwarbund.
2nd „	-	-	10	„	- -	Dwarbund to Kattlicherra.
3rd „	-	-	12	„	- -	Kattlicherra to Kallalocherra.
4th „	-	-	16¼	„	- -	Kallacherra to Hurreecherra.
5th „	-	-	16½	„	- -	Hurreecherra to Stockadecherra.
6th „	-	-	12	„	- -	Stockadecherra to Dullessur.
7th „	-	-	7½	„	- -	Dullessur to Changsil.
7 marches.			92¼	miles.		

DESCIRPTION of ROUTE from *Changsil* to *Pauchanghai*, recorded by Mr. *T. Burland*, in January 1871.

Time.	Distance.	Bearing.	Thermometer.	Barometer.	26 January 1871.
				Feet.	
8 a.m.	- -	- -	50·30	1,000	Left Changsil.
to 8.15	¼ mile	136°	- -	1,325	Steep ascent.
to 8.30	½ „	90°	- -	1,500	
to 8.45	¾ „	45°	- -	1,600	
to 9.00	¾ „	112°30	- -	1,675	
to 9.30	1½ „	157°30	64·30	1,875	Water spring a little to left of path.
to 9·40	¼ „	- -	65·20	2,150	Sukker Moe bears 93°. To this point, path very good, through bamboo and light timber forest.
10.15 to 10.30	¼ „	90	- -	1,974	Steep descent.
to 11.00	¾ „	157°30	74·00	2,225	Road to Sookpilal's villages and to Bepari Bazaar, goes up to south and west.
to 11.30	1 „	112°30	73·00	2,500	Water to right path very good.
to 12.15	½ „	90°00	75·20	3,400	Sukker Moe bears 70°. Mehtong poonjee 70°.
	6½ miles				

4 p.m.—Thermometer, 66·00; boiling thermometer, 207° 50′/; a barometer, 27·35. Encamped on road. Water found to right of path. Mehtong poonjee and jooms seen from this place. The poonjee distant about three miles, bearing 70°. Sukker Moe immediately behind it. The poonjee is built on an arm of Sukker Moe.

Time.	Distance.	Bearing.	Thermometer.	Barometer.	27 January 1871.
				Feet.	
7.5 to 7.15	¼ mile.	80°	57·40	3,400	Road to South to Tonpilal.
to 7.50	1 „	- -	- -	3,275	Turned to left from Mehtong road and through joom; steepish descent to belts of jungle, beyond which came to stream running north-east, rocky bed. Mehtong poonjee ¾ mile to east.
to 8.15	1 „	45°00.			
to 8.30	½ „	- -	- -	2,000	Down bed of stream for ¼ mile, then across small spur to another stream, up which the path goes for 200 yards. Thermometer, 64·00; boil thermometer, 210°.
9.00 to 9.30	1 „	north	- -	2,175	Over second joom to another belt jungle to
to 9.45	½ „	north	- -	1,800	Kallacherra, a fine stream running to north-west, said to join Dhullessur at our camping ground of 22nd December. A salt spring on north-east bank. Salt makers at work. Across stream, and through jungle to another stream, nearly dry-path goes up bed of this stream.
to 10.30	1 „	337°30″	70·00	1,875	
12.20 to 12.45	¾ „	north	67·00	2,300	Left stream, and up steepish hill: then slight descent to stream called Pulrang, running south-south-west. Plentiful supply of water, and ground for camp good.
to 1.10	1 „	45°	69·20	2,200	
7.20 to 8.00	- -	- -	53·00	2,100	Proceeded up bed of stream which joins Pulrang from north-east for a few hundred yards, and then up steep ascent.
to 8.30	¾ mile	45°	62·80	2,900	
	¾ „	22° 30″	65·0	3,350	Boiling thermometer, 207°50. To this point ascent very steep.
8.45 to 9.15.	1 „	north	- -	3,900	Very steep.
11.00 to 12.00.	1½ „	- -	81·20	4,550	Boiling thermometer, 205·25. Camped on site of Mora, the village destroyed by Colonel Lister in 1849–50.

Sookpilal's villages bear from this point 205 degs., and a peak said to be near Saboong as villages bears 200 degs. Water here plentiful, and camping ground very good.

Time.	Distance.	Bearing.	Thermometer.	Barometer.	29 January 1871.
				Feet.	
7.25 to 8.00	2 miles	10°	- -	4,550 4,250 4,100	
8.45 to 9.0.	½ mile	north	66·80	4,250	Very good road, through heavy forest jungle.
10.20 to 10.40	¾ „	45°	67·50	3,800	
to 11.00	½ „	- -	- -	4,000	Through old joom. Darmingpi's poonjee bears north 29 ①, distant one mile. Nisapui.

Time.	Distance.	Bearing.	Thermometer.	Barometer.	29 January 1871.
				Feet.	
12.20 to 11.40.	1 mile.	north	- -	- -	To Darmingpi's poonjee.
1.00 to 1.40	1¾ „	10°	71·00	4,600	Road very good, and gradients easy.
to 1.55	½ „	north	- -	- -	Camped on upper-edged joom. Water plentiful, but boiling thermometer, 205 deg. 75 sec.
500	- -	- -	65·00	4,400	

At a considerable distance, 300 yards down, at lower or eastern end of joom:—

Time.	Distance.	Bearing.	Thermometer.	Barometer.	30 January 1871.
				Feet.	
6.45 to	- -	- -	54·80	4,350	
7.5 to	¾ mile	north	- -	- -	Here two roads branch off, one to north-east and one to south-east, said to be joom roads.
7.30 to	1¼ „	- -	- -	3,550	Trees, jungle.
7.45 to	½ „	- -	61·80	3,775	
8.5.	½ „	60°	62·00	3,925	
8.55 to 9.15.	1 „	75°	69·00	3,450	Piloo's old village site, Dollong jooms, bear 55 deg. to 75 deg.; distant about 10 miles.
9.45 to 10.10	1 „	45°	69·00	2,850	Decline very steep. Immediately before reaching Sonai crossed two small streams running east. Struck Sonai at 11.20, at a place called "Punchunkai." River contains plenty of water, and is at this point much wider than the Dhullessur, at Changsil.
to 11.7 to	¾ „	60°	71·50	1,175	
11.20	¼ „	- - Boiling thermometer -	80·50	1,125 211°80″	

The road from Changsil to Punchunkai is very good. Between Darmingpi and the Sonai extremely so. The descent for Piloo's old poonjee is rather precipitous, but not very bad. The journey may easily be performed in two days or 2½ days.

	Miles.
1 march, Changsil to Pulrang - - - -	13½
2 marches, Pulrang to Nisapui - - - -	11
3 marches, Nisapui to Punchungkai - - -	6
3 marches, 2½ days - - - - - -	30½

NOTE on Road by River and Land between *Punchunghai* and *Looshai Haut.*

LEFT Punchungkai at 7·30 on bamboo raft, and arrived at Looshai Haut at 1.30; thus taking six hours for journey in time: estimated distance, nine miles. Found river one succession of rapids. On many barely six inches of water flowing over. Returned from Looshai Haut by land route. From Mr. Edgar's camp of last year, on West Bank River, crossed at ford to mouth of stream opposite. Up-bed of this stream south-east for a quarter of a mile; then struck into hills to right. Ascent rather steep. At two miles dip, and crossed stream containing little water; then an ascent and level to 3¾ miles, when another dip, and stream similar to last one. At five miles another small stream, at 5½ to chur on east bank Sonai. Skirted river and crossed at ford to camp at Punchungkai. General course of land road south, 10 degrees west. Time, from Looshai Haut to Punchungkai, 3½ hours. Estimated distance, six miles.

Enclosures to letter No. B., dated March 1871, from the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar, on special duty, to the Commissioner of Dacca division.

J. W. Edgar,
Deputy Commissioner.

From *J. W. Edgar*, Esq., Deputy Commissioner of Cachar, to the Commissioner of Circuit, Dacca Division, No. 257; dated Cachar, the 20th March 1871.

WITH reference to your Memorandum, No. 59, of 16th March, I have the honour to inform you that I have noticed the rumour about the identification of Lalchung in a report which is now being copied out, but I have not been able to give any decided opinion, owing to the vagueness of the information received as yet.

2. I have sent the three Looshais who came down with me from the Sonai back to their villages. They go up the Dullessur, and are accompanied by Baboo Obhoy Churn Mitter, a very intelligent and trustworthy man; he ostensibly goes to trade, but his main objects are to get all the information he can collect, to find out all about the prisoners, and do what he can for their release. Four Cacharees from Anwarkhal village asked me to let them go up and inquire about their relatives; I have let them go, and they have promised to find out all they can while among the Looshais; as they are hill men, they will probably be able to learn more than the Baboo. As these people had lost their all when the village was plundered, and as all other survivors are very badly off, I have advanced them 250 rupees from save money drawn on account of my tour. If I was wrong in making this advance from public money, I shall repay it myself.

3. Besides the people who are on their way to the Looshai villages, Hurrv Thakoor and Raipa Muntri are inquiring locally into the story told Mr. Bagshawe about the four Kookies who went to his garden in November. Possibly, in the course of this inquiry, they may light upon facts connected with the reported identification of Lalchung.

The magistrate of Sylhet has been written to for information about the present residence and position of Gnur Shailon, Rungbhoom, and Lal Hoolien; but unfortunately he did not understand the meaning of our letter, and some time has been lost in furnishing him with explanation.

4. I have heard a rumour that Lilkrisno, half brother to the Raja of Tipperah, an unsuccessful claimant to the succession, has had something to do with this year's raids. There is supposed to be some connection between him and Gnur Shailon, who is said to have been protected by the Boi Thakoor (these are adherents of Nilkrisno) after the Adampore outrage of 1862. We have written to the magistrate of Tipperah and Commissioner of Chittagong for further information, and if I hear anything more on the subject, I shall report.

I have for the present stopped all trade with the villages on the Tipai and Sonai, and have recalled some traders who went up the Barak on an old pass which they had not returned. I have allowed no one up the Dullessur, except the Baboo mentioned above.

From *F. B. Simson*, Esq., Commissiouer of the Dacca Division, to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Political Department, No. 83; dated Dacca, the 28th March 1871.

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith copy of a letter, No. 265, dated 22nd instant, from the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar.

2. I have already, in my very brief remarks on Mr. Edgar's Report C., expressed my entire disagreement with Mr. Edgar as to the views expressed in this letter. With reference to paragraph 4, I can only say that I accompanied Mr. Edgar in that expedition to Looshai Bazaar, and that he himself and all of us believed firmly that we were watched the whole way, and nothing could be easier than for a few hill men to keep themselves concealed, and get completely to watch the movements of our forces through these jungles. I do not quite understand the expression, network of roads; it is the one continuous road along the frontier which would enable us to keep a good look-out, and to move our military or police rapidly. A road to extend from east of Cachar into Chittagong, which others as well as I advocate. I believe this plan would afford great protection, and, as Lord Napier observed to Mr. Edgar, has always been found a successful means of defence in operations against other hill tribes.

3. I have no desire to make roads through the fringe of jungles and swamps referred to in paragraph 5, for the hill men to attack us by. It is true they have used our roads, and may do so again, but it is a very different thing, using an unoccupied road from the forest to civilisation, and using one which terminates in a fortified post at its forest end, and must inevitably place our forces behind the raiders, and between them and their country, and would enable us to intercept or follow them in, at any rate, a much easier manner than we have ever hitherto attempted.

4. At the end of paragraph 3, Mr. Edgar says: "Strong guards at certain points, with a connecting road, would protect the tea gardens, and would compel raiding parties to attack our villages in Sylhet;" but, according to my proposals and views, Sylhet and Independent Tipperah should be similarly protected, and the road from the east Cachar to some spot in civilised Chittagong, should be continuous and regularly patrolled.

5. The

5. The road should be beyond our territory, and the gardens and villages which we are bound to protect; the line of Sookpilal's treaty must be respected, but we are not bound to the same extent to protect the country we have first acknowledged to be his. The treaty causes a difficulty, but I am firmly convinced that if a road was opened out such as so many persons recommend, after its first cost was defrayed, all the territory within that line could be protected almost to a certainty, while the effect of other measures against the hill tribes, either peaceful or otherwise, was being carried out or discussed; and I think that after the total failure of Mr. Edgar's attempts at defence by merely peaceable action, we are bound to take entirely different and more certain measures for the protection of British subjects of every race in this frontier. I am as strongly opposed to Mr. Edgar's desire to stop the opening out of this road and communication as I possibly can be, and I have thought over the matter continually for more than four years; and during the whole time of Mr. Edgar's service in Cachar, I advocated this road and plan from the first, and though my proposals have never met with approval, the more I think over them, the more strongly do I feel it my duty to press them before Government.

From *J. W. Edgar*, Esq., Deputy Commissioner of Cachar, to the Commissioner of the Dacca Division, No. 265; dated Cachar, the 22nd March 1871.

LAST evening I received the following telegram from the Secretary to the Government of Bengal:

"Begg, Dunlop complain that Catlecherra and Rupacherra gardens (guards?) are withdrawn. Is there any good and sufficient reason for this?"

After ascertaining from Brigadier General Bourchier the facts of the case, I telegraphed as follows:

"General Bourchier has informed me that there is a guard of one head constable and ten constables at Rupacherras; I consider this too weak. The guard at Catlecherra has been withdrawn to cut a path to the top of the high range to the west. I cannot approve of this, and hope that the guard will be brought back as soon as possible." I have given a copy of this to the Brigadier General.

2. When the Commander-in-Chief was here, his Excellency was good enough to allow me to lay my ideas on the subject of the protection of the frontier, verbally before him. Therefore, when I was informed in your letter No. 253 T., of the 1st March, that the defence of the frontier had been made over to General Bourchier, I did not think it necessary to put on official record any opinions on the step now being taken to protect the tea gardens, and in my general report, I touched very lightly on the difficulties and expense of working out any really efficient system of pure defence. I have since, however, thought that in justice to myself, and to the people of my district, I ought to state plainly that I do not believe any measures that I have yet heard of at all likely to protect our gardens and villages from the attacks of the hill men if they should wish to make them. In other words, I believe that the only practical way of defending our cultivated frontier, is to make the people outside unwilling to attack, or if that cannot be done, to reduce them to complete subjection. In trying to explain my grounds for this belief, I fear that I shall appear to touch upon military matters to greater extent than I care to do; but really this is a question in which a knowledge of the country, and the people with whom we have to deal, is more important than military science.

3. The tea gardens exposed to the attacks of Looshais, are dotted along an irregular 126 miles in length from the point where the Munnipore road crosses the Jeri to Ballykandy, a little to the west of the Hylakandy sub-divisional station; and on this line there are 23 which offer peculiar facilities to an enemy attacking from the southern jungles. A strong guard at each of the points, and good roads connecting them, would no doubt make the Cachar tea gardens almost safe from the southern enemies, and compel raiding parties to confine their operations to our villages and the tea gardens of Sylhet.

4. But it is not proposed to place outposts at these points. The plan is to push on further, and to throw out a chain of outposts, posts beyond which the raiders, as it is expected, dare not advance. Such a system would no doubt give much confidence to our people, and be otherwise useful, as long as the hill men choose to abstain from making raids; but I do not think it would prevent them if they wanted to attack us. In the first place, from their habits and knowledge of the jungles, they can get about them in a way that seems almost incredible to us, and I am quite sure that they slip past any outposts without being perceived. In 1869, when Major Stephenson's force was at Gujjulghât, a few miles from Nugdigram, several Looshais came down to look after the four muntries who were accompanying us. We did not suspect that there was any one in the jungle, and yet these people managed to hold communication with the muntries. To get to Gujjulghât, they had to pass Bongkong, where Mr. Nuthall with a party of police scouts and jungle cutters were in a stockade, and Callicherra, where there was another stockade. The three points were connected by paths which were constantly used by people carrying on provisions, &c., to the front, yet we should not have known anything about the matter if the Looshais had not told some of our people. The other day one of the muntries who came in with me from the Sonai, told General Nuthall that he had seen him and several other officers at Pakwa Mukh. He said that he with 50 men had come down

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to watch the advance of the force; that they saw it turn back, and carried off several pairs of boots or shoes thrown away by the sepoys. These people might, with the same ease with which they came to Pukwa Mukh without discovery, have slipped past and attacked the gardens behind. It may be said that, even if they did get past, they would be intercepted on their return. I think not. Their custom is to disperse on leaving a place they have attacked. Every man works through the jungle as best he can, and all meet at some appointed place, which there can be little doubt would be beyond the most advanced outpost. Of course a few of them would be intercepted and killed, but the rest would get off safe with their plunder, and exulting over our powerlessness to protect our people from them.

5. I pointed out in my report how dangerous the defensive roads might become to us during the rains. I have heard it asserted that the hill men do not make raids except in the cold season; but a reference to the account of the three raids in Chittagong in July 1866, given by Mr. Mackenzie in page 61 of his memorandum on the north-east frontier, will show that the opinion is erroneous, and I know of a raid made on a Looshai village during last rains. The reason, as I pointed out in my report, of the rarity of raids during the rains hitherto, is that our cultivation has beyond it a fringe of always difficult, and in the rains almost impracticable country; and it is just this defensive belt that will be made easy by a network of roads. I have mentioned that I thought it probable that the guards would frequently have to be withdrawn in unhealthy seasons, but I omitted to point out the difficulty that would be found frequently in keeping up regular communication between the outposts and the station. The cause of this difficulty is shown better than I could show it, in a very accurate and well-written article in the "Englishman" of 3rd February. During the great floods of last year, the Barak flowed right across country over the bunded roads leading to Luckipore, Monierkhall, Hylakandy, and Sylhet.

6. The above remarks are intended as arguments, not against taking such defensive measures as are in our power, but against regarding such measures as effected or giving the slightest promise of leading to a final settlement of the difficulty. If successful measures for the effectual punishment of offenders be taken next year, we can with safety carry out any policy we choose to adopt, and of course outposts and roads can do no possible harm, but a policy of defence, not accompanied by punishment for past outrages, would in all probability result in failure.

From Captain *T. H. Lewin*, Deputy Commissioner, Chittagong Hill Tracts, to the Commissioner of the Chittagong Division, No. 119; dated Rangamuttea, the 20th March 1871.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the correspondence forwarded under your endorsement, No. 426, of the 15th instant, calling for a report as to the tribe of the Looshai lately killed in Sylhet.

2. In reply, I would refer you to my remarks on the statement of Sabitri Calini, an escaped captive, forwarded with my letter No. 106, dated 9th March 1871, in which I have given details as to the dress of the Looshai tribe.

3. I have to add further with especial reference to paragraph 7, of letter No. 136, of the 1st instant, from the magistrate of Sylhet to the Commissioner of Dacca, which was forwarded under your above-mentioned endorsement, that the fact of the dead Looshai having worn a chudder similar to those of Munnipore manufacture, points to his being a member of the Bhootaiya clan who reside in the hills bordering on Munnipore.

4. Mr. Sutherland states further that the dead Looshai was dressed in a white cotton jacket. Such jackets, made of dirty, white, home-spun cloth, are worn by all the Looshai clan, but it is not possible to say with certainty to what tribe the dead man belonged.

5. The head chiefs of the Howlong, Syloo, and Rutton Pooea clan all originally sprang from one parent stock, the Looshai family. These chiefs, therefore, are Looshai, and their men (belonging to many different families or clans) are known as followers of the Looshai. The Bhootaiya clan of which the chief Sookipilal is a member, is distinct and separate from the Looshai family.

From Captain *T. H. Lewin*, Deputy Commissioner, Chittagong Hill Tracts, to the Commissioner of the Chittagong Division, No. 61; dated Rangamuttee, the 16th February 1871.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your endorsement, No. 370, dated 14th February 1871, covering copy of letter unnumbered, dated 6th February, from Commissioner Dacca Division, to your address. In reply, I have to inform you that up to date I have received no information on the subject of Mr. Edgar's movement.

2. Information as to the identity of the Cachar raiders was conveyed to you in this office letter No. 41, dated the 6th February 1871.

3. The

3. The tidings conveyed therein, as far as concern the son of Lalpitang, have since been confirmed by the statements of one Chand-soi-loo, a captive belonging to the Paukho tribe in the Hill Tracts, who lately escaped from Rutton Pooea's village, and sought shelter in our territory.

4. There have, I hear, been some causes of quarrel between Saboonga or Savoonga, the head of the Syloo tribe, and Sookpilal, on the Cachar side. This, doubtless, gave rise to the report referred to by Mr. Simpson, in his letter as to fighting among the tribes south of the Tipai and Souai Rivers.

5. The nearest point to Beparee Bazaar, fairly and at all times accessible from Chittagong, is the Demagiri Falls, on the River Kurnafoolee. From thence it would be easy to communicate with Cachar, by following the Surthaz Klang range of hills, which extends from there northward, in an uninterrupted line, to the waters of the Gangetic valley.

From *H. Le Poer Wynne*, Esq., Under Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Political Department, No. 758 P.; dated Simla, the 26th April 1871.

WITH reference to your Junior Secretary's docket, No. 1761, dated the 18th of April 1871, forwarding copy of a letter from the Deputy Commissioner, Chittagong Hill Tracts, to the Commissioner of Chittagong, I am directed to request that you will be good enough to furnish this office at an early date with a copy of the letter* mentioned in the 2nd paragraph thereof, conveying information as to the identity of the Cachar raiders.

From *H. L. Harrison*, Esq., Junior Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, in the Foreign Department, No. 1037; dated Fort William, the 9th March 1871.

I AM directed to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of the papers cited on the margin, referring to the raid committed by a party of Kookies on the village of Golungeah, in the Sungoo Sub-division, in the Chittagong Hill Tracts.

Judicial Proceedings for January 1871, Nos. 91–93.
Letter, No. 16 ct., dated 6th February 1871, from Officiating Commissioner, Chittagong Division.
Letter, No. 698, dated 17th February 1871, to ditto, from Officiating Junior Secretary to the Government of Bengal.
Letter, No. 89 ct., dated 13th February 1871, from Commissioner, Chittagong Division.
Letter, No. 803, dated 22nd February 1871, to ditto, from Junior Secretary to the Government of Bengal.

2. No report was made to the Government of India when information of this raid was first received, as there was then no indication of a serious outbreak on the part of the hill tribes, and the Lieutenant Governor waited for further and fuller information of the circumstances connected with the raid. The papers then got mixed up with those of the subsequent and more serious raids, and it has only just been discovered that they have not been officially laid before the Government of India.

From Lord *H. Ulick Browne*, Commissioner of the Chittagong Division, to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department, No. 331; dated Chittagong, the 12th January 1871.

I HAVE the honour to report the first Kookie raid of the season 1870–71, which has taken place about a fortnight earlier than usual in the part of the district that has been chiefly selected by raiders during the last two years.

2. When I was on my way to Kassalong for the annual Kookie meeting and fair, I received two notes from the Deputy Commissioner of the Hill Tracts, saying that Rutton Pooea had sent a messenger to say that two bodies of the Howlongs had set out on raiding expeditions, one to the north and the other to the south, under two chiefs, Mongpoong and Janga. Nothing has been heard up to date of the party that went to the north, but the acts now reported seem to have been perpetrated by the party that went to the south. It may be added that there were no Howlongs at Kassalong during the fair, which, in a Kookie point of view, is confirmatory of the raiders being of that tribe.

3. I enclose a copy of a demi-official letter just received from Major Graham, the Deputy Commissioner, giving a full account of what has taken place. The village and the scene of the encounter are in the Sungoo Sub-division of the Hill Tracts.

There are three circumstances worthy of notice in the present *report*, viz., the unusually small loss of the village raided on, the unusual audacity of the Kookie raiders, and the courage and good conduct of the 9th Ghoorka constables.

4. The

* No. 41, dated the 6th of February 1871, from the Deputy Commissioner, Hill Tracts, to the Commissioner of Chittagong.

4. The small loss of the villagers is stated by Major Graham to be owing to the villagers being warned of the probability of an attack, and going at night to the jungle with all portable property.

It will be remembered, however, that when inquiring into the raid of last season that was committed on a village near the Chimah post, the Assistant Commissioner found that, owing to the raids of late years, the general population of the villages in that portion of the district had adopted the plan of regularly leaving their villages, carrying with them a good deal of their property, and sleeping in the jungles every night for some months during the principal raiding season, for security's sake. It does not seem very satisfactory that British subjects, living within our police posts, should think it necessary to pass such a life for some months annually; but in this instance it has had the effect that the villagers anticipated, as only two men were killed and one carried off, together with some paddy.

5. The audacity of the Kookies is remarkable, nothing like it having ever been known before. The usual practice with them is to commit a raid, and then return to their own country and villages as quickly as possible by forced marches, even going to the length of killing any captives that are unable to keep pace with their retreat. But in the present instance, after raiding on the village, they did not return home, but went on through the Hill Tracts, probably with the intention of committing another raid. In the course of their explorations they seem to have come across a wild elephant, to have disregarded the risk of additional delay in the Hill Tracts, and to have hunted down, killed the elephant, and then halted to cut up as much of the flesh as they could eat and carry off. They did all this with the knowledge that their trail would be easily followed, and apparently thought that we could do nothing that would injure them.

6. The conduct of the 9th Goorkha constables was, if correctly narrated (and the casualties and the carrying off of the wounded constables support the account given), indeed admirable, and the survivors will, of course, be promoted as soon as it is practicable. If the sub-inspector had kept the whole party together and followed up the trail, the probability is that 29 men would, with the example that would have been shown by nine of their number, have accounted for some 30 Kookies.

7. As regards the sub-inspector, as Major Graham says, we must hear what he has to say before condemning him; but as the account runs, his conduct throughout was almost inexplicable. I reserve comments, however, till I am in possession of his explanation.

8. I will request the Deputy Commissioner to report some further particulars as to the number of days that elapsed between the raid and the encounter, and as to the line followed by the Kookies; also to send in the sub-inspector's explanation, with his (the Deputy Commissioner's) opinion and recommendation as to what should be done in the case of the sub-inspector and constables respectively. I will further direct him to send out a party to follow up the trail of the Kookies to a sufficient distance to ascertain, beyond doubt, their identity, if this has not, as it probably has been, done already.

Rangamuttee, 10 January 1871.

FROM further reports from Chimah, and from an examination of two constables who have just come in, the following particulars have been obtained of the first hostile movement of the Kookies for the season 1870–71.

On the 31st December the village of Gulungeah, which is at about a day and a half journey from Chimah stockade, was attacked by Kookies; but as the villagers had previously been warned by the police that an attack might be expected, the villagers had gone into the jungle, taking with them their women, children, property, &c. Five men were left in charge of the village, of whom two were killed by the Kookies, and one carried off; and the paddy remaining in the village plundered, and the village burned to the ground.

On hearing of this, the sub-inspector in command at Chimah appears to have gone out with a party of eight men, and to have seen the Kookies, about 200 in number, on a hill, pounding and husking the paddy they had plundered.

Not considering himself strong enough to attempt anything, the sub-inspector appears to have returned to Chimah; and then taking with him 29 men of all ranks to have again advanced to the place he had formerly seen the Kookies, but found they had left. The sub-inspector and party then followed the track of the Kookies, and in the afternoon halted at a place where there was a little water: nine men here said they would push on in advance in the direction the Kookies had taken and look for more water.

He then stayed all night where he was, and next day the constables wished to go on, but were forbidden by the sub-inspector, who said the nine men in advance had doubtless descended into the bed of the Chimah stream and returned.

He then returned to Chimah, reaching it at 12 p.m., and some of his men not until six p.m.

On the way in his party appears to have heard no firing, but from about 10 a.m. it was heard at the stockade, passing along the hills eastward, and descending into the valley; and it is said that, although knowing this, it was not until six p.m. that the sub-inspector sent out a party of 10 men in support.

I now return to the nine men who went on from where the sub-inspector first halted; it

was

was composed entirely of Goorkhas, and halted the first night in the jungle. Next morning they followed the Kookie trail by a path which leads east to south in a circuitous manner towards the front of Chimah, and on coming to a point where one road went east, and another south-west, towards Chimah, they suddenly came on the Kookies in a nullah cutting up an elephant they had killed.

Seeing themselves heavily out-numbered, the nine men fell back slowly along a nullah towards Chimah, fired on by the Kookies, and firing in return, until at last coming to some rocks in a narrow gorge they halted and took up a position; the Kookies did the same, creeping up to within 15 yards of the police, and attempting again and again to carry the position. These attacks were, however, successfully repelled, but not until a large powerful Kookie, who always led the advances, beating a drum, was shot down. Eight or nine Kookies are here said to have fallen, and, whenever they did so, their friends rushed in and carried back the bodies. The police here lost one man, Wuzeermân Roy, killed, who in falling said, "Fight on, brothers, I am sped;" and another man, Runudal Rana, wounded in two places through the head, since dead.

At dark the Kookies ceased firing, probably either from their ammunition running short, or on account of the darkness, and creeping up a high bank threw heavy stones into the police position, by which two men were slightly hurt. The police, however, held their position all night, and in the morning found the Kookies had retreated, leaving their path strewn with "Pooeas." On this the police also retired, carrying off their wounded man, and leaving the corpse of Wuzeermân Roy on the ground, as they had no means of carrying it, but bringing his arms, accoutrements and clothes. One man was also missing. Their leaving this body was unfortunate; but on the whole, and if reports are true, the conduct of the nine policemen appears to have been admirable. They held their position obstinately, and did all that could be done against a very superior body of men. It will also be seen that the strength of the Kookies, as stated by the police, tallies with that of the body of 200 men of the Howlong, reported by Rutton Pooea to have gone south under the chief "Janga."

From the information we have at present, I think the conduct of the Sub-Inspector Rutton Sing must have been slack and unsoldier-like; but, until he is heard on this point, it would be unfair to judge him.

"Rooldroo Khan and Faizoollah, both good men, are now at Chimah, and A. Rattray leaves to-night, so that we will have exact accounts ere long; and in the meantime I believe I may say that what is above written is substantially true; and that had Rutteo Sing supported the party who behaved so well, the Kookies would, in all probability, have suffered a severe check. As it is, I trust they have been forced to retire; but their coolly remaining and supplying themselves in our country is an accession of impudence which will speak for itself.

From *A. Mackenzie*, Esq., Officiating Junior Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department, to the Commissioner of Chittagong, No. 181; dated Fort William, the 17th January 1871.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 331, dated the 12th instant, with enclosure, reporting that a party of Kookies had, on the 31st ultimo, attacked the village of Gulungeah in the Sungoo Sub-division in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, which they plundered and burnt, killing two men and carrying off a third.

2. In reply, I am to state that the Lieutenant Governor approves of the action taken by you in the matter, and awaits the submission of a further report on the subject. His Honor hopes to learn speedily whether the Kookies have left the hill tracts, and whether the tribe to which they are said to belong has been accurately traced.

3. The Lieutenant Governor concurs with you in considering the conduct of the Goorkha constables in repelling the attack admirable, if the facts have been correctly narrated by them. The explanation which has been called for respecting the conduct of Rutteo Sing, the sub-inspector in charge of the Chimah outpost, in abandoning his men, will be awaited.

4. I am to inquire on what information the police warned the villagers to expect raids, and whether Rutton Pooea's warning had been conveyed to the police at Chimah.

No. 182, dated Fort William, the 17th January 1871; endorsed by the Officiating Junior Secretary to the Government of Bengal.

COPY of the correspondence forwarded to the Officiating Inspector General of Police for information.

From *S. C. Bayley*, Esq., Officiating Commissioner of the Chittagong Division, to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department, No. 16 Ct.; dated Camp Commillah, the 6th February 1871.

In continuation of my predecessor's letter, No. 331, dated the 12th ultimo, reporting a raid committed in Gulungeah, in the hill tracts, I have the honour to forward herewith copy of a letter* from Mr. A. Rattray, Assistant Commissioner of the Sungoo Sub-division.

No. 10, dated 21st January 1871.

2. It is not sent as a complete answer to Government letter, No. 181, of the 17th January, as the Deputy Commissioner's report on the whole subject, including the Sub-Inspector's explanation, has still to be received. Mr. Rattray has, in paragraphs 6 and 13, expressed his inability at present to speak with certainty as to the tribe to whom the raiders belonged, but the Deputy Commissioner was instructed by Lord Ulick Browne from Calcutta, by telegraph, to make further inquiries as to the truth of Ruiton Pooea's warning in regard to both parties of Howlongs.

3. This raid in the south, followed so speedily by the more important raids on the north, would certainly seem to confirm his warning; but on this point, also, the Deputy Commissioner's report must be awaited.

4. The Government will observe that Mr. Rattray speaks of the villagers sleeping out in the jungle, not as the result of any special warning, but as a precaution generally adopted by them at this time of the year, thus bearing out the conjecture of my predecessor contained in paragraph 3 of his No. 331, dated 12th January.

From *A. Rattray*, Esq., Assistant Commissioner, Sungoo Sub-Division, to the Deputy Commissioner of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, No. 10; dated Bunderbun, the 21st January 1871.

The following facts have been elicited by me in connection with the raid at Gulungeah, and the recent disturbances reported on by the police during my absence from the Sub-division at the Kassalong Fair, and I now have the honour to submit my report on the subject.

2. For two or three nights running previous to the 25th December last, the guard at Paindoo had been disturbed by people from the surrounding jungle throwing stones into the stockade. It is scarcely necessary to remark here on the prevalence of this practice amongst parties out on a raid desirous of testing the vigilance of a watch, whether in a village or in any of our posts. On search, however, no clue was obtained. On the 26th, one Sathaeo gave information at the post that his joom, situated about three miles from the post, had been robbed the previous night. On investigation, paddy to the value of about 30 rupees, and one maund of cotton, all that had been picked, were proved to have been carried off. This man Sathaeo lives some distance below Paindoo, going to his joom as occasion required. On the arrival of Inspector Rudro Khan from Bunderban shortly afterwards, with a number of armed Mughs, the case was re-investigated, and, with some police from the stockade, traces of the movements of a large body of men leading in a southerly direction were followed up for a day. When night set in the party returned to the stockade, and Inspector Rudro Khan went back to Bunderban.

3. On the evening of the 31st December, a report reached Paindoo that the village of Gulungeah, a day's journey up the river, had been cut up that morning. That same morning the sub-inspector at Chimah, Rutteo Sing, whilst out patrolling, in ignorance of what had occurred at Gulungeah, arrived at the village about four hours after the raid, and thus accidentally became aware of the occurrence. The sub-inspector at Paindoo, sending off information of the raid to Bunderban, started for Gulungeah on the morning of the 1st instant, with six constables and one head constable.

4. Gulungeah lies about half way between Chimah and Paindoo stockades, on the left bank of the Sungoo, and at a distance of about a day's journey from either post. There are no other villages near the place. There were 12 houses in the village when the place was cut up. For a month previous to the occurrence of the raid, the villagers, in accordance with the usual practice at this season of the year, had been sleeping in the surrounding jungles, where also they had removed most of their property for greater security. On the morning of the attack there were but three men in the village, and who had slept there that night for the protection of such property as had not been removed. When Sub-Inspector Rutteo Sing arrived at the village, as mentioned above, his party having been led there by their suspicions being roused at the sight of *pooes* stuck along the path leading up to the village, he saw the dead body of one of the watchers in a *gully* near the village lying apparently as if he had been shot while attempting to escape, and the burnt remains of another in the smouldering fires of one of the huts. Ten houses had been burnt to the ground. The third man, Pain-Keoring, a brother-in-law of the headman of the village, is missing. As to the number of the attacking party, and the circumstances connected with the attack, nothing is known. Large quantities of paddy and cotton were partly destroyed and partly carried away.

5. Sub-

5. Sub-inspector Rutteo Sing had left Chymah on the morning of the raid with eight constables, and, after finishing his inquiries at Gulungeah, he started with his party, in the track of the raiders, in their retreat. The track was traced for about three reaches up the river, along its banks towards Chymah, when it struck off inland in an easterly direction. At nightfall the party distinctly heard the noise of men husking paddy in advance of them. Here they halted, and, consulting together, turned back, arriving at Chymah at about 10 o'clock that night. The action taken by the sub-inspector on this occasion will be remarked on further.

6. The following morning the sub-inspector, with 28 constables, made a fresh start in pursuit. On arrival at the spot where the voices had been heard the previous evening, the husks of paddy in large quantities, and traces of encampment of a numerous body of men, were seen. The whole of that day the track running in a south-easterly direction was followed with great difficulty, owing to the nature of the country, combined with the many contrivances successfully adopted by the party in retreat to throw their pursuers off the track. At dusk a halt was called. It appears that previous to starting in pursuit a rear and advance guard had been told off; but, owing to the circumstances mentioned above, the men did not keep their formation, and, when night set in, some time elapsed before they could be got together. The men told off for the advance guard say that from this point they urged upon the sub-inspector to follow up the track farther, to which he would give no definite reply. The sub-inspector being at head quarters, I am unable to record his statement; but the rest of the party state that the sub-inspector distinctly told the men that they were not to proceed any further, as it was his intention to return, being of opinion that the pursuit would lead to nothing. This the men of the advance guard emphatically deny, stating that, but for their determination to continue the pursuit, the sub-inspector would not have proceeded even so far as he had done that day, and that his conduct throughout was that of one in personal fear of encountering the raiders, and that most of the party were much in the same state of mind with the sub-inspector. However difficult to arrive at the actual facts of the case, it is evident now that the retreat of the sub-inspector was premature. That night the sub-inspector and his party halted where they had arrived, and the advance guard, consisting of the nine men whose names are given in the margin, with the exception of the head-constable in charge, Nurput Sing, who remained back, proceeded in the track before them, halting about two hours' journey in advance of the main body. The following morning the sub-inspector and his party turned back and retraced their steps to Chymah, and the advance guard continued in their pursuit. Neither party had seen or heard anything of each other since their separation the previous evening. On the evening of the 2nd instant, Sub-inspector Rutteo Sing and his party arrived at Chymah.

Jhilkoa Thapa.
Baishur Haheo.
Jusman Roy.
Jungheer Suba.
Shathoor Nagne Rotee.
Chuthur Sing Euba.
Jungheer Thapa.
Wuzeerman Roy.
Rundal Roy.

7. Sub-inspector Fuzla, sent to relieve Rutteo Sing of his charge, met him on the river a few reaches below Paindoo, and the two proceeded to the stockade together. On arrival, the guard at the stockade informed them that, since noon of that day, heavy firing had been heard in the direction of the hills to the east; in fact, the firing had been so distinct that the men of the village near the stockade had remained concealed in the jungles with their families since the firing had commenced. Sub-inspector Fuzla immediately sent off a party of 10 men, in charge of a head constable, in the direction the firing had been heard. On the evening of the 3rd this party returned in company with seven men of the advanced guard, of whom one was severely wounded. The latter had had an encounter with a body of Kookies, leaving one of their number dead and one missing. The missing man returned two days afterwards.

8. The following is an account of their engagement with the Kookies:—

It has been previously stated that the advance guard of nine men separated from the main body on the evening of the first, and halted for the night about two hours' journey ahead of them. The following morning, after waiting for some time in expectation of the main body coming up, they continued their pursuit. About this stage of the pursuit it was observed that the men in retreat had become less careful of concealing the course taken by them, and had no longer followed the practice of sticking *pooes* into the ground, from which the men had suffered so much the previous day. Whilst the hills were still enveloped in a dense fog, about 7 a.m. the men were startled by the faint report of a musket ahead of them, and on crossing the valley below they came upon an abandoned encampment on the top of the next range. The remains of large cooking fires still smouldering, cleared spaces in the jungles, and numerous other indications, shows that a large force, estimated by the party at about 150 men, had been encamped there that night. Rudely contrived stocks, and a piece of bamboo for confining the arms, found in the same place, showed that the party in retreat had a prisoner amongst them. Here our men halted to cook, and whilst so engaged another musket shot was heard still ahead of them. After waiting a short time in the expectation that the main body would overtake them, they continued their advance, expecting eventually to come out into the Chymah Kheong, in which direction the track was leading them, and by which route they intended to return to their stockade. They had proceeded till noon, when three reports in quick succession warned them of the close proximity of men. Another half an hour's walk brought them upon fresh traces of blood, and the voices of men cutting bamboos up the valley were also heard. On following up the traces of blood, they came upon the entrails of an elephant still reeking, and some of its bones stripped of every particle of flesh. A few yards in advance they came face to face upon four Kookies, armed with *dows*, coming out of the Chymah Kheong. The constables

fired a volley the moment they caught sight of the men, who, however, escaped unhurt into the dense jungle, and ran up the ravine forming the bed of the Chymah torrent, with the constables in chase; but hearing the shouts and angry voices of men up the ravine, they turned round and fled in turn down the ravine, and had barely time to take shelter behind rocks and boulders in a side ravine, when an immense crowd opened fire upon them from the surrounding jungle. And here for six hours these men fought against terrible odds, as men fight when fighting for their lives.

9. One of the constables, Jungheer Thapa, disappeared unknown to the others, before the attack, and immediately after the four Kookies had been fired upon, consequently the number of the party was reduced to eight. Shortly after the attack commenced, Oozeen Man Roy was shot through the arm and disabled. He was subsequently killed by a shot through the groin, and not very long afterwards Rundal Kana was shot through the face, consequently the effective force of the party was reduced to six. Our men state that there were not more than about 30 muskets amongst the Kookies, but that the rest of the party gave them great annoyance by throwing down among them pieces of rock from the surrounding heights, by which some of them received severe contusions. After trying to intimidate our men by hideous yells, the beating of drums, and the rattling of bamboos, but failing in courage to make a rush, at dusk their fire slackened, and they eventually sneaked off, with one of their number killed and at least two wounded. I think it will be admitted that, on the whole, our men had had the best of it.

10. Finding themselves no longer molested, the constables left the place about 10 o'clock that night, taking with them their wounded companion and the arms of the men killed; and the following day, below the junction of the two Chymah streams, met the party sent out to their relief, and arrived at the stockade on the morning of the same day, the 3rd instant. Two days afterwards Jungheer Roy, the constable who had not fought, appeared at the stockade without his arms. He admits before me that he ran away through fear, throwing away his arms to facilitate his flight. On the return of these men, a party was sent out to the scene of the encounter. The Kookies had not returned to the spot, for the body of the deceased constable had not been touched, nor anything on his person stolen. Some small pools of blood on the ground, and also many indications of the same amongst the leaves and branches about the place held by the Kookies showed that they had not escaped harmless; and in one place there were marks as if a body had been dragged along for some distance.

11. It will be gathered from the above inquiry, that from the first appearance of the raiders near the Paindoo stockade, the track was followed in a south-easterly direction till they crossed the Sungoo river, about three reaches below Gulungeah. After cutting up the village, they re-crossed the river about three reaches above the village, and struck off in an easterly direction, falling in with our men in the Chymah Kheong in a line as the crow flies about six or seven miles to the north-east of the Chymah stockade.

12. The Chymah post is not more than about four hours' journey by boat from the spot where the raiders re-crossed the river on their return from Gulungeah, consequently the conduct of the sub-inspector on the occasion when he abandoned the pursuit, after actually coming upon the raiders on the night following the raid, is most unaccountable. Had he, instead of turning back, halted and sent off to the post for reinforcements, a party could have reached him some hours before day-break, and long before the raiders broke up their encampment and continued their retreat. In fact there is every reason to believe that the conduct of the Sub-inspector Rutteo Sing has been most culpable throughout this affair; and, coupled with his negligence last year when he allowed a party of raiders to escape him from under the very walls of his post, I do not think him fit to be entrusted with any command.

13. No allusion has been made to the tribe or tribes concerned in this raid, as on this point nothing is known, but arrangements are being made by me to send out a party of Khoomies in the track of the raiders, when I trust to be able to obtain some clue to the parties concerned.

From *A. Mackenzie*, Esq., Officiating Junior Secretary to the Government of Bengal, to the Officiating Commissioner of Chittagong, No. 698; dated Fort William, the 17th February 1871.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 16 Ct., dated the 6th instant, with enclosure, giving particulars of the late raid in the village of Gulungeah, in the Sungoo sub-division in the hill tracts of Chittagong.

2. In reply, I am to say that the Lieutenant Governor will await the further report of the Deputy Commissioner of the Chittagong Hill Tracts on the whole subject, including the explanation of Rutteo Sing, the sub-inspector in charge of the Chymah outpost, of his conduct in abandoning the pursuit after actually coming upon the raiders on the night following the raid. The sub-inspector should, however, be suspended at once, and the constable who ran away placed under arrest.

(No. 699.)

COPY of the Letter, and of the one to which it is a reply, forwarded to the Inspector General of Police, Lower Provinces, for information.

From *S. C. Bayley*, Esq., Officiating Commissioner of the Chittagong Division, to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department, No. 89 Ct.; dated Camp Badya Bazaar, the 13th February 1871.

I HAVE the honour to forward copy of a Letter, No. 37, dated the 4th instant, and its enclosure from the Deputy Commissioner of Hill Tracts, for information of the Lieutenant Governor, in continuation of No. 16 Ct., dated 6th idem.

2. It will be observed from Major Graham's 3rd paragraph that the identity of the raiders still remains to be satisfactorily established. His letter, No. 39, dated 5th February, sent to the Secretary to Government direct, explained the strong grounds he had for supposing that the Howlongs had taken part if they were not the sole actors in the Cachar raids, but he did not state in that letter his opinion as to their concern with this raid on Gulungeah.

3. I gather from the 5th and 7th paragraphs of Major Graham's letter that he will report further, after full and formal inquiry regarding the conduct of Sub-inspector Rutteo Sing, and I have asked that the report may be expedited.

4. The inconvenience of having women and children in the frontier outposts during the raiding season, as noticed in his 8th paragraph, is obvious, and I cannot see why they should not, at all events for those three months, be gathered together at head quarters. On this point, however, Captain Lewin will be able to give a more valuable opinion.

5. I have asked the Deputy Commissioner, in reference to paragraphs 9 and 10, to report definitely the amount of pensions which should be given to the families of the two constables who were killed, and of the special rewards which he would recommend for the survivors of the party. I have no doubt that Government will agree in the Deputy Commissioner's opinion, that the occasion calls for some special reward as an encouragement to others.

From Major *J. M. Graham*, Officiating Deputy Commissioner, Chittagong Hill Tracts, to the Commissioner of the Chittagong Division, No. 37; dated Rangamuttee, the 4th February 1871.

IN compliance with the instructions contained in your letter, No. 335, of the 14th instant, I have the honour to submit a further report on the circumstances attending the late encounter between a body of Kookies and a few men of the Chimah outpost; and it will be observed from the report of Mr. Assistant Commissioner A. Rattray, herewith forwarded, that my demi-official report was substantially correct.

2. Before adverting more particularly to the paragraphs of your letter above noted, I may mention, with respect to paragraph 4 of letter, No. 181 of the 17th instant, from the Officiating Junior Secretary, Government of Bengal, to your address, that the police of the Chimah had been warned of the probability of Kookies being in their neighbourhood, in consequence of a joomhouse having been plundered in front of Pyndoo, and the men of the Chimah dâk boat had actually seen two Kookies in the bed of the Sungoo, and had, in consequence, specially warned the villagers of "Gulungeah." Rutton Pooea's warning was not given until 3rd January, that is, until after the raid was over.

3. It will be observed from Mr. Rattray's report that steps are being taken to trace the raiders; this, however, will probably be a work taking up some time.

4. The position of the village of Gulungeah is indicated by Mr. Rattray, and I may further add that it is on the left bank of the Sungoo, close to the mouth of the Gulungeah khal, which is shown on the map. It is between the posts of Pyndoo and Chimah, at about a day's distance from either.

5. From Mr. Rattray's report it will be seen that the village of Gulungeah was destroyed on the morning of the 31st December, and that the encounter between the police and the raiders took place on the evening of the 2nd January; and it will likewise be observed that the constables who were engaged with the Kookies formed the advanced guard of Sub-inspector Rutteo Sing's party, which halted on the evening of the 1st. The sub-inspector states that his advance had in effect outstripped him, and that when he halted in the evening he was unable to recall them. The men, however, as reported by Mr. Rattray, state that the advance went on in spite of the remonstrances of the sub-inspector. I believe the truth to be that the sub-inspector only advanced under a certain degree of pressure, and that next morning he did not attempt to follow up his advance; but this is a point which will be more clearly proved when the depositions of the men concerned are taken by Mr. A. Rattray.

Mr. Rattray further mentions that Head Constable Nirput Sing who was in command of the advance force, remained behind, but does not say why. I hear, however, that he was down with fever and unable to go on, a point which will be further inquired into. Constable Jilkea Thaffa gives a very different account of this affair, as will be seen from his deposition.

6. The account formerly given of the encounter between the constables and the Kookies, is, it will be seen, much the same as that given by me. It is satisfactory to observe that the corpse of Wuzeerman Roy was not carried off by the Kookies, and the fact of their leaving it, and entirely deserting the spot, tend to show that their repulse was decisive. The blood marks about the position held by them also show that they did not retire scatheless.

7. Mr. Rattray does not appear to have taken formal depositions in the case of Rutteo Sing, and as such depositions are, I think, necessary, I have requested him to take them.

8. The very small parties which were out on patrol from both the Pyndoo and Chimah posts, will doubtless be observed; and this, I believe, to be a result of the system which fills the post with women and children, and so forces the native officers to leave a stronger guard in them than would otherwise be necessary. Had I my own way, I would have neither women nor children in the posts during, at all events, the months of December, January, and February.

9. Constable Wuzeerman Roy has left a wife, and Constable Rundul Rana has a wife and son in Nepal. The first, it will be seen, was killed in action, and the latter died from the effects of wounds received in action; and this being so, the families of both are, I think, entitled to the usual pension.

10. I have promoted Constable Jilkea Thaffa to 4th grade head constable, and the other constables have each received a step in their grades; and it is to be considered whether further reward should not be given them, if merely as an inducement to others. Sub-inspector Ruttoo Sing's promotion has been stopped from last year.

11. Owing to the great distance of Chimah, and to my absence from head-quarters, this report has been delayed for a considerable time; and even now I am obliged to forward it incomplete, that is, without the formal depositions of certain constables, which have to be taken by Mr. Rattray. These, however, I trust will soon follow.

DEPOSITION of *Jilkea Thaffa*, Constable.

I WAS one of the advance with Ruttoo Sing's party, and followed the track of the raiders with great difficulty, until at about 2 p.m. we came to an empty encampment. This was on 1st February. We went on again towards the east, following the Kookie path, and came on nine Mughs who were also following the Kookie path, who told us they had seen "Pooeas" towards the north, and we went in that direction, accompanied by the Mughs, and also by the guard at a short distance. Ascending a high hill we rested and ate some dry rice, and the guard came up. After resting we were told to go on slowly by Nirput Sing who was in command of us: and going on again, descended the hill and found a little water. We went on a little again, and about 6 p.m. were joined by the guard. I wished the whole guard to go on quickly, but the Jemedar Rutteo Sing said, "You have left one water behind already, do you know of any other in advance?" I and eight others said we would go on, and had words about it with Nirput Sing, who said he could not go on, and abused me, saying the Kookies have gone home, and you wish to show your *bahadooree* in the jungles. We, however, went on and rested for the night in the jungle a little to the right and off the track. In the morning we waited some time for the guard, but not finding it come up we followed the tract eastward, and so went on till we came on a Kookie camp with fires still lit, and heard guns, when we ate a little, and waited for the guard which we thought would hear the firing and come up. We again went on, and at 1 p.m. heard three shots, and shortly after came on the remains of an elephant. After this we suddenly came on four Kookies and fired on them, and at this time "Jungheer Thaffa" was suddenly missed. We went back a little to look for him, and were suddenly attacked by a large body of Kookies, and seeing our position, a bad one, we ran down to Chimah khall, and took up a strong position, where shortly after the Kookies followed us, and Wuzeerman Roy was hit in the arm and shortly after in the groin. Rundal Rana was also shot in the face by a Kookie at about four yards distance, and he also shot the Kookie in the chest, who dropped his musket and fell back. At about 6 p.m. the Kookies ceased firing and throwing down stones on us, and fell back, and we also fell back at about 11 p.m., taking with us the wounded man, Rundal Rana, and the accoutrements of the dead man, Wuzeerman Roy. We went down the khall for some distance, and then lighting a fire, stayed till morning, and then went on till 11 a.m., when we met the party sent to assist us, and returned with them to Chimah.

On the 1st, when we went on in the evening, and Nirput Sing objected, the Jemadar Rutteo Sing only made a difficulty about the water, but about nothing else.

ANSWER of *Rutteo Sing*, Sub-inspector.

I WAS in command of the Chimah outpost. On the 31st December I was out on patrol with seven men of all ranks besides myself. Came to "Gulungeah" village, and found it burned. Seeing this, we followed what we thought was the track of the Kookies who had

burned

burned the village, and suddenly heard voices in the jungle as of many men. Believing myself too weak to effect anything, and thinking matters would be expedited by my return, I at once returned to Chimah for reinforcements. The distance was four or five hours' journey, and the next morning I came back with a party of 31 men of all ranks to the spot where I had first heard the voices, and following a track with great difficulty, and picking it out from blind tracks which had been made by the raiders, at 3 p.m. we came upon their empty encampment. Went on again, sending an advanced guard on ahead under Nirput Sing, head constable. About 6 p.m. came up with the advance, when, seeing it late, I told them to look for water so that we might halt. They did not come back, and we again went on, but not knowing where they had gone, we encamped for the night.

In the morning, not knowing the road the advance had taken, we went on by what we thought was a proper road, and came into a nullah, down which we went and reached the Sungoo, from whence we returned to Chimah, having with us Sub-inspector Fuzlah, who had been sent to relieve me, and whom we met on the road. I did not know where the advance had gone, and thought it might have gone on by the road we did. We reached the guard at about 3½ p.m., and hearing from the men there that firing had been heard to the north-east of Chima, I ordered out a party of one head constable and ten constables in that direction. Next day I was relieved. I never told the advance not to go on. I told them to go and look for water, and they never came back.

(signed) *J. M. Graham*, Major,
4 February 1871. Officiating Deputy Commissioner.

From *H. L. Harrison*, Esq., Junior Secretary to the Government of Bengal, to the Officiating Commissioner of the Chittagong Division, No. 803; dated Fort William, the 22nd February 1871.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 89 Ct., dated the 13th instant, submitting a letter, with enclosures, from Major Graham, late Officiating Deputy Commissioner of the Hill Tracts, reporting further regarding the late raid on the village of Gulungeah, and the encounter between the raiders and the few men of the Chima outpost guard who followed them.

2. The Lieutenant Governor desires that all possible inquiries tending to establish the identity of the raiders be prosecuted steadily and perseveringly till all doubt on this point be removed.

3. With reference to the two concluding paragraphs of your letter, the Lieutenant Governor, before taking further action, will await the report which you appear to have called for from Captain Lewin, as to sending in to head quarters the families at the outposts during the months of December, January, and February, as also the report regarding the pensions for the families of the two policemen who were killed in action, and the rewards to be given to the survivors of the party that engaged the raiders.

(No. 804.)

COPY of this, and the letter to which it is a reply, forwarded to the Inspector General of Police for information, in continuation of No. 699, of the 17th instant.

From *C. U. Aitchison*, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Political Department, No. 603 P.; dated Fort William, the 24th March 1871.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your junior secretary's letter, dated the 9th March 1871, No. 1037, giving cover to a copy of correspondence regarding a raid of Kookies on the village of Gulungeah in the Chittagong Hill Tracts.

2. In reply, I am desired to state that the Viceroy and Governor General in Council will await the result of the further reports which have been called for in the letter of the Bengal Government, No. 803, dated the 22nd February.

3. It appears to his Excellency in Council of great importance that misconduct on the part of the frontier police should be most severely and promptly punished, while good conduct should be most handsomely and promptly rewarded. In the present case, already more than two months have elapsed since the misconduct of some, and the gallant conduct of others, was brought to light, and this delay will, it is to be feared, destroy much of the effect both of the punishment and of the reward. The Assistant Commissioner should, I am to remark, have at once made all the inquiries needful to enable Government to act, and the Officiating Commissioner should have asked that authority for the punishment and reward might be conveyed by telegraph.

From *H. L. Harrison*, Esq., Junior Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department, to the Officiating Commissioner of the Chittagong Division, No. 1572; dated Fort William, the 6th April 1871.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 451, of the 23rd March last, and enclosures, referring for orders on questions arising out of the Gulungeah raid near the Chima outpost, in the Chittagong Hill Tracts.

2. In reply, I am to say that the Lieutenant Governor approves of the recommendations made in paragraphs 3 to 6 of your letter, to dismiss from the Hill Tract Police Sub-inspector Rutteo Sing, Head Constable Nirput Sing, and Constable Jungheer Thappa, for their cowardly and disgraceful conduct when in pursuit of the raiders.

3. His Honor approves of your proposal to withdraw the guards at all the outposts every year, from the setting in of the rains and rise of the rivers till the 1st November.

4. The grant of a special reward of 20 rupees each to the six constables who so gallantly followed up the raiders and withstood their attack in overwhelming force is sanctioned, and the Inspector General of Police will be requested to have them at once promoted to a higher grade.

5. The Lieutenant Governor will be prepared to sanction pensions for the widows and children of the constable who was killed in action, and of the other constable who died of his wounds, on the receipt of the necessary rolls from the Inspector General of Police; but in the meantime they should be allowed a subsistence allowance, to be deducted hereafter from the sanctioned pensions.

6. The dismissal and rewards should be as public as possible, with a view to the production of a proper effect on the Hill Tract Police, and to encourage the men to behave well in any future encounters with hostile tribes.

From *S. C. Bayley*, Esq., Officiating Commissioner of the Chittagong Division, to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department, No. 451; dated Chittagong, the 23rd March 1871.

IN my Report, No. 89 Ct., dated 13th February, regarding the Gulungeah raids near the Chima out-post, the following questions were still left undisposed of:—

(1.) The identity of the raiders.
(2.) The conduct of Sub-inspector Rutteo Sing.
(3.) The question of bringing the women and children of the police in from the outposts to head-quarters during the cold weather months.
(4.) Pensions to families of the constables who lost their lives in the fight.
(5.) Special rewards to the survivors.

The first of these questions, viz., the identity of these raiders, has not advanced. A form drawn out by Captain Lewin, and communicated to you with my demi-official letter of the 1st March, while showing the ground we have for considering certain chiefs implicated in the other raids of this season, is silent as to this raid, and I have again asked him to report on the subject. The other questions are all now ripe for disposal.

3. In regard to the conduct of Sub-inspector Rutteo Sing, I enclose the Deputy Commissioner's letter, No. 112, dated 14th March, and concur in his suggestion that the sub-inspector should be dismissed the service. Nothing could have been worse than his behaviour. On the first night when he came within reach of the raiders, he did his best to ensure them a safe retreat by going back instead of sending for reinforcements, or making a night attack, and on the following night he left what he calls his advanced guard without support, and instead of following them up the next day, he returned with his main force to the stockade.

4. There can be no doubt, from the evidence taken that his conduct was the result of sheer cowardice. I think the evidence shows him to have been supported in this cowardice by head constable Nirput Sing, who appears to have done his utmost to prevent the advance of the party that ultimately came across the raiders, and I have asked Captain Lewin if he has taken any notice of this conduct.

5. It is to the cowardice of these two officers that we owe the loss of two good lives, and the finally incomplete affair with the raiders, which, had the whole force been there, would probably have terminated very differently.

6. I notice in regard to Jungheer Thappa, that Captain Lewin proposes to dismiss him with ignominy; but he had already, on 10th February, in his letter, No. 52, reported that he had degraded him for this offence. I think he should be dismissed for his cowardice notwithstanding, for it was the more disgraceful, as he deserted his few companions at the most critical time, and their own firmness should have set him a good example.

7. I now come to the question of removing the women and children. Major Graham, in the 8th paragraph of his letter, No. 37, of 4th February, had recommended that during

during the raiding season, *i.e.*, the cold weather months, the women and children belonging to the police should be removed from the out-posts and brought into head-quarters, thus leaving a larger force free for the work of patrolling, and leaving the men in the posts unhampered in case of attack. But in your letter of 21st February, paragraph 6, the Lieutenant Governor takes the question a little further, and suggests that in the non-raiding season (I should say from 15th May till 15th November) the posts themselves be withdrawn, the men brought in for drill and discipline to head-quarters, and by thus establishing the women and children at head-quarters; the men might be sent to occupy the posts and patrol during the cold season without their families.

8. I discussed this question verbally with Captain Lewin, and I have now the honour to enclose his Report,* in which I fully concur.

*No. 111, dated 14th March.

9. He proposes to withdraw all the posts from what may be called the frontier defence line (as distinguished from administrative stations) during the rains, and exercise the men at head-quarters. In case of an expedition against the Looshais, this is obviously desirable, and I gather that Captain Lewin hopes that having once settled their families at head-quarters, the men will be more easily induced to do without them at the out-posts during the patrolling season. I trust this experiment will be sanctioned. I am not aware, however, if Captain Lewin has consulted the Inspector General of Police or not on this point.

10. In regard to pensions for the families of the constables who were killed, Captain Lewin has, as I reported in my No. 427 of 10th March, applied to the Inspector General of Police, and in the same letter I applied to Government for special rewards of 20 rupees to be given to survivors, who have, moreover, been all promoted one grade. I learn now that this application ought to have been made through the Inspector General of Police. The omission was purely inadvertent.

From Captain *T. H. Lewin*, Deputy Commissioner, Chittagong Hill Tracts, to the Commissioner of Chittagong, No. 111; dated Rangamuttea, the 14th March 1871.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Memorandum, No. 398, dated 4th instant, covering letter, No. 790, dated 21st ultimo, from the Government of Bengal, calling upon me for an expression of opinion as to the advisability or otherwise of withdrawing the police guard from certain of our frontier posts during the rainy season of each year.

2. In reply, I beg to state that I entirely concur with the views of Major Graham on the subject, but I would suggest that the step in question is one, the advantages or disadvantages of which will be best ascertained practically.

3. Moreover, the Government have now under consideration a scheme which will in all probability change altogether the localities of the different frontier posts, and such alterations of site would naturally modify the views that may be entertained upon the present subject.

4. I, therefore, propose on the 1st of May next to withdraw the posts as per margin, bringing men into head-quarters for drill and discipline, in which they are at present deficient. I shall maintain all executive posts not connected with frontier defence, as they are required for the civil administration of the district.

1. Gungaram.
2. Phurrooah.
3. Chimah.
4. Pyndoo.
5. Bellye Surree.

5. I shall leave a guard of 50 picked men at Bundrabun for service in the Sungoo subdivision (*see* Commissioner's letter, No. 330, dated 11th January 1871, to Government of Bengal).

6. In the event of the advanced frontier post on Oicpoom Hill being sanctioned, I should withdraw also the Kassalong guard, leaving the post temporarily in the hands of the men intended to garrison Oicpoom.

7. I agree with Major Graham that there is little or no good in keeping up the line of frontier guard posts during the rains.

8. I consider, however, that if the three posts of Gungaram, Chimah, and Phurrooah be withdrawn, there is no reason for keeping the remaining two posts of Bellye Surree and Pyndoo isolated by themselves. Frontier patrol at that season is impracticable, and if the measure is undertaken, it had better be carried out in its entirety, we shall thus be in a better position to judge of its effects, both as a measure of economy and as affecting the well-being of the men, as also to observe whether, by the withdrawal of the guards, the hill people themselves manifest any additional symptoms of insecurity.

9. I would add that, in the event of any hostile expedition against the Looshais being contemplated next November, it is absolutely necessary that the police should be brought together for training, if they are expected to take any active share in the affair.

From Captain *T. H. Lewin*, Deputy Commissioner, Chittagong Hill Tracts, to the Commissioner of Chittagong, No. 112; dated Rangamuttea, the 14th March 1871.

In continuation of my letter, No. 75, dated 20th ultimo, and with reference to previous correspondence in the matter of the conduct of Sub-inspector Rutteo Sing and Constable Jungheer Thappa in the late Gulungeah raid, I have the honour to forward herewith copies of the depositions of constables who were present at the time, together with the statement of the sub-inspector who stands accused of cowardice in the face of the enemy.

2. I am of opinion that the sub-inspector's conduct has been most culpable, and I agree with my predecessor, Major Graham, that he has shown himself unfit to hold any further command in the frontier force.

3. Not only on the present occasion has he manifested his unfitness to hold any responsible situation, but also (as stated in paragraph 12, Assistant Commissioner's letter, No. 10, of 21st January 1871, forwarded to you under cover of this office letter, No. 37, dated 4th February 1871), he was guilty of culpable negligence on a very similar occasion last year.

4. I therefore recommend that Sub-inspector Rutteo Sing be discharged from the Hill Tract Police, and be further declared ineligible to serve Government again in any capacity whatever.

5. Constable Jungheer Thappa, by his own admission (*see* paragraph 10, Assistant Commissioner's letter, No. 10, dated 21st January 1871, above alluded to), has been guilty of cowardice in the face of the enemy, and I recommend that he also be dismissed with ignominy from the force.

6. Had it been practicable, I consider that both the sub-inspector and constable are deserving of even heavier punishment than that which I have recommended, but the offence committed by them does not, under the constitution of the Bengal police, admit of more weighty sentence.

7. I await your orders, as to the recommendations made by me (letter, No. 25, dated 20th February, paragraph 4, to your address), for the bestowal of a money gratuity on the constables who distinguished themselves by their bravery in this affair.

6. The pension roll for the widows and families of those constables who were killed in action have been submitted to the Inspector General of Police for the requisite sanction.

Joshman Roy, states: About a month since I accompanied the Sub-inspector Rutteo Sing in chase of the party from Gulungeah. The morning after our return from Gulungeah we left the stockade with, I think, 29 men to follow up the raiders. We left in boats about six in the morning. We left the boats near Gulungeah, and took up the track of the raiders. We left the boats about 9 a.m. About 2 p.m. we came upon an abandoned encampment. We had been engaged the whole forenoon in following up the track of the raiders. A great many false tracks had been made, and we found ourselves constantly returning to the place from where we had started. The encampment showed that about 30 men halted there for the night. When we left the boats, an advance and rear guard we told off. The advance guard consisted of four men and a head constable, Nurput Sing. I was one of the advance guard. Before we arrived at the abandoned encampment the men got mixed together, and no order was attempted on the line of march. Sub-inspector Rutteo Sing remained with the main body. No order was kept after leaving the abandoned encampment. The men were fagged out, and the jungle was very thick. About 4 a.m., six of us arrived in advance and halted on the top of a main range of hills. After an hour or so, three others, Setoo Nugger Kote, Jungheer Thapha, and Ooneez Man Roy, came up and joined our party. These three men stated that the sub-inspector was behind. After some time the whole party assembled, and some of us went on a-head in search of water. The sub-inspector would give no orders. After I had gone some distance in advance with some others, the three men mentioned came and said that the sub-inspector had no intention of continuing the advance that day. We then halted, nine of us, and the following morning, after waiting for some time for the rest of the party, continued our journey in the track of the raiders.

The morning Gulungeah was cut up, Rutteo Sing and nine constables (I was one of the party), arrived at the spot about noon of that day, and, after investigating the case, started in pursuit of the raiders. About sunset we heard the voices of men on a low range of hills close to us; we also heard the noise of men cutting bamboos and husking paddy. Here we halted, and the sub-inspector ordered a retreat, saying that he did not think us strong enough to make an attack. We arrived at the stockade about 10 o'clock that night, and the following morning started a fresh pursuit.

Jungheer Subah, states: I am stationed at the Chymah stockade. I was with Sub-inspector Rutteo Sing when he made the inquiry connected with the raid on Gulungeah. Including myself and the sub-inspector, there were nine who went to Gulungeah the morning after the place was cut up. We left Gelungeah about 2 p.m., and followed the track of the Kookies till near sunset, when we heard their voices in the jungles. We told the sub-inspector to halt and attack the men at night, and surprise them when asleep. Sub-inspector said it would be better to go back to the stockade, and return with reinforce-

ments,

ments, and attack them at daybreak. On this we turned back, and arrived at the stockade about 10 o'clock that night. When we arrived at the stockade some were for the attack and others against it. Nothing was done till the following morning, when the sub-inspector started with 29 men, himself included. We left in boats, and struck off for the interior near Gulungeah. I was told off with three others to the advanced guard, under Nurput Sing, head constable. About 11 a.m. we arrived at the spot where the raiders had encamped the previous night. When we left the encampment ground all order was abandoned, and we proceeded in straggling parties of twos and threes. About 5 p.m., I and some six or seven others reached the top of a high range of hills where we halted, and had some dry rice to eat. After some time I saw the sub-inspector and others coming up the hill, on which I went off with Joshman Roy to search for water in advance. After going some distance, seven others came up and said that they did not know if the others were coming on that night. As night had set in, we halted and slept under a tree. The following morning we continued on the track of the raiders under the impression that the rest of our party were following behind. I left the hill before the sub-inspector came up, and did not hear of the dispute amongst the men about following up the track further that day.

(signed) *A. Rattray,*
Assistant Commissioner.

Bundrabun, 5 March 1871.

Koishbeer Hai, states: I am stationed here as a constable. I accompanied the Sub-inspector Rutteo Sing when he went after the Gulungeah raiders. Including the officer, there were, I think, 31 men. I do not remember the date. I think it was the 1st January when we left the stockade after the raiders. We left early in the morning. We left the boats and started for the interior about six in the morning. Before starting an advance guard of four men and one head constable was told off. There was also a rear guard. I was with the main body. After losing our way very often, in consequence of the raiders having made numerous false tracks, we arrived at their encampment about noon. About 150 or 200 men had encamped on the spot. A great quantity of paddy had been husked on the spot. Near the encampment about 15 Mugs from Gulungeah met us, saying that they had come in the track of the raiders. They would not accompany us but turned back. No order had been kept after leaving the boats. The country is very wild, and it is not possible to keep together in going through the ravines. After leaving the encampment, each man went as he liked. There was no advance guard and no rear guard. The men kept together in small parties over a great length of country. About 4 p.m., some 13 of us arrived at the top of a high range of hills and halted for the rest of the party. After about an hour the men came up in small parties. There was no water to be had on the top of the hill, and some of us advised a further advance that day. The sub-inspector had not arrived there. When he arrived a little after this he sat down, and would give no orders as to whether we were to advance or fall back. I suggested the probability of water a-head if we continued our pursuit. Others said the same, but he would give no orders. The Head Constable Nurput Sing abused those who talked of an advance, saying that the "fighting ones" were at liberty to go on a-head. During this dispute some of the men had gone on, and I followed after a short time. After walking till sun-set, and finding no water, I halted with some eight others, and waited for the main body to come up. The following morning, finding that the main body had not come up, we continued in the track of the raiders.

I was not with the sub-inspector the morning he went to Gulungeah.

Shabatoor Sing states: I am a constable attached to this post. I did not accompany the Sub-inspector Rutteo Sing the morning he went to Gulungeah. I went with him the following morning in pursuit of the raiders. I do not remember the date. We left the stockade early in the morning. We numbered 29 men of all ranks near Gulungeah. We turned off into the jungles. Advance and rear guards had been told off at the time of starting. I was with the main body when we got inside the jungles. The men mixed together, and there was no guard in advance or rear. About 2 p.m., we arrived at a spot where some 300 men had encamped; we met some Mugs here who had come from Gulungeah in search of the raiders, who turned back when we continued our advance. A great many false tracks had been made by the raiders, and we separately lost our way. After forcing 4 p.m., we arrived at the top of a high range of hills. There were about 12 men in our party, the rest of the men kept dropping on in twos and threes till sunset. The Sub-inspector Rutho Sing came in late, and made inquiries about water. Some of the men had gone on a-head in search of water. I also left the party in search of water. The sub-inspector did not wish to go on any further, but would not tell us so; although we asked him, he would give us no definite reply. The Head Constable Nurput Sing abused the men who left in search of water. He said there was no use in going any further. When I had gone some distance a-head, I met eight others of our party, who had gone in advance to search for water. We halted for the night, expecting that the sub-inspector and his men would come up, but they did not, and the following morning finding that the main body had not arrived we proceeded in the track of the raiders, thinking all the time that the sub-inspector was following.

Sitoo Nugyar Kote states: I am constable of this post. I did not accompany Sub-inspector Rutteo Sing to Gulungeah the morning that village was cut up. I accompanied him

the following morning in pursuit of the raiders. We left the stockade early in the morning of the 1st January 1871. We mustered 27 men of all ranks. We went down in boats to the spot where the raiders had struck off for the jungles, and then marched inland. After wandering about the jungles till about noon we came upon the encampment of the raiders. About 200 men had encamped on the spot. Before leaving the boats, I had been told off for the rear guard. There were four of us in the rear guard. After leaving the abandoned encampment, no attempt was made to keep up the advance or rear guards. We struggled on a long time in isolated parties. In the afternoon I and some 12 others were the first to arrive at the top of a high range of hills. We waited here for some time, when the rest of the party dropped in in twos and threes. After all the men had collected, the sub-inspector said no water could be had in advance. He asked us if water was to be had in advance. Some said yes, others replied in the negative. Those who said water could be had by going further were abused by the Head Constable Nurput Sing. The sub-inspector would give no orders. We did not know what to do. In expectation of finding water in advance, I and some others went on a-head till dark. When we halted, nine of us found ourselves in advance of the main body when night set in. We halted for the night, and the following morning found that the main body had not come up. Expecting the main body to follow, we continued in the track of the raiders till we came upon them in the manner I have mentioned before. The sub-inspector would give us no definite orders when we came to a halt on the top of the hill. He told us to do as we liked.

From *C. U. Aitchison*, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Political Department, No. 73 C–P.; dated Camp Mooruja Ghât, the 24th April 1871.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your junior secretary's letter, dated the 6th of April 1871, No. 1572, reporting the action which has been taken by the Government of Bengal to punish the sub-inspector and constable of police who acted in so cowardly and disgraceful a manner on the occasion of the recent raids by Looshais on the village of Gulungeah, and to reward the constables who gallantly did their duty by following up the raiders, and resisting their attack.

2. The Viceroy and Governor General in Council fully approves of the proceedings of the Government of Bengal as reported in your letter.

TELEGRAPHIC MESSAGES.

Dated 22nd April 1871.

From—Chittagong.	To—Calcutta.
From—Commissioner.	To—Secretary to Government of Bengal.

Rutton Pooea has seen Mary Winchester in village of Saboonga, chief of Howlongs. Thirty muskets demanded as ransom. Negotiations being made to induce the chief to accept money or cloth. Rutton Pooea desires retention of the guard, which I have allowed.

Dated 24th April 1871.

From—Calcutta.	To—Commissioner.
From—Secretary Government of Bengal.	To—Chittagong.

MUSKETS cannot be given, but a moderate ransom in any other shape may be agreed to. India's recent orders are strict as to withdrawal of guard from Rutton Pooea, and it is not expedient to keep a small guard so isolated. If there is really very strong reason for keeping it, explain.

No. 839 P., dated the 8th May 1871.

From—Simla.	To—Calcutta.
From—Foreign Secretary.	To—Secretary, Government of Bengal.

YOURS of 25th April. Viceroy considers that a very handsome ransom should be offered for Winchester's child, and wishes for a precise report as to Rutton Pooea's proceedings since guard was placed at his village.

Dated the 8th May 1871.

From—Calcutta.	To—Simla.
From—Secretary, Government of Bengal.	To—Foreign Secretary.

COMMISSISSIONER of Chittagong reports he has agreed for the ransom of Mary Winchester from Saboonga for 400 rupees. While the negotiations are going on, the Lieutenant Governor proposes to retain the guard in Rutton Pooea's village for a few days longer. Hopes that you approve. Lieutenant Governor guarantees its coming back very shortly.

No. 844 C. P., dated the 9th May 1871.

From—Simla.	To—Calcutta.
From—Foreign Secretary.	To—Secretary, Government of Bengal.

YOURS of 8th. Rutton Pooea's post may be retained for another fortnight or three weeks. If required longer, report specially. Ransom approved; but nothing to be said or done to fetter future action of Government in regard to Saboonga or his tribe.

(Strictly confidential.)

Foreign Department—Political.—No. 861 P.

From *C. U. Aitchison*, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal.

Sir, Simla, the 12th May 1871.

I AM desired to acknowledge receipt of your docket, No. 1580, dated 6th April 1871, forwarding a communication from Mr. Edgar, by which considerable additions are made to the information already possessed by the Government of India regarding the tribes and chiefs who committed the late raids in Munnipoor, Cachar, Sylhet, and Hill Tipperah.

2. The sources of information on this subject have been by no means as yet exhausted, and, from the inquiries which his Honor the Lieutenant Governor is instituting, the Viceroy and Governor General in Council hopes to receive still more complete evidence by which to bring home the guilt of particular acts of outrage to individual chiefs and tribes. Still, in the opinion of his Excellency in Council, sufficient information has been obtained on which to frame a decision as to the general measures which may be expedient for Government to adopt, in consequence of the wanton and cruel outrages committed within British territory on British subjects, and their property, during the last spring.

3. There appear to have been six, or possibly seven, distinct raids committed last season by the Looshai tribes:—

I. On the last day of last year occurred the raid on Gulungeah, in the south of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, which has formed the subject of the correspondence noted on the margin.* Concerning the tribe that committed it, practically nothing whatever is yet known; and, till something is discovered on this point, there is no reason for connecting it with the discussion on the far more serious raids to the north and north-east of the Looshai tract.

* From you, No. 1037, dated 9th March.
To you, No. 603 P., dated 24th March.
From you, No. 1575 P., dated 6th April.
To you, No. 73 C-P., dated 24th April.

II. Of the more serious raids to the north, the first in point of time were nearly simultaneous attacks† on two villages in the south-east of Munnipoor on the morning of the 16th January.

†From Political Agent, No. 12, dated 25th June.

III. Within a very few days after this, there were raids‡ in Hill Tipperah of such a character as to spread panic among the villages on the Dulai, in the Sylhet district.

‡From Bengal Government to Government of India, No. 360, dated 31st Jan.

IV. Very possibly these raiders were connected with those who, almost immediately afterwards, *i. e.*, on the 22nd January and two following days, committed outrages in the neighbourhood of the Chargola post, in the extreme east of Sylhet. Another, but probably§ connected body of men on 23rd and 24th, committed in the Hylakandy subdivision of Cachar, the successful attacks on the village of Cacharee Poonjee, and the factory of Alexandrapoor, where they murdered Mr. Winchester, and whence they carried off his little child. The same party of raiders made the two partially successful attacks on the Katlicherra factory, after which they retired along the Chutter Choorra range to the south.

§(From what Mr. Metcalfe observed in following up the Katlicherra raiders.)

V. Three days after this, there occurred very formidable attacks on the gardens of Monierkhall and Dhurmikhall, on the police post of Monierkhall itself, and on the rear guard of the reinforcement which came up for its relief.

VI. After quiet had been restored for nearly a month, an unsuccessful attack was on the 23rd February* made on the Julnacherra garden, in the extreme south of the Hylakandy sub-division, whence the raiders again retired by the Chutter Choorra range.

*Enclosure in letter from Bengal Government, No. 1044, dated 9th March.

VII. Four days afterwards, on the 27th February,† a body of raiders issuing from the Tipperah Hills, attacked a Sylhet village, north-east of the Alinuggur police post, on the Dulai. The police came on the raiders as they were retiring, and inflicted some loss.

†Enclosure in letter from Bengal Government, No. 1044, dated 9th March.

On the next day, the 28th, there was an attack on Toetelah ‡ Reang's house near Oodeypoor, in Hill Tipperah, and, in a few days later apparently, attacks on villages about Shonamorrah, also in Hill Tipperah, where, moreover, about the 1st March two bodies of raiders were reported to be engaged in plundering and burning the villages, one body about 12 miles east of Oodeypoor, the other 20 miles east of the Chukulnay Station, in Comillah, the peace of which district appeared at one time to be seriously menaced.

‡Enclosure in letter from Government of Bengal to Government of India, No. 1252, dated 23rd March.

4. I am now to proceed to the examination of the information which, from time to time has been procured as to the identity of the chiefs and tribes who committed these outrages.

5. As to the raiders in Munnipoor (paragraph 3, II.,) the captives who escaped gave evidence which implicated Vonolel, Poiboi, and Vonpillal. They said that the raiders, as they made the attack, shouted out the names of their leaders and of the villages which they had destroyed, and among them were the names of the above chiefs. The captives also stated that they had themselves been carried prisoners to the villages of these chiefs. Further, according to the statement of Sawai Jamba, a Munnipoor major, large bodies of Looshais, whom his men had encountered on two occasions before the raid, named on one occasion Vonpilal, and Vonpillal's mother, and on the other Poiboi and Vonpilal as their chiefs.

6. Mr. Edgar's information was, that the raiding party was headed by Lenkom§, Vonolel's eldest son. He does not give any information directly implicating the other chiefs mentioned, Vonpilal and Poiboi. It is also worthy of notice that the only village definitely named by the captives as that to which they were brought, was Sumfai, clearly corresponding to Chumlai, which is the village of Vonolel's son, Lallboorah. On the other hand, it is to be observed that the people from whom Mr. Edgar derived his information were the tribesmen of Impanee, Vonpilal's mother, and the Kamhows who brought in the ransomed women mentioned below in paragraph 9, said that the raid in Munnipoor was conducted by Poiboi as well as Lenkom.

§ Paragraph 13 of his No. B., dated 6th March. Enclosure in the docket now under acknowledgment.

7. The information on the other hand, procured by Major Lewin, and forwarded in your letter No. 1234, dated 21st March last, points doubtfully to Lal Saboola, the Howlong; to Bhootaiya (possibly Bhoota), and to Dookooma, Saboonga, and Jatna, Syloo chiefs, as being implicated in these raids. Of the value of this information the Government of India has no means of judging.

8. Next, as to the perpetrators of the raids in East Cachar, Monierkhall, and Nugdigram (paragraph 3, IV.), Impanee's men assigned them, in talking to Mr. Edgar‖, to Lallboorah, the son, and Tangdong the nephew of Vonolel; and this account is, he says, borne out by two facts: 1st, that Munoo Sing, the trader whom Mr. Edgar sent down the Sonai, met at Bazir Ghât men of Vonolel's tribe, bearing heads in baskets; 2nd, that the Rajah of Munnipoor heard¶ from Kamhow, chief of Molbem, that hearing of an expedition into the west on the part of a son of Vonolel, he attacked his villages in his absence. Now Impanee's men had said that the village of Tangdong, Vonolel's nephew, but often called his son, had been attacked by Kamhow in his absence, and the Political Agent at Munnipoor had, on the 11th February, received like information** that Shindoos and Kamhows had attacked the villages of a son and brother of Vonolel.

‖Enclosure in the communication from Bengal Government now acknowledged.

¶Section 17 of enclosure to communication now acknowledged.

** Telegram from him.

9. Lastly, a woman from the village of Vonolel's brother, whom she calls Thulal, which was attacked by the Kamhows, says, that the attack was made during the absence of many of the male inhabitants of her village, who had gone to commit a raid in Cachar. She added that the Kamhows could not have effected this with success had they not been assisted by the villagers of Sookpilal and Vonpillal acting as guides. This woman's story is confirmed on a collateral point by Mr. Edgar's informants, who had heard that, as she reported, the wife of the chief Thulal or Tangdong, had been carried off by the Kamhows.

The Kamhows, who brought this woman in, when she was ransomed by the Rajah of Munnipoor, said that the raid on Cachar was made by the chiefs Vonolel, Laloom, and Thulal, and that they went under instructions from the villagers of Sookpilal and Vonpillal acting as guides. This information procured from the Rajah of Munnipoor, was communicated to you under cover of docket No. 38 C–P., dated 17th ultimo.

10. The men of Pibuk, Sookpilal's mother, informed Mr. Edgar that these raids were committed by Lenkom, Vonolel's eldest son; but it was clear to Mr. Edgar afterwards that Lenkom was mentioned by mistake for other relations of Vonolel.

11. Inconsistent with this was the statement of Rutton Sing, the Hindustanee, who lives in Kholel (Vonpilal's larger village), and who informed Mr. M'Williams††, when Officiating Deputy Commissioner of Cachar, that Bhoota's two sons had, after attacking Vonpilal's smaller village, gone on to Monierkhall.

††Telegram from Mr. McWilliam to Government of Bengal, dated 4th February.

12. The

12. The first series of raids in West Cachar (probably, therefore, the nearly simultaneous raids in Eastern Sylhet also (paragraph 3, IV.), and perhaps those immediately preceding in Hill Tipperah) (paragraph 2, III.), were by some men* whom Mr. Edgar sent to the south to make inquiries, set down to Bhenkui and Sangboong, sons of Lalpitang, the most powerful of the Howlong chiefs, and Savoong, chief of the Syloos. The planning of this expedition was by these emissaries attributed to Mischoilal, who has occupied a conspicuous place in the annals of the disturbances on this frontier. They said that Mr. Winchester's child was with the mother of Bhenkui. Other informants, namely, the men† of Dharmangpi, told Mr. Edgar that this child had probably been taken to Savoong's village. By Khalkom, Sookpilal's son, talking to Mr. Edgar, these raids were set down‡ to the same chiefs, with the addition of another Lalboorah, nearly related to the great Howlong chief, Vandoilah. He was less sure of the complicity of Mischoilal; but in Mr. Edgar's opinion some confirmation is to be found in the visit of the four men§ who, shortly before the raids had come on a suspicious errand of inspection to the Katlicherra Tea Garden. These men were clearly Poitoos, *i.e.*, of the tribe of Kookies, whose chief is Mischoilal. This was proved by their description, and by the fact that one of them had accompanied Mr. Kemble's expedition in 1869, and therefore, in Mr. Edgar's opinion, probably belonged to the villages of Rungbhoom or Lalholien, who are nearly related to Mischoilal. Further inquiries are, Mr. Edgar says, being made as to the names of these Poitoos.

*Paragraph 24 of the enclosure to the communication now under acknowledgment.

†Paragraph 21 of the enclosure to the communication now under acknowledgment.

‡Paragraph 27 of the enclosure to the communication now under acknowledgment.

§Paragraph 30 of the enclosure to the communication now under acknowledgment.

13. If it is true, as Mr. Edgar has heard,‖ that this Mischoilal has been sheltered by Ali Ahmed Khan, a zemindar of Sylhet, there will probably be little difficulty in ascertaining whether the character of his actions and of the persons he saw previous to the outbreak was such as to give colour to the belief that he was implicated in the outrages referred to.

‖Section 24 of enclosure to the docket now under acknowledgment.

14. As an additional evidence of Saboonga's share in these raids, his men brought down for sale at the Kassalong fair in Chittagong, some forks and spoons, &c., which, perhaps with the intention of averting suspicion from themselves, they said had been got from Sookpilal, and which (so Mr. Bagshawe thought) had been taken from Alexandrapoor. Means have probably been by this time found of identifying these articles with certainty. Major Lewin disbelieves¶ the statement which criminates Sookpilal, and accounts for it by the known enmity which exists between that chief and Saboonga.

¶Enclosure in your communication, No. 1106, dated 13th March.

15. In the detailed information sent by Major Lewin, and forwarded with your letter No. 1234, dated 21st March last, no mention is made of Sookpilal or Lallboorah, the son of Vonolel, as having been implicated. Nor is Savoonga the Syloo chief mentioned. Major Lewin's informants (among whom was Savoonga himself) pointed rather to Lall Saboola, Mongpoon, Seipooya, Lallboorah, and Vantsanga, Howlong chiefs, to Dook ooma Syloo, and Burkoya, Lallboorah, Lal-Thong-Bong, and Rang Vroong, chiefs whose tribe is not stated.

16. The complicity of the Howlong chiefs was early known to the Commissioner of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, for on receiving** a description of the dress worn by the raiders, he replied that it corresponded exactly with that worn by the Looshais of those parts, and that the Cachar raids were committed by the Howlong chiefs, Lal Saboola, Moungpood (or Moungpoon), and Seipooya. Of these chiefs, Moungpoon and Seipooya are also implicated by a passage in a memorandum by the Commissioner of Chittagong, dated 14th January, mentioned by Mr. Edgar in paragraph 28 of the communication under acknowledgment, but not apparently forwarded to the Government of India, which, therefore, I am to request may now be sent up.

**Telegram of 7th February.

17. Again, the information picked up by a Cachar trader, whose stay about Chungsil is mentioned by Mr. Edgar, in paragraph 29 of the above-mentioned communication, pointed to the son of Lalpitang as the head of the raids in the west of Cachar.

18. Lastly, according to the information sent under cover of your docket, No. 1864½, dated 25th ultimo, Mr. Winchester's child, Mary, has been seen in the village of Saboonga, a Howlong chief.

19. The raids in Hill Tipperah, near Adumpoor, in Sylhet (paragraph 3, III.), which slightly preceded those in Hylakandy were according to the information gathered by an escaped prisoner, Charun, committed by the followers of one Darool Raja, a cousin of Sookpilal, residing at a place about seven days to the south-west of Sookpillal's residence near a river, the water of which is saltish. Major Lewin, however, has shown there is the greatest reason for discrediting this information.

20. Sookpilal himself, on the 9th January, had sent to Mr. Edgar†† to say that a party of Syloos from Saboonga's village had gone towards Adumpoor, or, as he said afterwards, to Hill Tipperah.

††Paragraph 12 of his letter, No. A., dated 21st January 1871.

21. As to the raid on Julnacherra, in South Hylakandy (paragraph 3, VI.), on the day before it happened (22nd February), Mr. Edgar heard that a small party of Howlongs, without the consent of their chiefs, had started on a plundering expedition, and that it was probable that they would attack some of the gardens east of the Dullessur, in South Hylakandy.

22. Regarding the last raids mentioned in paragraph 3 of this letter, which formed the the second series in Sylhet and Tipperah, the information is very conflicting.

23. Just before they occurred, a warning had been roceived from the Deputy Commissioner of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, due to informatien received from Rutton Pooea, that Soonga, chief of the Syloos, Lallboorah (brother-in-law of Rutton Pooea), and Rantsanga (or, as it was subsequently stated, Vantsana), a Howlong chief, were preparing an attack by the Dulai to avenge the death of those who had been killed in the previous expedition.

24. On the other hand, when the raid near Alinuggur, on the Dulai, took place, the Kookies there are said by the magistrate of Sylhet* to have recognised Lall Shoonga (or Lalchung), Sookpilal's son, as among the assailants. who, they asserted were Sookpilal's men. In the magistrates' detailed report, forwarded with your No. 1044, dated 9th March, the raiders were stated to be Bamaleah Kookies, whatever they may be.

* His telegram, dated 5th March.

25. The almost simultaneous raid in Hill Tipperah was attributed by Pooran, the escaped prisoner, to the retainers of Sookpilal's sister (the wife of Mischoilal, separated from him and living near her brother, Sookpilal), with Dartong Kookies, and Sookpilal's own tribesmen.

26. The Raja of Tipperah heard from his own men that the raiders were Chukmas from the south of the Fenny, and the fugitives who were met by the Comillah police said that there were Chukmas among the raiders. The complicity of the Chukmas, who reside well within British jurisdiction, is, however, quite disbelieved by the Commissioner, who has desired Captain Lewin to do his best to ascertain who the raiders really were.

27. While there is much that is doubtful in the information as yet procured, the evidence analysed in the preceding paragraphs indicates with tolerable certainty the chiefs and tribes who were implicated in the more serious raids in the Hylakandy Valley and Eastern Cachar. The inquiries which are being prosecuted by the Lieutenant Governor may probably elicit further facts, confirmatory of the evidence already obtained, and which may clear up much of the uncertainty that still hangs over these raids. In the meantime, his Excellency in Council requests the Lieutenant Governor to submit his opinion on the following points:—

1st. As to who the guilty tribes are, where they reside, and the mode by which they could be most easily approached.

2ndly. Whether a visitation of these people in their own homes by an armed force is absolutely necessary for the future security of our fellow-subjects, who reside on the Cachar and Chittagong frontier.

3rdly. In the event of a hostile expedition being determined on, what would be the description of punishment which would be most felt by the individuals who took part in the raids, and would have the surest effect in deterring other tribes from committing similar outrages.

4thly. The nature of the country through which a British force, whether of police or military, would have to pass for this purpose, should be as nearly as possible described, and a statement furnished as to the probable length of time during which it would be necessary to occupy certain positions in the country. In this case opinion should be given as to how communication should be kept up, and supplies conveyed.

The Governor General in Council is also desirous of being furnished with the Lieutenant Governor's opinion as to whether any arrangements can be made with friendly Looshai tribes, by which either their active assistance could be obtained, or their neutrality secured, during the progress of the movement of troops and police in their country. His Excellency in Council attaches great importance to this latter point, in the view not only of obtaining an additional element of success in the enterprise, but also as affording a means of laying the basis of future friendly relations with many of these people.

28. Until all these questions are fully answered, the Government of India will not come to a decision as to whether an expedition is to take place or not, or, if it is determined upon, as to its precise character and objects.

29. I am to remark that, if active operations are to be undertaken, it is essential that they should be made as silently and as swiftly as possible. The Lieutenant General will therefore no doubt recognise the necessity that exists of keeping absolutely secret the contents of this letter and all future correspondence on this subject. All officers with whom he may communicate, either verbally or in writing, should be told that any disclosure of such communications will be considered as a serious breach of duty.

30. His Honor will doubtless recognise the necessity of such expedition in the preparation and submission of the report now called for as is consistent with its completeness in all points.

From *S. C. Bayley*, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal (Judicial Department) to the Secretary to the Government of India.—Foreign Department, No. 2099; dated Fort William, the 2nd May 1871.

In continuation of the endorsement from this office, No. 1645, dated the 13th ultimo, I am directed to submit herewith, for the information of the Government of India in the Foreign Department, a printed copy of a letter, No. 82, dated the 28th March, from the Commissioner of Dacca, enclosing a report from Mr. Edgar, Deputy Commissioner of Cachar, giving an account, &c., of the state of Looshai clans, and his opinion as to the policy that should be pursued towards them; also a note on these tribes by Mr. Burland, the gentleman who accompanied Mr. Edgar in his recent expedition into the Looshai country.

2. The Lieutenant Governor will not at present offer any remarks on these interesting and important papers; but as Mr. Simson, Mr. Edgar, and Captain Lewin will shortly arrive in Calcutta to confer with his Honor, he hopes to be soon in a position to lay before the Government of India, in a complete shape, his views as to the policy that should be adopted in respect to the tribes concerned in the late outrages on the Eastern Frontier.

From *F. B. Simson*, Esq., Commissioner of the Dacca Division, to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal.—Political Department, No. 82, dated Dacca, the 28th March 1871.

I have the honour to forward herewith a long and very able report from Mr. Edgar, Deputy Commissioner of Cachar, describing the position and history of the hill tribes southward of Cachar, and the policy which he considers should be now followed in consequence of the raids committed this year. Attached to Mr. Edgar's report is a very valuable note by Dr. Burland, an independent and enterprising gentleman, wholly unconnected with Government, who has learnt much of uncivilised races both in America and Australia, and who, to a certain extent, is connected with commercial and tea interests, and the European community, whose ideas on this subject demand the fullest consideration.

2. Very little of the information now given by Mr. Edgar is new to me, and consequently I have very little to add to my remarks in letter, No. 42 of the 9th of March. I agree with Mr. Edgar entirely as to the necessity of two expeditions, and differ wholly with him as to views of the uselessness of roads and of a connected line of defence. As I have said, I would insist on the opening out of the road from Eastern Cachar all along the south of that district, to be carried on to civilised Chittagong. I have written what I had to say often, and repeated it in the letter, No. 42. It is quite true that the Looshais would make use of our roads, but we should know of their inroads and be very likely to catch them on their return. We could follow them up if they advance within our outposts, so that it would be simply impossible for them to remain long at one place, as they did at Monierkhall. We ought successfully to come up with them and prevent them doing any damage, as Lieutenant Robertson did at Allynuggur. For defence, for prevention, for certainty of interference, and probability of power to inflict punishment on every occasion of a raid, I think a line of outposts connected by a road is the most advisable and feasible plan. Mr. Edgar seems to stand alone in his opposition to it. I have no objection to the carrying forward of his projects for conciliatory communication with the hill tribes, and I think much might be done by encouragement of trade; but a line of defence connected by a road along which troops and police could move with rapidity, and the opening out of communication with Chittagong, would not retard or prevent friendly dealings with the Looshais, while, at the same time, the frontier would be protected.

3. It was hoped and thought that Mr. Edgar's dealings with the powerful chief Sookpilal, who has behaved in as friendly a manner as imagination could expect, whose influence has increased, and whose territory, as Mr. Edgar points out, has extended, would insure peace for a time at least, and Cachar was denuded of its officers. Mr. Edgar proceeded to a distance, indeed to such a remote spot, that the existence of his whole party depended solely on food supplied by Sookpilal. Mr. McWilliam went towards Assaloo, and the station was almost deserted; but never was there a more fatal mistake. Sookpilal's influence, even though he had full knowledge of the coming raids, was utterly powerless, and Cachar and Sylhet were both attacked by greater number of hillmen than usual. The attacks were prolonged and repeated in an unaccustomed manner, and with marked success on the side of the hillmen, at any rate up to present date. I most earnestly trust that no agreement in Mr. Edgar's well-expressed ideas as to peaceable action towards these tribes, even after the proposed expeditions, will lead the Government to abandon the scheme of outposts along the frontier to be connected by roads and held in force till years of peaceable behaviour on the part of the hill tribes show their inability or unwillingness to commit such raids as have been made this year.

4. In no part of Mr. Edgar's later correspondence does he refer to the treaty which he made with Sookpilal, and to conclude which was one of the chief objects of his expedition this year. The treaty is made. It gives a northern boundary to Sookpilal; and, looking

to the admirable manner in which Sookpilal has behaved, I think we must thoroughly act up to the spirit of the treaty, though I beg respectfully to remark that I think we have much hampered our future action, and placed ourselves in an unfortunate position by this treaty.

5. I think that Mr. Edgar's three reports, A. B. and C., should be printed, and copies distributed to the military authorities on this frontier, and to the officials of Chittagong and Sylhet.

From *J. W. Edgar*, Esq., Deputy Commissioner of Cachar, on Special Duty, to the Commissioner of Circuit.—Dacca Division, No. C.; dated Cachar, the 13th March 1871.

In continuation of my letter, No. B., dated 6th March 1871, I shall now attempt to give some information of the position and internal relations of the people to the south of Cachar. This information is not, however, new, for it may be found scattered through various reports made by me from time to time during the last three years.

2. In describing the position of the various clans, I shall begin from the west and work east, for convenience sake. East of the district of Commillah is a hill tract known as Independent Tipperah, or Hill Tipperah, as it has been the fashion to term it for two or three years back. This is inhabited partly by Tipperahs and partly by Kookies, under chiefs of the Poitoo family. The best known and most influential of these is named Mischoilon, or Gnurshailon, or Mischailal. There are several other versions of the name. He is son of Lalchokla, a chief who surrendered in 1845 to Captain Blackwood on a promise of pardon, according to the Kookies. Lalchokla was, however, tried and transported for life, and his dubiously named son is said to have sworn to take vengeance on us, a vow which he has religiously observed.

3. East of the Poitoos are the villages of the Syloos. Their most powerful chief is Saboonga. Majors Graham and Macdonald got to some of their villages last December. The Syloos swore friendship with Captain Lewin in 1868, but, as shown in my report, No. B., there is reason to believe that they were concerned in the recent raids.

Saboonga's village is said to be on the west bank of the Gootur, on a hill which was pointed out to me, apparently 30 miles south of Bepari Bazaar.

4. On the east side of the Gootur are the villages of the sons of Lalpitang, who has been always considered by us as the most powerful of all the Looshais. I extract a passage from a report of Major Stewart, dated 10th April 1862: "Between the villages of Rutton Pooeah (Captain Raban's opponent) and (the Cachar) Looshais, there are other villages of Looshais at war with them; the chief of these is Lalpitang, three days' journey south of Sookpilal. * * * * Of Lalpitang all that is known is that it is numerically equal to the three tribes north of it." In a previous paragraph, Major Stewart had stated that the number of the three tribes was 27,500; therefore he considered Lalpitang's villages to number 27,500 more. This I consider to be an enormous exaggeration.

5. East of the villages of Lalpitang's sons are the villages of their cousin, Bandool or Vandullah. He is considered by the Chittagong authorities to be head of the chiefs whom they call Howlong, and probably he is now the most influential chief among them. But we in Cachar have always considered Lalpitang to be the more powerful of the two.

6. To sum up what I know of the southern tribes. North-east and south-east of the villages inhabited by Tipperahs are Poitoo and cognate Kookie villages. East of them, and apparently west of the head-water of the Gootur, are Syloos, among whom the leading chief is Saboonga. East of them, and south of Mote Thlang (shown in Major Macdonald's map) are the Howlong chiefs, among whom the most prominent are Vandullah and the sons of his cousin Lalpitang.

Ruttonpooea is further south, and practically may be said to be in the Chittagong Hill Tracks. East of all these are villages of different tribes, called Poi by the Looshais. These northern Pois are said not to be Lakhayr Pois (Shindoos), but probably they are closely connected with them. I once thought that they might be possibly Syloos, but I have been informed that their women are not tatooed.

7. If we return again to our frontier, we find to the south-west of Cachar and north of Saboonga the villages of Sookpilal. His own village lies between the Gootur and the Dullessur, on a high hill called Ryek, which I cannot identify with certainty on the map, but which is probably the hill marked D., south of Tonpilal, as marked on the map. North of Sookpilal is the village of his sister, Vainatang, reached by Mr. Kemble in 1869. The village of Tongpilal, an inferior chief, is further east. To the west are villages of Sookpilal's brother, Thomheem, and his son, Zorock. East of the Dullessur, and a little to the north of Sookpilal's latitude, are the villages of his mother Pibuk, and a sister, Ruttungpi. Further north are Mehtong and Dharmangpi. East of the Sonai are Khalkom, a son of Sookpilal, Impanu, and some smaller villages. Further south, close on to the Howlongs, are the villages of Bhuta, who himself is said to live on a hill called Kootniloon, a peak of the Kanthong range, from which the Sunai rises.

8. Going

8. Going to the north and north-east, across the Tipai, we get to Kholel, the village of Vonpilal's son, Lalhi. This is two days' journey south of Tipai Mukh. One long march further on towards the south-east is the village of Poiboi. Two days further on is Gnoupa, a village formerly inhabited by Lalroom, brother of Poiboi, and by his grandmother, Vonolel's mother. One day and a-half more in a south-easterly direction, and one gets to the village of Lalboorah, better known as Vonolel's village. Tangdong, who attacked the rear guard at Nugdigram, lies one day further on, on a hill to the north-east. South-west of Lalboorah are his brothers Leukom, and Deouti. Further east are the Pois, and north of them, in or on the watershed of the Irrawady, are the Soktes or Pytes, whose great chief is Kamhow.

9. The above is a rough and possibly incomplete account of the position of the chief villages between Tipperah on the west, and the great Burmah range on the east, and between Sylhet, Cachar, and Munipore on the north, and the Chittagong Hill Tracks on the south.

I shall now try to give an idea of the internal relations of these clans, a knowledge of which is, I think, of the greatest importance to us. Probably the best way to do this will be to relate what I know of the history of the family of Lalul, which is the one that has had the closest connection with Cachar for many years back.

10. When we first took possession of the district, the hills to the south were occupied by various clans of the tribe called Kookie by Bengalees. Villages under Piotoo chiefs held the Hachuk range up to the Gootur. East of the Dullessur were Thado chiefs. There were Changsils on the range which runs south of the Bhubuns, which were held by Thlangums. The Saibreem chiefs were east of the Tipai. Besides these, there were many other clans, such as Hraltes, Waipies, &c. All these were people of the same race, speaking dialects of the same language, wearing the same dress, and having the same customs, form of politics, and religious belief. But they were constantly at war with one another, and when one chief became more powerful than any of his rivals, the latter used to move up into Cachar, taking with them as many of their people as remained faithful; but the majority of the clan generally went over to the village of the stronger chief. It was just as if in a feud between the Campbells and the Macgregors, the former had proved better men, and had driven the Macgregor chief, with some of his clan, to take refuge in the lowlands; the Campbells taking all the clan lands, and inducing the greater number of Macgregors to remain on them, and acknowledge the head of the Campbells as their chief.

11. About 60 years ago a chief named Lalul of the Looshai clan, whose village was then situated far to the south-east, began to get formidable to his neighbours, and he pushed his village on towards the Cachar frontier, forcing the chiefs that he dispossessed to move north. He had five sons, Lalinvoom, Lalsavoong, Mougper, Bhuta, and one whose name I do not know.

Each of these when grown up started a village on his own account, and so successful were they, that 20 years ago Mougper had driven out the Poitoos, and moved his villages up to the Pakwa, north of Chatterchoora. Lalinvoom had all the country between the Dullessur and the Tipai, the Thado, Changsil, and Thlangum chiefs, having taken refuge in Cachar. Lalsavoong had completely broken up the Saibreems, and got their hills east of the Tipai, while Bhuta had got the lands which he still holds to the south of Lalinvoom.

12. Mora, the son of the latter, made a raid on a Thado village in Cachar in 1849. This was followed by an expedition under Colonel Lister, who burnt the Looshai village. Soon after this Mora died, leaving a son, Vonpilal, during whose boyhood the affairs of the clan were managed by Impanu, widow of Mora. Vonpilal died a couple of years ago, aged 20, leaving an infant son, Lalhi. The consequence of the early deaths of Mora and his son is, that the clan has grown very weak. It has almost lost the land between the Dullessur and the Sonai, which has been annexed by Sookpilal, son of Mougper. Impanu, in order to strengthen herself, some time since invited Bhuta to move a village north to a hill south of Dallong, and about due east of Mehtong, between the Sonai and Tipai. Bhuta was anxious for this, but Impanu changed her mind, and allowed Khalkom, son of Sookpilal, to settle there instead. To avenge this, Bhuta's people plundered Impanu's village last year, and burnt Thangteloon, a small village of Hraltis, belonging to her, this year. In spite of this, Khalkom holds on, and now the villages of Sookpilal and his sons extend from the Gootur to the Tipai.

13. Two of Lalsavoong's sons, Lalpong and Vonolel, became great chiefs. The son of the former is Poiboi, whose village is south of Tipai Mukh. Vonolel's sons are Leukom, Deouti, and Lalboorah, who has succeeded to his father's village. Vonolel had a second brother, whose name, I think, was Thang Chao. He is now represented by his son Tangdong, whose village, however, is always considered to be one of Vonolels. In the last-mentioned villages, besides the usual mixture of Kookie clans, there are great numbers of Pois.

People of this tribe took an active part in the attack on Monierkhall, and I have been informed that five of them were killed.

14. The village which belongs to Lalboorah is said to contain about 250 houses, but there are several small villages near, which contain about 300 more. Tangdong is said to

have contained about 200 houses before it was destroyed by Kamhon, who is represented as one of the greatest foes of the eastern chiefs. One account gives Leukom 150, another not more than 90. Deouti is said to have had a large village once, but it has dwindled down to about 40 houses. Possibly these may be understated, but I have generally found tendency to be towards exaggeration.

15. It is probable that, if we know more than we do of the Howlong and Syloo chiefs, we should find that their history and position resemble those of the family of Lalul, who is said by the Looshais to have been of the same stock as Vandool, Lalpitang, and Saboonga, and I daresay that careful inquiry would show that the villages of the latter are, like those of the former, to a great extent, composed of a motley collection of people from the various clans dispossessed from time to time by the Howlong and Syloo chiefs. This accounts for the constant fluctuations which we observe in the relative power of different chiefs. If a man is dissatisfied with his chief, there is nothing to prevent his moving to the village of another chief. Consequently, when any chief is unfortunate or unpopular, his village, and with it his general influence, dwindle away as his people desert him for luckier or more popular chiefs.

16. I think it is of the utmost importance that these circumstances should not be overlooked, either in shaping our frontier policy, or in the dealings of local officers with the Looshais; and I believe that, if we know how to take advantage of the relations of the people to their chiefs, we shall find in them a most valuable auxiliary force, not only in our immediate work of securing our cultivated frontier, but also in the attempt which I fervently hope we shall make hereafter to elevate and benefit the hillmen themselves. But we have not only to take into consideration the relations of the people of the Looshai villages to their chiefs. It is still more important to understand the position of the ejected chiefs living in our territory or the adjoining dependent states. I shall, therefore, at the risk of repetition, attempt to explain this more clearly than I have done above.

17. There are Kookie chiefs settled in Munnipore, Cachar, Sylhet, Tipperah, and possibly in the hill tracks of Chittagong. These chiefs, and the people with them, have been driven out of the hills south of Cachar, as pointed out above, by other Kookie chiefs of the clan known to us by the name of Looshais. We, seeing this, and hearing complaints from time to time of outrages committed in our territory by the people of the Looshai chiefs on the people of the ejected chiefs, are apt to look upon the latter as a distinct race from the former, separated from them by impassable barriers raised not only by years of feud, but by difference of blood, of customs, and of language.

Closely connected with this belief is an idea that our hillmen are always in the right in their disputes with the Looshais; that in all frontier matters, we can depend implicitly on their fidelity; that their peaceful habits, gentleness, and truthfulness, offer a sharp contrast to the turbulence, cruelty, and treachery of their opponents, much in the way that the friendly Indians of Cooper's novels are represented to possess all the imagined virtues of the uncorrupted child of nature, while the hostile tribes are incarnations of all kinds of wickedness.

An accurate knowledge of the composition of the tribe, and of the relations of its clans to one another, shows that all this is exactly the reverse of the real facts.

18. The people who live in the village of a Thado chief in Cachar, or a Poitoo chief in Sylhet or Tipperah, differ in no respect from the people who live under a Looshai chief. Probably there will be a greater proportion of people of the Looshai family under the latter, a greater proportion of Thados or Poitoos under the former; but the elements are precisely the same in both cases. Again, people from Looshai villages constantly come and settle in villages within our jurisdiction, while people from our hill villages from time to time join the Looshai chiefs. More than this, whole villages with their chiefs occasionally move from one jurisdiction to another, or leave our districts for the tracts outside. These chiefs, when not openly on bad terms with the Looshai chiefs, are generally engaged in intrigues with them, which sometimes result in raids on our territory, sometimes in attacks made by one clan upon another.

19. A brief sketch of the history of one family, that of Gnurshailon, some at least of the chiefs of which are now settled in our territory, may show perhaps better than the above general remarks that the present position of the Kookie subjects of our Governments, as well as those of Tipperah and Munnipore, is full of danger to the safety of the frontier. Most of the facts will be found in Mr. Mackenzie's memorandum on the North-east Frontier, others I have learnt lately.

When the Looshai chief Lalul began to push towards the north and west, the hills east of the Dullessur were occupied by villages under a family of Poitoo chiefs, the most influential of whom was named Lasoo. These Poitoos are also sometimes called Kachoks, but the latter name seems to be used by Kookies as a general term to describe all other clans of Kookies but that to which the speaker belongs.

Lasoo was driven out of the hills between the Dullessur and the Gootuf by Mougper, father of Sookpilal, and then seems to have taken up a position north of Chatterchoora, where, however, he was very hard pressed by the Looshai chiefs. At length, after a very severe raid, the Poitoos asked for the help of two Munnipooree Rajputras, Ram Sing and Tribhubhanjit, who were at that time settled in South Hylakandy. These chiefs are said to have collected their retainers, and under the guidance of the Poitoos to have surprised

Mougper's

Mougper's village and taken him prisoner. They released him, however, on his promising not to molest any of the Poitoo or Munnipooree villages near the frontier. This agreement was kept until 1841, when Tribhubhanjit was defeated in an attempt made by him to get possession of the Munnipore State. Immediately on this, Mougper attacked Lasoo, and drove him with some of his people from the Chatterchoora Range to the South of Koilasshur in Sylhet. Mougper then moved his village to the north of Chatterchoora, where he was joined by many of the people of the Poitoo chiefs.

20. Some time after this Lasoo died. His son Lalchoklo became reconciled to Mougper, and immediately committed a raid on the Munnipooree village of Kochobarri, where he killed 20 people and carried off six prisoners. Lalchockla afterwards said that he did this in revenge for injuries done to his father, Lasoo, by Tribhabhanjit; but this was untrue, and the story was evidently suggested by the attack on Mougper, made, as described above, mainly to protect the Poitoos. Probably the raid was suggested, if not aided, by Mougper. The Kochobarri outrage took place in May 1844, and in December of the same year some troops, led by Captain Blackwood, were sent from Koilasshur against Lalchokla. They were assisted by a cousin of the latter, Lalmi Sing, who led them to the village. They there obtained possession of all the year's crops, and in a few days Lalchokla surrendered, as all the Kookies say, on being told by Lalmi Sing that he would not be put to death or kept in captivity. Of course Captain Blackwood did not know of this promise, but from what I know of the Kookie character, I have little doubt that it was made by Lalmi Singh. However, Lalchokla was tried at Sylhet and transported for life.

21. He left a son, Gnurshailon, who is said to have taken an oath to avenge what he considers our breach of faith with his father. In 1849, simultaneously with the raid on Cachar made by Lalinvoom's son. Mora, some of our wood-cutters were massacred to the south of Sylhet, and a Tipperah village burnt. The perpetrators of these outrages were described at the time as Kachoks, and there is little doubt that they were Poitoos of Gnurshailon's clan. The matter, however, does not seem to have been carefully inquired into at the time. Probably about this, Gnurshailon married Vainatang, a daughter of Mougper and sister of Sookpilal. He then settled in the Sylhet district and had a large village there partially peopled by Looshai and other adherents of his wife. In course of time, however, Vainatang and her husband quarrelled, and she with her people left him and returned to her brother, Sookpilal, near whom she established a village, the one seen by Messrs. Baker and Kemble in 1869. Gnurshailon seems after this to have left Sylhet and taken his village into Hill Tipperah. This separation led to an unintelligible dispute between Sookpilal and his brother-in-law about the price of the bride, which was patched up in 1862, on a proposal made by Gnurshailon that they should join and make a raid on Sylhet.

This led to the Adampore massacre in 1862, in which Sookpilal, Gnurshailon, and two relatives and dependents of the latter, Rungbhoom and Lal Hoolien, were concerned. At this time Gnurshailon was supposed to reside in Hill Tipperah, and is now said to have been under the protection of the Bar Thakur, who was supposed at that time to favour the pretensions of Nil Kisno, the unsuccessful claimant to the raj. The present raja offered to give up Gnurshailon, but we did not accept his offer, and when he was asked about him in 1867, he denied all knowledge of him. For some time after the Adampore massacre Gnurshailon remained quiet, and we thought he had disappeared from the scene.

However, the dispute between him and Sookpilal was somehow again re-opened, and about 1868 he made an alliance with the the Syloo-chief, Saboong, who has been long on bad terms with Sookpilal. Meantime Rungbhoom, and possibly other Poitoo chiefs, had moved into Sylhet from Tipperah and were attacked there by Sookpilal's people in 1869. They afterwards acompanied Messrs. Baker and Kemble to the Looshai villages. These are the people to whom we suppose the four men who were at Katlicherra in November belonged, and whom I suspect of having got up the raid on our western gardens; yet I am informed that all these chiefs, Gnurshailon, Rungbhoom, and Lal Hoolien, are at present residing in the Sylhet district under the protection of Ally Ahmed, a Sylhet zemindar. The magistrate has been asked to inquire into the truth of this; but whether it is the case or not, the really dangerous thing is that it should be probable or even possible.

22. The fact is that the state of the law, and the ease with which these people move from one jurisdiction to another, make it almost impossible to deal with them effectually. I think that wandering tribes like the Kookies should be exempted from the operation of sections 25 and 26 of the Criminal Proceedure Code, and section 4 of Act VIII. of 1859, and that the jurisdiction over them should be made to depend on their race, not on their geographical position at any given time. In other words, I should propose to treat them on somewhat the same principle as that theoretically adopted by the Government of the United States in dealing with the Indian tribes. This would require some legislative action, a special agency, and special tribunals. There might also be some difficulty in getting such a system to work in districts like Sylhet and Cachar without clashing with the jurisdiction of the existing courts, but I think this difficulty might be got over with a little care and trouble. Of course the above remarks apply mainly to our own districts. The rajas of Tipperah and Munnipore should be pressed to put all matters connected with the management of their subject Kookies into the hands of the Political Agent in each state, who could then work in close connection with our own frontier officers.

23. If the system above indicated, or some similar one could be carried out, we should have taken the first steps towards protecting our cultivated frontier from Kookies external

to it by getting a real control over the Kookies settled in our districts, in Munnipore, and in Tipperah. But of course any measures of this nature would have no effect by themselves, and it is of more immediate importance to settle on the direct action to be taken with regard to the Looshai chiefs and their villages. I have seen many propositions for the defence of our frontier, and for the prevention of outrages like those committed in 1869 and this year, but I think they may all be classed under one of three heads.

24. The first of these may be called the policy of pure defence. It is to have as few relations as possible with the tribe, and in the words of Lord Dalhousie, used of another frontier, to confine ourselves to the establishment of effective means of defence on the line of our own frontier.

A second line of policy is the permanent occupation of the Looshai Hills, and the more or less complete subjugation of their inhabitants.

A third course is to refrain from occupying the country, or from exercising any direct control over the people, and to attempt to gain an effectual influence over them by conciliatory measures, by doing all in our power to extend trade, and other humanising influences, while making the chiefs and their followers clearly understand that we had both the power and the determination to inflict severe punishment for any misbehaviour on their part.

The first plan has, perhaps, the merit of being the most consistent with our general frontier policy, and it would apparently lead to fewer complications than either of the other two, but I think that practically it would be found the most difficult, and in the end by far the most expensive course that could be adopted.

It must always be borne in mind, in considering this question, that our exposed tea gardens and villages are as yet mere specks of cultivation in a vast expanse of marshes, hills, and forests, and that to give effectual protection to them by means of guards and outposts we should require a line that could not be slipped through with safety, extending from the north-east of the tea gardens on the Jeri round the south of Cachar and Sylhet, and probably through Hill Tipperah to the north-west of the Chittagong Hill tracks and along the north of that district to Arracan. The difficulties and cost of establishing such a line of posts are questions of a military nature, and I do not feel confident to discuss them; but I may point out how, under certain contingencies, the network of roads, which would necessarily form part of the line of defence, might become a serious danger to the frontier. It would be impossible to keep up the guards during the rains except at a great sacrifice of human life, and it is likely that in very unhealthy seasons it might be absolutely necessary to withdraw them altogether, in which case, if the Looshais were unfriendly, they might make use of the road in attacking our villages and gardens. Hitherto we have enjoyed a practical immunity from raids during the rains, but this has not been because the Looshais cannot get about at this season; on the contrary, this is their best time for collecting rubber, and they constantly come during the rains in pursuit of game along the high hills almost up to our cultivation. But they fear the low hills that surround our gardens with their rank and, in the rainy season, almost impenetrable vegetation, and the treacherous streams and strips of marsh that intersect them. Our paths would enable them to overcome the difficulty, and would, when the guards were withdrawn, deprive us of the protection which we now have for eight months of the year.

This danger would, of course, be equally great if, instead of thoroughly defending the whole of the exposed line, we were to select for complete protection certain portions left, while during the cold weather attacks would be almost certainly diverted to the portions left imperfectly defended. Such are a few, and only a few, of the considerations which would lead me to reject the policy of pure defence if a more hopeful one could be devised.

25. The permanent occupation of all the hills lying west of the watershed of the Irrawaddy, if accompanied by the complete subjugation of the tribes inhabiting them, would have the great advantage of almost completely protecting the south frontier of Cachar and Sylhet as well as Hill Tipperah, and, in some measure, the Chittagong Hill Tracks. In other words, it would have the effect of pushing the line to be defended some 80 miles, perhaps more, east of Hill Tipperah. I have no doubt that all the villages west of this line could be brought under subjection; of course a strong military expedition at the outset would be necessary, and even after that the work would be troublesome and very costly. Still the thing could be done, and the only question to be considered is whether the advantage would outweigh the disadvantages.

26. If, by subjugating the people of these hills, we should deprive them of the power of injuring us, we should at the same time deprive them of the power of defending themselves against attacks from outside, and we should take upon ourselves the duty of protecting them from such attacks. We do not know, with anything like an approach to certainty, how far east lies the portion of the watershed of the Irrawaddy connecting the Yum, a range east of Arracan, with the Laimatokh range, west of Munnipore; nor do we really know what people we may find in addition to the Looshais west of this line. For instance, it is not impossible that some at least of the Sokte villages, and some of the people called Pois by the Looshais, are on this side of the watershed. We should, therefore, in occupying these hills, undertake to defend a country about the extent and inhabitants of which we know scarcely anything. But we know still less of the people from whose attacks we should have to defend it. The hills east of the watershed are supposed to be subject to the Burmese, but their inhabitants are described by Sir Arthur Phayre as "practically as independent and as little known as the tribes of Central Africa before the days of Burton, Speke, and Grant." The little

little that is known of these tribes seems to show that they are more numerous, fiercer, and more untractable, than those nearer our present frontier. It is, therefore, possible that after we had, with great difficulty and expense, subdued every chief up to the watershed, we might find that we had to defend a more difficult frontier than the present one, from more formidable assailants than we now have to deal with, and that too, at a much greater distance from the cultivated districts, which must always be the base of any operations, whether defensive or offensive.

27. In the above remarks I have taken it for granted that the whole country up to the nominal Burmese frontier would be occupied, and effective measures at once taken to establish our authority over the inhabitants. It might be urged that the occupation of a portion of the hills; say, of all to the west of the Tipai, would be sufficient; or that, instead of employing at once sufficient force to reduce all the villages to submission, we might, while declaring that our jurisdiction extended over the whole territory, take our own time in reconciling the facts with this theory, and, as opportunity offered, extend our actual rule to one village after another.

As one of the objects of the occupation would be effectually to protect Cachar, I think that no boundary short of the watershed would be sufficient.

The clans who attacked Monierkhall and Nugdigram this year came from the east of the Tipai, and their conduct at the Monierkhall stockade showed that they are a more formidable enemy than we have had to deal with hitherto. The occupation of the hills west of the Tipai would not directly put any restraint on them, and might have the effect of making them attack us more furiously than before, by exciting their anger without depriving them of the power to hurt. The chiefs, too, at the villages occupied by us, would not fail to increase the danger by their intrigues, and they would possibly attempt to divert suspicion from themselves by inducing the eastern clans to attack the exposed gardens on the Jeri and the Barak, which are perhaps the most difficult of all for us to defend. The objections to a gradual, and at first merely nominal, occupation of the country are the same in kind, but far stronger.

Even if we were eventually to succeed in extending our authority to all the villages (and success would be by no means a certainty) there would be a long intervening period during which the danger of attacks of Cachar would be perhaps greater than it is now; and such attacks, if made by people nominally our subjects, and theoretically within our jurisdiction, would have a worse moral effect than even unpunished outrages committed by wild tribes whom we do not pretend to govern. In Eastern Bengal, with its dangerous Mussulman population, and its colonies of intriguing Munnipoores and wild hillmen, it is of vital importance that every man should feel that our rule is a real one wherever we choose to extend it, and that the power of our Government is sufficient to enforce unqualified submission from every one living within the limits of our territorial jurisdiction.

Besides this, if we should eventually succeed in bringing all the villagers up to the watershed by degrees under our rule, we should then have to face the difficulty of defending them from the tribes beyond; so that after many years of possible suffering to our subjects, and of danger to the internal peace of our districts, we should be in no better position than if we were to occupy and subdue the country at once.

I have not said anything of the cost of administering the hills after our authority had been once established in them, because I believe that their wealth in forest products would be great enough, if properly managed, to do more than make the district self-supporting; that is, if in addition to the expense of the internal administration we should not have to take costly precautions against the inroads of the tribes to the east.

28. On the whole, if we were confined to the alternative of merely defending our cultivated territory, or of permanently occupying the hills west of the Irrawaddy watershed, I should, for the sake of my own district, prefer the latter; but I consider that the third line of policy mentioned above is in many ways better than either of the others. I believe that by a just and prudent course of action we could bind the Kookies to us by ties so strong and lasting, that the tribe, instead of being a source of difficulty and danger to us, would become our strongest frontier defence. But while I think that this can be done by conciliatory measures, I am convinced that we cannot hope to succeed unless we make the tribe feel that we can, and, when occasion requires, shall not hesitate to punish for misbehaviours with unflinching severity. There would be no need of adopting a policy of reprisals in order to bring this home to the minds of the hillmen, and nothing but absolute necessity could justify such a policy. But it seems to me that a distinction should be made between a mere system of counter raids and measures taken deliberately for the punishment of known offenders. In the one case, perhaps a year after the commission of an outrage a few troops or police would be hurried into the hills; the first village reached, possibly an innocent one, would be burnt, and the force would then hurry back to the plains, pursued by angry hillmen, like a swarm of hornets after an unwary intruder into their nest. After this nothing would be done till the next outrage, which would be followed by another miserable attempt at a reprisal, and so on in a monotonous and humiliating alternation of raids and counter-raids.

I can see no resemblance between such a system and a carefully-organised and well-conducted expedition, undertaken after grave deliberation, to inflict punishment of a defined character on known chiefs, whose guilt had been established by careful inquiry, and who had previously rejected all the friendly advances made to them. Such an expedition would be merely

merely a break in the policy of conciliation which could be resumed again immediately after the successful ending of the expedition, with a certainty that hereafter, for a long time at least, there would be no danger of our friendship being despised or our motives misunderstood.

29. If the above views are correct, the only points we have to consider are, whether the circumstances under which the recent raids were committed are such as to call imperatively for punishment; whether we have proof enough of the identity of the guilty parties to take action in the matter; and whether there is a reasonable probability of our being able to carry out a successful expedition.

I think an affirmative answer may be given to all these questions. The attacks on our gardens and villages were unprovoked, and were avowedly made for the sole object of getting plunder and prisoners. The raiders on one side were completely successful without apparently any loss to themselves; but after killing one European and many natives, they carried off much plunder and a large number of prisoners. The party attacking Monierkhall were not so fortunate; but though they suffered severe loss, and did not get very much booty, still they did a great amount of mischief, besides killing a number of our troops and police. Besides this, they think that we were prepared for them in consequence of the information I sent in from Chongsel, and naturally hope to do better another time. Even if Cachar stood alone, punishment seems to me to be imperatively called for; but the outrages in Munnipore, Sylhet, and Tipperah, make the case very much stronger.

30. There can be no doubt that raids on Monierkhall and Nugdigram were committed by Lalboorah and Tangdong. The Munnipore Political Agent seems to think that Poiboi was also concerned in them, but I have not been able to get any evidence of this. Indeed, all that I have heard favours an opposite view. The evidence against Bhenkni and Saboonga seems to me strong enough to justify hostile measures, and Vandool and Saboonga will probably find much difficulty in clearing themselves.

I have not noticed a statement made by some Kookies, who said they recognised one of Sookpilal's sons at Allynugger: in the first place, because I do not know any further particulars, and cannot tell how far we can depend upon the Kookies; and, secondly, because I hope to get some reliable information from people who are going out with the three Looshais who accompanied me to Cachar. Meantime I may point out that before the last raids the Chittagong authorities warned us that Howlongs were on their way down the Dulloi to attack Cachar. Now the Dulloi runs near Allynugger, and people working through the hills above it would probably come out at that place. Anyhow, we may assume that the deplorable outrages at Katlicherra, Alexandrapore, and the Anwarkhal Cachari village, were committed mainly by Howlongs, and surely they ought not to go unpunished.

31. Lastly, There is now a better chance of conducting an expedition to a successful end than there has been hitherto. We now know the character of the country, and that it does not oppose any insuperable obstacles. We also know generally the direction of the villages we want to get at, and the way to reach them. Above all, the information collected lately on this side, and at Chittagong, makes it possible to estimate the amount of opposition we are likely to meet with, and to form a definite plan for an expedition. Taking all these things into consideration, I have come to the conclusion that we ought to take measures to inflict punishment next cold weather on the perpetrators of the outrages of this year; and I should propose to send one force from Cachar to the villages of Lalboorah and Tangdong, and another from either Chittagong or Tipperah to the villages of the sons of Lalpitang.

32. Of course I do not presume to make any definite suggestions about the strength of the force to be sent in, its organisation, or the way in which it should be conducted. There are, however, some points upon which the knowledge I have gained in the hills may be useful.

33. If an expedition should be decided on, it is of the utmost importance that preparations should be commenced as early as possible. Supplies, carriage, &c., should be collected at Cachar during the rains and sent by the Barak to Tipai Mukh before the 1st of November, or, at all events, within a week after the cessation of the rains. I have assumed that Tipai Mukh would be adopted as the starting point, because it is nearer to Lalboorah's village than any other place that can be reached by water. The river up to it has been surveyed, and is navigable for boats of 200 maunds up to the very end of the rains; and although there are some shoals which impede the navigation in the dry season, still even then it is every way superior to either the Sunai or the Dullessur. From Tipai Mukh there are paths leading to the villages, but I am inclined to think that a little higher up the Barak there are better paths leading from a place at which some Munnipooree traders have established a mart.

34. Between Tipai Mukh and Lalboorah's village are the great villages of Kholel (Vonpilal's) and Sellam (Poiboi's). It is almost certain that the former would side with us, and more than probably that the latter would follow its example; but it would be advisable to leave a strong guard near, but not in each. This would ensure the fidelity of the people, and when they found that we had no intention of injuring them, their women and children would probably return to the villages from their hiding places in the jungle. Of course if these people should prove friendly, the utmost care should be taken to protect them from any kind of injury or annoyance.

35. Lalboorah's

35. Lalboorah's village would probably be found deserted, perhaps burnt. The force should, however, establish itself there and send out parties to get possession of the grain in the jumes, to make prisoners any women and children they could find, and disperse parties of armed men they could get intelligence of. The clan, on finding that the force did not mean to hurry back to the plains in the usual manner, would probably take to offensive measures. It is not likely that they would venture to attack the main body or any of the scouring parties, but it would almost certainly attempt to interrupt communications and cut off supplies. Besides attacking weak parties coming up from the rear, they would probably take the paths leading from the base to the main body. They would, however, soon tire of this, and attempt to negotiate. The surrender of the chiefs concerned in the raids should be insisted on as a preliminary step. They would give themselves up if promised their lives and liberty on complying with our demands. A very heavy fine of elephants' tusks, nutnas, gongs, and amber necklaces, should be imposed upon them, and they should be compelled with their people to assist in making a good path up to the place in which a junction with the Chittagong force should be effected.

36. The latter expedition should, *mutatis mutandis*, proceed on the same principles as that from Cachar. In returning, both forces should be accompanied by the chiefs and headmen of the offending villages. This would prevent any attempts at annoyance on the way back.

37. In the foregoing remarks I have assumed that the force would not meet any resistance in its advance, but that the supports would require to be very strong, in order to provide against annoyance after the villages had been occupied. From what I know of the Looshais and their ideas about fighting, I think that this is the most probable course of events. But there may be opposition; other clans may make common cause with those against whom our force would be directed, and these last might elect to stockade and defend their villages. In either case a strong force would be necessary, and above all things it should be thoroughly organised and equipped. It would be well, too, to post strong parties on Chatterchoora, Rengtipahar, and Bongkong, and to get the Raja of Munnipore to send a large force to some point south of Moirang. This measure would prevent Kamhow from giving any aid to the Looshais even if he were willing, which seems unlikely.

38. Mr. McWilliam is at present engaged in collecting all available information about the relative positions of the several Looshai villages, and about the routes from Tipai Mukh. We shall then compare this with what I have learned during my tour in the hills, and then show the result of our inquiries as correctly as possible on the existing maps, as in this matter fulness and accuracy of information are of greater importance than haste in submitting it. We shall not send the maps and reports of routes until we are satisfied that we have exhausted all means of adding to our knowledge, or of correcting our present views.

One very important point, on which we hope to gain information, is the supply of water along the route. It is possible that in some places there may be difficulty in getting water enough for the force, but this can be overcome by the use of Norton's pumps, where the water rises from a considerable depth, and by carefully accumulating and economising it when it is dependent on mere surface drainage. The question of carriage is very difficult. I should advise that elephants be employed as much as possible, on account of the difficulty of feeding coolies, and the danger of their breaking down. We should not be able to supply many elephants from this district, or from Sylhet. They should, therefore, be set up here, if possible, before the rains. The mahoots should be all picked men, and great attention should be paid to the gear of the elephants. On this point, more than anything else, would their efficiency as a means of carriage depend.

38. After the termination of the expedition, I think that we should again return to those measures of conciliation which were interrupted by the outrages of this year; chief among these is the development of trade. The history of our relations with the tribes on the north-eastern frontier abounds with examples of the eagerness of hillmen to trade, and of the beneficial influence which we have been able to exercise by taking advantage of it. But in all previous cases that I know of (with the doubtful exception of the Khasi hills) the trade has been of a comparatively unimportant description. Now the Looshais have not only an intense desire for many articles which they can only get from us, but also what is for the present a practically unlimited supply of a valuable staple, india-rubber. The trade in this article may be said to have begun after the expedition of 1869. It has been hitherto confined to a few villages near the Cachar streams. By far the greater portion of the vast forest of caoutchouc trees is still untouched, yet the amount of rubber imported into Cachar since March of last year has been more than 1,300 maunds, said to be worth in Calcutta 65,000 rupees. From the inquiries I made when in the hills, and from what I myself observed, I do not think that this was one-tenth of the possible out-turn from the hills between Cachar, Munipore, and the hill tracts. The forests near the villages of the Howlongs and Sylhoos are described to me as of far greater extent than those to the north. But, strange to say, although people from the southern villages have been for years back trading in the Chittagong marts, they do not seem to have discovered the value of their rubber. I do not find india-rubber mentioned among the articles from the hill tracts in the Appendix to Captain Lewin's Report, and it is not noticed in the advertisement of the mêla at Chittagong. I have heard, however, of Looshai traders taking salt to the Howlong or Sylhoo villages, and exchanging it for four times its weight in rubber; that is,

for about 40 times its intrinsic value, if the price of rubber be really so high as I have been told it is.

There are also to be great forests of caoutchouc trees east of the Tipai which have scarcely been touched as yet. Even in the forest from which the rubber imported during last year was collected, a comparatively small proportion of the trees seems to have been tapped. Rude measures have also been taken for the preservation of the trees, and the Looshais with whom I have been have promised to plant out suitable portions of their jhoom lands, as they abandon them, with caoutchouc trees. This last, of course, is meant as a precaution for the future. At present there seems to be as much rubber as the Looshais can collect; and as the demand for the article seems to be steadily increasing, it is probable that the price will long continue at least as high as it now is.

39. The Looshais, therefore, have the means of obtaining by trade far more wealth than they could possibly acquire by a long course of the most successful plundering, and they will come to realise this fact after a few years of intercourse with us, for they are not wanting in intelligence. But, as they become rich, as their villages get filled with all the articles that hillmen covet, the danger to them of attacks of tribes still further east will be a constantly increasing one, and this must make them the more inclined to rely upon our good will. We shall be able to aid them by advices, and probably eventually to give material assistance, thus by degrees forming them into a barrier against the encroachments of the tribes beyond.

In this way the rubber trade may have very valuable political results. I have dwelt on this article because it is undoubtedly the most important; but, besides rubber, cinnamon, lac, ivory, wax, cotton, and some other things of less value can be supplied from the Looshai hills. I have also heard of something, which I conjecture to be sandal wood, found in the eastern hills, as well as pine yielding turpentine.

I have attempted to introduce the cultivation of the potato among the people I have come in contact with, but I do not expect it would be likely to become an important export. Indeed, it is not impossible that after a time the clans nearest to us may find it more profitable to buy food from the plains than to produce it themselves. But it is not easy to forecast all the changes that the discovery of the caoutchouc forests will eventually produce in the internal economy of the clans inhabiting the Looshai hills.

40. While relying mainly on trade as a means of influencing the Looshias, I should not neglect education. I do not mean so much instruction in book knowledge as in the simpler mechanical arts. At present some of the people in each village can work roughly in wood and iron, but the great intelligence which they show in all matters connected with mechanics makes me think that they could be taught to do much better.

Some of the people I have seen seem anxious to have their children taught to read and write Bengalee. I think that this desire should be encouraged, and that we should do all in our power to gratify it; but I am adverse to forcing any kind of education on hillmen where there are no traces on their part of a spontaneous desire to learn. To my mind, the most valuable school for the youth of the tribe would be some such levy as the one proposed by me in 1869, in my letter to you, No. 204, dated the 3rd of April of that year.

As I still hold the views then expressed about the usefulness of such a levy, I shall here quote some passages from the letter for readier reference.

"The Kookie levy was raised in 1850, at the recommendation of General Lister, partly as a force to be used against the Looshais, and partly to give employment to the youth of the Kookie tribes, whose love for fighting, it was hoped, would then be legitimately gratified in defending our frontier instead of in murdering their neighbours, as had been their custom from time immemorial. How this project succeeded, what the Kookie levy was, and what it might have become, may be learned from the report of Major Stewart to Mr. Allen, of the Board of Revenue, dated 15th September 1857. Major Stewart commanded the levy for some years, and I know of no man whose opinion on the subject ought to outweigh his. The levy was amalgamated with the new police in 1863, and now, in 1869, the Officiating District Superintendent of Cachar has stated in a report, which I have just received, the Kookies are unfit to defends outposts. I believe that I can account for the apparent degeneracy of men whom competent judges like General Lister and Major Stewart thought singularly brave.

The Kookies, like most of the other tribes upon this frontier, are of a low civilisation; even for hillmen they are dirty in their habits, and they eat the most revolting kinds of food. They are at the same time sensitive to praise or blame, submissive to their superiors, and always ready to yield to any one possessing a higher civilisation than themselves.

The effect of the organisation of the police force, and of the duties constables have to perform, is to render men of such a character perfectly worthless as fighting men. They find themselves looked upon by the Hindoo and Mussulman constables as unclean savages, scarcely worthy to be called men. They see that their ignorance and the incapacity to learn practically shut them out from promotion to the higher grades, in which a knowledge of reading and writing is required; when they go into the district to serve summonses or to perform other similar duties, they cannot help perceiving that they are regarded by the people with contempt as hillmen and with hatred as policemen.

The consequence is, that the Kookie constable is one of the meekest and most inoffensive of men; but, in becoming so, he has lost the pluck and love for fighting which used to excite the admiration of Major Stewart.

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In this way we are unable, under the present system, to make any real use of the classes most suited for the work to be done on the frontier, while the same objections that exist to the employment of regular troops, whether Seiks or Hindustanees, may be urged with equal force against the employment of policemen of the same races in jungles so unhealthy as those of Cachar. But there is a point of view, even more important than the defence of the frontier against hostile tribes, from which I regard the project of reorganising the levy. It might be made the most powerful means of binding them to us by ties of friendship and loyalty. If I were allowed to reform the levy, I should do all I could to induce Looshais, Angamies, and, in fact, men of all the neighbouring tribes, to enlist in it, and I should above all things endeavour to get unmarried youths of the most warlike villages to spend in the levy the years that are now employed in the commission of acts of the most revolting kind. During the time of their service we should have an opportunity of teaching them to see, however dimly, the value of civilisation superior to their own, and we might be able to foster a desire to share in its benefits. But should we fail in this (and I confess that I am not very hopeful about it), still I am certain that European officials, in a few years of kindly intercourse, could get such a hold on the affections of the young men, that they would, on their return to their villages, do all in their power to keep up friendly relations between their tribes and us."

41. There can be no doubt that great advantages would be gained if we could see our way to recognising any one chief as head of the entire Kookie tribe; but this seems to me out of the question. I do not think that even among the limited number of chiefs who claim descent from Lalul, there is any one who could undertake to conduct the affairs of the whole family. The efforts of frontier officers might, however, be profitably directed to an attempt to form a kind of confederacy of villages for the common object of defence against the tribes to the east. They might be also taught to look upon our good-will as a sort of bond connecting all the clans with which we maintained friendly intercourse, and be induced eventually to submit internal disputes to our officers for arbitration. Of course, before we could gain an influence of this kind over the hillmen, we should have to make them feel that we were really friendly and disinterested, and they can scarcely be made to understand this until they realise that we have the power to hurt them. If they think that our friendly advances are merely made to purchase their forbearance, they will be inclined to distrust and perhaps to despise them; and I fear that after the events of this year, they would put such a construction on any further efforts at conciliation, unless preceded by the punishment of these chiefs whom we know to be the worst offenders.

42. Since writing the above, I have received from Mr. Burland a note on the same subject. I find that he takes the same view that I do on most points. He has more confidence in the possibility of uniting all the clans under a single chief than I have, but I think we do not differ on any other point. A copy of Mr. Burland's note is appended. I have not gone into the subject of the precautions to be taken for the immediate protection of our cultivated frontier line, as the matter has been put into the hands of the military authorities.

Notes on the Looshais by Mr. *Burland*.

From what I saw of the Looshais of Sookpilal and his subordinate chiefs' villages at Changsil, and generally throughout the tour, I can entertain no doubt to their good faith and friendly feelings towards Mr. Edgar and party; and I am certain that the chiefs with whom he was in communication did not at any time contemplate acting in a hostile manner, either active or passive. Had they wished to break up communication with the expedition, they had ample evidence that they could have done so without danger, and with the greatest ease, from the unfortunate failure of the Chittagong party, with whose failure they were well acquainted.

Judging from all that occurred during the tour, the only deduction I can draw is that the Looshais with whom we were brought into contact were not only friendly, but anxious to cultivate permanently amicable relations with us.

From the day of our arrival at Changsil on the Dullessur, till we left for the Sunai, many hundreds of Looshais, from very old men and women to little children just able to walk, visited our camp, and the intercourse between them and our own people was always of the most friendly description. The muntries of Sookpilal and of several of his villages were continually residents with us, and were always willing to give any information we wished to acquire with regard to their villages, country, products, or any other subject. As was subsequently proved, the information they gave us regarding the Moniekhall raid was correct, and, so far as I know, was of value in enabling the Cachar authorities to provide for the defence of that post.

On crossing from Changsil our party was taken close past two of their villages and through many of their jooms, and along a road which seems to be of considerable importance, and used by great numbers of people. It is a well-known fact that Looshais are necessarily very jealous of showing either their roads or villages to strangers; even traders who visit them frequently are rarely, if ever, taken to the villages, and in the event of their being taken, are taken by a roundabout road, and the usual village road carefully avoided. So that the Looshais who guided us showed the greatest confidence in our faith by taking us the road they did, and for wild men such as these to act in this manner showed that they had really friendly feelings to us. On passing the second village, that of Dharmangpi,

we were received by the inhabitants with every appearance of good will, and on leaving, the armed men, who were numerous, fired their guns as a salute. At the camp that evening numbers of men, women, and children visited us.

Their conduct to us after our arrival at the Sunai, and after the provisions we had brought with us had been expended, and famine seemed inevitable, certainly showed, by acts as well as words, that they were really friendly; for no sooner was a hint that we were short of food, and that our boats had not arrived, given to the chief Dharmangpi, than he sent in rice and other things, for which he refused payment, and after he had given us all his own surplus supply, he made his people clean and bring in rice to the camp for sale. The people of this village gave all they had to give, and although we had to suffer some privations, still they never allowed us to experience actual want. For above a fortnight we were entirely dependent on Looshais for our daily food, and had they wished us to go, they had only to stop supplies to compel us to do so. By actual force they could at any time have either destroyed or captured us, or compelled a retreat.

I am strongly of opinion that after they knew that the raids had actually been made we were guarded by them, armed bodies being, I believe, so near to us in the jungle, that if an attack had been made in our camp by any hostile tribe they would have given us material assistance. That they had scouts out to watch the movements of the raiders, I am quite certain. Sookpilal sent muntries with us, under instructions that we were to be taken wherever we wished to go within his territory, and they were answerable for the safety of the party.

Of course there is a very strong reason for Sookpilal and his people to assume this attitude, and that is trade. The rapid increase in their production of india-rubber, the vast price (in their own opinion, but really about one quarter the value) they get for it from traders from Cachar, and their being able to make from 300 to 400 per cent. profit by selling the articles for which they have bartered their rubber to the southern tribes, prove to them that the fostering of trade is most important to them, and no trade can exist or extend without friendly relations with us. In former times these tribes made all the salt they required for their own consumption from salt springs, and they say that to make enough of salt for the requirements of an ordinary family a man's labour was required for three months. A man can now collect sufficient india-rubber in one month to exchange with Bengalee traders for more than enough salt to last him and his family for a year. So that a man who chooses to occupy himself three months in collecting rubber will, by bartering the same for salt, have a large surplus of that article with which to trade with the southern tribes, who, they say, are willing to give one maund rubber for a quarter maund of salt, or at the rate of about 160 rupees per maund for salt; and I have been told daos have been sold to Savoonga's people at from two to three maunds of rubber, the dao being worth 10 to 12 annas. The central and eastern tribes seem to be entirely cut off from frontier bazaars. The villages of the so-called Howlongs and Syloos, with whom Sookpilal's people trade, cannot be very far from the Chittagong frontier marts, and it seems strange they do not go there to trade. Possibly Ruttun Pooea might be able to explain why. This trade is capable of great extension. The Looshais say that a vast number of trees exist in various parts of their forests, and that the quantity of rubber now produced is as a drop in the bucket to what will be put in the market in a few years. I believe that about 1,500 maunds of rubber have been sent out of the Looshai country in this year, and considerable quantities were for sale when we left the Sonai camp. As the traders did not come up as usual, owing to the disturbances, the rubber could not be sold, much to the disappointment of the collectors.

As the news of the value of rubber spreads amongst the tribes to the south and east, they will naturally wish to participate in the trade directly; but to enable them to do so peace is essentially necessary, and so one very important check will grow up against their marauding propensities. With American Indians, and many other similar wild races, hunting and war are considered to be the only occupations suitable for men to follow, and consequently they have no instinct for trade, and to them trade is simply degrading. The Looshai, on the contrary, while occasionally indulging in hunting or war, has, for a wild man, a most extraordinary aptitude for trading, and I am certain will, with fair opportunities, in a short time be on a level with the Munnipooree as a trader, or even with the Bengalee. Taking into consideration the past and present position of these tribes, having been so long living in a state of perfect isolation, their intelligence is something wonderful, as also their desire to obtain information, most especially in mechanical contrivances. I was of opinion when at Changsil, and am still of the same, that artisans should accompany the officer who visits these people, and that any Looshai who wished to learn any trade shall be taught. I do not think there would be any lack of learners, and the effect, as a civilising process, would be satisfactory. In addition to india-rubber, the Looshais have small quantities of wax and ivory, but as yet nothing of much value in trade as regards quantity. Something might be done by introducing cotton of a superior staple to what they now produce, and potatoes also might be given them to cultivate.

Unhappily the advancement of these people in civilisation will be delayed, owing to the outrages committed this year on British territory by the southern tribes; and to finally settle our relations with the tribes occupying this tract, strong measures are necessary, and the perpetrators of the raids should be punished. I am of opinion that the offending tribes should be attacked from both Cachar and Chittagong by strong parties, who would be able, not only to take vengeance on those who are actually guilty, but show to other neighbouring tribes that they are all accessible, and that any outrage committed by them can

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and will be severely punished. The expeditions should leave their respective starting-points in the frontiers of Chittagong and Cachar early enough to occupy the offending villages before the Looshais would be able to gather their crops, as it might, and probably would be, considered advisable to destroy them. The occupation of the villages should continue as late in the season as the weather permitted, so as to impede the cultivation of the jooms for 1872.

The result of successful action by our forces would, I imagine, be the dispersion of the tribes attacked, and the absorption of the dispersed by other chiefs. Every effort should be made to consolidate the tribes living in the hill tracts lying between Cachar and Chittagong under one chief, who could be made responsible. At first, of course, the chief selected by Government for this purpose would, from his relations with us, become more a head chief amongst all the chiefs than *the* chief; but from his position, and his being able to give more security to his people than any other chief could, and as he would possibly have special facilities for trade, &c., people would leave less fortunate villages and go to him, so that I believe in a few years he would gradually absorb the whole rule, and quite as respectable a kingdom as Munnipoon arise. The occupation of this country by Government would be simply that a bad frontier would be exchanged for possibly a far worse one. It would be impossible, for some years at least, to annex the entire hill tracts to Burmah, and if a portion only were annexed, and made into a deputy commissionership, the effect would be that the Looshais would be brought to depend upon the officer in charge for protection, and cease to protect themselves, and thus become, like the tribes in the Chittagong frontier or hill tracts, an easy prey to the wild and warlike tribes who had been left independent.

Until our relations with these tribes are more satisfactory than they now are, frontier defence is necessary, and nothing can be more suitable than a chain of strong posts along the edge of the jungle beyond all cultivation. The posts ought to be not more than five or six miles apart, and should be connected by good roads, which should be frequently patrolled. The guards should be armed with breechloaders, and each post should have a big gun, about a 24-pounder; one of the heavy old-fashioned affairs which are now considered unfit for modern warfare. A charge of grape or canister shot fired into a party of raiders would not only kill many of them, but would terrify them so much that I question if they would renew their attack. The report of a gun of this size would be a signal to nearly all the other posts, as well as to most of the district, and be much better than beacon fires or rockets, as the country is usually shrouded in dense fog all the morning during the cold season, when raids are generally made, and the rockets, &c., could not be seen. Expeditions to punish the raiders of this year are necessary to settle the difficulty. Without teaching them a lesson, and a severe one too, all measures of defence or conciliation will be useless. To finally put matters on a satisfactory footing, the offending tribes must be severely punished, and all other tribes shown that misconduct on their part can and will be punished. By the consolidation of power in the hands of one chief, the promotion of trade in every way, and constant communication with them by representatives of Government, the Looshais may (and with no great difficulty) be made a useful community, instead of, as now, being a nuisance to their neighbours. They are intelligent, industrious, and good tempered, and from all I saw of them, I believe them to be kind and affectionate in their dispositions when in their own country and pursuing their useful peaceful avocations. When on the war path, they are neither better nor worse than other men, civilised or uncivilised. Greater atrocities have been committed by people who are called civilised when at war than have ever been recorded against Looshais.

List of the Descendants of *Lalul*, the Chief mentioned in paragraph 11 of the Report, No. C, dated 13th March 1871, to the Commissioner of Dacca.



(1) Attacked a Munnipooree village in 1871
(2) ,, Monierkhall in 1869.
(3) ,, ,, in 1871.
(4) Attacked Nowarbund in 1869.
(5) ,, Nugdigram in 1871.

J. W. Edgar, Deputy Commissioner.

From *H. LePoer Wynne*, Esq., Under Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal. No. 916 P.; dated Simla, the 18th May 1871.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letters noted in the margin, forwarding reports from Mr. Edgar, Deputy Commissioner of Cachar, containing an account of the state of the Looshai clans, together with suggestions for the defence of the Sylhet and Cachar frontier.

No. 1645, dated 13th April 1871.
No. 2029, dated 2nd May 1871.

2. With reference thereto I am desired by the Viceroy and Governor General in Council to request that the general question of the permanent defence of the frontier may be kept quite distinct and separate from the subjects embraced in the confidential letter from this office, dated the 12th of May last, No. 861 P.

3. From a remark made by Mr. Simson, the Commissioner of the Decca Division, in his letters, Nos. 82 and 83, dated the 28th of March last, his Excellency in Council observes that apparantly Mr. Edgar, during his recent tour, concluded a treaty with Sookpilal, in which, seemingly, a line of boundary was defined. In the letter from this department, No. 2021 P., dated 24th November 1870, it was intimated that his Excellency in Council withheld final sanction to the definition of the southern boundary of Cachar until after Mr. Edgar had returned from his visit to the interior. If Mr. Edgar has concluded arrangements with Sookpilal, I am to request that a special report by him on the subject may be submitted for the consideration and orders of the Government of India.

From Brigadier General *G. Bourchier*, Commanding Eastern Frontier District, to the Quarter Master General of the Army. No. 206; dated Cachar, the 21st of March 871.

I HAVE the honour to report, for the information of his Excellency the Commander in Chief, my return to Cachar on the 17th instant, after visiting the whole of the frontier posts of this district, and established fortified posts at Dooarbund, Jhalnacherra, and Moonierkhall, also on the summit of the Chota Choora ranges, nearly west of Alexandrapore.

I started with Captain Thomson and Mr. Daly on the 8th, and proceeded nearly due south to the Brackhore Garden, distant about eight miles. We then left the Government road which runs through Silcoorie and Bara Jalinga, and took a fair weather track more to the south, skirting the Chatta Bheel, from which valley we obtained a splendid panoramic view extending for many miles: gardens separated by strips of forest and swamps were dotted about by dozens in all directions, with cooly lines in each extending over a very large space. It was obvious how impossible it would be to afford individual protection to each garden, and that the plan we had adopted of a strong line of defence with fortified posts at the centre of groups, was the only practicable one. We rejoined the Government road at Chota Jalinga, crossing the Jalinga stream by a ford. I may here state that the road from Cachar to Jhalnacherra is, on the whole, a fair galloping road, some bridges are broken, but I have requested the civil authorities to have them repaired. At about 20 miles from Cachar we arrived at Dooarbund, the most northern of a group of gardens, the remainder being Nowarbund, Loharbund (woodlands), and Sonarbund, now deserted. I visited each of these gardens with the managers, and at Nowarbund, the most central, selected, with Mr. Shircore's permission, a fine site for the new stockade, commanding the whole garden, and with the assistance of two pickets protecting the cooly lines, and affording sufficient area for the barracks, and a place of refuge for the labourers. I attach a sketch plan. I may here mention that it was utterly impossible to abide by any fixed trace, or rather regular mathematical trace. The tops of the teelahs are so narrow, and their sides so abrupt, that I was obliged to be guided by their form and the extent of area obtainable for the barrack room required, and the position of the cooly lines to be protected. This post is only one and a-half miles from Dooarbund, and about two and a-half miles from Loharbund (woodlands), where I have posted a police guard to protect the garden from sudden attack, while the coolies could fall back on the stockaded post. I consider this a most important position; about two miles in its rear is a low range of hills communicating with the Rengti Range, and terminating almost north of the stockade, to the top of which a road will be cleared; and when the road is finished across the Rengti to Monierkhall, and a guard placed on the range, all places north of a line drawn from Monierkhall to Dooarbund will be safe, as far as I can possibly make them. Raids may slip through and do mischief, but I doubt the Looshais attempting it with the certainty of having their return cut off. After the rains I shall resume the position of Claverhouse (Dhurmkhall).

On the 9th we rode to Catleecherra (Bagshawe's garden), which, with Alexandrapore and Lotakhandy, forms another group on the Hylakandy Valley, and very close to the Chota Choora range. The Deslanee is about 20 miles. The whole country was a succession of tea gardens, slips of forest, and swamp. At about eight or nine miles from Dooarbund

we crossed the Khatakhall by a ferry at Hosearah. This was the largest garden I had seen, the cooly lines formed a large village with shops, cloth merchants, bunneahs, carpenters, and blacksmiths, extending for a mile along the river's bank. The manager has flanked the garden with a wall terminating at the river bank with a fortified post, and at the rear by a deep khall which runs along the back of the garden. The whole bore signs of a well-paying concern, and good management.

From as far north as Jafferbund to Jhalnacherra, the road commands and runs parallel to the Khatakhall, lower down called the Dullesser.

Fleets could, with the greatest ease, be protected along its course.

Beyond Hosearah, numbers of north-western coolies have settled, cleared the land, and large fields of wheat, dhall and peas, with ordinary garden produce, are the fruits of their labours.

For 10 miles after crossing the Khatakhall, skirting the Dullessur, we passed, as before, variations of forest, swamp farms, and tea gardens, until we arrived at the junction of the two Government roads at Fessacherra. The one we branched over, the other running nearly due north to the Hylakandy Valley through Moonacherra, Aena Khall, Luckinuggur, and so on to Khanebanpore on the Barah, and Buddepore on the Cachar and Sylhet roads. I was particularly anxious to explore the Chota Choora range, at the summit of which I had a guard of 40 police in stockade. For reasons which I shall hereafter explain, I considered this a most important position.

We arrived at Cuttacherra, the scene of Mr. Bagshawe's engagement with the Looshais, at 11 a.m.: nothing had been destroyed. The dwelling-house is on a fine, prominent position, overlooking the Dullessur. The cooly lines of vast extent spreading far and near. In the afternoon we visited Alexandrapore, distant about three-quarters of a mile. This is the private property of Mr. Sillar, and here poor Mr. Winchester was killed and buried under some trees in the neighbourhood. The lines, tea-houses, and dwelling-house had all been burnt; the stock plundered. We subsequently rode about three miles up, what I shall call the Hylakandy road to Lotakhandy, a fine garden belonging to Mr. S. Barry, and, I believe, his uncle, Dr. Barry. Here the buildings and dwelling-house had all been burnt, but not, it was believed, by any enemy; it was suspected by the garden coolies themselves. These last two gardens certainly presented a sad spectacle: broken furniture, crockery, glass, books, &c., strewed about in all directions. Though terrible losers, the owners bore their losses cheerfully, and were most kind in their reception of us. I may say the same of the owners and managers of all the gardens I have visited: their hospitality has been unlimited.

On the morning of the 10th we started for the tops of the Chuttur Choora from Alexandrapore. Our course lay nearly west for a mile over low spurs, by the track cut by the Looshais when they attacked Alexandrapore; their line of retreat being marked by fragments of useless spoil they had thrown away. We then crossed a bottomless jheel, covered with long grass, 14 feet high, treading, as we went, on a floating road made by grass cut down, and crossing our track. The stench from the water and slush as it bubbled up through the grass was scarcely bearable; not a breath of air reached us; leeches and ticks in abundance added to the discomforts of the road, and after one and-a-half mile's of "jheel trotting" we cheerfully encountered the ascent of the range itself. The track was one made by elephants, but looked in parts as neatly defined as if it had been done by hand; in one hour and 45 minutes we reached the summit. The day was bright, the guard had cleared a fine open space all around them, and the view east and west was lovely; on the Cachar side (north and east) the gardens of Lotakhandy bearing N. E. by E. half E., and Aena Khall, N. half E, were visible. Alexandrapore was hidden by the intervening range, but must have borne nearly due west: distant about four and a-half miles. On the Sylhet side (westward) our view was only bounded by the horizon; many villages and several gardens were visible, but were ignorant of their names. I have said that I consider this point on the Chuttur Choora a most important one. It is, I may say, at the junction of four tracks southwards along the ridge to Jhalnacherra, and it was by this ridge road that the guard marched from Jhalnacherra to its post northwards towards Aena Khall, Moonacheurra, and the whole of the northern part of the Hylakandy Valley, while, so to speak, at one foot eastward were the Lotakhandy, Alexandrapore, and Cuttacherra group Westward was the track leading to Sylhet, and connecting the Chota Choora stokade with the Chargola stockade.

I have massed at Alexandrapore 60 police from Jhalnacherra, Lotakhandy, and Cuttacherra, and am cutting a road up to the top of the range, while the guard itself is cutting towards Chargola. I hear the cutting has been cleared, and shall soon visit it.

On the afternoon of 10th we rode 12 miles to Jhalnacherra, crossing the Dullessur about half-way at Kookricherra garden, where a stockade had been erected by the manager to protect his coolies. The road still skirted the Dullessur, passing through a forest of magnificent timber, much of which is floated on bamboo rafts down the river.

The Jhalnacherra garden has a frontage of about a mile, and is cut right across in several places by deep ravines, backed quite up to the forest by high precipitous hills. Two of these are valuable as pickets commanding the cooly lines and covering the flanks of the position. The whole river frontage is so extensive that it was impossible to protect it; but by having the guard in the old picket-house on the left and palisading the river front, inclosing the flanks of the cooly lines with the pickets on the rear, I think the whole building will be effectually protected.

On the 11th we returned to Cuttacherra, and on the 12th to Dooarbund.

On

On the 13th we left Dooarbund, and, travelling *viâ* the site of the Nowarbund stockade endeavoured, by taking Mr. Daly's track, to reach Monierkhall, but on that day only got as far as the Rooknee Garden, distant about 10 or 11 miles.

The first few miles lay over very narrow teelahs, the banks of the ravines between them being about as perpendicular as man could either ascend or descend; yet our little ponies followed us. This continued for six or seven miles when we traversed about two miles of jheel, intersected in every direction by the tracks of wild elephants; while wherever the ground was bare, we discovered the footprints of tigers, deer, hog and buffaloes in abundance; a herd of wild elephants was roaring and trumpetting near us: leeches and ticks troubled us cruelly on the low lands. After crossing the bheel, we arrived at the Rooknee river, which was crossed by a footbridge. Three miles more bheel and cane brake brought us to the Rooknee Garden, now abandoned. Here we slept in the cooly lines.

On the 14th we started for Monierkhall and hit the road from Cachar near the Dhurmkhall. This, compared with the route we had followed, was a turnpike road. We reached Monierkhall at 10 a.m., and in the afternoon laid out the stockade. The teelahs are so narrow we were obliged to follow their crest.

Mr. Grace, the manager for Messrs. Jardine, Skinner & Co., most courteously met my wishes in every way.

From Monierkhall we started at 6 a.m. to cross the Bhooban Mountains. The first three miles was tolerably flat. The road was cleared, and we were able to ride. Then came a steep, continuous ascent to the summit of the range which we reached at 9 a.m., I should say about 2,500 feet above the sea. The day was not so clear as when we ascended the Chota Choora, but we took bearings of the following gardens:—

Monierkhall, W. by N. half N.
Dhurmkhall, N. W. half W.
Rooknee Garden, N. W. by W.
Deedar Koosh, N. by W.

The descent was far more fatiguing than the ascent. The former was a steady pull; the latter a succession of ups and downs across the summits of high teelahs. Much of this might be obviated by keeping more round the teelahs. This will hereafter be somewhat rectified.

After descending to the level of the valley of the Barak, we had about two miles of bheel and cane brake, and a mile over the terraced teelahs of the Menadhur Tea Garden, beautifully situated as to scenery on the banks of the Barak. Like several other gardens I could mention, it is simply a slip hewn out of the forest. It seems marvellous how any manager can be found willing to settle down, not to mention coolies. However, such a man has been found who, after having tried every employment under the sun, seems to think he has hit the right thing at last. To attempt to protect these gardens eastward of the Bhoobans, except by individual guards, is impossible; a body of raiders might either drop down the Barak, or take the road on right bank of the river, which Mr. Edgar tells me exists, and commit any amount of mischief long before intimation could be conveyed to the nearest station. The manager of Menadhur informs me he receives his dâk once a week, and learnt the *details* of the Monierkhall raid from the Calcutta papers. The guard at Menadhur and the other gardens in this neighbourhood shall be strengthened when men are available and the post at Luckeepore resumed, perhaps pushed on to Jerree Ghât after the rains.

On the 16th we embarked in boats on the Barak, and, after passing three or four tea gardens on the river bank, arrived in the evening at Luckeepore, and next day, the 17th, rode 15 miles over a fair road into Cachar.

The Barak is a fine river, averaging 100 or 120 yards across up to Menadhur; the channel up to this season is deep enough, I think, for boats of 200 maunds. There are a few snags and rapids, but of no moment when considering the stream as an auxiliary to the advance of a column. From the cursory notes I was able to make on the way down, I think a steamer of small draught, say, two or two and a-half feet, would be able easily to get as far as Menadhur, and, perhaps, higher at the end of the rains.

From what I saw on my tour of the frontier, of the extent and position of the tea gardens, I feel sure that to give each a small guard would only be to fritter away an army, and then not actually to afford the protection we would wish to the planters. The line of defence we have adopted, with strong detachments of troops at the stockades, and connecting links of police on the intervening ridges, with the roads connecting them well opened out and patrolled, will, for the present, be the most effectual protection we can give. I am aware that Mr. Edgar does not consider that anything will *ensure* the safety of our frontier until the savage tribes who have committed these outrages have been made to feel and respect our power, and in this I quite concur; but this is a subject I have not touched upon, as I am aware his Excellency has taken it under his own consideration. Much may be done by the planters by raising on each garden a small detail trained to arms as well as gardening. This would mightily assist in any scheme of protection. Many are lukewarm, many are anxious to inaugurate such a system, and, if it meets the approbation of Government, I shall be very happy to give my aid to foster the movement among them.

MEMORANDUM from Colonel *P. S. Lumsden*, Quarter Master General, to the Secretary the Government of India, Military Department, No. 1313C.; dated Calcutta the 5th April 1871.

Submitted for the information of Government in the Military Department.

From Colonel *P. S. Lumsden*, Quarter Master General, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 1336 C.; dated Calcutta, the 7th April 1871.

I AM instructed by the Right Honourable the Commander in Chief to submit, for the information of Government, the annexed copy of a report, No. 255, dated Cachar, 1st April 1871, from the Brigadier General, Commanding Eastern Frontier District, intimating that the Eastern Looshais appear to be assembling in considerable numbers for a raid in the direction of Cachar or Munnipore.

From Brigadier General *G. Bourchier*, C.B., Commanding Eastern Frontier District, to the Quarter Master General, No. 255; dated Cachar, the 1st April 1871.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for information of his Excellency the Commander in Chief, two letters received from the Deputy Commissioner yesterday. In concurrence with that officer, I have sent the police guard from Deedar Koosh to Minodhur, and a part of the detachment of 44th at Wurke, near the Koolmee Garden, to Deedar Koosh. I have already reported on the unprotected state of the valley of the Barak; but as the danger is anticipated from raiders crossing from Munnipore I have pointed out to the Deputy Commissioner that I think the Munnipore Raja should take precaution to prevent his country being made a thoroughfare for raids into our territory. This opinion Mr. Edgar has communicated to the Political Agent.

P.S.—It seems strange that the Political Agent of Munnipore should, in a private letter to a planter, enter into more minute details of the raid than he has to the Deputy Commissioner.

From Surgeon *R. Brown*, Political Agent at Munnipore, to the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar, No. 42; dated Munnipore, the 20th March 1871.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that information has just been brought in by spies that the eastern Looshais are again out in very large numbers for a raid, and they report that Cachar will be the most probable point of attack, and not improbably Munnipore; failing this an attack will be made on the Kamhaws. At all events, the spies are positive that the chiefs now out will not return without raiding in some one direction or another. They have assembled at Cheefoo, where the salt springs are in a situation convenient for an attack on either Cachar or Munnipore.

2. The principal chiefs out are Vonolel, Poiboi, Thulal, and the lesser chiefs under orders of Vonpilal's mother; with it may be others whose names are unknown. The Khongjai spies say that, from the fact of their seeing much smoke in one place, they can say that, according to the customs of the Looshais, no fewer than five chiefs of consequence have assembled.

The smoke is meant as a signal for an assembly on extensive scale.

3. Although this assembly may be meant to resist another threatened attack by the Kamhaws, the spies are of opinion, from all they have been able to see and hear, that an attack is intended as above mentioned.

No. 304, dated Cachar, the 31st March 1871.

Endorsed by the Deputy Commissioner.

FORWARDED to the Brigade Major for the information of the Brigadier General Commanding Eastern Frontier District.

From *A. S. Aird*, Esq., General Manager, Minodhur and Dhubeedhur, to the Deputy Commissioner of Silchar; dated Luckipore, Cachar, the 30th March 1871.

In a private letter from Dr. Brown, Political Agent at Munnipore, I had intimation that the eastern Looshais were reported to be again on the war trail, and intended invading Cachar, their numbers being from 2,000 to 3,000.

As you are doubtless in possession of information in the matter, I write merely to ask whether you consider the Minodhur Tea Garden on the Barak is entitled to additional protection from its isolated and exposed position.

Dhubeedhur, a garden in the same neighbourhood, and belonging to the same proprietor, has no military or police force to protect it; and as there is no means of escape for the people on either garden, a raid from the enemy would be disastrous.

No. 303, dated Cachar, the 31st March 1871.

Endorsed by the Deputy Commissioner.

Forwarded to the Brigade Major for the information of Brigadier General Commanding Eastern Frontier District.

From Colonel *P. S. Lumsden*, Quarter Master General, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 1042 C.; dated Calcutta, the 21st March 1871.

With reference to Military Department letter, No. 630 of 14th current, I am directed by the Commander in Chief to express his Excellency's opinion as follows:—

2. An inspection of the river which Captain Lightfoot and his party have to ascend would convince any one acquainted with military affairs that a small body of soldiers would be very powerless in canoes, poled up a narrow stream from 20 to 40 feet wide, with very steep overhanging banks, lined with dense forest, so that large trees could be felled and thrown across the stream, forming barricades in front or in rear of the party; a hostile body in the jungles, with the greater facility of moving possessed by savages in their native forests, could arrest, and in time destroy 50 or 60 soldiers under such circumstances.

3. At the first shot, the native boatmen, who pole on the canoes, would take the water and escape; of course the only safety of the soldiers would be to land immediately and meet their enemies on shore.

4. Captain Lightfoot had left his men in this dangerous position before he approached the signals, which were interpreted to him by the guides, supplied to him by the civil authorities, as signs of hostile boundary, the crossing of which would involve hostilities.

5. It was difficult for Captain Lightfoot to neglect such a warning when he believed Mr. Edgar to be in the power of the Looshais, and that, if still safe, any hostile act on his part might precipitate his destruction; the Government instructions being that Mr. Edgar's safety was to be the paramount consideration.

6. I think it would have been better had Captain Lightfoot either gone forward with the guides and a small party, or sent an intelligent native officer with a party to examine the marks on the rocks; and if any of the Looshais could be seen, to communicate with them through his interpreters, or had he tried to communicate with the men whom he describes as picquets perched in the trees, whom he became aware of in the earlier part of his journey.

7. It is not said whether he made such attempts to communicate an assurance that he had no hostile intentions, but the account given of the panic-stricken condition of the guides leads to the belief that they would not have undertaken their part of the duty.

8. It must be remembered that at that time there was nothing to show that some of the marauders were not Sookpilal's tribe, and that the friendly relations between Mr. Edgar and Sookpilal, and the circumstances of the gifts and treaty employed to conciliate that chief, were unknown to Captain Lightfoot, who, on the contrary, must have been aware of Major Macdonald's failure to penetrate into Saboonga's country owing to hostile prohibitions.

9. Dismissing, therefore, the subsequent information and view of Mr. Edgar's camp, and familiar intercourse with Sookpilal's people from consideration, I should say that Captain Lightfoot was justified in his proceeding as a prudent measure for the safety of his party, which leaves no reproach whatever on his military character; but had he risked more and succeeded, he would have gained very much greater credit; had he risked more and failed, either by causing Mr. Edgar's death or captivity and the loss of his own party, he would have been blamed as inconsiderate. But, taking a general view of Captain Lightfoot's

proceedings, the energy of his march from Sylhet to Cachar (70½ miles in three days), his subsequent determination in proceeding still at much risk, the labour which he and his men underwent in dragging the canoes up the rapids in the stream, and his steady endeavours to carry out the Government instructions to escort Mr. Edgar back in safety, entitle him to my warm commendation, with the remarks that some efforts to investigate the signs of hostility, the red flag, &c., or to communicate with the Looshais, would have been satisfactory.

From Captain *E. Lightfoot,* Commanding Detachment, 44th Regiment Native Infantry, to the Brigade Major, Eastern Frontier District; dated Cachar, the 6th March 1871.

In continuation of my letter of the 16th February 1871, I have the honour to submit the following report for the information of Brigadier General Bourchier, C.B., Commanding Eastern Frontier District.

1. On the 17th February I halted at Silgur, and began erecting a stockade, and I also sent some scouts (with a letter for Mr. Edgar) to ascertain the position of the Looshais supposed to be concealed between my party and Mr. Edgar's.

2. At about 6 a.m., on the 18th February, two policemen arrived from Mr. Edgar's camp on a raft; these men stated that they had left Mr. Edgar, on the 16th February, at a place called Phunchun Kai, distant some nine miles from Looshai Hât, in a southerly direction by the river. Phunchun Kai, they averred, could be reached overland from Looshai Hât in three and a half hours.

On receipt of this intelligence, I directed Lieutenant Bourne and his detachment to return to Monnierkhall, there to await the Brigadier General's orders, and embarking my detachment proceeded up the river. The two policemen I ordered into Cachar to report personally to the Brigadier General Commanding, in regard to Mr. Edgar's supply of provisions, and the state of his party. At nightfall I bivouacked at a place some distance above Coolie Ghât.

3. On the 19th February I started at dawn, and at the night reached Asoomea Khal, where I halted.

4. On the 20th February, at dawn, I proceeded on my journey, and at about 6 a.m. I reached the place where the scouts had reported the bamboos and chungas, &c., to be. I examined the spot and found that, on the left bank of the river, a tall bamboo had been erected, and on the right bank another bamboo, with a small red flag on the top of it, had been placed at an angle; under this bamboo were some chungas, and Looshai rice was strewed about. Looshai rice is of a coarser description than the rice used in Cachar; it was the sight of the Looshai rice and chungas, I imagine, that made my scouts come to the conclusion that a force of Looshais must be in the neighbourhood, and moreover, in such numbers as not to care whether their presence was betrayed or not.

At about 3 p.m. I reached Looshai Hât, where I landed for a few minutes only. I then pushed on further up the river, and at night I halted and bivouacked in the bed of the stream.

5. At day-break, on the 21st February, a policeman, with a letter from Mr. Edgar (in answer to the letter I sent on the 17th February) joined me. In his letter Mr. Edgar mentioned that the Looshais had supplied him with 20 maunds of rice, and that he and his party were well.

This evening I reached Phunchun Kai, where I found Mr. Edgar and his party. The provisions I had brought in boats were duly made over by me.

On the 22nd and 23rd February I halted at Phunchun Kai. Mr. Edgar having expressed a wish to remain in his camp until he had had an interview with a Looshai chief, Kolgong (a son of Sookpilal's), through whom he thought he could negotiate for the restoration of the late Mr. Winchester's daughter.

7. On the 24th February the whole party started for Looshai Hât, which was reached in the afternoon. Shortly after our arrival a party of armed men belonging to the Looshai chief, Kolgong, came into our camp and stated that their chief would arrive in an hour or so. These men were under-sized men, and their physique did not impress me favourably; they are, however, very active: the fire-arms they had with them were old flint guns, some of them bearing the mark "Tower," and others, again, the arms of the East India Company. Their powder, which is of a very inferior description indeed, and made by themselves, would not, in my opinion, propel one of their bullets as far as one hundred yards with any accuracy.

In the evening the Looshai chief, Kolgong, came from the other side of the river into our camp, and had an interview with Mr. Edgar. I was present at this interview, which I shall briefly allude to.

The Looshai chief, Kolgong, told Mr. Edgar that he would assist the Government as far as he could with men to act as guides, and act offensively also, in case of an expedition into the interior of the Looshai country, to punish the raiders; for this offer he demanded no reward. At the same time he deprecated the idea of sending in any force this season, it being too far advanced.

My

My impression is, that this chief was speaking loyally, and meant what he professed; time and circumstances can only show if the opinion I formed be correct or no, but the fact of his coming into our camp at night would tend to show that he put faith in us. He was attended by some *muntries* and armed men who showed no distrust or suspicion in their manner.

On the 25th February the whole party started down the river and camped at the Tipai Mookh.*

On the 26th February the party proceeded on its journey, and in the evening halted at Broon Khal.

On the 27th February the party again started; at about mid-day I met Lieutenant Bourne and his detachment at Silgur. This party joined mine, and we went on until dusk, when we camped on the river bank.

Mr. Edgar, having been furnished by me with a light boat, pushed on the same day to Monnierkhall.

At day-break on the 28th February the whole party started for Monnierkhall, which was reached at mid-day. Here, under orders conveyed through Colonel Duffin, commanding at Monnierkhall, I halted.

With regard to Mr. Edgar's camp, I would beg to state that I do not consider it a suitable site for a stockade; it was situated on the left bank of the river; it was about 100 yards in length, and about 50 yards in depth, the rear of the camp forming a segment of a circle, the right flank was extremely exposed to an attack from the direction of Dhurmangpi, and the left flank and rea from Looshai Hât.

Looshai Hât, in my opinion, is not a desirable place for a small camp or stockade. Many paths lead to it from the interior, and from these paths other paths branch. Being so central, in case of a combined attack on the part of an enemy, he could advance on Looshai Hât from four directions.

I did not land at Ram Lukun Tila, and regret, therefore, that I can give no description of the place.

I would beg to bring to the notice of the Brigadier General Commanding the co-operation and assistance I received from Lieutenant Bourne when I came across him. The river being very low, and consisting of rapids and pools, necessitated the sepoys dragging the laden boats over the shallows; this took place near every two hundred yards from Monnierkhall to Phunchun Kai. The detachment under Jemadar Sham Lall set to work most cheerfully whenever any occasion arose.

I had occasion to notice how well Inspector Dost Mahomed, of the police, had maintained the discipline and morale of his men.

* This appears to be wrongly named, as Tipai Mookh is on the Barak river.

COPY of a MEMORANDUM from Brigadier General *G. Bourchier*, Commanding Eastern Frontier District, to the Quarter Master General, No. 237; dated Cachar, the 27th March 1871.

IN forwarding this report I have the greatest pleasure in bringing to notice Captain Lightfoot's conduct, as also Lieutenant Bourne's; both officers were placed in a most critical position, into which I was only justified in placing them by the paramount importance of rescuing Mr. Edgar. They both have merited my warmest approbation. I forward also Mr. Edgar's opinion of Captain Lightfoot, which places his character for energy and prudence in a strong light.

EXTRACT Paragraph 26 of a Letter, No. B., dated 6th March 1871, from the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar, to the Commissioner of the Dacca Division.

ON the 21st Captain Lightfoot arrived with 50 men of the 44th. I learned from him that when he had heard of my safety, and that the Looshais about me were friendly, he had ordered Lieutenant Bourne and some 62 men back to Monnierkhall, thinking that the sight of a large party of troops coming up might frighten the Looshais, who had shown themselves friendly, and perhaps embarrass me. In this, I think, Captain Lightfoot showed great judgment. As far, at least, as my position was concerned, nothing could have been better than the course adopted.

No. 1356 C, dated Calcutta, the 7th April 1871.

Endorsed by the Quarter Master General.

SUBMITTED for the information of Government in the Military Department, with reference to this office letter, No. 1042 C, dated 21st March 1871.

COPY of a LETTER from the Officer Commanding Detachment, 22nd Punjab Native Infantry, to the Deputy Assistant Quartermaster General, Presidency District, No. 3, dated Kassalong, Chittagong Hill Tracts, 2nd April 1871, forwarded under Presidency District (No. 1114 G); dated 19th April 1871.

I HAVE the honour to report as follows of the detachment, 22nd Punjab Native Infantry, under my command. In my last, dated the 15th March, I mentioned that I had received a demi-official from Captain Lewin, Deputy Commissioner, requesting me to move the whole of my detachment at once to Kassalong police post, the reason assigned being that the police force from that place had moved north-east to take up an advanced position in the village of Rutton Pooea, a friendly Kookie chief, and that Kassalong Fort was thereby left without a garrison. I despatched the baggage the same evening by water to Rangamattee under a guard of seven men, with orders to await our arrival there.

On the following morning we marched 15 miles in the direction of Rangamattee, passing through a perfectly open and generally cultivated country, and halted for the night near some wood-cutters' huts, which afforded the men certain shelter from the rain, which fell heavily during the night.

The next day, Friday, the 17th, we reached Rangamattee at 10.30 a.m., after a march of 10 miles, the road leading us across several ranges of very steep hills. Here we again halted for the night, the men getting quarters in the police lines.

The following morning, Saturday, the 18th, according to Captain Lewin's request, I left a party of one havildar, one naick, and 20 men in command of the jemadar at Rangamattee; the remainder marched for Kassalong at 7 a.m. Kassalong, formerly the head quarters of the Deputy Commissioner of the Hill Tracts, differs from the other police posts in the district in being situated on low ground.

The stockade, which is named Fort Gordon (from a former Commissioner of Chittagong) occupies the east end of an open space of about 30 acres, and is sufficiently strong, both in natural position and artificial defence, to resist with a garrison of 100 men any sudden attack by raiders. The open space has been cleared in the jungle at a bend of the Kurnafoollee river, which encircles it on the north, west, and south sides. In the centre of the stockade there is a small fort or keep, which contains the magazine, stores, ammunition, &c., &c, of the garrison, and a nine-pounder brass gun, of the time of George IV., in position.

The stockade appears to me to be unnecessarily large, measuring, roughly, 100 yards by 50 yards, and of an irregular shape. The north side rests upon a steep cliff overhanging the river, and from 50 to 60 feet in height; upon this side, therefore, assault would be impossible. But the whole of the rest of the stockade (roughly 250 yards) would have to be manned in the case of even a moderately-determined attack by raiders, not to mention the brass gun, which would require at least five men to work it effectually. Captain Lewin requested me to establish a daily communication between Kassalong and the police force at Rutton Pooea's village, the plan suggested being that the Kassalong half of the dâk duty should be taken by the sepoys of the 22nd detachment, and the Rutton Pooea half by the police there stationed, the two parties meeting at some rendezvous previously to be fixed upon, and, having exchanged letters or reports, to return to their respective detachments. In order to arrange this, I took four of my sepoys and four constables out to settle upon a suitable half way place of meeting; I found a spot well suited to the purpose about five miles above the Bhurkal Falls, and where the Government road ends abruptly in a small open space overlooking the river. The place has one disadvantage, namely, that it does not exactly subdivide the road, but as the longer half falls to the constables from Rutton Pooea, I waived this objection, and ordered a small guard house to be built, which was finished the same evening at a cost of five rupees.

I sent on the police constables (one of them who knew the road acting as guide) to Rutton Pooea, with order to return with the first dâk party to point out the place of meeting.

The communication is now working well, and food as well as letters have been sent out, it having been reported by the jemadar of police at Rutton Pooea that it is with the greatest difficulty that he can obtain even a little rice for his men.

The probable reason of this is, that the chief herself is absent from home upon an expedition in Howlong, and the Ranee fears to take upon herself the responsibility of supplying too much food from the provision stores of the village.

The absence of Rutton Pooea at this time is vaguely accounted for by the report that he is treating with the Howlongs for the release of two European tea planters carried off by them from the Cachar neighbourhood. It is also said that the release of Mr. Winchester's child is his object. These reports are most likely mere suggestions, his real object probably being known only to himself.

The dâk between Rangamattee and Kassalong is also worked by the sepoys of the detachment, so that six men of the 59th I have with me are daily upon the road, and, taking the guard duty and the sick men into the calculation, the dâk duty falls to each man once in every three or four days. I attribute mainly to this the present healthy state of the detachment at a time which I am informed is in this district the most trying during the year.

I have

I have been requested by the district superintendent of police to take over charge of the police guard of this place, which I have accordingly done.

In conclusion I have the honour to report that nothing further has occurred worthy of special remark since my last, dated 15th March.

Endorsed by the Deputy Quartermaster General (No. 1196); dated Simla, 28th April 1871.

SUBMITTED for the information of Government in the Military Department, in continuation of this office, No. 740 C, dated 2nd March 1871.

From the Officer Commanding Eastern Frontier District to the Adjutant General (No. 268); dated Cachar, 3rd April 1871.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that since my last reports Colonel Hicks, at Jhalnacherra, has completed his stockade and barracks. I have, therefore, made arrangements for withdrawing the 44th from that station, and, agreeable to the arrangement concurred in by his Excellency the Commander in Chief, leaving the 4th in charge of Cachar and its three frontier posts, Jhalnacherra, Nawarbund, and Monnierkhall; the two latter stockades are fast approaching completion, when their garrisons will be reduced to a full company under a Native officer. Captain Ommaney's party have nearly cleared the road from the Rooknee river through the Rooknee garden to the Monnierkhall road; on completion, this detachment will be brought in. No time will be lost in completion of Chargola stockade, as I have sent 100 of 44th there from Jhalnacherra; they will, on finishing their work, fall back on Sylhet and remain there. Captain Lightfoot reports favourable progress. The road to *top* of Chatta Choora from Alexanderpore is now rideable, and progressing favourably towards Chargola; also thence, towards Allynuggur, as reported by Captain Lightfoot. Captain Robertson reports having marked out and dug trench for the posts of his stockade, and trusts next week to be able to report much progress. I shall myself leave for Chargola and Allynuggur on the 4th, and fix my head quarters for the present at Sylhet.

P.S.—I trust it will not be forgotten I have had only one month's working weather, and the completion of these stockades and roads between them must go on next cold weather: I say completion of stockades; they will be, so to speak, completed, but may constantly be improved.

EXTRACT from Eastern Frontier District Orders by Brigadier General *G. Bourchier*, C.B., Commanding (No. 36); dated Cachar, 3rd April 1871.

THE stockade at Jhalnacherra having been reported completed, the following movements of troops will take place.

2. One hundred men of all ranks of the 44th Regiment, Native Infantry, under command of Captain Williams, will march by the direct road to Chargola. On their arrival there, Captain Palmer, 4th Regiment, Native Infantry, will march by the same route to Jhalnacherra with his company of 4th Native Infantry, which is to occupy that outpost during the ensuing rainy season.

3. Captain Williams will also return to Jhalnacherra, and join head quarters of his corps, the whole of which will return to Cachar under command of Colonel Hicks, on relief by the permanent garrison of Jhalnacherra.

4. Captain Palmer will hereafter rejoin his regimental head quarters under Lieutenant Colonel Stubbs' orders, leaving a Native officer in command.

5. On arrival at Cachar, Colonel Hicks will collect all the men left at Cachar, and proceed by land to Sylhet, sending heavy baggage, hospital, and ammunition by boat; at Sylhet he will await further orders.

6. Five elephants are being sent from Cachar (four from the 4th Native Infantry and one from the 44th Native Infantry) to carry out these movements at once, aided by the carriage already at Colonel Hicks' disposal. The elephants of the 4th Native Infantry will be made over to that corps again by Colonel Hicks on arrival at Cachar.

7. The men proceeding to Chargola will be left there, under the orders of Captain Lightfoot, to assist in constructing the stockade.

8. Supplies for five days only are to be sent with the party, as arrangements will be made to have *russud* sent out from Sylhet.

9. Lieutenant Colonel Stubbs will make arrangements to have supplies ready at Jhalnacherra for Captain Palmer's company about the 12th or 13th instant.

10. Captain Ommaney, 44th Regiment, may, should he consider it desirable, send off to Sylhet the reserve ammunition and any heavy baggage now at Cachar, with a party of 20 men previous to Colonel Hicks' arrival, as there may be a difficulty in collecting many boats at one time.

11. The sepoys' tents of the detachment, 4th Native Infantry, at Chargola, will be made over to Captain Lightfoot, should he require them for the shelter of his detachment, and in this case he will give notice to Colonel Hicks, who will then transfer an equivalent number to the officer commanding 4th Native Infantry at Cachar.

Colonel Hicks will send with Captain Williams' party to Chargola half of the intrenching tools that are now at Jhalnacherra, and make over the other half to Captain Palmer to be kept at Jhalnacherra.

MEMORANDUM from the Adjutant General to the Quartermaster General; dated Camp Benares, 16th April 1871.

TRANSFERRED to the Quartermaster General in India.

From *S. C. Bayley*, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department (No. 2039); dated Fort William, 3rd May 1871.

IN continuation of this office letter, No. 1044, dated 9th March last, I am directed to forward a copy of the correspondence noted in the margin, regarding the raid near Allynuggur, in the district of Sylhet, and to say that it does not seem probable to the Lieutenant Governor that the charge against Sookpilal will be made good, but the case is, in his Honour's opinion, a sad illustration of the evils of our present position. In this instance there are nine British subjects killed, and a number of women and children carried into captivity, and the Government are absolutely helpless in the matter.

Letter No. 73, dated 24th ultimo, and enclosure, from Commissioner of Dacca.
Letter No. 2037, dated 3rd May, to Commissioner of Dacca.

From *F. B. Simson*, Esq., Commissioner of the Dacca Division, to the Officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Political Department (No. 73); dated Dacca, 24th April 1871.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith copies of a letter, No. 272, of the 17th April, and its enclosures from the magistrate of Sylhet. The submission of this report was delayed beyond all reasonable time, during which I was incessant in my calls for it. Intermediately I received some lengthy communications from the magistrate; they were filled with his ideas as to Sookpilal's complicity, and remarks as to Mr. Edgar's errors, especially in inventing the term "Looshai" as a name for these tribes. I will notice these letters separately.

2. The report made by Mr. Patch, the district superintendent of police, is, I think, now complete, and great credit is due to the police. It is quite out of my power to state why Captain Robertson, who was stationed at Allynuggur with a strong force, should have remained in the stockade and have sent a small mixed force of soldiers and police to attack these raiders, when the affrighted villagers must have given the very best information that the raiders were at work. I can only regret these apparently mistaken tactics, by which we lost the best opportunity yet afforded of reading these raiders an effectually severe lesson.

3. It appears that the two villages of Ranibaree and Rypa were ravaged. The position of Ranibaree is described by Mr. Patch. It is a village of Ally Ahmud Khan, the influential Sylhet zemindar, so often mentioned, with whom I am intimately acquainted, but far from favourably impressed. The village is inhabited by the people of the mother of Gnurshalong *alias* Murchaillall. It is not quite improbable that the raid may have been committed by hillmen wholly or almost wholly unconnected with the tribes living between Beparee Bazaar and Rutton Pooea's country, for there is no plumbing the depth of the intrigues carried on in connection with the affairs of Ally Ahmud and the Raja of Tipperah and the hill tribes, over whom both claim rights, and who are willing to pay rent to neither; with which

which intrigues the family quarrels of the hill tribes dwelling further to the south and east are mixed up, as also are matters connected with Kanyhe Sing, the Munnipooree, who was intimate with some Looshai families when he haunted the country near the Sonai River, and who was till lately protected from capture by Munnipoorees living near Adampore, where he was taken prisoner just before these raids. The positions of the villages are given by Mr. Patch, but their names, and those of Allynuggur and Lingla, are not to be found on the maps. I know the position pretty well. All the places named are very close to the frontier line fixed by Sir George Yule, and it should have been more plainly stated how the villages were situated with reference to this line which divides Sylhet from Hill Tipperah. The line is not known to the hill tribes, nor recognised by them, nor approved of by Ally Ahmud; but raids on the Sylhet side of it are on British grounds, and raids on the other side are not; and though raiding is, of course, wholly unjustifiable, still the hill tribes do not consider that they interfere with us when they raid in Hill Tipperah, and we have no history of the wars of late between these tribes and the Tipperah rajah.

4. Sookpilal's complicity, or that of some near members of his family, is a subject of much difficulty. Mr. Sutherland has written a great deal about it, and within three days I will submit a separate report on this matter.

5. The guns are described; my impression is different from Mr. Sutherland's. I believe most of the guns came from the eastern side; many guns are obtained from Burmah. I do not think these guns are at all of uniform kind. They are described to me by Mr. Daly, who has seen them, as all of different lengths and kinds; they may have been picked up at various places and times, and there is nothing connected with them which throws light on any importation of arms from Calcutta, or elsewhere, or which will assist us in identifying the tribes of raiders.

6. The Kookies, whose villages were plundered, suffered much distress. Mr. Sutherland telegraphed to me, and I desired him to supply rice, and to work the distressed Kookies, if possible, on roads, &c., and called for more detailed information, which has not yet reached me. The matter will be reported more fully.

From *H. C. Sutherland*, Esq., Magistrate of Sylhet, to the Commissioner of the Dacca Division (No. 272); dated Sylhet, the 17th April 1871.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your information, a copy of the report from the district superintendent of police on the Allynuggur raid.

2. As this report is the first clear, complete, and intelligible report that I have received on the subject, you will now, I trust, see why it was difficult for me to have written more than I have already done on this subject. I was hoping from day to day that Mr. Patch would be able to go out to Allynuggur, and, pending the receipt of his report, I thought it would be better not to write you a supplementary report myself. Pressure of works in several quarters prevented the district superintendent from going out sooner than he did, and I am deeply grieved that you should impute any neglect to me for not writing before.

3. In my letter, No. 136, dated 1st March, I reported to you the facts connected with the raid so far as they were known to me at the time; but I hasten to make one correction in my letter. I wrote that Captain Robertson accompanied his men and the police. This, I find, is a mistake.

4. The attack appears to have been principally directed towards Raneebaree, where Murchaillall's mother lives. This fact, coupled with what the district superintendent reports subsequently that he has ascertained (a copy of the letter is also forwarded herewith), viz., that Murchaillall and his mother have been on bad terms, it would look very like as if Murchaillall had something to do with the raid. This conjecture is further borne out by another letter from Mr. Patch, copy of which is also sent for your information; but the statement will require a little more inquiry before I can be prepared to endorse it. If the Ranee Lall Poee Tobi is on bad terms with her son Murchaillall, she would in all probability have tried to implicate Murchaillall. The fact of her not doing so is certainly a presumption against Mr. Edgar's theory connecting Murchaillall with the raids. But on this subject I should prefer to suspend judgment until I have further satisfied myself.

5. It is important that some steps should be taken in recovering our subjects who were carried off by the raiders; but until we can first be sure who the raiders were, it will be, I presume, idle to attempt any retaliatory measures. On this subject I would call special attention to paragraph 9 of the district superintendent's letter. You will see that Sookpilal's sons have been identified by Shanglala, who was carried away by the raiders, and succeeded in effecting his escape on the third day. This fact is important for two reasons; first, it will explain to you, I trust satisfactorily, why the identification of Sookpilal's sons was not stated at first, a point on which you would appear to lay great stress; second, the identification would appear to be more trustworthy from the fact that it was not a

hasty one, but a recognition by a Kookie after having been a captive with the raiders for three days.

6. To Mr. Patch's description of the guns, I can only supplement what I have observed as the two guns sent into the station. They are evidently old sepoy's muskets. They bear the Tower mark and George, but the stocks are evidently new. They are very roughly made, and, I should think, must have been made by the Khachacks themselves. They were originally flints, but from a bit of tow attached to one of them, I think that the scarcity of flint probably suggested the use of cloth or tow to fire their guns with. The barrels are very long, and will explain how it is that the raiders have been able to shoot, and sometimes with success, at such long ranges. The guns with me could not have been cleaned at all for a long time. That they should have stood firing so well would go, I think, to show that they must be old sepoy's muskets, and not Monghyr made.

7. I quite agree with the district superintendent in his remark about sub-inspector Beblaram. I think that the police have done so well all through the raids, that a slight error of judgment should not be allowed to have any prejudicial effect on the police.

8. I shall report in a separate letter on the distress of the Kookies, reported by the district superintendent, from paragraph 21 to the close of his letter. On some more points I should wish to have a little more information.

From *J. Patch*, Esq., District Superintendent of Police, Sylhet, to the Magistrate of Sylhet (No. 5 A.); dated Sylhet, the 17th April 1871.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your memorandum, No. 250, dated 11th instant, forwarding an extract from the Commissioner's letter, No. 1 A., dated Dacca, the 2nd instant, and beg herewith to furnish the report called for therein.

2. I propose to commence my report with a brief *resumé* of the skirmish that took place between the raiders and our people on the morning of the 27th February, near the Allynuggur frontier outpost.

3. About 9 a.m. on that day, a Bengalee resident of Nuldoora, a village situated about two miles to the south-east of Longla, Ally Ahmed Khan's house, and about the same distance east of the Allynuggur frontier outpost, arrived at the stockade and reported that a party of raiders had made their appearance at some Kookie villages to the east of Nuldoora. The man was very excited, and his statement was slightly incoherent.

4. Captain Robertson, who was in command of a detachment of the 44th, immediately despatched a force, consisting of 20 sepoys, under a havildar and a naik, as a feeling party. This force was supplemented by a party of police, consisting of one head constable and 14 constables, under command of Sub-inspector Beblaram.

5. The party proceeded to Raneebaree, a Kookie village belonging to Ally Ahmed Khan, and inhabited by Ranee Lall Poee Tobi, the mother of Murchaillall. They surprised the raiders in the poonjee, and after a very short skirmish, in which one of the raiders was killed and his body captured, the enemy fled away.

6. I must not omit here to mention one circumstance which is much to be regretted. On first perceiving the raiders in the village, sub-inspector Beblaram was under the impression that they were ordinary Kookies, and, acting on this belief, prevented our men from firing first, and so gave the Looshais an opportunity of effecting their escape with trifling loss. It is a matter much to be deplored, but I do not impute any blame to the sub-inspector; it was, however, a most unfortunate mistake.

7. After this short skirmish, no more was seen of the raiders. It was at first supposed that they were lurking about the hills near Allynuggur, but it has since been ascertained that they went clean away.

8. A few days afterwards, the remains of the heads of two of the Looshais were brought into the stockade.

9. A small guard, consisting of 10 men, was posted at Nuldoora. This guard was first furnished by the military; it has since been relieved by the police.

10. The raiders would appear to have come from the south-east. They first made their appearance at Bypar Poonjee, a Kookie village about two miles to the east of Raneebaree; they plundered and destroyed that village, and then came on to Raneebaree.

11. Raneebaree is situated about three or four miles to the east of Allynuggur, and about the same distance to the south-east of Longla.

12. I will now proceed to give a detailed list of the number of British subjects killed and captured by the raiders; also the number of guns captured by our people.

13. Of

13. Of the inhabitants of Bypa Poonjee, eight were killed and eight taken prisoners. Of the eight killed, two were old women, the rest men; five were killed on their joom, and three in the poonjee. The eight taken captives were all females.

14. The names of the people killed are as follows: Men, Nakya, Koongas, Lena, Cheyga, killed in the poonjee; Toungpueeja, Darkoomboong, Bongrong, killed on the joom. Two old women, Dobbee and Bowjee, killed on the joom.

15. The names of the females taken captives are as follows: Arju (middle aged), Haba (old), Shomee (middle aged), Tangchung (old), two little girls named Attecka and Beyhe, and two more old women named Ijoytinga and Sheecha.

16. Of the Raneebaree Kookies only one man was killed; his name was Sangtong Yeary Pol. Three boys were taken prisoners, viz., Kottana, Toola, and Shanglala.

17. Shanglala succeeded in making his escape on the 3rd day after his capture; he is the lad alluded to in my letter, No. A—1, dated Camp, Allynuggur, the 29th ultimo, as having recognised among the raiders two of the sons of Sookpilal. As the alleged recognition of these two has formed the subject of a separate correspondence, I will not allude to it further in this report.

18. Ten guns and 15 spears belonging to the raiders were captured by our men; one was a double-barrelled gun, and another a single percussion, the remainder were flints.

19. In addition to the Looshai killed, whose body was photographed, and the two men whose heads brought in afterwards; another of the raiders is said to have been shot by a man named Dinga, an inhabitant of Raneebaree. This would make a total of four of the enemy ascertained to have been killed.

20. Since the 27th of February, up to the present time, no fresh disturbance has taken place. About the middle of last month, the garrison at Allynuggur was reinforced by Captain Butler, and 113 men of the 43rd Native Infantry, and the whole force at that place, have since been employed in constructing a new stockade.

21. I will now do myself the honour of reporting upon the distress prevailing among the Kookies of Raneebaree and Bypa, as reported in my letter, No. 3 A., dated Camp, Allynuggur, the 30th ultimo.

22. These unfortunate people fled into the plains at the approach of the raiders; houses were burnt, in them their small store of grain and marketable articles; and as they were afraid to go to their homes for some time, the cultivation of their jooms was seriously retarded.

23. They are still reluctant to go into the jungle, and, until supplied, begged their food from the villagers who lived at the foot of the hills. Some of the men occasionally visited their poonjees in the day, but returned at night to their families to sleep under but scanty shelter.

24. I have ascertained, after careful inquiry, that the total number of Kookies requiring assistance of Raneebaree is 331, women and children making up the greater portion of this number; in addition to which there are 64 distressed Kookies of Bypa Poonjee, making altogether a total of 395.

25. According to your instructions, I made arrangements for the supply of rice for the relief of the above, making myself responsible to the supplier, Ally Ahmed Khan, for the payment of the money expended.

26. I should be greatly obliged if you would communicate to Ally Ahmed Khan your wishes concerning the future steps to be taken for the relief of these people.

27. Referring to the suggestion of the Commissioner regarding the employment of these Kookies on Government work, I would propose that the services of all the able-bodied men might be utilised by the officer commanding the Allynuggur outpost for the purpose of clearing the jungle, collecting material for the new stockade, or any work of a similar nature required of them.

28. I would, however, strongly deprecate any measure that would take them a distance from their forsaken jooms, but would rather encourage them to return to their cultivation before the approaching rains set in.

From *J. Patch*, Esq., District Superintendent of Police, Sylhet, to the Magistrate of Sylhet (No. 6 A.); dated Sylhet, the 17th April 1871.

WITH reference to paragraph 5 of my letter, No. 2 A., dated Camp, Allynuggur, the 30th ultimo, I have the honour to inform you that, since writing the above letter, I have been informed that Murchaillall, previous to the late raids, dispatched some 10 or 12 of his men to the Looshai country.

2. To what particular chief these men were deputed, I have been unable to ascertain. Rungbhoom and Congbhoom, the latter being the adopted son of the late Lall Hooban, were connected with the sending of these men. If the above be true, it would certainly tend to throw suspicion on the good faith of the above-named chiefs.

From *J. Patch*, Esq., District Superintendent of Police, Sylhet, to the Magistrate of Sylhet; No. 7 A; dated Sylhet, the 17th April 1871.

WITH reference to copy of letter, No. 237, to the Commissioner of the Dacca Division forwarded to me, and particularly with reference to paragraph 3, I have the honour to report that in my recent visit to Allynuggur I ascertained from Ranee Lall Poee Tobi, Murchaillall's mother, that she had been for many years on very bad terms with her son.

From *S. C. Bayley*, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal in the Judicial Department, to the Commissioner of Dacca (No. 2037); dated Fort William, the 3rd May 1871.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 73, dated 24th ultimo, submitting a detailed report from the District Superintendent of Police of Sylhet on the Allynugger raid.

2. The Lieutenant Governor has observed with extreme surprise and displeasure that the complete and detailed report of the circumstances attending this very serious occurrence, in which nine British subjects were killed and a number were carried away into captivity, was not received till two months after the event. The magistrate seems to impute the delay to the district superintendent of police, who was (despite the magistrate's wishes) prevented by pressure of work in several quarters from going out sooner than he did, that is, apparently a full month after the occurrence. The case as reported, though very serious and sad, is extremely simple; yet the superintendent's report of his inquiry into the events of 17th February is dated 17th April. His Honour cannot imagine what other work could have prevented the superintendent's attending to an affair of this magnitude. I am to request that you will be good enough to call on the superintendent for an immediate explanation why he delayed going to Allynuggur taking the necessary steps with respect to this matter; and this explanation should be submitted to Government for orders with as little delay as possible. The magistrate should also be asked to state precisely what measures he took during the month of March with respect to the alleged identification of the raiders. The Lieutenant Governor awaits a further report from you on the subject.

3. As regards the distressed Kookies the Lieutenant Governor is not satisfied. So far as he can gather, it would seem as if nothing whatever were done for them at the time when they may be supposed to have most wanted food, and afterwards nothing is said of any pressure put on the zemindar to assist them in his character of zemindar. Later, the public officers seem to have somewhat too readily assumed the whole responsibility on the part of Government for food to be supplied by the zemindar, making a census of 395 Kookies "requiring assistance," and apparently undertaking to supply food to them all. In such cases the Lieutenant Governor thinks Government can hardly assume the duty except to avert absolute starvation and very extreme distress; and from whatever quarter they receive assistance, it should be given with discrimination in a shape and with a view to enable them to resume their ordinary occupations, and to earn wages as useful labourers. They must on no account be turned into pensioners. A further report on this subject is awaited with interest.

From *C. U. Aitchison*, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department, No. 960 *P.*; dated Simla, the 20th May 1871.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 2039, dated the 3rd of May 1871, submitting a copy of a correspondence regarding the raid by Looshais near Allynuggur in the District of Sylhet, on the 17th of February last, and conveying the opinion of his Honour the Lieutenant Governor that although nine British subjects were killed, and a number of women and children taken captive, yet Government are absolutely helpless in the matter.

2. It appears to the Viceroy and Governor General in Council that this helplessness is due not only to the apathy which has characterised the proceedings of the magistrate and district superintendent of police at Sylhet in procuring information regarding this raid, but also to a want of that antecedent knowledge of the affairs and politics of the district which is a necessary preliminary to action, and which is to be attained by nothing but free and continued communication with the people.

3. His Excellency in Council observes that Captain Robertson, who was in the Allynuggur post with a strong force of the 44th Native Infantry, when the raid was going on in his immediate neighbourhood, remained in the stockade, and sent only a small force of sepoys and police "as a feeling party." It appears to his Excellency that some explanation is required as to the conduct of this officer, and that he should be asked why some energetic measures were not taken; further, that when this party arrived at the spot when the raiders were plundering, the sub-inspector of police, Beblaram, acting under the impression that they were ordinary Kookies, prevented his men from firing first, and thus gave the Looshais an opportunity to effect their escape with trifling loss after having carried off their captives. Such conduct on the part of the sub-inspector seems to his Excellency in Council to be utterly inexplicable. Even if the raiders were ordinary Kookies and not Looshais, that was no reason why they should have been allowed to get off with impunity. A copy of the papers will be forwarded to the Military Department, with a request that an explanation may be obtained as to his want of action in the matter, and his Excellency in Council hopes that the Lieutenant Governor will take suitable notice of the proceedings of the sub-inspector.

4. In conclusion, I am to request that the Commissioner of the Dacca Division may be called upon to state with due preciseness of detail upon what grounds he based the opinion expressed in paragraph 5 of his letter, No. 73, dated 24th April 1871, that several of the guns in possession of the raiders were obtained from Burmah.

(No. 961 P.)

COPY of the correspondence forwarded to the Military Department for the purpose indicated in the concluding portion of paragraph 3 of this letter.

(No. 43 of 1871.)

Government of India.—Foreign Department.—Secret.

To His Grace the Duke of *Argyll*, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

My Lord Duke, Simla, 3 August 1871.

IN continuation of our Despatch No. 87, dated 23rd May last, and with reference to paragraph 3 of your Grace's Despatch, No. 75, dated 15th June 1871, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of the papers specified in the accompanying abstract of contents, regarding the measures to be taken for preventing a repetition of the raids committed by certain Looshai tribes on the eastern frontier of Bengal.

(signed) *Mayo.*
Napier of Magdala,
&c. &c.

From *H. L. Harrison*, Esq., Junior Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department, to the Under Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department (No. 2368); dated Fort William, the 22nd May 1871.

WITH reference to letter, No. 475 P., dated 8th March last, I am directed to forward, for submission to the Government of India, the accompanying copy of a note by Mr. Edgar, expressing his opinion as to the light thrown on the question of the identity of the Cachar raiders by the production at Kassalong of the spoons, forks, &c., which formed part of the plunder of the Alexandrapoor Garden.

NOTE by *J. W. Edgar*, Esq., on a Statement made by some Sylhoos to the Deputy Commissioner of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, about Sookpilal's complicity in the attack on Alexandrapoor, dated 16th May 1871.

THE forks, spoons, and knife, &c., have been seen by Mr. Sellar, of Alexandrapoor. He recognised them as his, but knew nothing of the Native ornaments.

Mr. Sellar's property, therefore, had been taken off, either by the Syloos or by some people from whom they received it.

They said they had got the things from Sookpilal, but this is very improbable. Majors Graham and Macdonald ascertained last December that the Syloo Looshais were hostile to the Looshais of Sookpilal. I have heard the same from every one who knows anything about the matter. The ill-feeling does not seem to put a stop to all intercourse between the unfriendly villages, but it makes it very improbable that Sookpilal, even if he were really guilty, should, while showing the utmost eagerness to prove his innocence to us, have put into the hands of his enemies conclusive evidence of his complicity in the worst raid of all.

Again, it is very unlikely that these articles could have gone from Sookpilal's villages to the Kassalong Bazaar in the course of trade. The articles which Sookpilal's people have the command of through our traders, such as salt, cloth, &c., are just those for which the Syloos would have exchanged the plunder at Kassalong. They would have given Sookpilal rubber or other produce for it. No adequate reason can be assigned for the clumsy complication that all this implies, and it would, of itself, make me suspect the truth of the Syloo's story. Sookpilal's people at first told me that Winchester's little girl had been taken to Saboonga's village, afterwards that she had been removed to the village of the widow of the Howlong Lalpitang. Later information from Chittagong seems to show that Saboonga has some power over the disposal of her. If so, it is very probable that his people were actually engaged in the Hylakandy raids.

There is not as yet a scrap of evidence against Sookpilal that will bear investigation, but I do not consider that his innocence is by any means clear. Probably (perhaps, I might say certainly) he or his people have nothing to do with the Cachar raids. But I cannot at present say more than this. I find it impossible, with the material at my disposal, to come to any conclusion about Tipperah or Sylhet. It is easy enough to show that the evidence collected by the magistrate of Sylhet is utterly worthless, but that wont prove that Sookpilal had nothing to do with the matter. After all I do not think the question one of very great importance: we know with certainty that the family of Vonolel and the family of Lalpitang were the most prominent among the perpetrators of the outrages on us, and that Saboonga and his family were scarcely less guilty. These three sets of chiefs were undoubtedly the principals, and any others engaged in the raids or cognisant of them played subordinate parts.

Now, I do not think it necessary, in order to be able to deal with the guilt of the principals, to ascertain who were the accessories, and what was the precise nature of their complicity.

(Judicial Department.—Judicial.—No. 2386).

From *S. C. Bayley*, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal in the Judicial Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

Sir, Fort William, 22 May 1871.

IN continuation of previous correspondence, and with reference to your letter, No. 861 P., dated 12th instant, I am directed to submit herewith, to be laid before His Excellency the Governor General in Council, a copy of a minute recorded by the Lieutenant Governor, under date the 18th idem, containing His Honor's views as to the best means of punishing the Looshai tribes concerned in the recent raids on the Cachar and Sylhet frontier, the measures to be adopted for the protection of the frontier and the future policy that should be pursued towards the Looshais.

2. Referring to paragraph 16 of your letter, I am to point out that a copy of the memorandum by the Commissioner of Chittagong therein alluded was submitted to the Government of India in the Foreign Department with this office docket, No. 250, of the 20th January last. A spare copy is annexed for easy reference.

MINUTE by *G. Campbell*, Esq., D.C.L., Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, dated 18th May 1871.

CHITTAGONG AND CACHAR FRONTIER.

[Government of India's Letter, dated 11th April 1871.]

THE Government of India appears to treat the questions discussed in this letter with a view to the settlement of a line of outposts, identical with a line bounding the British jurisdiction commanded and protected by the line of outposts; but the matter is put in a shape which admits of our considering not merely the position of the Chittagong frontier line and the Cachar frontier line, but the question whether these lines might not be entirely altered and made into a line running north from Chittagong and prolonged into Cachar, so as to unite the two districts and establish a common line of defence against the tribes to the east.

I must explain that I had not taken exactly the view which seems to be assumed by the Government of India. I had no idea that in sending forward a detachment of our police to Rutton Pooea's village, we should in any way undertake any sort of jurisdiction up to that point. I did not contemplate making the single post there one of a line of frontier posts, but only looked on it as a sort of subsidiary force attached to a friendly chief, on the principle of controlling the Looshais by dividing them. I can well imagine a policy of establishing posts quite beyond the line of jurisdiction for the purpose of watching and dividing the hill tribes, and checking their raids by the presence of a British force in their rear. Indeed, I understand that this is exactly the course which has been followed in regard to the Naga tribes. I believe that the post at Samoogoodting is established solely for the purpose of checking the Nagas in the way which I have described, and that so far the result has been extremely successful. We exercise no sort of jurisdiction over the tribes around Samoogoodting. We do not even keep the peace among them; but we have so far successfully checked their incursions into British territory.

I hope therefore I shall be pardoned for taking a somewhat wider view of the Chittagong-Cachar question than the wording of the letter of the Government of India would strictly warrant. I have had the advantage of consulting Messrs. Bayley and Simson, late and present Commissioners of Chittagong and Dacca, Captain Lewin and Mr. Edgar, Deputy Commissioners of Chittagong Hill Tracts and Cachar, Major Macdonald, and other gentlemen of experience, and I shall now record my impression on the whole subject, and the proposals which I would submit on the part of the Government of Bengal, as required in the 3rd paragraph of the letter of the Government of India. To Mr. Edgar especially I am indebted for a great portion of the facts which I shall recite.

The conformation of the country between the Chittagong and Cachar districts seems to be somewhat as follows: On the Chittagong side there is no wide uninhabited tract between the Looshai Hill country and the British districts. The hills come down to the navigable waters of the Kurnafoolee and other rivers, and to the north ascend rapidly to the water-shed between the streams flowing to the sea and those flowing north to Cachar. That water-shed seems to be only some 25 or 30 miles beyond our Chittagong frontier outposts, as the crow flies. The range of high ground forming the water-shed seems to reach a height of 3,000 and 4,000 feet, and it may be in some points nearly 5,000 feet. It seems to be clear from the ocular evidence of Major Macdonald and others, that this high ground is comparatively inhabited and cultivated, villages and "jooms" being numerous. It is, in fact, the best part of the Looshai country, and is inhabited, on the south face, at any rate, by the people whom we call Syloos and Howlongs.

On the other side of the water-shed we come to the country of Sookpilal, and other chiefs known to the Cachar officers; Sookpilal's residence being apparently 25 or 30 miles north of the water-shed.

Between these northern Looshais and the Cachar frontier is a broad belt, of something like 50 miles of country almost uninhabited. The distances then are much greater on the Cachar side. The configuration of that part of the country appears to be that long ranges of hills run from south to north from the water-shed till they are lost in the low country; and several rivers run also from south to north, and nearly parallel to one another, between these ranges. In the Looshai country it appears that there are no cultivated valleys; the river beds are narrow; and the Looshais live on the hills, which are accessible, and along which tracks exist, well engineered by wild elephants, and improved and used by Looshais.

Towards the Cachar frontier posts the river valleys become broad and swampy. They seem to be there very difficult to travel after rain, and General Nuthall's force got but a very little way. Most of the successful advances of troops and civil officers from Cachar seem to have been made along the higher grounds, but boats can be sent for a considerable distance up the rivers at some seasons if they are not attacked, and the country being uninhabited, they are seldom attacked.

On the Chittagong side the Kurnafoolee seems to be navigable for steamers at all seasons up to Rungamuttee, the head quarters of the Chittagong hill district, and the river is

certainly in some sort navigable for boats up to the Demagiree rapids. Small boats can even be dragged up these rapids, and used further up the Kurnafoolee to the neighbourhood of Rutton Pooea's village, and also for a little distance up a branch to the north; so that by means of water-carriage depôts or provisions may in fact be formed about as far north as Rutton Pooea's present residence.

On the Cachar side the rivers are not so navigable in the dry season, but light boats can generally be sent up to Gootur Mook, at the junction of the Gootur and Dullessur, and to Tepai Mook on the Tepai. In some sort there is, when the rivers are high, navigation to Looshai Haut on the Sonai, and to Beparee Bazar on the Dullessur.

The latter place is not so far south by a few miles as it is placed on the maps; but, bearing this correction in mind, it may be said that the country has been repeatedly explored to that point.

On the other side Majors Graham and Macdonald reached a point considerably north of Rutton Pooea's residence, and about 35 miles distant from Beparee Bazar, as the crow flies. I think it may be taken as certain that the two known points are within 40 miles of one another. The country between has never been explored, but it has been seen and the bearings of the hills taken from either side.

It is not clear whether the deserted character of the tract between Cachar and the Looshai country is due solely to the barbarous incursions of the Looshais, or whether unhealthiness, due to the swamps before alluded to, has anything to do with it; but Mr. Edgar thinks it is due entirely to the Looshais, deserted village sites being common on the hills. Our troops employed in that country at a favourable season do not seem to have specially suffered.

On the Chittagong side the peculiar unhealthiness, now attributed to the station of Chittagong, seems not to extend inland in the same shape. Although much unhealthiness was formerly attributed to the hill tracts, the recent experience of our civil officers seems to be decidedly favourable; and neither the police, nor the detachment of troops lately there, seem to have suffered seriously. All that we can learn, and the experience of the Looshais, seems to indicate that the highest parts of this country are the healthiest and the best in every way.

I have had very great difficulty in getting at the true meaning of the words Kookie and Looshai. Indeed, the only fact that can be ascertained is that these words have no very definite meaning, but that Kookie is the larger word of somewhat wide applications, while Looshai is a more restricted term; all Looshais being Kookies, but not all Kookies Looshais. After much inquiry and cross examination of all the officers who know these tracts, I am satisfied that the people whom we call Looshais, and who occupy the country above described, between Chittagong on the south, Cachar on the north, Hill Tipperah on the west, and the country which the maps may lead us to call Burmah or quasi-Burmah on the east, are in fact a homogeneous people, speaking a common language, and bound together by ties of consanguinity and relations of marriage and murder, peace and war, and other social intercommunications. The Looshais have also relations of this kind with other Kookies living in Tipperah, Sylhet, Cachar, and Munnipore, but not to the same extent. The nature of the eastern boundary of this tract is not very clear; but this seems to me to be established, that it extends but little, if at all, east of a line drawn from the eastern boundary of Chittagong to the western boundary of the Munnipore valley. It is established in my view, by the evidence of Mr. Edgar and others, that the people east of those of whom we have information, that is, east of the families of Vonpilal and Vonolel, are known to the Looshais as "Pois," *i.e.*, strangers, foreigners, barbarians, a people with whom they have comparatively little intercourse. Only one family of Kookies, called Soktees, live east of this line, and they are not very nearly allied to the Looshais. Possibly there may even be some natural barriers more considerable than in the Looshai country. The hills to the east seem to be higher. Pines are said to grow on them. The belief seems to be that, speaking roughly, Kookies, including Looshais, occupy the countries draining to Chittagong and Cachar, and tribes foreign to them, the countries draining to the Irrawaddy. Looshai land seems to be a tract not exceeding 100 miles in length from north to south, and, say, 50, 60, or 70 miles in breadth from east to west.

Within that tract, among this people called Looshais, I cannot find that any real tribal sub-division exists. The chiefs hold a family rank quite above that of the common people, and they seem to be related by a not very remote affinity as well as by marriage. The people seem to be not so much tribes as followers and subjects for the time being of particular chiefs, or of mothers and sisters of chiefs having appanages of their own.

Clearly, among the Looshais with whom we are familiar, either on the Cachar or the Chittagong side, there are no proper tribal divisions; and it is more than doubtful whether the Howlongs and Syloos, whom we do not know, will be found to bear a tribal character.

I find that the words "Howlong" and "Syloo" are sometimes used as if the names of tribes, sometimes as the names of men, sometimes as the names of places, and both are marked on the maps as the names of mountains, the exact height of Howlong being given.

The want of definite tribal divisions is important in considering the character of the raids. After much discussion I incline to the view suggested by several experienced officers, that we cannot trace particular raids definitely to particular tribes, Howlongs or Syloos, or any other. It rather seems that these expeditions are of the character of great dacoities, and that though they may be led by well-known Looshai chiefs, they are not exclusively composed of their proper followers in a body, but are recruited from all the country through which they pass, the active and pugnacious young men joining and sharing in the plunder.

All

All that I have learned regarding these raids, in recently discussing the subject, leads me to look on them as even more serious than I had before supposed. It seems clear that large numbers of British subjects have been massacred on many occasions, and that much larger numbers have been carried off into captivity, and still are in captivity, in the villages of the Looshai chiefs. The injury to the rising tea interest is not confined to the actual raids. It seems to be undoubted that such a terror is established in all the tea estates within reach of the Looshais, that no coolies will willingly remain on them; and though those who are bound by their contracts may be forced to stay for the time, they will never renew their contracts, or work as free labourers under present circumstances. Tea planting in Cachar seems to have been more successful, and the system has been put on a better footing than anywhere else, and it will be a subject of very great regret if this enterprise is seriously checked.

The most successful retaliatory expedition against the Looshais was made many years ago by Colonel Lister, who penetrated far into their country and destroyed a considerable village; and as our prestige had not then been weakened by familiarity, it seems not improbable that to this expedition may, in great degree, be due the comparative quiet of the frontier for many years subsequently. None of the expeditions of recent years have been very successful in a retaliatory sense; but since those indifferently successful expeditions, Captain Lewin and Mr. Edgar have succeeded in establishing friendly relations with some of the chiefs. At the same time, however, the Looshais seem to have acquired that familiarity which leads to the absence of respect, and the raids of the season just passed seem to have been the most numerous, daring, and successful yet known. This state of things certainly seems to point to the necessity of some change of policy, and I am decidedly of opinion that some measures should be taken in order effectually to check the raids.

It is to be noticed that though our territories are much nearer to the Looshai country on the Chittagong side, we are now comparatively little attacked on that side. Our relations with the Looshai chief Rutton Pooea are such, and he is so accessible from our territory, that we are able to march a police guard from our frontier post to his residence in a single day. The guard lately sent to afford him some protection has been hospitably treated and fed by him, and they have maintained a *daily* intercourse with the British post of Kassalong, a patrol from either side marching out each day, and the two meeting and communicating. From Rutton Pooea's present residence, again, to the higher ranges, where the people called Syloos and Howlongs reside, is, as I have shown, but a short distance. It may be that these people feel that their proximity renders them more liable to attack from the Chittagong side, and that they therefore prefer expeditions to more distant Cachar, from which they are separated by so large a tract of difficult country, and where the tea gardens afford them a large amount of plunder which they specially desiderate.

The inference which I am inclined to draw from all that I have been able to learn on the whole subject is, that if, in addition to cultivating friendly relations with those of the chiefs who are nearest to us, we could establish military posts in such positions that they should be visible to and felt by those who are now more remote, we might succeed in cultivating friendly relations with the whole people, recovering our captives, checking future raids, and bringing the Looshais to cultivate India-rubber, cotton, and tea, in preference to murder, robbery, and man-stealing. The policy, therefore, which I would recommend is one of military exploration, with the view of finding out whether in the higher parts of the Looshai country, where the Looshais now thrive so well, we might not locate one or two posts in advantageous and healthy sites, whence we might overlook and control the country to the same extent at least as the Nagas are controlled by the post at Samoogoodting. I would the more advocate this move, because it would not be an advance from our frontier into the interior of Asia, but only an attempt to break through a sort of screen which now separates two British districts. After the first few marches each further advance would not take us from British territory, but would bring us towards British territory. If we could establish one or two posts, such as I have suggested, in the direct line between Chittagong and Cachar, and could establish relations with the Syloo and Howlong chiefs, similar to those which we now have with Rutton Pooea and Sookpilal, I imagine that we should have easy communication between Chittagong and Cachar, and could at small expense convert the elephant tracks into roads or paths along which travellers and troops might pass with little difficulty.

I really feel that it is quite impossible that I should literally comply with the call of the Government of India for a definite recommendation of the best line of posts. It seems to be admitted as possible in the fourth paragraph of the Government letter that the best line may prove to be a line running through Rutton Pooea's village impinging on the Tipperah frontier, and thence joining Cachar. Now, of the greater part of the country through which that line must pass, we have no precise knowledge whatever; and I do not see how I could recommend any particular line till it is explored. As regards the boundary of Hill Tipperah, I may say that we cannot well impinge on it, because neither we nor the rajah have the least idea where it is; that seems to depend entirely on the surveyor general or on the functionary in his office who puts on the paint. Hill Tipperah, as possessed by the rajah, seems to consist of a semicircular rim round the outside of what is marked as his territory. In the centre and east he has no posts and no control; and, in fact, has very little knowledge of that country. This Eastern Tipperah is, in fact, the only part of the country respecting which I have been able to gather no information. The people there

appear to be Kookies but not Looshais. They may well have been concerned in the western raids on Sylhet and Tipperah. The position of the rajah seems to be that he is somewhat afraid to enlist Native troops lest they should be subject to intrigues on the part of rival members of his own family and others, and he prefers to entertain mercenaries. As he has no frontier posts and no Native levies, the contributions to the defence of his territory which he may be fairly called on to make may probably be made in money, without greater burden to him and with greater convenience to us than if he supplied men.

It seems to me that, supposing we established a frontier line from Chittagong to Cachar, about the line of what is now painted as the frontier of Hill Tipperah, we should have a very difficult frontier to defend, and that Tipperah would chiefly benefit, while the Looshais would be as free as now to raid in the directions of Cachar and Chittagong. If, on the other hand, we put our line further east, we should both become responsible for the peace of the Looshai country, and should be bound to defend the Looshais against the Pois and other unknown people to the east. In fact, we might have just the same frontier difficulties that we now have, only shifted further into the interior. My view then is, that for the present at least, till we know something more of the country and the people, we should keep the Looshai country as a sort of middle land, in which we should exercise a certain military control so far as to check the Looshais and prevent attack on us, but that we should not become altogether responsible for the internal peace of the Looshai country, nor undertake to defend the Looshais at all points; rather they would be bound to fight their enemies themselves with such assistance and support as we could conveniently give them (*e.g.*, such support as we have given Rution Pooea), when they seem to deserve it.

It is in this view, then, that I would not at present advance our proper frontier, but would only seek with an exploring force to find a convenient location for a few troops, to be posted in the centre of the Looshai country and to establish the means of maintaining communications with them.

Munnipore, as well as Tipperah, might well contribute to the expense of an arrangement by which they would benefit as much as we do if the raids of the Looshais are checked.

I HAD written this when I received the letter of the Government of India, No. 861 P, dated 12th May. I fear I am not in a position to add much to the history of the raids there recited except this, that the spoons and forks brought down from Saboonga's country to Kassalong have been identified as part of the property plundered from Alexandrapore. With this will be submitted a note prepared by Mr. Bayley, lately Commissioner of Chittagong, and now Officiating Secretary to this Government in the Judicial Department, which gives an account of the raids and also summarises the opinions of various officers and his own views regarding the course which it is desirable to pursue.

I proceed to reply to the questions put by the Government of India as well as I can. The questions are noted in the margin.

Question.—1. Who the guilty tribes are: where they reside, and by what mode they can be most easily approached.

1. I have already expressed my opinion that there are no tribes properly speaking; and as respects the guilty persons I cannot hold out any prospect of obtaining information which can be considered as really precise and reliable. I think that the discrepancies and contradictions in the evidence on the subject may be in great degree accounted for by the character which I have attributed to the raids, *i.e.*, as not perpetrated by tribes bound together by permanent ties, but by an aggregation of people collected from different villages and various quarters. Thus there may be, and probably is, some degree of truth in the various statements which have been made as to the localities from which some of the raiders came, but the guilt cannot be precisely localised in particular villages. Still there seems to be a general consensus of opinion that many people from the Syloo and Howlong country of Saboonga and Sangbhoom were concerned in the western raids, and Mr. Edgar has a very strong opinion, supported by much evidence, that the eastern raids were mainly perpetrated by the people of the chiefs who succeeded the late Vonolel. This Vonolel family are among the most eastern of the Looshai chiefs, their country lying a considerable distance to the south-east of the point reached by Colonel Lister and marching with the Poi country. Statements have been made that in some of their villages the water flows to the south; possibly it may be to the Irrawaddy.

The *locale* of the Syloo and Howlong chiefs has already been mentioned. The evidence regarding the presence of particular chiefs is conflicting in the last degree, but it may, I think, be assumed that some members of the families named took part in the raids. Against Vonpilal the evidence is not so strong, and the accusations against Sookpilal's family are not made out. I conclude then that the nearest approach which we can make to fixing the guilt is to say that some of the principal Syloo and Howlong chiefs, and many of their followers, were probably engaged, and that the Vonolel family and their followers were also, it may be believed, engaged.

There is, I apprehend, no doubt whatever that the Syloos and Howlongs may be most easily approached from the Chittagong hill tracts by the line of the Kurnafoolee and the hill ranges about the upper branches of that stream. The rise from the river to the crest of the water-shed ranges must be so considerable, that I have anxiously inquired whether there might not be some steep and precipitous southern face to the hills, something like the ascent of the western ghâts and similar abrupt hill faces; but all that I can make of the information obtained by Captain Lewin, and the observations of Major Macdonald, go to

negative

negative that apprehension. We do not know particulars, but it seems certain that there are no extraordinary physical difficulties of communication between Rutton Pooea's and Sookpilal's country, and that Looshais can travel that way without difficulty. In short, I gather that it is probable that from the ranges about Rutton Pooea, say 2,000 feet high, to those of the Syloos and Howlongs, ranging to 3,000 and 4,000, the ascent is not specially difficult.

Vonolel's country is more remote and unknown. Probably it may be best approached from the Cachar side by way of Tepai Mookh and Looshai Hât, though we know little of the ground beyond these places; but it may also be that if we once had a secure position in the Howlong country, we could more easily approach it along the eastern range, if we should find practicable tracts on the high ground.

2. In my opinion a visitation of some of these people by an armed force is absolutely necessary for the future security of the British subjects residing on the Cachar and Chittagong frontiers. I would certainly visit some portions of the Syloo country. A visit to Vonolel's country would depend on circumstances, viz., whether, when we had attained the first object, we find ourselves in case to go to the east also; and whether, when troops are well into the Looshai country, the Vonolels submit or not.

2. Whether a visitation of these people in their own homes by an armed force is absolutely necessary for the future security of our fellow subjects who reside on the Cachar and Chittagong frontier.

3. All the officers seem to be now agreed that, since it is too late to follow up a blow by a blow, and we have no special force ready at all times for that kind of work, if punishment is to be inflicted, it would be best effected by seizing the crops and property of the offending chiefs early in the season before they have fully reaped and secured them, and by occupying the ground so long that they would be prevented from preparing and sowing the next season's crops, thus depriving them of two crops. This plan would be, it is considered, effective, even on the supposition that they may not stand up to fight us. The suggestion is, that if they fight us, they must be beaten; if they go off into the forests, they will lose their means of livelihood and be starved. I am myself, however, against any measure of pure retaliation. I would rather say, "Let us go to certain points; if the people submit, let us treat with them and demand surrender of our captives; and if we obtain a fair amount of success in that way, let us enter into friendly relations with them; if they resist let us use force and compel respect."

3. What description of punishment would be most felt and would have the surest deterrent effect on other tribes.

4. I do not know that I can give much of the general nature of the country through which a force would have to pass in addition to what has been stated in the first part of this paper, beyond adding that the country is everywhere covered with dense forest, and that the principal difficulty in opening it up will be to make routes through this forest. It is the opinion, however, of the officers acquainted with the subject, that the Looshais have not an exclusive advantage from the forest. It covers our parties as well as theirs. There is not the liability to be fired at and picked off from hill sides and such advantageous positions, which make an advance in a bare hill country so difficult. The Looshais can do nothing against a force passing through their country till they come almost to hand-to-hand conflict. It has been said that the elephants have engineered and the Looshais have improved the paths along the ridges; and it appears that with a little cutting and pioneering, men and probably some pack animals might get along well enough. The reports of the officers who have explored parts of the country are before the Government of India, and if an expedition is to be undertaken, an exact compilation may be made of all that is known of the geographical and topographical details.

4. What is the nature of the country, and what the probable length of time during which it would be necessary to occupy certain positions. How communication can be kept up and supplies conveyed.

The view of the officers who contemplate a retaliatory occupation is, that this occupation must be not less than from early in December till the end of March or April. Judging by the conditions of somewhat similar hill countries in Central India and elsewhere, I had doubts of the prudence of going into the forest country so early as the beginning of December, but all the officers whom I have consulted think that we may prudently do so by that time. It would be a great mistake to go too early and have the men laid up at the commencement, and further inquiry will still be made; but at any rate it seems clear that we should arrange to be ready by the beginning of December. Experience seems amply to show that the country is by no means unhealthy in February and March; and even if the occupation were continued later, the rivers give great facilities for coming down after the first shower of rain. I have, however, already stated that I would myself prefer keeping one or two posts permanently, if favourable locations for them can be found.

The result of my consultations with the officers who have entered into friendly relations with Rutton Pooea, Sookpilal, and one or two others, is that we could not at present depend on them for active co-operation, and that it would not even be safe to take their men as the coolies of the force, since they might run away at any time; but those officers believe that their neutrality might be secured; especially as it so happens that the Syloos are enemies both to Rutton Pooea and to Sookpilal; and on the Chittagong side, at any rate, Captain Lewin is confident that we could depend on Rutton Pooea and the people of the country to transport provisions, &c., from point to point, for payment at contract rates. On that side I imagine that there would be no difficulty in maintaining communications. I would have a depôt at the highest point to which boats could be got, secured by a moderate guard and an arrangement with Rutton Pooea, and it would be desirable,

during the continuance of expeditionary proceedings, to have a good strong post further up on the high ground where Majors Graham and Macdonald were stopped, and where, in fact, the Sylhoo country commences. From thence the distance to the water-shed is but small, and communications would not be difficult.

On the Cachar side it would probably be desirable to send provisions up in boats to two or three different points on the different rivers; and to carry with any force advancing further provisions sufficient for a few weeks. If we can then come to terms with some of the Looshais, arrangements may be made for supplying an advanced post; but it will doubtless always be more expensive to do so on this side than on the other.

On both sides, for the transport of goods and stores beyond the limits of water-carriage or the territory of friendly tribes, we must trust to elephants, coolies, and possibly we might take some pack bullocks, to be killed and eaten as their loads are consumed. The supply of elephant carriage available, if the kheddahs are stopped for the season, is large, and elephants are not expensive in their native forests. It would probably be desirable to take from Calcutta a sort of coolie corps to accompany the force, composed of men who, being in a strange country, could not run away.

I have now answered, so far as I can, all the questions put by the Government of India. I would venture to add my own suggestion of the character of the expeditions which might, I think, with advantage be undertaken. We have no well-organised police force sufficient for an undertaking of this kind, for the Looshais have inspired a certain respect; and as we can hardly hope to get up a sufficient force in time, soldiers must be employed. I would make the strongest advance from the Chittagong side, both because that route is shorter and cheaper, and there is more constant water-carriage, and because there is a certain element of uncertainty as to the amount of opposition which the Syloos and Howlongs may be able to offer and as to the nature of their country; also because we may be pretty confident that in this direction we should by a short advance reach an elevated and healthy country.

On the Cachar side experience seems to show that resistance on a large scale is not to be apprehended. If one good regiment were given for operations in advance, and the other troops now available in Cachar and Sylhet were kept to guard the frontier, that would probably suffice.

My idea would be that a force from the Chittagong side should occupy a point or points on the Sylhoo hills. We might put, say, a regiment on those hills, keeping some additional force behind in the Chittagong hill tracts and Rutton Pooea's country. At the same time from the Cachar side a strong wing, or say 400 men, might be pushed 15 or 20 miles beyond the point reached by Colonel Lister on the ridge east of Beparee Bazar. The two forces would then be within 20 or 25 miles of one another, as the crow flies, and it would probably then be possible to establish communications and explore the country between.

I would make the effecting a communication between Chittagong and Cachar, the occupation of the water-shed, and the establishment of relations with the Syloos, or occupation of their country, the first object, and would not do anything against the more eastern Looshais till this is effected. If so much is successfully done, it will then be time enough to see whether the Howlong and Vonolel chiefs come to terms, and whether a further advance against them is necessary and practicable. If the idea of establishing a permanent post were accepted and found feasible, I should think that the Syloo country would probably be the best situation: and if there were to be a second post, the high land east of Beparee Bazar would probably afford a good position whence we might support Sookpilal as a friend, and keep in check Vonolel's family either as friends or enemies.

It will be very desirable to limit the number of the men actually employed beyond water-carriage, because while the resources of the country and of the elephant kheddahs would go a long way to supply a small force, all that is required for a larger force must be imported, and the expenses would increase in a geometrical ratio. I would therefore suggest that any additional force which it may be thought prudent to have within reach may be kept in reserve. With only a limited force used for active operations, I hope that the expense would not be very great. Say that 1,200 or even 1,500 men are so employed, the elephants available in the eastern districts would suffice, and the principal expense would be, say, 1,200 to 1,500 coolies and camp followers. The chief commissariat officer here tells me that good coolies could be got here at 11 rupees per month; say 15,000 rupees *per mensem* for four months, total 60,000 rupees. No additional troops would be required in Cachar if the regiment at Shillong is moved down. Some of our available river steamers would be sent to Chittagong, and the moderate cost of water-carriage to Chittagong and Rungamatta will be easily calculated by the Military Department.

If we could once establish familiar relations with the Looshais, the India rubber trade seems to offer such temptation to their cupidity, and they so much stand in need of salt and other things which they would get from us, that I hope we might overlook and check them by small posts maintained with little difficulty or expense.

NOTE by Mr. *S. C. Bayley*, Officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial, Department, on Looshai Raids in 1870-71.

THE raids of this season have been more extensively organised, and of a far more determined character, than any previous incursions of the kind, and the audacity of the raiders in many cases was quite new to our experience. The manner in which they fought at Monierkhall has shown that they have fighting qualities not altogether to be despised, and that they have other tactics to depend on beyond those of night surprises and rapid flight.

Chittagong hill tracts—Gulungea raid

The first raid, which Lord Ulick Browne prophetically characterised as "the first raid of the season 1870-71," occurred on the 21st December 1870, at a little more than a day's distance from the Chima outpost, in the village of Gunlungea, in the Sungoo sub-division of the Chittagong hill tracts. The raiders were about 200 strong, but the loss to the villages was not very great. This was attributed to the fact that the general population of the villages in that portion of the district had adopted the plan of regularly leaving their villages, with a good deal of their property, and sleeping in the jungles every night for some months during the principal raiding season. On this occasion five men were left in charge of the village, of whom two were killed and one carried off. The village was burned to the ground, and the paddy remaining in it plundered. The raiders were followed and encountered by a party of nine Goorkha constables, who acted very gallantly on the occasion; but being considerably outnumbered, were unable to cut off the raiders' retreat, and themselves lost two of their number killed in the fight.

The raiders were at first supposed to be of the Howlong tribe, as about this time Rutton Pooea had given information of two bodies of Howlongs having set out on raiding expeditions, the one under Mongpoom to the north, and the other under Janga to the south; and the strength of the Kookies encountered by the Goorkha constables corresponded with that of the body under Janga. The fact of no Howlongs having gone to the Kassalong fair confirmed the suspicion that the raiders were of that tribe.

The Deputy Commissioner of Hill Tracts, however, reported in the beginning of April, that the people sent out to follow the track of these raiders had returned, and stated that the raid had been committed by a party of Shindoos, under a chief named Arkhyne. The report may be true, but no confidence can be placed in it.

Cachar raids

On the north several raids occurred, towards the close of January 1871, in the Hylakandy sub-division of Cachar.

Ainerkhall.

On the morning of the 23rd, the Cacharee Poonjee of Ainerkhall was burned, and about 25 persons were killed and 37 taken prisoners.

Alexandrapore.

On the same day Alexandrapore was destroyed by another body of Looshais. Mr. Winchester, a planter living there, was killed, and his child, a little girl, captured.

Cutlicherra.

Shortly after, Cutlicherra, the adjoining garden, was attacked by Looshais, who were apparently a part of the body who were at Alexandrapore. Messrs. Bagshawe and Cooke opposed them most gallantly and drove them away. Another party commenced to attack the lines, but was dispersed by Mr. Cooke and some coolies. They had, however, killed five and wounded others, and were carrying off some women, whom they left on being threatened. Mr. Cooke then, with some Caboolees and others, went over to Alexandrapore, recovered Mr. Winchester's body, and brought back some wounded coolies.

On the 24th, a second attack was made on Cutlicherra by some 30 Looshais, 15 of whom were armed with guns. Messrs. Bagshawe and Cooke, assisted by some policemen who had arrived the previous night, and some armed servants, fired at and disabled two Looshais, on which the whole body rapidly retreated.

Monierkhall.

On the 27th January, a body of Looshais having surprised some sepoys and police of the Monierkhall garden, shot one sepoy and wounded another with a dâo. The head constable in command of the stockade fired upon them and was wounded. They then commenced an attack on the stockade, while a party plundered the coolie lines. This went on all day, and the next day Mr. Daly arrived with some sepoys and police. Two sorties from the stockade were unsuccessful; but the Looshais left on the night of the 28th, and their loss was afterwards reported to be fifty-seven. The total loss at Monierkhall was six killed, six wounded, and one missing (coolie). Mr. Eglington's conduct at Monierkhall received the thanks of Government.

Darmiakhall.

While the attack was made on Monierkhall, a party of Looshais went on to the adjoining garden of Darmiakhall, which they plundered but did not burn. All the coolies escaped.

Nugdigram.

An attack on Nugdigram was also made on the 27th, when about 11 persons were killed and three carried off. Here, on the following morning, the rear guard of the party of troops and police that had been sent to the relief of Monierkhall was attacked by the raiders. The guard consisted of eight sepoys, and a constable in charge of coolies carrying provisions. The sepoys made a stand, and gave time for the constable and coolies to escape. Eye-witnesses reported that their conduct was most admirable. Eventually they were overpowered, and six of them were killed and one wounded, but the Looshais also lost about 25 in killed and wounded.

On the same day some wood-cutters on the bank of the Rukni were surprised by 10 or 12 Looshais. They swam across the river and gained the opposite bank, where one of their number was wounded by a spear thrown after him. These men, passing near Guzzle Ghât in the evening, saw a large party of Looshais going south, who did not, however, perceive them. Subsequent inquiries showed that this was the party that had attacked the rear guard on the same day.

Julnacherra.

On the morning of the 23rd February, an attack was made on the coolie lines at Julnacherra by a party of Looshais, said to be about 120 in number, who crossed the river from the west. A patrol of one head constable and four constables was in the lines at the time; they at once fired on the raiders and repulsed them, but not till the latter had killed four persons and wounded three.

Raids in Hill Tipperah.

In the latter part of January, a party of raiders made their appearance in Hill Tipperah, burning villages and killing and wounding the villagers. On the 21st, the khedda people, who were working at about a day and a half's distance south of the Sylhet outposts, were fired on and dispersed, and a village named Pooyasbari was plundered and destroyed. On the 22nd, another village named Boongbarie was burnt. The khedda people said that the raiders were from 200 to 300 strong, and that they were tall, strong, stout men, much resembling ordinary Kookies in appearance.

On the 2nd March, a hundred men armed with guns and dâos made their appearance on the Goomtee, about 40 miles east of Comillah. They had fired on a party of 10 wood-cutters, of whom three were missing.

About the same time 500 Kookies were reported east of the Chagulniah thannah, in the Tipperah district; but they never came into our territory, and appear to have done but little damage to life, and only to have burnt and plundered the deserted baris of the Tipperahs.

Sylhet raids, Chargola.

In Sylhet some villages near the Chargola frontier post were attacked. On the 23rd January, a village named Cacharipara was almost entirely burnt, more than 20 persons being killed, and some young women carried off. On the 24th, a large body attacked a village exactly opposite to the outpost, not further from it than 40 or 50 yards, and killed two men. The guard immediately turned out and commenced firing. The raiders returned the fire, but after an hour they were defeated, and retired in confusion into the hills.

Allynuggur.

On the 27th February, a village near the Allynuggur outpost was attacked. Captain Robertson immediately sent out a party of sepoys and constables, who were just in time to prevent the raiders escaping into the hills. In the skirmish which ensued several of the raiders were wounded, but, as usual, they were immediately carried off by their brethren. One raider, however, was killed, and the police succeeded in bringing in the dead body, together with two dâos and 10 or 12 guns, and two other corpses were found afterwards in the jungle.

Munnipore raids.

The Political Agent at Munnipore reported on the 25th that an attack had been made on a village in the hills south-east of the valley, on the night of the 15th. The village had been destroyed, 40 persons decapitated, and about 10 carried off. Although the raid was made further to the east than any former attack by the Looshais, the Munniporees felt almost certain that the raiders were of that tribe. The Political Agent thought that the raid was on account of Vonolel's death.

The above is a recapitulation of the various raids committed along our frontier by the tribes that we are accustomed to call Kookies or Looshais during the past season. Continual instructions were issued by the Lieutenant Governor to the local officers, impressing on them the necessity for exerting themselves to obtain information of the movements and doings of the hill tribes, and specially in collecting evidence as to those implicated in the outrages that had been committed.

Identity of raiders.

I will now bring together the reports of the various officers as to the identity of the tribes concerned in the raids on Cachar, Sylhet, and Hill Tipperah.

The solitary raid in Hill Chittagong is said to have been committed by Shindoos who dwell on the east side of the watershed between Chittagong and Burmah, and cannot be dealt with from the Bengal side. If it was not committed by the Shindoos, we have no sort of information by whom it was committed.

About the beginning of January, Rutton Pooea informed the Deputy Commissioner, Chittagong hill tracts, that two bodies of Howlongs had gone to raid, one north, the other south, the former being under a chief named Mongpoom.

Saboonga. Vonolel's sons.

On the 21st January, Mr. Edgar, who was then on the Dullessur, in Sookpilal's country, wrote in his diary that he had received word of a party of Sylhoos from Saboonga's villages having gone to raid in the direction of Adampore. This might be either applicable to the raids in the south-west of Cachar, Alexandrapore, &c., or in the south-east of Sylhet, Chargola; also of Lenkum, son of Vonolel. So much for warnings which point towards Howlongs and Sylhoos, and the son of Vonolel.

Lal Savoola, son of Lal Poitang-Mongpoom.
Seipoya, brother of Vandoola.

On 5th February Major Graham reported that a messenger of his had come back from the Kookie country, bringing information that a large body of Howlongs, under the chiefs noted in the margin, had been concerned in the Cachar raids.

Vonolel's sons, Lalboora and Tangdong.

On 9th March Mr. Simson, Commissioner of Dacca, reports that Mr. Edgar's information implicated the sons of Vonolel as having committed the raids in Eastern Cachar, while those in Western Cachar had been done by Saboonga and Lungboong.

The

The next piece of evidence is that of the spoons and forks. Certain Looshais brought these for sale in Kassalong Bazar, and there is strong reason for supposing that they were plundered from Alexandrapore, where Mr. Winchester was killed.

Syloos.
Saboonga / Alexan-
Lungboong \ derpore.

The Looshais gave themselves out as being men of Saboonga (which was probably true), and as having obtained the spoons and forks from Sookpilal, who had got them in the Cachar raids, adding that Sookpilal had two European captives with him. The latter part of the story was certainly false. Sookpilal being at enmity with Saboonga, it would appear obvious to Saboonga to say he bought the forks from Sookpilal; and the mere fact of this being certainly a lie, renders it all the more probable that the fact of the men belonging to Saboonga's tribe was true. It is to my mind a very strong corroboration of the information given to Mr. Edgar that Saboonga had gone to raid westward when he was on the Dullessur in January. I would add here that Government has received information of Mary Winchester having been seen by Rutton Pooea in the village of a chief called in the telegram Saloonga, possibly Saboonga.

Saboonga and Syloo villages.

On 20th February the Munnipore agent reported that a numerous body of Looshais had been met, about the middle of January, by a khedda force of Munnipore sepoys, and that they had apparently intended raiding in Munnipore, but, meeting an armed force, had turned westward. They said they belonged to the villages of Vonpilal and Vonpilal's mother.

Vonpilal.
Imparu.

In his subsequent letter, No. 36, of 5th March, the Agent says that the woman carried off captive in the raid on Munnipore of 15th February implicated Vonolel, Vonpilal, and Poiboi, also Lenkum and Imparu.

Vonolel's sons Vonpilal and Poiboi, and Imparu.

In regard to the Cachar raids, the Agent subsequently reported that a captive Looshai woman, ransomed by him from another tribe, had informed him that the Cachar raids were committed by the people of Vonolel, Lalroom, and Thoilal, under guidance of Sookpilal and Vonpilal's people, and that on Munnipore had been committed by Poiboi and Lengkum. She belonged to the village of Vonolel's brother Thoilal.

Vonolel's sons.
Thoilal.
Poiboi - Munni-
Lengkum / pore.

Captain Lewin, in demi-official of 15th March, No, 205 T, gives an analysis of the information obtained by him. He throws the responsibility principally on the Howlongs, of whom the chiefs given in the margin are most clearly implicated, and probably that Sylhoos were engaged in the attack on Sylhet.

Lalboora, Lal Saboola, Moongpoom, and Saipoiya. Also Bhootaiya or Bhoota, and possibly Saboonga.

Lalboora Howlong is a relation of Vandoola, and is not to be confounded with Lalboora, a more northern chief, son of Vonolel, unless, indeed, as is barely possible, from our information as to the tribes in these parts coming partly from the north and partly from the south of them, Vonolel and Vandoola should turn out to be one and the same person. This, however, is not likely.

I now come to the information given by Mr. Edgar in his Report C., as to the identity of the raiders on Cachar.

In this he gives at some length the relations of the clans among themselves, and his reasons for supposing the sons of Vonolel to have been concerned; and he says that the raids on Monierkhall were committed by Lalboora and Tangdong, sons of Vonolel; that Poiboi's connection with them is doubtful; and that in all probability the chief of the Howlongs, Vandoola, and of the Syloos, Saboonga, were concerned in them.

Vonolel's sons, Lalboora and Tangdong, and Bhenhum and Sangboong.
Vandoolah, How long.
Saboonga, Sylhoos.

This is all the evidence we have in regard to the Cachar raids, and we may, I think, consider it certain that the sons of Vonolel, certain of the Howlong chiefs, and certain of the Sylhoo chiefs, acting in concert, committed the raids in January in Cachar.

As to the raids in Sylhet, the information is more doubtful; and as Mr. Edgar has, I understand, a note under preparation on this point, I will abstain from any lengthened analysis.

It is sufficient to say that Mr. Sutherland is of opinion, from the evidence of a Kookie captive, and from private information, that the raid of 27th February, at Allynuggur, in Sylhet, was committed by people of Sookpilal, as two sons of Sookpilal were recognised, and certain other followers of his sister Vanaitang, the wife of Gnurshailon, a Kookie chief, who now lives under the protection of Ali Ahmed, an influential zemindar of Sylhet. This Gnurshailon, who has had much to do with raids on the Sylhet and Hill Tipperah frontier for many years, is suspected, apparently on good grounds, by Mr. Edgar as having organised one of the Cachar raids in January last.

Mr. Simson, the Commissioner, and Mr. Edgar, Deputy Commissioner of Cachar, disagree with Mr. Sutherland, because the witnesses are Ali Ahmed's ryots, and he is notoriously at enmity with Sookpilal, because Sookpilal has been consistently friendly with Mr. Edgar, and has proved it throughout the Cachar raids, because one of the men named as Sookpilal's son turns out to be the son of Saboonga, and because Rawá, one of the followers of Gnurshailon's wife, identified by the Kookie captive as present in the raid on 27th February, was actually on that day in Mr. Edgar's company at Monierkhall.

On the other hand, it is to be remembered that the fact of Sookpilal being sincerely and *bonâ fide* friendly with Mr. Edgar would have very little bearing on the question, whether his people did or did not raid on Sylhet and Hill Tipperah. It is admitted on all sides that Kookies have no conception of what an organised state means, and probably judge of the different neighbouring jurisdictions as being under various chiefs, connected only as they themselves are, or more probably as no more connected than the two states of Hill Tipperah and Munipore. This view is illustrated by the anecdote of one of the Kookie chiefs having *seriously offered the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar to join him in a raid on a neighbouring*

ing district; and if my idea is correct, a raid on the frontier of Sylhet, where moreover it touches Hill Tipperah, may very well have been committed by Sookpilal's people without his having any intention of breaking off his friendly relations with Mr. Edgar. The view taken by Mr. Sutherland is to some slight extent borne out by independent testimony from a totally different quarter.

A Tipperah woman, who was taken captive in one of the raids on Hill Tipperah at the latter end of January, contrived to make her escape, and her deposition, which is interesting, was sent in on the 5th March from Tipperah before any question of accusing Sookpilal of the Allynuggur raid could well have arisen. She says, and gives her reasons for supposing, that the raiders were Darlong and Cachar Kookies, not Looshais; that they were the followers of Vanaitang, wife of Gnurshailon and the sister of Sookpilal; and that they committed the raids with the assistance of the latter. On the whole, then, I think that, while Sookpilal's complicity in these raids on Sylhet and Hill Tipperah is quite possible, it is certainly very far from being proved; and after the admirable way in which he behaved to Mr. Edgar, and in consideration of the political necessity of making no false step in punishing on suspicion a man who has otherwise been consistently friendly, I would give him the benefit of the doubt, so far at least as our present evidence goes, and would in considering the organisation of a retaliatory expedition, treat him as a friend, and not as an enemy.

Retaliatory measures.

I now come to the question of the measures which should be adopted to punish the tribes concerned in these atrocious raids, to recover, if possible, the numerous British subjects now captives in their hands, and to prevent, so far as lies in our power, a repetition of their incursions for the future.

The Government of India, while holding strongly to the policy of conciliation and of personal influence, have distinctly admitted that circumstances may arise which would render necessary an armed expedition to punish refractory tribes. If any departure from the policy of uninterrupted conciliation be permitted, the events of last season are surely sufficient to force on Government measures of determined and sensible punishment. It is true that the tale of factories attacked, villages plundered, of British subjects murdered by the score, and carried away captive by the hundred, is an old tale; and that the events of last season have differed in degree only, and not in kind, from the raids which have gone on unpunished for the last 10 years, till they have come to be looked on as almost a matter of course on the frontier districts; but what makes these raids so significant is, that they were simultaneous with the highest and most successful development of the policy of conciliation which has yet been reached. At the very time when Sookpilal was giving the best possible proof of his real friendliness to Mr. Edgar; when Rutton Pooea was on the best of terms with the Chittagong authorities; when Majors Graham and Macdonald were holding interviews with the Syloo chiefs in their own country, at that very time the most extensive and the most successful series of raids that have yet been known took place along the whole southern frontier, from Munnipore to the east, as far as Allynuggur in Sylhet to the west.

Now, whatever else these raids may prove, one thing is quite clear from them, that however friendly the chiefs on our borders may be, they are of no use whatever as a protection from the incursions of tribes living beyond them. By conciliating our neighbours, we apparently succeed only in tempting the cupidity of the tribes beyond, and neither the friendliness nor the power of Sookpilal can protect us from the incursions of his neighbours, even though to reach us they must, as they apparently did in this case, come through a country whose inhabitants own him as their chief.

I am far from saying that the policy of conciliation has proved a failure. On the contrary, both in regard to the warnings given of the coming raids, and to the personal protection of Mr. Edgar and his party, it has this very season been eminently useful and successful, but I think that the facts show that taken by itself it is incomplete and insufficient.

The policy which Sir C. Beadon laid down, which Sir William Grey urged on the Government of India, is the same as that now recommended unanimously by the local officers, that raids like those of last season should be met by condign punishment, in the shape of a military occupation of the raiders' villages during as long a period as possible, the seizure of their crops and stored grain; the forced submission of their chiefs, and after that by the steady endeavour of the frontier officers to influence them and promote trade; and finally by a system of frontier posts, combined with which a line of road running north and south from the Cachar frontier to that of Chittagong is universally recommended, and another running east and west along the Cachar frontier behind the posts is proposed, but is objected to by Mr. Edgar.

It must, moreover, not be lost sight of that the success of last season's raids in the acquisition of plunder and captives will combine in the Looshai mind with the point of honour which renders it incumbent on them to revenge the death of their comrades, in inducing even more serious raids in the future than there have been in the past, and to meet these the existing system of posts is, I submit, wholly inadequate.

The officers* who have given their opinion as to the necessity of an expedition are moreover unanimous, and are, I understand, supported by the weightiest of all authority, viz., that of his Excellency the Commander in Chief, in the opinion that such an expedition should consist of two columns, starting one from Cachar on the north, and the other from Chittagong on the south, that they should start as early as possible (say) by 15th November

* Commissioner of Dacca.
Commissioner of Chittagong.
Major Graham.
Mr. Edgar.
Captain Lewin.
Major Macdonald.

ber, effect a junction, occupy villages of chiefs known to be implicated, and open out a road of communication between the two frontiers.

I will now summarise the opinions of the various officers as briefly as may be, omitting all reference to details which only concern the Military Department and not the local Government.

I will begin with quoting Mr. Edgar, who in his latest report on the subject says, "If successful measures for the effectual punishment of offenders be taken next year, we can with safety carry out any policy we choose to adopt, and of course outposts and roads can do no possible harm; but a policy of defence not accompanied by punishment for past outrages, would in all probability result in failure." This is the key-note of the policy, which, after the fullest experience, and the most loyal endeavours to carry out conciliatory measures, Mr. Edgar deliberately adopts.

In his Report C, submitted by the Commissioner of Dacca on the 28th March, Mr. Edgar reviews the various theories of frontier defence, which resolve themselves into three possible systems: 1, *pure defence*, which is only compatible, as I have before urged, with strict non-interference, and not (in my opinion as in Mr. Edgar's also) with the endeavour to influence the tribes by personal association and trade, and which consists in our confining ourselves to a line of police posts, and endeavouring, by a system of roads, to render it impossible for the Looshais to make incursions into the country behind.

Mr. Edgar objects to this plan from the nature of the country, which renders it easy for savages to slip by our posts, however close to each other, without being perceived; from the impossibility of properly manning a length of frontier not less than 150 miles in length, and from the facilities which the roads behind the frontier posts would give the Looshais for attacking the gardens in the rains. He is of opinion that the jheels and swamps alone prevent them now from raiding in the rainy season, and that a system of roads behind our posts will get rid of this safeguard.

The second theory is that of *permanent occupation* and complete subjugation of the Looshais; and he objects to this, both on the ground of expense and also because it only brings our frontier further eastward, and so into collision with other tribes more powerful, and as we should be further from our base, more difficult to deal with than those on our present frontier.

The third plan is *conciliation*, humanising by the extension of trade, and the introduction of articles of barter, and finally, at some future time, by education.

This, he thinks, is our only true policy; but it is one which is not only sure to be futile and fruitless by itself; it cannot even be entered upon, unless punishment for raids be made a part of it; and in this case he insists on punishment preceding conciliation. He makes some judicious remarks also on the necessity of making this punishment complete and searching, having it thoroughly well organised, so as to leave a lasting effect, and not spasmodic, like the hasty retaliatory raids, and still more hasty retreats, that we have hitherto effected.

Mr. Edgar proposes two punitive expeditions, one to start from Tipai Mukh, in Cachar, which should be directed against Lalboorah and the Howlongs, the other from Chittagong, which should be directed mainly against the Sylhoos. He would have both expeditions to start as soon after 1st November as possible. He would have a portion of Cachar force establish itself in the village of Lalboorah (marked on the map as Vonolels) and thence send parties to bring in grain, women, and children. He would demand the surrender of the chiefs, guaranteeing them life and liberty, levy a heavy fine of such things as they had, and make them assist in making road to Chittagong. He suggests, also, that a supply of Norton's tube-wells should be taken, and dwells on the use of elephants for carriage; but, as before said, he deprecates the idea of roads running along the south face of the Cachar frontier. From the report which Mr. Simson sent in of the views of the Commander in Chief, it appears that his Excellency agreed in the scheme of punishment, but laid very great stress on the necessity of the roads; and Mr. Simson himself agreed in these views also, holding strongly to the importance of two main lines from Tipai Mukh, one running westward along the south face of the Cachar frontier to Julnacherra, the other running south to some point on our Chittagong hill tracts, either at Demagiri or Kassalong, which should be in direct and easy communication with Chittagong. He suggests, also, that a portion of the expense of this latter road should be borne by the Maharajah of Tipperah, as defending his eastern frontier, which seems to me a more feasible idea than the suggestion in Mr. Aitchison's letter of 11th April, that our line of defence on the hill tracts should impinge on the south frontier of Hill Tipperah, and there terminate abruptly.

He also suggests that the hill tracts, Cachar and Sylhet, should be under one frontier commissioner, an arrangement to which I attach great importance, and hope the Lieutenant Governor will take it into consideration.

Captain Lewin, Major Graham, and Major Macdonald, have all drawn out plans more or less elaborate for the proposed campaign. Captain Lewin deals principally with the column from the Chittagong side, but all are agreed as to the expediency of having a double attack, one column starting from Cachar and one from Chittagong. It is agreed by all that the importance of early preparations cannot be exaggerated; and if the work is to be effectively done, depôts should be established and stockaded, and the columns ready to start from the extreme points to which water-carriage is available by the 1st of December. While all are agreed that the depôt for the Chittagong column should be just above the Demagiri falls, and close to Rutton Pooea's village, about the starting point of the Cachar columns there is considerable diversity of opinion. The opinion of Major Macdonald is

that it should start from Beparee Bazar, which would bring it after four days' march to a point where it would effect a junction with our column from Chittagong in the heart of the Sylhoo country. Mr. Edgar, on the other hand, would start it from the Tipai far eastward. Assuming the water-carriage on the Tipai to be not inferior to that by the Dullessur, so that a depôt might consequently be formed as far south by one stream as by the other, the question must be determined more by the relative position of the tribes than by the convenience of a joint attack. It is stated that from Tipai Mookh to the villages of Vonolel's sons, which are the first that the Cachar column would have to deal with, there is a good route along which guns might be carried. This track leaves Sookpilal safe to the west; he might help us, or he might turn upon us; and the line taken being so far east as to leave his country altogether untouched, we should have to specially protect the gardens on the south frontier of Cachar. It is an important question, moreover, in other respects, which line is taken. If Mr. Edgar's line is taken, the two columns will not meet till each has done its work separately. The Cachar column having to occupy and harry villages under Vonolel and the northern Howlongs; while the Chittagong column would do the same by Saboonga and his Syloos, and then to turn eastward, and join the Cachar column in the middle of the Howlong country. In this latter case each column would have to be strong enough to depend on itself alone, and no reliance could be placed on combined action. By the plan of Major Macdonald, however, which is very complete indeed as far as the punishment of the Sylhoos are concerned, no thought is taken of the necessity of dealing with Vonolel's villages to the north-east, and even the powerful clan of Howlongs, whom Major Graham estimates at nearly 5,000 fighting men, and possessing nearly 2,000 muskets, are also left insufficiently provided for.

Both Majors Graham and Macdonald and Captain Lewin agree that for the Chittagong column the best line of advance would be from the Dem giri falls by the river Sahjuk, and one of the parallel ranges, either Demagiri or Rhoejung Klang (the latter being on the more exposed flank of the boats moving up the Sahjuk should, I think, have the preference), as far as the Rotung klang, and thence their proposal is that they should work in concert with the Cachar force. If Mr. Edgar's idea is carried out the Cachar force has its work cut out for it nearly 40 miles to the north-east of this point, and the Chittagong column must be strong enough to complete the occupation of the Sylhoo villages by itself.

All the authorities are agreed that the occupation should be gradual, systematic, and relentless; the chance of there being fighting, except in taking a stockaded village, is looked upon as very small; and the means of punishment that are looked to are—

1, Preventing the reaping the December crops.

2, Obtaining all the stored grain and live animals in the villages.

3, Preventing the preparation of the ground and the cultivation of next year's jooms.

By this pressure it is expected that the chiefs will come in, and we must then insist on having the captives surrendered, and make as much use of them in getting the road cut as may be practicable. For all this three or four months will be necessary, and there is no reason, if arrangements are carefully organised beforehand, why the refractory villages should not be occupied up till the latter part of March.

The authorities all agree also in the expediency of leaving a permanent post 200 strong, at the Chittagong end of the proposed road, either on the Lysree Klang or behind Demagiri on the Oepoom range, which, as I have before remarked, has been urged unceasingly both by the local officers and by the Government of Bengal as the backbone of any system of frontier defence for Chittagong.

See No. 789, dated 21 February 1871, pp. 2 and 3, and connected correspondence.

I find it very difficult to say anything as to the question of numbers, of carriage and of equipment.

Major Graham recommends two Native regiments and 300 police.

Major Macdonald's recommendations, which are connected with the gradual bringing up of small bodies carefully organised, is for only 1,500 men in all, of whom half are to be regulars and half police. This is clearly the minimum estimate possible, and is recommended solely because of the great difficulties we shall have to encounter in providing carriage and supplies. Even for this force he calculates that we shall require to provide for a consumption in supplies of 3,000 lbs. daily, and that we shall want a column for the whole of not less than 700 coolies.

The force proposed by his Excellency the Commander in Chief having in view very much the same objects, is for each column three Native regiments and half a battery of artillery, and one company of sappers, and carrying power even greater in proportion than that proposed by Major Macdonald. It is obvious that the whole question of carriage and supplies is too closely connected with the kind of force ultimately decided on to be considered separately.

Major Graham proposes a force of two Native regiments and 300 police. Special weight perhaps should be attached to Major Macdonald's opinion, as he is the only officer who has penetrated the Looshai country both from the north and the south, having accompanied Major Graham in his expedition last season, and Mr. Edgar in his expedition of the previous year.

A coolie corps should be organised at the very earliest date. Water-carriage up to Barkhal, say 100 miles up the Kurnafoolee, is available to large boats, and only a little short of that to steamers and flats. Hence small Native canoes can be got up beyond Demagiri falls to the depôt. Thence four days' march would take a force into the heart of the

Sylhoo

Sylhet country, and about eight days to the furthermost point of the Howlongs. Similarly, from the Cachar side, water-carriage is said to be available to within four days of the point of attack.

Bengalee (including Coles, Sonthals, &c.) coolies are recommended in preference to hill tracts men, partly because the latter have a great hatred of coolie work, and because the former cannot run away, while the latter cannot resist endeavouring to escape to their jooms. All parties recommend elephants to be substituted for coolies as far as possible, and also the obvious precaution of dressing, arming, and equipping the troops specially for the jungles, and with a recollection of the fact that the struggle will be far more with natural obstacles than with the living enemy. The suggestions are many and valuable, but need not be extracted here, as it will be desirable, if anything is decided on, to send up the reports of Majors Graham and Macdonald, Captain Lewin and Mr. Edgar *in extenso* to the Military Department.

Major Macdonald's suggestion, however, of having survey officers attached to each column is, I think, very valuable, and should be supported.

It is for the Lieutenant Governor to decide whether he will recommend to India a punitive expedition, and on what scale; whether they should carry out their object of punishment as proposed by an occupation of the hostile villages as long continued as possible; whether the plan of a road (1) from Chittagong to Cachar (2) along the south face of the Cachar frontier should be approved; whether the system of frontier posts, on which a report was called for in Government of India's letter dated 11th April should not be postponed till the question of this expedition is decided; as if there is to be no expedition we shall require a much more numerous, close, and retired line of posts for defence than would be necessary after a successful expedition. Moreover, in regard to a line between Demagiri and Cachar whether it impinge on the south frontier of Hill Tipperah or not, we have not at present the requisite information to enable us to decide.

(Confidential.)

OFFICE MEMORANDUM from *C. U. Aitchison*, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 1336 P.; dated Simla, the 30th June 1871.

THE undersigned is directed to forward, confidentially, to the Military Department, a copy of the papers specified in the accompanying list, on the subject of the measures to be adopted towards the Looshai tribes who recently committed raids on the frontiers of Cachar and Chittagong. His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General in Council desires that the whole question may now be taken up in that Department; that the necessary arrangements for despatching an armed force into the country inhabited by the tribes in question may be considered in full detail, and that the opinion and views of the Military Department may be communicated to this department at the earliest possible date.

(Confidential.)

(No. 1453 P.)

EXTRACT from the PROCEEDINGS of the Government of India in the Foreign Department (Political), under date Simla, 11 July 1871.

READ again the under-mentioned papers:

Political Proceedings A, March 1871, Nos. 54—89, and Nos. 471—576.
" " May " " 295—337 " " 576—653.

Read also:

Letters from the Government of Bengal, Nos. 2363 and 2386, both dated 22nd May 1871, and memorandum to the Military Department, dated 30th June 1871, No. 1336.

RESOLUTION.—The Viceroy and Governor General in Council considers that these papers show that, in the opinion of all the authorities who have been consulted, an armed expedition into the Looshai county, during the ensuing cold season, will probably have the effect of preventing the recurrence of the outrages committed in British territory last spring, and would be one effectual means for permanently establishing the security of our frontier.

2. While His Excellency in Council fully agrees in this opinion, so clearly expressed and sustained by such convincing arguments, he has arrived at the conclusion that armed intervention in these districts is necessary, with great regret. The general policy of Government towards the tribes who inhabit the country lying between the Cachar and Chittagong districts, and to the east of Hill Tipperah, as described in the papers marginally noted, is unchanged. But the cruel raids that have been perpetrated for some years on various parts of the frontier, more especially on the tea gardens in the Cachar district, show that the friendly intentions of

To Government of Bengal, No. 1338, dated 18 September 1869.
Ditto, No. 6 A., dated 29 October 1869.
Ditto, No. 1126 P., dated 30 June 1870.

Government have not as yet been understood or fully appreciated by many of the tribes; and there is some reason to suppose that the leaders of the raids and their followers may have imbibed the idea that we are either unable or unwilling to take active measures for the punishment and repression of such outrages.

3. The information as to the actual perpetrators of the raids is as yet extremely incomplete. The tribal divisions do not appear to be very decidedly marked, and it is difficult to trace particular outrages or raids to particular tribes or villages. There is, indeed, little or no room to doubt that the most prominent offenders came from the country of the Howlongs and Sylhoos; but these names are used with much indefiniteness, and it appears that, although the names of some of the leaders are known with tolerable certainty, their followers most probably did not belong exclusively to any one particular section or tribe, but were attracted by a love of plunder from various parts of the country to the chief whom they may have followed. Under these circumstances, his Excellency in Council is of opinion that the object of the expedition which it in necessary to send into the country cannot be one of pure retaliation, and that much discrimination will be needed in dealing with the different chiefs.

4. If, during the progress of the expedition, guilt can with certainty be brought home to any particular villages, punishment must follow. The surrender of chiefs who, like the Howlong Sungbongah, are known to hold, or to have lately held, British subjects in captivity, should be demanded, and in the event of non-compliance, their houses and property should be destroyed. The restoration of the captives should be insisted on, and every effort made for their deliverance. When it is ascertained that particular inhabitants of a village have taken part in a raid, without complicity on the part of the village as a whole, the infliction of a fine on the village, and the surrender or punishment of the guilty individuals, would probably be sufficient. In some cases it may appear desirable to take and detain either the leading chiefs, or others, as hostages for future good behaviour. His Excellency in Council does not anticipate any formidable armed resistance to the advance of the troops; but if hostility is met with, resisting villages should be attacked and burnt, and the surrounding crops destroyed.

5. It must, however, always be borne in mind that retaliation is not the only object of the expedition. The main end in view is to show these savages that they are completely in our power; to establish friendly relations of a permanent character with them; to make them promise to receive in their villages, from time to time, Native agents of our own; to make travelling in their districts safe to all; to show them the advantages of trade and of commerce; and to demonstrate to them effectually that they have nothing to gain, and everything to lose, by placing themselves in a hostile position towards the British Government.

6. With this view, it will be necessary that the expedition should be attended, as far as practicable, by chiefs belonging to friendly tribes; and that such use should be made of their people and followers as the circumstances of the case will admit. Rutton Pooea and Sookpilal may be instanced as chiefs whom it may be found expedient to influence and employ in this manner.

7. The details of the expedition, the strength and composition of the force to be employed, and the special equipment in arms and clothing, if such be deemed necessary, will be carefully considered and determined in the Military Department, in direct communication with the Bengal Government; but the papers appear to the Viceroy and Governor General in Council to call for the following general observations:—

I. His Excellency in Council is of opinion, not only that a large force is not required, but that its employment would be objectionable, both in a political and military point of view; he would, therefore, deprecate the moving of troops from a distance. But while he wishes the utmost possible economy to be practised, he desires that nothing should be omitted in the organisation of the force which the Military Department may consider necessary to make complete success a certainty.

II. It appears clear that whatever be the strength and organisation of the force, the larger portion of it must advance from the south, and must start from Chittagong. The hills to be invaded are nearer and can be more easily reached than from Cachar. The sea forms the easiest mode of carriage for troops, munitions of war, and stores. The routes from the side of Chittagong are better known than those from the north. There is excellent water communication by the Kurnafoolee, and by it supplies can be forwarded to within a few days' march of the Sylhoo villages. The force from Chittagong should be accompanied by Majors Macdonald and Lewin. The capacity in which the first-named officer can most usefully be employed will be considered in the Military Department.

III. It is in the opinion of His Excellency in Council most desirable that, unless objections exist of which His Excellency in Council in this Department is not aware, a Madras regiment should form part of the expeditionary force. Cuttack, Vizagapatam, or the Presidency Town, would easily supply an efficient battalion.

IV. At the same time that the main force is despatched from Chittagong, a smaller body should start from the Cachar side, to be accompanied by Mr. Edgar, leaving in the

the posts on the Cachar border a sufficient number of soldiers and police to provide for the security of the district during the absence of the expeditionary force.

V. The two forces should endeavour to reach, on a particular day, positions from which they would be able to maintain uninterrupted and easy communication with each other. They should start, if possible, by the middle of November, but not later than the 1st December, and the country should be completely evacuated by 10th March.

8. His Excellency in Council leaves it to the Military Department, in direct communication with the local authorities, to decide to what extent police should be employed in all the duties connected with the expedition, and also to what extent, and in what manner, use should be made of co-operative action on the part of the Rajas of Munnipoor and Tipperah. He will merely at present remark that as much use should be made of the police as is possible, and that it is desirable that the Rajas, whose frontier territories have been devastated by the raiders, should co-operate. The Raja of Munnipoor is bound by his engagement to "assist the British Government with a portion of his troops, in the event of anything happening on the Eastern frontier of the British territories." His Excellency in Council considers it necessary that the Political Agent in Hill Tipperah, whose appointment was sanctioned in October 1870, should be nominated by the Lieutenant Governor and required to take up his duties before the military operations commence.

9. For various reasons, His Excellency in Council considers that it would be inexpedient to hamper the expedition with the task of laying out and clearing a road between Chittagong and Cachar.

10. One or two officers of the Survey Department should accompany the force, both from Chittagong and Cachar, and they should be instructed to make as careful and complete a survey of the country as circumstances will permit. His Excellency in Council also considers it a matter of much importance that advantage should be taken of the expedition to acquire all the information necessary to enable the Bengal Government to submit to the Foreign Department specific proposals (as called for in the letter to the Bengal Government, No. 17 C—P., dated 11th March 1871) regarding the best line of frontier posts to be established on the Chittagong border.

11. The Governor General in Council has lastly to observe, that it is an object of primary importance that the preparations for the expedition should be conducted with as much secrecy and with as little bustle as possible. It cannot be looked upon as a campaign, but rather as a military occupation and visitation by detached bodies of troops of as large a portion of the Looshai country as possible, for the purpose above explained, and also to show the Looshais that there is no part of their hills to which our armed forces cannot penetrate.

ORDER.—Ordered that, in continuation of Memorandum No. 1336 P. of 30th June, a copy of this Resolution, and of the papers on which it is founded, be forwarded confidentially to the Military Department, for consideration and action in the manner indicated.

(No. 1454 P.)

COPY to the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, confidentially, for information, in reply to No. 2386; dated 22nd May 1871.

(No. 239 of 1871—Military Department.)

(Separate.)

To His Grace the Duke of *Argyll*, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

My Lord Duke, Simla, 3 August 1871.

IN continuation of our Despatch, No. 97, dated 22 March 1871, we have now the honour to forward further papers bearing on the subject of the late disturbances on the North Eastern Frontier.

See Note on Letter No. 261, dated 24 August 1871, p. 194 of Return.

2. Enclosed is a copy of General Order by the Commander in Chief, dated 17th June 1871, from which it will be seen that the trial of the jemadar of the 4th Native Infantry has resulted in his dismissal.

3. In a separate Despatch of this date, we forward copy of correspondence with the Bengal Government and His Excellency the Commander in Chief, relative to a projected expedition into the Looshai country, during the ensuing cold season.

We are, &c.
(signed) *Mayo.*
Napier of Magdala.
&c. &c.

From Colonel *P. S. Lumsden*, C.S.I., Quartermaster General, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 1042C.; dated Calcutta, the 21st March 1871. (*See* page 139.)

From Colonel *P. S. Lumsden*, C.S.I., Quartermaster General, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, Calcutta, No. 65 F.C.; dated Army Head Quarters, Chittuck, the 7th March 1871.

I AM directed by the Commander in Chief to submit to Government the annexed copy of a letter, No. 119, of 2nd current, from the Officer Commanding Eastern Frontier District, and, with reference thereto, his Excellency would solicit sanction to locate the troops as follows for the ensuing season.

2. Head Quarters 4th Native Infantry at Cachar, with a company detached to each of the posts of Monierkhall, Nowarbund and Jalnacherra. Head Quarters 44th Native Infantry, Shillong, with a company at Sylhet, one at Chargolah and another at Allynuggur.

Head Quarters with three companies 43rd Native Infantry, Shillong, leaving the present detachments at Tezpore and Nowgong, and a company at Gowhatty.

3. His Excellency has directed the troops now in the field to remodel the stockades at the different outposts, with the view of their being made respectively capable of containing a company of Infantry and with space for coolies or others seeking shelter therein, as fully detailed in the annexed copy of a letter, No. 1570 C., of 3rd current, to the address of the Officer Commanding Eastern Frontier District.

4. Of course none of these arrangements would have effect until all immediate prospect of further inroads from the Looshais for the present season had terminated.

5. His Excellency, as already urged in my telegraphic communication of the 3rd, thinks it necessary that the Public Works Department at Cachar and Sylhet should immediately set in hand the erection of huts of bamboo and mats with thatching for the extra troops to be contained there, the cost of which would be but trifling.

From the Officer Commanding Eastern Frontier District, to the Quartermaster General, No. 119; dated Cachar, the 2nd March 1871.

I HAVE the honour to report that I propose, with the sanction of His Excellency the Commander in Chief, that the following operations and movements should be carried out at present:—

1st. The weakly men of Captain Lightfoot's and Lieutenant Bourne's detachments to return to Cachar under command of Captain Lightfoot.

2nd. Lieutenant Bourne with the strongest men and men most likely to be good woodmen, up to 40 strength, to proceed *viâ* the Boobun Range to Mynadhur, clearing the road as they proceed.

3rd. The present detachment of 4th Native Infantry to garrison Monierkhall and commence clearing the track made by Mr. Daly towards Nowarbund.

4th. The detachment at Nowarbund to commence their clearing towards Monierkhall.

5th. The detachment 44th Native Infantry at Jalnacherra to commence clearing the road northwards towards Nowarbund, and in a north-east direction towards Chargola.

6th. The Chargola detachment to work down towards Jalnacherra.

7th. As I propose occupying during the rains and summer the post of Monierkhall, Nowarbund, Jalnacherra, and Chargola, each with one Native officer and 50 men, I would detail a portion of the detachments now at those posts to build huts for the detachments which will be left out.

2. On the setting in of the rains, I propose that the Head Quarters of the 4th Native Infantry and six companies should be located at Cachar, furnishing the outposts as above, and that two companies of the same corps should garrison Sylhet; that the 44th Native Infantry and the three companies 43rd Native Infantry (now at Sylhet and Shillong) should be located at the latter station, Lieutenant Colonel Cookson, Commanding the 43rd, joining his companies at Shillong. Of course all road-making must be postponed until the weather clears up.

From the Quartermaster General, to the Officer Commanding Eastern Frontier District, No. 1520 c.; dated Cachar, the 3rd March 1871.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 119, of 2nd current, and with reference thereto, to communicate the approval of His Excellency to the proposition therein set forth as to the immediate disposition of the troops now at Cachar and Sylhet for the purpose of opening lines to connect the frontier posts.

2. With reference to the location of the troops for the approaching season, the Commander in Chief desires arrangements may be made for the posts of Monierkhall, Nowarbund and Jalnacherra being prepared for one company each of the 4th Native Infantry, while those of Chargola and Allynuggur should be held by the 44th Native Infantry, and shelter be provided accordingly.

3. His Excellency has recommended to Government the construction by the Public Works Department of shelter at Cachar for a wing of Native Infantry, and at Sylhet for one company, which should hereafter be occupied by the 4th and 44th Native Infantry respectively.

4. With regard to the outposts, the shelter should be at once constructed by the men, and the existing posts either remodelled or reconstructed. In the execution of this work His Excellency thinks it very desirable that provision should be made within the stockade to afford shelter for coolies, planters, &c., in case, where the posts are in gardens, the owners of the garden should be permitted, if desired, to construct a tea-house inside; the positive outline of such works can, of course, only be determined on by the nature of the ground at each locality, but for guidance I am to submit what appears to His Excellency an appropriate plan for general adoption.



From Colonel *H. K. Burne*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, No. 521; dated Fort William, 13th March 1871.

I AM desired to transmit the accompanying letter from the Quartermaster General, No. 65 F.C, dated 7th March 1871, conveying the recommendation of the Commander in Chief in regard to the location of the troops in the eastern frontier district during the ensuing season, and to request that the Government of India may be informed whether the Honourable the Lieutenant Governor concurs in the proposed arrangement.

2. The favour of a very early reply is requested.

From *H. L. Harrison*, Esq., B.A., for Secretary to the Government of Bengal, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 1177; dated Fort William, the 17th March 1871.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 521, dated the 13th instant, with its enclosure, relative to the arrangements for the location of the troops in the Eastern Frontier District during the ensuing season.

2. In reply, I am to state, for the information of His Excellency the Governor General in Council, that, on the receipt in the Department Public Works of this Government of the copies of the telegraph messages from and to the address of the Quartermaster General, on the subject of sheltering troops in Cachar and Sylhet, the civil officers were directed to communicate freely with the military authorities, and to try to come to complete accord as to the places where detachments might be posted. Their replies have not yet been received, and the Lieutenant Governor is not in a position to offer an opinion on details; but as it is understood that His Excellency the Commander in Chief has himself made the arrangements on the spot, he cannot doubt that they are the best possible.

3. The principal question that occurs is, whether so large detachments will be necessary in a somewhat unhealthy country when the rains make it equally impossible for the Looshais to invade our territory and for the sepoys to make roads in it. The Lieutenant Governor understands that the country in which it is proposed to place the Cachar posts becomes absolutely impassable in the rainy season.

4. The cost of hutting these detachments of Native troops will be, however, very small, and the Lieutenant Governor would suggest that if detachments of such strength as are considered necessary are posted as proposed, then, in the event of their being threatened with sickness in the rains, they may drop down the rivers in boats, and abandon the posts without incurring danger of attacks at that season.

5. The Lieutenant Governor has no doubt that the arrangements made by His Excellency for enlarging the stockades, so as to receive the coolies, planters, &c., in case of necessity, will be most beneficial.

6. The original enclosure of your letter is herewith returned as requested.

From Colonel *H. K. Burne*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Quartermaster General, No. 61; dated Fort William, the 3rd April 1871.

I AM directed to acknowledge your letter, No. 65 F–C., dated 7th March 1871, soliciting sanction to the proposals of His Excellency the Commander in Chief for the distribution of the troops on the eastern frontier during the ensuing season.

2. Though concurring mainly with the views of the Commander in Chief, the Governor General in Council wished, before passing final orders, to obtain the opinion of the Bengal Government on these.

3. I now forward a copy of a letter* from the Secretary to the Government, from which his Excellency will perceive that the Honourable the Lieutenant Governor accepts the proposed arrangements without question. The only point on which a doubt is suggested is as to the expediency of maintaining, during the rainy season, the Cachar posts at the strength contemplated.

* No. 1177, dated 17th March 1871.

4. The Governor General in Council, I am to state, approves of the arrangements proposed by His Excellency in your letter under reply, and entertains no doubt that if circumstances seem to call for any alteration in either the strength or the locality of any of the posts, the local military authorities under His Excellency's orders will act with promptitude and judgment.

5. I am to take this opportunity of acknowledging your letter, No. 1162, received on the 30th (in substitution of one of the same number, dated the 25th March), to which an early reply will be sent.

From Brigadier General *G. Bourchier*, Commanding Eastern Frontier District, to the Quartermaster General of the Army, No. 206; dated Cachar, the 21st March 1871.

(*See* page 135.)

From Captain *E. Lightfoot*, Commanding Detachment, 44th Regiment, Native Infantry, to the Brigade Major, Eastern Frontier District; dated Cachar, the 6th March 1871.

(*See* page 140.)

MEMORANDUM from Brigadier General *G. Bourchier*, Commanding Eastern Frontier District, to the Quartermaster General, No. 237; dated Cachar, the 27th March 1871.

(*See* page 141.)

EXTRACT paragraph 26 of a Letter, No. B., dated 6th March 1871, from the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar to the Commissioner of Dacca Division.

(*See* page 141.)

From the Officer Commanding Detachment 22nd Punjab Native Infantry to the Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, Presidency District, No. 3; dated Kasalong, Chittagong Hill Tracts, 2nd April 1871, forwarded under Presidency District No. 1114 G.; dated 19th April 1871.

(*See* page 142).

Quarter Master General's Office, Army Head Quarters, Simla, 8th May 1871.

From the Officer Commanding Eastern Frontier District to the Quarter Master General, No. 327; dated the 11th April 1871.

I HAVE the honour to report, for the information of his Excellency the Commander in Chief, my arrival at Sylhet, after visiting the frontier of that district. Starting from Cachar on the 5th, I had hoped to have been able to cross the Chutter Choora range from Alexandrapoor, but about a mile on the west side being still impassable, I was obliged to give it up, and cross at Pakeechurra by the ordinary track. Our route for the first eight miles was along the Sylhet road, where we struck south to Burnee Mookh on the Khata Khall, travelling along its bank about three or four miles, passing the Burnee Broes Garden on our left, where we crossed the Chandla Jheel, and eventually struck the Government road from Buddeepoor through the Hylakandy Valley; even at this season the Chandla Jheel was nearly impassable, and a little later it would be necessary to keep along the Sylhet road to Buddeepoor and there strike south. We passed the Hylakandy Sub-division Station, and soon after arrived at the Puckeechurra Tea Garden under the Chutter Choora range, distant from Cachar about 27 miles. The road may be said to be good all along.

6th April. From Pakeechurra over Chutter Choora to Chargola, about 16 miles. The track to the summit was a fair rideable road, and down to a large Munnipooree village on the west side where we got into a deep swamp, almost then impassable; but as this was not the connecting link I wished kept open between Cachar and Sylhet, I had not put parties to work on it. We skirted for several miles the Soone Bheel, which terminated in the Singla Nuddee, over which we had to swim our horses, and three miles further, arrived at the Chargola Tea Garden, beyond which is the stockade on the left bank of the Singla Nuddee on a salient angle. Captain Palmer has, I think, made a mistake in having lost a deal of valuable time in levelling a *teelah* to make it flush with the old stockade. It is now slightly commanded by a second teelah more to the westward, but not in the direction from which an attack would be expected. The stockade itself had not been begun; and, as the season was so far advanced, I directed Captain Lightfoot, who had assumed command, to strengthen the old stockade A. and construct a second in echelon with the old one, connecting them with a covered way, and also protecting the road to the water. The old stockade was too small to give protection to the bazaar, magazine, and camp followers. It would have been far better to have built an earthwork on the river bank closing the rear with pallisades, The track from this to the Chutter Choora guard will, I hope, be finished this year.

The position for this stockade was chosen to protect a number of Munnipooree villages in the neighbourhood.

Friday, 7th. From Chargola to Gowrnuggur, distant about 19 miles. We retraced our steps as far as the Chargola Tea Garden, distant about three miles, through low swampy ground, which continued for two miles beyond it, to the foot of a low range of *teelahs* called the Langai range. I could not find out whether the water rose on this plain to any great height, but have directed the officer in command to have a register kept of the rise. Captain Lightfoot, who accompanied me, had been hard at work, and made a really good road for four miles over the range, and to within a mile and a half of the Langai stockade. He had done this work with 35 men from the 26th March to the 2nd April. Mr. Patch has promised to complete the one and a half mile still uncleared, with his police. About half way over the range is a large Munnipooree village almost deserted, near which, and as a link between Chargola and Langai, a picket will be posted. Within a few miles of the bottom of the range we came upon the Langai police stockade, beautifully situated and in excellent repair.

Leaving the Langai river, our route lay nearly north, over what had evidently once been a large bunded road, now in ruins; four miles brought us to the village of Luckeepoor, where we commenced crossing a series of long disconnected *teelahs* called the Pateria Range, from the highest of which, the Adem teela, at four miles from Luckeepoor, we had a lovely view of the boundless forests and swamps of Sylhet. The remaining seven miles of teela, walking to the Pateria Tea Garden, I can describe as nothing but execrable. The track

was a difficult one to manage, and had here and there been improved by the police, but for a long distance it kept the bed of a stream ankle deep in slush, neither water or mud, and covered in by bamboos, shrubs, rocks, &c. &c., so that you actually travelled through a tunnel; the heat was all but suffocating, the air sickening. Emerging from this we came at once on the Pateria Tea Garden, one of a cluster of three managed by Mr. George Smith.

8th April. Gowrnuggur (Pateria) to Hingajeea police station, distant 20 miles. This was a very easy and uninteresting march, over rice lands interspersed with Bengallee villages, the largest of which and through which our road ran, were Azimgunge and Manickgunge; at the former we crossed the Kushoo river, and near Manickgunge the Poree river; at the Hingajeea station is a small police bungalow which we lived in. Clean water is unprocurable here; there is one small tank used for every purpose.

9th. Hingajeea to Alleenuggur, seven miles. We were now in the zemindaree of Ali Ahmed, who has a fine house at Singla. It was a painful sight to see fine bounded roads built by his forefathers with good brick-work bridges, all going to ruin for want of a little repair. His house is only three miles from the Kookie village near Allynuggur, which was attacked on the 27th February; we could see it plainly. The stockade at Allynuggur is getting on very well indeed, and is really well built; Captains Butler and Robertson have been most industrious in the work. It is a pity that it was not built nearer the River Munnoo, distant one mile from its present site, or even at Adampoor on the Dhuloie, down which stream the Chittagong authorities heard the raiders were advancing on Sylhet to avenge the death of their comrades at Monierkhall; but its present position is not in itself objectionable, or would in any way warrant my ordering its removal.

On the 10th, we returned to Sylhet, 30 miles from Hingajeea, I may say through uninterrupted swamps, the largest, the Hukalokae Hao, extending four miles without a symptom of path. We crossed the Hoosiara river at Renchoogunge, and arrived at Sylhet in the evening.

I should say that Cachar was a far more manageable district, in a military point of view, than Sylhet. The former has marked features, ranges of mountains, open valleys of gardens extending for miles and miles; the swamps are much smaller, and the roads in fair order; you can somehow always get about the country, but Mr. Simson, the Commissioner of Dacca, was quite right when he stated there was not a road in Sylhet; and at the beginning and end of the rains, when the rivers had not risen sufficiently for boats to ply, and the jheels have become almost impassable, you have the greatest difficulty in getting along at all, and if you come to a river which has suddenly swollen, you must swim.

I have said that there is not a road in Sylhet. There is not, but there are the remains of excellent roads, whose bunds are not about five feet above the level of the country in the neighbourhood of Allie Ahmed's house, which seem indicative of the water-rise in the rains there; and I noticed in the case of the Hukalokae Hao (swamp) that its western side was bounded by a high ridge of land runningnearly north and south, along which a road was once begun, but for some reason abandoned; and the ruined road running north from the Langai stockade is another instance showing that road-making is not impracticable; it requires, doubtless, care in construction; but at present the district, excepting the few tracks we have made this year, is a chaos of forest and swamps, the south-eastern portion little known even to any but the police. There are not, as in Cachar, immense tracks of *teelah* land opened out for tea; there are six gardens I believe south of the Soorma. I must express a hope that steps will be taken to open out lines of communication, as the means of sending supplies to the outposts in the rains are not always to be depended on.

MEMORANDUM from the District Superintendent of Police, Sylhet, to the Personal Assistant to the Inspector General of Police, Lower Provinces, No. 134; dated Sylhet, the 26th March 1871.

No. 197, dated 22 March 1871, from the magistrate of Sylhet, to the district superintendent of police, Sylhet.
No. 189, dated 20 March 1871, from the Brigade Office, to the magistrate of Sylhet.

THE undersigned begs to forward, herewith, copies of the correspondence marginally noted, for the information of the Inspector General of Police, Lower Provinces.

From *H. C. Sutherland*, Esq., Magistrate of Sylhet, to the Brigade Major of Cachar, No. 197; dated Sylhet, the 22nd March 1871.

IN reply to your letter, No. 189, dated 20th instant, I have the honour to inform you that I have this day directed the district superintendent of police to place under your orders the police in the frontier outposts of Chargola, Lungai, Allynuggur, and Adampore.

2. I have also directed the district superintendent to hold himself in readiness to comply with all your instructions; but, as Mr. Patch's duties with regard to the civil police of the district will not leave him sufficient time to devote to frontier work, I have directed him to place the assistant superintendent, Mr. Bedford, entirely at your disposal, and I trust that this arrangement will meet with your approval.

3. You

3. You may rely upon me for entire co-operation with you in all matters connected with the frontier work of this district.

4. Mr. Patch starts in a day or two for Allynuggur, to conduct some very important inquiries into the recognition of the tribe or tribes which have made raids in this district during the present cold season, and will be able to meet the Brigadier General commanding Eastern Frontier District at Chargola, on the 3rd or 4th of April next. If this arrangement should not be convenient to the Brigadier General, please let me know, as soon as possible, at what time Mr. Patch is to expect the Brigadier General at Chargola, to accompany him on his tour of inspection on the frontier.

(No. 198.)

COPY forwarded to the District Superintendent of police, for his information and guidance.

From the Brigade Major to the Magistrate and Collector of Sylhet Frontier Defence, No. 189; dated Cachar, the 20th March 1871.

I AM directed by Brigadier General E. Bourchier, Commanding Eastern Frontier District, to inform you that the Government of India having made over to him the defence of the frontier, the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar has placed the whole of the police in the southern frontier, together with the district superintendent, under his orders.

The Brigadier General would be obliged if you would adopt the same course with regard to the police stationed along the south frontier of your district, making any requisitions for troops or police, or for changes in their location, to the Brigadier General.

General Bourchier considers this course will best ensure his being fully aware of the points of defence taken up in the frontier, for which he is responsible. He will always meet your wishes as much as possible.

The Brigadier General requests that any occurrences requiring notice may be reported to the officers commanding at Allynuggur and Chargola, as well as yourself, by the police.

These officers will report, for the Brigadier General's information, what they may learn from the police, and he will feel obliged if you will also be good enough to keep him informed of anything which occurs in the frontier.

I have said that the district superintendent of police of Cachar has been placed at the disposal of the Brigadier General, but the latter fears that you could hardly dispense with the services of Mr. Patch, as he is supposed to be your only police officer; but General Bourchier will feel obliged by your ordering Mr. Patch to accompany him from Chargola along the frontier, when he makes his tour of inspection.

The probable date of the Brigadier General's arrival at Chargola will be notified to you hereafter.

From Colonel *H. K. Burne*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Quartermaster General, No. 103; dated Simla, the 8th May 1871.

IN forwarding, for the information of the Right Honourable the Commander in Chief, the accompanying communication* from the Government of Bengal, relative to the occupation by the police, under the orders of the Brigadier General Commanding the Eastern Frontier District, of the posts of Chargola, Lungai, Allynuggur and Adampore, I am directed to request that the Government of India may be favoured with his Excellency's opinion as to the posts which it is absolutely necessary to maintain during the rainy season.

*No. 1663, dated 13 April 1871. (To be returned.)

2. In view of the fact that raids have never been made during the unhealthy period of the year, the Governor General in Council, I am to state, is desirous that the arrangements for the protection of the frontier shall be made so as to cause the least possible exposure of the troops or the police.

(No. 104.)

COPY of the foregoing forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, for the information of the Honourable the Lieutenant Governor.

From the Officer Commanding Eastern Frontier District to the Quartermaster General, No. 337; dated Sylhet, the 18th April 1871.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter as per margin, and to report that, as the stockades are nearly completed, I am now issuing orders for the return to quarter of the men now out in excess of the garrisons to be located at the outposts. This is being done in consultation with the civil authorities.

Field operations—No. 1344c, dated Calcutta, 7 April 1871.

Finding that the 4th Native Infantry would be unable to take the civil station guards of

Cachar, now mounted by troops, until the working parties rejoined head quarters, I directed a company of the 44th Regiment Native Infantry to remain at Cachar until further orders.

There have been daily storms of wind and rain all this month, but I am glad to report that the troops have not suffered much from sickness.

From the Officer Commanding Eastern Frontier District to the Quartermaster General or Military Secretary with his Excellency the Commander in Chief, No. 330; dated Sylhet, the 16th April 1871.

Quartermaster General's Office,
Army Head Quarters, Simla, 10 May 1871.

Monierkhall. 4th Native Infantry under Colonel Duffin, and temporarily a detachment of 44th, now withdrawn.

I HAVE the honour to forward two weeks' reports from officers commanding the outposts. The first week's reports came here while I was absent in the district. I may epitomise the work done as follows:—Stockade nearly finished, built by 4th; road to top of Bhoobun range partially cleared by 44th, made practicable. Colonel Duffin thinks the stockade too large; it is not in area so large as the plan approved by his Excellency.

Rooknee Garden, 44th Native Infantry, under Captain Ommaney. The road from the garden to the River Rooknee, and back from garden to Monierkhall road completed, but much damaged by rains; distance about seven miles. Party withdrawn.

Nowarbund stockade, 4th Native Infantry, under Lieutenant Smith.

Greatly advanced, progressing favourably; road made four miles towards Rooknee Garden, but stopped on account of the rains and storms.

Jhalnacherra. 44th, Colonel Hicks and Captain Williams.

Stockade finished; 44th head quarters returned to Cachar, and ordered to Sylhet; 100 men sent to Chargola to assist Captain Lightfoot, being relieved by a company of 4th at Jhalnacherra, which will be the permanent garrison of the stockade.

Chargola, a company under Captain Palmer, 4th; and 50 men, 44th, under Captain Lightfoot.

Chargola now progressing, but behind the rest a good bit. Captain Palmer has gone to Jhalnacherra with the company of 4th to take over stockade. He will leave the company with the Native officer, and return to assist Captain Lightfoot until the stockade is ready.

Captain Lightfoot has made four miles of good road over Langai range with 35 men of 44th, and bridged the road.

Allynuggur. 1 Company, 43rd, under Capt. Butler. 1 Company, 44th, under Captain Robertson.

Stockade progressing very well, and very well built indeed.

The rains have stopped all road-making; 18 inches have fallen in Sylhet.

I am now only waiting to hear of the posts being palisaded in, to reduce the garrisons to their fixed strengths, leaving the banquettes to be finished at leisure.

I find it necessary, for the present at any rate, to leave a company of 44th at Cachar to meet the frontier requirements.

From Captain *E. Lightfoot*, Commanding 44th Native Infantry, to the Brigade Major, Eastern Frontier District, No. 21; dated Jhalnacherra, the 3rd April 1871.

I HAVE the honour to report, for the information of the Brigadier General Commanding Eastern Frontier District, that the entire stockading is finished, including barracks with *machans*, huts in small stockades, also with *machans*, and the gates.

DISTRIBUTION.

From Colonel *P. S. Lumsden*, C.S.I., Quartermaster General of the Army, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 1543; dated Simla, the 16th May 1871.

Enclosures herewith returned.

I AM directed by the Commander in Chief to acknowledge the receipt of Military Department letters, No, 61 of 3rd April, and No. 103 of the 8th May 1871, respectively, on the subject of outposts to be held during the approaching rainy season on the Cachar and Sylhet frontier.

2. Government solicit an expression of His Excellency's opinion as to the posts which it is absolutely necessary to maintain during the rainy season. On this subject Lord Napier of Magdala considers that the proper course to pursue is to leave the Officer in command of the frontier, in communication with the civil authorities, totally untrammelled to act with regard to maintaining, weakening, or reinforcing the posts as he may deem most expedient.

3. This course is the more necessary, because His Excellency is not altogether assured of the fact that the Looshais will not raid during the rainy season. It is true that heretofore they have abstained from doing so; but in talking over the matter at Cachar with Mr. Edgar

Edgar and Mr. Burland on their first arrival from Sookpilal's country, both stated that as the rains was the season in which these tribes hunt the low countries and congregate for the purpose of sport, there was no reason why at any time a hunting party should not be converted into a raiding one.

4. On receipt of the approval of Government, His Excellency would propose to communicate to Brigadier General Bourchier instructions empowering him to act as above suggested.

From Colonel *H K. Burne*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Quartermaster General, No. 533; dated Simla, the 31st May 1871.

I AM directed, in reply to your letter No. 1543, "Distribution," dated 16th May 1871, to acquaint you that the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council is willing to leave the Brigadier General Commanding the Eastern Frontier District quite free to act (in communication with the civil authorities) with regard to maintaining, weakening, or reinforcing the posts he has established, as he may deem most expedient.

FIELD OPERATIONS.

From Colonel *P. S. Lumsden*, C.S.I., Quartermaster General of the Army, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 1545; dated Simla, the 16th May 1871.

IN continuation of this Office No. 1381, dated 10th May 1871, I am instructed by the Right Honourable the Commander in Chief to submit, for the information of Government, the accompanying letter No. 350, dated 21st April 1871, from the Officer Commanding the Eastern Frontier District, reporting the further progress made towards the completion of stockades, the roads, &c.

2. His Excellency desires me to state that the removal of the head quarters of the 43rd Native Infantry to Shillong has been left, under the circumstances represented, to the discretion of Brigadier General Bourchier.

From the Brigadier General Commanding the Eastern Frontier District to the Adjutant General, No. 146; dated the 6th March 1871.

I HAVE the honour to forward copy of a report from Captain D. Robertson, 44th Regiment Native Infantry, commanding at the outpost of Allynuggur, and to state, for the information of the Right Honourable the Commander in Chief, that I have called upon that officer to explain why he did not send out a party of greater strength to repel and punish the raiders, he having with him 100 sepoys and 40 police, and why he did not proceed in personal command.

Captain Robertson's explanation will be forwarded hereafter for his Excellency's information.

From Captain *D. Robertson*, Commanding Detachment 44th Native Infantry, to the Brigade Major, Eastern Frontier District; dated the 28th February 1871.

I HAVE the honour to report the following detail with reference to my telegram of yesterday. Yesterday morning I received information to the effect that Kookies (ryots of Ali Ahmed, the zemindar here) were fleeing from their village, which is about three miles to the east of this post, having been attacked by raiders.

I immediately ordered off 20 sepoys (reinforced afterwards in case of attack); 15 of the police guard accompanied.

They surprised the Looshai (said to be about 300) in the act of plundering the villages, wounded very many of them, who, however, escaped in the dense jungle, and secured one corpse and all the plunder. The raiders fled precipitately, and leaving in our hands ten of their guns (eight flints), one double barrel, and one single (both percussion), and about a dozen of their spears.

Though they fired several shots at our men, I am happy to say no one was touched. Last night they satisfied themselves with lighting fires in different points on the higher hills, to which they have retired, and where they still are. If practicable, I shall send a party to attack them in their present position, should they make a stand, but if they retire further into the jungles, I cannot afford, with the number of men at my disposal, to follow them. The Kookies of the attacked village are re-appearing from the jungles to which they had fled, and taking possession of their several effects, which we were just in time to rescue yesterday.

From the Brigadier General Commanding the Eastern Frontier District to the Adjutant General, No. 198; dated the 20th March 1871.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith copy of a letter addressed by my order to Captain Robertson, commanding at Allynuggur, and his reply,* his not having reported in detail what had occurred, and his accident, which was a severe one. He has only himself to thank for the opinion I had formed of his apathy.

*Marked A.

Not having seen Allynuggur, I am diffident as to expressing an opinion; but it seems to me strange that he did not put his sick, ammunition, and stores into the stockade, so that unhampered he might be ready to strike a blow at a moment's notice. He was disabled, so his going was out of the question; but I disapprove of the opinion he holds as to his position, had he not been so.

Were he commanding extensive field operations, he would be right in considering it his duty merely to direct; but with a detachment of 100 of his own corps, and 30 police, he should have sent at least three-fourths of his own men, and left the majority of the police and the remainder of the soldiers to guard the stockade under a Native officer.

From Captain *H. Thompson*, Brigade Major, Cachar, to the Officer Commanding at Allynuggur, No. 137; dated the 6th March 1871.

I AM directed by the Brigadier General Commanding the District to acknowledge your letter of 28th ultimo, received this day, and to request you will explain why, with a force of 100 sepoys and 40 police at your disposal, you did not proceed with the greater part, if not all, of your company to the scene of the raid, not above three miles off, leaving the police to guard your position. In the absence of any such explanation, the Brigadier General can see a want of energy on your part almost incredible, and that you have lost an opportunity of punishing the raiders which may never recur.

I am further directed to point out, with reference to your intention of sending a detachment, that on such occasions you should yourself accompany the party, as it is mainly from the British officer's intelligence and energy that we must hope for success.

No reply has yet been received to my letter No. 100, calling upon you to explain why you kept the coolies under a guard for so lengthened a period.

From Captain *D. Robertson*, Commanding Detachment 44th Native Infantry, to the Brigade Major, Eastern Frontier District, No. 1; dated the 8th March 1871.

I HAVE the honour to report, for the information of the Brigadier General Commanding, some further detail in regard to the skirmish of the 27th ultimo with raiders, as gathered from subsequent inquiry.

As I have already mentioned in my report to Colonel Hicks, the surprise of the 27th would have been attended with signal results had there not at first been, unfortunately, uncertainty as to whether they were the Kookies of the village or the Looshais.

This uncertainty appears to have been started and urged by the sub-inspector of police, who went in command of the 15 men of the police, accompanying the party of sepoys. The havildar in command of the latter naturally submitted to the judgment of the police on this point of uncertainty, knowing that they, the police, were regularly stationed here, and were, accordingly, better authorities on this matter of recognition whether they were our own Kookie ryots or the enemy.

The sepoys, therefore, restrained themselves until they were actually fired on; an act which then disclosed the enemy.

In this way there was time given to the raiders to take to flight, and many escaped intact, who otherwise would not have had the slightest chance of doing so.

It is difficult to blame the sub-inspector, as he acted to the best of his judgment, and there is no doubt of a great similarity between the Kookies and Looshais; nay, further, I think it will be admitted that it was his duty to act as he did while there was the slightest doubt on the matter, as otherwise the consequences might have been most serious.

This dilemma might altogether have been obviated, had any of the Kookies of the village (who could of course at once have pointed out they were the enemy) come to our camp to give the alarm; but, as I have since found out, their reason for not doing so is based on the same similarity between the two people, and they were afraid, in the early morning, of being taken for Looshais had they rushed to our camp.

The *contretemps* might also have been avoided had Kookies been sent at once as guides from the Zemindar's house, to which many of them had fled; but he himself was absent, and his people did nothing. They say that two Kookies were sent; but this, if at all, was after our men had arrived at the village, and all was over. Everything depended on celerity of action, and had there been any delay such as would have been caused by searching for or waiting for guides, the probability is that the raiders would have been off altogether with

all

all the plunder which they had just completed packing up and had placed ready to take off when they were surprised.

Had the zemindar been here and supplied us with guides at once, it is also possible that, by some bye-paths known to them in the jungle, our men might have got to the rear of the raiders, and perhaps have captured even Lutshoonga himself, Sookpilal's son, who, as I have already telegraphed, was recognized by the Kookies here to have been of the party.

Much as I cannot help regretting that by this unfortunate mistake much of the opportunity was lost, I trust I may at the same time venture to submit, for the approval of the Brigadier General, the good discipline shown by my men in restraining themselves under the tempting circumstances.

From Captain *D. Robertson*, Commanding Detachment 44th Native Infantry, to the Brigade Major, Eastern Frontier District, No. 2; dated the 8th March 1871.

I HAVE the honour to report the following details in regard to the retreat of the raiders after the skirmish of the 27th ultimo.

We are all here under the impression that the Looshais' remained that night (27th) and the next also on the range of hills flanking this post to the east, seeing fires lit every night, &c., and indeed had come to the conclusion that they had taken up their position there with the intention of coming down to attack us shortly.

This, however, has been proved to be erroneous from information gained from a young Kookie who was taken away by the raiders, but managed to make his escape.

He says that they never stopped day or night in their retreat from this (after their being driven out of the village by us) till they got well over to the foot of the other side of the range. This tallies with the result of the reconnoissance of a party sent by me on the morning of the 1st instant, which on its return reported that they could find no trace of the Looshais having camped as far as they (the sepoys) went (in one day there and back), and at the same time explained the meaning of the fires which we had seen nightly. These were rice pits in the cultivation patches of the Kookies, and also high grass jungle which the raiders had fired as they retreated.

Since then, on the 5th instant, another party of sepoys by my order started to track the enemy as far as they could go, remaining one night in the jungles, and back the next evening. This party reports that they seem to have gone towards the Soorie River (marked in map), and that there is no proof of a report that part had gone north-east, at any rate on the range.

In fact, after having done all that we could, we are in perfect ignorance as to where they have ultimately gone, only knowing that at present they are not within days' marches of this, and accordingly, as I telegraphed "out of our reach."

Two more corpses were found by the Kookies in the jungle, abandoned by the raiders in their retreat, but they have only brought in remains of heads (having scalped them), and reporting that the bodies were putrified. The Kookies report that these two bodies were killed by the bullet wounds inflicted by our sepoys, and that one more Looshai was killed in a "jhoom" by a Kookie to whom the Zemindar had entrusted a gun (in order to give the alarm), but that the Looshais carried off this body.

This in all (including the one secured in the skirmish) gives four ascertained dead among the raiders.

The young Kookie also reports that the enemy carried away with them many wounded.

Four Hindustanis with beards were distinctly seen by our men, when the raiders took to flight out of the villages.

From Captain *D. Robertson*, Commanding Detachment 44th Native Infantry, to the Brigade Major, Eastern Frontier District, No. 3; dated the 9th March 1871.

I HAVE the honour to enclose, for the information of the Brigadier General Commanding, two reports containing further details (1) in respect to skirmish of the 27th ultimo, (2.) in regard to retreat of the raiders. I have refrained from sending these in earlier, till I could be thoroughly satisfied, from full enquiry into the matter, that they are substantially correct.

I also beg to give a list, as per margin, of communications addressed by me to you since my coming here, as some appear to have miscarried or been delayed.

Telegram, 10 February, "further orders," &c.
Report of skirmish, 1 March.
Reply to your letter 100, 4 March.
Report on outpost and present state, 5 March.
Telegram of skirmish, 27th ultimo.
Telegram of raiders having left vicinity, and being Sookpilal's men, sent on 4th instant.
Telegram of raiders having gone out of reach, &c., 8th instant.
2 B. Besides these there were several to Colonel Hicks.

From Captain *D. Robertson*, Commanding Detachment 44th Native Infantry, to the Brigade Major, Eastern Frontier District, No. 4; dated the 13th March 1871.

I HAVE the honour to enclose a present state of detachment under my command. There is nothing new to report since my last. All has been perfectly quiet. No re-appearance of raiders anywhere.

I hold regular inspection of arms and accoutrements of detachment, and have replaced in pouch the ammunition expended on occasion of skirmish. I have again personally visited the Kookie village (the scene of attack on the 27th ultimo), and have ordered bye-paths to be cut (screened from observation) in the jungle on both sides, and leading round to the further side of the village, so as to turn the position, should it by any chance be again occupied by the raiders, though, of course, I should endeavour to forestal them in its occupation on any future occasion. I have also ordered the jungle to be cleared on that side of the village (not on this, as cover would be useful to us in approach), so as to expose both the advance and retreat of the enemy. The jungle favoured them considerably in their flight the other day.

The guard which (as mentioned in my last) is placed in a Munnipoorie village at the exit of path from jungle into plain, and which is relieved weekly, has instructions to make itself thoroughly acquainted with all the bye-paths about, and country generally. I also intend personally to examine the paths into the hills in the other (the Kumberghat) direction, and to take with me from time to time a section of the men, so that shortly they will all become thoroughly acquainted with that part of the country also.

I have received information from the magistrate of Sylhet to the effect that he has countermanded the march of the company of the 43rd Native Infantry to Kumberghat.

From Captain *D. Robertson*, Commanding Detachment 44th Native Infantry, to the Brigade Major, Eastern Frontier District, No. 5; dated the 15th March 1871.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt this day of your letter No. 137, dated Cachar, 6th March 1871, and now beg to state the full facts of the case on the 27th ultimo, which will, I think, speak for themselves and for the course of my conduct thereon, which I trust will now meet with the approval of the Brigadier General Commanding. On the morning of that day (the 27th ultimo) the stockade and camp here were suddenly aroused by the appearance of some Bengalees using excited gestures which made us at first imagine the raiders had stolen a march through the jungle, and were on us.

My men immediately stood to their arms, and I ordered half the company to prepare to meet the supposed attack, and the other half to stand as a support, as also in protection of magazine, supplies, and sick. Upon calming our excited informants, however, I ascertained, as well as I could from their confused accounts, that the raiders were not near our camp, but had attacked a Kookie village, as you know, some good distance away. I accordingly ordered a section of my available men to proceed in the direction, and find out the facts of the case, with instructions to send back word as rapidly as possible.

You will observe (as indeed mentioned in my report of the 28th) that this was an advanced party of the nature of a patrol or advanced guard on column of march, nothing more.

As fortune had it, before they well knew where they were, they came upon the raiders, surprising themselves at least as much as the enemy.

As the latter, instead of offering resistance, fled precipitately, our men did not wish the opportunity altogether to escape out of their hands, and so fired as many shots as they could at the enemy (when they disclosed themselves as such) as they plunged into the jungle. The whole was the affair of a minute or two, being nothing in any way in the nature of an engagement.

As soon as possible the second section of the half company arrived on the spot, the half company then coming under command of a Native officer, and prepared for any attack on the part of the enemy.

But as you know there was no attack, and the raiders fled as men unshackled by accoutrements, &c. could alone flee through the dense jungle, never stopping (as ascertained from reliable information and previously reported) till they had got to the foot of the other side of the range.

Headlong pursuit would have been of no avail in overtaking the raiders, for, as it was, only the fugitive stragglers were shot, and would have been a suicidal act had the enemy made a stand and surrounded them when they got them well into the jungle.

The number of men at my command in the position of this outpost (as I proceed to show) is not even satisfactorily sufficient to act on the defensive and protect the extent of the plains open to attack, much less to enter densely tangled hills in pursuit, or in any way in them to act on the offensive.

As I have in former reports explained, there is not only this direction of the Kookie village in which there is a full half of the hill range from any point of which the raiders can descend on the plains, but there is also the Kumberghat direction, on any point of which also descents are open to be made from the other half of the range. Accordingly at the same time as the party went to the Kookie village, I also had to send a strong patrol in this latter direction, to give warning lest simultaneous attack of the raiders was imminent on this side, as also to communicate with the Rajah's (Tipperah) guard at Koilashur.

I may

I may as well here state that from latest information only one-third of the raiders' force was at the Kookie village, and therefore the remaining two-thirds free to make a raid anywhere else in the vicinity.

Further, in full front and circling towards the flanks of my camp is dense jungle the whole way from the centre of the range, through any part of which the enemy could also have appeared. I therefore had to throw out a chain of double sentries for protection of the camp, with two pickets also at night.

With all this you will see I had no surplus of available men to do any more than I did.

2. As regards my not proceeding personally with the party to the Kookie village or with any other detached party, I could not have done so (as I unfortunately met with an accident which prevented my moving about at the time), even had I considered it my duty to do so.

This I may as well frankly state, I should not have considered it, to accompany a reconnoitring party once the enemy were known to be in the vicinity, and, as I have shown, free to attack us in different directions, and to leave my camp supplies, sick, and especially magazine (ammunition) under charge of a Native officer, however trustworthy, having only lately been warned by what happened elsewhere of the consequence of doing so.

Had there been two British officers here, I should then have considered it the duty of one to be present in camp, and the other to have proceeded with any detached party. I thus unreservedly state my conception of my duty under the circumstances, which is, I think, what the Brigadier General wishes and expects me to do, as on it is based the course of action I took in the matter.

If I am in his opinion, now that he has received my full explanation, still in error, I respectfully stand under correction.

The party of police I found ready to hand, and (in accordance with spirit of circular since received) thinking they might be useful to act as guides, having been stationed here, I allowed them to accompany the sepoys, giving them no military instructions whatever, neither have I on any other occasion made use of them in a military way, leaving them simply to look after their stockade.

It was not my fault that, as it happened, they did more harm than good by starting the erroneous impression already reported. The number of police here is, and was then, 30, not 40, as stated in your letter.

From the Adjutant General to the Brigadier General Commanding the Eastern Frontier District, No. 3601 E; dated the 5th April 1871.

No. 146, dated 6 March 1871.
No. 198, dated 20 March 1871.

HAVING laid before the Right Honourable the Commander in Chief your letters marginally noted, forwarding the reports of Captain D. Robertson, 44th Native Infantry, of a skirmish which took place three miles to the east of the outpost of Allynuggur between a party of his men and Looshai raiders on the 27th February last, I am directed to request you will be so good as to inform Captain Robertson that Lord Napier is by no means satisfied with the manner in which he conducted the affair, and unless more energy and enterprise are displayed by that officer on any future opportunity, the detachment now under his command will be replaced by another from some other corps.

The Commander in Chief desires that, after inspecting the outpost of Allynuggur, you will be good enough to direct Captain Robertson how to make his arrangements for the future.

My dear Colonel Lumsden,

YOU have of course seen Edgar's notes on the Looshais, Parts I. and II. In them, so many of the questions you put to me are answered, that there is little remaining for me to tell you. But I send you the accompanying rough sketch of route from Moirang in the south of the valley of Munnipore to the Looshais near the upper part of the Teepai or Tooyai, as it illustrates a part you wished to know of, and shows how right Edgar is in his estimation of the importance of that stream. The route is sketched by a Kookie. I have never been further along it than the Torboong. Against the tribes to whom this route leads, Munnipore is anxious to act, not making a sport of it, but to work amongst them for some five or six months. In order that they may do this efficiently, our Government should give them some assistance, as the supply of a quantity of ammunition, &c. There ought to be no lack of the best of guides, for the country now occupied by Vanpeelal, Poiboi, &c. is the country from which the Kookies now near us were expelled, and many of whom know it well. Vanpeelal occupies a very strong position, named Hêngmol, formerly the site of the village of Kooding Kai, the chief of the Singsols. Plenty of the Singsols could show the best way to this, and from thence there are Looshai paths in every direction. But one would not have to depend only on the Kookies in our or the Munnipore territory for guides. The Looshais, though they arise from one progenitor, are not closely linked together; they are all jealous of one another, and not long ago Vonolel's, and Sookpilal's people were at feud, and killing one another. It is quite common too among them for one party to make a raid, and to accuse another of it; so now Vonolel's son, Salboorah, is accused of having led a raid, whilst Salboorah is a mere boy. But, however this may be, amongst people having so little regard for one another, plenty of guides would be forthcoming. The people of the villages supposed or allowed to have had no hand in the late raids, and therefore not touched by our troops, would volunteer to lead them against those we wished to attack; jealous of, and disliking one another as they do, it is improbable that

they would combine to resist our troops, thus a force advancing amongst them would not be likely to be opposed by any great number at a time, say not more than a thousand. They have a very considerable number of muskets not in very good condition, their powder is usually bad, their valuables they usually conceal amongst the jungles and in caves in rocks at a distance from their villages. Their rice, however, they do not usually thus dispose of, and the most effectual way of punishing them is to seize their stores of rice, &c. Their flocks and herds would most probably be driven far away into the jungles, but would easily fall into the hands of our Kookies, if we chose to take any with us to find them out. The Burmese have not any authority over these tribes, nor even over those east of them, with whom they are at enmity, and at whose hands they have lately suffered much. These enemies of theirs could easily, I should think, be brought to side with the Munnipoorees in an attack on Vonolel and the villages influenced by him. The slaves in captivity amongst them are of course principally persons captured in raids in Cachar, Munnipore, and amongst the tribes surrounding them. The number captured from Munnipore must be much larger than that from Cachar. They have too, amongst them, villages of Kookies who, though not slaves, are in a state of subjection they very much dislike. All these Kookie villages would be glad of the opportunity of getting away, and I feel sure would gladly join us if they saw their way to getting from amongst them, and living out of the thraldom in which they are. It would be a great thing, if there is to be an expedition (and we cannot go on without one), if it could reach them just as their crops are ripening. They might be prevented from reaping them, and as hill men seldom raise more than a year's supply of grain, they would soon, if prevented reaping, be in a very bad way.

I remain, &c.

Cherra Poongee, 16 May 1871. (signed) *Wm. McCulloch.*

GENERAL ORDERS by the Right Honourable the Commander in Chief, No. 295; dated Head Quarters, Simla, the 17th June 1871.

AT a General Court Martial assembled at Dacca, on Wednesday the 19th day of April 1871, Jemadar Cheda Tewaree, 4th Regiment Native Infantry, was arraigned on the following charge:—

Charge.—For having, near Monierkhall, on the 28th January 1871, when in command of a detachment of the regiment, misbehaved, in presence of an armed party of Looshais, against whom it was his duty to act, by running away when he should have stayed and fought.

Finding.—The Court find that the prisoner, Jemadar Cheda Tewaree, 4th Regiment Native Infantry, is guilty of the charge.

Sentence.—The Court sentence the prisoner, Jemadar Cheda Tewaree, 4th Regiment of Native Infantry, to be dismissed the service.

(signed) *J. J. O'Bryen,*

Dacca, 24 April 1871. Lieut. Colonel, President.

APPROVED AND CONFIRMED.

IN reviewing the proceedings of the court martial on Jemadar Cheda Tewaree, of the 4th Native Infantry, I have given full consideration to the evidence, which shows that the Jemadar and his party were led from the stockade by the district superintendent of police, Mr. Daly, without instructions or explanation, to seek for an enemy whose position and numbers were unknown. Mr. Daly in his evidence says, he gave the Jemadar no instructions. "He thinks he remarked, it was necessary to hurry after the Looshais." "The men who went with him ran in no order at all."

He thinks the Jemadar and Sipahis started in file, "but as we doubled we got scattered."

Head Constable Puthroo Sing, a witness for the prosecution, states, that when the Looshais fired, the sahib, Mr. Daly, and seven police who were with him, stepped back some four or five paces, to where, owing to the road being cut out of the face of the hill, its formation gave shelter.

Under such circumstances, hurried at a rapid pace, without explanation of what was intended, and in disorder, and seeing a recoil at the head of the party, good troops might be surprised into unsteadiness; but it is precisely in situations of emergency that officers should prove themselves worthy of their commission, and set an example of courage and discipline; in this the Court have considered that the Jemadar entirely failed, and he is therefore unfit to retain his commission in Her Majesty's Army.

(signed) *Napier of Magdala,*

Head Quarters, Simla, 8 June 1871. General, Commander in Chief in India.

By order of the Right Honourable the Commander in Chief.

(signed) *F. Thesiger,* Colonel,
Adjutant General.

(No. 240 of 1871—Military Department.)

(Separate.)

To His Grace the Duke of *Argyll*, K. T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

My Lord Duke, Simla, 3 August 1871.

In continuation of our separate letter, No 239, of this date, and with reference to previous correspondence on the subject of the disturbances on the north-eastern frontier, which has been reported in the Foreign and Military Departments, we have now the honour to transmit copy of further correspondence showing the reasons why we have thought it necessary to organise an expedition for the purpose of dealing with these Looshai tribes in the ensuing cold season, and the measures we have adopted in communication with the Government of Bengal and his Excellency the Commander in Chief in India, towards carrying out this object.

2. The instructions now issued will, of course, be subject to alteration and modification as may be found necessary or desirable after further communication with the Government of Bengal. Our further proceedings in this matter will be be duly reported from time to time for the information of Her Majesty's Government.

We are, &c.
(signed) *Mayo*,
Napier of Magdala.
&c. &c.

Field Operations.

(Confidential.)

From Colonel *P. S. Lumsden*, Quarter Master General, to the Secretary to the Government o India, Military Department, No. 2857; dated Simla, the 17th July 1871.

I am directed by the Right Honourable the Commander in Chief to acknowledge the receipt of Military Department letter, No. 294, of 13th current, conveying to His Excellency the views of Government as set forth in the Proceedings of the Government of India, Foreign Department, No. 1453 P, of 11th July 1871, with regard to the measures to be adopted towards the Looshai tribes who have for so many years, but more especially during the last cold weather months, committed raids on the frontier of Cachar and Chittagong, and requesting his Excellency to submit proposals for giving effect to the same.

2. The Commander in Chief, after perusal of the various reports on the Looshai country, and after the fullest personal communications with the officials on the Cachar frontier, felt confident, as early as March last, that however reluctant the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council would be, both from motives of humanity as well as on account of the financial difficulties of the country, to adopt punitive measures, no other course would be found possible with due regard to the duty of the Government to protect its subjects, to maintain its authority and influence on the frontier, and to pave the way to such pacific relations as would ultimately lead to the civilisation of those wild tribes.

3. So convinced was His Excellency of the inevitable necessity of such a measure, that he considered it advisable, while carefully abstaining from unduly pressing his views on the Government, to lay clearly before them his opinion, formed on the reports of all the most experienced frontier officers and the practical experience of the time, of the strength and constitution of the force required and of its equipment.

4. This opinion was contained in Quarter Master General's letter, No. 1256 C., of 31st March, of which a copy is attached for easy reference.

5. The Commander in Chief having now given full consideration to the propositions of Government under reference, His Excellency desires me to state that in his opinion the force composed and divided as detailed in the above-quoted letter, will be required to give effect to the operations for which Government desire "that nothing should be omitted in the organisation which the Military Department may consider necessary to make complete success a certainty."

6. His Excellency believes that the columns composed as set forth will be sufficient, but not more than sufficient, to give every reasonable prospect of success in obtaining all the objects of Government, as far as such success may depend on the action of the troops if they are efficiently commanded; and it would be His Excellency's study to select officers to command, on whom there is just reason, from their previous services and character, to place reliance.

7. In the observations of the Foreign Department, two points are expressed with some degree of emphasis: that the employment of a large force would be objectionable in a

political and military point of view and that the movements of troops from a distance is to be deprecated.

8. The Commander in Chief is not aware what the Government may consider a large force, but the numbers of each column proposed by his Excellency would not amount in the field at the outset to more than 1,500 infantry.

9. These numbers were arrived at after considering the opinion* of the late Colonel Lister, an officer of great courage and ability, and with intimate knowledge of the Eastern Frontier.

10. His Excellency's opinion as to the force required was also guided by considering the duties which each regiment might have to perform, in reserve, in support, or in occupation of one portion of the enemy's country, while another part of the column might be prosecuting the advance.

11. The communication from the Foreign Department further expresses an opinion that the larger portion of the force should advance from Chittagong for the reasons that the hills to be invaded are nearer, can be more easily reached, and are better known.

12. In His Excellency's humble opinion, these reasons would lead to the force for Cachar being the larger of the two, because the more distant the enemy, the more difficult, the longer and less known the route, the more men would be required for support and communication; but so little is really known of the distance of the actual habitat of the tribes to be visited, and of the numbers that might be opposed to either column, that his Excellency would very seriously advise that there should be no reduction of the Cachar column.

13. In conveying the troops to their base of operations, it is presumed river steamers would be employed both for Chittagong and Cachar; and, although the communication is shorter by a few days to Chittagong, yet, as a portion of the Cachar column will march from Shillong, the balance of advantages may be considered nearly equal.

14. The third observation in the Political Department conveys the opinion of his Excellency in Council that a Madras regiment should form part of the expedition. The Commander in Chief would be glad, indeed, of an opportunity of employing the Madras troops; and if the style of warfare were suited to the ordinary regiments of the line, His Excellency would advise rather that one column should be given entirely to the Madras Army, instead of employing only one regiment; but the opinion of every authority, who has written on the frontier relations, is in favour of employing troops accustomed to, or specially suited to, the country, climate, and style of warfare, and recommend Nepaulese, Seikhs, or Punjabees, the latter, from their severer climate, food, and stamina, being better able to bear the damp climate than the other natives of the plains.

15. Captain Lewin and Lord U. Browne, both excellent authorities, agree in recommending the employment of Goorkhas and Seikhs; the Commander in Chief is entirely of this opinion, and in this office demi-official† letter of 10th May last, to your address, named battalions (as per margin‡) composed mainly of the required races, as the best regiments to be employed. His Excellency considers the service requires picked troops specially adapted to its nature.

† Copy annexed.

‡ 2nd Goorkhas.
4th ditto.
22nd Punjab Infantry.
27th ditto.
42nd Assam Light Infantry.
44th ditto.

16. It may surely be assumed that the first serious preparation on the frontier will give warning to the tribes of the intention of Government to take steps for their punishment, and those who are conscious of deserving it will lose no time in stockading their villages and the approaches to them.

17. If at an early period of the expedition a stockade could be invested so as to prevent the escape of the defenders, and stormed even at some loss, it would have the best moral effect and prevent any other ones from being severely defended; but experience has shown that stockades are frequently placed in positions which could not be invested or turned without an undue expenditure of men and labour. In these cases the use of our superior means is necessary to prevent the enemy from obliging us to assault positions from which they could escape after doing the greatest injury in their power. For these reasons a half battery of mountain artillery§ is recommended to each column; and the only native artillery accustomed to mountain warfare is attached to the Punjab Frontier Force. The transit of this by rail from Lahore would be a matter of no difficulty. The services of a company of sappers with each column in such a country as that to be operated in, hardly requires any explanation or recommendation.

§ Carrying also rockets.

18. With regard to the employment of Majors Macdonald and Lewin and Mr. Edgar with the respective columns, the Commander in Chief could not overrate the value of their advice and assistance to the officers who may command the two branches of the expedition; but his Excellency would most strongly advise, as a measure on which the success of

* Extract from letter No. 13, of 2nd February 1850, from Lieutenant Colonel F. G. Lister, Political Agent, Cossiah hills, to J. P. Grant, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Bengal.—"Paragraph 17. I am of opinion that to put down these people effectually would employ a well-appointed force of not less than 3,000 men; a portion of this force ought to consist of Europeans, as a great deal of stockade work might be expected, &c."

of the operations would depend quite as much as on the efficiency of the troops, that the supreme political authority should be vested in the commanders of the columns when separate, or the senior if united. It would be the duty of the civil officer to act as the intelligence department and to give every assistance to the commanding officer in communication with the hill tribes, but under the control and authority of the respective commanding officers, who should be made fully acquainted with the views and wishes of the Government and held responsible for carrying them out faithfully as far as the circumstances or emergency of the time and the safety of the force would permit.

19. His Excellency is of opinion that there will be ample employment for such portion of the police as can be spared from the protection of the frontier from raids during the expedition, in preparing and garrisoning the posts at the base of operations, maintaining the communication or affording such other assistance to the operating columns as the commanding officers may find necessary.

The Commander in Chief would strongly recommend that their employment should be left to the discretion of the commanding officers, who will, no doubt, assign suitable duties to the police, while bearing in mind that forces of mixed character and dissimilar organisation can seldom be successfully combined in one military action.

20. The Commander in Chief has very frequently been engaged when the forces of allies have been acting in co-operation with the regular army, and can safely say that such has never been carried out without the occurrence of mistakes, accidents or misunderstandings likely to endanger the success of the operations. The Commander in Chief would limit the operation of the Rajahs of Munnipoor and Tipperah to the protection of their own frontiers; to the opening of roads, or the maintaining of communications through their own country; but carefully avoiding to bring their forces into juxtaposition with our own, who are always puzzled to distinguish between allies and enemies.

21. Similarly, his Excellency, while advising the utmost use being made of the friendly Looshai Chiefs in obtaining information, would carefully keep them apart from our columns, excepting in such small numbers as would admit of their being carefully looked after, so that individuals may be prevented from communicating, through inadvertence or otherwise, to the enemy intelligence which would interfere with the intentions of the commanding officer. In fact, as with the employment of the police so with the friendly chiefs, the officers commanding may be safely left to make such use of them as they may find necessary and desirable.

22. When His Excellency in Council was without information, which in His Excellency the Governor General's opinion would justify military action against any particular hill tribes, and as the Commander in Chief understood was unwilling to raise an idea in the public mind of more serious military operations than were intended, the Commander in Chief in a Minute, in the Political Department, dated 30th March 1871, suggested that the force which might ultimately be necessary for military operations should be employed as a pioneer brigade in opening a road between portions of British territory. Such a road has now been recommended by high frontier authorities, and in the Commander in Chief's opinion is a very desirable measure.

23. The Commander in Chief is informed that the pacification of the Cossiah hills followed immediately the opening of Lister's road from Gowhatty to Cherra Poonjee, and the road to Munnipoor from Cachar has had the most beneficial effect. But his Excellency never contemplated such a road as would involve extensive engineering operations or heavy estimates. The road contemplated by the Commander in Chief was merely such as a column penetrating and remaining some time in a country of hills and forests would be obliged to make for the convenience and safety of its communications. Such a road would generally follow the watershed lines, as those of the natives of the country usually do, and would be merely a track sufficiently marked and cleared to facilitate the communications of the force while engaged in the operations, and to be sufficiently indelible to remain as a guide for any future expedition, or as a nucleus for commercial intercourse.

24. In the excellent note by the Secretary to the Bengal Government, in which th whole question is so clearly represented, it is observed, "It is agreed by all that the importance of early preparations cannot be exaggerated, and if the work is to be effectually done, depôts should be established and stockaded, and the columns ready to start from the extreme points to which water carriage is available, by the 1st December."

The Commander in Chief entirely concurs in the necessity of being prepared to move at the earliest possible period, and would respectfully urge upon the Government the vital necessity of securing an effectual supply of carriage for the contemplated expedition.

25. So far back as the 17th March last,* the Commander in Chief, moved by the anxious representations of the Brigadier General commanding the eastern frontier, and the Commissioner of Dacca, ventured to draw the attention of Government to the fact that should such an expedition be in contemplation, elephants should be secured and collected at Dacca for the use of the troops. In a subsequent letter, dated 7th April 1871, as per margin,† the

* From the Quarter Master General to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 970 C, of 17th March 1871.

† From the Quarter Master General to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 1358 C, dated 7th April 1871.

the Commander in Chief suggested that the elephants for the Cachar expedition should be collected at Sylhet, where their natural forage abounds, and before the rising of the rivers, so that they might be available at the earliest period for the purposes of the expedition. It is, therefore, with some apprehension that his Excellency now learns, in the communication as per margin,* that there are but 20 elephants at Chittagong, 55 at Dacca, and 60 still at Barrackpore.

26. The deficiency in elephant carriage can certainly be supplied by coolies, but the advantage of elephant carriage was strongly impressed upon his Excellency the Commander in Chief by the officers on the Cachar frontier, because the natural food of the animal is supplied in the forests in which he will have to work, and he is so much feared by the Looshais as to be a means of some protection to the loads or people whom he may carry while the value of coolie carriage is diminished in the proportion necessary to be allotted for his food. To whatever extent coolies may be employed, the Commander in Chief would advise their being regularly organised and suitably clothed.

27. In this office letter, No. 1256 C., of 31st March last, the particulars of the equipment of the force detailed were stated. No tents whatever were to be allowed with the force, but to each fighting man a waterproof sheet was to be supplied by the State. Two years ago, in Quartermaster General's letter, No. 585 C., of 4th February 1869, the recommendation of the officer commanding the Eastern frontier that these articles should take the place of tents was forwarded to the Military Department, and the Commander in Chief concurs in considering them most essentially necessary to secure the efficiency of the soldiers. In China and Abyssinia waterproof sheets proved invaluable, and secured the force from sickness in a remarkable degree, and His Excellency would most urgently recommend that no time may be lost in telegraphing to England for a supply, in order that they may arrive early enough for the expedition.

28. An ample supply of tarpaulins to cover perishable stores at the depôts is also necessary.

29. In conclusion, the Commander in Chief would crave the indulgence of his Excellency in Council for observing that, however advisable it is that the importance and extent of the operations should not be exaggerated in public estimation into a serious campaign, yet this evil would be but momentary, and would be far less than that of abstaining from any measure or the employment of any troops that may be necessary.

30. Our mountain expeditions of late years in India have not generally been considered successful, and it is most important for the future peace of the frontier and the credit of the Government, that the one in contemplation should not be a failure. It is easy to underrate difficulties; but it must be remembered that even barbarous mountaineers are formidable in their own fastnesses, and that they have been annually becoming better armed than they were in their earlier contests with our troops.

31. His Excellency the Governor General in Council has favourably received the suggestion of Major Macdonald that surveyors should accompany the columns.

32. Every expedition into a new country should be similarly attended. Our ignorance of the topography of the Eastern frontier has been a great disadvantage. The opportunity afforded by the columns of occupation may not occur again for years. The Commander in Chief would therefore recommend that the Surveyor General may be instructed to send such a number of surveyors as will suffice to take every advantage of the present occasion. The companies of sappers will afford them valuable assistance.

33. The annexures of Military Department, No. 294, of the 13th instant, are herewith returned as requested.

From Colonel *P. S. Lumsden*, Quartermaster General, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 1256 C., dated Calcutta, the 31st March 1871.

On 3rd March 1871 the Commander in Chief sent to His Excellency the Viceroy a telegram, conveying the information that His Excellency found, on visiting Cachar, that the Commissioner, Mr. Simson, and the Deputy Commissioner, Mr. Edgar, were of opinion that the raids on British borders would not finally be put an end to until a military expedition had penetrated to the hills occupied by the marauding tribes, and made those tribes sensible that we had not only the will but the power to punish them if they should persist in their hostile proceedings, and that his Excellency concurred in this opinion.

2. The Commander in Chief is under the belief that His Excellency the Viceroy has resolved not to consent to the punishment of any tribes without the most convincing proof that they were the real offenders, and such proof may not be obtained in time to admit of preparations

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* Military Department, docket No. 45, dated 4th July 1871, to Quarter Master General, submitting, for information of His Excellency the Commander in Chief, Commissary General's No. 392 of 26th June 1871, to his address.

preparations being made for a military expedition to commence its operations early enough in the ensuing season to insure success.

3. But all the civil authorities and other officers connected with the frontier with whom the Commander in Chief has conversed, appear to concur in opinion that a communication should be opened between Cachar and Chittagong, passing through the unexplored tract of country which is occupied by or which borders on the tribes, some of whom have undoubtedly been guilty for the last few years of outrages which it is incumbent on the Government of India to prevent or exact reparation for.

4. Several expeditions have been sent with a view of penetrating this tract of country, and although some good appears to have resulted from such as had the most partial success, yet not one has really succeeded, and all have returned under circumstances which were scarcely creditable to a Power such as the British Government.

5. The cause of these failures is very evident; the forces were too small, were ill-equipped, or set out too late in the season.

6. His Excellency would therefore recommend that an expedition, consisting of two columns, composed of regiments entirely suited to the nature of the country and the kind of warfare which may be involved, should proceed from two bases not later than the 1st of November next. One of these columns should start from Cachar, and the other from Chittagong, to meet at some point hereafter to be fixed, and in their progress to open a track which shall be sufficiently cleared and made practicable for the passage of troops, so that the wild tribes, who have habitually made incursions on our territories, may be made sensible that neither our ignorance of the country nor the inaccessibility of their positions will in future protect them from the just anger of the British Government.

7. If the information which may be obtained from the officers whose special duty it is to investigate the circumstances which have recently disturbed the frontiers of Cachar, Sylhet, and Chittagong should be sufficient to indicate the tribes from whom reparation is to be enforced, the columns of troops proposed will be of sufficient strength to effect the object without interfering with the opening of the road which is recommended. Should any of the tribes oppose the troops in opening the proposed road, they will render themselves liable to punishment.

8. It is extremely probable that some will foresee the object of the measure and endeavour to oppose it; others, it may be hoped, will see the inutility of offering resistance to a superior Power, and will enter into those pacific arrangements which it has been so earnestly the desire of the Government of India to establish with them.

9. From such communication as the Commander in Chief has held with officers entrusted with the relations on the frontier of Cachar and Chittagong, and from the various reports relating to those frontiers which His Excellency has read, he believes he is correct in saying that it is the conviction of all of those officers, that the occupation of the tract of country which would be traversed by the road proposed for some months in the cold season, by the punishment of such tribes as may be clearly convicted of the acts of hostility perpetrated in our territory, and by the relations we may establish with those who prefer submission to resistance, we may deter them from acts of aggression in future. These measures also may pave the way to such pacific relations as will lead to the security of our own subjects, and to some extent to the civilisation of the wild tribes, who at present have little knowledge of our power, or belief in our desire to maintain friendly relations with them if they will cease from acts of hostility towards our subjects.

10. His Excellency the Commander in Chief, while stating his concurrence in these views after the best consideration he has been able to give to the subject, does not desire to press upon the Government of India measures which cannot be entirely free from the chances which attend all military undertakings, and which must involve very considerable expense.

11. To enable the Government of India to form some idea of what that expense may be, I am directed to attach a statement of the strength of the columns proposed, together with their probable requirements in carriage, and to point out that, should the Government determine on the operations above described, it will be necessary to instruct the Commissariat and Ordnance Departments to make the necessary arrangements so as to insure the collection, at Cachar and Chittagong respectively, of all the carriage, material, and ration supply required for the operations by the 15th of October next.

12. It would further be very convenient to His Excellency to receive timely notice of the views on this subject of the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council, so as to enable the Commander in Chief to select battalions especially suited for the operations, and to arm them with Enfield rifles.

13. It might be advisable, in considering any plan for the protection of this frontier, to include the district of Tipperah. It will be in the remembrance of Government that the several raids which have taken place into the Sylhet district all passed through Tipperah, the rajah of which might, perhaps, be required to co-operate in any scheme which the Government may finally determine on, and, in furtherance of the same, be required to establish posts connected by roads with Comillah or Agartola.

MEMORANDUM of the probable Carriage Requirements for a Force for Active Service on the North Eastern Frontier.

I. Strength of Force:

½ Mountain Train Battery, Native.
1 Company Sappers and Miners.
3 Regiments, Native Infantry.

II. Equipment:

1. No tents to accompany the force.
2. No private horses, servants, followers, baggage, or stores to accompany the force beyond what is here prescribed.
3. No bazaar establishment to accompany the force.
4. Soldiers to carry the following articles themselves:—

	Lbs.	*oz.*
Great coat	7	8
Waterproof sheet, 5½′ × 8′, to be supplied free by Government, and to be worn in a roll over the shoulder with the great coat	5	8
Arms and accoutrements	16	0
60 rounds ammunition in pouch	5	7
Two days' rations	4	0
Sundries	3	9
TOTAL, lbs.	42	0

5. Carriage to be provided by Government to the following extent:—

	Mds.	*seers.*
General Officer Commanding	1	0
Each Staff Officer of Force and Commanding Officer of Regiment, extra for office	0	20
British officers	0	20
Native officers	0	10
Troops	0	6
Followers	Nil.	
Cooking utensils per regiment	2	0
Ditto per separate company or detachment	0	20
Hospital stores	1	0

6. Ammunition:—
   Artillery, 100 rounds per gun.
   „ 50 24-pounder Hale's rockets.
   „ 50 12-pounder „
   Sappers and Miners, 60 rounds per man in pouch.
   „ „ 40 rounds per man to be carried on animals with the force.
   „ „ 100 rounds per man, in reserve, in boats at nearest depôts, to be advanced with the force.
7. Rations:—
   (*a.*) Officers, troops, and followers to carry two days' food in their haversacks.
   (*b.*) 8 days' food to invariably accompany the force on animals.
   (*c.*) 15 days' food to be at the nearest advanced depôt.
   (*d.*) 5 months' supply to be at commencement of operation at reserve depôt.
   (*e.*) Rum only to be issued on medical recommendation, and no more than one day's supply to be with the force.
8. Private servants and chargers:—
   British officer, each one servant.
   „ „ one riding pony and one syce.
   „ „ one grass-cutter for every two chargers or ponies.
   Native officers, one servant between two officers.
9. Public establishments:—
   Regimental: Three per separate company, or 24 per regiment, to be detailed under regimental arrangements, and to provide for bhistees, langrees or cooks, sweepers, and one mistree or mochee.
   Hospital: Three hospital servants per separate company and detachment of artillery.
   8 hospital servants per regiment.
   1 dooly or dandy per company, or } with 6 bearers each.
   8 „ „ per regiment, }
10. Four tarpaulins, to be supplied at the reserve depôt, to be used as tents for protection of the sick.
11. All camp-followers to have either kookries or spears.

(A.)

EQUIPMENT of each COLUMN.

STRENGTH.					WEIGHT OF BAGGAGE AND STORES.				CARRIAGE REQUIRED FOR BAGGAGE AND STORES.			PRIVATE AND PUBLIC ESTABLISHMENTS.							AMMUNITION.					
												Private.		Public.					40 Rounds to be carried with Force.			100 Rounds per Man in Reserve.		
British Officers.	Native Officers.	Troops.	Sub-Medical Establishment.		Baggage.	Cooking Utensils.	Hospital Stores.	Total Weight.	If Coolies, at 20 seers each.	If Elephants, at 7 maunds each.	Chargers or Riding Ponies.	Personal Servants.	Syces and Grass Cutters.	Regimental.	Hospital.	Dooly Bearers.	Total Private and Public Establishments.	Doolies or Dandies.	Rounds and Weight	If carried by Coolies.	If carried by Elephants.	Rounds and Weight.	If carried by Coolies.	If carried by Elephants.
					M. S.	*M. S.*	*M. S.*	*M. S.*	*No.*	*No.*	*No.*													
10	–	–	2	General Staff, &c. (say) - - - -	10 20	–	–	10 20	21	2	10	10	15											
2	1	81	1	½ Battery, Mountain Artillery - - -	14 16	0 20	– 20	15 6	31	3	2	3	3	3	3	6	12	1						
2	2	114	1	1 Company Sappers and Miners - - -	19 34	0 20	0 20	20 34	42	3	2	3	3	3	3	6	12	1	4,560	10	1	11,400	23	2
																			M. S.			*M. S.*		
																			4 22			11 16		
8	16	696	2	1 Regiment Native Infantry - - - -	117 16	2 0	1 0	120 16	241	18	8	16	12	24	8	50	82	8	27,840	56	4	69,600	140	10
																			27 33			69 24		
8	16	696	2	1 Regiment Native Infantry - - - -	117 16	2 0	1 0	120 16	241	18	8	16	12	24	8	50	82	8	27 33	56	4	69 24	140	10
8	16	696	2	1 „ „ - - - -	117 16	2 0	1 0	120 16	241	18	8	16	12	24	8	50	82	8	27 33	56	4	69 24	140	10

Engineers' Park.

2,500 tools, at 2½ seers each = $156\frac{10}{40}$ mds. = 313 coolies, or 23 elephants.

6 barrels powder, at 300 seers each = 45 mds. = 90 coolies, or 6 elephants.

(B.)

SUPPOSING one regiment, Native Infantry, to advance separately from the column, what carriage would it require?

The troops to carry two days' rations in their haversacks and 60 rounds ammunition in pouch.

Eight days' rations to accompany the regiment, but no reserve ammunition.

ANSWER.

If Cooly Carriage:—

Baggage and stores per Statement A. - -	=241 coolies.
Rations:—	
Officers and troops - - - - -	= 722
Public and private establishments - -	= 82
Coolies for baggage - - - - -	= 241
	1,045
Add, say, 10 cent. for collies to carry rations	104
TOTAL - - -	1,149 rations.
At, say, one seer each × 8 days = 9,192 seers = $229\frac{32}{40}$ mds. - - - -	= 460 coolies.
TOTAL - - -	701 coolies.

If Elephant Carriage;—

Baggage and stores per Statement A. -	= 18 elephants.
Rations:—	
Officers and troops - - - -	= 722
Public and private establishments - -	= 82
Attendants for 18 elephants for baggage -	= 36
	840
Add 3 per cent. for attendants on elephants for carrying rations - - - -	24
TOTAL - - -	864 rations.
At, say, one seer each × 8 days = 6,912 seers = $172\frac{32}{40}$ mds. - - - -	= 28 elephants
TOTAL - - -	46 elephants.

Or, for each column, say, 1,000 coolies,
" " 150 elephants,
with boats for reserve stores, according to requirements.

(Private.)

Demi-official from Colonel *P. S. Lumsden*, Quarter Master General, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, dated 10th May 1871.

WITH reference to yours of yesterday the Commander in Chief thinks the requirements for operations in the Looshai country, should they be determined on, might perhaps be best met by detailing the following corps, all conveniently located, viz., the 42nd, 44th, and 22nd, also the 27th, whose tour of duty at the Presidency would be to relieve the 22nd in next relief during the approaching cold season.

In considering the special nature of the operations, the Chief would add to these the 2nd and 4th Goorkhas from Deyrah and Dalhousie.

The only quarter from whence a native mountain train battery can be procured is the North Western frontier, and one of the Punjab frontier force batteries would have to be detailed.

It is inconvenient having to bring troops from long distances, but when special troops are required for special purposes, there is no help for it, and owing to the reduced strength of the Native army, this must always be looked upon as necessary upon every requirement, and was contemplated in considering some of the reductions with reference to extension of railway communications.

(Confidential.)

From Colonel *H. K. Burne*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Quartermaster General.—No. 636, dated Simla, the 26th July 1871.

I AM desired to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 2857, of the 17th instant, conveying the views of the Commander in Chief in regard to the measures to be adopted against those members of the Looshai tribes who have committed raids on the frontier of Cachar and Chittagong.

2. I am to remark that when the letter referred to in paragraph 2 of your letter was received, the Government of India was not in possession of such information as would have justified the course now about to be adopted. The papers will show that the most valuable portion of the intelligence and the opinions of the Government of Bengal were not laid before His Excellency in Council until a much later period.

3. Had the Government of India then adopted His Excellency's advice, and determined (without procuring all available information) on sanctioning an expedition that could not, owing to the circumstances of the country and climate, be undertaken for a period of nine months, it would have justly exposed itself to the charge of entering upon an important undertaking with unnecessary haste and undue precipitation.

4. Nothing,

4. Nothing, however, has been omitted which was really necessary towards the equipment of a force which cannot commence actual operations before the 1st December next.

5. I am further to add, with reference to the remarks in the same paragraph, that financial considerations will never be allowed to interfere with the undertaking of any military operations that are by His Excellency in Council deemed essential for the protection of the subjects of the Queen or the defence of Her territories.

6. Although the force proposed by the Commander in Chief is somewhat larger than it was desired to employ, or than has been suggested by the Bengal Government or by any of the local officers, the Governor General in Council will not, in deference to the opinion of His Excellency, insist on its reduction, or suggest any change in its composition further than to point out that a complete* mountain battery, with elephant equipment, to which artillerymen could be attached, is now in Fort William.

* Four 7-pounder rifled guns. Four small mortars.

7. But should His Excellency prefer that the Punjab Mountain Battery be attached to the force, I am to inquire whether it is suggested that the battery should bring down its mule equipment, as it appears to the Governor General in Council that such equipment is entirely unsuited for service in the Looshai jungles, and that it would be necessary to adapt the equipment of the battery to elephant or other carriage. The expense of conveying the mules from the North-west frontier and back would be very great, and, in His Excellency in Council's opinion, unnecessary.

8. The Governor General observes with regret that the opinion expressed by the Commander in Chief is adverse to the employment of any portion of the Madras Army in this expedition, the reasons assigned being that they are unsuited to the climate, country, and style of warfare.

9. After the expression of such an opinion by the Commander in Chief, his Excellency in Council would certainly not permit the employment of any portion of the Madras Army on this service; but he is bound to observe that the climate of the south-east frontier resembles very much that of a great part of the Madras Presidency; that there is every reason to hope the style of warfare will not be extremely formidable, and that the character of the country, climate, and people, is very similar to that in which the Madras garrison of British Burmah would be called upon to act, in case of its being obliged to undertake operations in the field for the protection of many parts of the Burmese frontier.

10. If the regiments of the Madras army are considered unfit to take part in this particular expedition, His Excellency in Council is at a loss to know what the service in the field is to which they are supposed to be adapted.

11. As regards transport, the resources of the Commissariat Department will not admit of the force being wholly equipped with elephants; but it is believed that about 160 of these animals can be made available, or 80 for each column, which, with two corps of coolies, one for each column of 600 or 700 men each, as suggested by his Excellency, should, it is thought, suffice.

12. His Excellency in Council agrees with the opinion expressed by the Commander in Chief that the employment of the police should be mainly left to the discretion of the officers commanding the expedition. Seeing, however, that the military force recommended by the Commander in Chief is larger than that suggested by the Government of India or the Government of Bengal, it probably will not be necessary to send any extra police into the districts.

13. At the same time, it is to be hoped that the Commander in Chief will commend the services of this force to the careful consideration of the officers commanding the expedition, seeing that they are the men who will mainly, for the future, be employed in the protection of the frontier and in the repression of disturbance, and that in the late events on the Cachar frontier their conduct did not contrast unfavourably with that of the regular troops; and that it is highly undesirable that any action should be taken which would give members of that force to understand that they were looked upon as a body of men inferior in any degree to the native soldiers of the line.

14. I am to request that His Excellency will favour Government with an expression of his views as to the formation of the bodies of coolies which will be employed, and whether they should be organised and placed under military officers, or the arrangements left in the hands of the Government of Bengal.

15. The supply of waterproof sheets in lieu of tents is approved, and I am to inquire the exact description and size of the sheets most suitable for the purpose and the number required, in order that arrangements may be made for their supply.

16. The Commander in Chief would appear to desire that the commanders of columns should be in charge of the political duties attaching to the expedition, and the senior, if the columns unite, be placed in chief political charge.

17. The extent to which such duties can be entrusted to the military commanders will much depend upon the officers who may be selected for command; but it will be necessary, under any circumstances, to attach political officers to each column, whose duties will have to be carefully defined, but upon these points further instructions will be issued after the question has been fully considered in the Foreign Department.

18. At the same time His Excellency in Council is convinced that no substantial division of authority should take place as between the civil and military authorities. The responsibility of the conduct of the operations must be placed entirely in the hands of the military commanders; but long before the commencement of the expedition, His Excellency the Commander in Chief will be furnished with the orders of the Government as to its precise objects and as to the exact points on which the opinion of the civil officers who are to accompany the expedition will have to be consulted by the officers in command.

19. The question of the employment of allies, and the extent to which friendly Looshai chiefs and their followers should be permitted to accompany the columns, and on what conditions, is a very important point. Though it will be undesirable to permit friendly chiefs to accompany the force in any way which may impede military operations, yet it is of the greatest importance that the co-operation of these men and their followers should be made available, not only for keeping up communications, but also for more active service. As the time for the expedition draws nearer, and further information is obtained, it will be necessary to communicate to His Excellency the Commander in Chief the wishes and orders of the Government in this respect.

20. While the Governor General in Council attaches much importance to the employment of a portion of the troops of the Rajahs of Munnipoor and Tipperah in co-operating with the expedition, he agrees with His Excellency the Commander in Chief that the duties entrusted to them should be of a subordinate kind. The detachments that may be furnished by the Rajahs must of course be placed absolutely under the authority of the officers in command of our columns, and must take up any position and perform any duties required of them, and execute any orders they may receive. If this be fully understood, it is improbable that mistakes or misunderstandings likely to endanger the success of the operations will arise. His Excellency in Council would consider it a matter of regret should circumstances not admit of the employment of these troops, if not in actual conjunction with our own forces, at all events in a part of the country where they can assist in the active operations in hand or in keeping open communications. It is of great importance that the duties which the British Government are entitled by treaty or otherwise to call upon these native States to perform, should be exacted; that their responsibilities for the peace of the frontier should be practically brought home to the chiefs; and that motives should thereby be afforded them to strengthen their borders and to maintain towards the tribes a policy least calculated to provoke aggressions.

21. The Governor General in Council thinks it undesirable that the formation of a road or path from Cachar to Chittagong should form a portion of these operations; such an undertaking might seriously hamper the movement of troops. It is not at all clear that if a road is eventually to be made, that the best direction would be that which was most suitable for the military operations in hand; the opening up of paths and road, therefore, should be confined entirely to such lines of communications as are indispensable for military movements, or for the keeping up of communications with the various bodies of troops in movement and with the rear. In the event, however, of its being determined by the Government hereafter that it is desirable to form and keep open a road from Chittagong to Cachar, advantage will of course be taken of any work of this description that may be done by the troops on this occasion.

22. It is considered that the troops will have ample occupation in this and the necessary movements through the Looshai country in the limited time during which they can remain there, for the Governor General in Council considers the columns should without fail be on their way back before the first week in March.

23. Arrangements will be made to ensure the attendance on the expedition of suitable survey parties.

24. It is hardly necessary to add that, in any correspondence or preparation that may ensue, the utmost secrecy that is compatible with safety must be observed, and His Excellency in Council considers that, as a considerable time will elapse before it is necessary that any movement should take place, there can be no necessity for any premature publication of the intentions of the Government on the subject.

(Confidential.)

From Colonel *H. K. Burne*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, No. 660; dated Simla, 26 July 1871.

To Quarter Master General, No. 294, dated the 13th July 1871.
Reply, No. 2857, dated the 17th July 1871.
To Quarter Master General, No. 636, dated the 26th July 1871.

WITH reference to the communication from the Foreign Department to your address, No. 1454 P., dated 11th July 1871 (confidential), I am directed to transmit, for the information of the Honourable the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, copy of the correspondence marginally noted, regarding the measures it is proposed to adopt towards certain of the Looshai tribes during the ensuing cold season.

2. I am to add that, on the receipt of a reply from the Quarter Master General to my letter, No. 636, of this date, a further communication will be made to His Honor with reference to the organisation of bodies of coolies and other matters connected with the supply of the force.

(No. 661.)

COPY of the above, and of its enclosures, forwarded to the Foreign Department for information, with reference to the communications (confidential) from that Department, No. 1336 P., dated 30th June, and No. 1453 P., dated 11th July 1871, with an intimation that copy of any further communication from the Quarter Master General on this subject in reply to Military Department letter, No. 636 of this date, will be forwarded on receipt.

The undersigned is also to add that it is very desirable that the exact nature and extent of the political control with which the commanders of columns are to be invested should be defined as early as conveniently practicable.

(Confidential.)

From Colonel *P. S. Lumsden*, Quarter Master General, the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 3097; dated Simla, 26th July 1871.

I AM directed by the Right Honourable the Commander in Chief to acknowledge the receipt of Military Department letter, No. 636, of to-day's date, and to at once communicate that 4,000 waterproof sheets, with eyelet holes at intervals all round, each 7 feet × 4 feet, and weighing 4 lbs., will be required for the troops in the contemplated Looshai Expedition.

2. With regard to coolies, his Excellency considers they should be raised under the orders of the Bengal Government by military officers, one for every 200 men, to be selected by the local Government. I am, however, to point out that 160 elephants and 1,200 coolies only meet the requirements of the force without commissariat, and that further carriage will have to be provided for the commissariat requirements.

3. I am further to call attention to the fact that river transport should be arranged for towards the end of October and commencement of November to convey three regiments of Native Infantry, two companies of Sappers, from Sahibgunj or Calcutta, as may be considered most convenient, and for the artillery from the latter port or from Golundah.

4. A further communication on the other points requiring reply in your letter under acknowledgment will be forwarded hereafter.

TELEGRAM, No. 209; dated 27th July 1871.

From Viceroy, Simla, to the Secretary of State for India, London, *viâ* Russia.

FOUR thousand waterproof sheets are urgently required with eyelet holes at intervals all round. Size, 7 feet by 4 feet, weight not exceeding 4 lbs. each.
Please send out immediately by Peninsular and Oriental steamer direct to Calcutta.

(Confidential.)

From Colonel *H. K. Burne*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Commissary General, No. 699; dated Simla, 28th July 1871.

WITH reference to previous correspondence on the subject of the dispatch of elephants to Dacca and Chittagong, I am desired to request that you will issue instructions for the immediate removal to Barrackpore of all elephants that can be spared from stations below Agra and in the Saugor District, and that you will report at once how many will be available, including such as can be withdrawn from keddahs, as also all now at Cachar, Chittagong, Barrackpore, and likewise those that will be sent to the latter place under the orders now given.

From Lieutenant Colonel *J. I. Willes*, Commissary General, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 658; dated Simla, 29th July 1871.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter, No. 699, of 28th instant (confidential), and to state that the number of elephants at Cachar, Shillong, Chittagong, and Barrackpore are given in the statement annexed; and there are besides at Dacca, with the kheddah establishment, 40 koonkies and 42 elephants, new captures of 1870-71 and three of 1869-70, total 45, not fit for service yet.

2. The koonkies, are of course, very fine animals, reserved for hunting purposes. There are also 10 of the same kind lent to the Bengal Government for service in the Cuttack kheddahs under Captain Johnstone.

3. The statement also shows the number of elephants that can be made available at stations below Agra. Those belonging to moveable columns are noted separately, and they cannot be removed from stations withut auth ority being conveyed to officers com-

manding; by His Excellency the Commander in Chief. Those not belonging to moveable columns will be ordered off to Barrackpore at once.

4. If it is considered desirable to replace the elephants that will be detached from Jubbulpoor and Saugor District, pack-bullocks will be engaged as the only description of carriage available. In Rohilcund and Oudh the elephants detached can be replaced after the rains with camels. I shall be obliged by your favouring me with orders as to the number of elephants that may be detached from moveable columns. If one-half, the number that can be sent to Barrackpore will be about 145, about 5 per cent. may be expected to be unfit for work by the time they reach Barrackpore.

5. At Hazareebaugh there are 42, and at Dinapore 15 elephants; but these are mostly young animals and new captures from Cuttack kheddahs, and I do not anticipate more than 20 being available from the two stations.

STATEMENT of Elephants available for transfer to Barrackpore from Stations below Agra, and already at Barrackpore, Dacca, Chittagong, and Shillong:—

Cachar	8	
Chittagong	20	
Barrackpore	58	
Shillong	9	
Dacca	55	
	150	
Deduct 8 per cent. sick	12	
Available, fit for duty	138	
Bhagulpore	2	
Dorunda	4	
Allahabad	24	
Cawnpore	10	
Nowgong	2	
		42
Moveable Column:—		
Jubbulpoor	21	
Saugor	30	
Lucknow	52	
Fyzabad	24	
Bareilly	40	
		167
		209
From Hazareebaugh and Dynapore		20
		229

(Confidential.)

From Colonel *H. K. Burne*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, No. 11; dated Simla, the 1st August 1871.

IN continuation of my letter, No. 660, of the 26th July 1871, I am desired to acquaint you, for the information of the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, that, in addition to the elephant carriage that can be made available, a considerable number of coolies, probably not less than from 1,200 to 1,500, or more, will also be required.

2. The Commander in Chief would desire that these coolies should be collected and organised under the orders of the Government of Bengal, and placed under the charge of military officers to be selected by the Lieutenant Governor for that purpose.

3. I am to request, therefore, that His Honor may be moved to take steps to commence the formation of two bodies of men of, say, 600 each, of the most suitable classes for service with the two columns, respectively. This number can be added to hereafter, if found necessary.

4. I am further to request that His Honor will propose a scale of pay for these men, and also the organisation of the two bodies, the number of officers to be employed, the scale of remuneration to be attached to their posts, and other necessary details, for the information and approval of the Government of India.

5. A further communication will hereafter be made in regard to marine requirements for river transports, &c.

(No. 12.)

COPY of the above forwarded to the Quarter Master General with reference to his letter, No. 3097, of 26th July 1871, for the information of the Commander in Chief, and with a request that His Excellency may be moved to inform Government as soon as conveniently practicable, what the strength, respectively, of the two columns will be.

MINUTE by His Excellency Lord *Napier* of *Magdala*, Commander in Chief in India; dated Simla, the 3rd August 1871.

IN signing the Despatch, No. 240, of 1871, I desire to record my dissent from the interpretation apparently put on the Commander in Chief's reason for not advising the employment of a Madras regiment in the expedition against the Looshais.

The Commander in Chief considers the Madras regiments quite as fit for the service as the ordinary regiments of Bengal infantry of the line, and would be as content to employ the one as the other in the plains; but the mountain chains occupied by the Looshai tribes rise to altitudes of from 5,000 to 6,000 feet, and the climate is reported to be severe in the cold weather.

Because the service will be mountain warfare in a colder climate than that of the plains of India or Burmah, the Commander in Chief agrees with the frontier authorities in advising the employment of Goorkha or Punjab regiments in addition to the Assam regiments, which are, for the most part, similarly composed. In this selection for a special duty no imputation of inferiority can be applied to the Madras Army.

MINUTE by Major General *H. W. Norman*, C.B., dated Simla, the 5th August 1871.

HIS Excellency the Commander in Chief has recorded a Minute on the subject of the non-employment of Madras troops in the projected Looshai Expedition, and this Minute is intended to be an enclosure to the Despatch of the Viceroy in Council, No. 240, of the 3rd instant.

The Foreign Department having suggested the employment of Madras troops as a part of the force, the Commander in Chief objected, in paragraph 14 of the Quartermaster General's letter of the 17th July 1871, No. 2857, for the reasons therein stated.* The paragraph is given in the margin.*

In reply, the Secretary in the Military Department expressed the regret of the Governor General in Council at this objection of the Commander in Chief to employ Madras troops in the paragraphs copied in the margin.†

In the Minute now recorded, his Excellency the Commander in Chief says he considers Madras regiments just as suited for this service as "the ordinary regiments of Bengal infantry of the line," but the height of the hills in the Looshai country makes His Excellency think the climate is severe in cold weather, and, because the service is mountain warfare in a climate colder than the plains of India or Burmah, he agrees with the frontier authorities in advising the employment of Punjab or Goorkha regiments in addition to the Assam regiments which are for the most part similarly composed; and His Excellency adds, that in this selection for a special duty there is no imputation of inferiority on Madras troops.

His Excellency estimates the height of the ranges as higher than that given in the papers I have read, and it seems doubtful whether the troops would ever have to operate at a height greater than 4,000 feet, if so high. In such a latitude I should think no well-clad troops

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* Para. 14. "The third observation in the Political Department conveys the opinion of his Excellency in Council that a Madras regiment should form part of the expedition. The Commander in Chief would be glad, indeed, of an opportunity of employing the Madras troops; and, if the style of warfare were suited to the ordinary regiments of the line, his Excellency would advise rather that one column should be given entirely to the Madras army, instead of employing only one regiment; but the opinion of every authority who has written on the frontier relations, is in favour of employing troops accustomed to, or specially suited to, the country, climate, and style of warfare, and recommend Nepaulese, Seikhs, or Punjabees, the latter, from their severer climate, food, and stamina, being better able to bear the damp climate than the other natives of the plains."

† No. 636, dated 26th July 1871.—Para. 8. "The Governor General observes with regret that the opinion expressed by the Commander in Chief is adverse to the employment of any portion of the Madras army in this expedition, the reasons assigned being that they are unsuited to the climate, country, and style of warfare.

9. "After the expression of such an opinion by the Commander in Chief, His Excellency in Council would certainly not permit the employment of any portion of the Madras army on this service, but he is bound to observe that the climate of the south-east frontier resembles very much that of a great part of the Madras Presidency; that there is every reason to hope the style of warfare will not be extremely formidable, and that the character of the country, climate, and people is very similar to that in which the Madras garrison of British Burmah would be called upon to act in case of its being obliged to undertake operations in the field for the protection of many parts of the Burmese frontier.

10. "If the regimeuts of the Madras army are considered unfit to take part in this particular expedition, His Excellency in Council is at a loss to know what the service in the field is to which they are supposed to be adapted."

troops would suffer from cold, nor do I imagine that it was any apprehension of this kind that led the frontier authorities referred to by His Excellency to advise the employment of Punjab and Goorkha troops.

I cannot speak positively as to Madras troops; but, having passed a winter in Kumaon with ordinary Bengal troops at a height of about 5,600 feet, I can safely say they would have been capable of any service.

But His Excellency appears to class the Madras infantry and the ordinary Bengal regiment of the line as composed of much the same material, and as distinct from some special regiments of Punjab and Goorkha troops; and, as I think this may lead to misapprehension, I will state a few facts.

In Madras the whole of the Native infantry regiments are composed of the same stamp of men. Some regiments, no doubt, are physically inferior to others, but only to a limited extent, and there are no special regiments composed of any particular caste or race, and, with few exceptions, the whole army is composed of men of Southern India.

But there is no such uniformity in Bengal, and I think it a mistake, therefore, to speak of the "ordinary Bengal line regiment," meaning thereby, I presume, old Hindustani regiments, or Hindustani regiments raised in the Mutiny. In the first place, the whole Punjab force of 12 regiments of infantry is composed almost entirely of Goorkhas and Punjabees, while of 49 regiments of Bengal infantry under the Commander in Chief, 24 are Punjab, Goorkha, or Assam regiments, which His Excellency considers suited for this service. Further, in many of the remaining regiments, there is a large infusion of Punjabees or Goorkhas amounting, in 19 corps, to more than 2,800 men. Two of these corps have more than 300 of these men, and a considerable number of the rest have each one, two, or three companies of the classes.

In fact, in the infantry regiments under His Excellency, there are about 15,400 Hindustanis and 18,600 Punjabees and Goorkhas; a fact which, I think, should be borne in mind when the Madras troops are classed with the ordinary Bengal regiment.

It is unfortunate, I think, that every opportunity should be lost of employing Madras troops.

(Military, No. 273.)

To His Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor General of India in Council.

My Lord, India Office, London, 26 October 1871.

Para. 1. I HAVE considered in Council your letters, Nos. 240 and 251, of the 3rd and 17th August respectively, upon the subject of the disturbances on the north-east frontier, and the measures you have adopted in consequence.

2. I learn from the enclosures which accompany your letter, that it is the opinion of those best qualified to form a judgment on the question, which opinion is concurred in by His Excellency the Commander in Chief, that the raids committed on the frontiers of Cachar and Chittagong by the Looshai tribes will not finally be put an end to until a military expedition has penetrated to the hills occupied by the marauding tribes.

3. Your Government has, therefore, determined to dispatch an armed force in the next cold season into the country inhabited by the tribes in question.

4. With reference to this decision, I have observed with satisfaction the desire of your Excellency in Council that as great leniency as is compatible with the objects to be attained should be shown to all but known offenders.

5. His Excellency the Commander in Chief proposed that the force to be employed should consist of two columns composed of regiments of the Bengal Army "entirely suited to the nature of the country, and the kind of warfare which may be involved," one column to start from Cachar, the other from Chittagong, to meet at some point to be determined upon; and that, in furtherance of the opinion of all the civil authorities and other officers connected with the frontier, that a communication should be opened between Cachar and Chittagong, the force should in progress "open a track which shall be sufficiently cleared and made practicable for the passage of troops, so that the wild tribes who have habitually made incursion into our territories may be made sensible that neither our ignorance of the country nor the inaccessibility of their positions will in future protect them from the just anger of the British Government."

6. I further learn that a difference of opinion existed between your Government and His Excellency the Commander in Chief as to the strength of the force to be employed, and also that of its composition, in regard to the latter, your Government

Government being desirous that a Madras regiment should form part of the force, yet, in deference to His Excellency's opinion, you did not insist upon its reduction, or suggest any material change in its composition.

7. With reference, however, to the proposal of His Excellency that the construction of a road from Cachar to Chittagong should form a portion of the operations, you expressed an opinion that such an undertaking was undesirable, as it might hamper the movement of the troops; moreover, that if a road is eventually to be made, it is not clear that the best direction would be that which was most suitable for the military operations in hand, and that the opening up of paths and roads should, therefore, be confined entirely to such lines of communication as are indispensable for military movements, or for keeping up communications with the various bodies of troops in movement and with the rear.

8. You at the same time observed that the troops will have ample occupation in this and the necessary movements through the Looshai country in the limited time they can remain there, as you considered the columns should, without fail, be on their way back before the first week in March.

9. Your Government further expressed your opinion as to the great importance of calling upon the Rajahs of Munnipore and Tipperah, for the performance of those duties to which Her Majesty's Government are entitled by treaty or otherwise, for the preservation of the peace on their respective frontiers, and you also directed the attention of His Excellency to the employment of the police force where practicable.

10. I do not doubt that His Excellency will endeavour to carry out your views on both the above points by availing himself of the opportunity of employing a portion of the troops of those states in the way he may deem best calculated to effect the objects in view, and by commending the services of the police to the careful consideration of the officers commanding the expedition.

11. With respect to the desire of His Excellency the Commander in Chief, that the commanders of the columns should be in charge of the political duties attaching to the expedition, and the senior, if the columns unite, be placed in chief political charge, you observed that the extent to which such duties can be entrusted to the military commanders will much depend upon the officers who may be selected for command.

12. As you consider it necessary, under any circumstances, to attach political officers to each column, I trust that their duties will be so carefully defined before the commencement of the expedition, as to preclude the possibility of any substantial division of authority taking place between them and the military authorities, with whom the responsibility of the conduct of the operations must entirely rest.

13. I trust that, under the arrangements which you have made, the expedition will fulfil all the purposes for which it has been projected.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Argyll.*

(No. 261 of 1871—Military Department.)

(Separate.)

To His Grace the Duke of *Argyll*, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

My Lord Duke, Simla, 24 August 1871.

ADVERTING to paragraph 3 of our Despatch, No. 97, dated 22nd March 1871, we have now the honour to forward the accompanying statement of Mr. W. Shaw, one of the defenders of the stockade at Moneirkhall, bearing testimony to the good conduct of the detachment of the 4th Native Infantry, which held that post when attacked by the Looshais during the late raids on the eastern frontier.

The papers referred to in this previous Military Despatch are given as Enclosures to India Foreign Letter, dated 23rd May (No. 87) 1871.

We are, &c.
(signed) *Mayo,*
Napier of Magdala,
&c. &c.

MEMORANDUM from Colonel *M. Dillon*, C.B., Military Secretary; to the Adjutant General, Head Quarters, No. 7086; dated Head Quarters, Simla, 5th August 1871.

THE Commander in Chief requests the Adjutant General to be so good as to forward, for the consideration of His Excellency the Viceroy in Council, the accompanying statement of Mr. W. Shaw, one of the defenders of the stockade at Monierkhall, bearing testimony to the good conduct of the detachment of the 4th Native Infantry, which held that post when attacked by the Looshais during the late raids on the eastern frontier.

Lord Napier of Magdala considers it due to the 4th Native Infantry that Mr. Shaw's statement should be submitted to Government.

EXTRACT from a NOTE from *William Shaw*, Esq., Cachar.

ON the morning of the 27th January 1871, at 6 a.m., the Looshais made their appearance. At the time of attack, two Europeans (Messrs. Pearce and Eglinton) and myself were taking a walk, I being some distance behind, and near the bungalow. On perceiving them, I shouted to Pearce and Eglinton (I was not the first man to see them; but the alarm seemed to be given simultaneously by a few natives and myself); they soon came up, and we all three started for the stockade, Mr. Pearce being the last, as he had to get his cartridges, &c., from the bungalow. After entering the stockade, we experienced some rather heavy firing from all sides of the stockade, which we returned, taking as good aim as possible, so as not to waste powder and shot.

From 6 a.m. to 12 p.m., they never entirely ceased firing. The Looshais seemed at first to think that they would be able to overpower the stockade, and made some determined fighting, in which they lost several men; but finding our fire rather too heavy for them, they thought it better to confine their firing to better ranges, and to take advantage of what cover they could get, such as stumps of trees, &c.

Mr. Pearce had a breech-loading rifle, with plenty of ammunition, which seemed to do some service. I had a regulation Enfield, which I found very good for the long shots. Mr. Eglinton had a revolving rifle; but unfortunately only ammunition enough for four chambers.

Pearce was the first who made a sortie, with about 10 to 12 of the guard, to the bungalow, from which place they drove out several Looshais, killing two as they fled. This, however, being perceived, they (the Looshais) came down in such great force that our men had to give ground, and again take to the stockade. At about two o'clock I made three successive sorties; the first to the bungalow for some stores, &c.; the second to rout out about 30 Looshais, who were pillaging about the lines; the third to get water, as there was none in the stockade. I am happy to say that all of these were successful, owing chiefly to the fine manner in which the sepoy havildar managed his men. The guard behaved capitally throughout, and in not one of the sorties did the sepoys hesitate to accompany me. There being no provisions in the stockade, or surplus ammunition, Mr. Eglinton volunteered to go down and take the news of our position to the station. He, however, subsequently changed his mind, and preferred to remain in the stockade. Mr. Pearce offered 20 rupees to 30 rupees to anyone who would go down and report the state of affairs in the station. No one being willing to go, Mr. Pearce and myself, at the request of sepoys, volunteered to do so. We started from the stockade between 12 and 1 at night, and reached Sildoobie at about 7 o'clock of the 28th; from there Mr. Pearce sent a mounted man to the station with a letter, giving an account of all that had happened, at the same time informing them of the want of provisions and ammunition in the stockade at Moneirkhall.

(No. 132 of 1871.)

Government of India—Foreign Department—Political.

To His Grace the Duke of *Argyll*, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

My Lord Duke, Simla, 24 August 1871.

IN continuation of our Despatch, dated the 23rd of May 1871, No. 87, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of the further documents specified in the accompanying abstract of contents, relative to the late raids by Looshais.

We have, &c.

(signed) *Mayo*,
Napier of Magdala,
&c. &c.

(No. 2218.)

From *S. C. Bayley*, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal in the Judicial Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

Sir, Fort William, 12 May 1871.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 710 P, of the 5th April 1871, and, in compliance with the request contained in paragraphs 2 and 3, to submit herewith, for the information of his Excellency the Governor General in Council, copies of the letters marginally indicated, from the Commissioner of the Dacca division, enclosing the explanations of Mr. McWilliam, the officiating Deputy Commissioner of Cachar, and the magistrate of Sylhet, in reference to the action taken by them on receipt of the warnings given by Mr. Edgar of the likelihood of raids by the Howlong tribe on Cachar and Sylhet.

No. 129, dated 27th April 187.
No. 135, dated 1st May 1871.

2. I am to add that, although Mr. McWilliam has curtly answered the single question put to him, as to whether he communicated by telegram the warning he received from Mr. Edgar on the 15th January 1871, and has shown that he did communicate it to the Commissioner, yet the Lieutenant Governor desires me to add that he has learnt from Mr. Edgar, who is now at the Presidency, that he himself did not believe (as he has officially reported) the story of coming Looshai raids, and *was* more apprehensive of raids by the Nagas in the north, and that it was quite in accordance with his wishes and instructions that Mr. McWilliam went on in the latter direction.

From *F. B. Simson*, Esq., Commissioner of the Dacca Division, to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department, No. 129; dated Dacca, the 27th April 1871.

Sir,

WITH reference to No. 1622 of 11th instant, I have the honour to submit herewith, for the information of his Honor the Lieutenant Governor, copy of a letter, No. 273 of the 18th idem, from the magistrate of Sylhet, recommending Messrs. Peterson and Patch for some public recognition of their services for their good conduct in the recent Looshai raid, and to observe that proper energy and alacrity was shown, but it was the simple performance of duty. I do not see, therefore, that any public recognition of services is required; but I am very willing to notify that Mr. Patch, district superintendent of police, is one of the best, most able, active, and energetic police officers I have ever had under me, and that in the supervision of ordinary crime, and in alacrity and good judgment connected with, the defence of the frontier, I find his administration highly satisfactory.

From *H. C. Sutherland*, Esq., Magistrate of Sylhet, to the Commissioner of the Dacca Division, No. 273; dated Sylhet, the 18th April 1871.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of a letter from the Government of India in the Foreign Department, No. 710P., dated the 5th April, forwarded with your office memorandum, No. 108, dated 13th April for report as to the action or precautionary measures taken by me on receipt of the warning by telegram of a raid in this district.

2. I was out on my cold weather tour, and was on my way from the south-western extremity of the district when I received an information from the joint magistrate, who was in charge of my office, of the threatened raids.

3. The joint magistrate received the telegram referred to on the 16th January. He sent in the telegram to me in camp, directed the district superintendent to proceed at once to the frontier. A copy of the telegram was also sent to you, reporting the action taken by him on the 17th January. A telegram was received from the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar, communicating the information received from the Commissioner of Chittagong. The joint-magistrate immediately telegraphed to Shillong for troops as soon as the telegrams from Chittagong confirmed Mr. Edgar's warning, in so far as it showed that the rumours of a raid in this district and Cachar were pretty general through the hill tracts.

4. Immediately, on the receipt of the information late at night on the 17th January, I dispatched a robocary to the Tipperah Rajah's agent at Koilashur, opposite to Khanbeghat, through an intelligent and active inspector of police, who happened to be not far from my camp, and who lost no time in delivering the robocary to the Rajah's agent. This was the first intimation that the Tipperah rajah's officer at Koilashur received of the threatened raids. They were put on the alert, and communicated what I have told them to the rajah at Agortollah.

5. The inspector who took my robocary to the Tipperah Rajah's agent at Koilashur had also my instruction to put the Adampore police on their guard, who again passed the word on to the guard at Allynuggur.

6. The district superintendent, with his usual energy, started, as soon as he could, for the frontier, having first proceeded to reinforce all the outposts on the frontier with every spare policeman he could lay hands on. His presence at Adampore was most invaluable,

as he succeeded in re-assuring our Kookies who had fled in dismay after the raid in Hill Tipperah at a little distance from Kamalpore, and therefore not far from our outpost at Adampore.

7. Having inspired the people with confidence at Adampore and then at Allinuggur, he went on to Lungai and Chargolah, when again his judgment and presence of mind were most useful after the raid, not far from our outpost at Chargolah, on the 24th January.

8. I hastened to the frontier, and at first intended to go to Chargolah after having visited Adampore. I met the district superintendent at Hingajeeah thannah, where his report of the state of affairs at Allynuggur and Adampore was so satisfactory that I decided on adhering to my original plan of going to Chargolah. On my way back I received information, which led me to believe that an attack at Adampore was not improbable. As the district superintendent had already gone on to Chargolah, I thought it would be better for me to look after Allynuggur and Adampore, leaving the district superintendent to look after Chargolah and Lungai. This division of labour was attended with the best results. All our frontier outposts were on the alert. The raiders who had their spies knew this very well. With a judicious distribution of police, and afterwards of troops, the district superintendent and myself succeeded in keeping the district free from all attacks till the raid of the 27th February near Allynuggur.

9. I cannot speak too highly of the energy and promptitude displayed by the joint magistrate and the district superintendent. The district superintendent's rapidity of movement was sometimes marvellous; for one occasion he passed two whole nights on his saddle when he went to look after the troops and to escort them to Chargolah. I shall be glad to see some public recognition of their services; for I feel that, whilst I accept for myself the responsibility of all the arrangements made and orders issued for preserving the district from attacks of the Kookies, I owe at the same time a very great deal to the hearty and untiring co-operation of the joint magistrate, Mr. Peterson, and the district superintendent of police, Mr. Patch, for the succes which has attended our efforts.

From *F. B. Simson*, Esq., Commissioner of the Dacca Division, to the Officiating Secretary to the Government of *Bengal*, Judicial Department; No. 135, dated Dacca, the 1st May 1871.

Sir,

With reference to No. 1622 of 11th ultimo, I have the honour to submit herewith copies of Mr. McWilliam's No. 407 of 22nd idem, and of telegram.

2. The explanation from the magistrate of Sylhet was forwarded with my letter, No. 129, of 27th ultimo.

3. Mr. McWilliam explained in the opening paragraph of his general report, that he had received this telegram, and also a warning from Mr. Edgar; but though Mr. McWilliam does not repeat the fact here, as he well might have done, I know, and he himself then stated, that he considered Mr. Edgar's presence in Sookpilal's country on a friendly expedition a sufficient guarantee for the peace of the frontier of Cachar, and he accordingly went into the northern hills with Mr. Daly. As it has since turned out it would have been better had he stayed, and if he had given warning quietly and judiciously to the frontier planters; but it is to be recollected that rumours of this sort are common every year, and that if it is once hinted abroad among the frontier gardens that the authorities expect an attack from the Looshais, every coolie at once absconds.

4. The outlying posts were fairly strengthened, and in some places the coolies were removed, as at Monierkhall, where the manager and the guard alone were left, and where the real fighting took place.

5. Alexandrapore and Dermiekhall were the two gardens which were undefended by special guards, and the first of these is not exactly an outer garden. The Looshais passed northward along the Chutterchoora range, and then went at right angles eastward to this garden; they also attacked the more outlying places at Julnacherra and Cattlycherra but here they were unsuccessful.

6. Dermiekhall is a garden lying immediately behind Monierkhall, and it is believed that this garden was stumbled on by accident by the force of Looshais originally sent against Nowarbund, and who lost their way. I am not altogether certain that this last supposition was correct, because two places were attacked about the same time, evidently in accordance with concerted arrangements on the west, and it is not unlikely that the two places, Monierkhall and Demierkhall on the Sonai river, were both marked out for simultaneous attack on the east.

7. The Sylhet frontier is very different from that of Cachar. In the latter the outer line of habitations held by our subjects is the tea-garden line, and beyond it no friendly tribes or villages scarcely are to be found. On the Sylhet frontier there are hardly any planters, and these are on the Cachar border, and as you proceed westward the boundary line of Sylhet only separates our native subjects from tracts not thinly inhabited by the subjects of the Rajah of Tipperah.

From *O. G. R. McWilliam*, Esq., Deputy Commissioner, Cachar, to the Commissioner of the Dacca Division, No. 407; dated Cachar, the 22nd April 1871.

Sir,

WITH reference to your office memorandum, No. 107, dated 13th April 1871, I have the honour to state that I telegraphed the substance of Mr. Edgar's warning to your office on the 16th January. On the 15th, when I received the letter from Mr. Edgar, I was at Budderpore. I also reported by letter, No. 35, of 17th January.

2. I have the honour to enclose a copy of telegram from the Commissioner of Chittagong.

TELEGRAM from the Commissioner of Chittagong, to the Deputy Officiating Assistant Commissioner, Cachar; dated 14th January 1871.

Rutton Pouea reports large body Howlong Kookies under two chiefs moving north-west to raid. Warn Munipore.

From *F. B. Simson*, Esq., Commissioner of Dacca, to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, No. 143; dated Dacca, the 5th May 1871.

WITH reference to Nos. 897 and 1126, of 1st and 14th March, respectively, I have the honour to submit herewith copy of a letter, No. 428 of 27th ultimo, from the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar, and to state that I have directed the Deputy Commissioner to restore the property, which belonged to Mr. Sellar, to that gentleman. This property is clearly part of the plunder obtained in the raid against Alexandrapore, and it was found in the possession of Saboonga's men, who said they had received it from Sookpilal. The question is, was it obtained by Saboonga's people in the raid of which we were warned, and which all evidence, except that set forth by Mr. Sutherland, collector of the next district, shows to have been committed by Saboonga; or are the statements of the persons in receipt of stolen property to be believed, viz., that the property was given them by Sookpilal, who is their enemy, and on whom the blame of every misdeed is laid?

2. I think the former supposition is true, and the last the only subterfuge by which the holders of the property could account for innocent possession of it.

From *O. G. R. McWilliam*, Esq., Officiating Deputy Commissioner of Cachar, to the Commissioner of Circuit, Dacca Division, No. 428; dated Cachar, the 27th April 1871.

WITH reference to your No. 47, of 13th March 1871, I have the honour to inform you that the spoons and forks and knife-rest have been identified by Mr. Sellar, of Alexandrapore, as his property.

2. The piece of silver and bracelets seem hardly capable of identification.

3. I solicit instruction as to the disposal of the articles.

From *H. L. Harrison*, Esq., Junior Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department, to the Commissioner of Dacca, No. 2264; dated Fort William, the 15th May 1871.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 143, dated the 5th instant, reporting the identification by Mr. Sellar of a portion of the property plundered by the Looshais, in the raid against the Alexandrapore tea garden.

2. In reply, I am to say that the property claimed by Mr. Sellar has been rightly given up to him, and I am to add that the rest must be treated as unclaimed property.

From *H. L. Harrison*, Esq., Junior Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department, to the Officiating Commissioner of the Chittagong Division, No. 2412; dated Fort William, the 25th May 1871.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 94, of the 11th instant, intimating your determination to locate the detachment of the 22nd Native Infantry in Chittagong for the rainy season, and soliciting sanction to the arrangement made by you for hutting the troops.

2. In reply, I am to refer you to the order, No. 2152, of the 9th instant, approving of your action in respect to hutting the men; but I am to say that you had better not get the men down till the rain falls, when, the Lieutenant Governor believes, that Chittagong becomes less feverish. If the men should suffer much, they can be sent up at any time to Calcutta by steamer; and you should telegraph if ever any great amount of sickness shows itself.

No. 1137 P., dated Simla, the 6th June 1871.

Endorsed by the Foreign Department.

COPY forwarded to the Military Department for information.

From Lieutenant Colonel *A. B. Johnson*, Officiating Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Adjutant General, No. 474; dated Simla, the 30th May 1871.

* No. 961 P., dated 20th May 1871. To be returned.

IN transmitting the accompanying correspondence* from the Foreign Department, regarding a raid by Looshais near Allynuggur, in the District of Sylhet, on the 17th February last, I am directed to request that the Commander in Chief may be moved to call upon Captain Robertson, who was then in command of a detachment of the 44th Native Infantry in the Allynuggur post, for such explanation as he may desire to offer, and to submit the same with an expression of His Excellency's opinion thereon.

(No. 3072.)

From *S. C. Bayley*, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal in the Judicial Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

Sir, Fort William, 30 June 1871.

I AM directed to submit herewith an extract (paragraph 2) from a letter dated the 18th instant, No. 4816, from the inspector general of police, regarding the anomalous position of the police frontier guards in Sylhet, now under the orders of the military authorities, and the confusion likely to arise therefrom, together with a copy of a letter, No. 101, dated the 13th idem, from the Commissioner of Dacca, with enclosures from the magistrate of Sylhet, reporting on the condition and present strength, &c. of the whole of the frontier guards.

2. The Lieutenant Governor desires me to say that there seems to be a difficulty about the arrangements for guarding the frontier, as the Inspector general of police complains of divided responsibility, and the Commissioner, that he has no information whatever of the movement of troops. His Honor thought that he had arranged with His Excellency the Commander in Chief that the military should undertake the duty of guarding the frontier, the police assisting as mere auxiliaries, being posted according to the instructions of the military authorities. It is believed that this arrangement answered quite sufficiently, as long as many posts were held by military detachments, and the superior military officers were on the frontier. Now, however, that the superior officers have withdrawn from the frontier, and some of the military detachments have gone into summer quarters, the state of things is altered, and the auxiliaries have become, in some cases, the principals, and there is no local directing head of the whole. It is certain that no information whatever, regarding the movements of the troops, is given either to the Commissioner or to this Government; and had this difficulty been foreseen, the Lieutenant Governor might have kept himself informed, through the district officers, of what is going on, or specially requested the Brigadier General to give him information. Reports have now been called for from the local civil officers; but His Honor thinks it well at once to refer the whole question, whether the defence of the frontier is to be undertaken by the Civil or Military Department, in the hope that the Government of India, in communication with his Excellency the Commander in Chief, will settle a definite plan.

3. Subordinate to the general question is that raised by the Commissioner regarding the conduct of the European officers of the 44th Regiment, Native Infantry, stationed at Sylhet. Captain Robertson is the officer whose conduct in the Allynuggur raid, in sending a native officer, instead of going himself to drive off the raiders, was animadverted on. It now appears that on a recent fresh alarm the district superintendent of police was sent off to the frontier in hot haste, and the magistrate requested that one of the two European officers (Captains Udney and Robertson), whose detachments were on the frontier, should

go

go too, but neither went. It is true that the alarm has turned out, it is hoped, false, but the officers mentioned could hardly then have sufficient information to justify their neglecting the call which the magistrate made on them.

4. With reference to the observations at the concluding part of the Commissioner's letter, His Honor thinks it necessary to be quite explicit with the Government of India; and I am to say that Mr. Simson, who has seen much of all that has occurred of late years on the frontier, holds a strong opinion that, though the men composing the 44th Regiment are admirably fitted for frontier work, the officers have been spoilt by too long residence at Shillong; and he apprehends that they have come to think that their natural occupation is to play cricket there, and that they feel all the time spent on the plains and in the jungles, beyond two or three cold weather months, to be a sort of grievance. In fact, his view is, that though they may be zealous enough when the higher military authorities are on the spot, and military glory is to be obtained, they are excessively backward in regard to the inglorious and unhealthy frontier work, which is so much required of frontier troops. It is difficult to substantiate charges of so indefinite a character, and the Government of India will best judge whether the matter may form the subject of any sort of communication with the military authorities; but, doubtless, when a suspicion of this kind is followed by overt omissions, such as are alleged in regard to Captains Udney and Robertson, it will be thought right that so much should be inquired into.

EXTRACT from a LETTER from Colonel *J. R. Pughe,* Inspector General of Police, Lower Provinces, to the Officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department, No. 4816; dated Fort William, the 15th June 1871.

2. THE police on this frontier have been placed under the orders of the military authorities by your letter, No. 1236, dated the 21st March 1871, so that I can give them no instructions; but it appears to me most essential that the guards at these frontier posts should either consist of military or police, and that there should be no divided responsibility. Again, if the police are employed, distinct instructions should be given them how they are to act in such an emergency as the one under review. With a European officer with them, of course there would be no difficulty in the matter; but when a detachment, composed partly of police and party of military, with no special responsible head, is sent out hurriedly on such an expedition, it is most probable that confusion would arise.

From *F. B. Simson,* Esq., Commissioner of the Dacca Division, to the Officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Political Department, No. 101; dated Dacca, the 13th June 1871.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith copy of a letter, No. 408, and its enclosure, of the 10th June, giving an immediate and proper report of the condition of the Sylhet frontier guards. I was under the impression (for I receive no reports from the military) that the whole of the 44th Native Infantry were at Shillong.

2. I regret much to see that the officers of the 44th Native Infantry remain so far behind, and allow their detachments to remain at the most important posts unsupervised by European agency. I observed the same thing before of this regiment in 1869, and when left to themselves; as far as I could see a very different action was insisted on when His Excellency the Commander in Chief, or Generals Nuthall or Bourchier were actually at Sylhet or Cachar.

From *H. C. Sutherland,* Esq., Magistrate of Sylhet, to the Commissioner of the Dacca Division, No. 408; dated Sylhet, the 10th June 1871.

Sir,

IN reply to your telegram of 8th instant, received last night, I have the honour to inform you that the strength of the police at Lungai and Adampore consists of 40 constables and three head constables at each outpost. There is also a sub-inspector at Adampore. The outposts at Chargola and Allynugger are guarded by a detachment of troops of the 44th Native Infantry. There are 88 men of all ranks in command of a subadar and a jemadar at each of these outposts. The outposts are all well protected, and there is no reason to be under any apprehension in the event of an attack. Mr. McWilliam's suggestion of patrolling from Chargola is a very good one, and will be acted upon at once.

2. I forward, for your information, a copy of my letter to Captain Udney, in command of the 44th here. I am sorry to say that neither he nor Captain Robertson went with the district superintendent.

From *H. C. Sutherland*, Esq., Magistrate of Sylhet, to Captain Udney, commanding 44th Native Infantry, No. 394; dated Sylhet, the 7th June 1871.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your information, a translation of a police report received this day from Chargola outpost, and to request that you will keep the troops under your command at Chargola prepared for any attack that may be made in British territory. The district superintendent starts at once for Chargola, and it will be extremely desirable for you or for Captain Robertson to accompany him.

From *H. Hankey*, Esq., Officiating Commissioner of the Chittagong Division, to the Secretary the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department, No. 122; dated Chittagong, the 25th May 1871.

WITH reference to your letter, No. 2163, dated the 9th instant, calling for a report on the conduct of Rutton Pooea since the police guard was detached for the protection of his village, I have the honour to report that the Looshai chief has behaved in a friendly manner towards the guard located in his village, and has spared no pains to satisfy the local authorities by negotiating the ransom of the daughter of Mr. Winchester, as appears from a letter from the assistant superintendent of police, a copy of which is herein enclosed. Captain Lewin's views as recorded in his annual report on the administration of the Hill Tracts, which will shortly be submitted, seem to coincide with those of Mr. Crouch as regards the friendly behaviour of Rutton Pooea.

From *C. P. Crouch*, Esq., Assistant Superintendent, Chittagong Hill Tracts, to the Commissioner of the Chittagong Division, No. 226; dated Rangamuttee, the 17th May 1871.

WITH reference to your memorandum, No. 100, dated the 13th instant, giving cover to Bengal Government letter, No. 2163, dated the 9th idem, I have the honour to state, in the absence of the Deputy Commissioner from head quarters, that Rutton Pooea, as will be seen from the letters marginally noted, was deputed to procure the release of Mary Winchester from the Howlongs. He used all his energies to do so, and subsequently procured consent of the Howlong chief to release the European captive on receipt of 400 rupees. This amount was forwarded to the sub-inspector, now at Rutton Pooea's village, on the 7th instant, and no doubt by this time Rutton Pooea is on his way to the Howlong tribe to procure the release of the captive. Upon hearing further a report will be at once made to you.

No. 181, dated 20th April, and subsequent correspondence.

2. In conclusion, I beg to state that Rutton Pooea has been supplying the guard with such articles of food (as rice, vegetables, &c. &c.) as are procurable in his village.

(No. 2693.)

From *S. C. Bayley*, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal in the Political Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

Sir, Fort William, 10 June 1871.

I AM directed by the Lieutenant Governor to report, for the information of the Government of India, that a numerous deputation, headed by Mr. Bullen Smith, on behalf of the tea planters in Cachar and Sylhet, waited upon the Lieutenant Governor at Belvedere on Tuesday, the 30th ultimo.

2. The following paragraphs give the gist of the remarks made by Mr. Bullen Smith, and of the reply of the Lieutenant Governor.

For the deputation it was urged, that the planters were aware that in pursuing the cultivation of tea they were primarily engaged in work which had for its object the increase of their own personal wealth, but at the same time it must be felt that while endeavouring to secure their own private advantage, they were also doing a good work for British India, by rendering productive, land hitherto waste, by creating a valuable industry, and by opening up a wide field for labour for our Indian fellow-subjects. While thus furthering the interests of the empire, the tea planters were entitled to the protection of Government; for unless a feeling of security from foreign attack could be ensured to them, the planters on the frontier gardens could not hope to retain their labour force, on the entertainment and well-being of which the success of their enterprise mainly hangs. The coolies, moreover, are induced to migrate to the tea gardens under the express sanction of Government, and are prohibited from running off. It therefore seems peculiarly the province of Government to protect the lives and property of such of its subjects from destruction and plunder. An attack on a

tea

tea garden, even if repulsed without loss to the people of the garden, has an almost equal effect in unsettling the minds of the coolies of the gardens and making them unhappy, for they will necessarily entertain the fear of the possibility of future attacks which might present results of a disastrous character. The scheme of defence lately sketched out by the Government of India while excellent as far as it goes, especially in its provision for roads to connect the various police posts, does not go far enough, and fails altogether to afford the confidence which is absolutely necessary to enable the planters to retain their own coolies, or induce the time-expired men from other gardens to come to them.

He could assure the Government that the raids which had recently taken place on the frontier were considerd by those who had great local experience and intimate acquaintance with the action and temper of these tribes, to be entirely attributable to the results of the attack which was made in 1869, when the booty which the Looshais then obtained, was allowed to be taken off with impunity. It is felt by all who have a close interest in tea, that the best security for the future rests absolutely in punishment for the past; and to the truth of this the history of the past points most clearly. The expedition of 1849, small as it was, had most certainly been followed by a cessation of all raids for a period of nearly 20 years, and he ventured to maintain that this cessation was the direct effect of that expedition, and lest it should be urged that an expedition into the Looshai country is an undertaking of serious gravity, as might be deduced from the fact that the expedition undertaken in 1869 was a failure, he would, without hesitation, assert that it was the general opinion that the ill success was due to the lateness of the season at which operations commenced. He thought that it by no means followed that because an expedition which commenced in February had failed, similar results would occur if our forces were put in motion in November or December. There is one other ground, moreover, why an expedition now should be attended by greater success, and that is, the greatly increased knowledge we possess of the Looshai country. He therefore believed that if a punitive force were dispatched as soon after the rains as it became possible to effect a passage through the jungles, there was little doubt but that it would be perfectly successful.

Mr. Bullen Smith, in continuation, said that the gentlemen composing the deputation fully concurred in the terms of the late memorial which had been presented to the Government of India by the planters and other residents in Cachar and Sylhet. That memorial likewise urged that an efficient expedition should be organised, so that it might be dispatched to the scene of operations early next season; and it was the object and wish of the deputation, in asking his Honor to accord them this meeting, to solicit most earnestly his support of the views put forward in that memorial.

3. In reply, the Lieutenant Governor assured the meeting of the entire sympathy of the Government of Bengal with the views which the deputation put forward as regards the importance to the tea interest of guarding against frontier raids in future. He admitted that it was of the utmost advantage to the Government and to the British rule that the condition of being a great military power encamped in the country, should be modified and supplemented by real settlement and colonisation on what had become in a special manner British soil, and said that though the position of Government in dealing with questions which involve the relation of planters settled on its frontier to the old tribes possessing indefinite and uncertain rights in the soil, is often extremely complicated, in the case of the tea planters on the south frontier of Cachar and the Looshais, no such complications have arisen, for a wide and almost impervious belt of jungle separates the most southern grants from the lands of the Looshais. Consequently, the raids that have been made have been acts of aggression induced by a desire of plunder, and when taken into consideration the course of policy which it should pursue, Government was thus relieved of one very great difficulty in determining its action. There could be no doubt as to the reality of the evils under which the tea interest labours in consequence of these raids, whether considered in the light of the actual destruction to property, or of the ulterior damage that must ensue from panics among the coolies arising from the feeling of insecurity. Therefore, as far as the desirability of prevention was concerned, the Lieutenant Governor might safely say that the gentlemen forming the deputation and himself, both individually and as head of the Government of Bengal, were in thorough accord; and he thought he might say that the Government of India also fully recognised this. But when the question arose, of the mode of procedure to be adopted to secure this, the question was much more difficult. Were this a case in which some small power was affected as the Government of India is, the matter would perhaps be more easy to settle. The Government of India, the Lieutenant Governor might say, was fully alive to the importance of the matter; but there were many considerations which rendered it most important that all measures which should be taken by this great Government should be deliberately and carefully weighed before being carried into execution. If we could suppose the District of Cachar to be ruled by an energetic raja, such as Mr. Edgar, who had no other considerations before him but the protection of his own territory, doubtless a small army might be collected, and by diplomacy or war the Looshais might be brought to terms. If, in the fortunes of war, fate should be adverse to this raja, and he should be taken and pickled by the Looshais, there would doubtless be a successor who would arise and carry on the war, until in turn the Looshais would be beaten off. But the Government of this great portion of the British empire could not be prepared to take up the cudgels with every raiding border tribe without strong proof of the advisability of the course. Prestige, a thing laughed at by very eminent personages, must still be a strong element, which cannot be disregarded in the determination

of the action of a large and mighty power like that of this great empire, upon which the eyes of Asia, and we might almost say, the world, are turned; for every momentary check, or even the slightest reverse, would be commented upon and magnified into disastrous defeat. A great government cannot, therefore, undertake petty expeditions in the way in which small powers might attempt them, and if it moves, it must do so on such a scale as will ensure its most complete superiority in every point. This leads us to the consideration of the vast outlay which would be necessary; and the deputation were aware that some expeditions which had lately been conducted by the British nation, though brilliantly successful in every way, had been most costly, and involved a large addition to the income tax. The Government of India would naturally determine with the greatest caution upon a policy which might involve a very large outlay, at a time when financial pressure was being felt throughout the land. Moreover, the Government felt that in going beyond its frontier, it is unable to forsee clearly the length to which it may be led. The relations with one tribe may conduce to a collision with other and unknown tribes, and thus, little by little, we might be led on to the confines of China.

4. Mr. Bullen Smith made allusion to the expedition of 1849, which was successful to a certain degree; but it was known to the deputation that since this there was an expedition, or rather three expeditions, in 1869, and it is also known to the deputation that the effect of these expeditions was not to prevent outrages, and of this the presence of the deputation to-day is a proof. He (the Lieutenant Governor) had not seen the planters' memorial, to which Mr. Bullen Smith referred, beyond what he read in the newspapers, nor had he it by him to refer to, but he remembered being struck by the very moderate and excellent tone of the memorial, and, as far as his Honor could remember, he subscribed to nearly everything in it; but of that he could not speak for certain. However, he had lately had the advantage of consulting, freely, and personally, with very many of the officers who were intimately acquainted with the subject and with those parts of the country, with Mr. Edgar, who had for years been connected with Cachar, and had much experience in matters relating to the frontier tribes; with Captain Lewin, also an officer of great local experience; and with the Commissioners of Dacca and Chittagong. The Lieutenant Governor had had the subject under the closest consideration for some time, and had addressed the Government of India, giving his views of the facts. The subject was under the consideration of the Government of India, and there the matter at present rested.

5. Mr. Macfarlane said that he regretted to hear from the Lieutenant Governor that financial considerations would be allowed to weigh in the matter, as he felt sure that the question would be one between Imperial outlay and private outlay, and it would not be difficult to foresee that private interests would go to the wall. Unless all cause for alarm were allayed, it would be impossible to secure labour for tea gardens. His Honor then explained that he did not mean to say that everything would be decided upon financial considerations only, but that he could not fail to state his conviction that the action of Government must undoubtedly be considered very much from that point of view. The Lieutenant Governor trusted that private property would not be wholly sacrificed to public finance, but there must be circumstances in which it would be inexpedient to save lacs of private property by the expenditure of crores of public money, and a large addition to the income tax. After a few further words from Mr. Bullen Smith and some remarks from Mr. Edgar, the meeting broke up.

6. The Lieutenant Governor in conclusion promised the deputation to inform the Government of India of what had passed, and desires me now to submit the case for the most favourable consideration of his Excellency in Council. His Honor trusts it will be thought that he acted prudently in exposing the difficulties lying before Government in entering upon an expedition of this kind, but he thinks that if possible something should be done for the planters' interest. The Looshais are becoming the scourge of all that part of the empire; both several British districts and the Native States of Munnipore and Tipperah, and other neighbouring territories, are constantly invaded by them, and only the Imperial power can put them down.

From *H. LePoer Wynne*, Esq., Under Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Political Department, No. 1324 P.; dated Simla, the 29th June 1871.

WITH reference to your letter, dated the 10th of June 1871, No. 2693, reporting the observations made by his Honor the Lieutenant Governor, with regard to the representations of a deputation of tea planters in Cachar and Sylhet, I am directed by the Viceroy and Governor General in Council to forward copy of the reply of Government, No. 1034 P., dated 13th May 1871, to a memorial on the same subject, and to state that the further views of the Government of India will be communicated hereafter when an answer is sent to your letter, No. 2386, dated 22nd May 1871, relative to our future policy in regard to the north-east frontier.

COPY of a TELEGRAM from General *Bourchier*, Shillong, to Quartermaster General, Simla, dated 9th June 1871.

RECEIVED following telegram, dated 8th June, from magistrate, Sylhet: police reports from Chargolah that nine (9) armed Looshais were seen by Kookies a day's journey south of the outposts, probably scouts.

Officer commanding at Cachar reports that in consequence of requisition from civil authorities he had sent 50 men to Pakee Cherra to protect gardens near Chutter Choora range.

European officers, 4th Regiment, sent to the several outposts. I am ready to leave Shillong for the frontier, if necessary.

(No. 2997½.)

From *H. L. Harrison*, Esq., Junior Secretary to the Government of Bengal, to the Secretary to the Government of India, in the Foreign Department.

Sir, Fort William, 27 June 1871.

WITH reference to your office letter, No. 2021 P., dated the 24th November 1870, and in compliance with the request contained in the concluding paragraph of your office letter, No. 916 P., of the 18th May 1871, I am directed to submit, for the information of his Excellency the Governor General in Council, a copy of a letter, bearing date the 8th instant, received from Mr. Edgar, the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar, giving an account of the circumstances under which the sunnud referred to was given to the Looshai chief, Sookpilal.

(No. 3003.)

From *S. C. Bayley*, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal, in the Judicial Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, in the Foreign Department.

Sir, Fort William, 27 June 1871.

IN continuation of previous correspondence, I am directed to submit the accompanying memorandum from Mr. Edgar, relative to Mr. Burland's services, for the consideration of his Excellency the Governor General in Council.

2. The Lieutenant Governor observes that it was owing to inadvertence that Mr. Burland's services were not sooner brought prominently to the notice of the Government of India; and I am now to add, that his Honor will be glad to see such public recognition taken of them as may seem requisite to his Excellency in Council.

MR. BURLAND.

IN my report (B.) of 6th March, on the subject of last year's tour among the Looshais, I mentioned that I had received very great assistance from my companion, Mr. Burland.

But I felt, when writing, that I was doing him very scant justice, and I did not see how to show what his services really were, without giving what would look like sensational pictures of the danger that we were, or fancied that we were, in.

I did not care to relate how for days, and even weeks, we felt ourselves face to face with death, or a captivity worse than death, and that the smallest mistake, a show of fear, or a rash move, might have brought destruction on our whole party. But I now feel that it is my duty to let Government know that to Mr. Burland, much more than to me, was it owing that we got out safely, and without in any way further compromising Government. More than this, if any good should eventually come out of our expedition, if Sookpilal should turn out faithful, and give us really valuable aid, the chief praise and reward should go to Mr. Burland. All the credit I can claim is that I recognised in Mr. Burland the kind of man that was wanted for work like that undertaken by me, and that he was willing to follow me with a loyalty and forgetfulness of self which I fear are rare in modern times.

Owing to, probably, an unintentional oversight, no notice has yet been taken of Mr. Burland's services, an omission which I feel the more pained at in consequence of the generous way in which the behaviour of Messrs. Bagshawe, Eglinton, and Cooke was acknowledged by Government, as well as by the Government of India. But I feel sure that it is quite enough now to call attention to the oversight. Mr. Burland is at present living at Spence's hotel.

(signed) *J. W. Edgar.*

19 June 1871.

(No. 51 of 1871.)

Government of India.—Foreign Department.—Secret.

To His Grace the Duke of *Argyll*, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

My Lord Duke, Simla, 31 August 1871.

In continuation of our Secret Despatch, dated the 17th of August 1871, No. 45,* we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of the further documents specified in the accompanying Abstract of Contents, relative to affairs on the frontier of Cachar and Chittagong.

* Not given, as all the Enclosures were duplicates of those with India military letter, dated 3rd August (240) 1871, p. 179 of Return.

We have, &c.
(signed) *Mayo.*
Napier of Magdala.
&c. &c.

Telegram, No. 1227 P.; dated the 15th June 1871.

From Foreign Secretary, Simla, to Bengal Secretary, Calcutta.

News received by telegram from officer commanding Eastern Frontier District, that large bodies of armed Looshais are collected about Sookpilal's village for avowed purpose of attacking Saboonga, and demanding restoration of British subjects. Sookpilal's village stockaded.

His Excellency desires further information, and that Lieutenant Governor will take necessary steps to obtain it.

(No. 2793.)

From *S. C. Bayley*, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal in the Judicial Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

Sir, Fort William, 16 June 1871.

With reference to your telegram of the 15th instant, desiring that the necessary steps may be taken for obtaining further information regarding the reported assemblage around Sookpilal's villages of large bodies of Looshais, with the avowed object of attacking Saboonga, and releasing the captives of the late raids, I am directed to state, for the information of the Governor General in Council, that no further details on the subject have yet been received, but as soon as the Lieutenant Governor obtains more complete and definite information of what the Cacharee traders, who brought in this report, actually heard and saw, it will be laid before the Government of India. His Honor desires me to remark that, though no great reliance can be placed on the avowed object of Sookpilal in the assemblage of these armed Looshais, yet the story is not unreasonable in itself, and has received unexpected confirmation from the Chittagong side.

2. It will be seen from the copy of a demi-official letter, dated the 8th instant, from the Officiating Commissioner of Chittagong, which I am directed to forward, together with enclosure, from Mr. Crouch, the assistant superintendent of police, Chittagong Hill Tracks, reporting the failure of Rutton Pooea to effect the ransom of the child, Mary Winchester, that Rutton Pooea, in again asking for a guard of 30 constables to be maintained in his village, expressly bases his request on the ground that Sookpilal was about to attack Sungboong for the release of the captives, and that hence his own village would be exposed to attack, as he was on friendly terms with Sookpilal. This at least shows that Sookpilal had let his intention become known among distant tribes, and inclines the Lieutenant Governor to believe that his preparations are, in all probability, not hostile to us.

3. The Lieutenant Governor deeply regrets the failure of the negotiations for the release of Mary Winchester; and as it appears to him to have resulted in some degree from our agent in the south (Rutton Pooea) and our agent in the north (Sookpilal) bidding against each other, his Honor proposes to take no further steps for the present in the matter from the Chittagong side, but to wait the result of Sookpilal's action.

From *H. Hankey*, Esq., Officiating Commissioner, Chittagong, to *S. C. Bayley*, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal in the Judicial Department.

My dear Bayley, Chittagong, 8 June 1871.

I AM sorry to have had to telegraph that the negotiations for the release of Mary Winchester have at the last moment broken down. This result must have been always looked upon as a not improbable contingency when dealing with a semi-barbarous chief. His policy may be best described by the slang expression "trying it on." If we had acceded to his first demand for muskets, he would probably have required an additional consideration; and if we have now to give him the bells he asks for, there is no security against his again drawing back and requiring a sum of money over and above. I enclose a copy of the assistant superintendent's letter giving me the information. You will see from the nature of the case that it is impossible for me to take any immediate action; but under any circumstances I should prefer writing for instructions from Government. It is also somewhat difficult for me to advise; first and foremost, because I am not acquainted with the future policy of the Government with reference to an intended expedition, and I think this would have an influential bearing on my advice; secondly, because I am in the dark as to whether negotiations have been going on from the other side or not; and, if so, what have been their nature; thirdly, because I am not sufficiently acquainted with the physical features of the country to be able to judge with what degree of rapidity communications can be carried on at this season of the year; and, lastly, I am deprived of the benefit of consulting Captain Lewin, as he has not yet arrived. Lacking these sources of information, so essential to forming a sound opinion, I should be inclined to suggest that we should take high ground, and yield no further to the caprices of the chief, Saboonga, but should cause it to be intimated to him that we are still ready to accept the terms proposed by him, but that no further terms will be agreed to, and the consequences of his refusal to ratify them will be severe and certain. Much, however, would depend on the progress of events and the circumstances of the hour; and I would therefore suggest that some sets of bells should be procured from Arracan, if for no other reason than that, if the value set upon them in the hills is not exaggerated, they would be desirable things to keep in the hill toshakhana. If subsequently opportunity offered for giving bells, I see no objection to effect the ransom by this means; but I would give them under circumstances which would guard against all risk of a second failure. Meanwhile Mary Winchester appears to be well cared for, and will, no doubt, continue to be so.

Paragraphs 5 and 6 of the letter require no present remarks.

Regarding the reward of 80 rupees asked for by Rutton Pooea for the four spies, I rather think that some reward was half promised by the assistant superintendent of police before they started; if so, it should be given. I shall not, however, give it even after Government approval, until I have made further inquiries into the matter.

Rutton Pooea's demand for a guard of 30 constables cannot, of course, be complied with, and he will be told so at once.

Yours, &c.
(signed) *H. Hankey.*

From *C. P. Crouch*, Esq., Assistant Superintendent of Police, Chittagong Hill Tracts, to the Commissioner of Chittagong, No. 259, dated Rangamuttee, the 6th June 1871.

Sir,

WITH reference to my letter, No. 255, of yesterday's date, I have the honour to report that the whole of the detachment have returned from Rutton Pooea's village, and that Subador Mahomed Hossain, the officer in charge of the detachment, arrived here last night, and, after a conversation with him this morning, I beg to forward the following for your information, with regard to the non-release of Mary Winchester by the Sagboonga Rajah. The subadar states that immediately he received the ransom of 400 rupees, he made it over to the chief, Rutton Pooea, who was unable to send the amount off for a few days on account of his brother having just died. About the 16th ultimo he dispatched the amount to the Sagboonga Rajah by four Kookies (the ransom formerly asked for the release of Mary Winchester).

2. The messengers returned to Rutton Pooea on the 2nd instant, and informed him that they had been unable to obtain the release of the captive, and brought back the money, stating that the sahib from the north that went to Sookpilal's village had offered a larger sum of money, and articles that would be more useful to the Howlong, through Sookpilal; so, consequently, they could not take only 400 rupees for her release, and told the messengers that if they procured five sets of bells (consisting of three bells in each set) they would not require any money, and give up the captive at once.

3. The bells (or gongs) they require are supposed to be made by the gods and goddesses. There are three bells in each set, of different tones, are flat, and about 50 inches in diameter, and may be procured, I believe, at Akyab. They are greatly prized by the Looshais, who estimate one set of bells (or gongs) the price of the heads of one village. Rutton Pooea, upon return of the messengers, expressed his regret, saying that he could not help it, the sahib of the north having offered more money, besides other articles.

4. The messengers stated that they saw the white girl, but were not allowed to approach near her. She is kept in the Sagboonga's youngest brother's house, and they say appears to be well taken care of.

5. There are in the same village 35 Bengalee captives (men, women, and children) taken in this year's raid on the tea gardens, besides about 20 captives taken in the raid on the Fenny River.

6. There are also a large number of captives who were taken in the raids of former years. One of the Kookie messengers informed the subadar that he could procure the release of the captives for less than 150 rupees each, if rewarded well; but Rutton Pooea states that the above amount would be the very least they would take for each captive.

7. Rutton Pooea wishes a reward of 20 rupees each to be given to the four Kookie messengers whom he sent. He also wishes for a guard of 30 constables to be sent to his villages to remain there, having, he states, heard that the Sagboong Rajah (Sylhoos) would commit a raid on his village, if Sookpilal attempted to commit raid on the Sagboong Rajah's village (Sookpilal and Rutton Pooea being friends).

From *C. U. Aitchison*, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal in the Judicial Department, No. 1382 P.; dated Simla, the 4th July 1871.

IN acknowledging your letter, No. 2793, dated the 16th June 1871, reporting that no further details have been received regarding the assembly of Looshais round Sookpilal's village for the purpose of attacking Sangboong and releasing the captives detained there, and announcing also the failure of Rutton Pooea to effect the ransom of Mary Winchester, I am directed to state that while the Viceroy and Governor General much regrets the failure of the above negotiations, he fully concurs in the opinion of his Honor the Lieutenant Governor that it will not be advisable to take further steps in the matter from the Chittagong side, pending receipt of information regarding the movements of Sookpilal, and of the action which he may take. I am to suggest that the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar be asked to transmit such intelligence as he can collect on this point.

From *F. B. Simson*, Esq., Commissioner of Dacca, to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department, No. 173; dated Dacca, the 16th June 1871.

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith copy of a letter, No. 608, of the 10th instant, from the Officiating Deputy Commissioner of Cachar, and to state that I wish Mr. McWilliam had specified the dates on which the Cacharees went to the villages, left Changsile, arrived at certain places on the Dullessur, &c.

2. The conduct of Sookpilal, if correctly represented, is satisfactory; it is wholly in accord with the action I hoped to see him carry out before Mr. Sutherland showed so strong a desire to burden him with the blame of all late outrages. I believe the presents he has received and the profits he obtains for facilities allowed for trade not only enrich him and his immediate adherents, but greatly excite the envy of other chiefs. Like Rutton Pooea he may think it far the best policy to behave in a really friendly manner to the British.

From *O. G. R. McWilliam*, Esq., Officiating Deputy Commissioner of Cachar, to the Commissioner of Dacca, No. 608; dated Cachar, the 10th June 1871.

WITH reference to my telegram of yesterday, I have the honour to submit the following abstract of a statement made by Mathura Burman, one of the four Cacharees who were left behind at Changsil by Obhoy Baboo, as reported in my letter, No. 540, of 18th May 1871. The other three have not yet been interrogated, as they went to their friends in the district before coming into the station.

2. After Obhoy's departure the Cacharees went to Mintang's village. He entertained them and then went back to Changsil. Next day a messenger came from Pibuk, Sookpilal's mother. She was suffering from toothache, and Mathura Burman and the other Cacharees went to her village and stayed there for two days, during which they cured her. She said her son and grandsons were making every effort to get the captives back. The Cacharees returned to Changsil, and, after two days, went to the village of Tompilal, where they were met by Sookpilal's interpreter, who took them on to Ryekpoonji. News of their arrival at Ryek was taken to Sookpilal, and two days afterwards two of his sepoys

came

came down and escorted them to Sookpilal's village. Sookpilal received them with great respect, and told them that all the captives were in Saboonga's village, and that he and Buta had sent four muntries to Saboonga to demand the restoration of the captives. Saboonga declined, on the ground that Sookpilal had not shared with him the presents he had received from us. Then Sookpilal's muntrie offered 50 metnas, 10 guns, 2 degchis, 20 gongs, and 20 great necklaces for the captives, but to no purpose. On the return of the muntries Sookpilal sent off a party of 300 men in Saboonga's direction.

3. The Cacharees, after their arrival at Sookpilal's village, saw about 1,000 or 1,200 of armed men belonging to Khalgom, Buta, and Thombong ready for a start. It seems that they had made an attempt to go southwards, but were kept back by the bad weather.

4. Sookpilal sent the Cacharees to visit Buta at his village two days off. They found Benkinza there. Buta and Benkinza said that they and their sons, and Sookpilal and his sons, in all 15 rajas, would soon start to attack Saboonga and rescue the captives from him, and make them over at Changsil in a month.

5. They then returned to Sookpilal, who told them the same, and dismissed them.

6. On their way north to Ryek they met 400 men, under Khalgom, going towards Sookpilal's village. This was about 12 days ago.

7. All the villages east of the Dullessur have been recently stockaded. Sookpilal's stockade was finished the day the Cacharees arrived. Ryek was not stockaded when they were at it a few weeks before, but it is now. The reason assigned by Sookpilal for this was, that he feared a counter attack from Saboonga on his villages during his absence.

8. One point in the Cacharee's statement is somewhat strange. Benkinza has, until the present time, been represented as one of the principal actors in the raid on Western Cachar. I, for my own part, believe that Saboonga and Benkinza have quarrelled about the captives, and that Benkinza has persuaded Sookpilal to help him against Saboonga, and to exculpate him in the eyes of Government.

9. As, however, Mr. Sutherland's telegram about the scouts seen south of Chargola arrived just before the information herein detailed, I think we ought to take every possible precaution on our southern frontier, knowing for certain that large armed parties are collected at and about Sookpilal's head quarters. Intrigues might alter the destination of these men.

10. Since the withdrawal of the guard on Chatter Choora by General Bourchier's orders, there is nothing to prevent a raid on the gardens at Ameerkhal, Pukeecherra, and the neighbourhood. Captain Eliot, of the 4th Native Infantry, has started with 50 men for Ameerkhal, with instructions to get on to the range behind Ameerkhal, and patrol the country where practicable.

11. Immediately I can get a burkundaz guard for the gaol, Mr. Daly is going to attempt to patrol the road from Katlycherra to Chargola. I fear he may not be able to get across the bheel on this side of the range, but if it can be done I am confident he will do it. I have recommended, by telegram, that it should be done, for the present, from the Sylhet side.

12. I shall report on the Cacharee's mission more at length after examining Mathura's companions. He is a very illiterate person, and it is difficult to record accurately a story extending over several weeks, related by a person not accustomed to write or dictate. I expect to get valuable information about the geography of the country through which the Cacharees passed, the position and strength of the villages, &c.

ACCOUNT of the CACHAREES who have visited SOOKPILAL'S Country.

WHEN Obhoy Baboo returned from the Looshai country, he left behind him at Changsil four Cacharees, three of whom belonged to the villages which were attacked on the 23rd January by Looshais. They remained with the hope of getting more exact intelligence of the fate of their relations.

The following statement was made by Mathura, the senior Cacharee, on his return. He came to the station by himself, and unaccompanied by the others, two of whom I have seen and examined. The fourth man has not been found yet. These men have no fixed residence now, as their village has been abandoned since January.

Mathura says: After Obhoy's departure, I and the three Cacharees went to Mintang's village; he entertained us. Next day we returned to Changsil, and on the next day Pibuk Ranee sent for us, as she was ill. We cured her in two days. There were no Bengalis, or Cacharees, or coolies in her village, which contains about 500 houses. We passed through Mintang's village (about 300 houses). I think there are about 100 *guns* in Mintang's and 200 in Pibuk's village. She is very anxious to be friendly with Government, and told me that she and her sons (she is Sookpilal's mother) will attack the Southern Looshais if the captives are not given up. *She would like to have a British force sent in by the Gooteer and*

and Chatter Choora in October. She told us that the names of Sangboong's sons are Laljeka and Lalmoor; his brother, Vonolel, has two sons (Lalchoom and Jysseeya). These four sons were the principals in the attacks on Kutley, Cheera, and Modnierkhall. We returned to Bazaar Ghât, and soon after our arrival two of Sookpilal's sepoys and a muntrie came to take us. We passed five poonjees on our way to that of Sookpilal. Tonpillal's we reached in a day, thence we went to Ryek, the village of Sookpilal's brother-in-law, Lalkur. Ryek consists of two villages; they are now strongly stockaded. They were not stockaded when we were there a short time before. Next day we reached Sookpilal's own village; they were finishing the stockade just as we got in. There are four poonjees within an hour and a-half's journey of Sookpilal's, all stockaded; one of them contains 300 houses of Pois. The number of houses in the five villages is about 1,400. I think there are about 5,000 *jowans* in the five villages. Sookpilal received us next day *with respect.* He told us that all the captives were in Saboonga's village, and that two of his muntries, with two of Buta's, had demanded them from Saboonga, who replied that Sookpilal had received benefits from the sahibs, and kept them to himself, whereas he (Saboonga) had, by his own daring and bravery taken a few captives. He was not going to make them over to Sookpilal on any account. They offered valuable presents to Saboonga, but to no purpose.

Sookpilal then sent us to Buta, his uncle; we reached his village in two days, passing through that of Thombong and two villages belonging to Sookpilal's wives. He has five wives. There are 500 houses in Buta's village, but it is not stockaded. I saw about 4,000 *armed* men there (!!) of whom a fourth were Pois. Buta told us exactly what Sookpilal did. Bhenkneia was in Buta's village; he wants to make friends with the sahibs. Buta told us that he and Thombong and his sons, and Sookpilal and Khalkorm, and Lalchung, and Bhenkneia, and Tanghine Koop, and others, are going to send an army against Saboonga for the recovery of the captives. Sookpilal told me that he has now 40 houses of Looshais with him, the remnant of the village of the chief who attacked Monnierkhall, which was attacked by tribes from the east during the chief's absence.

Sookpilal and Buta complain that the Southern Looshais get powder and guns and sulphur from a bazaar near Koilashur, a bazaar in the jungle, about a mile from the place. They want from us two European chairs, 500 *daos*, and brass and salt and tobacco. Sookpilal promises that if I return in a month, the captives will be in his power, and he will give them up. He asked me not to tell you that I saw three Bengali women, whom he got in a Tipperah raid 10 years ago, and two Tipperah girls he got five years ago in his village. I saw a Tipperah girl about 12 years old in Mintang's village. While we were in Sookpilal's village I saw a body of about 1,000 or 1,200 men starting for the south to support 300 men who had been sent against Saboonga. The main body was kept back by bad weather. On our way back to Ryek we met Khalkorm on his way to join Sookpilal with about 400 more men.

Bhenkneia, who was in Buta's village, denied that he had anything to do with the raid.

Sookpilal was very anxious to have a monopoly of trade with Cachar, and told us to ask the Deputy Commissioner to shut up all other bazaars. We heard that Sanboong had refused to give up the child to the Chittagong sahib.

The statement of Kripa Ram, Cacharee, is as follows:—

We went to Mintang's poonjee as we had no provisions; we stayed there that night and obtained rice, &c., from the raja. Next day we came back to Changsil, where we remained for three or four days, after which Sookpilal sent for us, and we started for his poonjee, in company with his interpreter, Sinthongpa. We walked three *prohurs*, and came to Tompillal's village, where we remained two nights. We then started from thence, in company with the interpreter, and arrived near Ryekpoonjee, where we were met by a man of Sookpilal's, who informed us that Sookpilal had permitted us to go to his village. Walking three *prohurs* we got to Ryekpoonjee and remained there that night. Next day we left at one *prohur* and reached Sookpilal's village before nightfall; remained that night in a *Deka house* (a house where young and able-bodied male Looshais *are kept*) and visited Sookpilal on the following morning. He told us that our relations and the sahib's child, who were taken away by Looshais were alive, and in the village of Saboonga. He sent his muntries to get them back, but they were not given up. Saboonga said that Sookpilal had obtained many presents by making friendship with the sahib; whereas he had taken some captives by force, and he saw no reason why he should give them up. On this the muntries offered Saboonga 50 metnas, 20 necklaces, 20 gongs, and 10 guns for restoration of the captives, but he did not let them go. After this Sookpilal sent 300 soldiers to fight with Saboonga and recover the captives. On hearing this we remained in the house of the muntrie. As we remained there we saw one day about 1,000 armed Looshais going southward to fight with Saboonga. As there was heavy rain that day they were unable to proceed; some returned, therefore, that day, and some on the next, and told that others were still on the way. I don't recollect the exact time, but we stayed at Sookpilal's poonjee for some days after that. We then, agreeably to the instruction of Sookpilal, went to the village of Buta, in company with Sookpilal's muntrie. After two days we reached his village and saw him. He told the same as Sookpilal, and added that all the Looshai rajas on the north would join and fight with Saboonga, and get back the captives, and that we should not be anxious for them. The raja's interpreter explained all this to Mothura Burman, and we learnt from him. I did not see any other raja there at the time, nor heard the name of any raja being mentioned. There are about 400 or 500 houses in Buta's village.

village. There are Looshais and Pois in it; there is no stockade there. In our way we got only one poonjee, and saw two other poonjees on the sides of the road. The path is pretty good throughout; there are not very high ascents or descents on it.

Six rajas, viz., Saboonga, his son Laljek, Lalboora, his brother and two sons (name unknown), made raids on tea gardens this year, and took away the Cacharees, &c., as prisoners. The Chittagong sahib sent messengers and tried to get back the sahib's child and the rest, but he did not succeed. We then left Buta's village, and came to Sookpilal's, where we remained three or four days. Sookpilal told us the same thing, and said that he will get back the captives to his village within a month, and if we go there next month with some things for trade, he will send back the released captives in company with his muntrie.

On our way back to Changsil we saw about 10 or 12 Looshai sepoys near Ryekpoonjee, and about 100 men with Khulkur below that poonjee and up the Dullessur. Ryekpoonjee and Sookpilal's poonjee are stockaded. We saw about 400 houses of Looshais and Pois in Sookpilal's village, and about 300 in Ryek.

Buta is older than Sookpilal, very dark and covered with hair. He is stout and has not much beard.

I heard the name of Bhenkneia from Rama, who said that Bhenkneia has made terms with Sookpilal and Buta. Mothura Burman has told me that Sookpilal has taken *Rs.* 109. 4 *a.* from him.

The muntrie said that the people of Sanboonga are supplied with food, &c., from the Koilashur side, and it would be better if this supply was stopped. I have heard that Pibuk is sick. None of us went to her village, or saw her. The road along which we passed is about one *hâth* in width; there are bamboo jungle on both sides. Buta drinks the water flowing to the mouth. We did not see any Tipperah woman there.

Moojeng Dao, Cacharee, made a similar statement.

There are some discrepancies in these two statements: the first is about the visit paid by Mothura to Pibuk, and the second is as to the presence of Bhenkneia in Buta's village. But Mothura is the man who transacted all the business, and he may have thought it imprudent to let the other Cacharees know that Bhenkneia was acting with Buta. There can be little doubt that Buta and Sookpilal are closely allied: that they have large bodies of fighting men in their villages, and that Sookpilal's villages are stockaded. I think the alliance of Bhenkneia with these two chiefs is more than probable. Sookpilal's messengers have all along given us to understand that Bhenkneia and Saboonga were equally implicated in the raid, and that Mr. Winchester's child was actually in Bhenkneia's village. They also stated that Saboonga had the Cacharee captives. I suspect that Saboonga has got hold of the little girl, and is intriguing to dispose of her to the Chittagong authorities. This would naturally lead Bhenkneia to turn to Sookpilal for assistance, and hence the alliance. Bhenkneia would be able to tell Sookpilal to tell us that he had not got the child, and Sookpilal might easily add that he was mistaken in saying that Bhenkneia was implicated in the raids.

From *F. B. Simson*, Esq., Commissioner of the Dacca Division, to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, No. 191; dated Dacca, 11th July 1871.

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith copy of a letter, No. 709, of 3rd instant, from the Officiating Deputy Commissioner of Cachar, and to state that I agree with Mr. McWilliam that it is our interest to encourage cordially every attempt, on the part of Sookpillal, to become more intimate and friendly with us. As Mr. Burland said, trade may really be the most powerful agent in civilising the Looshais.

From *C. G. R. McWilliam*, Esq., Officiating Deputy Commissioner of Cachar, to the Commissioner of Circuit, Dacca Division, No. 709; dated Cachar, the 3rd July 1871.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your memorandum, No. 185, dated 26th June 1871, covering a correspondence confirmatory of the intelligence received by me from the Cachari traders in Sookpilal's country.

2. I am about to send the Cacharees back again to obtain, if possible, information as to the result of the demonstration made by Sookpilal against Sangoonga.

3. From further conversation I have had with the Cacharies, I fear that Sookpilal and the friendly Looshais will be greatly disappointed if steps are not taken to punish the perpetrators of the late raids. Sookpilal and his sons, and Boota, a chief for whom we have never done anything at all, have deliberately taken a hostile position towards the chiefs who attacked us, a step which they will always bitterly regret if they find us wanting in supporting them. They are most anxious to get instructions as to clearing roads and making the way easy, and Sookpilal contemplates, after defeating our enemies, building a village at Gootur Mukh, and establishing one of his sons there for trade, and for the instruction of his people.

4. I shall allow the Cacharees to take with them some salt, tobacco, cloth, and other articles for barter with the Looshais. I think Sookpilal is fully entitled to the indulgence.

Office Memorandum from *H. LePoer Wynne*, Esq., Under Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 1724 P.; dated Simla, the 15th August 1871.

In continuation of the memorandum from this office to the Military Department, No. 1645 P., dated the 4th August 1871, on the subject of the proposed expedition against the Looshais, the undersigned is directed by the Viceroy and Governor General in Council to invite the attention of that department to the remarks made by the Officiating Deputy Commissioner of Cachar in his letter to the Commissioner of the Dacca Division, No. 709, dated the 3rd of July 1871, a copy of which has been forwarded to the Military Department by the Government of Bengal direct, relative to the aid which may be expected from Sookpilal and other friendly chiefs in the expedition to be sent into the country of the Looshais.

2. His Excellency in Council in this department considers this to be an important point; for if the friendly tribes are not associated with and utilised by the British force employed, one of the principal objects of the expedition will be lost sight of.

3. This communication should be considered as confidential.

No. 307, of 1871.—Military Department.

(Separate.)

To his Grace the Duke of *Argyll*, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

My Lord Duke, Simla, 26 September 1871.

In continuation of our separate letter, No. 240, of the 3rd August last, we have the honour to transmit, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copy of further correspondence regarding the measures adopted for the organisation of the expedition against the Looshai tribes.

We are, &c.

(signed) *Mayo.*
Napier of Magdala,
&c. &c.

Extract from the Proceedings of the Government of India in the Foreign Department Political (Confidential), No. 1645 P., dated Simla, the 4th August 1871.

Read again—

Resolution No. 1453 P., dated 11th July 1871.

Read—

Communication from Military Department, No. 661, dated 26th July 1871, requesting an expression of the opinion of His Excellency in Council in the Foreign Department as to,—

I.—The relations between the political officers to be attached to the expeditionary force and the military commanders.

II.—The co-operation of the forces of friendly chiefs.

Resolution.—It is, in the opinion of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General in Council, essential to the success of the proposed expedition that there should be no division of authority between the civil or political and military officers attached to the force. His Excellency in Council, therefore, approves of the proposal of His Excellency the Commander in Chief, that the political authority should be vested in the commanders of columns when separate, and in the officer in command of the whole force in the event of the columns being united.

2. The services of Mr. Edgar and Captain Lewin will accordingly be placed in subordination to the military commanders, to assist in the political duties. The commanding officers, however, must bear in mind the fact that, on Mr. Edgar and Captain Lewin will, in future, devolve the duty of managing the relations of the British Government with the people of the country. So far, therefore, as may be practicable with reference to military considerations, a most prominent place must be given to these officers in all transactions with the tribes, and all negotiations with the tribes should be conducted through their instrumentality. The commanding officers will also of course make full use of the local knowledge

ledge and the local influence of these officers, and will commit to them, in the first instance, the task of procuring the intelligence required as to the movements of the tribes, and the information needed to enable Government hereafter to settle the frontier questions referred to in paragraph 10 of the resolution of this department, dated 11th July. So far as friendly Looshai chiefs may be employed with the columns, the orders of the commanding officers to them should be communicated through Mr. Edgar and Captain Lewin.

3. The commanders of the columns should be made fully acquainted with the objects of the expedition, as explained in paragraphs 3 to 11 of the resolution of this department, dated 11th July, and should be held responsible for their due execution. His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General in Council considers that they will usefully employ the services of Mr. Edgar and Captain Lewin in reporting, from time to time, in the Civil Department, the progress made towards the attainment of these ends, apart from the military proceedings of the expedition, which will of course be submitted in the Military Department. It would also be desirable that a final report of the expedition, as to its political aspects, should be prepared by those officers on the conclusion of operations.

4. His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General in Council is unwilling to hamper the military commanders in their political capacity with detailed instructions, and trusts that the foregoing observations will prove sufficient. But if further instructions be desired on any special points of detail, separate reference should be made to the Foreign Department at as early a date as possible.

5. As soon as His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief has decided to what extent the troops of Munnipoor and Tipperah are to be employed, the chiefs of those states will be called upon to furnish their quotas. These will be placed absolutely under the commanders of the columns, who will make all necessary arrangements regarding them in direct communication with the political agents. In the meantime, the Political Agents will be confidentially warned of the probability of a demand for co-operation being made on the Rajahs of Munnipoor and Tipperah, and requested to supply all necessary information regarding the available troops of these states, their equipment, &c.

6. During the course of the operations, all communications from the commanding officers to the Munnipoor and Tipperah troops should be made through the Political Agents of those states as the medium of communication. Both political agents have been informed that they may be called on to accompany the expedition in their capacity of civil officers, and as such will be subordinate to the military commander.

ORDER.—Ordered, that a copy of the above resolution be sent to the Military Department, in reply to No. 661, dated 26th July 1871.

(No. 374.)

Copy of the above, forwarded to the Quarter Master General for the information of his Excellency the Commander in Chief, in continuation of No. 636, date d26th July 1871.

By order,
(signed) *H. K. Burne*, Colonel,
Secretary to the Government of India.

From Lieutenant Colonel *J. I. Willes*, Commissary-General, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 702; dated Simla, the 5th August 1871.

IN continuation of my letter, No. 658, of 29th ultimo, I have the honour to forward a statement showing approximately the carriage that will be required for a column of troops of the strength noted in Quarter Master General's No. 1256 c., dated 31st March 1871, to your address, together with a memorandum roughly explaining how and where the depôts for supplies might be formed. I have likewise ventured to make a few suggestions, with reference to the experience I gained in the Bhootan campaign, which, I trust, may not be considered presumptuous.

With reference to statement (A.), attached to Quarter Master General's No. 1256 c., dated 31st March 1871, each column, consisting of three regiments Native Infantry, half battery of Mountain Artillery, one company of Sappers and Miners, requires, exclusive of food,—

	Coolies.
Three Native Infantry Regiments, baggage and Stores 241 × 3	723
One Company Sappers	42
Mountain Battery	31
General Staff	21
Engineer's Park	313
Powder	90
Total	1,220
Ammunition with force 178	
Ammunition in reserve 443	
	621
GRAND TOTAL	1,841
80 elephants, at 14 coolies each	1,120
Balance	721

Allowed 80 elephants and 600 coolies.

There are with the force to be fed, camp followers and fighting men of all grades	2,773
Dooly bearers	156
Commissariat Establishment	100
Coolies	600
Elephants and attendants	800
TOTAL	4,429

Fighting men and camp followers:—	*Seers.*	
At 1¼ seer each, 2773	3,467	
156 dooly bearers, at one seer each	156	
Commissariat establishment, 100, at one seer each	100	
Coolies, at one seer each	600	
80 elephants, at eight seers each, and attendants, 160, at one seer each	800	
One day's requirements seers	5,123	
= to coolie's load	256	
Eight days to accompany the force	2,048	coolies.
Deduct 20 elephants, at 14 coolies each	280	
Coolies required	1,768	

But as the coolies and elephants with the column will also be available when troops are not on the move, to help in bringing up stores, I consider that 1,200 coolies should suffice for each column for commissariat purposes, with the addition of 20 elephants which I anticipate being available.

(signed) *J. I. Willes*, Lieutenant Colonel,
Commissary General.

MEMORANDUM by Lieutenant Colonel *J. I. Willes*, Commissary General; dated 5th August 1871.

THE chief depôt would, for the Chittagong Column, be at Kassalong, to which place river steamers and flats can take stores from Chittagong. There can be no difficulty in conveying any quantity of stores to this place. Large sheds would be required to be run up without delay for protection of stores. From thence small boats, I understand, can go to Demagiri Falls, where another depôt, on a smaller scale, with supplies, say, for a month

for

for the whole column, should be formed; onwards the country, I believe, is entirely unknown. It is believed that the column would march up to Demagiri Falls from Kassalong, keeping near the banks of the river, by which the stores would proceed, so that between the two places no anxiety need be felt about provisions.

2. The hills where operations will be carried on are supposed to be some 30 to 50 miles in advance of the falls, the country being totally unknown. I assume that from this point the column will advance in small parties, only sufficient to clear road and to overcome opposition, and that the main body will not advance until the advance column has cleared a road and selected a spot for the first depôt. Possibly, some 20 miles distant, supplies for the whole force sufficient for about two months could be collected, from whence the second depôt could be stocked. But as it is probable, as the column advances, the progress would be slower, supplies will continually be pushed on to the first depôt, so that stores possibly will be collected there sufficient to complete the next two depôts. I assume that, as the force advances, the advanced column will be reduced, as troops will be left on the road to protect depôts and keep open communication, so that in reality the column will be reduced possibly one-half by the time active operations commence. Therefore, only one-half the quantities of supplies will be required at the last depôt as in the first. But, as we are utterly ignorant of the state of the roads, I do not think less coolies than asked for with each column can possibly be considered sufficient.

3. I conclude the necessity for all the coolies being properly clothed will not be overlooked. In addition to a suit of warm clothes, a good blanket, stout shoes, and warm stockings such as are made at Loodhiana, should be provided, with a reserve stock in the depôts. Only those who saw the miserable plight of men employed in bad weather in Bhootan can form an idea of their utter helplessness without proper clothes. I am not aware that in the Looshai territories the cold will be so severe. (In Bhootan for three days snow was thick on the ground.) But still there is, at any rate, damp and probably rain to be provided against, for which, from sickness, good clothing is the best preventive; and to protect the health of the camp followers is as great a necessity as that of the troops.

4. From Silchar the column will advance, I believe, by Gootia Mukh and Bepari Bazaar. The main depôt will be at Silchar, the next at Gootia Mukh, and the third at Bepari Bazaar. I understand the land route to these places is very difficult, but that boats, capable of conveying from 15 to 20 maunds, can reach without difficulty the latter place, and that boats in large numbers can be procured. That being so, no anxiety should be felt in getting stores so far.

From Bepari Bazaar, the distance to Sylhoo and Howlong Ranges, where operations will probably commence, appears about the same as from Demagiri Falls on the Chittagong side; and the advance will be made, I conclude, much in the same way, and the carriage named I should think would be sufficient, but not excessive.

Arrangements will be made for all stores to be sent in bags not weighing more than 20 seers each; and when it is known what regiments are to form the force, each will be communicated with, to ascertain what food is wanted, viz., whether atta or rice, so that objections may not be made to whatever is sent, a not unlikely contingency.

Again, no animal food will be sent except for the Europeans. I beg, moreover, to represent that the Goorkhas and Sikhs will certainly demand spirits, which I notice is not intended to be sent; and, if my experience in Bhootan is worth anything, the medical authorities will readily grant certificates that it is a necessity. Goat's flesh for the Goorkhas and kine for Punjabees (Mahomedans) will also be expected, and therefore it should be clearly made known to Commanding Officers of regiments that neither can be supplied before troops leave cantonments. Rum is a very bulky article to carry, though, at the depôts in the rivers, there is no reason why any quantity should not be collected. I would respectfully suggest that, with Native troops, no hopes should be held out of anything beyond their regular rations, which alone, unless orders to the contrary are issued, will be arranged for. I found in Bhootan that the wants of the Punjabee regiments were so great, that it would have been as easy to feed Europeans; and all the demands of the men were encouraged rather than otherwise by their officers.

(Confidential.)

From Colonel *H. K. Burne*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Quartermaster General, No. 332; dated Simla, the 12th August 1871.

With reference to previous correspondence regarding the expedition to be formed in the ensuing cold season, I am directed to forward the accompanying copy of a communication* from the Commissary General, regarding the collection of stores for the use of the columns to operate against the Looshais, and the carriage required for commissariat purposes, and to beg that the Commander in Chief may be moved to favour Government with his Excellency's views on Lieutenant Colonel Willes's suggestions as to the best points at which to collect these stores for the two columns respectively.

* No. 702, dated 5th August

2. I am also to request that Government may be favoured with his Excellency's opinion on Lieutenant Colonel Willes's estimated requirements for coolies, which, taking into consideration that the whole force will never require, at any one time, eight days' provisions to be in actual course of transport, appear to be excessive.

(Confidential.)

From Colonel *P. S. Lumsden*, Quartermaster General, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 3413; dated Simla, the 8th August 1871.

I AM directed by his Excellency the Commander in Chief to acknowledge your letter, No. 636, dated 26th July 1871, and, with reference to the second paragraph, I am desired to state that it would have caused the Commander in Chief much regret had any measure recommended by his Excellency laid the Government open to a charge of entering on an important undertaking with unnecessary haste or precipitation.

2. The Commander in Chief would venture to observe that the subjects of the Government on the Eastern Frontier had suffered for a prolonged period a series of outrages, which were carried to an unparalleled extent in the cold season of 1870-71.

In addition to the burning of villages, the slaughter or carrying into slavery of their helpless inhabitants, and the burning or plundering of tea gardens, the murder of the tea planter, Mr. Winchester, and the carrying off of his unfortunate child, were outrages which his Excellency felt assured no Government could passively endure without losing the confidence of its own subjects on the frontier, and the respect of the tribes beyond it.

3. Had the efforts to obtain information of the guilty tribes made by the civil authorities failed, or been much longer delayed, his Excellency believes that Government would have felt obliged to send an armed force into the Looshai country, to obtain the information required, rather than remain with its injuries unredressed for another year.

4. The necessary and humane offer of a ransom for Winchester's child, whether fruitless or otherwise, if not followed by punitive measures, would, in his Lordship's opinion, have held out a premium for future aggressions.

5. The Commander in Chief, therefore, considered that, in proposing the measure of opening the frontier road or track, which had been advocated by several high authorities, his Excellency was proposing a measure which would have committed the Government to nothing more, in the first instance, than the earlier collection of elephant carriage on the frontier, and the earlier supply from England of certain articles of equipment, and even, if ultimately carried further, would have placed the Government in a position to take advantage at the earliest moment of any positive information that might be obtained, while effecting a measure which very experienced authorities on the frontier had considered desirable.

6. It was most earnestly impressed on His Lordship by the Commissioner of Dacca, and others on the frontier, that if the elephants required were not collected at Cachar before the flooding of the rivers and the low country, they could not arrive in time to admit of a sufficiently early advance, should such a measure be determined on.

7. The Commander in Chief is aware that His Excellency the Governor General has been informed that this is not the case, and Lord Napier of Magdala accordingly hopes that his own information was incorrect; but he still apprehends that elephants will not be in so good a condition for a mountain campaign after a month's march across the inundations of Eastern Bengal, as they would be were they to start fresh from Cachar. His Excellency's sole desire was to save the Government the difference of expense between elephant and coolie hire, and to prevent the possibility of another "too late" expedition.

8. His Excellency visited the frontier of Cachar at the desire of the Governor General, in order to be able to report on the measures necessary for its protection, and considered it his duty to make such recommendations as in his judgment were required to attain that end.

9. In reference to paragraph 7, I am desired to observe that the abolition of the batteries at Debrogurh and Shillong has left the Government with no Native battery in this Presidency nearer than Hazara; and as the employment of European gunners would be inexpedient, there is no alternative but to have recourse to the mountain battery now at Hazara, unless one were brought from another Presidency, which would be a still more expensive measure. When making reductions, the use of the railway has always been contemplated as a compensating resource, and its cost may be considered as the discount on the sum gained by the abolition of the reduced Native batteries.

10. His Excellency proposes that the Hazara Mountain Battery shall be brought down to Bengal, with its steel guns, but leaving the mules standing at Abbottabad, under charge of two 22nd Royal Artillery, which his Excellency would for the approaching cold season, locate at Abbottabad, to take the place of the Hazara Mountain train. The elephant carriage at the Presidency and the four mortars should be added to the equipment of the battery.

The

The Commander in Chief prefers the steel mountain guns for their great portability, especially the facility of moving them by hand, and because each half battery with two steel guns and two 4½-inch mortars will possess four shell pieces, in case of having to drive the enemy from any extensive stockade. But as the battery numbers only 60 gunners, it will be necessary to supplement each half battery with an equal number of men from the Native regiments of the columns; in this the Commander in Chief apprehends no difficulty.

11. Some slight alteration of the elephant gear, to fit it for the 150-lb. guns, may be necessary.

12. The question of the point from which the ammunition will be supplied will be referred to the Commissary of Ordnance.

13. With regard to the 8th and 9th paragraphs, the Commander in Chief desires me to say that he should, if he had the option, be equally content to employ the ordinary Madras or Bengal regiments of the line in the plains of India; but for mountain warfare, in which the troops may have to cross hills of from 3,000 to 6,000 feet high, his Excellency agrees with the experienced frontier authorities that Goorkhas or Punjab troops are best suited to the duty.

14. His Excellency cannot conceive that such selection can be construed as casting any imputation against the efficiency of the Madras regiments of the line.

15. The Commander in Chief, in considering the proposal of the Government to bring Madras regiments from the coast stations, did not overlook the great cost of sea transport, the tonnage of conveying three regiments from the Madras coast to Calcutta in 1868 having amounted, his Excellency is led to believe, to no less than 1,20,000 rupees.

16. His Excellency the Viceroy in Council may be assured, that the remaining portion of the letter under reply not requiring immediate answer will receive the Commander in Chief's most serious attention, and His Excellency desires me to express his acknowledgments for the extent to which His Excellency in Counilhas been able to accept the Commander in Chief's recommendations.

(Confidential.)

Office Memo. from Colonel *H. K. Burne*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Department of Agriculture, Revenue, and Commerce, No. 372; dated Simla, the 14th August 1871.

It having been determined that an expeditionary force to operate in the Looshai country shall be formed in November next, the undersigned is desired to intimate that it is considered most desirable that each of the two columns advancing from Cachar and Chittagong, respectively, should be accompanied by suitable and efficient survey parties, and to request that the Surveyor General may be at once requested to prepare and submit a scheme for carrying this into effect.

2. It is hardly necessary to observe that these parties, while as complete and efficient as possible, and under thoroughly reliable officers, should be limited in strength so far as is compatible with the above requirements, in order to obviate difficulty in regard to carriage in such a country.

3. Colonel Thuillier should also be called upon to submit a statement of the carriage which will be required for the officers and establishments, of which the parties will be composed, and whether it will be necessary for the Commissariat Department to supply rations for the Native establishments, and on what scale.

4. An early reply is solicited.

(Confidential.)

From *S. C. Bayley*, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 3655; dated Fort William, the 3rd August 1871.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your confidential letter, No. 660, dated the 26th ultimo, with enclosures, having reference to the expedition which it has been determined shall enter the Looshai Hills during next cold season, and to the arrangements necessary for its success.

2. In reply, I am to say that the Lieutenant Governor is anxious that there should be no chance of cross purposes between the authorities entrusted with the necessary arrange-

ments, or any possibility of confusion, and would therefore strongly urge that one single officer should be named to make all the necessary preparations, and to determine and state what is required in all departments. The officers who are to go in command of the columns should especially be required to say exactly what their requirements will be, so that they may not afterwards have to complain that the supplies, whether of material or carriage, were not suitable, or were insufficient or wanting in any way.

3. This Government has no Military Department, and the Lieutenant Governor has many other cares on him at present, and will besides be absent from Calcutta for the next two months. All the civil authorities, however, will do all that they are asked to do, but they are not in a position to suggest or determine what should be supplied in any department.

4. As regards coolie carriage, his Honor thinks that a good corps of Dhangurs will be best, and Colonel Dickens, Officiating Deputy Commissary General, believes that with proper notice he could enlist a sufficient number of men of this caste. Such an arrangement, if it can be carried out, will be much better than obtaining the men through the district civil authorities, as it would be very difficult in the latter case to draw the line between persuasion and pressure.

5. The coolies obtainable in Cachar or Chittagong, or the neighbouring districts, cannot be relied on, as they would be likely to run away, and, as before pointed out, it will be better only to arrange with the local chiefs for a sort of contract work in carrying supplies and stores to the front. With the troops of each column a regular foreign coolie corps will be best, and as Dhangurs are accustomed to go on service, and the roads of Calcutta are full of them, there will probably be little difficulty in organising two corps of this caste.

6. In respect to the allusion made to the use of river steamers for the conveyance of troops to the base of operations, I am to say that it will be necessary that the officer responsible for the arrangements of the expedition should give timely notice to the marine authorities of the probable wants in this direction, so as to allow them time to furbish up their old boats, such as they are.

7. Referring to the suggested co-operation of the troops of our allies of Munnipoor and Tipperah, I am to point out that the Rajah of Tipperah has no troops, and that the police of that State are indifferently armed and have little or no discipline; but the new Political Agent, Mr. Power, will be requested to report on the point as soon as possible.

8. His Honor fears that the relations between the civil and military officers of the expedition will be a subject of much difficulty, and he hopes that it will receive the careful consideration of the Government of India. No doubt there is a great advantage in unity of authority, and if officers could be found combining military rank and capacity with civil administrative knowledge and qualifications, it would be most desirable; but the Government of India are aware how rare such combinations are, especially where the expedition is of that size that the choice for command must necessarily be confined to a very limited number of officers of high rank. Our relations with the Looshai tribes are most peculiar and in some respects personal, and the whole effect of the expedition might be spoiled if the officer in command should insist upon having his own way, and act contrary to the opinion of the frontier officers, either from want of knowledge or owing to his being unamenable to the counsels of those who have it.

9. For these reasons the Lieutenant Governor would beg that before the question of what persons and tribes are to be treated as friends and what as enemies, is left entirely to the military heads of the expedition, the Government of India may be very sure of the qualifications and knowledge in regard to the frontier tribes of the officers who may be placed in command. Of course so long as the decision of this one question rests with competent authorities, the whole conduct of operations against the enemy must be on the undivided responsibility of the military officers.

COPY of a TELEGRAPHIC MESSAGE from the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal to the Viceroy, dated the 12th August 1871.

COOLIES for Looshai Expedition. Military Department letter of 1st August reached Calcutta after my departure. We have no military officers. I beg that military appointments may be made by Commander in Chief or Government of India. We will render every assistance. Orders have been issued to begin collecting coolies. I beg again to recommend that one responsible officer be at once appointed to make all arrangements in all departments.

(Confidential.)

From Colonel *H. K. Burne*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, No. 375; dated Simla, the 14th August 1871.

WITH reference to your letter, No. 3655, of the 3rd instant, and to the Lieutenant Governor's telegram to the Viceroy, copy of which is noted in the margin for easy reference, I am desired to acquaint you, for his Honor's information, that all requisitions on the Government of Bengal, in connection with the expeditionary force, will be made in the usual manner, and, as has hitherto been the case when such operations are undertaken, through the Military Department of the Government of India, so that no confusion ought to arise.

"12th, 6.40 p.m.—Coolies for Looshai Expedition. Military Department letter of 1st August reached Calcutta after my departure. We have no military officers. I beg that military appointments may be made by Commander in Chief or Government of India. We will render every assistance. Orders have been issued to begin collecting coolies. I beg again to recommend that one responsible officer be at once appointed to make all arrangements in all departments."

2. It may occasionally happen that requisitions will be made on the *local* civil officers by the military authorities in their districts, and instructions should be given that such requisitions be attended to as far as possible.

3. The Government of India will await a further reply to the letter, No. 11, of the 1st August last, on the question of the organisation, pay, and other details connected with the raising of the coolie corps; but, with reference to his Honor's telegram of the 12th instant, the Commander in Chief will be requested at once to submit the names of two military officers, who may be available, and also be, in his Excellency's opinion, best suited for appointment to these corps. More officers can be hereafter attached, if found necessary.

4. The requirements of the expedition in the Marine Department will form the subject of a separate communicaation.

(Confidential.)

From Colonel *P. S. Lumsden*, Quartermaster General, to the Secretary of the Government of India, Military Department, No. 3446; dated Simla, the 11th August 1871.

IN conformity with the instructions contained in Military Department Docket, No. 12, of 1st August 1871, I am directed by the Right Honourable the Commander in Chief to state, that each of the columns proposed by his Excellency to operate in the Looshai Expedition would consist of—

½ Battery, Native Artillery - - - - - -	35 men.
1 Company of Sappers - - - - - -	100 „
3 Regiments of Native Infantry, each - - - -	500 „

2. The base of these columns would respectively be at Cachar and Kassalong.

3. The left or Cachar column, his Excellency is inclined to think, should operate from the direction of Tipai Mookh, as suggested by Mr. Edgar, in which case all the troops intended for it should be assembled with their equipment complete, and their commissariat requirements insured for five months, at Cachar by the 20th November; while by that date one regiment should have established itself at Tipai Mookh, and secured a strong stockaded position there, with storehouses for the reception of commissariat stores, which should be immediately forwarded to it by water up the Barak River.

4. With reference to marine requirements, his Excellency considers that transport should be ready on 20th October to convey 100 men of the 43rd from Gowhatty, and 100 of the same regiment from Tezpore to Debroogurh, where the vessels could take on board 500 of the 42nd to be conveyed down the Burhampootra and up the Soorma River to Cachar by the 20th November.

5. The 22nd Punjab Infantry, with the half-battery of artillery and company of sappers, should all be at Cachar on or before the 20th November, and the 44th from Shillong by the middle of the month.

6. With regard to the right or Chittagong column, the troops to compose the same consisting of—

½ Battery Hazara Mountain Train,
1 Company of Sappers,
2nd Goorkhas,
4th Goorkhas,
27th Punjab Native Infantry,

should all be at Kassalong by the 20th November.

7. One regiment of this column should precede the rest by a fortnight, so as to have established a stockaded commissariat depôt above the Demagiri falls by 20th November. In fact, it would be well, so soon as the season will admit, if the police were to set to work upon this stockade, and the necessary storehouses requisite for the shelter of stores; these sheds should be well raised some three feet from the ground, and made to be covered by tarpaulins, so as to be perfectly water-tight.

8. The points of embarkation of the right column, whether from Sahibgunge, Golundah, or Calcutta, must depend on the convenience of the Marine Department.

9. The Commander in Chief desires me to annex an approximate return of the troops that will be left in Assam and Cachar on the departure of the expedition. His Excellency has provided in this Return for the maintenance of the detachments at the out-posts with such supports at Debroogurh, Gowhatty, Shillong, and Cachar, as the strength of the available troops will admit; but as the sufficiency or otherwise of this force is dependent on the political state of the frontier, his Excellency thinks that, perhaps, Government may consider it advisable to consult the local government.

10. In conclusion, the Commander in Chief would further respectfully submit that these proposals should be communicated as early as possible to the local authorities on the spot, in order to elicit an expression of any opinions which their local knowledge may suggest, and that they may take the earliest opportunity of commencing to establish posts and depôts for supplies at the bases of operations.

APPROXIMATE RETURN of EASTERN FRONTIER DISTRICT, showing Disposition of Troops after Withdrawal for Service of 500 Non-commissioned Officers and Men of 42nd and 44th Regiments respectively, and the Despatch of 22nd and 27th Native Infantry, leaving their Depôts at Decca until end of Operations.

			Non-Commissioned Officers and Men.	
Shillong	43rd	Native Infantry	167	220
Ditto	44th	„	53	
Jowaie	43rd	„	58	
Gowhatty	43rd	„	259	
Nowgong	43rd	„	86	
Tezpore	43rd	„	108	
Deboroogurh	43rd	„	200	345
Ditto	42nd	„	145	
Golaghât	42nd	„	56	
Jeypore	42nd	„	36	
Suddyah	42nd	„	112	
Poobamook	42nd	„	51	
Cherrapoonjee	44th	„	17	
Allynuggur	44th	„	84	
Chargolah	44th	„	88	
Monierkhall	4th	„	74	
Julnacherra	4th	„	77	
Nowarbund	4th	„	62	
Cachar	4th	„	336	
Dacca Depôt	22nd	„	100	250
Ditto	27th	„	150	
		TOTAL	2,319	

This disposition will entail the movement of 100 men of the 43rd Native Infantry from Gowhatty and Tezpore respectively to Debroogurh.

(Confidential.)

OFFICE MEMORANDUM from Colonel *H. K. Burne*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, Calcutta, No. 439; dated Simla, the 16th August 1871.

IN transmitting the accompanying copy of a letter from the Quartermaster General, No. 3446, of the 11th August 1871, the undersigned is desired to request that the Officiating Secretary, Military Department, at the Presidency, will at once place himself in communication with the Master Attendant, with a view to the consideration of the requirements for marine transport, and for the submission of a plan for carrying out the arrangements proposed by the Commander in Chief, as nearly as may be possible according to the dates given.

2. It is desirable that the plans proposed to effect this object should be submitted as early as possible, that, in communication with the Commander in Chief, any further necessary orders may be given, and the Government of Bengal duly informed.

(Confidential.)

OFFICE MEMORANDUM from *H. LePoer Wynne*, Esq., Under Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 1724 P.; dated Simla, the 15th August 1871.

IN continuation of the memorandum from this office to the Military Department, No. 1645 P., dated the 4th August 1871, on the subject of the proposed expedition against the Looshais, the undersigned is directed by the Viceroy and Governor General in Council to invite the attention of that Department to the remarks made by the Officiating Deputy Commissioner of Cachar, in his letter to the Commissioner of the Dacca Division, No. 709, dated the 3rd of July 1871, a copy of which has been forwarded to the Military Department by the Government of Bengal, direct, relative to the aid which may be expected from Sookpilall and other friendly chiefs in the expedition to be sent into the country of the Looshais.

2. His Excellency in Council in this Department considers this to be an important point, for if the friendly tribes are not associated with, and utilised by the British force employed, one of the principal objects of the expedition will be lost sight of.

3. This communication should be considered as confidential.

(Confidential.)

From Colonel *H. L. Thuillier*, R.A., Surveyor General of India, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Department of Agriculture, Revenue and Commerce, No. 411 F.; dated Simla, the 16th August 1871.

IN compliance with the instructions contained in Military Department Office memorandum, No. 372, dated the 14th instant, directing me to submit a scheme for providing two efficient survey parties to accompany the two columns of the expeditionary force to operate against the Looshais on the Eastern Frontier, in the ensuing cold weather, I have the honour to state that I propose the following parties to consist of the officers as specified for the South and North Columns respectively.

* One enclosure—map.
† (To be returned.)

2. Major Macdonald, Officiating Superintendent of Revenue Surveys in the Lower Provinces, who has already been twice employed in the Looshai country, I understand, has been directed to accompany the force from the South or Chittagong side, and that officer being now in Calcutta will be able to make his arrangements with the same ease and facility he did last year, when he accompanied Major Graham, Deputy Commissioner of the Hill States. Major Macdonald's experience and knowledge of the country render him highly qualified to command the survey operations in this direction.

3. To Major Macdonald's party it is proposed to attach Captain Tanner, Deputy Superintendent of Revenue Survey, at present in charge of the Bhawulpoor Survey, and from which he can easily be spared temporarily. This talented officer is very experienced in hill sketching and exploring difficult ground; and, having worked in the Kohistan of Sind with Major Macdonald, and also in the Satpoora range of the Central Provinces, is admirably suited both physically and professionally for the work in question, and fully prepared to go.

4. Mr. Barrett, an active Assistant Superintendent, attached to the Revenue Survey, who has served for several years under Major Macdonald's orders, and been named by him, is a well fitted officer, and will complete the party to render it as efficient and likely to attain the object in view as could be desired.

5. With reference to the instructions contained in the second paragraph of the Military Department Memorandum, the exact number of Native followers which may be absolutely necessary for carrying on the survey duties, conveyance of instruments, signals, &c., will be

reported on definitely by Major Macdonald, and the strength kept down to the lowest possible limits, as on former occasions. The question of carriage or porterage, and of commissariat rations, will be replied to, as soon as practicable, in a separate communication.

6. The southern party will work up from the base of the triangulation of the lower section of the Eastern Frontier series, and from the fixed points of the old topographical survey of the Chittagong Hills, and geographical information already obtained in the direction of Majors Graham and Macdonald's route of 1871 from Chittagong, as shown in the accompanying copy of the map of the Eastern British Frontier, penetrating, as far as practicable, to the north and east until a junction can be formed with the routes and the reconnaissance to be made by the second party, operating from the north or Cachar side.

7. For the executive of this latter party to accompany the column from Cachar, the Topographical Survey Establishment, now employed in the Khasia and Naga Hills, forms the best and most convenient source of supply.

8. Major Godwin-Austen, Deputy Superintendent, lately in charge of this party, is unfortunately now in Europe on furlough, which does not expire until April 1872. He is by far the best and most competent officer in every respect for explorations of this difficult character, and he has already marched with Colonel Nuthall's force, in 1869, a certain distance into the Southern Cachar country, and has a very fair knowledge of it.

9. I have good reason to believe that, if Major Godwin-Austen received early intimation by telegraph, he would, with his usual zeal for the public service, be glad to come out for an expedition of this sort, and it would be a great advantage to the public service if he could take part in it. If I am authorised, therefore, I can send him a message to the address, as per margin, or it can be done direct by the Government through the India Office. In either case it will be essential to provide for a reply message.

Chilworth Manor, Guildford, Surrey.

10. In the event of Major Godwin-Austen's services not being available, then the present officiating Deputy Superintendent of the Khasia and Garo Hills survey, Captain Badgley, can be deputed, and from his former experience in the department, he is the next best fitted and available officer for such duty, and being close at hand will be able to draw such men and supplies as may be needful from his own survey establishment, the current duties of which can be sufficiently provided for by ordinary departmental arrangements, so that the regular survey operations in the Naga Hills may not be stopped in any way.

11. With whatever officer who may go in command of this northern survey party will be associated Lieutenant Woodthorpe, R.E., Assistant Superintendent, lately appointed to the department, a very active and accomplished young officer, who is now under training for this special work at Mussoorie, and with such strength, I trust, the objects of obtaining good geographical information, and improving our knowledge of this hitherto unknown territory, may be fully accomplished.

12. There is a good base of triangulation to start from, and several well-known and fixed points in the Cachar District, which will enable this party to prosecute their reconnaissance to advantage, and they will, I hope, be able to advance southwards until a junction is formed with Major Macdonald's party, and so enable us to improve and fill up the present map very materially.

13. The provisions of paragraph 3 of the memorandum, as regards this northern party, will also be duly communicated at the earliest practicable date.

(Confidential.)

Demi-official, from *A. O. Hume*, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Department of Agriculture, Revenue, and Commerce, to the Surveyor General of India; dated Simla, the 17th August 1871.

His Excellency approves your proposed arrangements, and says that there is no objection to your telegraphing home to Godwin-Austen that such a survey party is to be sent, and that if he comes out he will have charge of it, and arrange for a reply. If Godwin-Austen does not come, your other arrangements may stand.

(No. 558.)

COPY of the above forwarded to the Quartermaster General for the information of the Commander in Chief, in continuation of docket No. 373 of the 14th instant, and with an intimation that the arrangements proposed by Colonel Thuillier for the survey parties to accompany the Looshai expedition are approved in the Military Department.

(No. 559.)

COPY of the above docket forwarded to the Department of Agriculture, Revenue, and Commerce for information, with reference to the docket* from that Department, above cited. * Map returned.

It is of course understood, that while approval is conveyed to Colonel Thuillier's proposal to telegraph to Major Godwin-Austen to offer the post to him, his return to India, in order to take it up, should be quite optional, and that he should not be ordered out.

By order,
H. K. Burne, Colonel,
Secretary to the Government of India.

(Confidential).

From Colonel *P. S. Lumsden*, Quartermaster General, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 3,678 ; dated Simla, the 20th August 1871.

IN reply to Military Department, Letter No. 332 of the 12th current, regarding the carriage which the Commissary General calculates as necessary to meet the requirements for commissariat purposes with each of the columns destined to operate in the projected Looshai expedition, I am directed by the Right Honourable the Commander in Chief to submit the annexed memorandum, drawn up in this office, of a project of advance for 10 marches of about six miles each, which, after very careful calculation, arrives at a result very similar to that of the Commissariat Department.

2. His Excellency would draw attention to the fact that the project submitted only provides for the daily requirements of the force, that no allowance is made therein for sick, which may be calculated at from 8 to 10 per cent. ; that in the position given, a regiment is in reserve, and a second in wings maintaining the line of communication.

3. Considering, however, that the carriage supplied for the baggage and ammunition of each brigade, amounting to 600 coolies and 80 elephants, may, when the force is halting, be applied to the provisioning of depôts at the third and sixth stages, and at the advanced post preparatory to further movements, His Excellency thinks that the provision contemplated, viz., 1,200 coolies for commissariat requirements, independent of the carriage for baggage and ammunition otherwise provided for, should meet all probable demands; but that it would not be safe to reduce that amount.

4. Should the tribes combine and opposition be offered to either of the columns of a more serious nature than the scanty information at command leads Government to expect, then the reserves would have to join the troops in advance, and the officers commanding the respective columns would find all their powers taxed to meet the question of provisioning the force.

5. A further knowledge of the country may develope a greater extent of water communication than we have any reason at present to calculate on, which would facilitate supply ; but again it is to be expected, that in certain marches, elephants will only be able to be used after a road has been made for them, or even that they cannot be used at all ; and, further, that the objects of the expedition may require a movement in advance of even twice the distance projected in the scheme submitted.

6. In the latter case, of course it would then be only a matter of time to collect sufficient supply at a depôt before the force could proceed on ; but these contingencies have all to be met, and to ensure success cannot be overlooked in providing for the wants of the expedition.

7. His Excellency thinks it might be well to ascertain to what extent the Munipoor state could be depended on to supply coolies for the purposes of the expedition.

8. The Commander in Chief has already in this office letter, No. 3,446, dated 11th August current, indicated Cachar and Kassalong as the primary bases of support and supply, to be advanced to Tepai Mookh and the Damargari falls as soon as practicable.

A force entering a country finds it necessary to carry provisions for the entire journey, which it is calculated will take 10 days, required the number of coolies for the transport of provisions?

The strength of the force is as follows:

Three regiments of infantry, each:—

Officers.	Native Officers.	Men.	Followers.	Officers.	Native Officers.	Soldiers.	Followers.
8	16	500	324	24	48	1,500	972
Half-battery of Artillery - - - -				1	1	35	30
One company of Sappers - - - -				2	2	100	62
Staff - - - - - - - - -				10	- -	- -	40
Police - - - - - - - - -				- -	- -	200	—
			TOTAL - - -	37	51	1,835	1,104
Of this force one regiment, or - - - -				8	16	500	324
In reserve at station will remain at the base, leaving - - - - - - - -				29	35	1,335	780

Or 2,179 men to go on; for each man 1½ seers of food are required daily; therefore for this number 3,268 seers must be carried; which, at 20 seers per coolie, requires for the - -	1st stage -	-	164 coolies.
At the 1st stage 20 police will be left, reducing the force to 2,159 men, requiring for the - - - - - - - - -	2nd stage -	-	162 „
At the 2nd stage 30 police will be left, reducing the force to 2,129 men, requiring for the - - - - - - - -	3rd stage -	-	160 „
At the 3rd stage 262 soldiers and 162 followers (a wing of a regiment) will be left, reducing the force to 1,705 men, requiring for the - - - - - - - - - -	4th stage -	-	128 „
At the 4th stage, 30 police will be left, reducing the force to 1,675 men, requiring for the - - - - - - - - -	5th stage -	-	126 „
At the 5th stage, 30 police will be left, reducing the force to 1,645 men, requiring for the - - - - - - - -	6th stage -	-	124 „
At the 6th stage, 262 soldiers and 162 followers (a wing of a regiment) will be left, reducing the force to 1,221 men, requiring for the - - - - - - - - - - -	7th stage -	-	92 „
At the 7th stage, 30 police will be left, reducing the force to 1,191 men, requiring for the - - - - - - - -	8th stage -	-	90 „
At the 8th stage, 30 police will be left, reducing the force to 1,161 men, requiring for the - - - - - - - - -	9th stage -	-	87 „
At the 9th stage, 30 police will be left, reducing the force to 1,131 men, requiring for the - - - - - - - - -	10th stage -	-	85 „
At the end of the journey therefore, there will remain - - 21 officers.			
19 Native officers.			
635 soldiers.			
456 followers.			
TOTAL - - - 1,131 men requiring for food alone to place them at this point - - -	-	-	1,218 coolies.

In

In the foregoing calculation it is supposed that coolies are supplied for the carriage of baggage and ammunition; if, however, elephants are provided in lieu, the number of followers leaving the base will be reduced from 780 to 264—

417 coolies being required for baggage,
99 „ „ ammunition.

516

780 — 516 = 264.

In place of these 516 coolies, 37 elephants would be required; for each elephant about 10 seers of food has to be provided daily, and for the two attendants three seers; so that for 37 elephants with 74 attendants, 592 seers, 30 coolies would be required daily.

In addition, arrangements must be made for the food of the 12 elephants carrying the artillery, guns, and ammunition, as well as for the food of the coolies who carry provisions, and also for feeding the troops in the advance and at the several posts, so that even supposing elephant carriage be supplied for baggage and ammunition, it will be found that 1,200 coolies will be required for food for each column, and if it be determined to take coolies for baggage and ammunition, 500 more must be added to the above number.

Considering, however, the carriage for baggage, stores, and ammunition, to be fixed at 80 elephants and 600 coolies, and taking into consideration the food of the elephants and their followers, the result arrived at is very much similar, viz., a want of about 1,200 coolies to feed the force.

The baggage to be allowed is as follows:

	Maund.		Seers.
Army staff and commanding officers, each	1	or	40
Other officers, each	½	„	20
Native officers, each	¼	„	10
Soldiers, each			6
Cooking utensils per regiment	2	„	80
Ditto per separate company or detachment	½	„	20
Hospital stores, per regiment	1	„	40
Cooking, per separate company or detachment	½	„	20

40 rounds per man to be carried with the force, calculating 100 rounds = 9 lbs.

Servants:

British officers, each	2, one for each pony.
Native „ „	½
Regiment	24
or per Company	3
Hospital, per regiment	8
per company	3
Doolie bearers, per regiment	48
per company	6

(Confidential.)

From Colonel *H. K. Burne*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Quartermaster General, No. 376; dated Simla, the 14th August 1871.

With reference to the docket from this Department, No. 12, of the 1st instant, I am desired to transmit an extract* from a message from the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, to the Viceroy, and to request that the Commander-in-Chief may be moved to submit the names of suitable officers from any that may be available for the duty of raising the coolie corps for the expeditionary force.

2. The Governor General in Council thinks that at first, and for the preliminary measures, two officers will be sufficient, as more can be appointed hereafter if necessary.

* "Dated 12th, 6.40 p.m.
"Coolies for Looshai Expedition. Military Department letter of 1st August reached Calcutta after my departure. We have no military officers.
"I beg that military appointments may be made by Commander in Chief or Government of India. We will render every assistance. Orders have been issued to begin collecting coolies."

(Confidential.)

From Colonel *G. E. Holmes*, Officiating Deputy Adjutant General, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 1767; dated Simla, the 28th August 1871.

In compliance with the request contained in your letter, No. 376, of the 14th instant, I have the honour, by direction of the Commander in Chief, to state that His Excellency is prepared to place the following officers at the disposal of Government for the duty of raising coolie corps for the Looshai expeditionary force, viz.:—

Major G. A. Brown, Staff Corps, whose tour as Brigade Major has just expired.
Captain A. D. Anderson, Staff Corps, Adjutant and Officiating Wing Officer, 23rd Pioneers.

2. If the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council be pleased to approve of these nominations, His Excellency begs to be favoured with instructions for the officers named.

(Confidential.)

From Colonel *G. E. Holmes*, Officiating Deputy Adjutant General, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 1768; dated Simla, the 28th August 1871.

WITH reference to my letter of this date, No. 1767, submitting the names of two officers for the duty of raising coolie corps for the Looshai expeditionary force, I am directed to request that you will be good enough to substitute the name of Lieutenant Colonel J. Moreland, Staff Corps, for that of Captain A. D. Anderson, Adjutant and Officiating Wing Officer, 23rd Pioneers.

From Colonel *H. K. Burne*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Adjutant General, No. 815; dated Simla, the 29th August 1871.

1767, 1768, 1769 } Field operations, dated 28th August 1871.

I AM directed to acknowledge your letters noted in the margin, and, in reply, to state that the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council approves of the orders issued by His Excellency the Commander in Chief placing Lieutenant Colonel J. Moreland and Major G. A. Brown at the disposal of the Government for the duty of raising coolie corps for the Looshai expedition.

2. Lieutenant Colonel Moreland should also, His Excellency in Council thinks, be directed to proceed to Bhaugulpore to await with Major Brown the instructions of the Bengal Government.

3. The Lieutenant Governor will be informed of these arrangements by telegram.

From Colonel *H. K. Burne*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Commissary General, No. 173; dated Simla, the 6th September 1871.

IN continuation of my letter, No. 718 of the 25 August 1871, I am desired to request that you will issue orders for the elephants intended for the two columns of the Looshai Expedition to move at the earliest practicable date to Cachar and Chittagong, respectively.

2. Those sent should be so divided as to ensure, as nearly as possible, an equal number for each of the columns.

3. While it is very desirable that these elephants should arrive at their destination at the earliest period in November that is practicable, no risks should be run by their being started at too early a date, and it is essential that their march should be so arranged as to ensure their arriving at their destination in a perfect state of efficiency so far as it is possible to secure this by care and good management.

(No. 174.)

COPY of the foregoing forwarded to the Quartermaster General for the information of His Excellency the Commander in Chief, in continuation of No. 719; dated 25 August 1871.

By order.

From Colonel *H. K. Burne*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, No. 213; dated Simla, the 7th September 1871.

I AM directed to acquaint you that a telegram to the following effect has this day been despatched to you:

Your demi-official of 26th August. Government of India will be glad to hire as many elephants for the expedition as may be procurable, up to 100, in the districts of Sylhet, Mymensing, and Chittagong, without the exercise of any unduly severe pressure. Only good and serviceable animals should be taken, for which the Commissariat Department consider from 30 rupees to 50 rupees a month, according to size, would be a fair rate, Government providing food of animals, pay of attendants, and all necessary gear.

Please inform Commissioners and report quickly how many animals, and at what rates, are procurable, also where and by whom gear can most conveniently be made up. The operations of Government Kheddahs in Assam will be suspended this season. All private kheddah operations should also be suspended as far as practicable.

Move Lieutenant Governor to issue any necessary orders.

From Lieutenant Colonel *A. B. Johnson*, Officiating Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Quartermaster General, No. 280; dated Simla, the 9th September 1871.

I AM to request that you will move the Right Honourable the Commander in Chief to favour the Government of India with His Excellency's opinion in respect to the question of providing rations for the officers of the Looshai expeditionary force. I am to state that should His Excellency be of opinion that arrangements should be made for this purpose, the Governor General in Council is prepared to receive His Excellency's recommendations, and, in that case, would be glad to be favoured with His Excellency's suggestions as to the amount and description of rations. In considering the point, it should, I am to point out, be borne in mind that the Commissariat Department might have considerable difficulty in provisioning detached officers.

EXTRACT from the PROCEEDINGS of the Government of India in the Foreign Department (Political), No. 1872 P; dated Simla, the 4th September 1871.

Read again—

The resolution of this Department, No. 1645 P, dated 4th August, defining the relative positions of the civil and military authorities who are to be attached to the expedition against the Looshais.

Read also—

A letter on the same subject from the Officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal, dated the 14th of August 1871, No. 14 T.

OBSERVATIONS.—The Viceroy and Governor General in Council observes that the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal fears that the relations between the civil and military officers of the expedition will be a subject of much difficulty, and suggests that the duty of deciding who are to be treated as friends, and who as enemies, should rest with the civil officers. His Excellency in Council cannot see why any difficulties, or conflict of authority of this kind, should occur. If, as His Excellency in Council expects and requires of them, the civil and military officers make up their minds to sink all personal matters and think only of the public interest, there ought to be no serious difficulty in the relations between them. As an illustration of this His Excellency in Council would point to the Umbeyla and Hazara campaigns, where perfect harmony existed between the civil and military officers. It is, in the opinion of His Excellency in Council, absolutely necessary that the supreme authority, command, and general direction of the force should vest in the Officer Commanding, and in him alone. The duties of the civil officer are perfectly distinct, and have already been defined in the resolutions of Government in the Foreign Department, No. 1453 P, dated 11th July, and No. 1645 P, dated 4th August 1871. He should give the Commanding officer every information which he may be possessed of, relative to the geographical features of the country, and the habits and disposition of the people, and should offer his opinion freely upon the objects to be attained, leaving the Officer Commanding to act upon his suggestions or not as he may deem expedient. But, on the other hand, the commanding officer should avail himself on every possible occasion of the superior local knowledge which the civil officer must necessarily possess, and employ him most prominently in all negociations with the tribes. And the officers of both branches of the service should have no other object than the success of the undertaking, which will, of course, like every measure of the kind, be difficult and critical, but which should, at the same time, be entirely successful if conducted with prudence and courage. His Excellency in Council is confident that the civil and military authorities will duly appreciate the importance of these remarks, and will prove, by their actions, that they recognise the necessity of acting thoroughly in harmony with each other.

2. His Excellency in Council further observes that the Lieutenant Governor is under the impression that orders have been issued to Mr. Edgar and Captain Lewin to correspond direct with the Government of India in the Foreign Department, and that the Government of Bengal will consequently be relieved of any control over, or interference with, the conduct of the expedition. Such orders have not been issued, nor was it contemplated to relieve the Government of Bengal of the responsibility which has hitherto devolved on it in similar cases. His Excellency in Council considers that the political officers should report to the Bengal Government, who should submit the reports, with the Lieutenant Governor's opinions and comments, as quickly as possible, to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

3. The Bengal Government again urges the importance of at once sending the military commander or some other officer to Calcutta to take charge of all preliminary arrangements, and especially represents the necessity of having the coolies, who are now being collected, under the orders of that Government, speedily brought under the management and organisation of the officers who will have to control them during the expedition.

4. His Excellency in Council believes that the former matter has been already under the consideration of the Military Department, and that an officer has been, or is about to be, deputed, but both suggestions will be forwarded for the consideration of that department.

(No. 3656.)

EXTRACT (paragraph 7) forwarded to the Political Agent, Hill Tipperah, with a request that he will submit the required report as soon as possible.

By Order of the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal,

(signed) *H. L. Harrison,*
for Secretary to the Government of Bengal.

FIELD OPERATIONS.

From Colonel *P. S. Lumsden,* Quartermaster General, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 1358 C; dated Calcutta, the 7th April 1871.

WITH reference to the collecting of elephants at Dacca, I am now directed by the Commander in Chief to report, for the information of Government, that His Excellency learns from the Commissioner and Brigadier General Bourchier that elephants cannot travel from Dacca to Sylhet during the rains or after that season, until the rivers and jheels dry up in November; and if there is a probability of their being wanted, they should be sent on to Sylhet.

MEMORANDUM by Colonel *B. E. Bacon,* Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 578; dated Fort William, the 15th April 1871.

THE Commissary General is requested to state below whether there are any, and, if so, what objections to his Excellency's suggestion. Early reply to the Simla Office requested.

From Lieutenant Colonel *J. I. Willes,* Commissary General, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 24; dated Simla, the 24th April 1871.

I HAVE the honour to forward your Calcutta Office, No. 578 of 15th instant, regarding the elephants at Dacca moving at once to Sylhet, as Brigadier General Bourchier and the Commissioner are of opinion that they could not travel before November, as the country would be impassable after the rains till then: and I am requested to state if any objections exist to the suggestion. In reply, I beg to state that I have no personal knowledge of the country between Dacca and Sylhet, and certainly was unaware that the country would be so bad as represented. But the Commissioner's opinion should certainly have great weight, and if there is time for the elephants to travel now before the rains set in, I see no objection to their moving. The Brigadier General Commanding the Eastern Frontier will, I trust, be directed to see that sheds or some kind of protection is ready for the elephants on reaching Sylhet, otherwise from exposure during the very heavy rains at Sylhet, both attendants and elephants would, in all probability, suffer greatly, and be unfit for work at the commencement of the cold season.

From Lieutenant Colonel *J. I. Willes,* Commissary General, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 33; dated Simla, the 25th April 1871.

IN continuation of my letter, No. 24, dated 24th instant, I have the honour to annex copy of Mr. Nuthall's telegram about elephants marching from Dacca to Sylhet, and this gentleman says that by a longer route than the direct one, elephants can travel all the year round. Mr. Nuthall knows the country well, and I think his opinion may be relied on, though possibly before accepting it, the Commissioner at Dacca should be consulted.

TELEGRAM from Mr. *Nuthall,* Superintendent, Dacca Kheddahs.

FROM Dacca to Sylhet about 12 forced, 16 regular, marches. To Cachar four forced, six regular, marches; further road open, all year round *viâ* Mymensing District to hills and Sylhet, takes longer than by regular route.

From Lieutenant Colonel *A. D. Dickens*, for Commissary General, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 1965; dated Fort William, the 25th April 1871.

WITH reference to paragraph 3 of your letter, No. 1160, dated 24th March 1871, to the Quartermaster General, copy received with docket, No. 1161, of same date, I beg to report that Lieutenant Colonel J. S. Dunbar, lately arrived from furlough on medical certificate, and who was the executive commissariat officer at Dacca from October 1861 to November 1862, has been appointed to take charge of the elephants ordered there. Lieutenant Colonel Dunbar left Calcutta for Dacca on the 22nd current.

From Colonel *H. K. Burne*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary of the Government of Bengal, No. 84; dated Simla, the 25th April 1871.

I AM directed to acquaint you that a telegram to the following effect has this day been dispatched to you:—

"Precedence.—It is stated that road from Dacca to Sylhet, *viâ* Mymensing District, is open all the year round. Is it so, and could elephants, if necessary, move up from Dacca to Sylhet in October, and in how many days?

"Please reply at once by telegraph."

Dated the 26th April 1871.

From Calcutta.	To Simla.
From Bengal Secretary.	To Colonel Burne.

THERE is a route open in the rains *viâ* Mymensing from Dacca to Sylhet. It takes three weeks, and Commissioner is against it on score of both delay and expense.

From Lieutenant Colonel *J. I. Willes*, Commissary General, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 40; dated Simla, the 26th April 1871.

IN continuation of my letters, Nos. 24 and 33 of 24th and 25th instant respectively, I have the honour to annex copy of a telegram, from which it will be seen that the Commissioner of Dacca states that the earliest possible date on which elephants can march thence to Sylhet is not before the middle of October. This opinion should be accepted as correct in preference to that of Mr. Nuthall's.

TELEGRAM, dated 25th April 1871, from the Deputy Commissary General, Lower Circle, to the Commissary General, Simla.

COMMISSIONER of Dacca telegraphs that elephants cannot march to Sylhet before middle of October, and even then with difficulty.

From Colonel *H. K. Burne*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Military Secretary to the Governor General, No. 113; dated Simla, the 28th April 1871.

I AM directed to acquaint you that a telegram to the following effect has this day been dispatched to you:—

"Referring to papers and office note sent yesterday, and which should reach you to-morrow, the following is distribution of elephants on Eastern Frontier:—

"Cachar, 16; Shillong, 9; Debrooghur, 12; Gowhatty, 10; Chittagong, 20; Dacca, 93: total, 160.

"In a demi-official received to-day, General Bourchier again expresses a hope that elephants will be sent on to Sylhet."

From Lieutenant Colonel *J. I. Willes*, Commissary General, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 70; dated Simla, the 29th April 1871.

I HAVE the honour to annex a statement showing the number of elephants at General Bourchier's disposal on the North-eastern Frontier. The total is 152, and the Koonkie elephants belonging to the Khedda establishment are not included, as it is supposed they will be required for huntin operations next season.

2. Twenty elephants have left for Chittagong, and are probably there by this time. As the Commissioner of Dacca states that there is a good road *viâ* Comilla open all the year, except from middle of May till September, when the rivers are high. Twelve of these elephants were taken from Khedda establishment, and eight from those sent from Barrackpore. They were sent under charge of a serjeant.

3. The elephants from Dinapore and Hazareebaugh had not reached Barrackpore on 24th instant; but when they reached, 20 would be sent on to Dacca if the rivers admitted of the animals crossing.

4. As there was no suitable accommodation for the Khedda elephants at Sylhet, the Deputy Commissary General has ordered Mr. Nuthall to come with his new captures 45 to Dacca.

5. I have written to enquire how many more elephants will be available, should it be decided not to work a Khedda next year, and will report again very shortly.

STATEMENT showing the Number of ELEPHANTS available at Chittagong and Dacca and with Regiments serving in Assam.

	Dacca.	Chittagong.	Gowhatty.	Debrooghur.	Cachar.	Shillong.	Sylhet.	Grand Total.
Commissariat elephants - - -	4	2	–	–	–	–	–	–
Captures of 1868–69 - - -	–	2	–	–	–	–	–	–
Ditto of 1869–70 - - -	37	8	–	–	–	–	–	–
Barrackpore elephants - - -	32	8	–	–	–	–	–	–
Dinapore and Hazareebaugh elephants	20	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
43rd Regiment, Native Infantry -	–	–	9	–	–	–	–	–
42nd ditto - - ditto - -	–	–	–	12	–	–	–	–
4th ditto - - ditto - -	–	–	–	–	7	–	–	–
44th ditto - - ditto - -	–	–	–	–	–	9	–	–
Telegraph Department - - -	–	–	1	–	–	–	1	–
TOTAL - - -	93	20	10	12	7	9	1	152

J. I. Willes, Lieutenant Colonel,
Commissary General.

Quartermaster General's Office, Army Head Quarters,
Simla, 8 May 1871.

From the Officer Commanding Eastern Frontier District, to the Adjutant General, No. 335; dated Sylhet, the 18th April 1871, transferred to the Quartermaster General on the 26th April 1871.

REFERRING to your docket, No. 60 C., dated 25th March 1871, forwarding Government letter, No. 1160, regarding supply of elephants for Eastern Frontier, I beg to report, for the information of His Excellency the Commander in Chief, that Mr. Nuthall, Superintendent

of

of Kheddas, called upon me a few days ago, and informed me that of the 39 Koonkie elephants (said in above-quoted letter to be available for service) he would not have more than about 19; that a number were to be sent to Chittagong, Debrooghur, and other places. He informed me that the Commissariat were urging him to train the young elephants caught this year for service in the autumn, but that their employment with an expedition would be disastrous. Captain Thompson informs me that the elephants supplied in 1869 to General Nuthall, trained for two years, gave immense trouble, throwing their loads in all directions. Mr. Nuthall seemed unwilling that the elephants should be collected at Sylhet instead of Dacca, making some difficulty as to training ground. Mr. Simson and Mr. Edgar agree entirely with me that if not brought up before the country becomes impassable, they will not get here until well into the cold weather when the swamps have dried. I begged Mr. Nuthall to favour me with his views (both on the rendezvous for elephants and the supply of half-trained animals) in writing for submission; he has not done so, and has gone off to Dacca. I also recommended him to address the Commissariat regarding these matters.

(No. 1328.)

MEMORANDUM from Colonel *P. S. Lumsden*, C.S.I., Quartermaster General, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

SUBMITTED for the information of Government in the Military Department, in continuation of this office letter, No. 1358 c., dated 7th April 1871.

From Lieutenant Colonel *J. I. Willes*, Commissary General, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 151; dated Simla, the 17th May 1871.

IN continuation of former correspondence, I have the honour to submit copy of letter, No. 34, of 2nd instant from Mr. Nuthall, Superintendent of the Dacca Kheddas, to the Deputy Commissary General, Lower Circle, and of its annexure, from which it will be seen that means do exist apparently of sending elephants from Dacca to Sylhet even in the rains.

From the Superintendent, Dacca Kheddahs, to the Deputy Commissary General, Lower Circle, No. 34; dated the 2nd May 1871.

WITH reference to the 2nd paragraph of your No. 141 of 13th ultimo, I have the honour to state that the elephants can go to Sylhet in 12 days during the dry season, but in rains they take about 20 or 25 days to reach the place. From Dacca* to Mymensing there is a Government good Kutcha road through Toonghee, Joygebpore, and Ekdalla, and it is open throughout the year. The route No. 169 in the route book is for an old road, and as it is a roundabout way, it is not much in use. During the rains there is but one road open from Mymensing to Sylhet, and a list of which, showing the several stages, is herewith sent for your perusal.

*Nine easy and five forced marches.

LIST showing the Several Stages from Mymensing to Sylhet generally used by Zemindars when moving Elephants to Sylhet.

From	To
Doorgapore	Nazirpore
Nazirpore,	Moish Khola
Moish Khola	Bangul Chita
Bangul Chita	Satkadum
Satkadum	Laoor
Laoor	Kalabai
Kalabai	Chattuck
Chattuck	Gobind Gunge
Gobind Gunge	Sylhet

From Lieutenant Colonel *J. I. Willes*, Commissary General, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 164; dated Simla, the 18th May 1871.

I HAVE the honour to report that the 20 elephants sent from Barrackpore to Chittagong reached on the 30th ultimo.

From Colonel *H. K. Burne*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Quartermaster General, No. 396; dated Simla, the 26th May 1871.

WITH reference to the correspondence noted in the margin,* I am desired to acquaint you, for the information of the Commander in Chief, that in the opinion of the Governor General in Council Dacca, is a more convenient and suitable place than any other for the concentration of elephants, in the event of their being hereafter required.

* To the Quartermaster General, No. 1160, dated 24th March 1871.
From the Quartermaster General, No. 1358 c., dated 7th April 1871.
No. 1328, dated 8th May 1871.

2. I am to add that, from information before Government, it is quite clear that the elephants can move from Dacca to Sylhet or Chittagong immediately after the rains (or even during the rainy season if such should be absolutely necessary) and could be at any place required on the North-eastern Frontier long before the troops could take the field, should it eventually be decided that an expedition should take place in the ensuing cold season.

From Lieutenant Colonel *J. I. Willes*, Commissary General, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 2474; dated Fort William, the 1st June 1871.

WITH reference to the third paragraph of letter, No. 70, dated 29th April 1871, from the Commissary General, Simla, I have the honour to report that the elephants which were ordered down from Dinapore and Hazareebaugh, in view to some of them being sent on to Dacca, arrived at Barrackpore on 8th May, but as they could not, by ordinary marches, reach the Pudma, 14 marches from Barrackpore, before that river rose, they have been detained (with the sanction of the Commissary General) till after the rains, when they will be moved on. To send them by double marches to the Pudma seemed injudicious, as they might not after such marches be able to cross a large river.

From Major *W. M. Lees*, Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Commissary General, No. 571; dated Simla, the 23rd June 1871.

WITH reference to your letter, No. 2474, dated 1st June 1871, I am directed to request that you will have the goodness to report, for the information of the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council, the number of elephants that have arrived at Barrackpore from Dinapore and Hazareebaugh, and how many are respectively at Dacca, Chittagong, Cachar, Sylhet, and Shillong.

From Lieutenant Colonel *J. I. Willes*, Commissary General, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 392; dated Simla, the 26th June 1871.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter, No. 571, of 23rd instant, and annex a statement showing the elephants at the places named. Thirty-seven have reached Barrackpore from Dinapore and Hazareebaugh.

STATEMENT showing the Number of ELEPHANTS present at the Station named below:—

Stations.	Number of Elephants.	
Dacca - - -	55	
Chittagong - -	20	*N.B.*—There are also 41 Koonkee elephants at Dacca, besides 45 captures of 1869-70 and 1870-71, the latter not yet fit for work.
Cachar - - -	9	
Sylhet - - -	—	
Shillong - - -	9	
Barrackpore - -	60	

(No. 45.)

COPY of the above forwarded to the Quartermaster General, in continuation of letter, No. 396, dated 26th May 1871, for the information of his Excellency the Commander in Chief.

By order,
(signed) *W. M. Lees*, Major,
Assistant Secretary to the Government of India.

(Confidential.)

TELEGRAPHIC MESSAGES.

Dated the 11th July 1871.

From Moulmein.	To Simla.
From Chief Commissioner.	To Military Secretary.

I COULD obtain a hundred fairly trained for carriage, and possibly more. But it takes two and a-half months to march them across, and the season would not be very healthy. Mahouts, servants, and officer to take charge, must be sent from India. If anything is to be done, immediate orders necessary; probably average price (800) to (1,000) if sent by sea; tonnage must be engaged in Calcutta. If required for immediate hard work on arrival, I would recommend ships to leave here about 20th October, in tow of steamers.

Dated the 20th July 1871.

From Rangoon.	To Simla.
From A. Eden.	To Colonel Burne, Military Secretary.

MY estimate was exclusive of commissariat cattle.

(Confidential.)

From Colonel *H. K. Burne*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to Brigadier General *G. Bourchier*, C.B., Shillong, or elsewhere, No. 112; dated Simla, the 28th April 1871.

I AM directed to acquaint you that a telegram to the following effect has this day been dispatched to you:—

"Supposing them to be required, how many coolies could probably be collected in Cachar and Sylhet for carriage in November. Please telegraph reply confidentially."

(Confidential.)

Dated the 29th April 1871.

From Shillong.	To Simla.
From General Bourchier.	To Colonel Burne, Secretary to Government.

FROM information I received from Mr. Edgar, I believe large numbers of Naga and Kookie coolies can be obtained in Cachar, but they will require organisation. I will make further inquiries confidentially.

(Confidential.)

Dated the 17th May 1871.

From Shillong.	To Simla.
From General Bourchier.	To Colonel Burne, Secretary, Military Department.

FROM Cachar we could draw 2,000 coolies for continued service of several months; from Sylhet about 5,000 Bengalees and 500 hill men; the Bengalees, as a rule, very inferior. It would be advisable to organise them into baggage corps superintended by officers and steady serjeants.

(Confidential.)

From *H. L. Harrison*, Esq., Officiating Junior Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 3963; dated Fort William, the 21st August 1871.

WITH reference to your letter, No. 11, dated the 1st instant, I am directed to report, for the information of the Government of India, that the Lieutenant Governor has appointed a committee composed of the officers named on the margin* to organise a coolie corps of 1,200 men for service in the Looshai country during the ensuing cold weather. Colonel Dickens been nominated president of the committee.

His Honor desires me to request that the services of Colonel Dickens may be placed at the disposal of the Government of Bengal, so far as may be necessary for the purposes for which the committee has been selected.

* Lieutenant Colonel A. D. Dickens, C.B., Officiating Deputy Commissary General.
Mr. C. E. Bernard, Revenue Secretary, Government of Bengal.
Mr. H. L. Harrison, Junior Secretary, Government of Bengal.
Mr. J. H. Reilly, District Superintendent of Police.
Dr. J. G. Garrow-Grant, Superintendent of Labour Transport.

TELEGRAM.—Dated the 30th August 1871.

From	To
From Simla.	To Calcutta.
From Secretary Colonel Burne.	To the Secretary to the Government of Bengal.

YOUR letter, 3963 of 21st August. Officers have been named for the duty of raising coolies as intimated by telegram yesterday.

Colonel Dickens is available to serve on any committee to lay down terms of service, &c., for the coolies, but his services must go on irrespective of those in the Commissariat Department, and he will probably be required away from Calcutta before long.

(Confidential.)

From *H. L. Harrison*, Esq., Officiating Junior Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department, to the District Superintendent of Police, on Special Duty, No. 4023; dated Fort William, the 25th August 1871.

WITH reference to paragraph 4 of the Government Resolution, dated the 11th instant, I am directed to forward to you the accompanying copy of a memorandum by the committee appointed to consider the organisation of the coolie corps required for service in the Looshai country, and to say that, subject to the confirmation of the Government of India, the Lieutenant Governor has approved of the rates of pay, establishment, &c., laid down by the committee, and I am to request that you will at once proceed to collect coolies in accordance with the committee's scheme.

2. With reference to the place where the depôt should be formed for Danghur coolies, the Lieutenant Governor desires to know whether, in your opinion, Raneegunge, Calcutta, or Goalundo is most conveniently situated for the purpose. In this matter you can act on your own discretion in communication with the master attendant as regards the route which will be followed in conveying coolies to Chittagong, and with Dr. Grant, as regards the danger of cholera, and the measures necessary to minimise the risk of its breaking out.

3. You are also requested to report whether the Danghur coolies are as well adapted to carrying loads as the Nepaulese and North-eastern Frontier coolies, and if not, whether it will not be advisable to modify so much of the committee's scheme as contemplates the separation of the western and eastern coolies into distinct corps, and instead thereof to constitute each corps partly of Nepaulese, Assamese, &c., and partly of Danghurs.

4. In reply to your letter of the 24th instant, you are authorised to draw at once from the Bank of Bengal an advance of 1,000 rupees, and the Accountant General will also be requested to give you a letter of credit on the Bancoorah Treasury for 3,000 rupees, and another on the Surulia Treasury for 5,000 rupees. You should submit monthly accounts to the Accountant General, in which you will debit yourself with the advances received from the treasuries, and credit yourself with the sum expended, for which, as far as possible, vouchers should be submitted.

RESOLUTION by the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department; dated Goalpara, the 11th August 1871.

THE Lieutenant Governor has received information from the Government of India, that a coolie corps of 1,200 men will be required for service in the Looshai country during the cold weather. One-half of this number will be wanted to accompany the column from Chittagong, the other half will accompany that from Cachar.

2. The coolies will, when collected, be organised and placed under the command of military officers.

3. It

3. It is essential that no time should be lost in collecting men, fixing rates of pay, and making other preliminary arrangements. With this view the Lieutenant Governor desires that the gentlemen named in the margin* may be requested to constitute a committee, under the presidentship of Colonel Dickens, to carry out the above objects, and to give effect to the suggestions offered below for their guidance.

* Colenel Dickens, Officiating Deputy Commissary General.
Mr. C. E. Bernard, Revenue Secretary to Government of Bengal.
Mr. H. L. Harrison, Junior Secretary to the Government of Bengal.
Mr. J. H. Reilly, District Superintendent of Police.
Dr. J. G. Garrow-Grant, Superintendent of Labour Transport.

4. The task of collecting the men in the first instance should be placed under Mr. Reilly, whose duties will, for the present, be confined to this.

5. It must be distinctly understood, however, that military officers will hereafter be appointed to take charge of the coolies, and as soon as any military officer is appointed, he will take complete charge and control of the arrangements. The various departments of Government will, of course, be directed to assist him in every way in their power, and the Lieutenant Governor does not doubt that the committee will render him whatever aid he may ask for.

6. The committee will fix the rates of pay for sirdars and coolies, the proportion of sirdars to coolies, and will decide whether clothing should be supplied to the latter. It will be desirable that the sirdars should be paid partly by a per-centage on the number of coolies present each month, so as to give them a direct interest in preventing desertion. It will be necessary to fix two rates of pay for the coolies; one to be given without rations before the actual duties of the expedition commence, and one to be in addition to rations, when the duties have commenced.

7. As the country where operations will be undertaken is in parts at an elevation of 4,000 to 5,000 feet above the sea, it may be necessary to provide them with blankets and warm clothing, as the preservation of their health is not less important than that of the troops.

8. The Lieutenant Governor is also of opinion that in fixing the rates of pay, it would be better to err on the side of generosity than on that of parsimony, as it is of the utmost importance to keep the coolies contented. It will be well also to make arrangements for a certain portion of their pay being made over during their absence to the families of such as may desire it. It may be mentioned that Mr. Edgar has usually paid his coolies (local) when in the Looshai country four annas a day in addition to their rations. It will be necessary probably to give some advance on this.

9. In regard to the classes and localities from which coolies should be recruited, the Lieutenant Governor desires it to be understood that local coolies are objected to for several reasons. They are more likely to run away, whether from discontent or fear, than coolies from a distance. They are known to be greatly afraid of the Looshais.
The total number that could be collected is not large, and it is desirable to retain them as a reserve, which may be fallen back on, if necessary, at the last.

10. Hindustanees are also objectionable, as being liable to fall ill, and unacquainted with jungle work.

11. The classes that are considered likely to make the best coolies are Nepaulese, Dhangurs (including Sonthals, Coles, and other wild tribes from the Sonthal and Chota Nagpore country), and any tribes that are accustomed to hill and jungle work, and physically able to carry good loads.

12. It will be necessary to arrange for keeping the coolies in Calcutta and Darjeeling during the process of organisation.

13. In recruiting these coolies, Mr. Reilly will communicate with the district officers in the Chota Nagpoor and Bhagulpoor Divisions, and with the Commissioner of the Cooch Behar Division. It is not improbable that among the numerous gangs of Dhangur coolies working on the Calcutta roads and on the railways, and the parties of Boonah coolies in the indigo factories in Bengal, useful men may be found to assist in the work of recruiting.

14. It is suggested that for recruiting Nepaulese, who are the most useful class of coolies if they can be persuaded to serve at a distance from their homes, it may be desirable to dispatch Captain Hedayut Ali to Darjeeling. His experience in Sikkim and in the Jynteah hills, and his well-known capacity for organisation, point him out as a particularly useful man for this purpose; and if he is willing to undertake the work, the junior secretary should at once write, in the name of the Lieutenant Governor, to ask if His Excellency the Commander in Chief will have any objection to placing his services temporarily at the disposal of the Bengal Government for this purpose.

15. If this is acceded to, a deputation allowance of 250 rupees might be allowed him while engaged in collecting and organising as many coolies, up to the number of 800, as may be obtainable on the terms offered at Darjeeling.

MEMORANDUM by the Committee appointed by the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, to consider the Organisation of two Corps of Coolies of 600 men each for Service in the Looshai Country, during the ensuing Cold Weather.

Proposed Strength and Rates of Pay and Allowances.

Strength.	Pay per Mensem.	Batta per Mensem while Campaigning.
	Rs.	
1 Officer (staff pay) - - -	300	—
1 Assistant (staff pay) - - -	150	—
6 Havildars (by transfer from Native Regiments) - - -	- -	50 per cent. of pay.
1 Gomashta - - - -	50	25 „ „
1 Moonshee or Writer - -	30	15 „ „
6 Sirdars or Chowdries - -	12	3 each.
24 Mates - - - - -	10	2 „
600 Coolies - - - - -	8	2 „

Rules.

1. Small advances will be made to the men through the Chowdries, and one month's pay given to be recovered in three monthly instalments.

2. Family remittances at par will be permitted to the extent of the full pay of each cooly if desired.

3. Each man will be armed with a dao or kookrie supplied by Government.

4. One blanket, a pair of sandals or shoes, and a flannel or serge jacket will be given to each man, and one waterproof canvas between two men. Each cooly will also have a metal badge marked with his number.

5. The duties of the men will be carrying doolies and litters, supplies, ammunition, baggage, &c., making roads and cutting jungles.

6. Whilst on actual service, *i.e.*, from date of leaving Calcutta to date of return, each man will receive free rations from the commissariat on the scale of public establishments.

7. In case of death three months' pay will be given to families of deceased men.

8. A native doctor, with a small hospital establishment and supply of medicines, will be attached to each corps, the details of the arrangement being settled in communication with the Inspector General of Hospitals.

9. Every man should be inspected and passed by a medical officer on arrival at the depôt, and should be made clearly to understand the rules under which he is entertained. No man under 18 or over 40 years of age will be taken.

10. The ordinary loads are not to exceed 25 seers, exclusive of the coolies' own clothes, food, &c.

11. The men are to be engaged for a period not exceeding eight months.

12. All those who are invalided will be sent back to their homes at the expense of Government on full pay, but without batta, up to the date of arrival at their homes.

13. Men falling sick will be allowed full pay, but no batta, while off duty.

The Committee recommend the following measures:—

That in the first instance endeavour be made to raise one corps of Danghurs, &c., from Calcutta and the Western Districts, leaving the other to be recruited from the North Eastern Districts.

That the depôt for the Danghurs be formed at Raneegunge.

That an advance of 500 rupees be made to Mr. Reilly for immediate contingencies.

The

The committee estimate the probable cost per mensem of each corps while on actual service, as below :—

	Pay.	Extra Allowance while Campaigning.
	Rs.	*Rs.*
1 Officer	300	—
1 Assistant	150	—
6 Havildars	(military pay)	60
1 Gomashta	50	25
1 Moonshee	30	15
6 Sirdars	72	18
24 Mates	240	48
600 Coolies	4,800	1,200
Add Rations.		
8 Men at 4 rupees each		32
630 Men at 3 rupees each		1,890
Contingencies, medicines, &c.	500	—
Total Monthly Cost	6,142 × 5=30,710	3,288 × 3=9,864
Total Cost — *Rs.*		40,574
Add Miscellaneous.	*Rs.*	
630 Blankets at 3 rupees each	1,890	
630 Serge jackets at 2 rupees each	1,260	
630 Pairs of shoes at 1 rupee each	630	
630 Daos or Kookries, at *Rs.*3. 8. each	2,205	
630 Badges at 8 annas each	315	
315 Waterproof canvas at 6 rupees each	1,890	
		8,190
Grand Total — *Rs.*		48,764

From Colonel *H. K. Burne*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Adjutant General, No. 883 ; dated Simla, the 31st August 1871.

In forwarding, in original (return requested), the accompanying communication* from the Government of Bengal, regarding the organisation of the coolie corps for employment in the Looshai expedition, I am directed to request that the Right Honourable the Commander in Chief may be asked temporarily to spare, if convenient, the services of Captain Hedayut Ali for the purpose indicated.

* Docket, No. 4026 of 26th August 1871, with annexures.

2. I am to request that you will invite the attention of His Excellency to the rates of pay fixed for the coolies, which, as exceeding that of the soldiers, might be productive of inconvenience, and on this point I am to request to be favoured with the Commander in Chief's very early opinion.

From Colonel the Honourable *F. A. Thesiger*, C.B., Adjutant General, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 1866 E. ; dated Simla, the 6th September 1871.

I have the honour, by direction of the Commander in Chief, to return the enclosures of your letter, No. 883, of the 31st ultimo.

2. The services of Captain Hedayut Ali, Aide-de-camp to the Commander in Chief, have already been placed at the disposal of the Bengal Government in a letter, No. 1788,

of the 30th August, in reply to an application received from the Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Calcutta.

3. With reference to paragraph 4 of your communication, His Excellency directs me to state, for the information of Government, that it has been represented to him that since the introduction of the system of supplying rations through commissariat agency to the Native troops in the Eastern Frontier District in substitution of a money compensation, the sepoys have felt the loss in money and convenience very much. From the time of the formation of their regiments they had been accustomed to receive this compensation in addition to their pay, and it enabled them to purchase extra articles of food, such as meat and milk, which are required in the climate of Assam. They find it difficult now, on their bare pay, to subsist in the manner they were accustomed to; indeed to the Native mind the alteration in the system of rationing cannot appear in any other light than an actual reduction of available income. The Commander in Chief desires me to add that it has been strongly represented to him that many of the sepoys of the Assam regiments will apply for their discharge from the service if some relief in this matter is not afforded.

4. Under these circumstances, His Excellency cannot but think that the feeling of discontent or disappointment will be much aggravated when the sepoys find that they receive a smaller rate of pay than the coolies attached to the force employed in the Looshai expedition, the cooly being looked upon by a Native as the lowest of the labouring classes.

5. The arguments herein adduced will apply, though perhaps in a lesser degree, to the other Native regiments which are to form part of the expedition.

Telegraphic Messages.

Dated the 9th September 1871.

From	To
From Simla.	To Calcutta.
From Secretary Colonel Burne.	To Secretary Colonel Bacon.

Can you ascertain early on what terms coolies were engaged for Bhootan expedition, as regards pay, clothing, and rations?

Dated the 8th September 1871.

From	To
From Calcutta.	To Simla.
From Junior Secretary, Government of Bengal.	To Secretary Colonel Burne.

Dickens and committee emphatically deprecate reduction of rates. Owing to short notice and harvest, great difficulties experienced in getting coolies. The proposed rates were given in Abyssinia.—*See* Major Holland's "Abyssinia," Vol. ii., page 437.

Dated the 11th September 1871.

From	To
From Calcutta.	To Simla.
From Secretary Colonel Bacon.	To Secretary Colonel Burne.

Your messages of 9th and 11th. Colonel Dickens stated sirdars got 12 rupees, mates 11, and coolies 10 monthly, but no rations. These, however, he thinks must be given now. Controller will report further to-morrow. All appear to have got a country blanket each. Coolie corps jemadars apparently got 15, duffadars 12, and coolies 10 rupees. *See* Proceeding, October 1865, Nos. 83 and 459.

Dated the 12th September 1871.

From	To
From Simla.	To Calcutta.
From Secretary Colonel Burne.	To Secretary to the Government of Bengal,

Your message of 8th. As arrangements have so far progressed, the pay and other arrangements made by the committee may stand. It is understood, of course, that the extra batta and free rations only commence on the coolies being embarked with the troops or when they go to Cachar or Chittagong. More by post.

CLOTHING.

From Colonel the Honourable *F. A. Thesiger*, C.B., Adjutant General, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 1785 N.; dated Simla, the 30th August 1871.

HIS Excellency the Commander in Chief desires to recommend to the favourable consideration of the Government of India that a pair of gaiters should be supplied to every officer, non-commissioned officer, and soldier employed in the proposed expedition to Cachar and the Looshai country.

2. The gaiters should be of the stoutest canvas bound with leather, with strap and buckle above, fastening up the outside with leather loops and eyelet holes, and reaching to just below the knee, and sufficiently roomy to be worn over the trousers.

3. If really good canvas cannot be procured, the next best material is leather. Linen is of too flimsy a nature for the rough work which may be anticipated.

4. His Excellency is induced to make this recommendation, as the country which the troops must traverse is covered in many parts with thorny canebrakes utterly destructive to the men's clothing, and is further infested with leeches, which, though dormant in the dry weather, will be brought into a state of activity by any temporary shower of rain.

TELEGRAPHIC MESSAGE.

No. 336; dated the 6th September 1871.

From Calcutta.	To Simla.
From Officiating Secretary Colonel Bacon.	To Secretary Colonel Burne.

YOUR message of 4th. Canvas gaiters will take some time; tenders must be called for, stating time of delivery.

Socks and bandages can be supplied in 10 or 15 days, unless the market cannot supply the small number of socks. 900 pairs cloth bandages ready in store now. Please say how many pairs are wanted. More by post.

CLOTHING.

From Major *W. M. Lees*, Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Adjutant General, No. 235; dated Simla, the 8th September 1871.

WITH reference to your letter, No. 1785 N., "Clothing," dated 30th August 1871, I am directed to forward, for the information of the Right Honourable the Commander in Chief, a copy of the telegrams noted in the margin, and to request that His Excellency may be moved to favour the Government of India with an early opinion whether, under the circumstances shown, socks and bandages, as were issued during the Bhootan War, might not be issued to the Looshai expeditionary force in lieu of the gaiters proposed.

To Military Department, Calcutta, dated 4th September 1871.
From Military Department, Calcutta, dated 6th September 1871.

2. I am to add that, in the opinion of the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council, the socks and bandages would be more suitable than gaiters.

From Colonel the Honourable *F. A. Thesiger*, C.B., Adjutant General, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 1893 E.; dated Simla, the 9th September 1871.

IN reply to your department letter, No. 235, of yesterday, I have the honour to intimate that His Excellency the Commander in Chief concurs in the opinion expressed by his Excellency the Governor General in Council that, under the circumstances shown, socks and bandages as were issued during the Bhootan War may be issued to the Looshai expeditionary force in lieu of gaiters.

From Colonel the Honourable *F. A. Thesiger*, C.B., Adjutant General, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 1913 E.; dated Simla, the 12th September 1871.

YOUR letter, No. 280, of the 9th instant, to the address of the Quartermaster General, having been transferred to this department, I have the honour, by direction of the Commander in Chief, to intimate to you, for the information of the Right Honourable the

Governor General in Council, that his Excellency considers that it will be absolutely necessary for the Commissariat Department to make arrangements for supplying European officers of the Looshai Expedition with rations.

2. The amount and description should be the same as is usually issued to European soldiers on active service; and to meet the case of detached officers, a certain amount of hermetically-preserved meat and vegetables should be provided and carried in the same manner as the rations for the sepoys.

From Lieutenant Colonel *J. I. Willes*, Commissary General, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 958; dated Simla, the 9th September 1871.

I HAVE the honour to request the sanction of Government for officers as well as European subordinates of all classes proceeding with the Looshai expedition being supplied with rations from the Commissariat at a charge of eight annas per diem, exclusive of liquor. Rum to be charged, when issued, at one anna per dram. No fresh animal food will be supplied, but simply salt, or preserved meats, to be bought in Calcutta.

From the Officer Commanding 2nd Goorkha Regiment, to the Commissary General.—No. 101; dated Deyrah Dhoon, the 5th September 1871.

IN reply to your letter, No. 912 of the 1st instant, I have the honour to state that as the men of my regiment generally eat twice a day; rice in the morning, and flour with meat for the evening meal; they would require half a seer of rice and half a seer of flour each per diem.

The only description of sheep that Goorkhas care about eating is the "karoo." I do not know if such animals exist in the Himalayas of the north-east frontier; but I consider a ration of "karoo" mutton or of goat flesh very essential, and I would request the favour of your informing me if it can be supplied, with the view, if your reply should be in the negative, of making a special representation on the subject.

By a special order of his Excellency the Commander in Chief, this regiment receives rum from the Commissariat Department, and the requirements in the field will be about 12 gallons a month.

I venture to suggest that a supply of country blankets and boots should be kept at the base of operations.

From Lieutenant Colonel *J. I. Willes*, Commissary General, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 957; dated Simla, the 9th September 1871.

IN reply to your No. 267 of this date, inquiring whether the issue of "karoo mutton" to the Goorkhas with the Looshai expeditionary force could be arranged for departmentally in the event of its being sanctioned, I have the honour to state that it is believed no sheep of any kind are obtainable in the Looshai territory; goats, too, are said to be very scarce.

2. Meat for the Goorkhas could no doubt be arranged for by this department; but it must be at a great cost. Goats would probably have to be sent from Bengal, as was the case during Bhootan campaign.

3. "Karoo" sheep are the hill sheep of these parts.

From Colonel *H. K. Burne*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Commissary General, No. 579; dated Simla, the 18th September 1871.

IN reply to your letters noted in the margin, regarding the supply of meat rations for the Goorkha regiments proceeding with the Looshai expedition, I am directed to acquaint you that as it is believed goats and sheep cannot without difficulty be procured in the Looshai Districts, and could not be conveyed there without great expense, meat is not to be regularly supplied to the Goorkha regiments. When, however, it can be locally procured, it may be occasionally issued to the men.

No. 946, dated 8th September 1871.
No. 957, „ 9th „ „

2. The Commander in Chief having been consulted on the point, His Excellency is of opinion that rum would be conducive to health, but it may frequently be impossible to provide it; when possible, however, it may be supplied at the rate of 12 gallons a month. In this view the Governor General in Council concurs, and accords the requisite sanction.

MEMORANDUM by His Excellency the Commander in Chief.

THE progress of the expedition depends absolutely on the carriage, with which no experiments should be risked.

Hedayat Ali is not capable of managing alone 600 coolies who will be in detachments along a considerable line. No European officer can serve under him, and three officers for each column at least are necessary, with a sufficient staff of subordinates. Every section of 20 men should be under a head constable, mate, or havildar, well selected, and four more subordinates of a better class for every 200 men, an assistant of some superior grade for each 200 men, to aid the European officer. Hedayat Ali might be the aide-de-camp, or assistant, to the senior officer of the Cachar transport column, so that his influence with the men would be preserved, and, if found to be no longer required, might have charge of the elephants. There is no branch in which he will not be useful.

The elephant carriage requires as much care and organisation as the coolie corps, to preserve order, and prevent overloading.

The Commanding Officer will no doubt supplement any deficiencies from his infantry columns, when they appear; but every care should be bestowed, in the first instance, to make each branch of carriage complete.

A few officers in excess will not add much to the expense, but very much to the efficiency of the organisation, as casualties are to be provided for.

I look to Colonel Roberts to secure due attention to this; he proceeds to-morrow, and will immediately communicate with the Bengal Government. In the meantime a copy of my opinion in full might be communicated to Colonel Haughton and the Bengal Government by telegrams.

It is well to note that whenever there are men connected with the raising of the coolies, either their head men, or those having influence with them, a portion of these should be incorporated with, and form part of, the subordinate superintendence.

15 September 1871. (signed) *Napier of Magdala.*

FIELD OPERATIONS.

TELEGRAM, No. 841; dated the 16th September 1871.

From Calcutta. From Junior Secretary to Government of Bengal.	To Simla. To Secretary, Military Department.

ARE the frontier police to take an active part in the expedition? Will the 4,000 coolies ordered include everything, troops and commissariat? Into how many separate corps will they be organised, and how many commanding officers?

From Colonel *H. K. Burne*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, No. 548; dated Simla, the 18th September 1871.

I AM directed to acquaint you that a telegram to the following effect has this day been dispatched to you:—

"Your message of 16th. The employment of police is left entirely to the decision of Commander in Chief. The 4,000 coolies will be divided into two corps with three officers, one commanding officer and two under him to each. All coolies in excess of 1,200, or whatever number may be required for troops, will be made over to Commissariat."

From Colonel *H. K. Burne*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Quartermaster General, No. 549; dated Simla, the 18th September 1871.

I AM directed to forward, for the information of the Right honourable the Commander in Chief, the accompanying copy of a telegram* received from the Bengal Goverment, and of the reply† forwarded from this office.

* 16th September 1871.
† 18th September 1871.

2. With reference to the inquiry as to the part the police are to take in the operations of the Looshai expedition, I am to request that His Excellency may be moved to cause the Government in the Military Department to be informed, as early as practicable, in what manner His Lordship proposes to employ them.

From the Adjutant General to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department No. 1963 E.; dated Simla, the 18th September 1871.

I AM directed by the Right Honourable the Commander in Chief to recommend, for the favourable consideration of Government, that every combatant soldier, not already so equipped, proceeding on the Looshai Expedition, be provided with a kookree at the Government expense.

2. The Goorkha regiments have them already, as also the Goorkhas in the 42nd and 44th Native Infantry.

3. The exact number of Goorkhas in these two regiments who will proceed on service is not accurately known; but if the issue is sanctioned, the number of kookrees required for other classes can be subsequently intimated.

4. His Excellency would further recommend that the coolie corps be supplied with spears, dhaos, or kookrees. Those who are enlisted from the Nepaul frontier will require either kookrees or dhaos according to their tribe; Hindustanees would probably prefer spears; but until the proportion of the various nationalities enlisted is known, the numbers of each article cannot be estimated. His Excellency would therefore recommend that the Government of Bengal be authorised to sanction the issue of such numbers as may be indented for by the officers commanding the corps, who will be able to decide as their recruits arrive the number and kind of each requirement.

From Lieutenant Colonel *A. Johnson*, Officiating Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Adjutant General, No. 623; dated Simla, the 19th September 1871.

I AM directed to acknowledge your letter, No. 1963, dated 18th September 1871, "Equipments, Field Operations," and, in reply, to acquaint you, for the information of his Excellency the Commander in Chief, that the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council is pleased to sanction the issue of a kookree, at the expense of the State, to every combatant soldier not already so equipped, proceeding on the Looshai expedition.

2. The Governor General in Council sanctions also the issue to the men of the coolie corps of spears, dhaos, or kookrees, according to the nationalities of the men enlisted.

From Captain *H. Howe*, Officiating Master Attendant, to the Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 4370; dated Fort William, the 28th August 1871.

WITH reference to your office, No. 662, dated 21st instant, forwarding copy of an extract of the Quartermaster General's letter, No. 3446, dated Simla, the 11th idem, and calling for report as to the marine arrangements that will be required to "carry out the wishes of the Right Honourable the Commander in Chief in regard to the columns from Assam and Chitagong respectively," I have the honour to submit the following plans for the consideration of the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council:—

LEFT COLUMN.

One hundred men from Gowhatty and 100 men from Tezpore of the 43rd, to Debrooghur, where the vessels could embark 500 men of the 42nd Regiment, and convey them to Cachar by the 20th November.	The Government steamer "Koladyne" and flat "Isla," stationed in Assam, supplemented by a hired flat, and, if necessary, by a steamer also, to embark these troops and convey them to Chuttuck, where boats will have to be provided for their transport on to Cachar, as inland steamers and flats cannot navigate further than Chuttuck after the middle or end of October, for want of water. Abundance of boats, I am informed, can be obtained for the purpose from Cachar or Sylhet. The boats would require to be temporarily covered over by a simple ridge pole, fore and aft, and mats. The boat voyage would occupy about four days.
22nd Punjab Infantry with the half-battery of Artillery and Company of Sappers.	One hired steamer and two flats from the India General Steam Navigation Company, at 500 rupees a day, including coal, to disembark the troops at Chuttuck, whence they would proceed as before shown.
44th, from Shillong.	This regiment marches down to Sylhet, whence it will have to be conveyed by boats to Cachar, as previously indicated in the matter of the other troops.

RIGHT COLUMN.

There are three plans of carrying out this service:—

Steamer "Peel" or "Jaboona," and "Ghazeepore" Flat. Steamer "Prince Albert," "Gogra" and "Konai" Flats. Steamer "Koel," "Ganges" Flat.

1st.—*Viâ* the Soonderbunds by inland steamers and flats belonging to Government, as per margin.

If

If the troops embark at—

	No. of Days.
Sahibgunge to Chittagong	6
At Goalundo to Chittagong	5
At Calcutta to Chittagong	7

2nd. By the sea route by the British India Steam Navigation Company's vessels, at a probable cost of 1,35,000 rupees as per statement annexed. Length of passage, three days, to embark at Calcutta.

3rd. By the sea route by hired sailing vessels towed by the Government port steamers at a probable cost of 50,000 rupees. Length of passage, three to four days, to embark at Calcutta.

The first is by far the most economical.

There are 30 miles of open sea from the island Sundeep to the mouth of the Chittagong river to be faced, but as it will be the fine season, and a fair opportunity can be chosen for the run across, this need not be considered a serious obstacle to the proposed mode of transport; moreover, the steamers "Undaunted" and "Celerity" could be dispatched to the island of Sundeep to convey the flotilla thence to Chittagong.

The second plan is the most costly, but the safest and surest; the troops would be taken direct to their destination without more than the ordinary risk attending a short sea voyage.

The last plan cannot be depended upon; sailing vessels of the class for conveying troops may not be available, and if they were, they might ask a higher rate of freight than 10 rupees per ton, for only one month's hire as allowed for by me.

The above arrangements do not include transport for five months provisions, nor for a large body of coolies for whose dispatch the Government of Bengal are providing; perhaps these might be dispatched in advance of the troops, otherwise extra inland vessels must be engaged, unless the sea route be decided upon, in which case there will be abundance of tonnage in the sea-going steamers which convey the troops.

STATEMENT showing probable Cost of employing the Steamers of the British India Steam Navigation Company for conveying Troops to Chittagong.

Name of Steamer.	Tonnage.	Capacity for carrying Native Troops.
Punjaub	1,030	337
Madras	680	268
Busheer	792	289
Burmah	1,025	341
Abyssinia	1,129	365
TOTAL	4,656	1,600

4,656 tons, at *Rs.* 27. 8. per ton.
4,656 tons.
27. 5. *Rs.*

23,280
32,592
9,312

Rs. 1,28,040. 0.

	Rs.
Amount of hire	1,28,040
Cost of coal	7,000
Total cost of hire for one month - *Rs.*	1,35,040

From Lieutenant Colonel *A. Johnson*, Officiating Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Quarter Master General, No. 266; dated Simla, the 9th September 1871.

I AM directed to forward, for the information of the Right Honourable the Commander in Chief, the accompanying copy of correspondence* regarding the marine requirements of the two columns of the Looshai expeditionary force, and to request that the Government in the Military Department may be favoured with an early expression of his Excellency's opinion on the several suggestions.

2. A copy of a demi-official note† from Colonel A. D. Dickens, C.B., urging that Calcutta shall be the point of departure for the Right or Chittagong Column, accompanies the correspondence. There appears to be force in this view; and as respects this column, the Governor General in Council would be inclined to prefer the troops taking the Soonderbunds route starting from Calcutta.

* To the Officiating Master Attendant, No. 662, dated 21st August 1871. From Officiating Master Attendant, No. 4370, dated 28th August 1871.

† Dated 2nd September 1871.

Demi-Official Letter from Colonel *A. D. Dickens*, C.B., to Officiating Secretary Colonel *Bacon*; dated the 2nd September 1871.

I SEE by the Quartermaster General's letter of instructions that there is an idea of sending the troops composing the right column of the Looshai Expedition from Sahibgunge, or rather letting them go on board the steamers and flats at that point.

As we have no establishments at Sahibgunge and should have to send all the supplies from this, this arrangement would entail much inconvenience to the Commissariat Department.

The Superintendent of Marine has authorised me to say that if anything it would be more convenient to them if the embarcation took place at Calcutta. Would you kindly telegraph to Simla to prevent, if possible, the regiments going on board at Sahibgunge.

From Colonel *P. S. Lumsden*, C.S.I., Quartermaster General, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 4166; dated Simla, the 11th September 1871.

I AM directed by the Right Honourable the Commander in Chief to acknowledge the receipt of Military Department letter, No. 266, of 9th current, and to express His Excellency's opinion that the proposal of the officiating master attendant to convey the detachments of the 43rd Native Infantry from Gowhatty and Tezpore to Debroogurh, and the men of the 42nd from the latter place to Chuttuck, in the steamer "Koladyne," with flat "Isla," and a hired flat, appears satisfactory; it is noted that they should be at Gowhatty for the up trip by the 20th October.

2. With regard to the wing of the 22nd Native Infantry, the half-battery artillery and company of sappers for the Left Column, it is not stated from whence they are to embark, but it is conjectured from Goalundo, picking up *en route* the other wing of the 22nd at Dacca. This steamer with flats should leave Goalundo not later than the 5th November.

3. With regard to the Right Column, the Commander in Chief approves of the first suggestion in the Officiating Master Attendant's proposal, to convey the troops destined for Chittagong in Government steamers and flats from Calcutta *viâ* the Soonderbuns.

One regiment with a company of sappers should start from Calcutta on the 26th October, while the half-battery artillery and two other corps might leave Calcutta on the 8th November.

4. Should Government be pleased to approve of this arrangement, I am to solicit early instructions, as it is desirable to issue the necessary subsidiary orders to regiments with regard to date of departure, &c., as soon as possible.

TELEGRAM, dated the 2nd September 1871.

From Calcutta.	To Simla.
From Officiating Secretary Colonel Bacon.	To Secretary Colonel Burne.

My band, No. 1171, dated 31st ultimo. Calcutta will be more convenient for Chittagong troops to embark than Sahibgunge or Goalundo, especially to Commissariat Department, and less expensive also. More by post.

From Colonel *H. K. Burne*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, Calcutta, No. 452; dated Simla, the 14th September 1871.

I AM directed to acquaint you that a telegram to the following effect has this day been dispatched to you:—

"Your band, No. 1171, dated 31st August, and telegram of 2nd September. Captain Howe's proposed arrangements for the dispatch of the Left Column are approved.

"The Right Column should embark at Calcutta, proceeding through the Soonderbuns to Chittagong.

"Inform Bengal Government, and impress on the local authorities the necessity for collecting sufficient boats at Chuttuck, to convey the Left Column thence to Cachar. More by post."

(No. 453.)

COPY of the above forwarded to the Quartermaster General, with reference to his No. 4166, dated 11th September 1871, for the information of His Excellency the Commander in Chief.

From Colonel *H. K. Burne*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Quartermaster General, No. 582; dated Simla, the 18th September 1871.

IN continuation of this department docket No. 453, dated 14th September 1871, forwarding copy of a telegram to the Officiating Military Secretary, Calcutta, sanctioning the arrangements proposed by the Officiating Master Attendant for the dispatch of the troops of the Looshai expeditionary force, I am directed to request that the Right Honourable the Commander in Chief may be moved to give effect to the subsidiary arrangements consequent on that approval.

2. A copy of the correspondence will be forwarded for the information and guidance of the Marine, Commissariat, Ordnance, and Clothing Departments, and of the Government of Bengal.

(No. 582 D.)

COPY of the above and of papers* forwarded to Calcutta, in continuation of No. 452, dated 14th September 1871, for communication as above.

From *C. Bernard*, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Revenue Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 2795; dated Fort William, the 11th September 1871.

I AM directed to submit copy of a memorandum by Major Macdonald and Captain Howe, who recommend the purchase of the small steamer "Flame," and the construction of two flats for the use of the Chittagong wing of the Looshai Expedition.

2. His Honor believes that Major Macdonald's opinion and facts, supported as they are by Captain Lewin, as to the river and its requirements, may be accepted; and he considers that Captain Howe's opinion as to the usefulness of the "Flame," and as to her being worth 20,000 rupees may also be trusted. The Government of India will be best able to judge whether military and financial considerations require or permit the purchase of the "Flame;" the Lieutenant Governor has no doubt she would do useful duty on the upper reach of the Kurnafoolie, and she would greatly help the expedition and its depôts over the 45 miles from Rangamati to Burkul. He apprehends, however, that in any case the expedition will require all the canoes Captain Lewin can get together, and the steamer might not directly save a sum of money corresponding to her cost; but she probably would, if Major Macdonald's views turn out to be quite correct, indirectly save money, and she would certainly contribute largely to efficient transport arrangements on the Kurnafoolie.

3. I am to solicit that if His Excellency the Viceroy in Council considers that the steamer should be bought and the flats constructed, a telegram may be sent to Calcutta in order that Captain Howe may take the work in hand at once.

MEMORANDUM regarding the desirability of buying the "Flame," Steamer, for work on the Southern Looshai Expedition.

As the expedition's plans at present stand, the troops and stores are to be at Chittagong by the 20th November; their route will then be up the Kurnafoolie valley as far as they can go by water, and they will turn off into the jungles and hills at some place above Kassalong. There is no road along the Kurnafoolie valley; and directly the troops leave the river, they will have to cut a path for themselves and for the stores through the jungle. From Chittagong up to Rangamati, a distance of about 70 miles or so, the Kurnafoolie, there is about five feet of water in the Kurnafoolie, excepting at bars, which occur near Chittagong, and at Rangamati. Some of the steamers which carry the troops over from Calcutta to Chittagong can ply on this reach of the river. So far as Rangamati, present arrangements will suffice, though it is to be remarked that the Marine Department has as yet received a requisition to carry the troops and commissariat to Chittagong only; no orders have as yet come regarding the transport of the expedition up the Kurnafoolie.

2. From Rangamati to Kassalong and onwards, up to the Burkul Falls, a place about 45 miles above Kassalong, the Kurnafoolie is shallow, and its course is very tortuous; the stream is from 18 inches to two feet deep at occasional shallows and rapids. Not one of the steamers named for the expedition can possibly ply on those waters. Captain Lewin, the

* Copy of Master Attendant's, No. 4370, dated 28th August 1871. Annexed to his No. 4460, dated 30th August 1871. Copy of Quartermaster General's No. 4166, dated 11th September 1871.

* He expects to have from 200 to 300 hollowed trees ready.

the Chittagong Hill Tracts Deputy Commissioner, has collected as many* canoes as he can for work on this reach; but he agrees with us, and urges very strongly, that it would be much more economical and efficient to have a steamer which could ply and draw flats on this reach of the river. Major Macdonald, who also knows the river and the country, is also very strongly in favour of such an arrangement, if practicable. It would take canoes two or three days to get up from Rangamati to the Burkul Falls; each canoe would require three or four men, and could carry only about 20 maunds at most; whereas a steamer could run up in a day and could constantly ply between Rangamati and the upper depôt at the Burkul Falls.

3. Captain Howe, on being consulted, reported that there was no Government steamer in the port which could do the required work, that is, could ply on a river where the water was only two feet deep. He represented, however, that there was in the harbour a nearly new steamer, the "Flame," belonging to the late Deehing Tea Company, which could do the work, and could be bought for 20,000 rupees. This "Flame" was built some four years ago; her engines are nearly new; she has not been in use for the last two years, but at a trial last week she worked well. She is altogether a handy boat; she draws from 15 to 16 inches; her dimensions are 80′ × 12′ × 2′; her engines are 12 nominal horse-power, and her trial speed eight knots; she can carry 50 sepoys, and can tow boats with troops and stores; she can store four days' coal, as well as the 50 sepoys. Captain Howe considers she is worth the 20,000 rupees; but if Government were to buy her, he would thoroughly overhaul her and would try her engines again. The "Flame" is very low in the water, she would not do to ply on the seas between Chittagong and the Soonderbunds; but she will always be a useful craft for any of the Bengal rivers.

4. Major Macdonald has pointed out that the "Flame," if she be purchased, will not do her full duty unless she is provided with flats. There are no flats of sufficiently light draught in the harbour; but Captain Howe undertakes to build in the dockyard two flats to carry 13½ tons each, at a draught of 1½ feet, within six weeks from the date of order, and at a cost of under 3,500 rupees a-piece. The dimensions of the flats would be 50′ × 12′ × 3′; a frame-work for a mat roofing could be fixed to the flat. The dockyard engineer's memorandum on this subject is annexed.

5. Captain Howe has no doubt but that the two flats will be more efficient and handy than canoes could be, as it would be tedious and clumsy (even if it were possible) to tow 30 canoes, and further each canoe would require three men at least to manage it. Canoe rafts would also be much less handy than flats. The proposed flats would hereafter be very useful in the Hooghly; they would take the place of the flats recently made over to the Torpedo Committee.

6. We, Major Macdonald and Captain Howe, recommend that in the interests of economy and efficiency, the "Flame" be bought, and the proposed barges be at once put in hand.

J. Macdonald, Major,
Deputy Surveyor General, Bengal.

H. Howe, Captain,
Officiating Master Attendant.

11 September 1871.

MEMORANDUM from *J. McGregor*, Esq., Chief Engineer, Government Dockyard, to the Superintendent of Dockyard, No. 864; dated Government Steam Factory, Kidderpore, the 4th September 1871.

THE Chief Engineer begs to state that during the trial of the steamer "Flame" with Major Macdonald on board, it was suggested that iron barges of light draft, suited in every way to the navigation of narrow rapid streams as in the Looshai territory, and which would admit of being towed with ease by a steamer such as the "Flame," should be constructed, as they would be in every way more serviceable than dug-outs, as was previously the intention of using. And in pursuance of this idea, the Chief Engineer begs leave to submit the enclosed specification and plans for barges of two different kinds, and which have been drawn out after due consultation with Major Macdonald, and both of which are of the following dimensions, viz.:—

Length between pps. - - - - - - - -	50 feet.
Breadth moulded - - - - - - - - -	12 „
Depth - - - - - - - - - - -	3 „

Plan (A.) being a flat barge of the ordinary type, whereas plan (B.) resembles that of a square-ended fishing boat, and as the Chief Engineer believes that time will now be one of the main considerations, is of opinion that plan (B.) will be found preferable.

The weight of this barge, when finished, will be 7½ tons, or equivalent to a light load-draft of 7 inches. She will therefore carry at,—

1 ft.	draft 6·02	tons dead weight.
1 ft. 6 in.	„ 13·48	„ „ „
2 ft.	„ 21·28	„ „ „

She

She is further provided with two large hatches, 8′ × 6′ so placed as to admit of easy stowage of the holds, which measure 16 feet by 12

She is also divided into four watertight compartments, which the Chief Engineer believes will be found an essential qualification for the work required.

Framework for a mat roof can also be formed along with the barge, if thought desirable.

The cost of this barge, made in the Government dockyard, and of the best material and workmanship, will be as follows:—

	Rs.	*a.*	*p.*
Material	1,460	1	9
Labour	924	5	7
Petty stores	705	8	2
TOTAL *Rs.*	3,089	15	6

and can be constructed and ready for delivery in Calcutta within six weeks from the date of order.

Plan (A.), in addition to all the good qualities above enumerated, will probably be slightly easier to tow, and of course is in every way a much more shiply craft, and, if itme can be afforded, is the preferable of the two.

The time and cost of construction, if made in the Government dockyard, will be as follows:—

	Rs.	*a.*	*p.*
Material	1,574	10	10
Labour	1,023	7	8
Petty stores	759	3	10
TOTAL *Rs.*	3,357	6	4

and will take nine weeks for completion from date of order.

The above barges will be found strong, serviceable boats for a number of years; but if only a few months' service is desired, they could be made of only one-eighth inch iron, which would answer admirably for a short time, but would not be half as durable as the others.

The time required for construction would hardly be perceptibly diminished, but the cost would be as follows:—

Barge A.

	Rs.	*a.*	*p.*
Material	1,369	1	2
Labour	889	9	1
Petty stores	637	15	—
TOTAL *Rs.*	2,896	9	3

Barge B.

	Rs.	*a.*	*p.*
Material	1,283	1	—
Labour	821	2	1
Petty stores	593	15	2
TOTAL *Rs.*	2,698	2	3

The Chief Engineer, however, as above indicated, would recommend barge B, and if time can be afforded barge A, in either case to be of the strong scantling, as when the immediate object for which they have been constructed is accomplished they cannot fail to be always extremely useful boats, and even if sold by auction, would realise a large per-centage of their original cost.

MEMORANDUM by Captain *S. G. Boon*, Superintendent, Dockyard, No. 5569; dated the 5th September 1871.

FORWARDED, together with the plans and specification, to Colonel Macdonald for information.

From Lieutenant Colonel *A. Johnson*, Officiating Deputy Secretary to Government of India, Military Department, to Lieutenant Colonel *F. S. Roberts*, Allahabad, No 594; dated Simla, the 19th September 1871.

I AM directed to acquaint you that a telegram to the following effect has this day been dispatched to you:—"On reaching Calcutta, please communicate at once with Colonel "Bacon. Your opinion being wanted on a question of river transport in Assam."

(No. 594 D.)

COPY of the above forwarded to Calcutta.

(signed) *H. K. Burne*, Colonel,
Secretary to the Government of India.

From Colonel *H. K. Burne*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Adjutant General, No. 588; dated Simla, the 19th September 1871.

IN reply to your letter, No. 1937 E. "Field operations," dated 15th September 1871, I am directed to acquaint you, for the information of the Right Honourable the Commander-in-Chief, that the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council approves of the nomination of Major H. Moore, Bombay Staff Corps, Persian Interpreter to His Excellency, in place of Captain A. D. Anderson, for the duty of assisting in organising the coolie corps for the Looshai Expedition.

(No. 188 of 1871.)

Government of India, Foreign Department, Political, to His Grace the Duke of *Argyll*, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

My Lord Duke, Simla, 31 October 1871.

IN continuation of our Secret Despatch, dated the 31st August 1871, No. 51, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of the documents specified in the accompanying Abstract of Contents, relative to the operations which are about to be undertaken against the Looshais.

We have, &c.
(signed) *Mayo.*
Napier of Magdala.
&c. &c.

From *S. C. Bayley*, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, No. 14 T.; dated, Yacht "*Rhotas*," Gowhatty, the 14th August 1871.

I AM directed to acknowledge your communications of 4th August, numbered respectively 1646 and 1648, regarding the position which the civil officers, with the troops, will occupy in the proposed expedition into the Looshai country, and explaining the assistance that will be looked for from the Raja of Hill Tipperah.

2. The Lieutenant Governor observes that when these communications were made, the Government of India had not received my letter,* No. 3655, of 3rd August 1871, addressed to the Military Department, in which the Lieutenant Governor had explained, in regard to Tipperah, that but little armed assistance could be expected from that State, and had also expressed in paragraph 8 his opinion as to the relations which the civil officers should occupy in reference to the military commanders of the expedition.

* Copy of which is now enclosed.

3. The

3. The Lieutenant Governor desires me to say that he still thinks that, unless the military commander were a man of very rare and exceptional qualifications, such as are hardly found, it would be better that the duty of deciding who are to be treated as friends and who as enemies should rest with the civil officers, as the personal relations of these officers with sundry Looshai chiefs offer the only chance we have of obtaining either assistance or intelligence from them, and action taken by officers who do not understand these people, may leave our relations with the Looshais in a worse state than they were before. In other respects, the Lieutenant Governor has no objection to offer to the decision of the Government of India, as to the employment of Mr. Edgar and Captain Lewin in subordination to the military commanders of the expedition, if the latter are fitted for political work.

4. His Honor understands from paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Resolution, that these officers will correspond direct with the Foreign Department, and that the Government of Bengal will consequently be relieved of any control over, or interference with, the conduct of the expedition.

5. The Lieutenant Governor desires me again to advert to the importance of at once sending the military commander or some other officer to Calcutta, to take charge of all preliminary arrangements. Without this, it is impossible to secure unity of control, and the absence of departmental friction; and it is specially necessary that the coolies, who are now being collected under the orders of this Government, should, at the earliest possible moment, be brought under the management and organisation of the officers who will control them during the expedition.

(No. 3656.)

EXTRACT (paragraph 7) forwarded to the Political Agent, Hill Tipperah, with a request that he will submit the required report as soon as possible.

From *A. W. B. Power*, Esq., Political Agent in Hill Tipperah, to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department, No. 7; dated Agurtollah, the 10th August 1871.

IN reply to your No. 3656, dated the 3rd instant, I have the honour to submit the following Report.

Men.

2. There are in the pay of the Raja 412 men, who go by the name of sepoys. They are Goorkhas, Tipperah hillmen, up-countrymen, and Bengalees; a force of 23 officers and under-officers, and 142 men is kept in reserve here; the rest are located in the various thannahs and outposts.

Arms and ammunition.

3. There are 300 new muskets in store, lately got out from England, and 50 police muskets borrowed from the Comillah police; the old arms are nearly all unserviceable, unless repaired. The new muskets have got a sword and saw bayonet, which the men do not seem to be able to manage yet. There are nine small guns only useful for firing salutes. The quantity of ammunition in store is ample for present purposes.

Efficiency.

4. Of the whole force, about 23 officers and under-officers, and 148 men, know their drill fairly; among these, all the Goorkhas (54) and the Assamese (11), some Munnipoorees (3), and up-countrymen (13), or a total of 81, might fairly be relied on; the rest, I imagine, would be a mere rabble: the discipline even amongst the best men being very lax.

Classification.

5. The reserve is supposed to be purely military, also the detachments at the frontier outposts; the remainder are armed and dressed like sepoys, but are, in fact, only policemen. They would, I think, be incapable of united action.

Transport.

6. There is no transport corps; but from what I hear, there would be no difficulty in organising one sufficient to supply the wants of a party of 60 or 70 men by employing the Hill Tipperahs. There is a place suitable for a depôt, which can be reached from here by boat, except when the rivers are unusually low.

From *S. C. Bayley*, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department, to the Political Agent of Hill Tipperah, No. 80 T.; dated Yacht "Rhotas," Sylhet, the 16th September 1871.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 7, dated the 10th ultimo, and, in reply, to request that you will be good enough to cause the 100 best men from the force employed under the Raja to be put in a fit state of preparation for service with carriage, and that you will endeavour to get 50 or 100 men put in order as a reserve besides.

From *H. LePoer Wynne*, Esq., Under Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal, No. 2077 P.; dated Simla, the 30th September 1871.

IN acknowledging the receipt of your docket, No. 82 T., dated 16th September 1871, regarding the preparation of 100 men of the force under the Raja of Tipperah for active service, I am directed to inquire when and how the 300 muskets referred to in the 3rd paragraph of the letter from the Political Agent, Hill Tipperah, to your address, were procured from England.

(No. 2078 P.)

COPY of correspondence forwarded to the Military Department, in continuation of the docket from this office, No. 1875 P., dated 4th instant.

From Colonel *H. K. Burne*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Adjutant General, No. 842; dated Simla, the 29th August 1871.

I AM directed to acknowledge your letter, No. 1765, "Field Operations," dated 26th August 1871, and, in reply, to state that the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council is pleased to accept the nomination, by his Excellency the Commander in Chief, of Brigadier General G. Bourchier, C.B., to command the Cachar column of the Looshai expeditionary force, and Colonel C. H. Brownlow, C.B., 20th Punjab Native Infantry, to command the Chittagong column of the force.

EXTRACT from the PROCEEDINGS of the Government of India in the Foreign Department, No. 1872 P.; dated Simla, the 4th September 1871.

Read again:—

The Resolution of this Department, No. 1645 P., dated 4th August, defining the relative positions of the civil and military authorities who are to be attached to the expedition against the Looshais.

Read also:—

A letter on the same subject, from the Officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal, dated the 14th of August 1871, No. 14 T.

(*See* page 225.)

OBSERVATIONS.—The Viceroy and Governor General in Council observes that the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal fears that the relations between the civil and military officers of the expedition will be subject of much difficulty, and suggests that the duty of deciding who are to be treated as friends and who as enemies, should rest with the civil officers. His Excellency in Council cannot see why any difficulties or conflict of authority of this kind should occur. If, as his Excellency in Council expects and requires of them, the civil and military officers make up their minds to sink all personal matters, and think only of the public interest, there ought to be no serious difficulty in the relations between them. As an illustration of this, his Excellency in Council would point to the Umbeyla and Hazara campaigns, where perfect harmony existed between the civil and military officers. It is, in the opinion of his Excellency in Council, absolutely necessary that the supreme authority, command, and general direction of the force should vest in the Officer Commanding, and in him alone. The duties of the civil officer are perfectly distinct, and have already been defined in the Resolutions of Government in the Foreign Department, No. 1453 P., dated 11th July, and No. 1645 P., dated 4th August 1871. He should give the Commanding Officer every information which he may be possessed of, relative to the geographical features of the country, and the habits and disposition of the people, and should offer his opinion freely upon the objects to be attained, leaving the Officer Commanding to act upon his suggestions or not as he may deem expedient. But, on the other hand, the Commanding Officer should avail himself, on every possible occasion, of the superior local knowledge which the civil officer must necessarily possess, and employ him most prominently in all negotiations with the tribes. And the officers of both branches of the service should have no other object than the success of the undertaking, which will, of course, like every measure of the kind, be difficult and critical, but which should, at the same time, be entirely successful if conducted with prudence and courage. His Excellency in Council is confident that the civil and military authorities will duly appreciate the importance of these remarks, and will prove, by their actions, that they recognise the necessity of acting thoroughly in harmony with each other.

2. His

2. His Excellency in Council further observes that the Lieutenant Governor is under the impression that orders have been issued to Mr. Edgar and Captain Lewin to correspond direct with the Government of India in the Foreign Department, and that the Government of Bengal will consequently be relieved of any control over, or interference with, the conduct of the expedition. Such orders have not been issued, nor was it contemplated to relieve the Government of Bengal of the responsibility which has hitherto devolved as in similar cases. His Excellency in Council considers that the political officers should report to the Bengal Government, who should submit the reports with the Lieutenant Governor's opinions and comments as quickly as possible to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

3. The Bengal Government again urges the importance of at once sending the military commander or some other officer to Calcutta, to take charge of all preliminary arrangements, and especially represents the necessity of having the coolies, who are now being collected under the orders of that Government, speedily brought under the management and organization of the officers who will have to control them during the expedition.

4. His Excellency in Council believes that the former matter has been already under the consideration of the military department, and that an officer has been or is about to be deputed, but both suggestions will be forwarded for the consideration of that department.

(No. 1873 P.)

ORDER.—Ordered, that a copy of the foregoing Resolution be forwarded to the Government of Bengal with reference to its letter last read.

(No. 1874 P.)

ORDERED also, that a copy of the foregoing Resolution, and of the letter last read, be forwarded to the military department for the purposes indicated in paragraph 4, with reference to the extract from this department, No. 1645 P.; dated 4th August 1871.

(No. 3917.)

From *H. L. Harris*, Esq., Officiating Junior Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department, to the Under Secretary to the Government of India, in the Foreign Department.

Sir, Fort William, 17 August 1871.

IN reply to your letter No. 1666 P., of the 9th instant, I am directed to forward herewith, for the information of his Excellency the Governor General in Council, a copy of the correspondence noted in the margin, relative to the examination of Mora Muntree, and Rutton Sing, who with seven Looshais were arrested by the guard at Monierkhall on their arrival at that place.

Judicial Proceedings for August 1871, Nos. 78, 79. Letter from the Commissioner of Dacca, No. 217 of 10th August 1871.

From *O. G. R. McWilliam*, Esq., Officiating Deputy Commissioner of Cachar, to the Commissioner of the Dacca Division, No. 772; dated Cachar, 18 July 1871.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that Mora Muntree, with Rutton Singh and seven Looshais, arrived from the villages of Khalgan and Impanoo at Monierkhall on Saturday; a very strong stream was running in the Sonai, and they came down from their villages in 2½ days.

2. On their arrival at Monierkhall they were seized by the guard, and apparently very roughly treated. I have remonstrated with the officer in command, pointing out to him that Mora, who has been on the whole of great use in dealing with the Looshais, deserved very different treatment. I have no doubt that Lieutenant Colonel Stubbs will cause an inquiry to be made into the matter, and that steps will be taken to punish the guard. They had no excuse whatever. The Looshais had daos only in their hands, and Rutton Singh speaks both Bengali and Hindustanee fluently.

3. I have taken every possible means for re-assuring the messengers, and I think they are regaining confidence. They were naturally very frightened and unsettled on their arrival.

4. Their principal object in coming down is to ask for a bazaar on the Barak, or on the Sonai, for the eastern villages. I told them that no bazaar would be allowed until they

had done all they could to get back the three Naga girls taken by Tandong, and convince me that they had done so. Then Mora said something about trying to persuade Lalboora, Tandong, and Deonte to make friends with us; but I told him that no intercourse could be had with them until the captives were restored. Then he said that Poiboi would send into the station some muntrees with elephants' tusks and other presents by the River Barak. This may or may not be true. He said he was going to send once before, but never did.

5. I shall keep the men here a few days longer, and talk to them again before they go.

6. I expect that Mora will complete the evidence against the man Nima Mirjon, whom I suspected of supplying the sulphur and guns alluded to in paragraph 3 of my letter, No. 540, dated 18th May 1871.

From *H. L. Harrison*, Esq., Junior Secretary to the Government of Bengal, to the Commissioner of the Dacca Division, No. 3670; dated Fort William, 4th August 1871.

Sir,

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your docket, No. 207, dated 25th ultimo, and enclosure, from the officiating Deputy Commissioner of Cachar, and in reply to request that you will instruct Mr. McWilliam to do all he can to establish friendly relations with any Looshai chiefs or people disposed to be friendly, and to give up their captives. On that condition Government will most gladly do all it can for them in the way of opening bazaars, and yielding the facilities of trade.

2. I am to add that the Lieutenant Governor desires to have clear particulars as to the ill-usage to which the Looshais, who arrived at Monierkhall, were subjected by the guard there. It is understood that some of the sepoys have been very severely punished by their military superiors. The Lieutenant Governor will be glad to have a full report on the whole subject.

MEMORANDUM by *F. B. Simson*, Esq., Commissioner of the Dacca Division, No. 217; dated Dacca, 10 August 1871.

COPY submitted to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, in continuation of this office, No. 207, of the 25th ultimo. The undersigned believes that neither of the Looshais named know what Sookpilal is doing. They are Impanoo's men, and have probably no authority to meddle with Sookpilal's concerns, and in the absence of Mr. Edgar may not communicate freely with Mr. McWilliam.

From *O. G. R. McWilliam*, Esq., Officiating Deputy Commissioner of Cachar, to the Commissioner of the Dacca Division, No. 820; dated Cachar, 1 August 1871.

Sir,

IN continuation of my letter No. 772, of 18th July 1871, I have the honour to inform you that since their arrival here the Looshai muntries have been most reticent. At first they said they knew nothing about Sookpilal's attempts to get back our captives. Afterwards, however, they told first Hurree Thakoor, and afterwards to me, that Sookpilal had gone to a short way in the direction of Benkin's country, but had returned on account of rain. Then they said that Boota and the Pois had attacked and burned a village belonging to Thinkol, a dependant of Saboonga. At one time Rutton Singh said Sookpilal was with Boota, but he did not insist on this statement. He altogether denies that Sookpilal has made friends with Benkniya, and states it to be his belief that Mary Winchester is still in that chief's hands. Mora denies all knowledge of Saboonga. I believe that their sole object in coming down to Cachar is to get a bazaar on the Barak or Sonai. They have no salt, as they did not make any this year, in the expectation of being allowed to trade with us. I have given them to understand that they will not be allowed to have to do with a single trader until something at least is done for the restoration of the three Naga girls taken away by Tangdong. I think they have been instructed by Impanoo not to give any information about Sookpilal's movements, because she knows that she had herself done nothing whatever for us this year. I think I have succeeded in persuading Mora and Rutton Singh to remain here while four of their party go back to Looshai hât for the purpose of getting Sookpilal's muntrie, Rowa, in here. Rowa is more likely to give a tolerably true account of what is really going on than any Looshai who has been here, or is likely to come here. I am not very certain whether they will go or not, as they appear to change their intentions hourly. I shall address you again on the subject directly the messengers leave.

From *O. G. R. McWilliam*, Esq., Officiating Deputy Commissioner of Cachar, to the Commissioner of the Dacca Division, No. 888; dated Cachar, 23 August 1871.

Sir,

WITH reference to your letter, No. 219, dated 12th August 1871, I have the honour to submit the substance of the complaint of ill-treatment made by the Looshai messengers against the Monierkhall guard.

2. The Looshais and Rutton Singh, who were coming down the Sonai on a raft, were challenged by the sentry. They informed him that they were coming to see me, and then, at the sepoy's request, they took their raft to the ghât, and Mura and Rutton Singh landed. Then a saheb (probably Mr. Wilson of Monierkhall, for I do not think any officer of the 4th was there at the time) came up on horseback and abused them in the Bengalee language, and ordered them and the other Looshais to be tied up.

3. The sepoys tied them up with cane with unnecessary severity, and brought them into the station under a strong guard. On their arrival Lieutenant Colonel Stubbs made them over to me, and I released them at once.

4. The list of property which the Looshais say was taken from them by the sepoys does not agree with the property sent to me by Colonel Stubbs. The following articles were missing:—

	Rs.
Dâos	3
Gold mohur of the neck	1
Dhotee	1
Markin cloth	2
Silver bangles	2
Rupee of the neck	1
Pugree	1
Pakoor Kookies	8

5. Colonel Stubbs informs me that, after careful investigation, the missing articles have not been found. As I have no reason whatever to disbelieve the truth of the Looshais' claim, I have replaced the missing articles by others of equal value, as I think it would be a pity to allow the Looshais to be losers in the slightest degree by their friendly visit to British territory.

6. Lieutenant Colonel Stubbs informs me that one man has been sentenced to a year's imprisonment with hard labour, and that all concerned have been more or less punished; but I am not informed on what charge the sepoys were tried.

From *C. U. Aitchison*, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal, No. 2022 P.; dated Simla, 23 September 1871.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your communications marginally noted, relative to the examination of certain Looshais who were arrested at Monierkhall.

No. 3917, dated 17th August 1871.
No. 4019, dated 25th August 1871.

2. The Viceroy and Governor General in Council observes that the Lieutenant-Governor has caused the Officiating Deputy Commissioner of Cachar to be instructed that he should do all in his power to cultivate amicable relations with any Looshai chiefs who are disposed to be friendly, and to give up their captives; and that he should inform them that on this condition Government will be willing to afford them all possible facilities for bazaars and trade. These orders, I am to state, are approved by his Excellency in Council, who also approves of the action of his Honor in calling for a full report of the ill-usage to which the Looshais were subjected by the guard at Monierkhall.

(No. 2023 P.)

COPY of correspondence forwarded to the Military Department, in continuation of the memorandum from this Office, No. 1665 P.; dated 9th August 1871.

(No. 4027.)

From *H. L. Harrison*, Esq., Officiating Junior Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

Sir, Fort William, 25 August 1871.

WITH reference to the letters from your office, Nos. 1380 P. and 1443 P., dated respectively the 4th and 8th ultimo, I am directed to forward, for the information of the Government of India, the accompanying copy of a report* from the Commissioner of Dacca, relative to the progress made in road-making in the districts of Cachar and Sylhet.

* No. 224, dated 17th instant, with Enclosures, including map.

2. Adverting to the inquiry made by the Government of India as to whether, in case the necessity for extending communications in the above-named districts should be established hereafter, it might not be desirable that the roads should be constructed in the ordinary way, that is, after submission and sanction of duly prepared plans and estimates, I am to say that the Lieutenant-Governor is probably about to visit Cachar, and an expression of his opinion on the question raised will be shortly submitted.

From *F. B. Simson*, Esq., Commissioner of the Dacca Division, to the Officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal, No. 224; dated Dacca, 17 August 1871.

Sir,

WITH reference to your memoranda, Nos. 3302 of 14th July, and 3410 of 20th idem, I have the honour to forward herewith in original, a report and map submitted by Mr. McWilliam, Deputy Commissioner of Cachar, giving all the information called for as regards Cachar.

2. Mr. McWilliam gives the military credit for nothing whatever; I think most unfairly, for even Mr. Daly's operations last year were carried on under General Bourchier, and the communications marked blue were either made or opened out after having been little more than once traversed, and General Bourchier's reports and the printed correspondence show that this was done under his immediate supervision.

3. Mr. McWilliam has thoroughly accepted Mr. Edgar's idea that roads in these parts must be useless to us, because, when the Looshais come, they will use them. I am quite certain that the Looshais, as far as the nature of the country is concerned, can come whenever they choose, with or without our roads, and of course if they find a road unoccupied they will use it. With the exception of Messrs. Edgar and McWilliam, the Commander in Chief and all officers I have met regard these frontier roads as most useful to us, as affording means of communication and patrol, and admitting of immediate movement of our forces from west to east, or *vice versâ*. Though the Looshais can move with or without roads, our troops and police can only move with them. I therefore differ entirely from the statements and opinions set forth in paragraphs 6 and 7 of Mr. McWilliam's letter, and, in total opposition to his suggestion to abandon these roads, would recommend that the line of communication from Chargola, in Sylhet, to Mynadhur in the east be made as practicable as possible. I know Mr. Edgar will oppose this. He has all along said that roads are useless; but, if necessary, he must subordinate himself to orders. The complete line of communication would run apparently from Chargola over the Chutterchoora range to Alexandrapore; thence northwards to Hylakandy; thence east to Doarbund, south to Nowarbund; thence direct east to the Rookni and on to Monierkhall; and thence to Mynadhur. This road would, when complete, allow us to patrol and communicate along the whole frontier from east to west; and if the tea garden and population, in consequence of continued peace and security, move further south, this must be an excellent line of cross road for the district.

4. Whether this line should be put into fair order by the military or civil authorities is a question for Government to decide. If the military are not to be stationed in the outposts —and I trust that their location there will be quite exceptional—it is impossible for them to take charge of these roads as Mr. McWilliam would apparently desire.

5. General Bourchier's description of the want of roads in Sylhet is correct. There are none to the south of the district; there is no trade that calls for them. Roads could be made as in Cachar, but very large sums have always been granted to Cachar, and none scarcely to Sylhet for road-making, save for connecting Sylhet directly with Silchar. The first need of Sylhet is a road from Chuttuck to Sylhet; this would connect Sylhet with Dacca and Calcutta, for steamers can always go to Chuttuck. However, when the Looshais are quieted, the subject of roads from Sylhet to the south of the district should be immediately taken into consideration; it will not be possible to do anything this year.

6. The papers forwarded with your memoranda are returned herewith.

From *O. G. R. McWilliam*, Esq., Officiating Deputy Commissioner of Cachar, to the Commissioner of the Dacca Division, No. 845; dated Cachar, 8 August 1871.

Sir,

In accordance with the instructions contained in your memorandum, No. 206, and letter No. 209, of 24th and 27th July 1871 respectively, I have the honour to submit the following report and accompanying sketch map.

2. The following roads have been constructed, or are in course of construction, by the Deputy Commissioner, and, since 1864, by the ferry fund committee, from the allotments of the amalgamated district road fund, together with some donations from proprietors of tea gardens:

1. Chatlahowar road.
2. East Hylakandy road.
3. Monacherra road.
4. Kattakhall road.
5. Nugdirgram road.
6. Sonai road.
7. Tarapore road.
8. Baladhun road.
9. Doorganugger road.
10. Burkhola road.
11. Natwanpore road.

3. The following roads are under the Public Works Department:—

1. Sylhet and Cachar road.
2. Hylakandy road.
3. Luckipore road.

4. 1st.—The Chatlahowar road. This road is from Silchar to Doarbund, a tea garden not far from the north-western spur of the Rengti pahar. This road was commenced in 1862, when Major Stewart was in charge of the district. For three miles from Silchar the road passes over paddy land at the ordinary level, and crosses numerous streams over which masonry or timber and masonry bridges are constructed. It then is carried over low tillahs to the Silcoori beel, where there is a bund; thence over more tillahs and across the Salgung river to Doorgakoona, where there is a very difficult swamp to cross. This has been bridged by a bund at very great expense. It has, I regret to say, been much damaged by elephants this year. After passing Doorgakoona, the road crosses Ikar beel, and thence is taken over high tillahs for about two miles to Bara Jallingah garden. In 1869, a new piece of road was made in order to avoid the Ikar beel and the high tillahs, taking a direct course from Irungmarah to the Jallingah bazar. The whole distance from Silchar to Jallingah is 14½ miles. From the Jallingah bazar the road goes nearly in a straight line to Doarbund, passing the sites of some villages destroyed by Looshais in 1849, and since abandoned. The distance to Doarbund is 18 miles. The following sums have been spent since the commencement of this road:—

Year.	Expenditure.			Number of Miles Open.
	Rs.	*a.*	*p.*	*Miles.*
1862-63	10,678	3	–	14½
1863-64	3,948	5	–	—
1864-65	2,552	12	6	—
1865-66	2,655	9	8	—
1866-67	2,890	9	10	—
1867-68	3,997	2	3	—
1868-69	6,575	4	1	3½
1869-70	5,300	6	4	—
1870-71	8,655	8	11	—
Total - - *Rs.*	47,253	13	7	18

2nd.—The east Hylakandy road, leaving Doarbund, passes through the range of hills, separating the sub-division of Hylakandy from the rest of the district by an easy pass with inconsiderable ascents extending for about four miles. The road is good, but a little sloping at the pass; but a pony can be ridden at a canter the whole way. Thence it passes over the richest and best cultivated part of the Hylakandy valley, crossing the Katlakhall at Matijuri, where there is a ferry, and terminates near the sub-divisional cutcherry. This road was commenced in 1868, and has cost up to date *Rs.* 16,187 1 *a.* 8 *p.*; there are temporary bridges throughout its extent, and it is in good order. It is 12 miles in length.

Details of expenditure since the commencement of this road:

Year.	Expenditure.	Number of Miles open.
	Rs. *a.* *p.*	*Miles.*
1868-69 - - - - - -	7,057 1 8	12
1869-70 - - - - - -	5,145 8 10	—
1870-71 - - - - - -	3,984 7 2	—
Total - - - *Rs.*	16,187 1 8	12

3rd. The Monacherra-road starts from Hylakandy, and is a continuation of the Public Works road from Panchgram to the sub-division. It was commenced in 1868-69, in which year five miles were opened, and extended two miles further in the next year. It has cost *Rs.* 5,366 1 *a.* 5 *p.* up to date. It is in good order, temporarily bridged throughout.

Details of expenditure since the commencement of this road:

Year.	Expenditure.	Number of Miles open.
	Rs. *a.* *p.*	*Miles.*
1868-69 - - - - - -	1,789 1 4	5
1869-70 - - - - - -	1,650 5 3	2
1870-71 - - - - - -	1,926 10 10	—
Total - - - *Rs.*	5,366 1 5	7

4th. The Katlakhal-road leaves the east Hylakandy-road about half way between the sub-divisional station at Hylakandy and Dwarbund; its direction is southerly; it has been completed as far as Goglacherra, where it crosses the Katlakhal. It is intended that this and the Monacherra-road shall meet in a point somewhere near Lalla, marked by a black cross in the map, and thence a road will be made in the direction of Jhalnacherra, the southernmost inhabited place in Hylakandy, but it is doubtful whether the east or west bank of the Katlakhal will be preferable after passing Rupacherra. Seven miles of the road are open: a sum of *Rs.* 5,624. 8 *a.* 11 *p.* has been expended on it. It is about 30 miles from the furthest point reached to Jhalnacherra, but there are tracks and planters' roads passable in the dry season. A sum of 750 rupees was devoted to the repair of the planters' bridges between Goglacherra and Jhalnacherra in March, out of last year's amalgamated fund grant in order to keep up communication with Jhalnacherra.

The following are the details of expenditure since the commencement of this road:

Year.	Expenditure.	Number of Miles open.
	Rs. *a.* *p.*	*Miles.*
1869-70 - - - - - -	3,229 5 6	5
1870-71 - - - - - -	2,395 3 5	2
Total - - - *Rs.*	5,624 8 11	7

5th. The Nugdirgram-road *viâ* Sonaimukh, the principal timber mart of the district, to Nugdirgram near the point at which the Rukni falls into the Sonai, branches from the Chatlahowar-road about a mile from Silchar. The country over which it passes is a level plain. It was commenced in 1862, and opened as far as Sonaimukh, 10 miles, and as far as Nugdirgram four miles further in 1863. There are masonry bridges over all the streams from Silchar to Sonaimukh, and only two streams between Sonaimukh and the Rukin remain unbridged. From Sonaimukh to Nugdirgram the distance is four miles. The road is in good order to Nugdirgram. A road from Nugdirgram to Monierkhall was commenced in 1869. It is not yet sufficiently raised to make it available during the rainy season. In the cold weather it was easily passable for four miles from Nugdirgram to Dermiakhall. A phari was being cut from the Dermikhal to Monierkhal, where the Lushai attack in January took place. As a temporary measure, a path was cut from the place where the new road crossed Dermiakhal, along the banks of the nullah to an old planters' path between Nugdirgram and Monierkhal parallel to our new road, and the old path was made use of from the nullah to Monierkhal garden. The forest has been cut for the new road to within about half a mile of Monierkhal garden.

The

The sums expended on this road since its commencement amount to *Rs.* 24,934 0 *a.* 5 *p.*, as per following details:—

Year.	Expenditure.	Number of Miles open.
	Rs. *a.* *p.*	*Miles.*
1862-63	1,321 1 2	10
1863-64	4,619 10 5	4
1864-65	1,307 4 11	—
1865-66	1,441 6 10	—
1866-67	1,723 9 11	—
1867-68	3,276 – –	—
1868-69	2,988 9 6	—
1869-70	3,158 10 2	4
1870-71	5,097 11 6	2
Total - - - *Rs.*	24,934 – 5	20

6th. The Sonai-road is a comparatively new one; leaving Sonaimukh it goes in a south-east direction to Haticoori, and thence north to Luckipore. There are as yet only temporary bridges on this road, and it has not been sufficiently raised in the low parts of the country. The sums expended on it up to date are as follows:—

Year.	Expenditure.	Number of Miles open.
	Rs. *a.* *p.*	*Miles.*
1868-69	2,997 9 2	5
1869-70	2,439 7 5	2½
1870-71	3,069 15 11	2½
Total - - - *Rs.*	8,507 – 6	10

7th. The Tarapore-road from Banskandy to Labac, north of Luckipore, is in very good order. It was commenced in 1862, and the following sums have been expended on it:—

Year.	Expenditure.	Number of Miles open.
	Rs. *a.* *p.*	*Miles.*
1862-63	636 8 –	3
1863-64	1,212 9 8	2
1864-65	506 – 11	—
1865-66	717 9 3	—
1866-67	1,164 2 3	—
1867-68	1,840 8 10	—
1868-69	1,403 11 5	—
1869-70	2,093 11 11	2¾
1870-71	872 12 7	—
Total - - - *Rs.*	10,447 10 10	7¾

8th. The Baladhun-road from Luckipore to Baladhun will be most useful in connecting North Cachar with the sudder station; as yet but a very small sum has been spent upon it.

Year.	Expenditure.	Number of Miles open.
	Rs. *a.* *p.*	*Miles.*
1870-71	2,893 11 –	10

9th. The Doorganugger-road is eight miles long in the valley of the Madura; it passes through a rich and populous part of the district; it is in very good order, all the culverts and bridges being of masonry.

The following sums have been expended on this road from its commencement:—

Year.	Expenditure.	Number of Miles Open.
	Rs. *a.* *p.*	*Miles.*
1862-63 - - - - - -	585 4 4	4½
1863-64 - - - - - -	1,867 7 10	2
1864-65 - - - - - -	1,345 10 10	—
1865-66 - - - - - -	1,053 2 —	—
1866-67 - - - - - -	875 2 11	—
1867-68 - - - - - -	1,955 — —	—
1868-69 - - - - - -	1,366 5 —	1½
1869-70 - - - - - -	906 14 10	—
1870-71 - - - - - -	1,065 3 1	—
Total - - - *Rs.*	11,020 2 10	8

10th. The Burkhola-road is nine miles long; it is in very good order; it only requires a masonry bridge over one large nullah. This will be constructed possibly in the course of the present year. This is a most important road, as it is the high road to North Cachar, and from its extremity at Burkhola Bazaar commences the path leading to Semkors, Assaloo, Hengroom, and Ninglow.

The following sums have been expended up to date:—

Year.	Expenditure.	Number of Miles Open.
	Rs. *a.* *p.*	*Miles.*
1864-65 - - - - - -	2,375 15 4	—
1865-66 - - - - - -	1,595 3 —	—
1866-67 - - - - - -	1,825 8 7	—
1867-68 - - - - - -	1,176 1 —	—
1868-69 - - - - - -	1,729 11 —	—
1869-70 - - - - - -	692 2 8	—
1870-71 - - - - - -	1,871 11 10	—
Total - - - *Rs.*	11,266 5 5	9

11th. The Natwanpore-road was commenced in 1869; it passes through a part of the district altogether without roads until this road was opened. This part of the district consequently was not so well in hand, and its mirashdars not so well known to us as other pergunnahs connected by roads with the Sudder Station. All the bridges are temporary; 19 miles of the road are open, and the work will be pushed on this year.

The following sums have been expended on it since its commencement:—

Year.	Expenditure.	Number of Miles Open.
	Rs. *a.* *p.*	*Miles.*
1869-70 - - - - - -	8,403 9 3	16
1870-71 - - - - - -	5,559 14 5	3
Total - - - *Rs.*	13,963 7 8	19

5. The Sylhet and Cachar road was commenced in 1864. The part of it which is in Cachar is not in very good order. I do not know what it has cost up to date. A small expenditure in clearing jungle near the Pola and Dullessur rivers is very desirable.

The Hylakandy-road from the mouth of the Dullessur to the thannah is also under the Public Works Department. It is in fair order, and as 15,000 rupees have been allotted to it this year, it ought to be in magnificent condition in 1872.

The Luckipore-road was constructed by the Deputy Commissioner, and made over to the Public Works Department in 1864. It is now, without exception, the worst piece of road in the district. I do not suppose much money has been spent upon it. In many places it is level with the fields it passes over.

6. In the cold season of 1869-70, Mr. Daly opened two paths, one from Nowarbund, *viâ* Rukni garden to the Monierkhall-road, and another from Monierkhall across the Bhubun range to Mynadhur. The former of these is, I think, the new road which misled

Tangdang

Tangdangs Looshais, and eventually led to their coming out at Nugdirgram. I believe General Bourchier had some jungle cleared from this road, and some bridges made, at the end of the last cold weather. This is the only road in Cachar with which, as far as I know, General Bourchier has had anything to do, and, as far as I know, it has been impassable for months. If this be the road "towards Monierkhall to the top of the Rengtipahar" (which can be explained on the supposition that the letter was written from Nowarbund), I would earnestly deprecate the expenditure by civil authorities of money from any district or provincial sources on it, as it could not be of the slightest use to the district generally for very many years, and would, if passable throughout the year, afford a means of approach during the rains to parts of the district only open to attack now in the dry season.

7. The path from Alexandrapore to Chargola has, I think, the same disadvantages that I complain of in the path from Nowarbund towards Monierkhall. When the rumour about Looshai spies south of Chargola reached me early in June, Mr. Daly went with a party of police from Alexandrapore to reconnoitre. To my surprise he was able with little difficulty to reach the top of the range by the path which he had opened a month or two previously, and thus a part of the district, which I thought was perfectly secure till October or November, was shown to be liable to attack as less naturally defended places.

8. I think in the first part of this letter I have shown the pressing necessity for pushing on the district roads already commenced, and their number and extent will more than exhaust for many years to come any funds that are likely to be allotted to them. The military paths almost invariably crossing ranges at right angles, and consequently the low treacherous swamps between them will be enormously expensive, and will probably never be of the remotest use to the districts in peaceful times, and the responsibility and cost of their construction should, I think, be left altogether to the military authorities.

P.S.—The roads made by the Ferry Fund Committee are marked red in the sketch map.
Roads made from local funds, afterwards transferred to Public Works Department, yellow.
Roads of the Public Works Department, green.
Roads made by Mr. Daly, District Superintendent of Police, in blue.

From *S. C. Bayley*, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department, to the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar, No. 132 T.; dated Yacht "Rhotas," Cachar, the 20th September 1871.

WITH reference to your office letter No. 845, dated the 8th August 1871, addressed to the Commissioner of Dacca, I am directed to state that plans and estimates for any regular roads should be submitted in the ordinary way; but in the meantime it is quite necessary that the paths or emergent roads required for military operations should be completed as soon as possible; the communications between the advanced frontier posts should certainly be opened out sufficiently for fair weather traffic.

2. The Lieutenant Governor desires you to place yourself in communication with General Bourchier, and do whatever the General may consider necessary in this way. For temporary roads not required for ordinary purposes, you should submit a special bill as for a charge connected with military operations.

3. In this matter a discretion is given to you, and you should not lose a moment when the state of the country admits of road-cutting operations.

From *C. U. Aitchison*, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Political Department, No. 2036 P.; dated Simla, the 26th September 1871.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 25th August 1871, No. 4027, submitting a report by the Commissioner of Dacca, relative to the progress made in constructing roads in the Districts of Cachar and Sylhet.

2. In reply, I am to state that after His Honor the Lieutenant Governor has visited the frontier, the Viceroy and Governor General in Council would be glad to be favoured with a full and comprehensive report on the roads required both for Sylhet and Cachar, distinguishing those which are needed for defence and imperial purposes from others that may be considered necessary.

3. Meantime the local officers might advantageously be warned against indulging in jealousies and want of consideration for the labours of departments other than that to which they themselves belong, such as disfigure Mr. M'Williams' report.

From *H. Hankey*, Esq., Officiating Commissioner of the Chittagong Division, to the Officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Political Department.—No. 273; dated Chittagong, the 23rd August 1871.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to submit the accompanying narrative of the evidence collected with reference to the identity of the late raiders in Hill Tipperah, in obedience to your letter No. 1123, dated the 14th of March last.

2. The Maharajah, in his letter No. 94, dated 6th March, states that a mohurir of his reported that a bunkumlah (? wood-cutter) had given information of a raid committed in two or three villages in the vicinity of Shonah Morrah; that 12 corpses were found, one being headless, that some bunkumlahs had seen the raiders who, from their being fair and wearing beards and moustaches, they took to be Kookies or Chuckmas.

3. The Maharajah, in another letter of the same date, encloses a deposition taken from a woman named Pooran Chung, who was taken captive but escaped. On this authority, and also on that of an officer specially deputed to inquire, the Maharajah reported that the raiders were Darlong Kookies, who a few years ago were taken away by Bannye Thange, the wife of Moorchoy Lall, and who formed a village near Sookpilal, who is alleged to be her brother.

4. The woman, in her deposition, says she was captured in the month of Magh; that the raiders were half Darlong Kookies and half Kochak Kookies, she concludes, partly from their talk and partly from their threat to bathe one of the captives in Guthoy's blood, and sacrifice him before the Ranee; that they belonged to the Ranee Bannye Thang. She states that they had *no* beards or moustaches, that they were armed with guns and daos, and wore coats of Khesh cloth.

5. The Magistrate of Tipperah, in his letter dated 12th March, again asserts that the raiders were Chuckmas. He does so, however, dogmatically, and apparently without thinking it necessary to state the ground of his belief. He says, "the savages were described as tall, fair, bearded men, armed with guns, javelins, and daos, and supposed, from the fact of their having Chuckmas among their number, to be a Chittagong Hill tribe." No evidence whatever is adduced, and the magistrate does not appear to have seen a single fugitive who had actually seen the raiders with his own eyes. This is forcibly pointed out by Mr. Officiating Commissioner Bayley in his letter dated 14th March, in which he cautions the Government against placing reliance on "the vague guesses which came through the Maharajah's subordinates, and which might be the result of insufficient observation or of intentional misstatement."

6. On the 22nd March, the Maharajah summarises the information he has collected, and submits it to the Commissioner. His letter is unsatisfactory, inasmuch as it gives no further evidence or even additional clues to what we had before. He says that "it occurred to him that the raids in his territories were not committed by Howlongs, as they would never come so far to the westward merely to attack these barees, and then return." He then refers to the story of the captured woman Poorun Chung, and alluding to her deposition says, "It occurred to me that it must be Looshais who had done it." He concludes his letter by stating that the raids in Cachar were committed by Howlongs, and the Looshais may have helped; that the raids on his villages were committed by Kookies, who came from south of the Fenny, and that the Reangs, whose barees they burnt, said they were Chuckmas.

Howlongs are Looshais.—*H. H.*

Kookie is the Bengali generic name for Looshai.—*H. H.*

Reang is a sub-section of the Tipperah tribe.—*H. H.*

7. On the 25th March, the Magistrate of Tipperah reported that the District Superintendent of Police had met with a Tipperah fugitive in the Chagulnya jurisdiction, who had been fired at and wounded; he described the raiders as men of middle height, *with* long beards, wearing only a dirty loin cloth, and armed with long flint guns. The magistrate encloses a letter he had received of a four days earlier date from Mr. Campbell, the Maharajah's agent, in which the following information is given. "Lall Bahadoor (the Maharajah's jemadar) has just sent in the head of one of the Kookies he killed, with the bag that they generally carry with them; the contents show that they were not the Kookies of our Hill Tipperah. The havildar who was with the jemadar says that they all had not beards, but some had. All the hill people say that they were Chuckmas, and had come from south of the Fenny." On the 7th April, the Maharajah sends in the bag above referred to, together with the depositions of two women who had been wounded. It appears that these women had been captured, but that their captors hearing firing at a distance let them go, and calling out "rungful," "rungful," commenced a goolmal among themselves. In this scuffle the women were wounded. The depositions of these women are word for word the same, and throw no additional light on the subject. They say they do not know the Kookie language, nor to what duffa the Kookies belonged to; they, the Kookies, were naked, had belts with cowries on both shoulders, hair tied in a knot behind, armed with guns, and spears, and daos.

Some of the Looshais having intermixed with Mussulman captives have beards, all others are beardless.—*H. H.*

8. On the 14th of April, the Magistrate of Tipperah again re-asserted his previously expressed opinion regarding the identity of the raiders. He said that he had had a personal interview with Jemadar Lall Bahadoor, from whom he received a graphic account of his encounter with the savages. The jemadar positively states that they were composed of Chuckmas,

Chuckmas, Mughs, and Hill Kookies from the south of the Fenny; that abuse was freely interchanged during the combat in the Bengali tongue, and also in Mughi, with which one of the Rajah's sepoys is acquainted, and that their arms were the gun, dao, and javelin. The Kookies were, he states, almost naked, and the Chuckmas and Mughs clothed after their fashion. The magistrate adds that the jemadar had ample opportunity for observation during the fight, which was carried on for several hours from behind trees, and having been formerly employed in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, in Government surveys, is competent to form correct opinion regarding the tribes of the raiders. The word "rungful" used by the raiders is explained by the jemadar to mean the army of the Rajah, in the Kookie tongue.

9. This letter was forwarded to Captain Lewin in the hope that some clue might be obtained from the use of the word "rungful." Before, however, he could receive it, he submitted his report as to the information he had collected regarding the identity of the raiders; a copy* of which I think it desirable to enclose. I also enclose a copy† of his supplementary report submitted after the receipt of the Tipperah magistrate's letter above referred to.

* No. 177, dated 18th April 1871.
† No. 190, dated 25th April 1871.

10. On the 26th April, Captain Lewin reports a very remarkable fact which had come to his knowledge. I give the account of it in his own words: "When the raiders entered the country in the vicinity of British territory, their advanced scouts or others tied bamboos across all paths leading into British territory, in one instance at the head waters of the Goomtee stream where the boundaries of Hill Tipperah and the Chittagong Hill Tracts are conterminous. A line of these bamboos had been tied on to the low jungle, thus marking distinctly the two jurisdictions. The raider's trail lay wholly outside the Chittagong Hill Tracts boundary. From this I infer that there were people with the raiders who knew the country well, and who acted as guides, while the body of the raiders were men ignorant of the locality.

11. Captain Lewin called attention to the fact that the disturbances in Hill Tipperah have nearly always some hidden instigator, and states that a rumour had reached him implicating one Parakit Senaputtee, a partisan of the Kala Thakoor, by name Neel Chunder, the half-brother of Beer Chunder, the present Maharajah.

12. On the 12th of May, two Tipperah women who had been captured, but managed to effect their escape, were sent in by the Assistant Superintendent of the Hill Tracts. No further information touching the identity of the raiders was derived from them. The women could not tell what tribe their captors belonged to; some of them spoke Bengali; they all had guns, spears and daos; some had white shirts, others black. The women were not ill treated, but made to work, cutting wood, &c.; the Kookies expressed a wish to marry them.

13. The bag referred to in paragraph 7 was sent to the Deputy Commissioner for identification of the articles it contained. On the 13th May, the Deputy Commissioner being absent in Calcutta, the Assistant Superintendent of Police replied that Mahomed Hassim, soubadar in command of the police force which was then located in Rutton Pooea's village, reported as follows: "After inquiry, I find that the articles sent belong to the tribe of Looshai Kookies, who reside in the Syloo country."

14. On my making inquiries as to the source of this information, it was further reported on the 8th June that Rutton Pooea had himself told the soubadar that the chiefs of the Syloo, Laloora, Laljieka, and Banoona clans committed the raids in Hill Tipperah.

15. After repeated delays, owing to illness and other causes, the Maharajah's jemadar, Lal Bahadoor, who had been sent for to be examined by Captain Lewin, for the purpose of ascertaining the grounds of his opinion, as well as his means of judging, arrived. On the 13th July, Captain Lewin reported that he considered the jemadar's opinion, as expressed before the magistrate of Tipperah, was not entitled to any weight or consideration; and that after his examination of the jemadar he saw no reason for modifying the opinion he (Captain Lewin) had previously entertained. As the weight to which this jemadar's statement is entitled is a matter of the first importance in determining the point at issue, I enclose a copy of Captain Lewin's letter regarding it.

No. 370, dated 13th July 1871.

16. On the 3rd instant, the Magistrate of Tipperah finally reported that the result of his inquiries as to the implication of Porakit Senaputtee with the Tipperah raids proved that the rumours which had reached Captain Lewin on the subject were without foundation. The above is the sum of the information that we have been able to collect regarding the identity of the savages who committed the raids in Hill Tipperah. The evidence on which we have to form our opinion is undoubtedly very slight; but though insufficient to indicate the particular tribe or tribes, it fully warrants the conclusion that they were Looshais.

17. If the statement made by Jemadar Lall Bahadoor, which in point of fact is the only piece of direct evidence implicating the Chuckmas, be discredited or disregarded, the absence of all other positive evidence is itself very strong grounds for exculpating the Chuckmas of all complicity. The absence of positive evidence of the guilt of an accused person in cases where abundant evidence might reasonably be expected, amounts to presumptive evidence of innocence. If the Chuckmas really had been implicated, it is from the nature of the case almost incredible that we should have been unable to have obtained

abundant proof of the fact. *Secondly*, Rutton Pooea must certainly be considered in a position likely to know the true facts, and he directly charges the Syloos. *Thirdly*, the evidence of the woman alluded to in paragraph 4 of this report, bears a *primâ facie* impress of truth, and this evidence would certainly exculpate the Chuckmas. *Lastly*, the Chuckmas speak Bengali; if, therefore, they had been concerned in the raids, the women who were taken captives would have understood their language which they did not do.

18. Captain Lewin simply ridicules the idea of the Chuckmas having been in any way concerned with the raids. He describes them as peaceful agriculturists, and denies their capabilities for raiding. He says that to anyone acquainted with the characters of the hill tribes, the idea of their appearing in the character of raiders is ludicrous and absurd.

19. I have given the above history of the collection of our evidence in considerable detail in the form of a narrative, and in chronological order. My object in doing so has been twofold. *First*, because in a subject of such great importance I considered that the Government would desire to have set before it as comprehensive a statement of facts as possible, to enable it to form its own conclusions. *Secondly*, because I was anxious to draw the special attention of Government to the state of our intelligence department. Six months have elapsed since occurrence of the raids, and the sum of evidence that we have been able to collect as to the perpetrators, may be said to consist of certain negative evidence in favour of our neighbours. We know who the raiders were not, but are puzzled to say who they were.

20. I think this fact is worth dwelling on, as it to my mind indicates a mistaken course of policy, and it would be well to take stock of our past policy before determining our future policy. I think, considering the able frontier officers we have had, men as zealous as able, that we ought to possess more knowledge of the tribes beyond our frontier than we do; and I further think that this result would have been obtained if our frontier officers had been allowed a little more discretion in mixing with tribes across our border.

From Captain *T. H. Lewin*, Deputy Commissioner of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, to the Commissioner of the Chittagong Division, No. 190; dated Rangamuttee, the 25th April 1871.

Sir,

In reply to your memorandum No. 35, dated 20th instant, forwarding copy of Tipperah magistrate's letter No. 287, dated 14th idem, I beg to inform you that I am able to give a distinct and unqualified denial to the statement of the jemadar Lall Bahadoor that any of the tributary Chittagong hill tribes were concerned in the late raid on Hill Tipperah. I am personally acquainted, and am in almost daily communication, with the most influential men of the Chuckma and Mugh tribes in the vicinity of the Fenny River. Not a week passes but men of the Reang Tipperah clan also from that part of the country visit my house at Rangamuttee. My own scouts have been through the whole of the Fenny valley, entering even into Hill Tippperah and the Kookie country beyond. Under these circumstances, it is impossible but that I must have heard something in confirmation of the jemadar's statement; but although my suspicions were, in the first instance, directed towards the Reang Tipperah clan (*see* my letter No. 105, of March 1871, paras. 2 and 3), all my subsequent inquiries tended to exonerate our hill tribes entirely from all implication in the late raid.

2. I shall be glad, however, if the jemadar could be sent here, with a view to substantiating his assertions and sifting to the bottom the reasons which may have led him to form so erroneous a conclusion.

3. With regard to the explanation of the word "rungful" used by the raiders, I have the honour to subjoin a few Looshai words, with their corresponding English meanings, which will, I think, throw some light on the subject.

Reng, a collection or assembly of men.
Reng-how, a fighting force of men.
Lal-reng, a chief's war party.

4. The above are words of the Rentchal Kookie dialect. The Rentchal clan belong to the Syloo tribe, and live in the hills south-east of Tipperah. Labrooma is the head chief of the clan; he has authority over about 500 houses.

5. The only meaning of the entire word known to me or my interpreters is, that the Rynkhiong stream in his district is called the Rungful in the Looshai tongue.

From Captain *T. H. Lewin*, Deputy Commissioner of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, to the Commissioner of the Chittagong Division, No. 370; dated Rangamuttee, the 13th July 1871.

Sir,

I have the honour to report, with reference to your Memorandum No. 188, dated 3rd instant, that I have examined the Tipperah Rajah's subadar as to his grounds for believing that

that there were Chuckmas or other men of our tributary Mehals concerned in the late raid on Hill Tipperah.

2. He states that his reason for thinking so was that he saw men among the raiders who had rings in their ears, whose hair was knotted on their foreheads, and who wore white dhotees or waist-cloths. He had no other reason for his supposition, nor was he prepared in any way to undertake the identification even of the tribe of the men whom he saw. He admitted finally that the majority of the raiders were Looshais.

3. I have made the most careful inquiries through a variety of sources, and am in a position to assert emphatically that none of our hill tribes were concerned in the raid in question.

4. With regard to the peculiarities noticed of dress by the subadar, I should add that the Chuckmas do not wear earrings and tie their hair in a knot at the back of the head.

5. The Bunjoyie tribe, however, of whom there are a large number living in the villages of Saboonga, chief of the Syloo clan, are in the habit of wearing small silver earrings, and likewise wear their hair in a lofty knot over the forehead.

6. There is a tribe among the Looshais called Rentchal, who do not wear earrings, an who wear a waist-cloth, which is what no other Looshai does.

7. The subadar I had thought to be a man of some local knowledge of the tribes; I find him, however, a Goorka of soldierly appearance and entire ignorance of all that relates to the people of the hills either here or in the district where he resides. I think, therefore, that too much weight should not be attached to his opinion.

From Captain *T. H. Lewin*, Deputy Commissioner of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, to the Commissioner of the Chittagong Division, No. 177; dated Rangamuttee, the 18th April 1871.

Sir,

WITH reference to your Memorandum No. 4, dated 1st April 1871, and to the previous correspondence on the late raid committed on Hill Tipperah, I have the honour to submit the report called for by Government on the subject.

2. The delay which has occurred in the submission of this report has arisen solely from my desire to obtain the fullest and most reliable information on the subject, my messengers and others, detailed for this purpose, having had to travel over long distances through a difficult and often dangerous country.

3. The result of my inquiries leads me to consider that the conclusions arrived at by the Rajah of Tipperah expressed in his letter No. 93, of the 6th March, to your address, are substantially correct.

4. The raiders were a body of Looshais from the neighbourhood of the village of Sookpillal, and assisted probably by the followers of that chief.

5. It appears that some time ago a certain number of Kookies, residing in the territory and under the protection of the Tipperah Rajah, threw off their allegiance to him, and joined the tribe of Sookpillal; a moiety of their number, however, remained behind in Hill Tipperah, and their brethren from the Looshai country sent constant messages to them to join the seceding body of their clan-fellows under Sookpillal. The Tipperah Kookies, however, replied that they were closely watched by the Rajah, and were unable to withdraw from his territory, unless a counter-movement were made by the Looshais, and their design thus masked; hence arose this raid.

6. I should add, that the wealth of a Looshai chief is not calculated by his gold or garments, nor by his flocks and herds; his real weight and influence are computed by the number of men who live under the shelter of his name.

7. To obtain possession of the Kookies residing in Tipperah, and to decoy them from their allegiance to the Rajah, has long been the effort of not one but many influential chiefs among the Looshais. Only last year the Chief Rutton Pooea formally applied to the Deputy Commissioner of the Chittagong Hill tracts for permission to take an armed body of his followers through our territory, with the avowed object of deporting *en masse* to his village the Kookies living in Hill Tipperah.

8. The return track of the raiders was followed by my scouts for a considerable distance beyond British territory: they report that the raiders in the first instance travelled in a south-easterly direction until they reached the range of low hills which forms the watershed of the Fenny and Chingree streams; from thence the track turned due east, and led straight to the Looshai country. It was only on coming in sight of a Kookie village that the trail was abandoned.

9. My scouts state further that the raiders were accompanied by a large number of women, and that they saw the foot-prints of many children and dogs. This entirely confirms the idea of the raid having been undertaken to cover the deportation of the Kookies resident

in Tipperah, for although the raiders might carry off women as captives, yet they would not of a certainty hamper themselves with many children; and dogs do not form part of a raiding party.

10. The supposition that any of our hill tract tributary tribes, Chuckma or other, have been concerned in the raid is, I assure you, entirely without foundation. The statement of the magistrate of Tipperah (*see* para. 3 of his letter No. 231, dated 25th ultimo, to your address) that some of the raiders were bearded, goes far to corroborate my assurance, for our hill tract races are beardless.

11. Note, however, *per contra*, that among the Looshais many tall and bearded men are met with, this divergence from the ordinary characteristics of their race arising from their intermarriage with Mahomedan women carried away by them as captives from British territory in former years.

12. With regard to the opinion solicited from me in your memorandum No. 425, dated 15th March, as to the prevention of such raids for the future, I have the honour to state that I think the subject of the guarding of the Agurtollah frontier and the adjacent British districts should be considered as part of the general scheme of defence to be adopted for the Cachar and Chittagong Hill tracts districts. There should, in fact, be but one line of frontier defence directly subject to one central authority, the three districts being interdependent and acting jointly in pursuance of their common object.

13. I would, however, respectfully venture to add that I consider that any attempt at defending so extensive a line of frontier inexpedient, first, on account of the enormous expense which would be entailed by any adequate system of guards, and, secondly, because I consider the true and only permanent mode of solving the question lies in the pacification and acknowledgment of our authority by the Looshai tribes.

14. The only efficient guard that can be interposed between British territory and hostile raiders is the Looshai themselves.

From *H. LePoer Wynne*, Esq., Under Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Political Department, No. 2102 P.; dated Simla, the 3rd October 1871.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your endorsement, No. 4166, dated 4th September 1871, submitting a narrative by the Commissioner of Chittagong of the evidence collected with reference to the identity of the late raiders in Hill Tipperah.

2. With reference to Mr. Hankey's observations in paragraph 20 of his Report, No. 273, dated 23rd August 1871, that considering the zealous and able frontier officers we have had, we ought to possess more knowledge of the tribes beyond our frontier than we do, and that this result would have been obtained if our frontier officers had been allowed a little more discretion in mixing with tribes across our border, I am desired to request that Mr. Hankey may be invited to explain in what way the frontier officers have been prevented from exercising their discretion as regards communication with the frontier tribes.

3. I am to request that a copy of Mr. Hankey's report, if it has not already been sent, may be forwarded to the Commissioner of Dacca, for communication to the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar.

TELEGRAM, dated the 11th September 1871.

From Political Agent, Munnipoor, to Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Munnipore, dated 30th August 1871.—IT is most essential that part of the Munnipore force should be better armed. Raja is willing, if required, to pay for such arms, and return useless to store. Sanction of Government solicited to the delivery or detention of those muskets (Victoria pattern, smooth bore) with ammunition, of which the regiment at Cachar has been relieved on receiving rifles. Application by post.

No. 1973 P., dated Simla, the 18th September 1871.

Endorsed by the Foreign Department.

FORWARDED to the Military Department for consideration and orders at the earliest practicable date.

From Colonel *H. K. Burne*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Officiating Inspector General of Ordnance and Magazines, No. 621; dated Simla, the 19th September 1871.

I AM directed to forward, for your information, copy of a telegram received in the Foreign Department from the Political Agent, Munnipoor, and, with reference to it, to acquaint you that the Governor General in Council in the Military Department has been pleased to sanction 500 of the smooth-bore muskets lately made available in the district by the issue of rifles to the regiments of the line being made over to the Political Agent, Munnipoor, on his application, for the use of the Raja's troops.

From Colonel *H. K. Burne*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Officiating Inspector General of Ordnance and Magazines, No. 827; dated Simla, 26 September 1871.

IN continuation of my letter No. 621, of the 19th instant, I am further desired to request that, if the 500 muskets are applied for by the Political Agent of the Raja of Munnipoor, a proportion of ammunition to the usual extent may be also supplied at the same time.

From *H. LePoer Wynne* Esq., Under Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Officiating Political Agent, Munnipoor, No. 2085 P.; dated Simla, 30 September 1871.

IN reply to your telegram, dated the 11th instant, I am directed to state that instructions have been issued to make over, on your application and payment, such number as may be required, up to 500, out of the stock of smooth-bore muskets, which has lately been made available by the issue of rifles to the Native regiment at Cachar. The cost of the whole stock of 500 would be somewhere about 9,708 rupees. A due proportion of ammunition will also be issued on payment of the usual price.

(No. 2086 P.)

COPY of the above sent to Military Department, with reference to communications received therefrom, No. 622; dated 19th, and No. 828, dated 26th instant.

From Major General *W. F. Nuthall*, Political Agent at Munnipoor, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, No. 106; dated Munnipoor, 31 August 1871.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your confidential letter No. 1647 P., dated 4th instant, informing me that an armed expedition will, at the earliest date possible, be sent into the Looshai country, directing me to be prepared for any call that may be made, and in the meantime to lose not a day in submitting the fullest information I possess regarding the available troops of the Munnipoor State, their equipment, and efficiency.

2. In reply, I have the honour to enclose a numerical return of the force and of its equipment. As material for soldiers the Munnipooree is of good average,—robust, active, steady in habits, and intelligent,—and were he provided with an arm in which he had confidence, I have no doubt that in bush-fighting he would be found useful and enterprising, and a formidable antagonist to the Looshai. They have still a smattering of the drill and discipline imparted to them by British officers years ago, and are frequently exercised under the supervision of the Raja in simple manœuvres and light infantry. Their great defect lies in the ignorance of their officers and non-commissioned officers, and in their not being well practised in the use of their arms, owing to the difficulty and expense of replacing ball ammunition.

3. They are armed—1,957 with the large smooth-bore musket, known as Brownbess, recently provided by our Government, and 2,000 with old flint muskets, which have been in use with the State over 50 years, and are unreliable and unsafe, and should be broken up. Their method of using the latter has been for one man to aim whilst another attached a lighted match. The Brownbess with its bayonet would be a very good weapon against these tribes in the open plain, but it has no accuracy beyond 50 or 60 yards, and is very unsuited for jungle warfare, where the enemy is only occasionally seen lurking behind rocks and trees, or passing from cover to cover beyond a ravine. If therefore the Munnipoor troops are to be employed against the Looshais, I would very strongly recommend that at least a portion of them should be supplied with our recently-discarded Victoria pattern musket. Those of which the Native Regiment at Cachar has been lately relieved on receiving rifles, would be sufficient for the purpose, and I have therefore requested the Officer Commanding (Colonel Stubbs) not to return them or their ammunition to the arsenal of Fort William pending this reference.

The Raja is willing to pay for them if required to do so, and I would suggest that nothing

be said on this subject until it shall be seen how this force behave. If creditably, the presentation of them would be a good opportunity of recognising the service, and would be highly appreciated.

In rugged mountains and pathless forests, untrained warriors meet disciplined troops on favourable terms. In the tangled wilderness of New Zealand, the Maori has shown himself a match for the British soldiers, and in the sierras of Spain, the Guerillas often held the seasoned soldiers of Napoleon at bay; and there is no more memorable passage in history of the success of savages, when well armed, than that of the total discomfiture of General Braddock's splendid force of upwards of 3,000 men, including two regiments, guards, and two batteries of artillery, when opposed to American Indians of scarcely one-fourth his strength, but mostly armed with rifles. Of his force, including 86 officers, he lost 62 officers and upwards of 700 rank and file, was himself killed, and the remnant of his force retreated, helter-skelter, a distance of 100 miles—a catastrophe almost entirely resulting from his inexperience in jungle warfare, and obstinate refusal to avail himself of the Indians as scouts and rangers.

Viewing Munnipoor as a British outpost on the Eastern frontier surrounded by numerous turbulent tribes, the efficiency of its force is of the greatest importance. The fear which these tribes once had of fire arms has diminished, as they have become possessed of them themselves and learnt their use, and we have seen that they have become proportionally emboldened: any hostile movement on the part of any one tribe re-acts to a greater or less extent on our neighbouring Provinces, and unless a good stand is made by the Munnipoorees, it must also have a disturbing influence upon all the other tribes. It is therefore most essential that the Raja's forces should be made sufficiently powerful to command respect, and to resist and punish promptly any aggressions of these savages.

4. Indeed, I am strongly impressed that when once the Looshais have been punished and brought to subjection, the cheapest and best means of frontier defence would be to subsidise part of the Munnipoor force, and place them in the Kowpoom Valley and at Tangkonloong—a strong position on the frontier, east of Tipai Mook. A strong detachment of Cachar police, placed at Tipai Mook, and communications opened with these three posts, and a line of telegraph from Tipai to Cachar, would be all-sufficient. Tangkonloong is north-east of the most thickly inhabited part of the Looshai country, and, with reference to the position of their villages to Cachar immediately on their flank, and savages though they be, they would never again venture to make any incursions on Cachar with the risk of being cut off from their homes. With a road from Kowpoom to Tangkonloong the latter would, in my opinion, be the proper place to put an officer to watch over these tribes, if it is the intention to do so.

5. But to return to the equipment of the Raja's force. It will be seen from the figured statement that he has only 45 rounds of ammunition for each effective musket, I therefore forward herewith an indent for 55 rounds additional, to complete 100 rounds per man, and shall feel obliged by your obtaining early sanction for the same. All that is not expended the Raja will pay for, and I will see to this.

6. Should it be deemed necessary to send two or four guns from this, it can be done with the assistance of the Raja's elephants; but from what I have seen of the nature of the country, I should not recommend it. I am strongly of opinion, however, that rockets would be found most useful, and as they are easily conveyed over hilly country and entail little carriage, a couple of tubes at least should accompany each column. Their value would be found in repelling night attacks on the camp, and in clearing the enemy out of commanding and inaccessible positions. In my expeditions in Burmah I found them most useful for these purposes, and I am informed that they proved equally so on the occasion of the night attack on Dewangiri by the Bhooteas in January 1865.

7. The chief difficulties in all expeditions of this kind lie in supplies, carriage, and communications, and unless these are secured, an officer renders his movements subordinate to his subsistence. With regard to the first the Raja will be able to provide about 1,500 maunds of rice for his force, and as each man would consume one seer a day, this quantity would supply 2,000 men for one month. The available amount of carriage would be about 600 coolies and a few untrained elephants. As the coolies would convey half a maund each they would only be able to convey 300 maunds at a time, *i. e.*, six days' supply for 2,000 men. It is, therefore, evidently necessary that I should receive early intimation as to the force to be employed and the route to be taken, in order to establish a strong advanced depôt and push forward the supplies by instalments. The Raja objects to the employment of his elephants in the hills, but would allow them to be used in the valley in conveying supplies to any part of the foot of the hills.

8. The route I would recommend would be by the Kowpoom Valley, south a little west, diverging somewhat towards Tipai Mook—(*see* Map of Eastern and British Frontier bordering on Burmah and Munnipoor, 1869). Kowpoom is on the main road to Cachar, five marches from that place, and three marches from the capital of Munnipoor. This route has many advantages. It is known to the hill people of Munnipoor, who could therefore act as guides. The country is not difficult, and presents but few obstacles to the march of a force. It leads direct down upon the most thickly inhabited part of the Looshai country, viz., to the villages of Vonpillal, Poiboi, and Vonolel; and it would be an alternative line of communication from Cachar with the officer who commands the force, and, when the columns combine, would also open up an alternative base.

From

From Kowpoom to the frontier, where our advanced depôt would be established, probably Tangkonloong, it would be necessary to clear the road as much as possible of all jungle and impediments to the advance of troops to examine all objects capable of concealing an enemy or aiding an ambuscade, and to establish posts in such commanding position (with water-supply) as would secure the communications, facilitate patrolling, and ensure the safe transport of provisions and material, &c. The advance so far, therefore, would be conducted leisurely. The following distances I understand would occupy from four to six hours each day :—

(1.) Kowpoom to Poongsah.
(2.) Poongsah to Tooring.
(3.) Tooring to Tsubbung.
(4.) Tsubbung to Tooree.
(5.) Tooree to Montha.
(6.) Montha to Tangkonloong.

From Kowpoom to Tangkonloong is actually three good marches, and from Tangkonloong to the Looshai villages (which can be seen from the latter place, and are supposed to be about 35 miles) four marches for unencumbered hillmen, or six marches for troops. The movement of this force should be regulated by officer commanding the whole by the distance from Tangkonloong, where it would be certain of arriving on any appointed day.

9. In conclusion, I beg to make the few following recommendations acquired from practical experience on this kind of service :—

1st. That the Kookies, who have had intercourse with these tribes, be freely used as scouts and spies. By their means an ambuscade or panjeepits or snares may be often discovered, and the force be saved. But they should on no account be allowed to retain their firearms *in camp* at night. They should be lodged with the inlying picquet.

2ndly. The coolies who convey the baggage and supplies should all be so classed, arranged, and supervised in squads of from 15 to 20 as to secure the efficient performance of the services required of them, and order and obedience in event of an alarm or surprise.

3rdly. The columns should be furnished with signal rockets, or some other means of distinguishing their relative positions, when approaching the objective point.

4thly. Each column should be accompanied by a competent surveyor to sketch the country.

5thly. The men should be provided with good blankets and boots, the former to protect them against the effects of the night dews, and the latter from the panjees. In Burmah I have had many men disabled with panjees, and have myself had one enter the side leather of an English boot, and pass through the foot.

6thly. Officers should be limited to a specified amount of carriage for baggage. For a brief campaign they must submit to a frugality suitable to the service, and stoop to the make-shift expedients of a new country where every difficulty is encountered and mastered in a rough-and-ready way.

7thly. With regard to tactics and the method of disposing of a force when marching in a long tortuous line, exposed to be attacked on its flanks by surprise, and to the means of readily bringing the men into action in jungle, it can only be acquired from experience on such service. The routine of the drill-book must be laid aside, or it will be found a constant obstacle to alert action.

10. I note your instructions that I am to accompany the Maharaja's force in my civil capacity, and that the Governor General in Council looks to me to prevent the possibility of any mistakes or misunderstanding which might endanger the success of the expedition and impede effective co-operation on the part of the Munnipoor troops; and have merely to remark that the interest of the service has always been my first consideration, and however disappointed I may feel at not being employed in my military capacity, being one of the only officers in India who has had a large experience in this special kind of warfare, and invariably successful in engagements with the enemy, nevertheless I can heartily and readily sink all these feelings in the united and concerted action necessary to ensure success to the views of the Government.

RETURN of the FORCE of the Maharaja of Munnipoor.

	Artillery.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	REMARKS.
Majors	1	-	7	There being effective arms for 1,957 men, that number of infantry only could be employed on service.
Subadars	9	-	73	
Jemadars	9	-	73	
Havildar-Majors	1	-	9	
Havildars and Naicks	36	-	292	
Buglers	4	-	32	
Drummers	3	-	24	
Fifers	3	-	24	
Sepoys	403	400	3,579	
Recruits	51	-	549	
TOTAL	520	400	4,662	

EQUIPMENT OF FORCE.

STORES.	Number.	Quantity.	REMARKS.
Guns given by Government, brass, 3-pounders	8	- -	4 serviceable.
Wall-pieces - - - - - - -	2	- -	Serviceable.
Shots - - - - - - - -	772	- -	Ditto.
Canister - - - - - - -	85	- -	Ditto.
Elephants - - - - - - -	40	—	—
Cavalry ponies - - - - - -	400	- -	Ditto.
Swords or daos - - - - - -	644	- -	Ditto.
New muskets from Government (cap) -	1,957	- -	Ditto.
Old - - ditto - - (flint) -	2,000	- -	Unserviceable.
Artillery ammunition - - - - -	- -	868 lbs.	Serviceable.
Infantry ditto - - - - - -	- -	8,000 „	Ditto.
Belts, sets - - - - - - -	3,600	- -	Ditto.
Flints, in pieces - - - - - -	3,000	- -	Ditto.
Caps - - - - - - - -	400,000	- -	Ditto.
Leads, pig - - - - - - -	- -	100 mds.	Ditto.
111 boxes cartridge, complete for musket, at 80 bundles in each.	8,800	=	88,000 cartridges, or 45 rounds per serviceable musket.
Cartridge for wall-pieces - - - - -	- -	52 lbs.	—

INDENT on the Arsenal of Fort William for Stores required for the Munnipoor Force.

ARTICLE.	Quantity.	REMARK.
128 boxes of cartridges, containing 800 in each, for the large smooth-bore muskets.	102,400	To enable the Maharaja to complete his force to 100 rounds per man for each effective musket.

From *C. U. Aitchison*, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Officiating Political Agent, Munnipoor, No. 2107 P.; dated Simla, the 4th October 1871.

I AM directed to acknowledge receipt of your letter, No. 106, dated 31st August last, containing a full report on the available troops of the Munnipoor State.

2. You have already been informed by the letter, No. 2085 P., of the 30th ultimo, from this department, that sanction has been given to the issue of 500 muskets to the durbar troops, together with a due proportion of ammunition. With reference to the concluding portion of the above letter, I am to request that the Raja should be given to understand that the arms are supplied to him on payment; payment may, however, be deferred for the present, pending further instructions from this office.

Office Memorandum from *H. LePoer Wynne*, Esq., Under Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 2208 P.; dated Simla, the 14th October 1871.

WITH reference to the correspondence ending with the Office Memorandum from this department, No. 2108 P., dated 4th October 1871, the undersigned is directed to forward to the Military Department a copy of a letter* from the Political Agent in Munnipoor, submitting an indent for 200 rupees' worth of cartridge-paper, which is required by the Raja of Munnipoor to prepare cartridges for the smooth-bore percussion muskets recently supplied to him. The undersigned is to request that the Military Department will be good enough to issue the necessary orders for the provision of this material, and communicate them direct to the Political Agent in Munnipoor.

* No. 109, dated 15th September 1871.

(Confidential.)

From Colonel *P. S. Lumsden*, C.S.I., Quartermaster General of the Army, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 3922; dated Simla, the 31st August 1871.

I AM directed by the Right Honourable the Commander in Chief to solicit the instructions of Government as to the procedure his Excellency should direct the officers in command of the columns of the Looshai expeditions to adopt in case of immediate submission, and an expression of a willingness to comply with all the demands of Government, on the part of all or any of the tribes against which the troops are to operate.

2. His

2. His Excellency ventures to suggest, with all due deference, that, under any circumstances, it is desirable, after the force may have once set out, that a perfect knowledge should be secured of the geography and inhabitants of the unknown hilly region lying to the south of Cachar and Munnipoor, north of the Blue Mountains bordering on Chittagong, and between the Munnipoor river on the east to the confines of Hill Tipperah on the west.

Office Memorandum from *C. U. Aitchison*, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 2275 P.; dated Simla, the 21st October 1871.

In reply to extract from the Military Department, No. 301, dated 11th September 1871, in which a letter is forwarded from the Quartermaster General, asking what course the commanders of the columns to be sent into the Looshai country are to adopt, if all or any of the tribes against which the troops are to operate make an immediate submission, and express their willingness to comply with the demands of Government, the undersigned is desired to remark that, as the officers commanding the force and the political officers will be in easy telegraphic communication with the Government, it will not be difficult for the Government to decide, as the expeditionary force progresses, for what period it will be necessary to keep the whole force in the Looshai District.

2. If one or more of the tribes express a willingness to comply with all the demands of Government, they should be made actually to comply, and should then be used as other friendly tribes are to be used in operations against those that are recusant.

3. If all the tribes express such a readiness, they also should be required to comply in deed, and not in word only. It will, of course, not be sufficient that mere expressions of willingness should be preferred.

4. If general submission is made, if the leaders of the guilty parties are sent in, if the captives are restored, hostages taken, and all the objects of the expedition accomplished at an early period, it certainly will not be necessary to keep the whole force in the country for protecting the survey and exploring parties, which it will then be advisable to send in such directions as may be found practicable for the purpose of acquiring an accurate knowledge of the tract, and also for the purpose of convincing the inhabitants that the fancied inaccessibility of the region does not exist. Expeditions for these purposes can then be made by a much smaller force, in a very different manner than if resistance was expected.

5. All this, however, can best be decided as events develope themselves.

6. As a matter of course, the commanders of the expedition will procure from the local officers, lists of all the captives known or supposed to be in the hands of those unfriendly chiefs into whose country the expedition will be sent.

(No. 2276 P.)

Copy of correspondence forwarded to the Government of Bengal for information, and with especial reference to the concluding paragraph of the above Memorandum.

Extract from the Proceedings of the Government of India in the Foreign Department (Political), No. 2166 P.; dated Simla, the 9th October 1871.

Resolution.—In the opinion of the Viceroy and Governor General in Council, it will be advisable, during the continuance of the operations which are about to be directed against the Looshais, to strengthen the Akyab frontier so as to secure an immunity from raids which may possibly occur should the Looshai chiefs find themselves pressed on the north and west.

2. With this view, the Military Department will be asked to detach temporarily to Arracan three companies of Native infantry. In the opinion of his Excellency in Council in this department it would be desirable that they should be sent from Madras.

3. The police force in Arracan should also, His Excellency in Council is quite convinced, be increased for the time by 100 men.* For this purpose, the necessary instructions will be issued to the Chief Commissioner of British Burmah, as soon as a reply is received to the necessary reference to the Financial Department.

* *Estimated Cost.*

		Rs.
1	Head Constable - - -	65
2	Serjeants at 30 rupees - -	60
6	Constables at 15 rupees -	90
91	„ at 12 rupees - -	1,092
100		1,307
	Contingencies - - -	150
		1,457
	Being for Six Months - Rs.	8,742

4. His Excellency in Council in this department would suggest this extra force might advantageously be distributed as follows:—

At Old Arracan - - - - - -	50 police.
„ Kalapensing - - - - - -	50 „
„ Akyab - - - - - - -	1 company.
„ Ralla - - - - - - -	1 „
„ Telukmer - - - - - -	1 „

But on this point it will be desirable that the Military Department should communicate direct with the Chief Commissioner and distribute the force in such positions as the Military Department may consider best.

5. The Financial Department will be asked to issue the necessary orders for passing the extra expenditure which will be unavoidable in carrying out the above measures.

(No. 2167 P.)

ORDER.—Ordered, That a copy of the foregoing Resolution be forwarded to the Military Department for the purposes indicated in paragraphs 2 and 4.

(No. 2168 P.)

ORDERED further, That a copy of the foregoing Resolution be forwarded to the Financial Department for the purpose indicated in paragraphs 3 and 5.

Office Memorandum from Colonel *H. K. Burne*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, No. 636; dated Simla, the 19th October 1871.

THE undersigned has the honour, with reference to Foreign Department Memorandum, No. 2167, dated 9th October 1871, to forward copy of a telegram addressed to the Madras Government, requesting the dispatch of three companies Madras Native Infantry to Akyab for the occupation of posts on the Arracan border during the progress of the Looshai operations. The Government in the Military Department will be obliged by detailed information as to the particular points which it is wished to watch, and the posts which it is wished to establish.

TELEGRAM, dated the 19th October 1871.

From Secretary Colonel *Burne*, Simla, to the Secretary to the Government, Fort St. George, Military Department.

IT is considered desirable during the operations in South Eastern Bengal to occupy some posts on the Arracan border. For this purpose, the Chief Commissioner, British Burmah, is unable to spare any part of the Rangoon garrison. I am therefore to request you to move the Governor in Council to detach three companies of Native infantry from Madras to Akyab at as early a date as practicable; the positions the troops are to occupy will be indicated on their arrival. Their services will not be required for more than five months when they will return to Madras. Field service equipment and camp equipage should accompany the detachment.

From *H. LePoer Wynne*, Esq., Under Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Officiating Chief Commissioner of British Burmah, No. 2323 P.; dated Simla, 26 October 1871.

Foreign Department Resolution, No. 2166 P., dated 9th October 1871.
From Military Department, No. 636, dated 19th October 1871.
From Financial Department, No. 4425, dated 24th October 1871.

I AM directed to forward a copy of the documents noted on the margin, from which it will be seen that it has been determined to strengthen the Arracan frontier during the operations which are about to be undertaken against the Looshais by the deputation hither of three companies of Madras Native infantry, and by an increase of 100 men to the police force at present entertained on the frontier.

2. It will also be observed that telegraphic orders have already been issued in the Military Department for the dispatch to Akyab of the military force, and, with reference thereto, I am to communicate the wish of the Viceroy and Governor General in Council that you will be good enough to convey, through the military authorities in the Pegu Division, provisional instructions for the detachment of the troops to the various posts where they should, in your opinion, be stationed, reporting those instructions to this office and to the Military Department.

3. Arrangements should also be made to distribute the extra police force in the manner which may seem to you best calculated to secure the protection of the frontier, a report of the distribution being submitted to this office.

From Major General *W. F. Nuthall*, Political Agent at Munnipoor, to the Secretary to the Goverment of India, Foreign Department, No. 107; dated Munnipoor, the 8th September 1871.

I HAVE the honour to report the arrival here of four Looshais, bringing with them, as a offering to the Raja, a musket of the Victoria pattern of 1859. It has on it the stamp of the Government reviewing establishment at Birmingham, and must have been taken from the Cachar police. I should have supposed it was an infantry havildar's musket, but it has not the usual regimental stamp on the stock.

2. They

2. They say "they have been sent by Vonolel's mother and his widow, Poiboi and his mother, and Lalkoom, *alias* Lenkom, a son of Vonolel, deceased, to ask the Maharaja to forgive their past offences, and be so merciful to them as to allow them to settle themselves in his territory, as the Lalpitang Howlongs are pressing up in a northerly direction, and, being a powerful tribe and at enmity with them, they no longer consider their country safe.

"The Lowsow and Singaroong villages wish to settle at Singul; the Boomhang Nagas, at Eolehee; the Poiboi Nagas, at Sellboong; and Lenkom at Khomefah; Vonolel's mother, widow, and son Lallbool (Lalboorah, I presume) will come afterwards, when the other poonjees are settled.

"If permission is granted, they wish to come as soon as their crops are gathered, *i.e.*, by December.

"Their crops are abundant this year, and consist of paddy and potatoes. In 20 poonjees the crops are unusually good.

"They have been eight days on the road, but halted three days on account of a swollen river and bad weather.

"The Lalpitang Howlong villages are 10 days from theirs.

"Have been at enmity for many years, and once had a severe fight, in which they lost 10 men and the Howlongs three chiefs.

"Lalpitang's party can number 3,000 fighting men, with 1,000 muskets, and they not quite so many.

"Have heard that the child Winchester is at Lalpitang's villages, with Saboonga.

"Being at enmity, they dare not go to negotiate for her recovery.

"Will be glad if the sahib will pay their villages a friendly visit, as Mr. Edgar did to Sookpilal, and will, if necessary, assist in trying to recover the child, and other captives.

"The Lalpitang chiefs are Dalong, Phallum, and Sookti.

"The sons of Vonolel (deceased) are Lalthni, Lalkoom, Lalbool, and Chilhie.

"Vonolel has not been buried yet. Vonpilal and his brother, Lalhie, have both been buried.

"The musket they have brought was bought by Poongsung of Poiboi's village, from a man of the Lalpitang villages, and Poiboi raja took it from him."

I have informed the Raja that he should allow two of them to return with a message that he will communicate with the Government of India on the subject of their wishes, and will dispatch the other two on receiving the orders of the Governor General in Council.

The Raja seems very willing to comply, if they move high up near to Bishenpore, and I think it very desirable that he should be allowed to do so, as it would at once give us great influence over a large portion of these tribes, and afford us the means of communicating with them, and of obtaining a knowledge of the people and country.

As it seems, from the independent testimony of two different parties, viz., a Munnipoor trader and Kalkom, Sookpilal's son, that Poiboi has always been friendly towards us (*see* paragraphs 17 and 27 of Mr. Edgar's report, No. B., dated 6th March 1871, to Commissioner of Dacca) and would be an useful ally, I shall give the messengers a small present in cloth to convey to him, and I trust that this measure will be approved by the Governor General in Council.

No. 2133 P: dated the 6th October 1871;

Endorsed by the Foreign Department.

COPY forwarded to the Government of Bengal, with a request that the Viceroy and Governor General in Council may be favoured with an early expression of the opinion of his Honor the Lieutenant Governor on the proposal.

From Major General *W. F. Nuthall*, Political Agent, Munnipoor, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, No. 108; dated Munnipoor, the 15th September 1871.

IN continuation of my letter, No. 107, of the 8th instant, I have the honour to report, for the information of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General in Council, that the four Looshai emissaries from Poiboi returned this morning. They opposed the proposition that two of them should remain until the orders of the Government of India could be received, on the grounds that they wished to be at their homes when their crops are cut next month, and they promised to return in six weeks with Damboom, an influential chief, and uncle of Poiboi.

2. Bearing in mind the general pacific policy observed by Government towards all these tribes, and the valuable assistance which these near clans can afford us in reaching the more distant ones, if, before proceeding to the south, we can bring them to complete subjection, and exact from them security for their future good behaviour, I deemed it prudent to treat them with civility, yet firmness, and in this spirit I explained to them through an interpreter to inform the Poiboi and the chiefs that the Looshais had for two years past committed a great of destruction both of life and property; that the Indian Government had been very forbearing, because it never punishes the good and bad indiscriminately, and it had taken time to find out who were the bad.

3. That it has now become necessary we should ascertain on the spot who are our friends and who our enemies, and with this view I shall this cold season visit their villages to receive the submission of those chiefs who wish that the past shall be forgiven and forgotten. That this one opportunity only will be afforded to them of showing repentance, and that all those chiefs who do not come in to me will henceforth be considered and treated as our enemies.

4. I had a good comfortable peacoat with brass buttons made up, and gave it to them to give to Poiboi, in order to assure him of the manner in which his messengers had been received, and of the moderation of our intentions.

5. In reply they said that since the death of Vonolel they had held no position amongst the tribes, and for this reason they were all most anxious to come under the protection of the Raja, and I might rest assured that they would return again in about six weeks, but they begged I would not visit them until after their crops were cut.

To the latter, of course, I could give no reply, and I gave them clearly to understand so.

In reply to questions they said,—

That their crops would be cut next month;
That their villages were five days from Tepai Mookh;
That Kholel's villages were two days from Tepai Mookh;
That Moolas's son, Puggo, is the chief nearest to Tepai Mookh;
That on their return they will first reach Boomhang's village, then Poiboi's, then Vonolel's;
That none of them are muntries;
That the muntry of Damboom is Nailai;
That the muntries of Poiboi are Boongs of and Womlai;
That the muntries of Lenkom are Sopee and Khutangboong;
That their chiefs have no captives whatever;
That their names and villages are as follows:—

Papoong, of Boomhang.
Pamang, of Tingrelong.
Tsoonglet, of Kamjeehai.
Ponk-shwe, of Ko-ee-hang.

6. As I deem it essential that Mr. Edgar should receive immediate information of all that goes on in connection with Munnipoor and the Looshais, I forward him copies of these communications, and trust this proceeding will receive approval.

From the Quartermaster General, Commander in Chief's Office, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department; dated Headquarters, Simla, the 13th October 1871.

THE Commander in Chief in India desires to forward, for the consideration of his Excellency the Viceroy, a copy of a letter received from Brigadier General Bourchier, commanding Eastern Frontier District, and to suggest that Major General Nuthall should be instructed to refer all communications from the frontier tribes to Brigadier General Bourchier.

Lord Napier of Magdala would further suggest that any proposition by General Nuthall for co-operating with the Cachar column should also be referred to Brigadier General Bourchier, by whose direction he should be guided.

It may be noticed that General Nuthall, in his capacity of Political Agent, Munnipoor, can have no command with a regular force.

From Brigadier General *G. Bourchier*, commanding Eastern Frontier District, to the Quartermaster General of the Army, Headquarters Simla, No. 995; dated Shillong, the 3rd October 1871.

IN continuation of my letter, No. 951, dated 23rd September 1871, and my telegram, reporting that after consultation with Mr. Edgar I had determined not to abandon the Tepai Mookh route for the advance of the Cachar column of the Looshai expedition, I have now the honour to report, for the information of His Excellency the Commander in Chief, the reasons which have led me to adhere to that route.

2. The overtures of the eastern tribes which led his Honor the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal to write me "that reasons might occur for preferring some other route," are contained in a report from General Nuthall, Officiating Political Agent at Munnipoor, to the Foreign Secretary, dated 8th September 1871, from which I epitomise as follows:—

"Four Looshais had arrived at Munnipoor with a present of a musket to the Raja. They say they were sent by Vonolel's mother and his widow, and Poiboi and his mother, and Lalkoom (Lalboorah), a son of Vonolel, begging the Raja to forgive past offences, and

to

to be so merciful as to allow them to settle in his territory as the Lalpitang Howlongs were pressing up in a northerly direction, and being a powerful tribe and hostile they no longer consider their property safe."

3. I see nothing in the above to call for any change of action on our part. They sue to the Raja of Munnipoor, but ignore the British Government entirely, and as I believe there is no doubt these tribes were the principal raiders at Monierkhall and Nugdigram, I can see no cause for abating our determination to bring them to justice, and the shortest route to do so is *viâ* Tipai Mookh.

4. With regard to the message sent in by Sookpilal, it is to the effect that he had sent valuable presents to Saboonga to try and get the captives and Mary Winchester, who is there, restored. The enemy had kept the presents and not given up the captives; that he was too weak to do more, but would help the Government as much as he could. He asks for 300 muskets and ammunition; recommends that our troops from Cachar should march on Savoonga, Saboonga, and Bhenkni by the Chatter Choora range; that the enemy would retreat towards Ryck or Bhoota and might be cut off.

5. Now there is very little promise of assistance in the above, not even a safeguard through his country, and Mr. Edgar knows nothing of the country south of Beparee Bazaar; and we should have to depend entirely on such information as Sookpilal chose to give us; but still we have no reason to believe that after his protection of Mr. Edgar [he would ?] prove treacherous, and if we could abandon the punishment of the eastern tribes, I have no doubt we could reach Saboonga's villages, travelling along the Chutter Choora range, and establishing our depôt at Pukma Mookh, up to which point we have water carriage.

6. I cannot see that the eastern tribes have in any way tendered subjection to us, or lessened their liability to severe punishment, neither do I see anything very tempting in Sookpilal's offer of assistance.

7. I have now, I hope, fully given my views for adhering to the Tepai Mookh route for the left column, and leaving the western tribes to the Cittagong column.

From *C. U. Aitchison*, Esq., C.S.I, Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Political Department, No. 2214 P.; dated Simla, the 15th October 1871.

In continuation of docket from this office, No. 2133 P., dated 6th instant, forwarding copy of a letter from the political agent, Munnipoor, No. 107, dated 8th ultimo, I am directed by the Viceroy and Governor General in Council to request that Mr. Edgar may be made acquainted with the contents of General Nuthall's letter.

2. With reference to that letter, I am further to state that His Excellency in Council is apprehensive that complications may arise if negotiations are carried on between the Looshai chiefs and two authorities. If the chiefs mentioned by General Nuthall desire to come to terms, they should make their submission to General Bourchier, as commander of the expedition, and deliver up to him any captives who may be in their hands. The political agent at Munnipoor will be directed to communicate direct with General Bourchier, and refer to him for instructions in all points connected with the approaching expedition.

3. In the opinion of His Excellency in Council, the chiefs in the neighbourhood of Munnipoor who may have been concerned in the late raids, or against whom suspicions may have been excited, should first clear themselves with the British Government. The question of their being taken under the protection of Munnipoor might then be considered by the political agent of Munnipoor, and the Cachar authorities acting in concert and submitting their views till the close of the Looshai expedition through the military commander of that expedition.

(No. 2215 P.)

Copy forwarded to the political agent in Munnipoor, with reference to his letter No. 107, dated 8th September 1871.

(No. 2216 P.)

Copy also forwarded, for information, to the Military Department, in continuation of the docket from this office, No. 1874 P., dated 4th September 1871.

From *H. LePoer Wynne*, Esq., Under Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Political Agent of Munnipoor, No. 2286 P.; dated Simla, the 24th October 1871.

In reply to your letter, dated the 15th September 1871, No. 108, reporting the result of the interview which you had with the emissaries from the Looshai chief, Poiboi, I am directed to refer you to the views of Government on the course to be pursued in negotiations with chiefs who may be disposed to come to terms, as conveyed in the letter from this office, No. 2214 P., dated 15th October 1871, to the Bengal Government, a copy of which was forwarded to you with the docket, No. 2215 P., of the same date.

(No. 2287 P.)

Copy of the correspondence forwarded to the Government of Bengal, in continuation of the letter from this office, No. 2214 P., dated 15th October 1871.

(No. 2288 P.)

Copy of the correspondence also forwarded to the Military Department, in continuation of the docket from this office, No. 2216 P., dated 15th October 1871.

Office Memorandum from Lieut. Colonel *A. Johnson*, Officiating Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, No. 711; dated Simla, the 21st October 1871.

* Return requested.

In transmitting the accompanying letter from the Quartermaster General, No. 211,* dated 19th October 1871, regarding the instructions issued to the officers commanding the two columns of the Looshai expeditionary force, the undersigned has the honour to inquire whether the orders issued by his Excellency the Commander in Chief meet the views of the Government in the Foreign Department.

No. 211, dated Simla, the 19th October 1871.

Endorsed by the Quartermaster General.

Three printed copies of Quartermaster General's No. 174, Looshai, dated 12th October 1871, to General Bourchier.
Three printed copies of Quartermaster General's No. 174½, Looshai, dated 12th October 1871, to General Brownlow.
Instructions regarding the manner in which they are to act while in command of the two columns of the Looshai expeditionary force.

Forwarded, with the compliments of his Excellency the Commander in Chief, for the information of Government in the Military Department.

(No. 174.)

From Colonel *P. S. Lumsden*, Quartermaster General, to Brigadier General *G. Bourchier*, C.B., Commanding Cachar Column, Looshai Expeditionary Force, Shillong.

Quartermaster General's Office, Army Head Quarters,
Simla, 12 October 1871.

Sir,

I am directed by the Right Honourable the Commander in Chief, preparatory to the advance into the Looshai country of the troops under your command, to invite attention to the requirements of the Government of India in giving execution to the project entrusted to you, and to other details which His Excellency considers may be useful for guidance in this matter.

2. It must in the first place be ever borne in mind, that the object of the expedition which it has been found necessary to send into the Looshai country, is not one of pure retaliation, and that much discrimination will be needed in dealing with the different chiefs.

3. Secondly. If during the progress of the expedition, guilt can with certainty be brought home to any particular villages, punishment must follow. The surrender of chiefs who are known to hold, or to have lately held, British subjects in captivity, should be demanded; and in the event of non-compliance, their houses and property should be destroyed. No vague promises, and nothing short of absolute and practical submission should arrest progress; and opposition should be dealt with promptly and thoroughly, but no unnecessary severity, and no injury to unoffending persons, or those who have complied with your conditions, should for a moment be permitted.

If hostility is met with, resisting villages should be attacked and burnt, and the surrounding crops destroyed.

4. Should

4. Should it be found more convenient for you to occupy any defensible village on the line of operations, using the houses therein for shelter of your troops, stores, &c., rather than to destroy them, you will no doubt take advantage of it.

5. Thirdly. The restoration of the captives in the hands of any of the chiefs is to be insisted on, and every effort made for their deliverance. When it is ascertained that particular inhabitants of a village have taken part in a raid without complicity of the village as a whole, the infliction of a fine on it, and the surrender or punishment of the guilty would probably be sufficient. In some cases it may appear desirable to take and detain either the leading chiefs or others as hostages for good behaviour.

6. It must, however, always be remembered that the main end in view is, after these savages have become sensible of our power and their inability to oppose us with success, to endeavour to establish friendly relations of a permanent character with them, and to make them promise to receive in their villages native agents of our own; to make travelling in their districts safe to all; to show them the advantages of trade and commerce; and to demonstrate to them effectually that they have nothing to gain, and everything to lose, by placing themselves in a hostile position towards the British Government.

7. It may assist in effecting the objects above mentioned, if use be made of chiefs belonging to friendly tribes and their followers, as far as the circumstances of the case may admit, but whenever such assistance or co-operation may be employed, the greatest care should be taken to distinguish friendly Looshais by some conspicuous mark which should be known to the whole force, or such parts of it as may be necessary, to prevent their being mistaken for enemies, and also to prevent our own troops from being deceived.

The Commander in Chief, speaking from experience, does not advocate as a general rule the mixing of regular troops in military action in immediate contact with any description of auxiliary force, as such a course has too frequently resulted in mistakes and misunderstandings.

The assistance of individuals or of small parties may prove very valuable, and is less likely to cause inconvenience. In the employment of any auxiliary tribe, care must be taken that they be not allowed to give vent to feelings and acts of outrage unbecoming the character of the British force with which they are associated.

8. It is desirable that, after accomplishing the objects immediately in view for each of the columns, they should if possible meet at some central point, so that the line of country beyond the frontier shall be completely explored, but this must depend entirely on the circumstances in which the commanders of columns may find themselves, and be left to their discretion.

9. As the Government of India have stated that no formidable armed resistance is to be anticipated, it is hoped that the regular troops provided for each column will be sufficient, but you will also have at command the services of a considerable police force, the extent of which you will ascertain from the Commissioner of the district. These police will properly be employed in completing the protection of the frontier, which will to a certain extent have been left with a diminished force of troops. They also may be usefully engaged in holding posts at the bases of operation, and on the lines of communication, as the troops advance, or in such other work as will promote the progress of the expedition. It is necessary that their state of equipment, clothing, arms and ammunition, should be ascertained to be efficient.

10. In the selection of posts the greatest care should be taken with regard to military security, to prevent surprise, and to maintain a command of ground as well as supply of water. In case of the latter not being feasible, with reference to the former consideration, arrangements should be made to secure at least 24 hours' supply within the stockade, in mussucks, choongas, &c.

11. When troops are not otherwise employed, they cannot do better than to clear jungle from the vicinity of posts, and improve the tracks of route to facilitate communication with the base and connecting stations.

12. Communication between the posts should be maintained at least once a day, and daily postal arrangement be established with the base.

The columns thus having communication with their bases, which will be connected by a telegraphic line, the commanders should be in constant communication with each other, and be kept informed of their respective progress.

13. The strictest discipline must be maintained amongst the troops.

14. Much of the impression made will depend upon the first success, and therefore, if serious opposition is anticipated, it should be met by a sufficient force to give a decided result. When there is any risk of interruption of communication by the enemy, care should be taken not to employ convoys of such weak strength as to invite attack.

15. His Excellency attributes the greatest importance to the efficiency of the carriage.

The elephants and coolies should invariably receive the greatest attention. The latter cannot be too much cared for. Their protection on the line of march, their shelter, and the care of their sick, are all most important, and should experience develope the advisability of increased supervision, his Excellency feels confident that you will at once secure the same from the services of the troops at your disposal.

16. No soldiers or camp followers are on any account to be allowed to leave the columns, camp, or bivouac, without orders; and every attempt to stray for purposes of pillage, &c., should be severely punished.

17. His Excellency desires that you will keep him constantly informed, by telegraph and letter, of the progress of the expedition. No elaborate reports are required, but everything of importance should be noted, and it will be well to remember that all your communications with head quarters, local Governments, and authorities, however hurried or brief, are of a public character.

18. Having thus reiterated for your guidance the general scope of action to give effect to the objects of the expedition entrusted to you, I am to state the Commander in Chief is aware that the service is one which admits of no definite and rigid rules for guidance, but requires much to be left entirely to your judgment and discretion, in which His Excellency has the fullest confidence. He feels assured that you will use every endeavour to cordially co-operate with the different officers placed by Government at your disposal, and with their assistance effectively give execution to the important project entrusted to you by the Government of India.

Note.—Similar instructions were, on the same date, issued to Brigadier General C. H. Brownlow, C.B., commanding Chittagong Column, Looshai Expeditionary Force, Calcutta.

Office Memo.—From *H. LePoer Wynne*, Esq., Under Secretary o the Government of India, Foreign Department.

To the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 2341 P.; dated Simla, the 28th October 1871.

* Original papers returned as requested.

IN reply to the Office Memorandum from the Military Department, No. 711,* dated 21st October 1871, the undersigned is directed to state that the instructions which have been issued to the officers commanding the two columns of the Looshai Expeditionary Force appear to the Viceroy and Governor General in Council in this department to be unobjectionable so far as they go, but that they do not seem to embrace all the points comprised in the Resolutions of this department, noted on the margin.† They do not, namely, provide for the object mentioned in Section 10 of the Resolution of this office of 11th July, regarding the information needed with the view of laying down a permanent line of defence, nor for the relations of the civil with the military officers, nor for the employment of Munnipoor and Tipperah troops. It is desirable that the desire of Government, with respect to these points, should be fully understood by the commanding officers, and the undersigned is to convey the wish of His Excellency in Council that the instructions already issued may be supplemented accordingly; a copy as amended being forwarded to this department for information.

† No. 1453, dated 11th July 1871.
No. 1645, dated 4th August 1871.
No. 1872, dated 4th September 1871.
No. 2275, dated 21st October 1871.

(No. 370 of 1871.)

(Separate.)

To His Grace the Duke of *Argyll*, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Military Department, Fort William,
6 December 1871.

My Lord Duke,

IN continuation of our Despatch, No. 307, dated 26th September 1871, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, copies of further papers relative to the progress of the Looshai Expedition.

2. It will be seen that all preparations have been actively pushed forward, and that most of the troops are now *en route* to the bases of operations, where the arrangements are progressing on the whole very satisfactorily.

3. It will be seen that cholera unfortunately broke out amongst the coolies collected in the hills shortly after they arrived in the plains, and caused 64 deaths; but such sudden outbreaks will at times occur; and we think that, judging from the healthiness of the troops and establishments who have preceded these men to Cachar, &c., there is every reason to hope that the precautionary measures adopted will prove effectual in preventing any recurrence of the disease. From later intelligence received, it appears that the worst of the outbreak is over, and that the men are generally in good health and spirits.

We are, &c.
(signed) *Mayo*,
Napier of Magdala.
&c. &c.

From Colonel *P. S. Lumsden,* Quartermaster General to Brigadier General *G. Bourchier,* C.B., Commanding Eastern Frontier District, Shillong, No. 3890; dated Simla, the 2nd September 1871.

THE Government of India having been pleased to approve of the Right Honourable the Commander in Chief's recommendation that you should direct the operations proposed to be carried out during the ensuing cold season in the Looshai country from the base of Cachar, I am directed to communicate to you the following instructions for your guidance in the carrying out the views of Government, as set forth in the annexed confidential extract from the Proceedings of the Government of India, Foreign Department, No. 1453 P. of 11th July 1871.

2. His Excellency feels certain that you will fully appreciate the confidence the Government of India have placed in your judgment, and that you will use every effort compatible with military requirements to ensure the cordial co-operation of the able civil officers placed at your disposal. On this subject I am to forward for your guidance the annexed extract from the Proceedings of the Government of India, in the Foreign Department, No. 1645 P., of 14th August 1871.

3. With these officers, including the representatives of Government with the States of Munnipoor and Tipperah, you should at once enter into the most intimate communication, so as to command all the local information in their possession, and secure the fullest knowledge regarding the chiefs, tribes, resources, and country in which you are about to operate, as also to obtain the services of the most trustworthy procurable agents to act as guides and spies to the force.

4. I am to inform you that, in accordance with His Excellency's recommendation, the Government have approved of the project to advance by detached brigades from the bases of Cachar and Chittagong.

5. The troops detailed for the service will be divided as follows:—

Cachar Column.

½ Peshawur Mountain Battery, with two 150-lb. steel guns, and two mortars, with 35 infantry soldiers attached, trained to the use of guns.
1 Company of Sappers, with equipment, 100 men.
22nd Punjab Infantry - - - - - - - 500 picked men.
42nd Native ditto - - - - - - - 500 „
44th ditto ditto - - - - - - - 500 „

Chittagong Column.

½ Peshawur Mountain Battery, similarly equipped.
1 Company of Sappers, with equipment, 100 men.
2nd Goorkhas - - - - - - - - 500 picked men.
4th Goorkhas - - - - - - - - 500 „
27th Punjab Infantry - - - - - - - 500 „

6. As no mules accompany the Peshawur Mountain Battery, elephant carriage must be arranged for from the elephants supplied by the Commissariat.

7. The equipment of this force for this special service in which it is about to be engaged is to be regulated by the annexed memorandum, marked (A.), and I am about to impress upon you the vital necessity of requiring the most positive adherence to the restricted allowance of baggage, on which so much of the success of such a peculiar operation must depend.

8. Waterproof sheets in lieu of tents have been telegraphed for to England by Government, and it is hoped they will arrive in ample time for distribution preparatory to the advance of the troops. The regiments, however, will take their camp equipage to the bases, where of course the hospitals would be established, together with depôts of supply, &c.

9. His Excellency especially desires a report from time to time of the practical use of the waterproof sheets, as on their applicability to the purposes required, and which should be so amply exemplified in this expedition, will depend any future representation to Government with regard to their being permanently supplied to the troops on the Eastern Frontier.

10. I am to inform you that the Commissary General has received instructions to supply each of the columns with 100 elephants, and that, under the orders of the Government of Bengal, officers have been nominated to raise a coolie corps of 600 men for the conveyance of the baggage and ammunition of each column; further, that the Commissary General, for the requirements of his own department with regard to the provisioning of the force, has applied for the authority of Government to entertain 2,000 coolies for each brigade.

11. The Government of India having solicited His Excellency's opinion on the possibility of reducing the number of coolies indicated, it may be useful for you to have in possession the calculations made in this department which induced the Commander in Chief to recommend the entertainment of the number of coolies originally proposed by the Commissary General: this is annexed, marked (B.)

12. The Government of Bengal have further been directed to issue the necessary instructions for the collection of a sufficient number of small boats on the Barak and Kurnafoolee rivers, up the line of which the columns to operate will advance, and his Excellency has further urged upon Government to insure immediate erection at Cachar and Kassalong of storehouses suitable for the storage of commissariat supply.

13. As soon as the season will admit, his Excellency thinks you should establish a post at Tepai Mookh of such strength as to ensure safety, and as soon as this may have been effected, that the troops should commence the provision of shelter for commissariat supply, and thus enable you to move forward by the beginning of December.

14. In the undertaking of an expedition such as that now contemplated, there is no point on which greater stress can be laid than the necessity of securing the most perfect medical and sanitary arrangements. Dr. Buckle, C.B., Deputy Inspector General of Hospitals, having been nominated to superintend the administration of the Medical Department, his Excellency considers that no better means can be suggested to obtain this than to depute that experienced officer to at once proceed to Calcutta, and, in communication with yourself and Colonel Brownlow, C.B. (who has been nominated to the command of the Chittagong column), arrange for the necessary supply of dandies and hospital equipment suitable for coolie carriage, care being taken that no one load exceeds 20 seers.

15. The Surveyor General has organised two distinct surveying parties, one to accompany each column, and it is scarcely necessary to enlarge on the importance of securing the most complete information, topographical and documentary, of the country hitherto unexplored, inhabited by the Looshai tribes. His Excellency looks to you to afford the officers in charge the fullest assistance in your power.

16. The Commander in Chief has also addressed Government on the advisability of extending the telegraphic communication from Cachar and Chittagong to such a distance on your route of advance as may be found desirable.

17. It will be well to remember that it is recorded in an account of Colonel Lister's expedition of 1855, that while little or no loss was sustained in the advance, casualties eventually resulted from the effect of poisoned arrows discharged from ambush on the retiring sepoys.

18. Further, that in the earlier days of Assam occupation, when our troops were so frequently engaged against the Burmese and other tribes of an analagous character to those against which we are now about to operate, the turning of stockades not unfrequently secured their evacuation, while the result of successful assault on defended works of that nature produced a more lasting impression and greater moral effect.

19. A further communication will be sent to you regarding the occupation of Assam during the absence of the men of the 42nd and 44th Regiments required for this service; in the meantime this department have communicated to Government the necessity for steam transport being available on 20th October at Gowhatty to convey 200 men of the 43rd Regiment from that place and Tezpoor to Dibrooghur, and to bring from the latter station the 500 men of the 44th Native Infantry destined for the Looshai Expedition, as also to carry out all the other arrangements required to ensure the remaining troops for both brigades being at their respective stations by the 20th November.

20. Your acknowledgment of this letter is requested.

(A.)

MEMORANDUM of the probable Carriage Requirements for a Force for Active Service on the North-Eastern Frontier.

I.—Strength of Force.

½ Mountain Train Battery, Native.
1 Company Sappers and Miners.
3 Regiments Native Infantry.

II.—Equipment.

1. No tents to accompany the force.
2. No private horses, servants, followers, baggage or stores, to accompany the force beyond what is here prescribed.
3. No bazaar establishment to accompany the force.

4. Soldiers

4. Soldiers to carry the following articles themselves:—

	Lbs.	*oz.*
Great coat	7	0
Waterproof sheet 7′ × 4′ to be supplied free by Government, and to be worn in a roll over the shoulder with the great coat	4	0
Arms and accoutrements	16	0
60 rounds ammunition, in pouch	5	7
Two days' rations, say	5	0
Sundries	4	9
Total *Lbs.*	42	0

5. Carriage to be provided by Government to the following extent:—

	Md.	*s.*
General Officer Commanding	1	0
Each staff officer of force, and commanding officer of regiment:—		
Extra for office	0	20
British officers	0	20
Native officers	0	10
Troops	0	6
Followers	Nil.	
Cooking utensils per regiment	2	0
Ditto per separate company or detachment	0	20
Hospital stores	1	0

6. Ammunition:—

Artillery - 100 rounds per gun.
50 24-pr. Hale's rockets.
50 12-pr. ditto.

Sappers and Infantry - 60 rounds per man, in pouch.
40 rounds per man to be carried on animals with the force.
100 rounds per man in reserve in boats at nearest depôts, to be advanced with the force.

7. Rations:—

(*a.*)—Officers, troops, and followers to carry two days' food in their haversacks.

(*b.*)—8 days' food to invariably accompany the force on animals.

(*c.*)—15 day's food to be at the nearest advanced depôt.

(*d.*)—5 months supply to be at commencement of operations at reserve depôts.

(*e.*)—Rum only to be issued on medical recommendation, and no more than one day's supply to be with the force.

8. Private servants and chargers:—

British officer, each, one servant.
„ „ „ one riding pony and one syce.
„ „ „ one grass cutter for every two chargers or ponies.
Native officers: one servant between two officers.

9. Public Establishments:—

Regimental; 3 per separate company or 24 per regiment, to be detailed under regimental arrangements, and to provide for bhisties, langrees or cooks, sweepers, and one mistree or mochee.

Hospital; 3 hospital servants per separate company and detachment of artillery.

8 Hospital servants per regiment.

1 Dooly or dandy per company or
8 „ „ „ per regiment } with 6 bearers each.

10. Four tarpaulins to be supplied at the reserve depôt, to be used as tents for protection of the sick.

11. All camp followers to have either kookries or spears.

(B.)

A force entering a country finds it necessary to carry provisions for the entire journey, which it is calculated will take ten days; required the number of coolies for the transport of provisions?

The strength of the force is as follows:—

3 regiments of infantry each,—

Officers.	Native Officers	Men.	Followers	Officers.	Native Officers.	Soldiers.	Followers.
8	16	500	324	24	48	1,500	972
½ Battery of Artillery - - - -				1	1	35	30
1 Company of Sappers - - -				2	2	100	62
Staff - - - - - - - -				10	–	–	40
Police - - - - - - - -				–	–	200	–
TOTAL - - -				37	51	1,835	1,104
Of this force one regiment or - - -				8	16	500	324
In reserve at starting will remain at the base, leaving - - - - -				29	35	1,335	780

Or 2,179 men to go on; for each man 1½ seers of food are required daily; therefore, for this number 3,268 seers must be carried, which at 20 seers per coolie, requires for the - - - - - - - - - -	1st Stage -	164 Coolies.
At the 1st stage 20 police will be left, reducing the force to 2,159 men, requiring for the - - - - -	2nd „ -	162 „
At the 2nd stage 30 police will be left, reducing the force to 2,129 men, requiring for the - - - - -	3rd „ -	160 „
At the 3rd stage 262 soldiers and 162 followers (a wing of a regiment) will be left, reducing the force to 1,705 men, requiring for the - - - - - - - -	4th „ -	128 „
At the 4th stage 30 police will be left, reducing the force to 1,675 men, requiring for the - - - - -	5th „ -	126 „
At the 5th stage 30 police will be left, reducing the force to 1,645 men, requiring for the - - - - -	6th „ -	124 „
At the 6th stage 262 soldiers and 162 followers (a wing of a regiment) will be left, reducing the force to 1,221 men, requiring for the - - - - - - -	7th „ -	92 „
At the 7th stage 30 police will be left, reducing the force to 1,191 men, requiring for the - - - - -	8th „ -	90 „
At the 8th stage 30 police will be left, reducing the force to 1,161 men, requiring for the - - - - -	9th „ -	87 „
At the 9th stage 30 police will be left, reducing the force to 1,131 men, requiring for the - - - - -	10th „ -	85 „
At the end of the journey, therefore, there will remain.	21 Officers - 19 Native Officers 635 Soldiers - 456 Followers -	
TOTAL - - - -	1,131 men, requiring	1,218 coolies

for food alone to place them at this point.

In the foregoing calculation it is supposed that coolies are supplied for the carriage of baggage and ammunition; if, however, elephants are provided in lieu, the number of followers leaving the base will be reduced from 780 to 264; 417 coolies being required for baggage.

99 „ - ammunition.

516

780—516=264.

In place of these 516 coolies, 37 elephants would be required. For each elephant about 10 seers of food has to be provided daily, and for the two attendants three seers; so that for 30 elephants with 74 attendants, 592 seers, or 30 coolies, would be required daily.

In addition, arrangements must be made for the food of the 12 elephants carrying the artillery guns and ammunition, as well as for the food of the coolies who carry provisions, and also for feeding the troops in the advance and at the several posts; so that even supposing elephant carriage be supplied for luggage and ammunition, it will be found that 1,200 coolies will be required for food for each column, and if it be determined to take coolies for baggage and ammunition, 500 more must be added to the above number.

Considering, however, the carriage for baggage, stores, and ammunition to be fixed at 80 elephants and 600 coolies, and taking into consideration the food of the elephants and their followers, the result arrived at is very much similar, viz., a want of about 1,200 coolies to feed the force.

The

The baggage to be allowed is as follows:—

		Maunds.		*Seers.*
Army staff and commanding officers - - -	each	1	or	40
Other officers - - - - - - - -	„	½	„	20
Native officers - - - - - - - -	„	¼	„	10
Soldiers - - - - - - - - -	„	0	„	6
Cooking utensils per regiment - - - -	„	2	„	80
Ditto per separate company or detachment -	„	½	„	20
Hospital stores per regiment - - - -	„	1	„	40
Ditto per separate company or detachment -	„	½	„	20

40 rounds per man to be carried with the force, calculating 100 rounds equal to 9 lbs.

Servants:

British officers, each - - - - - - -	2	one for each pony.
Native officers „ - - - - - - -	½	
Regiment - - - - - - - - -	24	
or per company - - - - -	3	
Hospital, per regiment - - - - -	8	
per company - - - - -	3	
Doolie bearers, per regiment - - - -	48	
per company - - - - -	6	

From Colonel *H. K. Burne*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Quartermaster General, No. 703; dated Simla, the 21st September 1871.

WITH reference to your memorandum, No. 4 of the 18th September 1871, "Field Operations," forwarding, for information, copy of instructions which have been issued to Brigadier General G. Bourchier, R.E., C.B., Commanding Eastern Frontier District, in connection with the operations to be carried out in the ensuing cold season, I am desired to point out the following slight inaccuracies in the letter adverted to which seem to require correction.

2. In paragraph 10 it is stated that the Commissary General has applied to Government to be allowed to entertain 2,000 coolies for each brigade for the use of his department.

3. As yet the coolies are being raised by the aid of the Bengal Government, and by military officers who have been appointed by the Commander in Chief for that purpose, and the total number ordered to be raised is 4,000.

4. This includes 1,200 (half for each column) specially for the troops, it being intended to make over all in excess of that number to the commissariat, whose requirements have been estimated at 1,200 for each column or a total, including those for the troops, of 3,600.

To meet casualties by sickness or otherwise, it was deemed prudent to authorise enlistment up to 4,000 altogether.

5. As regards elephants, also, 80 for each column was the number first allotted, and it is hoped this may be increased to about 100, or even more, if any of these animals can be hired locally; but it is not possible at present to state exactly what number will be available, and it is desirable that there should be no misapprehension on the subject of any expectation of a larger supply than it may prove practicable to provide.

From *H. L. Harrison*, Esq., Officiating Junior Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department, to the Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 4490; dated Fort William, the 19th September 1871.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 472, dated the 13th instant, calling for a report as to the progress made in recruiting for the cooly corps.

2. The papers forwarded with my endorsement, No. 4026, dated the 25th ultimo, have informed the Government of India of the arrangements made by the Lieutenant Governor for organising two corps of coolies, 600 each, in accordance with the instructions received in Secretary Colonel Burne's letter, No. 11, dated the 1st ultimo.

3. The committee appointed by the Lieutenant Governor to consider the organisation of these corps, having recommended the terms on which the coolies could probably be obtained, it was resolved to raise one corps from the Western Districts to be collected in Calcutta, and thence sent by water to Chittagong, and another from the North-Eastern Districts, to be collected at Darjeeling, moved down by land to Dhobree, and thence transported to Cachar.

4. Mr. Reilly, who has been entrusted with the duty of raising the Calcutta corps, having made arrangements for the establishment of a depôt at Garden Reach, and for the care and superintendence of the coolies, pending the arrival of the officers promised by the Government of India, proceeded to Bancoorah, on the 28th August, to collect recruits.

5. Notwithstanding the liberal terms offered, Mr. Reilly reports having encountered great difficulties in accomplishing the object of his undertaking. The causes which have retarded

his progress are the difficulty at this time of the year of reaching the Sonthal villages which are mostly situated in the jungles, and scattered over a large extent of country, the unwillingness of the Sonthals who are under advances from the Mahajuns to leave their crops; and the competition of the several emigration agencies who have depôts in this part of the country. Under these circumstances, as the Government of India have already been informed by my indorsement, No. 4262½, dated the 7th instant, it was found necessary to offer recruiting money not exceeding three rupees a head with a view to accelerate the organisation of the corps. This offer of head money has, Mr. Reilly reports in a letter just received, dated 16th September, proved of great assistance. He has succeeded in inducing several influential Sirdars and Sonthal manjees to go out and collect men. The rajah of Pachete has also sent men to bring in recruits, and the terms offered by Government have been proclaimed throughout Maunbhoom and Chota Nagpore. Mr. Reilly has also sent a man to the district of Nuddea to collect men from the cooly settlements near the indigo factories. He hopes that he may count on these exertions producing several hundred coolies within the next few days; still the number actually enlisted is almost *nil*, and the Lieutenant Governor is anxiously awaiting the result of the measures set in train, and hopes soon to be able to send a more satisfactory report of the progress made.

6. As regards the organisation of the second corps, I am to state that some time was unfortunately lost in obtaining the services of Captain Hedayut Ali, whom it was proposed to employ in raising this corps. In consequence of this, a demi-official communication was made to Colonel Haughton, the Commissioner of the Cooch Behar Division, to commence, with the assistance of a machinery under him, the work of raising the requisite number of Nepalese or hill coolies from the neighbourhood of Darjeeling, and measures were set in motion by him with great alacrity. Since then Colonel Burne's telegram of the 6th instant, placing Captain Hedayut Ali's services at the disposal of this Government was received. Fortunately Captain Hedayut Ali being at Dinapore and Colonel Haughton happening to have occasion to visit Patna at the time, no time was lost in their communicating with each other, and Captain Hedayut Ali has proceeded to Darjeeling, where his personal influence will be of great use in inducing the hill coolies to accept the service. Colonel Haughton is sanguine in his expectation of being able to collect 600 men or more, and arrangements are being made to meet them at Dhobree, on the 1st November, and transport them to Chuttuck.

None of the officers appointed by the Government of India to aid in raising the corps have yet reported their arrival at Bhagulpore.

From Colonel *B. E. Bacon*, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, Calcutta, to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department, No. 713; dated Fort William, the 20th September 1871.

I AM directed to acknowledge the letter from your office, No. 4490, dated 19th September 1871, and to request that, under the orders of the Honourable the Lieutenant Governor, an early report of the result of the measures now being taken to entertain coolies, both for the Calcutta corps and at Darjeeling, may be made for the information of the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council, as soon as their probable effect can be estimated.

From Colonel *H. K. Burne*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, Calcutta, No. 831; dated Simla, the 26th September 1871.

I AM directed to acquaint you that a telegram to the following effect has this day been dispatched to you:—

"To prevent the possibility of mistake which might arise from the Commissariat Department being employed by the Bengal Government in conjunction with their own officers in raising coolies, please make sure that it is understood that 4,000 coolies in all is the utmost number required for the expedition, and we wish for weekly report of the progress in collecting this number."

From Colonel the Honourable *F. A. Thesiger*, C.B., Adjutant General, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 2010 E.; dated Simla, the 23rd September 1871.

I HAVE the honour, by direction of the Right Honourable the Commander in Chief, to submit, for the favourable consideration of Government, the name of Colonel G. A. Fisher, Commandant, 5th Native Infantry, for the temporary command of the Eastern Frontier District, during the absence of Brigadier General Bourchier with the Looshai Expedition, and to request that Colonel Fisher be permitted to enter on the command at once.

2. His

2. His Excellency further recommends that Brigadier General Bourchier, C.B., be directed, on handing over command of the district to Colonel Fisher, to proceed to Cachar with a view to superintending the arrangements for the movements of his column.

3. Lord Napier of Magdala would also beg to recommend that Brigadier General Bourchier be considered as commander of the column from the date of his leaving Shillong.

From Colonel *H. K. Burne*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Adjutant General, No. 845; dated Simla, the 26th September 187..

I AM directed to acknowledge your letter, No. 2010, dated 23rd September, submitting the name of Colonel G. A. Fisher, for the temporary command of the Eastern Frontier District during the absence of Brigadier General Bourchier with the Looshai Expedition.

2. In reply, I am to acquaint you that the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council regrets to be unable to concur with His Excellency the Commander in Chief as to the necessity for incurring the additional expense which this measure would involve.

3. His Excellency in Council never contemplated such a measure, nor does he, I am to state, consider that it will be necessary to relieve Brigadier General Bourchier of the Eastern Frontier command while with the force against the Looshais, the ordinary duties of which may well continue to be conducted by him, any urgent matter being dealt with by Lieutenant Colonel Stubbs, commanding 4th Native Infantry, or other senior officer as regards Cachar and Sylhet, and by Lieutenant Colonel Cookson, Commanding 43rd Native Infantry, as regards Assam.

4. It will, I am to state, rest with His Excellency to direct Brigadier General Bourchier's movements in connection with this expedition.

From Colonel the Honourable *F. A. Thesiger*, C.B., Adjutant General, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 1996 N.; dated Simla, the 22nd September 1871.

REFERRING to your endorsement, No. 580, of the 18th instant, I am directed by the Right Honourable the Commander in Chief to forward copies of two letters* received from Colonel Brownlow, C.B., regarding the rations, clothing, pay, &c., of the troops about to be employed on the Looshai Expedition.

* Dated 21st and 22nd September 1871.

2. His Excellency concurs with Colonel Brownlow's opinion as expressed in his letter of the 21st instant, viz., that a meat ration should be issued three times a week, if possible, to every sepoy who will eat it, but His Excellency is aware that great difficulty would be experienced in carrying out such an arrangement. Lord Napier would suggest, however, that so long as the troops are at the primary bases of Chittagong and Silchar, and even after leaving those stations, the meat ration should be granted whenever procurable, so as to keep the men in a fit state of bodily efficiency.

3. Further, several representations have been made to His Excellency from commanding and medical officers, pointing out the absolute necessity of rum as a sanitary requirement by both Sikhs and Goorkhas. In the presence of this concurrent testimony of officers whose opinions are well worthy of consideration, the Commander in Chief would recommend, in substitution of His Excellency's recommendation contained in my letter, No. 1940 N., of 15th September 1871, that rum should be issued to every sepoy drinking it at the rate of a dram every two days.

4. Lord Napier of Magdala desires to strongly support Colonel Brownlow's proposal (in his letter of the 22nd instant), that a suit of woollen under-clothing, a pair of ammunition boots, and a good blanket should be supplied to the Native troops and mustered camp followers, in addition to the socks and bandages already sanctioned by Government, or that a money grant of ten rupees per man be given as compensation to be expended by the respective commanding officers in such manner as they may think best.

5. His Excellency desires also the favourable consideration of Government to the proposal for granting double batta to the troops, from the date of embarkation, as heavy expenses will be incurred by them, and they must suffer pecuniarily, unless some such boon is sanctioned.

6. The above proposals are made by the Commander in Chief after very careful

deliberation, and in the conviction that they are necessary to the health, well-being, and content of the soldiers about to be employed on arduous service.

7. I am desired to request that a very early reply may be given to these proposals, as Commandants of the regiments about to take part in the expedition are pressing in their requests for final instructions as to what articles are to be procured regimentally, and what will be supplied by Government.

From Colonel *C. H. Brownlow*, C.B., Commanding 20th Native Infantry, to the Adjutant General; dated the 21st September 1871.

* No. 579, dated 18th September, from Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of copy of the letter marginally* noted, and, in obedience to your memorandum at foot calling for an opinion as to the rations which will suit the Sikhs and Punjabees best, I beg to say that their wants and ways are very much the same as those of the Goorkhas, and that an allowance of meat, whenever procurable, will be absolutely necessary to keep them in health.

2. These men are in the habit of eating meat two or three times a week, even under ordinary circumstances and in a congenial climate. They will, therefore, feel the want of it to a very increased degree when under hard work in a malarious and depressing atmosphere.

3. I am aware of the almost insuperable difficulties in the way of conveying sheep and goats to the scene of action; but trust I may be authorised to make what local arrangements I can for the supply of fowls, which I believe abound at Chittagong, at the rate of a pound a man twice or three times a week.

4. With regard to rum, which is still more necessary to the preservation of health, and which Government has sanctioned at the rate of 12 gallons a month per regiment, I beg to point out that this will give each man exactly one dram every 30 days, an allowance so inadequate that I trust there has been some clerical mistake in the paragraph on this subject of the letter above quoted.

Rum is, comparatively speaking, so easy of carriage, and to the best of my belief, so conducive to health and spirits under the conditions the men of the Looshai force are likely to campaign, that I earnestly hope Government will sanction the issue of a dram to each man every other day, even should it entail the necessity of curtailing an equivalent in weight of the ration of flour or rice.

From Colonel *C. H. Brownlow*, C.B., Commanding 20th Native Infantry, to the Adjutant General; dated the 22nd September 1871.

I HAVE the honour to solicit the favour of your submitting, for the consideration of his Excellency the Commander in Chief, my recommendation that the articles of clothing, &c., as per margin, should be provided for the Native troops and mustered camp followers proceeding on the Looshai Expedition, or that Government should be moved to sanction a money grant at the rate of 10 rupees a head as compensation to enable Commanding Officers to supplement the present kits of their men according to the wants and deficiencies of their respective corps, and with reference to any arrangements they may have already made towards supplying them with the necessaries for the exceptional service on which they are bound.

1 Suit of woollen underclothing, *i. e.*, a pair of drawers and a banian, or a second banian in lieu of the drawers, if preferred.
2 pair warm socks.
1 Pair ammunition boots (Native made boots being quite unfit for such service).
1 Pair woollen "Putties."
1 Good blanket (razaies which Native soldiers usually possess being very unsuited to a damp climate).

2. Taking into consideration the handsome way in which the troops that went to China and Abyssinia were treated in this respect, I cannot think I am asking too much for men who are to be employed in a far more unhealthy country, and with little prospect of any of the advantages that attend more important campaigns.

3. Having learnt that the coolies accompanying the force are to receive a free kit, free rations, and pay at the rate of nine rupees a month, I beg to be informed of the intentions of Government as to the pay of the soldiers, who, I trust, are to receive double batta. The latter, according to the orders laid down, will carry 42 pounds on their backs (two pounds more than the coolies) and have to fight as well. It would, therefore, I think, give rise to invidious comparisons and be a certain source of anxiety, and possibly of trouble, if the coolies served on equal or better terms than the combatant portion of the force.

From Colonel *H. K. Burne*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department to the Adjutant General, No. 846; dated Simla, the 26th September 1871.

I AM directed to acknowledge your letter, No. 1996, dated 22nd September 1871, forwarding two letters from Colonel C. H. Brownlow, C.B., regarding the rations, clothing, and pay of the troops to be employed in the ensuing cold season on the Looshai Expedition.

2. The Right Honourable the Commander in Chief, in forwarding these proposals, recommends, as necessary to the health, well-being, and content of the soldiers about to be employed, that a meat ration shall be issued to every soldier who will eat it, so long as the troops are at the primary bases of Chittagong and Silchar, and even after leaving those stations whenever procurable; that rum shall be issued to every sepoy drinking it, at the rate of a dram every two days; that a suit of woollen under-clothing, a pair of ammunition boots, and a good blanket shall be supplied to the Native troops and camp followers, in addition to the socks and bandages already sanctioned, or that a money grant of 10 rupees per man be given as compensation to be expended by the respective Commanding Officers in such manner as they may think best; and lastly, that double batta shall be granted to the troops from the date of embarkation.

3. In reply, I am to communicate to you, for the information of the Right Honourable the Commander in Chief, the regret of the Governor General in Council that he should be under the necessity of refusing sanction to proposals made after very careful deliberation by the Commander in Chief of the army. But the Governor General in Council, while willing to accede to any reasonable suggestions for granting such articles of food and clothing as the special nature of the service may render appropriate, is altogether unable to entertain any proposal for granting to soldiers ordered on service any money allowance in excess of that to which they are entitled under regulation.

4. His Excellency in Council must decline, therefore, to comply with his Excellency's recommendation for the grant of double batta, or with the proposal for the donation of 10 rupees in lieu of extra regulation clothing.

5. Neither does the Governor General in Council consider it necessary that the soldiers should be provided by the State with a blanket, as each sepoy probably has one; nor does it appear needful to give the men the woollen under-suits now recommended.

6. The Governor General in Council, however, sanctions the issue, free, of one pair of ammunition boots or shoes to each soldier and follower employed; and, considering that there is no possible opportunity in the Looshai country of the soldier purchasing anything for himself, the Governor General in Council is pleased to sanction the issue of free rations, including a dram of rum every two days, and meat twice a week, when the Commissariat can issue it. Free rations may also be given to the mustered followers.

7. The position of the soldier then will be that he will receive his ordinary monthly pay as usual, but will be provided by the State with all that is necessary to him, instead of, as in cantonments or line of march, having to feed himself and to pay for carriage.

EXTRACT of a LETTER from the Officer Commanding 2nd Goorkha Regiment, to the Adjutant General, No. 111 C.; dated the 17th September 1871.

"I HAVE already supplied leg bandages and am providing each man with a strip of Cashmere blanket, two feet long and three and a half inches wide for each foot, in lieu of stockings. These I venture to think superior to stockings; a man can adjust this bandage to wherever the shoe pinches, and the material will last longer; they are, I am informed, found to answer admirably in the German Army. In lieu, therefore, of leg bandages and stockings, I would request compensation in money towards enabling me to pay for flannel jerseys and muslin. I cannot refrain from adding that every officer whom I know who has served in the Eastern Frontier, testifies to the efficacy of a muslin covering for the mouth and nose as a sort of an atmospheric filter. They agree also that nothing but woollen garment should be taken on the expedition."

Stockings and leg bandages.

Compensation in lieu.

Jerseys and muslin.

MEMORANDUM from Colonel the Honourable *F. A. Thesiger*, C.B., Adjutant General, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 2011 N.; dated Simla, the 23rd September 1871.

FORWARDED for submission to Government with the Commander in Chief's recommendation that the Officer Commanding 2nd Goorkhas may be authorised to draw compensation in lieu of the stockings and bandages already sanctioned.

From Colonel *H. K. Burne*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, Calcutta, No. 868; dated Simla, the 27th September 1871.

I AM directed to acquaint you that a telegram to the following effect has this day been despatched to you:—

"What is the cost per pair of the socks and bandages to be issued to the troops of the Looshai Expedition? Officer commanding 2nd Goorkhas has made up his own, and asks for money compensation in lieu; a price for this must be fixed."

From the Inspector General of Hospitals, Indian Medical Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 537; dated Fort William, the 30th August 1871.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 721, of the 25th instant regarding the proposed expedition against the Looshais, and to state that Dr. Buckle, Deputy Inspector General of Hospitals of the Dacca Circle, has been requested to submit a scheme of medical arrangements, and that as soon as it shall have been matured a report will be made.

From the Inspector General of Hospitals, Indian Medical Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 586; dated Fort William, the 11th September 1871.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter, No. 721, dated Simla, 25th August 1871, directing me to "detail medical officers and order all necessary medical arrangements for the expeditionary force" intended to operate against the Looshais during the ensuing cold weather.

2. As stated in my letter, No. 537, dated the 30th ultimo, I invited Deputy Inspector General of Hospitals, H. B. Buckle, C.B., whose previous experience and local knowledge place him in an exceptionally favourable position for judging of all the medical requirements of the expedition, to furnish a full report on the subject. As, however, I am directed by your letter, No. 283, dated Fort William, 8th September 1871, to forward my proposals at once, I do so in anticipation of Mr. Buckle's report, and submit the following memoranda for the consideration of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General of India. In doing so, I have had the advantage of perusing a careful memorandum which Mr. Buckle drew up on the subject of an expedition before it was finally determined on, and officially announced of having myself served in the Jynteah Campaign of 1862–63, and of having had frequent communications with the Deputy Commissary General at the Presidency.

3. The medical arrangements must, of course, correspond with the plans of the expedition, which I gather are:—

1st. A base and depôt at Cachar and Kassalong.

2nd. An advanced stockaded depôt at Tepai Mookh and Demagiri; and

3rd. Simultaneous advance of the two columns from these points.

4. Deputy Inspector General of Hospitals, H. B. Buckle, will, as directed in your letter, No. 721, of 25th August, superintend all the medical arrangements of both columns. I consider the appointment of a special administrative officer for so small a force unnecessary. The operations will, moreover, fall within the limits of his Circle.

Depôt hospitals, staff and establishments.

5. At each of the depôts, Cachar and Kassalong, a depôt hospital and medical store should be organised. The building should be well thatched and furnished with well-raised bamboo machans. A surgeon or surgeon major should be appointed to the joint duty of depôt surgeon and storekeeper, and should, moreover, be sanitary officer of the depôt and its surroundings. An establishment should be provided as for a regimental hospital, consisting of two hospital assistants, two bhisties, two cooks, two sweepers, one shop coolie and one goorgah; an additional compounder should be engaged for the stores. These officers and establishments should arrive at the depôts for duty early in November. The hospital should be built to accommodate 10 per cent. of the whole force (including police), and a separate hospital for coolies should also be provided. For the latter, one hospital assistant and a small establishment of one sweeper, one cook, and one bhistee, would suffice. The depôt surgeon would superintend these hospitals also.

Advanced depôt, hospitals' staff and establishment.

6. At each of the advanced or stockaded depôts, Tepai Mookh and Demagiri, an advanced depôt hospital should be organised. It should be built on the same principles as the others, but to accommodate only 50 sick. An assistant surgeon should be appointed to the

the charge of each, and he should also take charge of any additional or reserve medical stores which it might be considered advisable to place here, and be sanitary officer also of the depôt and its neighbourhood. The establishment would consist of one hospital assistant and one dresser, one bhistee, one cook, and one sweeper.

Regimental hospitals.

7. Each regiment will continue in medical charge of its own medical officer, and carry its proper staff of hospital establishment. The medical officer of every regiment and the senior, when two of them are together, should be the sanitary officer of any camp that may be established in the hills.

Number of additional officers required.

8. It will, I am of opinion, be necessary to provide two spare medical officers, assistant surgeons, for the expedition, in addition to those already detailed, to provide for wings and large detachments, and I shall at once take measures to have this number of officers in readiness for the duty, and to provide for those stations from which medical officers may be withdrawn.

Medical charge of artillery and sappers.

9. It will, I think, be sufficient to attach one hospital assistant to the two half batteries of artillery and two companies of sappers each, and as these branches of the service are habitually acting in co-operation with infantry, a regimental surgeon will be always at hand to supervise the work of the Native medical officer.

Hospital assistants.

10. There are now 25 hospital assistants supernumerary in the Dacca Presidency, and Dinapore Circles, and there will be no difficulty or strain in providing medical subordinates for all possible requirements.

Medical stores.
Field equipment.

11. The arrangements for medical stores will resemble those devised for the Bhootan and Abyssinian campaigns. Each regiment will be provided with three panniers, each weighing about 60 lbs.: one containing medicines, one surgical instruments and appliances, and one medical comforts. This will be the full field equipment. There will, however, be provided, for deposit in the depôts, one spare medicine pannier, and one for medical comforts and instruments for each regiment, to guard against the contingency of the wings being separated. There are already 11 pairs of panniers in the medical stores which were provided for the expedition to Abyssinia, and the remainder will be got ready without delay.

12. Field companions for detachments, and small tin cases to contain a small supply of the most useful medicines, will be provided and placed in the depôt store to meet the requirements of officers commanding small detached parties where, perhaps, a Native medical officer will not be at hand.

Additional medical stores for depôt.

13. A sufficient supply of the most necessary medicines, instruments, and appliances will be placed in the depôt store and issued on indent as required.

14. I propose that each regiment shall proceed to the depôt, or to Calcutta, as the case may be, with its complete ordinary stores and hospital equipment, and then, sending these into store, be supplied with the same equipment, detailed in paragraph 11, which they will require in the Looshai country.

Conveyance of sick.

15. For the purpose of carriage of sick, I consider that one dandy to every company will suffice. I am in communication with the commissariat officers here on this subject, and I am to inspect and approve those which are now in course of preparation. Each dandy will have a water bottle and should be supplied with a waterproof sheet; a blanket in addition should be given, if possible.

16. The regiments should be inspected by a medical officer and weeded of all sickly men before leaving their respective stations, and all such men might be permitted to proceed on sick furlough, whilst none but the most healthy and robust should be allowed to proceed on this trying duty.

Sanitary precautions.

17. Those falling sick on the field should, except in cases of very temporary illness, be promptly conveyed to the advance depôt hospital, and thence to the depôt hospital itself.

18. As regards the sanitary precautions necessary for preserving troops in health in this damp country, when they will be exposed to great alternations of temperature, and many of the predisposing and exciting causes of disease, I would urge the following considerations:—

19. *Housing.*—The troops should be housed as much as is practicable. The coolies of these localities very soon throw up temporary huts, and Goorkhas are also accustomed to this kind of life. Such huts should be used on every possible occasion. For more permanent houses, and more especially hospitals, a well raised bamboo machan should be constructed.

20. *Clothing.*—It is important that the shoes of the men should be easy, well-fitting, and provided in sufficient supply. The ordinary ammunition boot is quite unsuited for natives, especially on such a duty, and a sufficient supply of shoes should, therefore, be placed in the depôts. It is presumed that each sepoy will have a waterproof sheet.

21. *Food.*—

(*a.*) I know from experience that attah is very apt to become mouldy and bad in

these damp eastern districts, and I should, therefore, strongly advise that wheat should be sent to the depôts and hand-mills for grinding, instead of forwarding bags of attah, which, however carefully stored, in a damp climate soon become mildewed and unwholesome, and I have expressed these opinions to Colonel Dickens.

(*b.*) Rum is a most important consideration. It should be supplied on medical order, and sufficient in quantity to meet all circumstances of fatigue or exposure.

(*c.*) To obviate the risk of scurvy, which the experience of Bhootan and Abyssinia has taught is so apt to break out among Native troops on rations, and not sufficiently supplied with vegetables, and to form so large a factor in causing disease and death, I am very strongly of opinion that a generous supply of lime juice should be provided at the depôts, in sufficient amount to give each man half an ounce a day, for all those who may show any symptom of a scorbutic taint; indeed it may be necessary to issue it to the whole force during a portion of the time. I consider lime juice is likely to be much more beneficial to the troops than rum, situated as they will be.

(*d.*) *Water Supply.*—This is a subject of great difficulty. Some waters in these hills are known to cause diarrhœa, and when such is found to be the case, the troops should be at once moved off to another locality, if military considerations do not interpose any obstacle. I am afraid filters would not be very useful with the force, and they would unnecessarily add to the bulk of its equipment.

(*e.*) *A Meat Ration.*—Some of the castes in the regiments forming the force are accustomed to meat occasionally, and, if possible, therefore, a meat ration should be provided by the Commissariat on certain days in the month, and as, in all probability, herds of cattle and goats will be found in the hills, there may not be much difficulty in meeting this necessity.

(*f.*) The Commissariat has been informed that a supply of opium and assafœtida should be provided for men accustomed to the use of these articles.

From Colonel *G. E. Holmes*, Assistant Adjutant General, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 2026 E; dated Simla, the 26th September 1871.

THE Right Honourable the Commander in Chief having carefully considered the medical arrangements proposed in Letter, No. 586, dated 11th September 1871, by the Inspector General of Hospitals, Indian Medical Department, directs me to submit his opinion thereon as follows:—

2. His Excellency considers that Dr. Buckle can only superintend the arrangements for both the Chittagong and Cachar columns up to the time of their departure from Calcutta, and that it would be desirable the Medical Department should make such arrangements as that both the Presidency and Eastern Frontier Districts may be enabled to meet any future medical wants of the force.

3. The bad cases of the Chittagong column should be sent to Chittagong, and not left at Kassalong, where arrangements would scarcely be so complete.

4. One Surgeon major will hardly suffice at the bases of Silchar and Kassalong, where depôts are to be established; an additional assistant surgeon would, it appears, be desirable at each of these points.

5. The regimental medical requirements are scarcely met by one surgeon, seeing that the nature of the service renders their separation into wings, and acting independently, extremely likely.

6. The Inspector General has recommended two additional assistant surgeons for the expedition, but these would appear insufficient. Lord Napier considers that there should be two extra assistant surgeons for each column, to form a reserve to replace casualties, and to be placed where their services can be made readily available.

7. The suggestions of paragraph 16, of Inspector General's letter, will be duly carried out, instructions having been forwarded to the regiments concerned for the medical inspection of men, and for preventing all those considered by the medical officer unfit for active service from accompanying their regiments.

8. The suggestions of paragraph 19, with regard to "housing," will be conveyed to officers commanding columns.

9. The subject of equipment and clothing has been engaging His Excellency's attention, and will be early submitted to Government.

10. Lord Napier recommends that the attah supplied to the force should be packed in tin, the loss from leakage, absorption in the bags, and spoiling from exposure to damp, would

would all be prevented, and a saving effected which would go far to pay for the cost of the tin cases.

11. The hand-mills suggested by the Inspector General would probably render the supply of flour precarious, as coolies might not be procurable to work them.

12. The supply of meat has been separately recommended in this Office Letter, No. 1940 N., dated the 15th instant.

13. I have thus conveyed to you His Excellency's opinion on the foregoing points, and, with regard to the remaining proposals contained in the Inspector General's letter, I am to state that Lord Napier fully concurs in them.

The enclosure of your Memorandum, No. 543, dated 16th instant, is returned as requested.

From *H. F. Blanford*, Esq., Honorary Secretary to the Trustees, Indian Museum, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 669; dated Calcutta, the 27th September 1871.

I AM desired by the trustees of the Indian Museum to forward the accompanying copy of a report from the curator, in which it is proposed to send a museum collector to accompany the Looshai Expedition, together with materials for collecting and preparing specimens, which the curator engages to restrict to four coolie loads; the whole to be placed under the charge of Lieutenant Bourne of 77th Foot, 2nd Wing Subaltern, 44th Native Infantry who, it is understood, accompanies the expedition on military duty.

2. I am desired to recommend this proposition to the favourable consideration of Government, and, in case of its being sanctioned, to add a request that the museum collector may be rationed and transport provided by the Commissariat.

From Dr. *J. Anderson*, Curator, Indian Museum, to the Honorary Secretary to the Trustees, Indian Museum, No. 931; dated Calcutta, the 7th September 1871.

I HAVE the honour to submit the accompanying letter from Lieutenant Bourne, who has kindly offered to take charge of a museum collector, if one were sent along with the Looshai Expedition.

2. Lieutenant Bourne is an excellent collector of natural history objects, as I know by the splendid series of reptiles lately sent by him to museum, and all collected by himself. I would suggest that he should be accompanied by Shaik Harree, who did very well in Cachar and lately in Persia.

3. The district to be travelled over by the expedition is one of great zoological interest, due to its geographical position, and I would urge that the opportunity of learning more of its natural history should, if feasible, be taken advantage of. I would, therefore, suggest that the Government be requested to allow a museum collector to accompany the expedition, and that carriage be provided for two spirit collecting boxes, a small box for carrying bird skins, and another containing the materials the collector would require to take with him for preserving bird and mammal skins. The collector's kit, which I will undertake will be of very small bulk, would accompany the boxes, so that provision would only require to be made for four small boxes. Shaik Harree has been well schooled to hardships, and, I believe, he would in no way inconvenience the expedition, and that the carriage of the boxes would be very little, as one man would suffice for each.

4. If the Government do not see their way to allow a collector to accompany the expedition, may I suggest that they should be requested to allow Lieutenant Bourne to take along with him a spirit collecting box, and that carriage be provided for it.

From *A. O. Home*, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Department of Agriculture, Revenue and Commerce, to the Surveyor General of India, No. 205; dated Simla, the 13th September 1871.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letters No. 496 F, dated 31st ultimo, and 498 F, dated 2nd instant, and to convey the approval of the Governor General in Council to the arrangements proposed by you for the survey parties to accompany the Looshai Expedition.

2. It is observed that while, on the one hand, the transfer of the Garo Hill topographical survey party would not be attended with any additional cost, the deputation of certain officers from the southern revenue party would entail extra expenditure, which could not be met from the Survey Budget Grant without serious inconvenience. I am directed, therefore, to state that it may be debited to the expedition, and that whatever expenses may be entailed by the survey arrangements connected with the expedition may be charged by you in addition to the ordinary budget grant for surveys.

From Colonel *H. L. Thuillier*, Surveyor General of India, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Department of Agriculture, Revenue and Commerce, No. 496 F; dated Simla, the 31st August 1871.

In continuation of my Confidential Report, No. 411, dated the 16th instant, on the subject of deputing survey parties with the expeditionary force to proceed in the Looshai country next cold season, I have the honour of stating, for the information of the Government of India, that having been summoned by His Excellency the Commander in Chief to a consultation as to what strength of survey parties I proposed sending, His Lordship expressed his anxiety to have the two survey parties as efficient and complete as possible, so as to guard against sickness, and to have separate surveyors for each column or detachment of troops, and that the junior officer should, in each instance, be competent to take the place of the senior in case of need.

2. With the approval of Government, therefore, it is now proposed to make the two survey parties for the north and south columns as follows:—

For the Chittagong or Southern party	Major Macdonald, Officiating Deputy Superintendent General. Captain Tanner, Deputy Superintendent. E. C. Barrett, Esq., Assistant Superintendent. G. H. Cook, Esq., Assistant Superintendent.
For the Cachar or Northern party	Major Godwin Austen, Deputy Superintendent. Captain Badgley, Deputy Superintendent. Lieutenant Woodthorpe, R.E., Assistant Superintendent. Mr. Ogle, Assistant Surveyor. Mr. Robert, Assistant Surveyor. Mr. McKay, Assistant Surveyor. One Native Sub-Surveyor.

This will absorb the whole of the Khasia and Garo Hill regular party, with the exception of one or two individuals who are not fitted for a campaign of this nature, and who will be transferred for duty elsewhere. The ordinary survey operations in the Khasia and Garo Hills will, in consequence, have to be placed in abeyance for the season, as the whole available strength of the establishment will be required. It will be of no material consequence to stop the Garo or Naga Hill survey for a short time, as we can always carry on our operations there unmolested, whilst on the Eastern Frontier, where the troops are likely to penetrate, we may never have such another opportunity, and therefore in His Excellency the Commander in Chief's opinion, we should do our utmost on the present occasion to secure the largest possible amount of geographical knowledge of the whole country traversed, in which I entirely concur.

3. The foregoing programme differs very slightly from that submitted in my former letter above quoted, and if it meets the concurrence of the Governor General of India in Council, I beg that the same may be intimated to the Bengal Government with reference to the ensuing season's regular topographical survey proceedings.

4. To the telegram dated the 18th instant, transmitted to Major Godwin Austen in England, I regret to say no answer has been as yet received, but I have addressed him fully on the subject by post, and explained the wishes of the Government to have his services for this expedition. In case this officer does not come out, Captain Badgley is very competent to take charge of the party, and another young officer or Assistant Surveyor may be found to fill up the place. Instructions have been issued to this officer, but his reply has not been received as yet.

Dated 22 August 1871.

5. I beg to enclose copy of a letter from Major Macdonald as per margin, giving his views as to the strength of the Native establishment, and nature of equipment necessary for the expedition, which his knowledge of the country best enables him to determine. His proposals seem to me well suited for the purpose. Another European or fourth officer (Assistant Superintendent) is to accompany his party, which will slightly alter his calculations. His Excellency the Commander in Chief has, moreover, promised to allot to these survey parties soldiers from the corps of Native sappers and miners, to assist in the actual survey duties, and therefore it will be necessary to draw up a complete and revised estimate when the arrangements are in a more forward state. Every officer and assistant shows the most laudable desire to be employed on this duty.

6. As

6. As soon as the plans for the northern party can be matured, I propose submitting a full statement for the whole to show the number of Native followers and other particulars. It will be observed that it is absolutely necessary for the Commissariat Department to supply rations for the whole of the survey establishments.

7. I solicit the sanction of Government to the proposals contained in Major Macdonald's 12th paragraph. The budget of this department will amply provide for the salaries of all the officers and assistants employed, but not for the contingent expenses necessary to be incurred. I shall be glad of instructions as to whether the entire expenses are to be separately calculated and debited against the expedition.

(Confidential.)

From Major *John Macdonald*, Officiating Deputy Surveyor General, to the Surveyor General of India; dated the 22nd August 1871.

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter No. 412 F., giving cover to No. 372 from the Military Department to the Secretary, Agriculture and Commerce.

2. I have communicated its contents to my colleague, and the arrangements demanded in the 4th paragraph of your letter are made.

3. I gladly accept the position assigned me, and can also answer for the extreme willingness of the two other officers mentioned.

4. During the absolute hostile advance I apprehend our services will be chiefly used as aids in giving information regarding the line of advance; but when the occupation of the Sylhoo hills is complete we might commence a triangulation on the parallel of 23° from Great Trigonometrical Survey Bhanga Mura and Bhatti Moni across to the Bowlong range, about 50 minutes of Meridian, and carry it to the north along the Meridian of 92·30 where we should either meet the efforts of the topographers from Cachar, working to the south, or push on to Peak.

5. I would take the following instrumental equipment:

3 box chronometers and nautical almanacs		
2 seven-inch theodolites, 1·5 inch	6 lascars.	Armed with knife, talwar, or spear. Strong suitable men will be selected.
3 Plane tables	6 „	
3 Compasses	3 „	
3 Heliotropes, 8 inch	3 „	
3 Aneroid barometers		
3 Standard thermometers		
3 Sets boiling apparatus		

6. Our strength would be—

3 European officers	8 coolies.	To carry baggage and 3½ days' rations for the whole party.
18 Lascars	12 „	
6 Servants	3 „	

Twenty-three coolies for a strength of 27 men, in all 50 men, consuming 137 lbs. of food per diem.

The 18 lascars would carry the instrumental equipment.

7. The best plan is to entertain our own coolies, or it may easily happen that when we are free to move and act independently in securing positions, the Commissariat would be unable to meet a special demand for extra carriage to enable the survey parties to move out efficiently with a supply for 8 or 10 days. All the establishment must be rationed by the Commissariat.

8. I think it would be advisable to attach one non-commissioned officer and 8 soldiers from one of the (Native) regiments engaged to each survey officer. These 27 men would require 14 coolies for their baggage and 8 coolies to carry 3½ days' rations for their whole party, which, working with us, would be complete in itself, acting either as observers or in an armed body as guides.

9. I will endeavour to entertain 50 men in Upper Assam from the Nagas. In this respect Major Godwin-Austen will be very fortunate in being able to get hill Kookies in Cachar who will readily accompany an armed force. I know the rates offered to the Commissariat coolie corps, and if money only can do it, they are sufficient to tempt the Nagas. Any assistance I can obtain in labour will gladly be welcomed by the officer in charge of the transport. If I succeed in getting these men they will be as good as the Looshais in the jungles.

10. All the natives employed should each receive a kit of good boots, cotton clothing, and a good double blanket, as well as a good waterproof bag, divided in two pockets, one

for food, the other for tobacco and sundries; 20 lbs. weight may be allowed as sufficient for bedding, clothing, and cooking pots.

11. I shall prepare plane table sections on scale four miles to the inch, showing all great trigonometrical work and intersected points ruled out in blue lines on squares of one minute in latitude or longitude for the whole area, similar to those I worked on in previous years.

12. If this general plan is approved, I solicit an order from Government to incur cost in making my own arrangements to obtain carriage for the equipment of the party, and entertaining an effective establishment to be assembled at the Presidency after 15th October, before the 10th of November, submitting my bills for the cost of the same, and authority to draw such advances which the coolies and lascars might wish to leave at their homes, to an extent of 12 rupees for each man.

13. I append a statement I have drawn up of the equipment required:—

Indispensables.

Weight in lbs.		
2½	-	2 pair stout walking boots, one in wear.
3	-	2 suits stout charsootie cotton clothing, one in wear.
		1 pair strong canvass gaiters bound in leather and fastened with tags, in wear.
11	-	1 cork mattrass, air pillow, and oilskin cover.
8	-	2 blankets.
10	-	1 Indian rubber sheet, 7½ × 6½.
3½	-	3 flannel shirts, 4 pair knitted socks.
		4 towels, handkerchiefs, &c. (one of each always in use).
40 lbs.		

Weapons.

A light rifle, cartridge belt, bearing in frog a heavy knife or light sabre, and a waterproof bag.

Necessaries.

1 pair good light shoes or boots.
1 seer good mowrogan to keep boots and leather soft, a small bottle of oil for weapons, a good hand lamp, a small air-tight box in compartment to contain fuses, matches, tobacco, cartridges, a small medicine box, kettle and two cooking pots, 6½ lbs.
The whole weighing 15 to 16 lbs.

14. This would give a light effective kit for each officer, the whole within the powers of two coolies carrying their own food for three and a-half days in addition to the officers' baggage. It would not be safe to rough it too much in the dampest jungles in India. Nothing has been allowed for seats, or tables, or beds. All these will be made up from day to day out of bamboos; huts will also be run up in all halting places. In the above I have shown the equipment and strength of a strong body of observers working alongside of a military expedition into a hostile country.

TELEGRAPHIC MESSAGE dated 31st August 1871.

From Chilworth - - - - - - to Simla.
From Major Austen - - - - - - to Thuillier.

"Health will not permit return."

MEMORANDUM by Colonel *H. L. Thuillier*, Surveyor General of India (No. 498 F); dated Simla, 2nd September 1871.

COPY of the above telegraphic reply message from England from Major Godwin-Austen, Deputy Superintendent of Topographical Survey, stating his inability to return to India for the Looshai Expedition, is forwarded for the information of the Government of India, Agriculture, Revenue and Commerce Department, with reference to Surveyor General's Office, No. 411 F, dated the 16th August 1871.

From Lieut. Colonel *F. S. Roberts*, V.C., First Assistant Quartermaster General, to the Deputy Commissary General, No. 30 L.; dated Calcutta, the 2nd October 1871.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that this morning, in company with Major Brown and Major Moore, the two officers appointed to the command of the coolie corps proceeding with the Looshai expedition, Captain East, Assistant Quartermaster General of the Chittagong Column, and Assistant Surgeon Reid, Officiating Garrison Assistant Surgeon at Fort William, I inspected the coolies collected at the depôt of Garden Reach, in view to telling off 350 men for the vessels "Undaunted" and "Guide," under orders to leave Calcutta to-morrow for Chittagong.

2. Five hundred and sixty-two coolies were brought before the committee, and 95 of that number were placed on one side, being considered quite unfit for the hard work they will undoubtedly be called upon to perform.

3. These men will be taken to your office in the course of the day, in charge of a havildar of the 13th Native Infantry now attached to the coolie corps, and I would suggest that Dr. Buckle, C.B., Deputy Inspector General of Hospitals, who is now in Calcutta for the purpose of superintending all the medical arrangements for the expedition, be asked to give his opinion as to the physical fitness of the men for hard labour in a hilly country.

4. This procedure appears necessary, as I understand the coolies have been previously inspected by a medical officer, and have received certain advances of pay. Dr. Buckle has had considerable experience in hill warfare, and is, perhaps, better able to judge than any one else whether the men have been rejected without sufficient reason.

5. Taking into consideration the hardships the coolies will have to undergo, the reported insalubrity of the climate and the constant change of food and water, it appeared to myself and the officers who were present with me this morning, that the men, in general, were scarcely of sufficient physique to stand great privations and hard work. We endeavoured to pass as many as possible, but should Dr. Buckle unhesitatingly condemn the men now brought forward, I shall solicit that officer to give his opinion of the remainder of the coolies before any are permitted to embark, as very many of those we passed differ but little from the men we rejected.

6. The success of the expedition depends so entirely on the efficiency of its carriage that no effort should be spared to get the best coolies, and only such men as we may reasonably hope will be able to stand the hardships of a campaign should be despatched from Calcutta.

7. In conclusion, I would point out that, although the rejection of coolies here may cause some additional expense, it will be in the end infinitely cheaper than having the force encumbered with a number of useless men whose places will have to be filled by others, sent from a distance, hurriedly collected, and in all probability engaged at enhanced rates.

From Lieutenant Colonel *J. I. Willes*, Commissary General, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 1133; dated Simla, the 5th October 1871.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter, No. 34, of 3rd instant, intimating the number of elephants likely to be available for hire in the districts of Sylhet, Mymensing, Dacca, and Chittagong, and, in reply, beg to say that I think it would be desirable that the 10 elephants from Mymensing and 8 from Dacca should be sent to Chittagong as soon as the road is passable, and the 10 or 12 elephants now at Chittagong can at once join those there. This will, according to statement annexed, give for the Cachar and Chittagong columns 174 and 153 elephants respectively.

2. As regards your second paragraph, I have information up to 29th ultimo that the country is still flooded; and though the Furreedpore Collector says elephants can travel in his district, he states the Ganges to be still impassable. Lieutenant Colonel Dickens, C.B., intimates that he is in communication with the authorities with a view to being informed when the country is open, so that the elephants from Dacca may move off towards Cachar, and from Barrackpore to Chittagong, at the earliest possible date.

3. In regard to gear, it will be ready for any elephants that may be hired by the time they reach Chittagong or Cachar. It can be sent by steamers to these points, and this will, I think, be the best plan, in order that it may be fitted under the supervision of the Commissariat officers. I believe the animals will be handed over with bare backs, as the zemindars in Bengal do not use gear; and as the animals will not be required to carry loads, it is better that, whilst under their usual attendants, the animal should be without gear, lest by being badly put on, the elephants should get their backs rubbed whilst *en route* to destinations.

STATEMENT showing the Number of Elephants available for Cachar and Chittagong Columns of the Looshai Expeditionary Force.

	No. of Elephants.
Cachar Column.	
At Dacca	54
At Shillong	9
At Cachar	7
Koonkies	40
New captures	34
To be hired from Sylhet	30
TOTAL	174
Chittagong Column.	
At Chittagong	19
At Barrackpore	42
Going to Barrackpore	62
To be hired at Dacca, Chittagong, and Mymensing	30
TOTAL	153

From Lieutenant Colonel *A. Johnson*, Officiating Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Commissary General, No. 183 ; dated Simla, the 7th October 1871.

I AM directed to acknowledge your letter, No. 1133, dated 5th October 1871, regarding the supply of elephants for service with the Looshai expeditionary force, and in reply to acquaint you that the Right honourable the Governor General in Council concurs in all the proposals you make for their distribution, dispatch, and the conveyance of gear for the hired animals.

From Colonel *P. S. Lumsden*, C.S.I., Quartermaster General to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 138 ; dated Simla, the 5th October 1871.

IN compliance with Military Department, No. 903, dated 28th September 1871, I am directed by the Right honourable the Commander in Chief to submit, for the information of Government, the accompanying approximate statement, showing the number of officers, British and Native, non-commissioned officers and rank and file, and establishments which will compose the Cachar and Chittagong columns of the Looshai expedition.

STATEMENT, showing the Officers, Rank and File, and Followers to Compose the Looshai Expeditionary Force, Exclusive of Coolies, Commissariat Department, Survey or Telegraph Followers.

FORCE.	British Officers.	Native Officers.	Non-Commissioned Officers and Men.	Followers.
Cachar Column:				
3 Regiments, Native Infantry	24	48	1,500	324
½ Battery of Artillery	1	1	35	30
1 Company of Sappers	2	2	100	31
Staff	10	-	-	40
Police	-	-	200	—
Chittagong Column:				
3 Regiments of Native Infantry	24	48	1,500	324
½ Battery of Artillery	1	1	35	30
1 Company Sappers	2	2	100	31
Staff	10	-	-	40
Police	-	-	200	—
Total	74	102	3,670	850
Add	-	-	40*	12
GRAND TOTAL	74	102	3,710	862

* These are soldiers of the 2nd and 4th Goorkahs who are to be attached to the Mountain Battery.

(signed) *P. S. Lumsden*, Colonel,
Quarter Master General.

From Lieutenant Colonel *J. I. Willes,* Commissary General, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 1144; dated Simla, the 6th October 1871.

I HAVE the honour, with reference to your letter, No. 902, dated 28th ultimo, to state that the following officers have been detailed for duty with the Looshai expedition:—

Chittagong Column.—Major Mackenzie, Assistant Commissary General; Captain Case, Sub-Assistant Commissary General; Lieutenant Hallet, Sub-Assistant Commissary General; with Sub-Assistant Commissary General; Lieutenant Chalmers, at the Presidency available to go also, if required.

Cachar Column.—Lieutenant Colonel Davidson, Assistant Commissary General; Captain Marriott, Sub-Assistant Commissary General; Burlton-Bennett, Sub-Assistant Commissary General; Mr. Nuthall, Superintendent of Kheddas; also two European warrant and four non-commissioned officers with each column. These, in my opinion, are ample to supervise and efficiently carry out the duties that will devolve on the department, whether as regards the feeding of the troops or supervision of the carriage.

2. If more officers are found necessary, they can be quickly sent. As several are returning from furlough, I should have no difficulty in providing more after next month.

3. There are, besides, the necessary staff of native agents and servants of all classes.

From Colonel *H. K. Burne,* Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Quarter Master General, No. 243; dated Simla, the 10th October 1871.

IN forwarding, for the information of the Right honourable the Commander in Chief, the accompanying statement* by the Commissary General, of the arrangements for his department, with the Looshai expeditionary force, I am directed to say that the Governor General in Council considers them ample for all requirements, and trusts that his Excellency concurs in this view.

In continuation of No. 901, dated 28th September 1871.

* No. 1144, dated 6th October 1871.

From Colonel *H. Lewis,* R.A., Officiating Inspector General of Ordnance and Magazines, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 690 G.; dated Simla, the 7th October 1871.

I HAVE the honour to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a memorandum, dated 23rd September 1871 of ordnance arrangements for the Looshai expedition, with No. 9782 E., dated 6th October, from the Adjutant General, stating that the same had been approved of by his Excellency the Commander in Chief.

2. Instructions have been issued, in anticipation of Government sanction, for the supply of the ammunition and stores detailed in the memorandum.

MEMORANDUM on Ordnance Matériel for the Looshai Expedition, showing the Arrangements Finally Approved of by his Excellency the Commander in Chief on 22nd September 1871.

ARTILLERY.

1. Two 7-pounder† rifled guns (150 lbs.) and 2-5¼ inch mortars will accompany each column.

† Viz., the guns of the Peshawur Mountain Battery. The mortars to be supplied from the arsenal of Fort William.

2. There will be with each battery 118‡ rounds per gun and 64 rounds per mortar, and half of the equipment adapted for elephant transport belonging to the battery now in the arsenal of Fort William.

‡ This being the proportion of ammunition of the reserve battery in Fort William.

3. There will also be with each column, in charge of the officer commanding the artillery, 40 rounds per piece, of 5½-inch mortar ammunition in reserve.

4. Fifty Hales's rockets (to be obtained from England) with two troughs for firing them, and 50 blue lights will be sent with each column in charge of the artillery.

5. One hundred rounds per piece, of 7-pounder gun and 5½-inch mortar ammunition (in addition to the 40 rounds per mortar as above, which will be with the column) will be placed in reserve at Silchar, and the same quantity at Chittagong.

INFANTRY.

1. The service ammunition, 200 rounds per man, of the six regiments, each 500 strong, will be carried as follows, viz.:—

50 rounds per man in pouch
10 „ „ in ball bag
40 „ „ first regimental reserve, in leather cartouches, placed in bullock* boxes, two cartouches in each box. (The filled cartouch will weigh about 37 lbs.)

* The ammunition of the regiments of the Punjab Frontier Force is thus carried in cartouches placed in bullock boxes.

One hundred rounds per man, 2nd regimental reserve, in bullock boxes without cartouches. Each bullock box (weighing, filled, about 93 lbs.) will be provided with rope and a bamboo for carriage by two men.

2. In addition to the above, 100 rounds of small-arm ammunition per man, packed in camel boxes, will be placed in reserve at Silchar, and the same quantity at Chittagong.

3. The 42nd and 44th Regiments will take their service ammunition (which is believed to be for the most part packed in camel boxes) with them to Silchar, and it will be there transferred to bullock boxes, or re-placed by other ammunition packed in bullock boxes, under arrangements to be made by the Ordnance Department.

The ammunition in camel boxes now in possession of the regiments will go towards the reserve to be kept at Silchar.

4. Ammunition in bullock boxes, or empty bullock boxes for the ammunition now in its possession, which is in camel boxes, will be sent to the head quarters of the 22nd Regiment at Dacca, in charge of the left wing now at Barrackpore.

5. The 2nd and 4th Goorkhas will take their service proportion of ammunition with them to the Presidency.

6. The 27th Regiment will proceed to the Presidency with 40 rounds only in pouch, leaving the remainder of their ammunition in the Bareilly Ammunition Depôt.

7. The 2nd and 4th Goorkhas will make over their ammunition (if packed in camel boxes) to the arsenal of Fort William; and these regiments, and also the 27th, will be supplied from that arsenal with ammunition packed in bullock boxes.

As sanctioned by Government in Military Department, No. 623–4, dated 19 September 1871.

8. Each infantry soldier (if not already so equipped) will be supplied with a kookrie in sheath, with frog and loop for attaching it to the waist belt.

COOLIE CORPS.

Sanctioned by Government in Military Department, No. 623–4, dated 19th September 1871. Since this memorandum was written, it has been ascertained that the Government of Bengal have arranged for the supply of dhaos and spears for coolies.

1. Each coolie will be provided with a dhao or spear.

2. Four thousand dhaos, with sheath, and 1,000 spears have been ordered, and will be issued from the arsenal of Fort William to the officers commanding the coolie corps on their application.

3. Each load is to be adapted for coolie carriage, and will be under 25 seers for one man, or 50 seers for two men. Bamboo carriers and rope for lashing will be provided with each package that is of a weight for two men.

SAPPERS AND MINERS.

1. One company of Sappers and Miners will accompany each column, taking with it its own personal equipment of engineering tools and stores.

2. In addition to the tools in possession of the Sappers and Miners, the following will be provided by the Ordnance Department to be taken with each column, or left at its base at Silchar and Chittagong, at the discretion of the officers in command:—

A few blacksmiths, with forge, for the repair of tools, will accompany each column.

500 Mamooties.
100 Pick-axes.
200 Felling-axes.
200 Hatchets.
25 Crowbars.

A warrant or non-commissioned officer of the Ordnance Department will be placed in charge of the reserve ammunition and stores at Silchar, and another at Chittagong.

The above instructions supersede all others previously issued.

(signed) *H. Lewis*, Colonel,
Officiating Inspector General of Ordnance and Magazines.

Inspector General of Ordnance's Office, Simla,
23 September 1871.

AMMUNITION of two companies Sappers and Miners to be packed in bullock boxes, the same as infantry, with cartouches two in each box.

Each sapper and man of the Peshawur battery to be armed with a kookrie.

As sanctioned by Government in Military Department, No. 623-4, dated 19th September 1871.

(signed) *F. A. Thesiger*, Colonel,
Adjutant General.

5 October 1871.

MEMORANDUM from Major J. *Eteson*, Deputy Assistant Adjutant General, to the Officiating Inspector General of Ordnance and Magazines, No. 9782 E.; dated Simla, the 6th October 1871.

THE Adjutant General has the honour to return the Memorandum of ordnance arrangements for the Looshai expedition, and to state that the same has been approved by His Excellency the Commander in Chief, with the addition made at the end.

Referred to in Colonel Lewis's, No. 674, dated 3rd October 1871.

From Lieutenant Colonel *A. Johnson*, Officiating Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Officiating Inspector General of Ordnance and Magazines, No. 238; dated Simla, the 10th October 1871.

IN reply to your letter No. 690 G., dated 7th October 1871, I am directed to acquaint you that the Right honourable the Governor General in Council approves of the arrangements proposed in regard to the ammunition, &c., to be sent with the Looshai expeditionary force.

From Colonel *P. S. Lumsden*, Quarter Master General, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 161; dated Simla, the 7th October 1871.

THE Right honourable the Commander in Chief believes that a number of Norton's tube pumps, used during the Abyssinian expedition, are in Government store.

Should this be the case His Excellency would respectfully submit that six be added to the equipment of each of the sapper companies proceeding on the Looshai expedition. His Excellency considers it is exactly in cases such as will probably be met with in the Looshai country, such as poisoned or polluted springs, &c., that these implements can most usefully be resorted to in securing a supply of pure water from a lower level.

From Colonel *H. K. Burne*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Military Department, No. 212; dated Simla, the 9th October 1871.

I AM directed to acquaint you that a telegram to the following effect has this day been despatched to you:—

"Have you any of Norton's tube pumps in store, and in good order?"

From Colonel *H. Lewis*, Officiating Inspector General of Ordnance and Magazines, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 707 G.; dated Simla, he 13th October 1871.

IN continuation of letters marginally cited, I have the honour to report that the following telegram has just been received from Colonel Maxwell, superintendent, Cossipore Gun Foundry, regarding the provision of Norton's tube pumps for the Looshai expedition:—

No. 698 G., of 10th October 1871.
No. 703 G., of 12th October 1871.

> "Pumps cannot be constructed in time; 12 pumps, each giving 10 gallons per minute, price, 72 rupees each; eight sets, driving apparatus; price, 300 rupees per set, can be purchased at Calcutta. One set driving apparatus will drive many pumps."

2. Should Government decide upon purchasing these pumps, I would suggest that some duly-qualified engineer officer (or civil engineer) be appointed first to examine them.

3. This officer, and also the officer in whose charge the pumps will be, should be furnished with copies of the reports on Norton's tube wells Nos. 432-3 C., Proceedings of Government of India, Public Works Department, dated Simla, 13th July 1869.

Copy of a Letter, No. 1305, dated Calcutta, the 10th October 1871, from the Surveyor General of India, to the Commissary General.

I HAVE the honour to forward a statement prepared by Captain Badgley, showing the number of officers and men composing the survey party under his orders to accompany the Cachar Column of the Looshai expedition, and for whom rations and carriage will be required.

2. I solicit the favour of your informing me, with the least possible delay, whether the Commissariat Department will provide the rations and coolies required by the survey party.

EQUIPMENT of SIX SURVEYORS to Accompany the Cachar or Northern Column of the Expedition against the Looshais, the Survey Party being arranged to Serve, if necessary, with three detachments.

	Number of Kalasies.	Total Kalasies.
With each Surveyor.		
Plane table and stand	2	12
Umbrella, telescope, rule, &c.	1	6
Heliotrope, compass, arms, &c.	1	6
One extra man in case of sickness	1	6
With three of "the Party" besides the above.		
Theodolite 6" with stand	2	6
Pocket sextant and horizon	1	3
Chain and books, &c.	1	3
With the Officer "in charge" besides the above.		
Sextant and counterpoise stand	1	1
Chronometer	1	1
Office box	1	1
Photographic apparatus	1	1
Writer	1	1
		47
Sapper with three heliotropes		12
Servants		12
TOTAL		71

N.B.—The Kalasies will be supplied from No. 6 Topographical Survey Party.

For the above party the following rations and carriage would be required from the Commissariat.

Rations for six Europeans and 71 Natives:—

For carriage of bedding of 6 surveyors, at 20 seers each	6 coolies.	These coolies to be furnished by the Commissariat Department.
" " 3 officers, at 20 seers each	3 "	
" " 4 tarpaulins for instruments	4 "	
" " 69 men, at 1 cooly for 4 men	18 "	
" " extra coolies in case of sickness	10 "	
Total for carriage	41 "	

Dacca, 5 October 1871.

(signed) *W. F. Badgley*, Captain,
In charge No. 6 Topographical Survey.

From Lieutenant Colonel *A. Johnson*, Officiating Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Commissary General, No. 554; dated Simla, the 17th October 1871.

IN reply to your letter, No. 4096, dated 11th October 1871, I am directed to acquaint you that the Commissariat Department should provide rations for the whole of the force proceeding into the Looshai country, including departments attached to or accompanying it, and also, as far as possible, provide coolies for the survey parties.

Military Department, Fort William, the 9th October 1871.

From *H. L. Harrison*, Esq., Officiating Junior Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department, to the Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 4882; dated Fort William, the 7th October 1871.

In reply to your No. 51 of the 3rd instant, I am directed to furnish the following report of the progress made in recruiting coolies for the Looshai expedition.

2. The 4,000 coolies had been thus divided after first receipt of the orders for that number:—

Colonel Dickens had engaged to collect 2,000 coolies by the aid of the commissariat agency - - - - - - - - -	2,000
400 men to be engaged locally at Cachar, and 400 at Chittagong -	800
800 hill coolies were being collected by Hedayut Ali at Darjeeling -	800
800 were being recruited in Chota Nagpoor by Mr. Reily - -	800
TOTAL - - -	4,400

allowing a margin of 400 for disappointments.

3. The Lieutenant Governor, however, after duly consulting the officers most able to advise, determined absolutely to exclude all locally-collected coolies from the 4,000 to be sent with the expedition. As it appeared that an efficient force of 2,000 coolies would be needed with each column, it is evident that reserves will be necessary to supply losses by sickness and death, and also that extra duties may at any time require extra men. For these extra duties and for reinforcements generally, his Honor has determined to hold in reserve all the local coolies both in Cachar and Sylhet and in Chittagong, and to dispatch 4,000 independently of them.

4. This having left a deficiency of 400, viz., 4,400—800=3,600, the district officers in the Nuddea and Burdwan Divisions have all been called upon to collect from 50 to 100 Dhangurs or Boona coolies each, to make up the 4,000.

5. The progress made up to the latest information received is as follows:—

(1.) *Darjeeling.*—On the 30th September, 202 coolies had been actually passed and enlisted. In consequence of the urgent representations of Colonel Haughton and Captain Hedayut Ali, backed by the medical officer at Darjeeling, it has been found necessary to extend the date of embarkation at Doobree from the 1st to the 7th November. No precise numbers have been given since the 30th, but from telegrams received up to the 5th October, there is every reason to believe that between 600 and 800 coolies will actually embark at Doobree.

(2.) Colonel Dickens is making fair progress in collecting coolies. Up to date about 500 have actually been dispatched, and about 400 are in the depôt at Garden Reach.

(3.) The attempt to collect coolies in Chota Nagpoor has unfortunately failed entirely. Captain Bates, who went up to assist, explained the terms to between 300 and 400 punkah-pullers about to be discharged at Hazareebaugh, but not one would enlist. Mr. Reily, after a full month's endeavour, has only collected 33; Colonel Dalton, whose influence in the division is very great, has entirely failed to procure coolies. He reports that the surplus labouring population has long since been drawn off by emigration, that the harvest this year is particularly promising, and there is abundance of work for all the labouring population; hence they absolutely refuse to enlist; they do not object to the terms, but reply that they would not take 20 rupees a month, situated as they at present are.

6. Under these difficult circumstances, the Lieutenant Governor considers it necessary to abandon all reliance on the Chota Nagpoor Division, and, still adhering to his policy of reserving the local coolies (by which is meant the coolies in Cachar, Sylhet, and Chittagong), has directed an application to be made to the commissariat asking whether they can, with the agency at their command, supply another 1,000 Punjabi and Hindoostani coolies. It is understood that the Deputy Commissary General will be able to comply with the indent, and to have them in Calcutta by the end of October.

7. As a set-off against the expense of bringing these coolies down to Calcutta, I am to observe that with the Chota Nagpoor coolies, the batta, which though ultimately sanctioned, was at first demurred to by the Military Department, has been got rid of. No coolies on the Chittagong side are now engaged at more than 8 rupees, without batta, though with free rations during the campaign.

8. To the Darjeeling coolies, however, it has been found necessary to give 7 rupees, plus 2 rupees batta, while campaigning. This is scarcely more than the uniform rate of 8 rupees, and the Lieutenant Governor in any case proposes to restrict it to the hill coolies only.

9. In the Burdwan and Presidency Divisions it is difficult to report the progress made, as, owing to the unaccountable reluctance which prevails to enlist, no coolies that are promised can be relied on till they actually reach the depôt. It is hoped, however, that the 400 expected will be raised.

10. Local enlistment has not been stopped, though, as above stated, the coolies are kept in reserve. At the latest accounts, 300 coolies had been collected in Sylhet and 100 at Chittagong. The Lieutenant Governor is positively assured that 700 to 800 can be supplied by the local officers at each side without any difficulty, when needed.

(No. 275.)

COPY of the above forwarded to Brigadier General Bourchier, Colonel Brownlow, Lieutenant Colonel F. S. Roberts, and Captain C. J. East.

From Brigadier General *G. Bourchier*, Commanding Eastern Frontier District, to the Adjutant General, No. 1092 L.; dated 29th October 1871.

IN acknowledging the receipt of your docket, No. 9944 E., dated the 11th instant, with correspondence, regarding a museum collector being sent with the Looshai expedition under charge of Lieutenant Bourne, I beg to state that this officer has been told off to the command of the military posts on the Sylhet frontier, and his services will not be available to take charge of this branch of the expedition, but if the collector and his party are directed to report themselves to me, I will see that, as far as I am able, their wants are supplied. Lieutenant Bourne made his proposition to the museum without even consulting his commanding officer. I confess not to like the idea of having attached to the column a party whose business it must be, if they are to be of any good, to wander about in search of insects, reptiles, &c., and which must entail their being strongly guarded, or being liable to be cut up or taken prisoners.

From Colonel *B. E. Bacon*, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Honorary Secretary to the Trustees, Indian Museum, No. 622; dated Fort William, the 15th November 1871.

IN continuation of the docket from this office, No. 238, dated 6th November 1871, I am directed to forward the accompanying extract from a letter from Brigadier General G. Bourchier, Commanding Eastern Frontier District, to the Adjutant General, No. 1092 L., dated 29th October 1871, and to state that the Governor General in Council regrets that Lieutenant Bourne will not be able to take charge of the duties of collecting museum specimens, but if the work can be entrusted to any other officer, or if any other arrangement made, which Government can approve, the Brigadier General is ready to afford all the assistance in his power.

From Lieutenant Colonel *A. D. Dickens*, C.B., Deputy Commissary General, Lower Circle, to the Commissary General, No. 1068; dated 2nd November 1871.

ADVERTING to your letter, No. 1283, of the 24th October, relative to the powers of endurance of up-country coolies, I have the honour to forward, for your information, copies of the letters quoted in the margin, and to state that I fully concur in the views taken of the subject by Dr. Buckle, C.B., Deputy Inspector General of Hospitals, and Lieutenant Colonel Roberts, V.C., Assistant Quartermaster General.

Letter, No. 28 B., from Dr. Buckle, Deputy Inspector General of Hospitals, dated 29th October 1871.
Letter, No. 206 L., from Lieutenant Colonel Roberts, dated 30th October 1871.

2. The number of coolies collected by this department, including sirdars and mates, is as follows:—

Punjabees	1,854
Hindoostanees	1,131
TOTAL	2,985

and

and the distribution of these men has been arranged thus by the coolie organisation committee.

Cachar, or Right Column.

Hindoostanees	883	
Punjaubees	417	
Nepaulees	840	
TOTAL	*2,140	* Includes sirdars and mates.

Chittagong, or Left Column.

Hindoostanees	348	
Punjabees	1,437	
Danghurs	95	
Nepaulees	300	
TOTAL	†2,180	† Includes sirdars and mates.

3. The whole of the Nepaulees and Danghur coolies have been collected under the immediate orders of the Government of Bengal.

4. All the men have undergone careful medical examination, and with the exception of the number reported in my letter, No. 1022, of the 18th ultimo, none have been rejected since. In fact, the whole of the Punjab men up to the present have been passed.

5. Experience alone will show which class of men is most adapted for the hardships of a campaign, my own impression being that the Hindoostanee Kahar will prove as useful and enduring as either the Punjabee or Nepaulee coolie.

From the Deputy Inspector General of Hospitals, Dacca Circle, to the Deputy Commissary General, Lower Circle, No. 28 B.; dated 29th October 1871.

IN reply to letter, No. 670, dated 28th October 1871, I have the honour to state that there is no reason to doubt the powers and endurance of the up-country coolies that form the carriage of the Chittagong column of the Looshai expedition.

The men are chiefly Punjabees, have been carefully selected, and, as regards muscular development, strength, and fitness for labour, are suited for the work required, and will bear a favourable comparison with any of the coolies so employed.

2. That sickness must be anticipated amongst such a body of men, subjected to exposure and endemic causes of disease, is obvious; but the unhealthy season in which men from the plains suffer in the Chittagong hill tracts is after the cold season, when the hot weath sets in, accompanied with frequent and large rain falls.

3. The health of all men when removed to a climate different to what they are accustomed to, is liable to suffer, but this does not apply especially to Punjabees, or has peculiar reference to the small proportion of men from the north-west, composing the coolie corps with the right column

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From Lieutenant Colonel *F. S. Roberts*, V.C., Assistant Quartermaster General, to the Deputy Commissary General, Lower Circle, No. 206 L.; dated 30th October 1871.

IN acknowledging the receipt of your letter, No. 671, of 28th instant, I have the honour to state that I have no reason to doubt the powers and endurance of the up-country coolies that form the carriage of the Chittagong column of the Looshai expedition.

2. Which class of men will stand the climate best experience alone can prove, but if superior physique has anything to do with it, the Chittagong column should fare well, as, with the exception of one batch of 345 Hindoostanees and 96 Danghurs, all the men wh have as yet been dispatched to Chittagong have come from the Punjab, and are strong, robust-looking men.

3. Every man has been most carefully inspected, and no one who showed any signs of weakness has been permitted to embark, so that I am in hopes both columns will find their coolies able to work, though it is, of course, quite impossible to say what effect a strange climate may have on their constitutions.

TELEGRAM from General *Bourchier*, Cachar, to Secretary to Government, Military Department, Calcutta, No. 250; dated the 23rd November 1871.

CAPTAIN HEDAYUT ALI reached Chuttuck yesterday. His coolies are suffering from cholera; 64 have died, and 35 are in hospital. The civil doctor from Sylhet was ordered off to Chuttuck during the night, and Lieutenant Colonel Sherriff and Surgeon White of the 22nd Native Infantry are just starting from this to assist Hedayut Ali. Every possible precaution is being taken to prevent the disease spreading. Dr. Buckle is in hopes, now that the men have been landed, the disease will soon be checked. Arrangements have been made for the wing, 22nd Punjab Infantry, marching from Chuttuck by a different route. I leave for Mynadhur to-day with Colonel Roberts. Dr. Buckle and Captain Thompson will remain here for the present.

From Colonel *H. K. Burne*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to Brigadier General *G. Bourchier*, C.B., Commanding Eastern Frontier District, No. 1187; dated Fort William, the 27th November 1871.

I AM directed to acquaint you, that a telegram to the following effect has this day been dispatched to you:—

"Your message of 23rd.

"Please issue instructions to ensure as complete separation as possible of coolies suffering from cholera from all other bodies of troops or followers.

"Can it be arranged to land parties at Chuttuck at some place away from the infected spot, or perhaps to take them on to Kolarooka, the place mentioned in your number 1100, of 6th November, to Quartermaster General.

"Report to me frequently as to state of health of troops and followers."

TELEGRAM from General *Bourchier*, C.B., Cachar, to the Viceroy, Calcutta, No. 319; dated the 28th November 1871.

THE sick coolies are at Kolarooka Camp, about six miles from Chuttuck, where they were sent on the 1st instant, not having halted at Chuttuck at all. Over 533 healthy coolies are at Peergong, a march further towards Sylhet. Convalescents' camp established midway between two other camps. They will not advance until receipt of orders. Dr. White reports the worst of the outbreak over. All communication with camps prohibited; 22nd wing reached Sylhet from Chuttuck, all well, by another road. A telegram just received from Dr. White, reports all well, with main body at Peergong.

TELEGRAM from General *Bourchier*, C.B., Cachar, to Colonel *Burne*, Secretary to Government, Calcutta, No. 320; dated the 28th November 1871.

THE cooly camp has all along been at Kolarooka, not at Chuttuck. All necessary instructions to isolate the coolies have been issued. There are now three camps, one for sick, one for convalescents, and one for over 50 healthy men at Peergong. Dr. White reports worst outbreak is over, and that the numerous cases of diarrhœa are checked by treatment. The wing 22nd reached Sylhet from Chuttuck in good health, marching by a different road. The troops and followers are all in good health. A telegram this moment received, reports all well with main body of coolies at Peergong.

From Colonel *H. K. Burne*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, Calcutta, to Brigadier General *Bourchier*, C.B., Cachar, No. 1215; dated Fort William, the 28th November 1871.

I AM directed to acquaint you that a telegram to the following effect has this day been dispatched to you:—

"With reference to your message of 23rd, and my reply of yesterday regarding cholera amongst coolies at Chuttuck, select a healthy spot on elevated ground, if possible at some distance from road, where temporary shelter and comfort can be provided for infected coolies.

All communication with them should be rigidly cut off, and every effort made to prevent desertion.

Telegraph proceedings and state of health.

Orders will be given for their ultimate disposal when further and accurate information as to their state is received.

Copies of this message have been sent to Dr. Buckle at Cachar, and Mr. Sutherland, Sylhet, for information and guidance."

From Colonel *H. K. Burne*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to Brigadier General *G. Bourchier*, C.B., Commanding Eastern Frontier District, No. 1239; dated Fort William, the 28th November 1871.

I AM directed to acquaint you that a telegram from the Viceroy to the following effect has this day been dispatched to you:—

"Take the greatest care that no one, civil or military, on their way to or from Chuttuck to Sylhet or Cachar approaches the cooly camps. Make line of communication as far from them as possible, even if it necessitates miles of a round. No effort should be spared to secure absolute segregation until 10 days at least after last case occurs.

"The coolies should be told that any attempt at desertion will be punished with extreme severity. Deserters will spread disease all over country.

"Feed them well, and try and give them some occupation in their camp."

TELEGRAM from General *Bourchier*, C.B., Cachar, to Secretary Colonel *Burne*, dated the 29th November 1871.

MY telegram of yesterday will show that the instructions conveyed in yours of 28th have already been strictly carried on. The coolies will remain encamped at present until receipt of orders from Government as to their ultimate disposal. Dr. Buckle considers the state of things satisfactory; when next report from camp is received, it will be telegraphed.

TELEGRAM from Collector of Sylhet to Secretary Colonel *Burne*, No. 221; dated the 29th November 1871.

EVERY necessary precaution taken to arrest spread of cholera: three camps formed, one for those attacked, one for the convalescents, one for the healthy. I sent down dhobies, sweepers, cooks, and mallees, last to dig trenches for burying the dead, when burning was not possible. I have also sent down 100 coolies to assist in running up extra sheds if necessary. Civil surgeon here started immediately on receipt of outbreak. Dr. White, of 42nd Native Infantry, now in charge of the cholera camp, reports favourably. He reports that the cholera is not in a bad form, and will soon be stamped out. The number of deaths and admissions daily decreasing. Dr. White reports that the coolies are in good spirits, and that the healthy ones, 530 in number, will be able to march in two or three days. He assured that everything has been done, that the worst is over now, and that there is no further cause for alarm. Major Moore, with Dr. Gregg, of 4th Native Infantry, arrived this morning from Cachar, and started for the coolie camp.

TELEGRAM from Collector at Sylhet to Secretary Colonel *Burne*, No. 227; dated the 29th November 1871.

DR. WHITE reports five deaths, five admissions from Peergong, simple diarrhœa; despatches 18 convalescents to Govindegunge; no new cases of cholera for three days; outbreak completely stamped out. Deacon reports all well and healthy at Peergong.

From Colonel *H. K. Burne*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Collector of Sylhet, No. 1334 A.; dated Fort William, the 30th November 1871.

I AM directed to acquaint you that a telegram to the following effect has this day been dispatched to you:—

"Your message of 29th, Government consider three days far too soon for any coolie or body of coolies who were in any way in contact with the infected coolies to join the main body. As General Bourchier has already been told, complete segregation should be maintained, and no coolies allowed to move until a lapse of at least 10 days from date of last case."

TELEGRAM from General *Bourchier* to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal; dated the 26th November 1871.

LAST report from Hedayut Ali gives 18 deaths and 32 admissions in one day; 74 in hospital; 112 coolies deserted from camp; everything possible is being done under Dr. Buckle's advice to check the disease, but is apparent that I cannot reckon on ultimately obtaining the services of more than half the original number, and that at least 400 more coolies must be raised for this column. Please remind His Honor, the Lieutenant Governor, that Mr. Shadwell said he could get 200 Cossyahs or Jynteeahs. These are the strongest and best men to be obtained, and are close by. I recommend that Mr. Shadwell be specially deputed, through the Deputy Commissioner, to raise as many as he can up to (300) three hundred, and to bring them down to Cachar himself. The Deputy Commissioner, Cachar, may be able to raise the rest.

TELEGRAM from General *Bourchier*, Cachar, to Colonel *Burne*, Secretary to Government, Military Department, and to the Secretary, Bengal Government, No. 346; dated the 30th November 1871.

DR. WHITE telegraphs from Kalarooka last night as follows: five deaths, five admissions from Peergong, simple diarrhœa. Dispatched 18 convalescents to Govindgunge. No new case of cholera for three days. Outbreak completely stamped out. Dr. Deacon reports all well and hearty at Peergong. Colonel Sherriff is at Govindgunge: here message ends. Govindgunge is the convalescent camp between Kalarooka and Peergong. Dr. Buckle approves of convalescents being sent there from the sick camp. Precautions have already been taken by civil, military, and medical authorities to isolate the coolies' camps. But the Viceroy's telegram of 28th was forwarded to all officers at Chuttuck and Sylhet, and through them to the officers at the camps.

TELEGRAM from the Collector of Sylhet to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department; dated 30th November 1871.

ALL the medical authorities at the cholera camp are apprehensive of another outbreak if the coolies are detained for the next six days to make up the 10 clear days ordered by the Viceroy. The coolies are said to be in such good health that the doctors want them to march. Please move the Viceroy to leave it with Dr. White to march the coolies at once, or as soon as he thinks it safe to do so. No cholera for the last four days.

From Colonel *H. K. Burne*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, Calcutta, to Brigadier General *Bourchier*, C.B., Cachar, No. 42; dated Fort William, the 2nd December 1871.

I AM directed to acquaint you that a telegram to the following effect has this day been dispatched to you:—

"Collector of Sylhet urges early move of coolies, and that Dr. White be allowed discretion to move them when he considers it safe. With reference to the order to detain them 10 days, the Government would wish you to act as you think best. Every possible precaution being taken, or there may be great risk."

(No. 44.)

COPY of the above forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, for the information of the Honourable the Lieutenant Governor.

TELEGRAM from General *Bourchier*, C.B., Mynadhur, to Viceroy, Calcutta, No. 3; dated the 30th November 1871.

RECEIVED your Lordship's telegrams, conveying orders regarding segregation of infected camps. Every precaution has been taken. Disease evidently checked, as also desertion. Telegraph open to Mynadhur on Barak. All well in camps. Troops and coolies in excellent spirits. Road being pushed on toward Tipai Mookh. Sappers and detachment of 44th have gone on. The forest is far drier than I could have hoped. Just returned from most advanced point of road. Traced eight miles beyond Mynadhur. Plenty of water in Barak as far as advanced post.

TELEGRAM from General *Bourchier*, C.B., Cachar, to Colonel *Burne*, Secretary Military Department, and Secretary Bengal Government, Calcutta; dated the 1st December 1871.

LAST report from Kalarooka gives one admission from diarrhœa. No cases have occurred in villages, nor any even among attendants in the camps. Coolies reported to be in good health and spirits.

(No. 380, of 1871.

(Separate.)

To His Grace the Duke of *Argyll*, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Military Department,
My Lord Duke, Fort William, 13 December 1871.

IN transmitting copies of further papers relating to the progress of the Looshai Expedition, we are glad to be able to state that the hope expressed in our Despatch, No. 370, of the 8th instant, regarding the disappearance of cholera among the coolies has been realised, no case having been reported to us during the past week, and the main body of the men having passed on to the front. Arrangements for supplying casualties, desertions, &c., among the coolies have been ordered, and we have no reason to apprehend any difficulty in this respect, or any delay in the advance of the column.

We are, &c.
(signed) *Mayo.*
J. Strachey.
&c. &c.

From Colonel *M. A. Biddulph*, Deputy Adjutant General, Royal Artillery, for the Adjutant General, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, Simla, No. 191 G.; dated Head Quarters, Simla, the 15th September 1871.

I AM desired by the Right Honourable the Commander in Chief in India to forward, for the information of Government, the enclosed copy of a letter from the Inspector General of Ordnance, regarding Hales's rockets now in store.

His Excellency considers it very desirable that a supply of rockets should be sent with the expedition now being organised against the Looshais; and as there appears to be none in store of a trustworthy nature, the Commander in Chief begs that a demand may be made to England by telegram, for a supply of the latest pattern to be sent out at once overland.

His Excellency remarks that it is of no use taking unsafe ones on service.

From Colonel *H. Lewis*, R.A., Officiating Inspector General of Ordnance and Magazines, to the Deputy Adjutant General, Royal Artillery, Simla; No. 560 G.; dated Simla, the 9th September 1871.

IN reply to your letter, No. 4154, dated 8th September 1871, I have the honour to inform you that there is a considerable supply of Hales's rockets in store, *see* margin (and also troughs for firing them); but, with the exception of 200 nine-pounder rockets, pattern II., they are all of pattern I., which was pronounced in War Office Changes of Materiel, clause 1881, dated 1st May 1870, to be unsafe.

24-pounders	-	479
12 „	-	383
9 „	-	2,046

2. The Government of India ordered a trial of these rockets last year, and out of 41 three burnt explosively.

3. Six rockets of pattern II., which was supposed to be an improvement on pattern I., were also fired and found to be more unsatisfactory and dangerous to use than pattern I., five out of the six having exploded.

4. A demand for improved rockets, mark III., was submitted to Government on 23rd January 1871, but returned by the Home Department for reconsideration on a representation from Colonel Wray, who remarked that "Hales's war rockets were little better than fire-works, and that rocket carriages had been removed from all field batteries, Imperial service."

5. It is very possible, judging from the trial last year, that pattern I. rockets might be used with safety; but with reference to the following extract of my report to Government, dated 29th December 1870, I would recommend that about 100 more should be fired for trial before they are issued for service.

From *A. Mackenzie*, Esq., Junior Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 5995; dated Fort William, the 27th November 1871.

Extract (paras. 9-10) from a letter from officiating magistrate of Dacca, No. 2181, dated 17th instant. From Commissary General, No. 4632, dated 24th idem.

I AM directed to forward the accompanying copy of a correspondence regarding the ghee supplied to the coolies on the steamer "Success," and to state that the Lieutenant Governor deeply regrets to say that a frightful mortality from cholera has taken place among the coolies under Captain Hedayut Alli Khan Bahadoor before reaching Chuttuck. I am to add that the full extent of the mortality is not yet known. Some attempt to fix the responsibility for supplying such unwholesome ghee should, in the Lieutenant Governor's opinion, be made.

EXTRACT LETTER from *D. R. Lyall*, Esq., Officiating Magistrate of Dacca, to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, No. 2181; dated Dacca, the 17th November 1871.

Para. 9. A COMMITTEE has to day condemned the whole of the ghee on board as utterly unfit for use, and Dr. Wise and I saw and smelt it yesterday. It is adulterated with some oil, which Caytain Hedayut Ali says, is "Mhowa," and its smell is most sickening. Since yesterday its use has been stopped.

10. If similar ghee has been sent for the use of the troops, great sickness may be expected, as at this season men are pre-disposed to cholera, and very little brings it on.

From Lieutenant Colonel *J. I. Willes*, Commissary General, to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department, No. 4632; dated Fort William, the 24th November 1871.

WITH reference to your docket, No. 5870, dated 20th November 1871, on copy of a letter, No. 2181, from the magistrate of Dacca, reported that sickness (diarrhœa and cholera) had appeared on board the steamer "Success," among a party of coolies destined for the Looshai force, and that the ghee on board had been condemned as unfit for use, and was considered to have caused the sickness. I beg to observe that no similar complaint of the quality of the ghee supplied by this department has been made in any other case, or received from any other source. But orders have been issued that the greatest care be taken for the *best* quality of ghee being alone purchased for the Looshai force.

Military Department, Fort William, No. 1193; dated the 28th November 1871.

THE Commissary General is requested to report, for the information of Government, who is responsible for the supply of the ghee in question. In all such cases steps should be taken to fix individual responsibility when this can be done, and a report be submitted on that point without delay.

Return requested.

By order,
(signed) *B. E. Bacon*, Colonel,
Deputy Secretary to the Government of India.

From Lieutenant Colonel *J. I. Willes*, Commissary General, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 4726; dated Fort William, the 29th November 1871.

I HAVE the honour to return your memo., No. 1193, dated yesterday, regarding ghee put on board the steamer "Success," to which, according to paragraphs 8 and 9 of Dacca magistrate's letter, No. 2181, of 17th instant (copy annexed), to some extent apparently, is attributed the cause of the outbreak of cholera from which the coolies have suffered.

2. I have ascertained that all ghee is brought by the contractors in earthen vessels to the Commissariat go-downs, where it is tasted, and when approved of, is transferred into hogsheads and kegs, and shipped off for the use of the troops. In this way, too, the ghee sent for the coolies on board the steamer "Success" was examined and passed.

3. The responsibility of accepting all ghee rests with the go-down establishment at Baloo Ghât, at the head of which is Honorary Ensign Johnston, Deputy Assistant Commissary, but

but this officer is only a subordinate of the Presidency Executive Office, who I am satisfied will be able to prove that every precaution has been taken in properly examining all stores before despatched.

4. I have asked his Honour the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal to allow the ghee condemned to be sent to the commissariat officer here, after being duly sealed at Dacca. On receipt, every inquiry will be made with a view to ascertaining how the ghee, reported to be inferior and unwholesome, came to be despatched.

5. I would at the same time explain that all ghee, especially that made from buffaloes milk, which is alone obtainable in these parts, has an offensive smell, though to the taste it is quite good.

6. It will be noticed that cholera was prevalent at Dacca before the arrival of the "Success" with the coolies, as stated in the Dacca magistrate's letter, No. 2181, paragraph 4, to Lieutenant Governor, and that up to the date of the steamer reaching Dacca, on 16th instant, only a few slight cases had shown themselves, and one death had occurred; that the ghee referred to was not after that issued, but I presume landed, and it was subsequent to the vessel leaving Dacca, and after the ghee had ceased to be eaten by the coolies two or three days, that the frightful mortality alluded to occurred.

7. I submit, therefore, that some other causes than the eating of the ghee, which has never been complained of by others, though very largely issued, must be looked to as the cause of the outbreak of the epidemic.

From Colonel *B. E. Bacon*, Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Commissary General, No. 38; dated Fort William, 1 December 1871.

I AM directed to acknowledge your letter, No. 4726, dated 29th November 1871, reporting on the ghee supplied to the coolies per steamer "Success," with reference to the outbreak of cholera among the men, and to state that the Governor General in Council desires to have the further report of the result of the inquiry promised in paragraph 4, submitted as early as possible.

(No. 390 of 1871.)

(Separate.)

To his Grace the Duke of *Argyll*, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Military Department, Fort William,
20 December 1871.

My Lord Duke,

WITH reference to our Despatch, No. 380, dated 13th instant, we have the honour to transmit further papers relative to the progress of the Looshai Field Force.

2. It will be seen that our troops have not as yet met with any material opposition in their onward movement, and that fair progress is being made.

We are, &c.
(signed) *Mayo.*
J. Strachey.
&c. &c.

TELEGRAM from General *Brownlow*, Demagiri, through Kassalong, to the Quartermaster General, Under Secretary to the Government of Bengal, and Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, Delhi and Calcutta, No. 44; dated the 10th December 1871.

8th December. Two hundred coolies, chiefly Hindoostanees, Bengalees, and so-called Dhangurs, will be sent back for discharge immediately. This represents 50 per cent. of their numbers. They have broken down completely. The Punjabees are doing all the work.

From Captain *Hedayut Ally, Khan Bahadoor,* Aide-de-Camp to his Excellency the Right honourable the Commander in Chief, on special duty, to *H. L. Harrison,* Esq., Officiating Junior Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Calcutta. L. No. 63, dated Camp Chuttuck, the 22nd November 1871.

I have the honour to report, for the information of his Honor the Lieutenant Governor, that on my embarkation on board the steamer "Success," I at first went to the Commissariat gomasta for inspecting the rations for the corps, and saw the ghee in the store very bad; but I was informed by him that the coolies on the first batch had got the same, for which reason I did no more interfere with the matter, and had allowed the issue of it to my corps. On the 15th I received report from the sirdars of coolies that many had the complaints of looseness of their bowels, and got diarrhœa from using the ghee supplied to them. I therefore ordered the gomasta, on the sixteenth morning, to stop the issue of it to my corps.

2. One of the men in my corps died at first of diarrhœa on the night of the 15th instant, and another of cholera on the next day afternoon. When I saw the symptoms of breaking out of cholera in the corps, it became my confirmed belief that the ghee was very bad, and cause of illness. I then thought it necessary to make committee over it, preceiving that if it be used by the force on the expedition, there might be great loss of men. As proofs of my assertion, I humbly beg to enclose copies of letters of Captains Farlow and Thurlow, commanders of steamship "Success," and flat "Lutchmee" in tow with her, who had got illness by using the ghee one day only.

3. The Native doctor attached to the corps was also then dangerously ill, and altogether unfit for duty.

Under these circumstances, I determined to carry the vessel to Dacca, and arrived there at half-past two. The Commissioner of Dacca then having been on tour, I reported to the Collector all the matters, and requested him to inform the civil surgeon of the station. About 4 p.m., he came on board the steamer with the civil surgeon, and inspected the sick men as well as the ghee. Both of the officers agreed with me in voting the bad quality of ghee. The Collector then requested the officer commanding the station for assembling committee over it. On the next morning the committee condemned it as altogether unfit for use; the report is herewith enclosed.

4. I am very thankful to Mr. Lyall, Collector of Dacca, for rendering me what assistance I needed there.

The civil surgeon again came on board the next morning, and recommended the removal of six men and the Native doctor; copy of his letter is herewith appended. I then made over them to Mitford Hospital, and left Dacca at 11 o'clock a.m.

15th	1	died.
16th	2	"
17th	3	"
18th	6	"
19th	5	"
20th	8	"
21st	22	"
22nd	10	"
	57	

5. On leaving Dacca, cholera broke out in my corps regularly, and those previously suffering from diarrhœa fell first victim to its attack. The disease became widening, and 57 deaths occurred up to date, a detail of which is noted in the margin. All of the men in the corps were terrified and disheartened, and they were such panic-struck that on anchoring the vessel at Barrudoah, in Sylhet, on the twentieth evening, 55 men were found absent on the next morning's roll call. The commander of the vessel was then ordered to stop the steamer for some hours. On searching after them 46 men were found at 11 o'clock in a jungle, half covered with water, I then sent purwannah to the nearest police station to seek after the remaining nine men, and hope they would be caught, as the place was surrounded by rivers and bogs, and no way to get out.

6. A separate hospital was made apart from all for the sick men in cholera, and sick attendance was employed to each patient. I myself always attended to each of them, and encouraged them from depression. My constant encouragement and close mixture with them as well the corps have kept the men settled, but whatever I did for their benefit, I did so, not thinking beyond my duty, and should not be elaborate on the point any more.

7. I am sorry, indeed, that so many men of my corps have died of cholera; but the disease is of such a baneful nature, that when once commenced, it can hardly be repelled without loss, and had not the early preventive measures been taken for stopping the use of ghee, I think the havoc might have been greater.

8. I regret to say that I am under the painful necessity of informing His Honor that in the crisis of time, when cholera was raging, I derived very little medical assistance from Ameerudeen, second class hospital assistant of Mitford Hospital, Dacca, who is proceeding with the corps, on the illness of Rahyamdad Khan, second class hospital assistant attached to it. In several instances I found him drunk, and absent in duty.

In the late hours of night I heard the cholera patients loudly crying in my name for medicine, when I got up and administered it to them by the assistance of the compounder.

9. I lastly beg to inform that I am indebted to the officers of the steamer "Success," and her two flats "Lutchmee" and "Gorai," for their uniform civility and attention to the comfort of my men, especially to Captain Farlow, commander steamship "Success," who had showed great kindness to my men, and when any sick had been found by him, he took him to the hospital, administered medicine, and encouraged him from depression.

10. In conclusion I beg to enclose the diaries of my voyage.

From Captain *G. Thurlow*, Commander, flat "Lutchmee," to Captain *Hedayut Ali, Khan Bahadoor*, Aide-de-Camp to His Excellency the Right honourable the Commander in Chief, on special duty, dated flat "Lutchmee," in tow of steamer "Success," the 16th November 1871.

With reference to your letter, No. 57, dated 16th November 1871, I beg to state that the ghee in question was taken from the gomasta as a load, about 2 lbs. and to be returned to him at Dacca.

As there was none on board, I mess at Captain Farlow's table. At about 3 o'clock I commenced retching, after that purging and severe gripes in my stomach. At about 8 p.m. I felt all my limbs beginning to get cramps. I could not make water.

It was through the kind favour of Captain Warman, commander, flat "Goraie," in tow of steamer "Success," who, having the medicine on board, administered to me the same, which cured me, or else the case would have been perhaps a serious one.

My opinion is that the ghee the food was cooked with was not good, and was the cause of my illness.

From Captain *W. E. Farlow*, Commander, steamer "Success," to Captain *Hedayut Ali*, Commander, Coolie Force, dated Dacca, the 16th November 1871.

I beg to report for your information, that falling short of ghee, my butler took from the Commissariat Baboo about one seer of ghee, which my food was cooked with.

Myself and Captain Thurlow of the flat "Lutchmee," were attacked with diarrhœa, which was caused through the ghee being bad.

I am of an opinion that the said ghee was the cause of illness amongst your coolies, as they appeared to be suffering the same as I did.

From Baboo *Woomesh Chunder Bose*, Commissariat Gomasta, to Captain *Hedayut Ali, Khan Bahadoor*, Aide-de-Camp to his Excellency the Commander in Chief, on special duty, dated camp steamer "Success," the 16th November 1871.

With reference to your order No. 55, I beg most respectfully to state for your information, that the ghee which I tasted myself is sour to my knowledge. However, if it be the consequence of making the coolies sick, according to the order of your Honor, I shall make no more the issue of it to any man of the corps from this day.

From Dr. *J. Wise*, Civil Surgeon of Dacca, to Captain *Hedayut Ali, Khan Bahadoor*, Aide-de-Camp to his Excellency the Commander in Chief, on special duty, dated Dacca, the 17th November 1871.

In reply to your letter No. 59, of yesterday's date, I have the honour to inform you that I inspected the coolies of your corps on board the steamship "Success," yesterday afternoon and again this morning.

I found six of them so ill that I recommend them being landed and sent to the Mitford Hospital for treatment. Even should they recover, they would be useless as coolies this season.

As regards the Native doctor in medical charge, he was in a very critical state, and quite unfit for any duty. I have ordered second class hospital assistant Sheik Ameerudeen, attached to the Mitford Hospital, to go on board and proceed with the coolies to Cachar.

I trust you will use every endeavour to have him sent back to Dacca as soon as possible, his services being urgently required here.

Proceedings of a Committee assembled at Dacca, by order of the Officer Commanding the Station, to examine and report upon "Ghee" issued by the Commissariat for the use of Coolies proceeding to Cachar, under command of Captain *Hedayut Ali*, by the India General Steam Navigation Company's steamer "Success."

Dacca, 17th November 1871.

Articles.		Remarks by the Committee.
	lbs. oz.	
Ghee - - - - - -	2,464 11	The whole rancid and quite unfit for use.

(signed)

A. S. McRaily, 22nd Punjab Native Infantry, President.
(Unintelligible.)
Ramsing, Jemadar,
J. J. O'Bryen, Lieutenant-Colonel 22nd Punjab Native Infantry, Commanding at Dacca.
A. H. Kelly, Assistant, attending the Committee.
} Members.

DIARY of Captain *Hedayut Ali*, on special duty, proceeding with the Cooly Corps on Looshai Expedition during the voyage on embarkation at Doobrie steamer ghat and debarkation at Chuttuck.

12th November 1871.—At 8 a.m. embarked on board the steamer "Success" with eight sirdars, 32 duffadars, and 800 coolies. Inspected the Commissariat ration for the corps; ghee seemed very bad. Gomasta informed that the first batch coolies had got the same. I did not interfere with the matter more. At 5 p.m. anchored the steamer at Pookreebari, and allowed the coolies to go on shore to cook their food.

13th November.—Early in the morning the blankets of the men were rolled up, and the decks swept away. MacDougall's powder and carbolic acid were then sprinkled over. Proceeded at 7 a.m., and anchored at 4 p.m. near Sherajgunge. Allowed the men to go on shore for cooking their food.

14th November.—Cleanliness was observed on board, and MacDougall's powder and carbolic acid were sprinkled all around the decks. Proceeded at 6 a.m., and came to Goalundo at half-past twelve. Reported safe arrival to the Junior Secretary to the Government of Bengal by telegram. Left Goalundo at 2 p.m. and anchored at Elempore before evening. The coolies landed on shore and cooked their food.

15th November.—Regular cleanliness was observed. MacDougall's powder and carbolic acid were sprinkled over the decks. Started at 6 a.m. Sirdars reported that some of their men had got looseness of bowels and diarrhœa from using the ghee supplied to them. At 4.30 anchored at Babucachuck and brought the men on shore to cook their food. Twenty-five diarrhœa patients admitted in the hospital; one of them died this day.

16th November.—The decks were washed up in the morning, and MacDougall's powder sprinkled. At 5 a.m. proceeded. Inquired and examined the quality of ghee, and received information from Captains Farlow and Thurlow, commanders of s.s. "Success" and flat "Lutchmee," that by using the ghee they were suffering from diarrhœa. Ordered the gomashta to stop the issue of it to the coolies. Native doctor attached to the corps became dangerously ill. Brought the steamer at Dacca at 2 p.m. to take another doctor, and to make committee over the ghee. Went and personally reported the matter to the collector. He and the civil surgeon came on board the steamer at 4 p.m., and inspected the sick men and the ghee. Both of the officers voted the ghee very bad. The Collector then requested Officer Commanding the station for assembling committee over it. The men were landed on the plain meadow opposite Dacca, and allowed to cook their food. 24 patients in the hospital; two of them died of cholera.

17th November.—The regular sanitary condition of the Board was observed. The committee assembled at 6 a.m., and condemned the ghee as totally unfit for use. The civil surgeon came again in the morning, and recommended six patients of the hospital and the Native doctor for removal. They were made over to the Mitford Hospital. The civil surgeon gave an hospital assistant, attached to the Mitford Hospital, to proceed with the corps to Cachar. Left Dacca at 11 a.m., and anchored at Naraingunge at 3 p.m. Received 400 daos from the railway agent, indented by Colonel J. C. Haughton, Commissioner of Cooch Behar, for the corps.

Cholera regularly appeared in my corps, and the diarrhœa patients all seemed in choleraic types. Two more cholera patients admitted in the hospital. A separate place, aloof from all, was made for them, and sick attendance was employed to each of them. I myself also frequently attended to each of them, and encouraged them from depression and discouragement. Three of them died this day.

18th November.—Usual cleanliness was observed, and more particular attention was paid to cholera hospital. The steamer was detained up to 9 a.m. for taking coal. Started at 5.30 p.m.; anchored at Joykalipore. The coolies landed and cooked their food. Nine more attacked with cholera, and six died.

19th November.—MacDougall's powders were not regularly sprinkled. The Commissariat gomashta reported a little quantity of that in his store. It was preserved for the hospital and latrines. At 5 p.m. anchored at Rampore, to allow coolies on shore for cooking their food. Thirteen more attacked with cholera, and five died.

20th November.—The dreadful attack of cholera spread in the corps, and the men were panic-struck. The instructions of Dr. Buckle were closely adhered to. Proceeded at 6 a.m. In the afternoon, two cholera patients in agonies of death, jumped overboard. Prompt attention was paid, and the steamer stopped. One of them was found alive, and the other drowned. Anchored the steamer at Baradoa, in Sylhet, before evening, and allowed the coolies to cook on the land. Eighteen more attacked with cholera, and eight died.

21st November.—Before starting, 55 men were found absent on the morning's roll call. The commander was ordered to stop the steamer for a few hours. At 11 a.m. 46 of them were found in a jungle. Information sent to the nearest police station for the capture of the remaining nine men. I hope they are to be caught, as the place was surrounded by rivers and bogs, and no way to get out. One cholera patient, in the agony of thirst, snatched himself from the sick attendant and jumped overboard, but he was taken up. On the

the approach of evening, anchored the vessel at Shekidpore, and allowed coolies to land on shore. Twenty-eight men attacked with cholera this day, and 22 died.

In the night, the Native doctor attached to the corps was found drunk and absent on duty.

22nd November.—The decks were washed up, and MacDougall's powders sparingly sprinkled. Started at 6 a.m. and arrived at Chuttuck in the evening. Twelve more attacked with cholera this day, and 10 died. The men were landed from the steamer. Total cholera patients in the hospital were 44.

(signed) *Hedayut Ali*, Captain,
On special duty.

Camp Chuttuck,
The 22nd November 1871.

[No. 853.] Military Department, Fort William; dated the 8th December 1871.

(No. 350.)

COPY of the above forwarded to the Commissary General for information, in continuation of letter No. 38, dated the 1st December 1871, and with reference to his letter No. 4824, dated the 4th December 1871, with a request that the report promised may be submitted with the least avoidable delay.

By order,
(signed) *B. E. Bacon*, Colonel,
Deputy Secretary to the Government of India.

From *H. Hankey*, Esq., Officiating Commissioner of the Chittagong Division, to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department, Fort William, No. 502; dated Chittagong, the 22nd November 1871.

I HAVE now the honour to submit the following report, regarding the progress of the preparatory arrangements for the Looshai Expedition, in continuation of that given in my letter No. 372, dated the 18th ultimo.

2. The brief intimation that everything is progressing in as satisfactory a manner as could possibly be desired would convey to the Government in two words as full and complete an idea of the state of progress as the most detailed report could do. I am so confident that the military authorities will bear me out in this announcement, that it gives me great pleasure in stating it.

3. Everything is working with such clock-like regularity, that there is nothing really to report, unless it is the dates on which the "India" and "Koel" have been leaving. These steamers have been doing excellent service, and keeping time with the punctuality of a Thames penny steamer. The trip now takes three days to Rangamuttee and back. One day is allowed in port for the Commissariat officers to load, and on the following morning coolies or whatever body of men is going, embark, and both vessels start together.

4. The following statement shows the number of trips made by the "Koel" and "India" respectively, with the dates of departure from and return to Chittagong, and will verify my encomium of the regularity of the service.

"Koel" and "India."

Left Chittagong.			Returned.	
7th	November	- -	9th	November.
11th	„	- -	13th	„
15th	„	- -	17th	„
19th	„	- -	20th	„

5. The result is that the whole of the arrivals, consisting of the 2nd Goorkha Regiment, 3rd Company of Sappers and Miners, Ordnance Park coolies, recruits for Frontier Police, and survey party under Major Macdonald, together with the bulk of the Commissariat stores, have been passed up-country.

6. The Brigadier General and his staff, consisting of Captain Cockburn, A. D. C., and Captain Bates, Brigadier Major, arrived on the 28th October. The Brigadier, Captain East, and Captain Cockburn, left on the 7th instant, in the "India." Captain Bates remained behind to arrange for transport duties, and follows on the 23rd instant.

7. The "Flame" reached Chittagong on the 25th October 1871, and was despatched up-country two days subsequently with a number of Native boats in tow. She is reported as doing most efficient service between Rangamuttee and Kassalong.* Her flats are expected immediately,† and will be most useful for the troops.

8. The "Scotia" has landed all the elephants that are to come in course of two trips. No preparations of any sort were made for landing them, as it was determined to let them swim

* The time taken between the two places is four and a-half hours up and two down.
† One has since arrived.

swim ashore and walk up the sloping bank. The result justified the decision, for not a single accident occurred; one elephant, however, died *en route*, but whether from heat-apoplexy (the reported cause), or from an injury received at the time of embarkation at Calcutta, will probably never be clearly known. Another was injured in disembarkation, that is to say, whilst being hoisted up from the lower hold of the vessel.

9. I am not aware whether any statistics have ever been collected on the subject of the transportation of elephants by sea, and its subsequent effects on the animals. I have heard it said that very few of the elephants brought over from Burmah during the mutiny are now alive. If this be true, it certainly affords a very powerful *primâ facie* argument against this mode of transport. From my experience of the two batches brought by the "Scotia," I would certainly raise my voice against transporting elephants by sea, except as a very last resort under the sternest necessity. I, of course, mean so long only as the present appliances exist for hoisting the animals in and out of the hold. As matters at present stand, the animal is squeezed to such an extent in the slings, that if they do not receive internal injuries of the gravest character, their immunity therefrom is almost miraculous. I have put out of the question the hard knocks and blows they get on the head and elsewhere from contact with the lower framework of the hold whilst being hoisted up, and which, from the twisting of the rope, is almost, if not quite, unpreventible, unless a vessel is specially built for the purpose. Coupled, however, with the squeezing which must always be inseparable from the slinging, I think those who disbelieve the theory that no harm results therefrom to the elephant have the best of the argument.

10. The disembarkation of elephants is naturally a most important feature in the campaign, and excites great interest. Chittagong showed the interest it felt most emphatically, and the whole population of the town lined the banks of the river. I must not leave this subject without recording my sense of the zeal and energy displayed by Lieutenant Warden, who was specially deputed by Government. This officer not only assisted with advice but worked himself as hard as any cooly, and, in fact, did everything in his power to save Government expense, by preventing any preventible delay, and endeavouring to disembark the elephants with the greatest possible expedition. The result did him great credit.

11. So far, then, not a single *contretemps*, that I am aware of, has occurred. The only hitch of any kind has arisen above Burkul, and consists of the failure of the Bomong to supply his quota of boats for the boat service between Burkul and Demagiree. Each of the hill chiefs was requisitioned for a certain number of coolies and boats, which number was fixed with due regard to the capabilities of what may be called his chiefdom. The Bomong has defaulted altogether, and is reported by the Deputy Commissioner to have behaved badly. The boats, too, are much smaller than was calculated on, whilst the road between the two places (Burkul and Demagiree) presents more difficulties in construction than the Brigadier anticipated. I am doing all in my power to remedy the deficiency in boats by sending them up from Chittagong, and trust the whole number asked for (200) will shortly start.

12. I have now only to notice the accidents and casualties that have occurred, and I am happy to report the number small.

1st. *Accidents.*—A boat in tow of the "Koel," laden with Commissariat stores, *en route* to Rangamuttee, parted in the centre and sunk. A boat taking coolies from the "Undaunted" was capsized by two coolies suddenly jumping off the bulwarks of the steamer. All the coolies were picked up with the exception of two, who were drowned. A court of enquiry was appointed by the Brigade Major. No blame apparently attaches to anybody. One cooly of the cooly corps died from fever.

A bheesty attached to the 2nd Goorkhas was brought here ill and has since died.

Captain Smart of the "Koel" died of fever after a few days' illness only. A paragraph in the "Englishman" appeared, attributing the officer's death to the effects of a wound caused by striking a lascar in the mouth with his hand. This, however, is incorrect. It is, I believe, true that Captain Smart had such a wound, received in the manner described; it is, however, not true that this had anything to do with his death, except perhaps most remotely, inasmuch as Captain Smart had been lowering himself, and had not strength enough to resist a severe attack of fever.

13. Pending orders from Calcutta, I nominated Captain Williamson of the flat "Gogra" to take command of the "Koel." I understand since that this officer was degraded some time back by order of the Bengal Government, but I am not fully acquainted with the circumstances of his case; but whatever they are, I trust the admirable manner in which Captain Williamson has been acquitting himself since he took command of the "Koel," may be considered in his favour. He has succeeded in enlisting the good opinion of every officer who has had anything to do with him, and in the present juncture is proving himself a most willing, zealous, and efficient officer.

TELEGRAM from Dr. *Buckle*, Mynadhur, to Colonel *Burne*, Military Secretary to Govrnment, Calcutta, No. 122; dated the 14th December 1871.

YOUR message of 13th received, and forwarded to General Bourchier. Three cases of cholera have occurred during the month, of the coolies who are now halted at Budderpore, near which is a cholera camp. Dr. White has been instructed that the coolies are on on

accou

account to come on and join the force until all danger of infection is passed, and that every precaution must be taken to prevent the chance of bringing on the disease to Cachar and to the force. The coolies must be employed in the rear, as directed, when considered safe.

From Colonel *H. K. Burne*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department to Dr. *Buckle*, Mynadhur, (to be forwarded), No. 810; dated Fort William, the 15th December 1871.

I AM directed to acquaint you that a telegram to the following effect has this day been despatched to you:—

"Your message of 14th received. Every possible precaution must continue to be taken. Inform General Bourchier."

TELEGRAM from General *Bourchier*, C.B., Tipai Mookh, through No. 3 Station, to Quarter-master General, Delhi, and Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, Calcutta, No. 7; dated 14th December 1871.

Wednesday. Reconnoitred road six miles onwards towards Kholel road, practicable for troops, almost for elephants. Two hundred men of the 44th move on to-morrow; politically it is of importance that Kholel should be occupied without delay. All well.

TELEGRAM from General *Bourchier*, C.B., Tipai Mookh, through Station No. 5, to General *Brownlow*, C.B., Damagiree, No. 30; dated the 18th December 1871.

Clear the Line.—HEAD quarters, left column, 11 miles south-east of Tipai Mookh, advancing on Kholel, which in the map is put too far to the south and west. Progress slow. Hedayut Ali's coolies never having joined me has inconvenienced me terribly. Let me know your whereabouts; country so far perfectly uninhabited; climate excellent, elevation of camp 2,600 feet. All well.

(No. 392 of 1871.)

(Separate.)

To his Grace the Duke of *Argyll*, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Military Department, Fort William,
27 December 1871.

My Lord Duke,

IN continuation of our Despatch, No. 390, dated 20th instant, we have the honour to enclose copies of the telegrams since received, relative to the operations of the Looshai Field Force.

2. It will be seen that the columns have made considerable progress, and have both inflicted some injury on the Looshais, while our casualties have been few.

We are, &c.
(signed) *Mayo.*
J. Strachey.
&c. &c.

TELEGRAM from General *Bourchier*, Station, No. 6, through Tipai Mookh, to General *Brownlow*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, and Quarter-master General, Demagiree, Calcutta and Delhi, No. 44; dated the 19th December 1871.

Clear the Line.—December 19th. ENCAMPED about 15 miles south-east of Tipai Mookh on Seubong mountain. Elevation of camp 3,200 feet. From crest of hill can see Kholel, which appears to be about 20 miles distant by road. A few Looshai scouts who fled on our arrival in camp yesterday communicated with our scouts in the course of the day; they report Poiboi's and Kholel men assembling on the Toweboom, a stream running at the base of the hill on which we are encamped.

TELEGRAM from General *Bourchier*, Camp 18 miles South-east of Tipai Mookh, to General *Brownlow*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, and Quartermaster General, Head-quarters, Camp, Burkul, Calcutta, and Delhi, No. 77; dated the 22nd December 1871.

Clear the Line.—21st December. MARCHED to-day four miles in a south-east direction to a point overhanging Kholel, which is distant about seven miles; march on Kholel to-morrow, supplies being pushed on. Elevation of camp 4,050 feet. All well.

TELEGRAM from General *Bourchier*, near Kholel, through Tipai Mookh, to General *Brownlow*, Secretary to Government of India, Military Department, and Quartermaster General, Headquarters, Camp, Burkul, Calcutta, and *viâ* Delhi, No. 102; dated the 23rd December 1871.

Clear the Line.—22nd December. MARCH to-day to the junction of the Tipai and Toweboom, distance seven miles in a south-east direction. About 40 armed Looshais threatened our passage across the two rivers, but retired without firing as we advanced. All well.

TELEGRAM from General *Bownlow*, Vanoonah, through Burkul, to General *Bourchier*, Tipai Mookh, through Cachar, No. 51; dated the 24th December 1871.

Clear the Line.—Vanoonah, 21st December. WE have destroyed four villages with considerable stores of rice. Sylhoos offer feeble resistance. Our only casualty as yet, one Goorkha killed in an ambuscade. My next move will be in the direction of the high peak to the north, marked in the map "Saboonga," round which there are several large villages. We are at an elevation of 2,800 feet. Health very satisfactory. Our Nepaulese coolies all in quarantine for cholera.

TELEGRAM from General *Bourchier*, Kholel, through Tipai Mookh, to General *Brownlow*, Secretary to Government of India, Military Department, and Quartermaster General, Head-quarters, Camp, *viâ* Burkul, Calcutta, and Delhi, No. 118; dated the 24th December 1871.

Clear the Line.—23rd December, 8 p.m. ADVANCED this morning on Kholel. Attacked by enemy, who were driven back, and followed up until evening. We burnt large store of grain, and two large villages. We occupy a third village. Casualties, two killed, two dangerously wounded, and two severely wounded.

TELEGRAM from General *Brownlow*, Vanoonah, through Burkul, to Quartermaster General, Army Head-quarters, Secretary to Government of India, Military Department, and Secretary to Government of Bengal, Delhi, and Calcutta, No. 52; dated the 24th December 1871.

Clear the Line.—Vanoonah, 21st December. ELEVATION, 2,800 feet. Three considerable villages, with large stores of rice, have been destroyed by columns under Colonel Macpherson and Major Macintyre. The former from the next range to the east telegraphs "All well." The latter is operating in the valley below, about seven miles to the north-east of this. The enemy offer a very feeble resistance. As yet our only casualty has been one Goorkha killed in an ambuscade. On the return of these parties, I shall move in the direction of the high peak to the north, marked in the map "Saboonga," round which there are several large villages. The Sylhoos make no signs of desiring to treat. There is little doubt they had much to do with the Cachar raids. With the exception of a few cases of cholera between Kassalong and Demagiree, introduced by Nepaulese coolies, health of troops is satisfactory. Every precaution has been taken to prevent its spreading.

TELEGRAM from General *Bourchier*, Kholel, through Tipai Mookh, to Quartermaster General, Head-quarters, Camp, and Secretary to Government of India, Military Department, Delhi and Calcutta, No. 119; dated the 24th December 1871.

23rd December, 8 p.m.—MARCHED on Kholel to-day; Looshais attacked advanced guard on leaving the forest and entering their jooms, followed them up until evening, destroying large stores of grain and burning two large villages only deserted to-day; one, the residence of their chief, and the highest of the group being 3,300 feet above the camp. We left in the morning. We occupy a third village. The skirmishing continued until after dark, the enemy firing a volley from the crest of each hill, retired as we advanced. Our casualties

casualties are two of the 44th killed, one of the 22nd, and one constable dangerously wounded, and two of the 22nd severely wounded. From traces of blood, the enemy must have suffered; but, owing to the steepness of the hills and denseness of the jungles, it was impossible to follow them up quickly enough to prevent their killed and wounded being carried off. Coolies and baggage all safe within the piquets. We follow up our advance to-morrow.

TELEGRAM from Brigadier General *Bourchier*, Kholel, through Tipai Mookh, to Quartermaster General, Head-quarters Camp, and Secretary to Government of India, Military Department, Delhi and Calcutta, No. 139; dated the 26th December 1871.

25th December. STILL encamped in one of the Kholel villages. Yesterday I took out the troops and destroyed another large village and some granaries. I propose doing the same to-day, and returning to camp on the Tipai to-morrow, as our onward road appears to be on the right bank of that river. The only casualty yesterday was one cooly slightly wounded within the piquets.

TELEGRAM from Brigadier General *Brownlow*, Vanoonahs village, through Upper Burkul, to Quartermaster General, Secretary to Government of India, Military Department, and General *Bourchier*, Delhi, Calcutta, and Tipai Mookh, through Cachar, No. 57; dated the 26th December 1871.

Clear the Line.—Vanoonahs, 23rd December. Colonel Macpherson has made his way to the second range eastward of this, and destroyed the village, marked in the map as Lalpoethal, in addition to the two referred to in my last telegram; he will rejoin me on the 25th. Major Macintyre has returned to-day, having destroyed two villages, one of which was stockaded, and the rice granaries estimated at 8,000 maunds. He also captured 25 gyal, besides pigs and poultry. All the rice we find is in husk, and we cannot turn it to account, or our progress would be very different.

The difficulty in getting up supplies is heart-breaking. Notwithstanding the severe punishment we are inflicting, the Sylhoos continue to fire on us, and make no show of submission. Health of troops and coolies in advance could not be better.

(No. 5 of 1872.)

(Separate.)

To His Grace the Duke of *Argyll*, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Military Department, Fort William.

My Lord Duke, 5 January 1872.

IN continuation of our Despatch of the 27th ultimo, No. 392, we have the honour to communicate, for your Grace's information, further intelligence since received regarding the operations of the Looshai field force.

2. General Bourchier's column had advanced to Toweboom, the road to which place had been made practicable for laden elephants, and supplies for a month's consumption are expected to be stored there shortly. The troops met with some opposition, but our casualties have been very few, while the enemy appear to have suffered severely, both in life and property. Emissaries from Poiboi and the Kholel people have come in to treat for peace, and we hope at no distant date to report to Her Majesty's Government the successful termination of the expedition.

3. General Brownlow's column has reached the hill marked on the map Saboonga.

4. The health of the troops and coolies is reported to be excellent.

We are, &c.

(signed) *Mayo.*
J. Strachey.
&c. &c.

(No. 4 of 1872.)

Government of India.—Foreign Department.—Political.

To His Grace the Duke of *Argyll*, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

My Lord Duke, Fort William, 5 January 1872.

In continuation of our Despatch, No. 188, dated 31st October 1871, we have the honour to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a copy of the papers specified in the accompanying Abstract of Contents, regarding the expedition into the Looshai country.

We have, &c.
(signed) *Mayo.*
John Strachey.
&c. &c.

From Major General *W. F. Nuthall*, Officiating Political Agent, Munnipoor, to *C. U. Aitchison*, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department, with Governor General, No. 131; dated Munnipoor, 1st November 1871.

The Maharaja having with my concurrence sent for Kamhow, the chief of the tribe to the east of the Looshais, *i.e.*, between them and the Burmah frontier, in view to ascertaining what assistance he can afford towards the approaching expedition, I have the honour to report, for the information of Government, that he has sent word that he is unable to leave his tribe, as the Looshais are just now collecting in great force, and he does not know whether their object is to attack his tribe, or to set out in any other direction.

2. The Raja informs me that coming from Kamhow this information may be looked upon as perfectly reliable, but I have advised him to ascertain whether or not this tribe are in alliance with the Looshais, as I think it not improbable that the latter may have heard of the preparations for an invasion of their country, and induced the other tribes to make common cause with them.

3. The Kamhow tribe are Looshais, and speak their language, but they have for long been at feud with the other tribes, and have been very faithful to the Raja since they submitted to Colonel McCulloch for him.

No. 199-200 P.; dated Fort William, 15th November 1871.

Endorsed by Foreign Department.

Copy to the Military Department, the Government of Bengal, and the Chief Commissioner, British Burmah, respectively for information.

From *A. Mackenzie*, Esq., Junior Secretary to the Government of Bengal, to *C. U. Aitchison*, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, No. 6036; dated Fort William, 29th November 1871.

I am directed to forward the accompanying Report* from the civil officer with the Cachar column of the Looshai expeditionary force, on the subject of the overtures of submission made by the Raja of Munnipoor by certain Looshai chiefs, and to say that the Lieutenant Governor understands it to be clearly the intention of His Excellency the Governor General in Council to leave to the Commander of the expedition, who will be in communication with Government all along, the discretionary power suggested. Mr. Edgar has probably sent to your office direct a copy of his report in accordance with the instructions indicated in paragraph 3 of my letter, No. 5209, dated 17th ultimo, but as he has not made any allusion to this point a copy is sent herewith.

*No. 1136, dated 17th instant.

From *J. W. Edgar*, Esq., Civil Officer with the Cachar Column of the Looshai Expedition, to Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Political Department, No. 1136; dated Cachar, 17th November 1871.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letters noted on the margin.

No. 5210, dated 17th October 1871.
„ 5252, of 20th „ „
„ 5333, of the 30th October 1871, with their enclosures.

2. I have delayed answering them until I ascertained fully the particulars of the intelligence brought down by the Munnipoorees sent up to Tipai Mookh last September. It would appear from the accounts brought down by them that little

little reliance can be placed on the overtures made to the Munnipoor Rajah, and it would be in the highest degree dangerous to act upon these overtures now in any way that could have the effect of depriving the Brigadier General commanding the force, of perfect liberty to deal with these villages hereafter in the way that may seem to him most likely to ensure the attainment of the objects of the expedition.

3. If the people of any villages not suspected of complicity in outrages against our Government should remove into territory undoubtedly belonging to the Raja of Munnipoor, and if that Chief should be willing to receive them as his subjects, it would not be expedient or just for us to interfere in the matter; but if these people remain in the country through which the force will have to pass, our attitude towards them must be determined by considerations to which it is manifestly impossible to give a right value at present.

4. I think that this view is in accordance with the order of the Government of India in the Foreign Department, contained in Mr. Aitchison's memorandum, No. 2275 P. of the 21st October. But I may observe that a village might represent itself as willing to comply with all the terms enumerated in paragraph 4 of the Memorandum, and yet it might be quite clear to the Officer commanding the expedition that the submission was not real, or that the ultimate objects of the expedition would be more effectually secured by his delaying to accept such submission. In these, and many other cases easily imagined, the officer commanding must judge for himself, and on the spot, whether to treat a tribe as friendly or hostile, and the success of the undertaking would be seriously endangered by any attempt made now to forecast the course of events and prescribe the line of action to be adopted.

From Major General *W. F. Nuthall*, Political Agent, Munnipoor, to *C. U. Aitchison* Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department, with Governor General, No. 118; dated Munnipoor, 9 October 1871.

I HAVE the honour to enclose copy of a letter to Brigadier-General Bourchier, furnishing him, at his request, with such information as I possess calculated to assist him in his operations against the Looshais, and, with reference thereto, beg to report that it is my intention to visit the Tungching range of hills, Kowpoom, and Cachar directly I receive definite orders from you as to the part the Raja's force is to take in the said operations, and complete the necessary arrangements consequent thereon.

From Major General *W. F. Nuthall*, Political Agent, Munnipoor, to Brigadier-General *Bourchier*, C.B., Commanding Eastern Frontier, No. 115; dated Munnipoor, 6 October 1871.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 906, of the 15th ultimo, with extract from letter No. 3980, dated 2nd idem, from the Quartermaster General of the Army to your address.

2. In reply thereto, I must premise by pointing out that my short tenure of office here, want of acquaintance with the Munnipoor language, and inability to visit the southern frontier of the province until the fine weather shall set in, militate against my ability to supply you, as amply as I should wish to do, with information regarding the Chiefs, tribes, resources, and country in which you are about to operate. I have myself leaned upon Mr. Edgar a good deal for such information; as I learn he is about to visit you, he will doubtless make up for any deficiencies on my part.

3. As far as I can learn, the tribes on the southern frontier of Munnipoor are as follows:—

The Koonjai Kookies inhabiting the Tungching range of hills immediately west of the Logtuk lake (on Pemberton's map marked "Kom Nagas," which is a mistake). This tribe speak the Looshai language, and a few years back occupied the identical country now inhabited by the clans of Vonpilall, Poiboi, &c., with whom they are at feud. Since the raids on Munnipoor territory, commencing in October 1868, they have entered the service of the Maharaja, and number a force of 600, of whom 300 men are armed with flint muskets, and the rest with *daos* and spears. Their leaders are Punkhoama and Oolthing.

4. In March 1869 the Raja sent 110 of these armed with 90 muskets into the Looshai country to explore; five days after starting they came upon two encampments of the Looshais, and taking them by surprise early in the morning, completely routed them, killing 40 of their numbers, including two Chiefs, and taking 17 muskets, two spears, and two *daos*. They took no prisoners, and therefore evidently gave no quarter.

5. They have acted as a buffer between the Looshais and Munnipoorees, and have completely protected the southern part of the valley. Having measured their strength against the Looshais with such success, they have gained great confidence, and I anticipate much useful assistance from them; and with this view it is my intention to pay them an early visit, in order to feast, fee, and befriend them.

6. The hills immediately south of the valley, *i. e.*, between the Tungching range and the Toorool river south of Shoogoonoo (*see* same map) are uninhabited, but to the east and south of this river is the Sooti tribe of Kookies, under a chief named Kamhow. At one time this tribe gave so much trouble that the Raja proceeded in person with part of his force against them. When he got well into their country they severed his communications, and being for some days without supplies he was obliged to retreat, and did so, I understand, with great difficulty.

7. This tribe subsequently submitted to Colonel McCulloch for the Munnipoor Government, and have since behaved well. Should your movements push the tribes back to the eastward upon the Sooti tribe, their co-operation would be valuable, and I have, therefore, sent for Kamhow, who, I understand, is sure to come, in view to making friends with him and securing his services, should you require them.

8. The whole of the country to the Tungching range, *i. e.*, south of the Kowpoom Valley between the Looshai country and the high road into Munnipoor, has been depopulated by the depredations of the Looshais. The inhabitants have all moved to the north of the above road, being protected by the strong guards placed upon it, and I have no doubt will willingly assist us to avenge the injuries they have sustained.

9. With regard to the Looshai tribes, their Chiefs, relationship, habitat, and complicity in the late raids, all the information I possess has been derived from the very able reports of Mr. Edgar to the Secretary to Government of Bengal. These reports have been printed and circulated, and as I suppose you have copies of them, it would be superfluous on my part to quote from them.

10. Within the last month, however, we have had four emissaries here from the Vonolell clan of Looshais. They were sent by the widow of Vonolell and her nephew Poiboi to petition the Raja to allow their clan during the ensuing cold weather to move up into his territory south of Kowpoom, as the Lalpitang Howlongs are pressing up in a northerly direction, and having no longer any Chief, or any position amongst the tribes, they feel unsafe where they are.

11. The Lalpitang Howlongs are the tribe that committed the raids south of Cachar, and carried off the little girl Winchester.

12. They informed me that their villages were three days' march from our frontier, which would probably be five days' march for troops; and, from what I can learn, the position of these villages is direct south from a point midway between the Jeeree river and Tungching range above alluded to, somewhat south-west of Kowpoom. The latter place, however, is wrongly marked in Pemberton's map. It should be about 93° 34', 24° 35'.

13. They stated that Lalpitang's villages were 10 days' journey from theirs, probably 15 good marches for troops, and from what I can learn of their direction, I should think their position was about that of the word SYLOO on "the map of the Eastern British Frontier, 1869."

14. They describe the Lalpitang clan as strong, and able to bring together 3,000 fighting men, of whom one-third are armed with muskets; but I can't help thinking that they must have greatly exaggerated, although they did not conceal that they were nearly as well armed.

15. They gave a good account of their crops this year, and said that in at least 20 of their villages they were unusually abundant, and consisted of paddy and potatoes; the "yam," I suppose.

16. They have promised to return again in about six weeks, *i. e.*, on or about the end of this month, with an influential Chief named Damboom, uncle of Poiboi, and, therefore, I suppose a brother of the late Vonolell. If they do so, I shall inform you of the result.

17. In conclusion, I have to acquaint you that I have been confidentially informed by the Secretary to Government in the Foreign Department that it is probable that the Raja's troops may be employed under your orders in co-operation with the Cachar column, in which case I am to accompany them in my civil capacity. It depends upon information which has been called for as to their fitness and equipment.

18. Should I receive orders for their employment, it would be my wish to interview you at Cachar, and if you will inform me about what date you expect to be there, I will endeavour to be present.

OFFICE MEMORANDUM, No. 783; dated Simla, 24th October 1871.

From Lieutenant Colonel *A. Johnson*, Officiating Deputy Secretary to Government of India, Military Department, with Governor General, to Foreign Department.

THE undersigned has the honour to acknowledge Foreign Department Memorandum, No. 2216 P., dated 15th October 1871, and in reply to express the concurrence of the Government,

Government, in the Military Department, in the instructions conveyed to the Government of Bengal as to the course to be pursued under certain circumstances by the Political Agent at Munnipoor.

(signed) *A. Johnson*, Lieutenant Colonel,
Officiating Deputy Secretary to Government of India.

From Brigadier General *G. Bourchier*, C.B., Commanding Eastern Frontier District, to Col. *P. S. Lumsden*, Quartermaster General, No. 1060 L.; dated Shillong, 17th October 1871.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 163 Looshai, dated 7th instant, and also a telegram from Colonel Dillon, the former directing me to submit a plan for the co-operation of the Munnipoor Contingent, the latter informing me that General Nuthall was receiving overtures from the Looshais, which might hamper my operations.

2. On the 15th September I addressed General Nuthall, begging for all the information he could give me on the points enumerated in your letter No. 3980, an extract from which I forwarded. I have as yet received no reply, and to await a reply to any further communication I might address to the Political Agent would be to incur immense delay in laying my views before the Commander in Chief, and is rendered unnecessary from my having General Nuthall's* ideas on the subject before me, as communicated to the Foreign Office, from which, after carefully considering the subject and hearing Mr. Edgar's views, I am inclined entirely to differ.

* Contained in a copy sent by General Nuthall to Mr. Edgar.

3. General Nuthall wishes with two thousand men and six hundred coolies to start from Kowpoom on the road between Cachar and Munnipoor, and working down in a south-westerly direction combine with me somewhere south of Tipai Mookh; I cannot but feel that such a combination might be ruinous to the success of the expedition. To combine in such a country as we shall be working in means either a junction or nothing at all, and as General Nuthall states that the Munnipoor Raja can only supply 1,500 maunds of rice, this junction would simply mean that I should have to feed them, which would be a tax upon my commissariat I am not prepared to meet.

My plan for employing the Contingent is, that a strong line of outposts should be established to the eastward of Tipai Mookh, thus covering my left flank in the same manner as the posts on the Cachar and Sylhet frontier cover my right. Extending, say from some point south of Mentha across to some point, for instance, Koonshang Kool, on the water shed. This disposition of these posts must, of course, be left to the Munnipoor authorities. Any advance of the column of Munnipoorees beyond these posts (I agree with Mr. Edgar) should be from Mairang near the Logto Lake, its object being to prevent a junction of the Looktus and other tribes on the east and south-east, with Lalboora, Poiboi, Vonpilall, and Langdang, on whom we should be advancing.

Since writing the above, I have received a memorandum addressed on the subject of co-operation by General Nuthall to Colonel Thesiger. I quite agree with him that a force advancing from some point even nearer than Mairang, and acting in a line parallel to my advance would strengthen my position, if this force was well equipped and self-supporting, but I dread a junction with a Contingent described by General Nuthall as but indifferently equipped, and which I should have to feed, or have to find their way back as best they could to such parts of Munnipoor as could supply them with food.

I shall be obliged if you would by telegram convey to me Lord Napier's opinion on my plan; if sent here it will follow me.

From Colonel *P. S. Lumsden*, Quartermaster General, to Brigadier General *G. Bourchier*, C.B., Commanding Cachar Column, Looshai Expedition, No. 274 Looshai; dated 26th October 1871.

I AM directed by the Right Honourable the Commander-in-Chief to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 1060, of 17th October 1871, and, with reference thereto, to express his Excellency's opinion that your views therein set forth regarding the manner in which the Munnipoor State should aid your column during its advance, are reasonable and sound, and to annex a copy of a telegram this day addressed to you.

TELEGRAM, No. 275, Looshai; dated 26th October 1871.

From Colonel *P. S. Lumsden*, Quartermaster General, to Brigadier General *Bourchier*, Shillong.

ON referring to communications from Government, it will be seen that you have authority to employ the Munnipoor Contingent as you think fit.

You should at once distinctly and officially call on General Nuthall to carry out such co-operation as you desire, and no more.

TELEGRAM, No. 2406 P.; dated 3rd November 1871.

From Foreign Under-Secretary, Simla, to General *Nuthall*, Munnipoor, *viâ* Cachar.

YOUR No. 118 of 9th October. Brigadier Bourchier will already have communicated to you the way in which Government wish Munnipoor Contingent to co-operate.

From Colonel *H. K. Burne*, Secretary to Government of India, Military Department, with Governor General, to Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, Calcutta, No. 75; dated Simla, 4th November 1871.

I AM directed to acquaint you that a telegram to the following effect has this day been dispatched to you:—

"As you know, issue of 500 smooth-bore muskets to Raja of Munnipoor was authorised from those available from 44th Native Infantry. General Nuthall says great delay and difficulty will occur in getting these from Shillong or Assam, and asks for the smooth bores of 4th Native Infantry at Cachar, that corps having received Enfields. If old smooth bore not yet returned to arsenal, this can be sanctioned. If they have, and the arms can be otherwise provided more quickly than from Shillong, it may be done."

No. 23 C.P.; dated Camp Dhurmsala, 10th November 1871.

Endorsed by Foreign Department.

COPY forwarded to the Officiating Political Agent at Munnipoor for information.

From *C. U. Aitchison*, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department, with Governor General, to Officiating Political Agent, Munnipoor, No. 22 C.P.; dated Camp Dhurmsala, 10th November 1871.

WITH reference to your letter No. 118, dated 9th October, asking for definite orders as to the part the Raja of Munnipoor's force is to take in the expedition against the Looshais, I am desired to forward, for your information and guidance, copy of a telegram from the Quartermaster General to Brigadier General Bourchier, No. 275, dated 26th idem.

From Major General *Nuthall*, Officiating Political Agent, Munnipoor, to *C. U. Aitchison*, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department, with Governor General, No. 135; dated Munnipoor, 4th November 1871.

As the instructions which I have received from Brigadier General Bourchier, C.B., commanding the Looshai field force, regarding the manner in which the Munnipoor Contingent is to be employed, will in effect completely exclude it from taking any active part in the operations, I solicit the favour of the Government allowing the accompanying correspondence and sketch to be laid before the Right Honourable the Commander in Chief.

2. It is possible that the Brigadier General may, on receipt of my last letter, modify his plans; but, taking his instructions in conjunction with a paragraph which has appeared in the "Pioneer,"* embodying some of the mistaken impressions he has conveyed to me, I fear not; and that the position assigned to this force is intended to keep it out of the way. Should this be the case, it will then be too late for me to make any reference.

3. The Government must be aware that the greater part of my service has been with Irregulars (the Arracan Battalion and Pegu Light Infantry) with which I on several occasions took the field, and that I must have some knowledge of the capabilities of such men as the Munnipoor force is composed of for this kind of service; and I trust it has sufficient confidence in me to believe that I would be the first to deprecate its employment were it likely to prove worthless.

4. Physically,

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*The 44th Native Infantry are to leave Shillong for Cachar on the 1st November, whence they will proceed by boat to Tipai Mookh. The regulars of the Cachar column are by no means charmed at the prospect of being encumbered with the help of the Munnipooree rag-tag, "effective only to consume Government stores, burden the means of carriage, and generally clog all serious operations." It is suggested that the only use they could serve, and where they might really be of service, is to watch the Nagas, Howlongs, and Syloos in the rear and on the flanks, while the expedition itself is involved in the Looshai country.—"Pioneer."

4. Physically, they are a remarkably fine body of men, and they have a certain knowledge of drill and discipline. I cannot, of course, answer for their courage until I see it tested; but I cannot believe that men who are trained to such active and manly games as they are, and are entirely free from the vices of drinking, and using opium, &c., can be deficient in spirit if efficiently armed and properly led.

From Major General *W. F. Nuthall*, Political Agent, Munnipoor, to Brigadier General *G. Bourchier*, C.B., Commanding Eastern Frontier Districts, No. 129; dated Munnipoor, 30th October 1871.

HAVING been informed by the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department that the forces of the Maharaja of Munnipoor will in all probability be requisitioned for employment under your orders with the Looshai expedition, I shall feel extremely obliged if you will inform me whether you have received any definite orders on the subject, as I have not.

2. If they are to be so employed, it is most essential, not only that I should receive early information as to the probable date of taking the field, but of the direction in which this force will be required to act in concert with the force from Cachar, for upon this must depend the selection of a base and a line of operations, besides positions for depôts and arrangements for storing them with supplies.

3. Even with the vast resources and staff at your disposal, I opine that such matters will cause you much anxiety on a long and single line of penetration into a mountainous and jungly country, and it follows that, in the absence of any such advantages, I should be glad of such aid from you as will afford the Raja's troops every chance of fulfilling the views and wishes of Government.

4. From what I have learnt of the country and of the purport of the expedition, I presume that the operations of the force will be directed to three objective points: first to Vonpilal's tribe, secondly to Vonolel's tribe, and thirdly to Lalpitang's tribe. The first is nearest to Cachar, the second to Munnipoor, and the third to Chittagong; and if the forces from these three places move simultaneously upon the tribes nearest to them, it will effectually prevent their combination.

5. At first, after consulting with the Raja and his officers, I concurred in opinion with them, that "Kowpoom" would be the best base of operations for this force. This opinion was also left on record by my predecessor, and I conveyed it to the Adjutant General for the information of His Excellency the Right Honourable the Commander in Chief. So impressed was the Raja of the expediency of taking this route, that he at once had a large depôt for supplies constructed there, and it is ready; but since then we have had exploring parties out, and they report that owing to landslips during these heavy rains, and other natural obstacles, that route is now quite impracticable for the transport of supplies, and could not be rendered practicable in any reasonable time. Only one easy route, therefore, remains for an advance from Munnipoor territory upon the Eastern Looshais, viz., by Mouring, on the west side of the Logtak Lake.

6. To my mind this route has several strategic disadvantages, but as there is no choice, they must be accepted and overcome as best we can. It has this advantage, however, that the force will be able to take its supplies with greater ease and facility, and to a greater distance into the enemy's country than if it started from Kowpoom.

From Brigadier General *G. Bourchier*, Commanding Eastern Frontier Districts, to Major General *W. F. Nuthall*, Political Agent, Munnipoor, No. 1063L; dated Shillong, 19th October 1871.

HAVING been called upon by the Right Honourable the Commander in Chief to report on the part which I consider should be taken by the Munnipoor Contingent in the expedition about to enter the Looshai country, and having carefully perused your letter, No. 106, dated 31st August 1871, to the address of the Secretary to Government, Foreign Department, I regret to say that I widely differ from you. Your experience will have shown you that the co-operation of forces acting in parallel directions in such a country as we shall enter is simply an impossibility. I glean from your letter, above quoted, that you wish to take the field with 2,000 men, 600 coolies, and a maximum available supply of 1,500 maunds of rice, sufficient for your troops and coolies for 23 days. I can only suppose, therefore, that by co-operation you mean a junction with my column, and that your Contingent after exhausting its own food should be fed by my commissariat.

2. Should this have been your intention, I can only say that it is impossible and would be ruinous to the expedition.

Having been invested by the Government with full powers, both civil and military, with regard to this force, and also as to deciding the extent to which the Munnipoor Contingent

and the Tipperah troops shall be employed, I have to request that you will take steps for occupying strongly a line of posts along the southern frontier of Munnipoor, and keeping in the valley near Moirung a small compact force, capable of supporting itself, to act against the most eastern tribes, should information reach you that they have been tempted to join Lalboorah, Tangdoong, and others against whom the column I command will advance. The selection of spots for these posts will entirely be left to you, but, as has been done in Cachar, the summits of the ridges are the natural highways, and seem the most desirable positions, extending as far eastward, perhaps, as that on which Koongshang Kool is marked on the map.

I have recently been informed from head quarters that you have been receiving overtures from the Looshai tribes against whom it is intended the expedition should act. You will see, I feel sure, how much your doing so will hamper my action, and I, therefore, beg you will in no way commit the British Government to any line of policy with reference to these tribes, but refer to me any propositions which may be made, which, in consultation with the Political Officer placed at my disposal, I shall submit to Government. I shall be always happy to receive your opinions on any subject, whether civil or military, as I feel sure we have both but one wish, and that is, to further the interests of Government to the utmost. Should His Excellency the Commander in Chief approve of the plan I have sketched for the employment of the Contingent, or alter it in any way, I will at once inform you.

From Major General *W. F. Nuthall*, Political Agent, Munnipoor, to Brigadier General *Bourchier*, C.B., Commanding Eastern Frontier Districts, No. 134; dated Munnipoor, 3rd November 1871.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No 1063 L., dated Shillong, 19th ultimo.

In reply I must observe that my experience of the routes into the Looshai country seems to coincide with your own that "the summits of the ridges are the natural highways," and my knowledge of the country points out that those ridges are as nearly parallel to each other as possible, and it matters not, therefore, whether the Munnipoor Contingent starts from Kowpoom or Moirung; it must proceed along those ridges to reach the Looshai country, and must, therefore, for the greater part of the distance act in a parallel direction with the Cachar column, the converging being confined to crossing from ridge to ridge. However, your instructions that you simply wish this Contingent to contend the most eastern tribes, should information reach me that they have been tempted to join Lalboorah, Tangdoong, and others against whom the column you command will advance, disposes of the question of Kowpoom as a base, Moirung being undoubtedly the proper base for the object you have in view, and it is satisfactory that we are so far unanimous; but I must beg of you to re-consider your proposed disposition of this force, to give effect to the service above indicated, as I feel sure that when you wrote your instructions, you had not correct information before you as to the relative distances and position of the southern frontier of Munnipoor and the eastern tribes. Your instructions are, "I have to request that you will take steps for occupying strongly a line of posts along the southern frontier of Munnipoor, and keeping in the valley near Moirung a small compact force, capable of supporting itself, to act against the most eastern tribes should information reach you that they have been tempted to join Lalboorah, Tangdoong and others against whom the column I command will advance. The selection of spots for these posts will entirely be left to you, but, as has been done in Cachar, the summits of the ridges are the natural highways, and seem the most desirable positions extending as far eastward perhaps as that on which Koongshang Kool is marked on the map."

From the foregoing I conclude it is your wish that I should place a strong line of posts on the summits of the hills from Koongshang Kool direct west, and keep in reserve at Moirung (a good day's march in rear of the left flank of that line of posts) a compact force to move according to information that may reach me. These instructions give me a certain discretion in the selection of the outposts, but none in regard to the position in which the reserve column is to be kept, for that Moirung is definitely fixed.

From the accompanying sketch made from the best information obtainable, you will observe that Moirung is at least nine days' march from the nearest villages of the tribe to which you allude, and in such a position I should be as much out of the way of obtaining any information of the movements of the Eastern Looshais, as the moveable column would be of rendering the co-operation you require; in fact, for all useful purposes it might just as well be at the capital as at Moirung.

Now that I am somewhat acquainted with your plan of operations, I would suggest that to effectually ensure such co-operation as you allude to, Moirung should form the base of operations for the Munnipoor Contingent. That the force should then proceed to Tseklapi, which is from three to four marches over an easy country, and there construct a stockade or entrenched camp, and establish a line of posts between those two places. Leaving these sufficiently garrisoned for defence and patrolling, the rest of the force should proceed on to the Tseeboo salt springs, which is about another three or four marches somewhat westerly, and there carry out a similar plan.

The force would then be within three marches of the nearest eastern and hostile tribe,

and

and would be in a position not only to watch their movements, but to act against them in event of their attempting to effect a junction such as you deem probable.

Thus disposed, the object you have in view would be attained; Kamhon's tribe wouldbe held in check in event of any disposition on their part to secede from their long friendshp; communications would be opened and thoroughly established from the Munnipoor valley to the position in which a junction may be effected with your column; and when that junction takes place, I trust you will find a compact and efficient force at hand for employment in any manner in which you may consider advisable.

Should it be your intention eventually to proceed against the Lalpitang Howlongs which are, I understand, about 15 days' march further south, the value of such a disposition as I have above proposed will then become more apparent in the additional security it will afford to your communications.

If you will afford me anything like reasonable time to carry out the above programme, I will guarantee to have sufficient supplies at Tseeboo to enable a column of 500 men to take the field for at least 18 days, the utmost limit to which a force supplied with cooly carriage alone, at the rate of a cooly to each fighting man, can support itself carrying also a few rations in haversack.

From the foregoing you will perceive how erroneous have been the logistic conclusions you have drawn from my letter No. 106, dated 31st August, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department. I never for a moment contemplated that the Raja's force should, under any circumstances, be fed by your commissariat; such a proposition would have been scarcely worthy of a subaltern or an inexperienced civilian.

The letter alluded to was merely intended to give the Government a general idea of the resources which the Raja could place at the disposal of the expedition, and in no way intended to explain the manner in which those resources could be best utilised so as to assist a general officer in his dispositions for combinations such as the Government seems to have in view; and I am sorry that any such use has been made of it.

Such combinations can only be properly arranged on the commanders of the columns having a knowledge of their aim and object, of the distance and direction of the enemy, of the time the force is likely to be employed, and the time appointed for taking the field, on most of which points I am yet in the dark.

I note that you have been invested with full civil and military powers in all matters connected with this expedition, and the Looshais, but I am at a loss to understand in what way my reception of the Looshai emissaries nearly two months ago could possibly hamper your action. However, a full report of my proceedings was at the time made to Government, and if in my political capacity I have failed in judgment, I have no doubt I shall be duly informed.

The emissaries promised to return at about the present time, with a chief named Damboom. If they do so, I shall be glad to know in what way you wish them to be dealt with.

If you can furnish me with a rough sketch on the scale of Pemberton's map (that having Koongshang Kool marked on it), showing the positions you suppose to be occupied by Lalboorah and Tangdoong, I shall feel much obliged, and shall better understand your wishes.

From *C. U. Aitchison,* Esq., C.S.I. Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Major General *W. F. Nuthall,* Officiating Political Agent, Munnipoor, No. 2471P.; dated 30th November 1871.

In acknowledging receipt of your letter No. 135, dated 1st instant, I am instructed by the Viceroy and Governor General in Council to observe that, in the visit which, as his Excellency understands, you will by this time have made to Cachar, you will in personal conversation with Brigadier Bourchier have learnt what part it seems to the military authorities, on full and final consideration of the matter, desirable that the Munnipoor force should fulfil in the approaching expedition.

2. The letters noted in the margin define your position in respect to the Commanding Officer of the Expedition. The Munnipoor Contingent is placed absolutely under his command, and the responsibility for the use to be made of it, and the decision of the positions it is to take up, and the manner in which it can best co-operate with the British troops, must rest with him.

No. 1647 P., dated 4th August 1871.
No. 2215 P., dated 15th October 1871.

(No. 2472P.)

Copy of correspondence to Military Department for information, with the suggestion that General Bourchier would do well to communicate freely and unreservedly with General Nuthall in respect to the part to be taken by the Munnipoor troops in the expedition.

From Major General *W. F. Nuthall*, Officiating Political Agent, Munnipoor, to *C. U. Aitchison*, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Cachar, 24th November 1871.

HAVING had an interview with Brigadier General Bourchier, C.B., I have the honour to forward, for the information of Government, a copy of his modified instructions regarding the co-operation of the Munnipoor Contingent, from which it will be seen that it will now occupy a somewhat more advantageous position.

From Brigadier General *George Bourchier*, Commanding Cachar Column, Looshai Expeditionary Force, to Major General *W. F. Nuthall*, Officiating Political Agent, Munnipoor, No. 1125, dated Cachar, 23rd November 1871.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 134, dated 3rd instant. The only point now requiring reply is the best position for the force acting from Moirung; numerically you inform me that it will be five hundred strong. It was never my intention that the officer commanding it should be tied down to Moirung, but that it should move to the south of the Munnipoor valley, but not further south than the point marked Tseklapi in your map spelt Zalpee by Colonel M'Culloch, and which is about on the southern frontier of Munnipoor. There, as you propose, a stockade should be built. I consider that it would be most injudicious for the balance of this force, after leaving a sufficient garrison at Tseklapi, to go as far south as Tseeboo, for the present at any rate.

The line of posts extending from about Koonshangkool to Kowpoom at such points as you may select should be occupied as soon as possible.

My views regarding the employment of the Contingent have met with the entire approval of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, and been forwarded to Government.

From Colonel *P. S. Lumsden*, C.S.I. Quartermaster General, to Colonel *H. K. Burne*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, Calcutta, No. 344, dated Simla, 9th November 1871.

I AM directed by the Right Honourable the Commander in Chief to submt it, for the information of Government, the annexed copy of a letter No. 1064L., of 19th October, with its accompaniment, from Brigadier General G. Bourchier, C.B., Commanding Cachar column of the Looshai Expedition, enclosing the instructions conveyed by that officer to the Officiating Political Agent, Munnipoor, regarding the employment of the Munnipoor troops in co-operation with the Cachar column during the approaching operations.

2. His Excellency considers Brigadier General Bourchier's views sound, and that the instructions appear to meet the requirements which probable contingencies suggest as most conducive to secure the useful co-operation of the Munnipoor force.

3. His Excellency trusts that these instructions may meet with the approval of Government.

From Officer Commanding Eastern Frontier District, to Colonel *P. S. Lumsden*, C.S.I., Quartermaster General, No. 1064 L., dated 19th October 1871.

IN continuation of my letter of the 17th current, No. 1060 L., I have the honour to inform you that I have since its despatch received the confidential Memorandum, dated 31st August 1871, addressed by you to the Secretary to Government, Military Department, which has relieved me from a heavy anxiety, as I perceive that His Excellency the Commander in Chief agrees entirely with me as to the extent to which the Munnipoor Contingent should be employed during the expedition into the Looshai country. Such being the case, I have not awaited his Lordship's approval of my scheme, but have addressed General Nuthall, requesting him to prepare for the protection of the Southern frontier of Munnipoor, holding in hand a small force in the valley near Moirung, ready to advance upon the Eastern tribes, should they be tempted to join Lalboora and others against whom I shall advance. A copy of my letter is annexed.

P.S.—A copy of my letter to General Nuthall is annexed.

OFFICE MEMORANDUM., No. 2536P., dated Fort William, 7th December 1871.
From *H. LePoer Wynne*, Esq, Under Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Military Department.

In continuation of the docket from this Department, No. 2472P., dated 30th November, 1871, the undersigned is directed to forward to the Military Department a copy of a letter from the Officiating Political Agent, Munnipoor, dated 24th November 1871, from which it will be observed that the Officer Commanding the Looshai Expeditionary force has in some respects modified his orders regarding the manner in which he proposed to employ the Munnipoor Contingent in the coming expedition.

2. The undersigned is to take this opportunity of acknowledging the receipt of the docket from the Military Department, No. 1281, dated 30th November 1871, and, in reply, to refer that Department to the docket from this office, in continuation of which this communication is written.

From Colonel *B. E. Bacon*, Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to Adjutant General, No. 222, dated Fort William, 6th December 1871.

I AM directed to forward, for the perusal of the Right Honourable the Commander in Chief, the accompanying copy of a communication from the Foreign Department, No. 2472P. dated 30th November 1871, relative to the part to be taken by the Munnipoor force in the operations against the Looshais, with an intimation that that Department will be informed that Brigadier General Bourchier is believed perfectly to understand the necessity of his freely and fully communicating with General Nuthall, and to be acting on it.

From Colonel *B. E. Bacon*, Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to Quartermaster General, No. 764, dated Fort William, 15th December 1871.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 344, dated 9th November 1871, and in reply to acquaint you, for the information of the Right Honourable the Commander in Chief, that the Government of India approves of the instructions issued by Brigadier General Bourchier, C.B., to the Officiating Political Agent, Munnipoor, regarding the employment of the troops of that state during the expedition.

From Major General *W. F. Nuthall*, Officiating Political Agent, Munnipoor, to *C. U. Aitchison*, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Cachar, 21st November 1871.

FOR the information of the Viceroy and Governor General in Council I have the honour to report having visited Cachar, 1st, to inspect the state of the road since the late heavy rains; 2nd, to arrange for a more speedy conveyance of the dâks to Munnipoor during the Looshai expedition; 3rd, to obtain delivery of the arms granted for the use of the Contingent; 4th, to meet Brigadier General Bourchier, C.B., in view to the removal of doubt as to the manner in which he wishes the Contingent to be employed.

From H. *Le Poer Wynne*, Esq., Under Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Major General *W. F. Nuthall*, Officiating Political Agent, Munnipoor, No. 2541P., dated Fort William, 7th December 1871.

IN reply to your letter, dated the 21st November 1871, I am directed to state that the Viceroy and Governor General in Council fully approves of your action in having lately visited Cachar for the purposes therein reported.

From *C. U. Aitchison*, Esq., C.S.I. Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to *S. C. Bayley*, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal, No. 2473P., dated Fort William, 30th November 1871.

I AM directed by the Viceroy and Governor General in Council to request that an enquiry may be made by telegraph as to the latest news in respect to the attitude of the Looshai Chiefs and tribes both on the Cachar and Chittagong sides. When the replies are received, I am to request that they may be immediately submitted to this Office, which should be supplied with regular information on this important subject.

From *H. L. Harrison*, Esq., Officiating Junior Secretary to the Government of Bengal, to Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 5504, dated Fort William, 6th November 1871.

*No. 312, dated 10th October, and No. 773, dated 19th idem.

With reference to your letters noted on the margin,* I am directed to forward the annexed Memorandum, showing the number of British subjects who are supposed to have been taken captive by the Looshais during the raids in 1870–71.

2. I am to add that the information now given is somewhat vague, and merely such as can be given at once on the urgent requisition of the Government of India. The materials for a fuller and more detailed report are being collected, and will be sent without loss of time.

Memorandum.

Places Attacked.	Number of Persons taken Captive or Missing.
Gulungea, in the Chittagong Hill Tracts - - -	1 man carried off.
Anierkhall, in Cachar - - - - - - -	37 taken prisoners.
Alexandrapoor, in Cachar - - - - - -	1 (Mary Winchester) taken prisoner.
Monierkhall, in Cachar - - - - - - -	1 missing.
Nugdigram, in Cachar - - - - - - -	3 persons carried off.
Forty miles east of Comillah, on the Goomtee, in Hill Tipperah.	3 persons missing.
Cacharipara, near the Chargolla frontier post, in Sylhet -	Some young women (number not stated) carried off.

The following Table gives particulars regarding the captives, besides Mary Winchester, who are supposed to be in the possession of Rutton Pooea and his dependents:—

Name of Chief.	Date of Capture.	Name of Place where Captured.	Number of Captives and their Sex.
Rutton Pooea - - - -	1861	Oodypoor - -	1 Tipperah woman.
		Agurtolla - -	1 Man.
Ditto - - - - -	1867	Gulungea - -	1 Mugh woman, by name Chyken.
Ditto - - - - -	1861	Khundul raid -	1 Mahomedan woman, named Pingullee.
Sydophan, a dependent of Rutton Pooea.	1861	Oodypoor - Buradum.	Shonai Beebee and two Chuckma women.
	1867	Gulungea - -	1 Mugh woman.
Rodunga, a dependent of Rutton Pooea.	1861	Agurtolla - - Oodypoor.	2 Mussulmans.
Choong Boorga, a dependent of Rutton Pooea.	1861	Agurtolla - -	1 Mahomedan woman.
		Oodypoor -	2 Tipperah women.

From *H. Hankey*, Esq., Officiating Commissioner of the Chittagong Division, to *A. R. Thompson*, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department, No. 459, dated Chittagong, 14th November 1871.

With reference to your letter, No. 5191, dated the 14th ultimo, calling for a list of British subjects who are now in captivity in the Looshai country, I have the honour to submit herewith a Statement, showing the number of persons carried away captives by the Looshai from 1859 to 1870.

2. It has also been ascertained that there are 20 captives in the village of Seng-boonga, and 15 in that of Bankooea, two chiefs of the Howlong clan. The Deputy Commissioner reports that to obtain further information with regard to the captives with the Howlongs is difficult and impracticable.

List

List of Captives with Rutton Pooea and his dependent Chiefs.

Names of Chiefs.	Date of Capture.	Particulars of the Captives.	Names of Places whence Captured.
Rutton Pooea - - -	1861	1 Tipperah (woman) - -	Oodypoor.
Ditto - - - -	1861	1 Tipperah (man) - - -	Agurtolla.
Ditto - - - -	1867	Mugh woman, Chyken - -	Gulungea.
Ditto - - - -	1861	Mahomedan woman, Pingullee	Khundul raid.
Sydophan - - -	1861	1 Mahomedan woman, Shonai Beebee.	Oodypoor.
Ditto - - - -	1860	2 Chuckma women - -	Buradum.
Ditto - - - -	1867	1 Mugh woman - - -	Gulungea.
Rodunga - - -	1861	2 Mahomedans - - -	Agurtolla and Oodypoor.
Choong Boorga - -	1861	1 Mahomedan woman - -	Agurtolla.
		2 Tipperah women - -	Oodypoor.

Statement showing the Number of Persons carried away Captives by the Looshais from the Chittagong Hill Tract District.

Tribe.	1859.	1860.	1861.	1862.	1863.	1864.	1865.	1866.	1867.	1868.	1869.	1870.	1871.	Total.	Remarks.
Bengalees - -	31	–	–	–	–	8	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	39	
Mughs, or Burmese -	–	39	8	–	–	51	6	–	35	–	26	10	–	175	The captives who have been carried away by Rutton Pooea and his dependent chiefs from this district have also been shown here.
Chuckmas - -	–	8	–	–	–	2	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	10	
Tipperahs - -	–	–	–	–	–	2	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	2	
Bunjoogees - -	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	70	–	–	–	–	–	70	
Mroongs - - -	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	34	–	–	–	–	–	34	
Total - - -	31	47	8	–	–	63	6	104	35	–	26	10	–	330	

No. 5832, dated Fort William, 18th November 1871.

Endorsed by Government of Bengal.

Copy forwarded to the Government of India, in the Military Department, in continuation of the Letter from this Office, No. 5504, dated the 6th instant. A similar return has been called for from the Commissioner of Dacca, and will be forwarded when received.

From *A. Mackenzie*, Esq., Junior Secretary to the Government of Bengal, to Colonel *H. K. Burne*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 6160, dated Fort William, 5th December 1871.

Copy of this letter and of its enclosure, forwarded to the Government of India, in the Military Department, in continuation of endorsement No. 5832, dated the 18th ultimo.

From *F. B. Simson*, Esq., Commissioner of the Dacca Division, to Officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department, No. 357, dated Dacca, 1st December 1871.

WITH reference to No. 5190, of the 14th October last, I have the honour to submit herewith a list showing the number of British subjects taken captives by the Looshais from Sylhet and Cachar, and to state that a great number of these captives were undoubtedly taken by Sookpilall and his accomplices before he began to be on friendly terms with Mr. Edgar, and many, if still alive and unsold, are with him or his tribe even now.

CACHAR.

Names of British Subjects missing or taken captives by the Looshais.

Date of Raid, 10th January 1869, on Nowarbund.

Taken captive.

One woman (name unknown).

Date of Raid 23rd January 1871, on a Cacharee village at Ainakhal.

Taken captives.

Men.—Manickram, Karna Sing, Dhananjoy.

Women.—Khoombardi, Nowjingdi, Otika, Waroingdi, Nogredi, Totoidi, Laridi, Jashaidi, Loogingdi, Khairingdi.

Boys.—Ramdhun, Nanadow, Rhagia Moti, Bhodro Sing, Otri Cachari, Oolem, Luardow, Pitambar.

Girls.—Nanadi, Desaldi, Souta, Nanadi (2nd), Nairingdi, Janingdi, Khoolardi, Rajgadi, Totoidi (2nd), Moola, Nanadi (3rd), Baboodi, Simamotee, Jonamotee, Gardoodee, Doomdoodee.

Date of Raid, 23rd January 1871, on Alexanderpoor.

Taken captives.

Men.—Gody, Rajoo, Gonoo.

Women.—Soondary, Tookmany, Rany, Alladie, Poorna, Boobon, Benundoo.

Boys.—Huryhal, Manaah, Ram Charan, Mookindah.

Girls.—Mary Winchester, Bunoah, Bojosbanea, Chootoom

Missing.

Men.—Bagosah, Deerah, Gonoo, Kormoo, Joy Ram, Chamu, Mungoo, Rampersad, Woodhab, Chintamon, Kalachand, Chandy, Bachon, Poopchand.

Women.—Bimola, Goorbany, Sukun, Jognie, Jeetun, Bodmee.

Date of Raid, 23rd January 1871, on Catlicherra.

Taken Captives.

Women.—Sita, Jamni, Chopa (2nd).

Date of Raid, 27th January 1871, on Monierkhall.

Taken Captive or Missing.

Men.—Mukhoo Khan, cooly.

Date of Raid, 27th January 1871, on Nagdigram.

Taken Captives or Missing.

Women.—One Naga woman, one Naga girl, Rashi Doomnia, Bengalee girl.

SYLHET.

Date of Raid, after the Adumpoor Massacre in 1862.

Taken Captives.

Men.—Doorga Persad, Krishna Chandra, Ishur Chandra, Khetonti, Boloram, Brojobasi, Harijay, Ramjay, Juggabundu, Chand Roy, Shib Chandra, Ishar Chandra, (2nd).

Women.—Bhanumuty, Pungabutty, Shujabutty, Lungaitic, Sherry, Bishaka, Singhmoni, Poddaboti, Ramaboti, Doorgati, Jafili, Puncheshuri, Radhamoni, Raj Koinna, Shumookha, Kandari, Jogeshuri.

Date

Date of Raid, 27th February 1871, on Allynugur.

Taken Captives.

Women.—Rajeshuri, Chandra Kola, Rohini, Sharai, Khanasha, Madhabi, Shondari.

Men.—Khota, Toola.

Women.—Aice, Doianoo, Bongrongnoo, Bebee, Shocha, Dartoonroo, Shewbow, Sohokee.

DIARY of Captain *T. H. Lewin*, Civil Officer, Right Column, Looshai Field Force.

6th November.—Made over charge of my district to Mr. Cochrane. Five Bunjogres came in from the Bohmong by my request to act as scouts and interpreters during the expedition. Eighty coolies arrived from the Mong Raja, ordered them to proceed to Kassalong, all the works at Rangamutta being completed.

7th November.—Left Rangamuttee for Kassalong to superintend the completion of the works there.

8th November.—Reached Kassalong. Found that Mr. Crouch had left early that morning, according to orders, with 110 police, to establish a stockaded depôt at Demagiri, and to commence cutting the road from there to Burkhal.

9th November.—The 2nd Regiment Ghoorkas arrived here to-day. The General and his staff arrived a little later in the steamer Flame. Another batch of hill coolies arrived. I pushed them on to Burkhal, as we have enough men here to finish the work. Sheds erected for 2,000 men and Commissariat godowns completed; remaining to be done, Depôt Hospital and Regimental Storehouses; wrote to Cochrane to send Mr. Bignell of the Police up here to take charge at Kassalong and Burkhal on my moving to the front, also to relieve Subadar Muhommed Azim, who goes with me in the Intelligence Department.

10th November.—Halted at Kassalong. Superintending the erection of the Depôt Hospital, Regimental Storehouses, and Magazine.

11th November.—Halted at Kassalong. Made out rolls of the Hill Coolie Corps. Wrote to Major Brown as to their provisioning at Burkhal. Made arrangements to supply the Survey and Telegraph Departments with coolies.

12th November.—Arrived at Burkhal with the General and Staff. The works are well advanced. Ample accommodation for troops. Coolies and stores' sheds all ready, and boats collected.

13th November.—Rutton Pooea arrived with two of his subordinate chiefs, viz., Lengoora and Baithoma. Rutton Pooea had an interview with the General and gave in his definite adhesion to our side, promising all the assistance in his power. He said that Mr. Crouch had arrived safely with his men at Demagiri and was stockading himself. The Ranee Kalindee sent me 16 Chukmas armed with guns to act as scouts and spies in the expedition.

14th November.—Halted at Burkhal. Crouch's boats returned from Demagiri. He reports all well. Sappers arrived. Provided guides for the detachment 2nd Ghoorkas to start to-morrow. Wrote memorandum on organization of the Hill Tract Coolie Corps for the information of the General Commanding. Rutton Pooea, on my solicitation, consented to guide the column that goes from here by land, and to mark out the road to Demagiri. The police provision boats were seized by officers of Ghoorkas, and all our police provisions turned out on to the bare shore at Lower Burkhal. There will be undoubtedly difficulty in carrying out the Government orders prescribing separate provision supply arrangements for the police attached to the expedition. Rutton Pooea had another friendly interview with the General.

15th November.—Two Companies of the 2nd Ghoorkhas started by road for Demagiri. Employed all day in getting boats and paddles ready, serving out provisions, and telling off hill coolies for to-morrow's start by river. Reported that the sanitary orders for troops in bivouack are not observed by camp followers; by hill coolies employed all day in bringing 20 heavy Bengallee boats up the Burkhal rapids, as the Ghoorkas are not able to sit in our small hill canoes without being in imminent danger of an overset, and (as the majority cannot swim) of drowning. The General ordained a ration of rum to be served to all hill coolies working on the rapids to-day.

16th November,—Started with 28 Police and a company of 2nd Ghoorkas by river for Demagree. The General with us and Colonel Macpherson. Halted for the night on a small sand bank on the right of the river, about 2½ miles below the Ootan Chuttra rapids.

Distance travelled about 11 miles; only one small rapid to pass. Rutton Pooea started this morning with two companies of Ghoorkas under Captain East, to mark out Demagiri road.

17th November.—All day passing the rapids of Ootan Chuttra, camped two bends below the Thega stream, in full view of Suthay Tlang where Rutton Pooea's village was in 1870. Our Chukmas (hill coolies) did admirable service in getting the boats over the rapids; the General much pleased with them.

18th November.—Arrived at Demagiri, found stockade built with ample accommodation for all troops, godowns, &c. Mr. Crouch has worked well and deserves much credit for his exertions. A look-out post of the Looshais was found to-day in a tree on the high hill overlooking our camp; it was made of fresh cane and evidently only just built. Last night the enemy threw stones down upon our east picket; no one was hurt and no serious attack made.

19th November.—Went out on a "reconnoissance" with the General to the top of Oriepoom Range. We reached the Looshai village of Sydhoo, a subordinate chief of Rutton Pooea's clan. The General ordered me to send up 30 police under Crouch, and establish a stockaded post on the range.

20th November, Demagiri.—Crouch started with 30 men to establish a picket on the top of Oiepoom. I sent out scouts to gain information as to the enemy's whereabouts, as I hear they are collecting on the Subjuk. Sent two men to Rutton Pooea's village to ascertain if the Ghoorkas under East had yet arrived. Went up myself above the Demagiri Rapids to inspect and report on the road and mode of getting up boats. Ordered a slide of timber to be constructed for dragging up the boats. Fixed places for latrines, &c., and gave orders for their construction. Got in some Kookie rice unhusked from the jooms to experiment as to its being prepared for food by husking, in order that we may be prepared to draw food eventually from the enemy's country.

21st November.—Rutton Pooea came in to invite the General to visit his village. The chief recommends, as the best line for our advance, the route taken last year by Majors Macdonald and Graham. Does not think that boats will go beyond Thaymagree, which is the next big waterfall above here. Boats can go loaded to the Subjuk, and up that stream for some eight days' journey. I this day made over charge of all the expeditionary police force to Mr. C. P. Crouch, by orders of the General Commanding. Scouts returned report that the enemy have pickets out on the Subjuk. East came in with Ghoorkas.

22nd November.—Started with the General and a company of the 2nd Ghoorkas for Rutton Pooea's village on the Oriepoom Range. The chief came out to meet us, and took all the officers into his house, where we breakfasted and were regaled with hill beer. A gazelle was killed in honour of the visit, and two baskets of the flesh sent into camp. The General and staff left about 2 p.m. I remained for the night, at Rutton Pooea's request, as he wished to hold a council of his relatives and dependants as to the course of action they should pursue. There was a big talk and a corresponding drink. I gave Rutton Pooea (with the General's permission) a police guard of 15 men at his village, he undertaking to feed them, as there was reason to believe that the Sylhoos might attack him. He wishes a permanent guard at his village, and asks, moreover, to be made chief over all tribes that may be subdued by us. He promises on his own part to give us loyal and true assistance, and to obey all orders. He furnished two guides to-day to Captain East, to mark out the road down to the Subjuk on the eastern slope of Oriepoom. He says he cannot furnish us with coolies, as his people would be dissatisfied, but will give guides, scouts, and fighting men. I think we may fairly consider Rutton Pooea now to have cast in his lot with us.

23rd November.—This morning Rutton Pooea's wife brought her only son, putting his hands into mine, and asked me to take him to my house and educate him. I promised to do so at the close of the expedition. I returned about noon to Demagiri. Halted at Sydoba's village by the way; talked to a woman there who had been brought from one of our British villages to the south, being taken captive by the Howlongs in a raid. She had afterwards been sold by them to Sydoba. She was evidently under constraint and afraid to speak, answering my questions with reluctance. The chief Lengoora passed us on the road back; he was on his way to Rutton Pooea, to ask assistance, his village having been occupied by the Syloos. His village is on the left bank of the Kurnafoolee, some little distance below the Subjuk. On my return I reported all I had heard to the General, who thought it unnecessary to assist Rutton Pooea in protecting his villages, as the chief, in his opinion, should be able to protect himself. I found that Captain Hood and Major Macdonald had arrived. By the General's orders, I made over charge to Captain Hood of the whole Hill Coolie Corps, with all rolls, information, &c. At night I called all the Hill Coolie Sirdars and introduced them to Hood, telling them to work loyally under him for the future, and look to him for protection.

24th November.—Employed in writing up diary and arrears of correspondence. By order of the General I resigned my guard of 30 police, and made them over to Crouch. Sent out men to Rutton Pooea's village to see if there is any fresh intelligence as to the enemy's movements; also to ask him to send and call the Looshai chief, Lowsiloung. Sent back

back the Bohmong's five Bunjoyee guides, as I found them timid and useless, and I wish to take on Looshais in their place. The General authorised me to inform Rutton Pooea that we would assist him in case he were attacked by the Sylhoos.

25th November, Demagiri.—Nothing of importance. Wrote to Officiating Deputy Commissioner, Hill Tracts, on the subject of organisation of Hill Coolie Corps.

26th November, Demagiri.—A number of Rutton Pooea's Kookies afflicted with divers ailments came in to-day. Doctor Allen, the principal medical officer of the force, very kindly examined and prescribed for them all. Rutton Pooea sent me word that Lal Jeeka, son of Saboonga, the head of the Syloo tribe, had sent messengers to Lengoora's village, and wished to make terms for the Syloos with us. I sent back an encouraging message, saying that we wished nothing but good if our just demands were complied with, and inviting the chiefs to come in and have an interview with the General and self. I do not, however, think that anything will come of this, and it is but a *ruse* on their part to gain information of our movements and intentions. I sent out scouts to Lengoora's and Vanpooea's villages to ascertain the truth.

27th November, Demagiri.—My men returned to-day, saying that Rutton Pooea was very ill, and that it was true that some men of the Syloo clan had come to Lengoora's, but with what motive was not known. Vanpooea will send his son to me. I sent Subadar Mahomed Azim to see Rutton Pooea, and also to pick up news about Laljeeka. Went out with the General to-day to the site of Rutton Pooea's old village on Demagiri Hang, with escort of the Ghoorkas. A heavy day's work, cutting our way through the jungle on foot from 9 a.m. till 5 p.m.

28th November, Demagiri.—Subadar Mahomed Azim returned, and said that Rutton Pooea was seriously ill, too much so indeed to speak of business. His villagers in confusion, saying we had brought the Raja ill-luck. Sent Native doctor with my own boy to bring Rutton Pooea to me, to carry him if necessary. News came from Captain Hood that a party of armed Kookies had crossed from south to north at our ford of Ootan Chuttra, just above the guard; all boat coolies mutinied from fright and refused to proceed. I started, therefore, by the General's wish, with 20 police to pursue the Kookies and bring on the provision, boats, and coolies.

Travelling by night, one of my boats upset on a rock on the rapids. The men merely escaped with their lives, losing arms and accoutrements.

29th November.—Reached Ootan Chuttra at daylight. Re-assured all the coolies, telling them that the party they had seen crossing were Rutton Pooea's men, going by my orders to Vanpooea's. Calmed their fears, and saw the fleet off on its upward way. I followed the trail of the party which had been seen crossing the river for about half-a-mile; found there some commissariat rice scattered on the ground where they had been eating. This kind of rice is served out to our hill coolies and does not grow in the hills; moreover, the one man of ours who had seen the party cross was very vague in his ideas as to whether the party were armed or not; I concluded that they were not Kookies but deserted coolies. I left my Subadar and party to follow up their traces as far as possible and came on with the boats. Halted for the night on a sand chur some miles below Demagiri, as the laden boats could not get up by night over the rapids.

30th November.—Reached Demagiri and reported to the General the result of my trip. Found that Rutton Pooea had been brought in very ill and was under medical treatment by Doctor Allen, principal medical officer. Set my men to work to build a house for Rutton Pooea. Two more companies of the 2nd Ghoorkas arrived and a company of Sappers and Miners. Subadar Mahomed Azim has gone out by the General's orders.

1st December.—Rutton Pooea much better to-day. He has suffered from a strong attack of fever and bronchitis. Endeavoured to arrange with him for supply of meat and fowls for the force and rice for the elephants. Could come to no satisfactory conclusion; he said he would try to get one gazelle for us, and then laid down and covered himself up, saying he was too ill to talk. His people confined themselves to saying that they could do nothing without the chief's orders. I rose up angry, saying that it would be better if Rutton Pooea's tribe were openly hostile than thus to profess friendship and do nothing to help us. I imagine after two or three days' talk and threatening we shall get some supplies, but they are an impracticable people and will do nothing save through fear. Rutton Pooea has received really friendly treatment at our hands in every way, but nothing seems to stir any feeling in him, save fear only. The 2nd Ghoorkas made the first advance to-day here to Mora's village, about five miles. Captain Hood with the boats and coolies started on his way back to Ootan Chuttra; closed and submitted diary.

OFFICE MEMORANDUM, No. 2669 P.; dated Fort William, 15th December 1871.

From *H. LePoer Wynne*, Under Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Military Department.

THE undersigned is directed to forward to the Military Department an extract as per margin from the diary of the civil officer with the right column of the Looshai Field Force, from the 6th to the 24th November 1871, and with reference thereto to request that it may be ascertained whether the matter was represented to the General Commanding, and, if so, what steps were taken by him to provide a remedy.

"The police provision boats were seized by officers of Ghoorkas, and all our police provisions turned out on to the bare shore at Lower Burke haul. There will be undoubtedly difficulty in carrying out the Government Orders prescribing separate provision supply arrangement for the police attached to the expedition."

From Major General *W. F. Nuthall*, Officiating Political Agent, Munnipoor, to *C. U. Aitchison*, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department, with Governor General, No. 125; dated Munnipoor, 25th October 1871.

No definite orders have yet reached me, but the compliance with my request for better arms for at least a portion of the Rajah's troops leads me to conclude that they are to be employed in the approaching expedition against the Looshais.

2. In this case I would solicit the favour of his Excellency the Viceroy in Council granting me the services of an officer to act nominally as my assistant, but actually as a field staff officer.

3. It stands to reason that I shall not allow an ignorant class of Native officers, such as those in authority over the Rajah's troops, to carry out the orders of the General Commanding the expedition in any way they may think proper. The command of the force will, therefore, virtually rest with me, and this is the Rajah's wish, although I shall accompany it actually in my civil capacity.

4. The duties of such a command will be very arduous for one person. The arrangements for the daily march, in view to order and system, those for the safety of the camp at night by reconnoissance and pickets, and for regulating the distribution of the supplies, will be much more than I can efficiently perform without assistance, and if the Government will kindly permit me the choice of an officer, I beg to mention Lieutenant R. M'G. Steward, Royal Artillery, instructor in gunnery.

I know him to possess good physique, energy, and ability, and to be qualified to render me valuable assistance in general observations on the statistics, geography, and topography of the country into which the expedition is about to be carried.

From *C. U. Aitchison*, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department, to Political Agent, Munnipoor, No. 46 C.P.; dated Camp Sonepore, 25th November 1871.

In reply to your letter No. 125, dated the 25th October 1871, applying for the services of an officer to act as your assistant during the expedition against the Looshais, I am to inform you that his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General in Council is unable to accede to your request.

From *F. B. Simson*, Esq., Commissioner of the Dacca Division, to Secretary to Government of Bengal, Judicial Department, No. 19 T.; dated Burrisal, 16th November 1871.

I have the honour to submit herewith copy of a Report No. 1116, dated 5th instant, from the Officiating Deputy Commissioner of Cachar to Mr. Edgar, civil officer of the Looshai Expedition.

2. I consider that General Bourchier and Mr. Edgar will be careful that no action will be taken against friendly tribes of Looshais. I am glad to see that the tribes, hostile and friendly, both are alarmed at the magnitude of the expedition now evidently going into their country. It is their custom to deny guilt, and to place the blame on neighbours, and by various ways to attempt to stave off punishment; but to free themselves from guilt, it is absolutely necessary that the tribes professing friendship should admit us freely to their hills, and should prove that they have no captives, should show where the captives really are, and assist us in regaining them. Nothing short of positive active friendship shown by deeds and not by solicitation for delay should prevent the speedy and direct march of the columns through every portion of the country.

3. I trust that a brief abstract of operations on the Chittagong side will be communicated early to the officers interested on the Cachar side, and similar information should be transmitted from the Cachar force to the Commissioner of Chittagong.

From *O. G. R. McWilliam*, Esq., Officiating Deputy Commissioner of Cachar, to *J. W. Edgar*, Esq., Civil Officer of the Looshai Expedition, No. 1115; dated Cachar, 5th November 1871.

I have the honour to report that Shamsing and Rottonanundo Sing, and the two Munnipoorees, who went with Mora and the Eastern Looshais to Tipai Mookh on the 3rd August 1871, returned to Cachar yesterday.

2. They arrived at Tipai Mookh on the 31st October 1871, and went at once to Dollong Impanu's villages. They were four days on the road as Rottonanundo had a bad foot, and they went slowly for his convenience. They describe the road as a very difficult one, and consider it about two days' journey from Tipai Mookh to the village.

3. They remained six days at Dollong: on the night of their arrival they went to Impanu;

Impanu; she said she was willing to help us as much as she could, and she wished to find out from Poiboi whether he really intended to act with her or not; she said that Lalboorah, Leukum, and Tandung would certainly follow Poiboi, whatever attitude he might take.

4. On seeing Moora she asked why he had been bound; it was explained to her that the sepoys at Monierkhall had but lately arrived in the district, and from ignorance treated all Looshais as enemies; she was quite satisfied with what had been done to punish the sepoys, and to make up the losses incurred by her messengers.

5. Khallgom was not at Dollong, having gone to Sookpilall's village to be present at his mother's funeral ceremonies. Lallu and his mother came to Dollong on the evening of the day that the Munipoorees reached Kholel.

6. Six days were spent in drinking, at the end of which Impanu proposed to Shamsing and his party that they should go with Lallu to Kholel and wait there for Poiboi. It then appeared that the old position of Kholel had been abandoned. They reached the new Kholel in two days from Dollong, and another day brought them to the old site of the village. Next day two Looshais went to Poiboi, and returned the next night with two of Poiboi's men. Poiboi's answer was that his principal muntri had gone to Benkui to make inquiries about Mr. Winchester's child. Durpong was sick, and he himself could not come, so he invited Shamsing and Rottonanundo Sing to his village. They were ready to go, but Lallu's mother forbade them to go, and sent back Poiboi's messengers with two of her own men; on the third day after this four muntris from Poiboi and three from Khalgom came in. They said that they wanted to send 15 Looshais, three from Impanu, five from Poiboi, four from Kholel, and three from Khalgom, with the Munnipoorees to Cachar. Poiboi's men said that the three Nagas who were taken from Nugdigram had died on the road, and that Mr. Winchester's child was at Benkui.

7. They said that Lenkum, Lalboorah, and Tandung would, without doubt, carry out any arrangement made by Poiboi with us.

8. Shamsing asked whether Poiboi could get the child; they said they had heard that she might be got for a shield, a gong, and a pair of boots and trousers, together with some other things the Munnipoorees could not recognise from description. They also said that if Poiboi chose he could get her by force. Then Poiboi's five men, and three of Kholel, went with the Munnipoorees to Daidow, a small Guard Poonjee near Kholel, and made preparations for themselves and the others who were to accompany them to Cachar.

9. The night after they arrived at Daidow, two men came from Kholel and said the Tipai was full of water, and that they had better wait two days. There was a good deal of secret conversation between these two men and the other Looshais; next morning a man came from Dollong and said that one of his people had seen that the Borak was full of sepoys and boats, and that the Munnipoorees had come to cheat them, and they would do nothing to help us. After hearing what the Munipoorees had to say they made them swear that we intend to be friendly to them. They were reassured, but said they could not go to Silchar till they had sent *khubur* of our preparations to all the rajas, by which a delay of 15 days would be incurred. They could not feed the Munnipoorees, and advised them to go to Mynadhin and get *russud*, and told them that if they come back to Tipai Mookh in three weeks they (the Looshais) would go back with them to Cachar.

10. The Munnipoorees left Daidow eight days ago, arriving at Tipai Mookh on the fourth day.

11. There was nothing in any of the poonjees which the Munnipoorees visited; everything was hidden away. At one time there had been a report that Mora was dead, and there had been great mourning for him. The men do not go out from the villages, the paths being closed by the usual Kookee sign. The women are still in the villages.

12. The messengers did not go by the old road to Kholel as it is overgrown with jungle, but they can point it out. Elephants can go to old Kholel. The only difficulty is at Tipai Mookh itself. It is a precipice which can be avoided by making a slight detour. There is no difficulty between new and old Kholel, but from new Kholel to Dollong a road would have to be made.

18. When Rutton Sing arrived with Munnipoorees at Dollong he threatened to keep them a month as prisoners, because he had been kept five months (?) imprisoned by me, but Mora was appealed to, and by Impanu's orders he abused Rutton Sing and turned him out. Rotton Sing told all the Dollong people that he had been to Amoo Sing's house to recover a debt, and that Amoo had told him that sahibs could not be depended upon, and no man could understand their machinery.

14. The villages are not stockaded. I cannot understand what information the Dollong messenger had received when he told the Looshais that the Borak was full of boats and soldiers, because at the time no change had been made in the Mynadhin guard, nor had any boats with supplies passed Luckipoor.

15. I do not think it right to allow Shamsing and Rottonanundo Sing to go back to Tipai Mookh at the expiration of the three weeks without a guard.

MEMORANDUM, No. 1116, dated Cachar, 5th November 1871.

From *O. G. R. McWilliam*, Esq., Officiating Deputy Commissioner.

COPY forwarded to the Commissioner of the Dacca Division for information.

No. 2507 P., dated Fort William, 2nd December 1871.

Endorsed by Foreign Department.

COPY forwarded to the Military Department for information.

TELEGRAM, dated 2nd December 1871.

From Commissioner of Chittagong to Secretary to the Government of Bengal.

RUTTON POOEA reported very friendly; nothing else known; will telegraph from Kassalong.

TELEGRAM, dated 2nd December 1871.

From *Edgar*, Cachar, to Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Calcutta.

YOUR message of first; my people who went up to Sookpilal's villages with the muntris seen by Lieutenant Governor have not yet returned; they are a little overdue. Eight men in from Poiboi with presents; they are not muntris, tell improbable stories, and make no definite offers; four of them are now with General Bourchier, aiding him to explore unknown country between Mynadhin and Tipai Mookh; detailed report on the political aspects of expedition by post.

From *J. Ware Edgar*, Esq., Civil Officer with the Cachar Column of the Looshai Expedition, to Secretary to the Government of Bengal, in the Judicial Department, No. 1192; dated Cachar, 2nd December 1871.

I HAVE the honour to submit an outline of our present relations with the friendly or neutral Looshai villages on this side, and of the effect the arrangements made by Brigadier General Bourchier may be expected to have upon the attitude of these villages. I have put off the submission of this Report from day to day in the hope that some messengers sent by me to Sookpilal would return, but I think it better not to put it off any longer.

2. Mr. McWilliam's memorandum of the 26th September gave the intelligence we had about Sookpilal and his people up to that date. But the muntris mentioned in the last paragraph of the memorandum, when brought before his Honor the Lieutenant Governor, made many professions of the willingness of Sookpilal to give us every assistance in his power. These promises, however, though large, were altogether indefinite, and it seemed to me that Sookpilal could only aid us effectively through his son, Khalkom, from whom we have had no direct communications since he came down to Looshai Bazar last February. When, therefore, the muntris returned to Sookpilal's village, Baboo Abhoy Mitter, who had been up at Changsil last April and May, returned with them with instructions to find out definitely what Sookpilal could do, and to inform him that I wished Khalkom to meet us at Tepai Mookh. The Baboo has not yet returned as I mentioned above.

3. There are no new reasons to distrust Sookpilal, but it must be remembered that he can scarcely be expected to rely fully on our assurances that we do not mean to do him any harm. He will see two large forces advancing through the villages of his relations, and conscious that he has many times offended against us he must feel uneasy, lest his turn may come after the other chiefs have been disposed of, and he might think it better to make common cause with them at once than to wait till our hands were free to deal with him. If there should be any such disposition on his part, I confidently hope that it will effectually be checked by the measures taken by Brigadier General Bourchier. Strong outposts supported by a line of guards along the tea gardens have been or will be held at Chatterchoora, Bong Kong, and the Rengtipahar by the police and 4th Native Infantry. As these posts command all the roads leading from the western Looshai villages into Cachar, they will not only defend our frontier but will appear to the Looshais to be possible bases from which, if necessary, we could push forward and attack them independently of the forces advancing from Tipai Mookh and Demagiri. This would be a very powerful argument

argument when used by the party in the villages which are anxious to be on friendly terms with us. The guards on the Sylhet frontier are not of the same political importance as the three outposts above mentioned.

4. Eight Looshais from the villages of Poiboi and Vonpilall's son have come in, bringing two small tusks from Poiboi. They are all men of small account in their villages, and have not brought any definite overtures. They say that now that Vonolel is dead, Poiboi, as the oldest member of the family, claims to be the head; that last year some villages dependent on Kamhow revolted from that chief who sought Poiboi's aid; that the latter went to assist, and that it was during his absence that Lalboorah and Tangdong made their raid on Nugdigram. They add that Poiboi is in consequence on bad terms with his cousin, but somewhat inconsistently undertake that they will bring him in to make full submission at Tipai Mookh. It is not difficult to see that this story is completely false, and I am inclined to think that Poiboi will regard our advance from Tipai Mookh as a hostile measure directed against himself, and will join the sons of Vonolel, but it would be folly to attempt to predict anything until we have been established at Tipai Mookh.

5. We have found considerable difficulty in exploring the country between Luckipoor and Tipai Mookh for a route. Owing to the hilliness of the country and the density of the forest there has long been an opinion in the district that it would be impracticable. After many attempts and failures, Mr. McWilliam at last succeeded in finding a tolerable route to Mynadhin, which is now being made practicable for elephants by portions of the 44th and 22nd regiments. But till within the last few days the attempts made to connect Mynadhin by land with Tepai Mookh were fruitless. Poiboi's Looshais on their way down met Roipa muntri exploring, and on arriving here told me that he was not likely to find a route in the direction taken by him, but that they knew where the country was practicable and offered to guide us. I therefore sent four of them to General Bourchier and Colonel Roberts, keeping the remainder here. Before they arrived at Mynadhin, however, Roipa had found a route which he pronounces practicable apparently in the direction indicated by the Looshais.

6. The Brigadier General has requested the Munnipoor Political Agent to advise the Raja to choose points and fix outposts along a line south of the hills between Cachar and the Munnipoor valley and east of Tipai Mookh. A compact force of about 500 men, accompanied by General Nuthall, will advance south of Moirung to a point in the direction of the Chiboo salt-spring so often mentioned in the correspondence of the past three years. It is thought that the presence of the Munnipoor Contingent there will, while protecting the valley, strengthen and give confidence to the villages of Kookees hostile to the Looshais, and inhabiting the ranges south of the Munnipoor Valley. At the same time the measure is calculated to secure the fidelity of Kamhow, the Sokti chief, and will put the Munnipoor State in a position to take full advantage of his assistance. Lastly, it will lessen the chance of the hostile Looshais falling back towards the east as we advance from Tipai Mookh, with the ultimate intention of closing in upon our rear and cutting off our supplies.

7. I am most anxious to learn what has been done by the messenger sent up the Dullessur before I leave this, but it is at least equally important that I should be at Tipai Mookh as soon as possible after its occupation by our troops. I have sent a mounted messenger to Julnacherra to inquire whether any messages have been heard of there. If not, I shall wait here no longer, but proceed at once to join General Bourchier.

No. 2738 P., dated Fort William, 22nd December 1871.

Endorsed by Foreign Department.

COPY forwarded to the Military Department, in continuation of the docket from this office, No. 2507 P., dated 2nd December 1871.

TELEGRAM, dated 15th December 1871.

From Deputy Commissioner, Cachar, to Foreign Secretary, and Secretary to Government, Bengal, Political Department, Calcutta, and to General *Bourchier* and *Edgar*, Civil Officer, Tepai Mookh.

GENERAL NUTHALL reports attack by Looshais on one of his working parties between Tseklapi and Tseeboo on 1st December. Munnipooree Subadar killed and 12 Looshai. Five Looshai heads brought in and five muskets, one bearing Tower mark. Munnipoorees 35 strong.

No. 2797 P., dated Fort William, 29th December 1871.

Endorsed by Foreign Department.

COPY forwarded to the Military Department for information.

TELEGRAM, dated 20th December 1871.

From General *Nuthall*, Moirung, through Cachar, to Foreign Secretary, Calcutta.

No reply to my application for an officer temporarily. For so important service, costing lakhs, surely it is not refused. If also I am to have no surveyor, please send me a compass and box of instruments.

TELEGRAM, No. 2763 P., dated 26th December 1871.

From Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, to General *Nuthall*, Munnipoor.

YOUR telegram of 20th. No surveyor available. Thuillier suggests your applying to Captain Badgley, the survey officer, with General Bourchier, to see whether he can help you.

From *A. Mackenzie*, Esq., Junior Secretary to the Government of Bengal, to *J. Ware Edgar*, Esq., Civil Officer with the Cachar Column of the Looshai Expedition.—No. 6349, dated Fort William, 14th December 1871.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 1198, dated 4th instant, and in reply to inform you that the Lieutenant Governor, approving of the views expressed in your 3rd paragraph, has been pleased, in anticipation of the sanction of the Government of India, to instruct the Accountant General to give you a credit on the Cachar Treasury for (25,000) rupees, twenty-five thousand, for the purposes indicated, namely, for paying for useful intelligence and for distributing in presents to such Looshais as may be inclined to be really friendly.

2. You will be good enough to submit your accounts to this office for counter-signature.

From *H. LePoer Wynne*, Esq., Under Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department, to *S. C. Bayley*, Esq., Secretary to the Government, Bengal.—No. 2799 P., dated Fort William, 29th December 1871.

I AM desired to acknowledge the receipt of your docket, No. 6351, dated 14th December 1871, soliciting the confirmation of the Government of India to the action taken by his Honor the Lieutenant Governor in having placed 25,000 rupees at the disposal of Mr. Edgar, to be expended in procuring intelligence, and as presents to such Looshais as may be inclined to be really friendly.

2. In reply I am directed to state that the sum proposed appears to the Viceroy and Governor General in Council to be unnecessarily large for the purpose. In the opinion of his Excellency in Council it will be sufficient for the present to give a credit of 10,000 rupees, and the Financial Department will be asked to sanction this. If it should be found hereafter that this sum will not suffice, application may be made for a further advance, full reasons for the measure being at the same time assigned.

(No. 2800 P.)

COPY of the Correspondence forwarded to the Financial Department for the purpose indicated.

(No. 2801 P.)

COPY also forwarded to the Military Department for information.

From *H. LePoer Wynne*, Esq., Under Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to *S. C. Bayley*, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal, No. 2505P.; dated Fort William, 2nd December 1871.

WITH reference to the correspondence ending with the letter from this Office, dated 30th September 1871, No. 2077 P., relative to the men provided by the Raja of Tipperah for active service, I am directed to request that the Government of India in this Department may be informed at the earliest convenient date what particular duty is, for the purposes of the approaching expedition, to be assigned to the men in question.

(No. 2506 P.)

COPY to the Military Department in continuation of the docket from this Office, dated 30th September 1871, No. 2078 P.

From *A. Mackenzie*, Esq., Junior Secretary to the Government of Bengal, to *H. LePoer Wynne*, Esq., Under Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, No. 6163; dated 4th William, 4th December 1871.

IN reply to your letter No. 2505 P., dated the 2nd instant, I am directed to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of the correspondence noted on the margin, from which it will be seen how it is proposed to employ the Contingent furnished by the Rajah of Tipperah during the Looshai Expedition.

Letters of Government, Nos. 5266–67, dated 25th October 1871, to Political Agent, Tipperah.
Letter No. 27, dated the 23rd November 1871, and sketch from Political Agent, Tipperah.
Letter No. 6030, dated 29th idem, to Political Agent, Tipperah.

2. A copy of this correspondence should have been forwarded before.

From *S. C. Bayley*, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal, to *A. W. B. Power*, Esq., Political Agent, Tipperah, No. 5266; dated Fort William, 25th October 1871.

IN continuation of my letter No. 80 T., dated the 16th ultimo, I am directed by the Lieutenant Governor to request that you will place yourself in communication with Brigadier General Brownlow, C.B., Commanding the Right or Chittagong Column of the Looshai Expedition, and receive his instructions as to where you should join the column, or what course you should follow with the Raja's Contingent.

2. You will also learn from Brigadier General Brownlow, C.B., whether such assistance as you may require can be given you from the military stores of the column, or whether it will be necessary for you to indent for them from Calcutta.

From *A. W. B. Power*, Esq., Political Agent, Hill Tipperah, to *S. C. Bayley*, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal, No. 27; dated Agurtollah, 23rd November 1871.

I HAVE the honour to report that on receipt of your No. 5266 of the 20th ultimo, I at once communicated with Brigadier General Brownlow, C.B., and that after some correspondence, he has decided on employing the Contingent furnished by the Raja in the following manner:—

2. Patrol parties are to be continually on the move along the south-eastern boundary of Hill Tipperah, keeping up communications with Khagoria stockade, and also with Gangaram, about 10 miles north of Khagoria, where there is a pass which requires to be guarded. Brigadier General Brownlow leaves it to me in a general way to make the best use of the Contingent in guarding the frontier.

3. The steps which I have taken in consequence of this permission are as follows:—I have arranged to constitute a series of thannas all along the line of inhabited hill country, to be garrisoned by the best men procurable for the purpose, an average of 25 men for each thanna. For the present we must be content with untrained hill Tipperah men; they are at least better than untrained Bengalee peons, as they know the jungle, and are not deficient in courage. The positions of the thannas will be seen from the accompanying map. I propose to make Choupphoo the head quarters, to have a depôt there and a stockade. The patrols will march from Omersagar by Choupphoo and Talamura to Subrang-mugrung, and occasionally north from Choupphoo as far as practicable, also from Choupphoo to Khagoria and Gangaram. The advantages of Choupphoo as a depôt are that supplies can be carried almost up to it by water, and that it is a convenient point for starting a patrol to Khagoria.

4. Being cut off from the Commissariat Department, we shall have to make our own arrangements, and owing to the uncertainty of our destination hitherto nothing had been done.

done. Supplies are now being rapidly collected; the Hill Tipperahs have received orders to build godowns and huts at Choupphoo and to clear the paths, and some of the Raja's men start in a day or two to superintend the carriage of the stores.

5. I have also received communications from Brigadier General Bourchier; he wishes to have constant patrols between the Raja's posts on the north and the stockades in Sylhet. Orders have been despatched to have his wishes in this respect attended to. I further asked the Raja to employ his Kookie ryots in that part as scouts, and a purwanna has been sent. I mentioned to General Bourchier that it was impossible for the Raja to keep up a large force on the north, as all available men were required in the south, where there is greater apprehension of an attack.

6. I am afraid that the Contingent will never come up to its full strength of 100 regulars; I wish to take only 60 with me to the front, leaving the others in Omersagar and Subrang-mugrung. Cartridge paper is badly wanted, and if Government could supply the Raja with 50 Kookies, they would be a valuable addition to the arms.

From *A. Mackenzie*, Esq., Junior Secretary to the Government of Bengal, to *A. W. R. Power*, Esq., Political Agent of Hill Tipperah, No. 6030; dated Fort William, 29th November 1871.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 27, dated 23rd instant, and in reply to inform you that the Lieutenant Governor approves generally of the dispositions made by you, as therein reported, in consequence of the instructions communicated to you by Generals Brownlow and Bourchier, in connection with the employment of the contingent furnished by the Raja for the Looshai Expedition.

(No. 7 of 1872.)

(Separate.)

To His Grace the Duke of *Argyll*, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Military Department, Fort William,
19 January 1872.

My Lord Duke,

IN continuation of our Despatch No. 5, of the 5th instant, we beg to enclose copies of the telegrams since received, regarding the operations of the Looshai Field Force.

2. It will be seen that the columns have made considerable progress; and the officers in command of the Expedition appear to be making every exertion to carry out fully the objects for which it was undertaken.

We are, &c.
(signed) *Mayo.*
J. Strachey.
&c. &c.

TELEGRAM from General *Brownlow*, Upper Holien through Burkhul, to the Secretary to Government, Military Department, Private Secretary to the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal and Commissioner, Calcutta and Chittagong, No. 12; dated the 7th January 1872.

CLEAR the line.—3rd January.—Savoonga elevation, 4,000 feet. The Sylhoo chief has at last sent a message desiring peace, and his Karbarees are expected to-day. As yet our conversations have been in the dark, and at a distance. I shall not however stay any progress in any respect until the chief himself comes in, and satisfies me that he is in earnest. Columns have started for two large villages, one 10 miles due north on this range, the other nearer and more to the east. I cannot now indicate our exact movements on the map, as it ceases to be correct. To make the most of our limited means of transport, both troops and coolies have been placed on three-quarter rations, and are doing hard work with the greatest spirit and contentment. The 27th Goorkhas campaign with the clothing they carry on their backs. The effect of these measures on health is carefully watched.

TELEGRAM from General *Bourchier*, C.B., Cam on the Toweeboom through Tipai Mookh, to Quartermaster General, Head Quarters Camp, and Secretary to Government of India, Military Department, Delhi and Calcutta, No. 39; dated the 5th January 1872.

4th January.—Sappers and Miners and Wing 44th Native Infantry, move on to-day to the Toweetee River, distant about seven miles nearly east; the road is completed for four miles. Hills are becoming very precipitous, and water between rivers very scarce; no hostilities since last report. Looshais come into camp with fowls and vegetables, which they eagerly barter for salt; they are civil and quiet, and cleaner than most hill-men, and not at all the savages we expected to find them. I am making efforts now to separate the western tribes as far as Poiboi from the eastern ones, who are more distinctly hostile, and to attach the former to our interests.

TELEGRAM from General *Bourchier*, C.B., to the Quartermaster General, Head Quarters, Camp, Delhi, and Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 75; dated Camp on the Mook Toweetoo through Tipai, the 7th January 1872.

7th January.—Camp on the Toweetoo. Arrived here this morning; distance about seven miles east of number seven station on the Toweebhoon. Road very steep, rising from 700 feet elevation of the Toweebhoon to 3,400 feet, and descending to this elevation 1,500 feet. Provisions are being rapidly collected at number seven station, which will be our advance depôt for the present. I proceed to-morrow to Daidu, the most western of Poiboi's villages. Chiefs from Kholie are in camp, also emissaries from Poiboi's. The cold nights and dense fogs are telling somewhat on the troops and coolies, but all are in good heart, and anxious to get on. Two of the wounded have died; remainder are progressing favourably at Tipai Mookh.

From General *Brownlow*, C.B.

7th January 1872.—Latitude, 23 degrees 14 minutes, longitude, 92 degrees 38 minutes elevation, 2,800 feet, half way between places marked on map as Savoonga and Sylhoo Savoonga; the latter being three miles further north than shown. The head waters of three rivers have to be crossed through an extremely broken country. The nocturnal conversations with Savoonga's emissaries have not been repeated since my last, and he has this day fired his village on our approach. Columns still operating to our north off the main line of advance, which is now eastward. Fifteen villages, averaging 150 houses, have been destroyed, together with their grain stores, up to date. The enemy continue to fire on us, but without effect.

TELEGRAM from General *Bourchier*, Camp Daidoo through Tipai Mookh, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, Calcutta, No. 94; dated the 10th January 1872.

9th January.—Camp Daidoo. Marched from the Toweetoo yesterday. A steady rise of 2,200 feet; distance, about three miles; elevation of camp, 4,000 feet. We are now on a ridge overlooking some of Poiboi's villages. No opposition to our advance. Found Daidoo deserted and burnt. Troops are being gradually pushed towards the front. Water is scarce here, so I move on a short distance to-day. Heavy rain during the night.

TELEGRAM from General *Bourchier*, Camp number 9, station through Tipai Mookh, to General *Brownlow, viâ* Burkhul, to Secretary to Government of India, Military Department, Calcutta, and Quartermaster General, Head Quarters Camp, Delhi, No. 22; dated the 11th January 1872.

CLEAR the line.—10th January. Marching in a south-east direction. Encamped at present at a place shown in map as L (2) Kolong Thlang. Elevation about 4,000 feet; mountains very precipitous. Halted to complete roads and bring up supplies. Kholel, Poiboi's, and Khalkom's emissaries are in camp. We overlook some of Poiboi's villages on the next range, which runs east of the Tipai. Have had heavy rain; days very fine; nights excessively cold, which is increased by the dense wetting fogs of the morning. All well.

TELEGRAM from General *Brownlow*, C.B., Loll Ugoon, to General *Bourchier*, Tipai Mookh, Quartermaster General, Delhi, Secretary to Government, Military Department, Private Secretary, Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, Calcutta, and Commissioner, Chittagong, No. 16; dated the 13th January 1872.

ONE march short of Syloo Savoonga, 10th January. Colonel Macpherson rejoined me yesterday from his raid to the north. He met with more than usual resistance at the village of Lall Gnoora, which was strongly stockaded. One Goorkha was killed, and one officer and nine men wounded by bamboo stakes. He brought back a seer weight, stamped C. H. Crane, Wolverhampton, which must have come from the Cachar tea plantations, and clearly implicates the Sylhoos in last year's atrocities. A party of Looshais, while preparing an ambush on the 6th, were surprised by a convoy; one of the former was killed, and two wounded. I should have mentioned in my last telegram that in the conversations with the enemy therein referred to, they were repeatedly told that if they ceased to fire upon us, no further harm would be done to life or property pending the opening of negotiations.

TELEGRAM from General *Bourchier*, C.B., Station No. 9, through Tipai Mookh, to Quartermaster General, Delhi, and Secretary to Government of India, Military Department, Calcutta; No. 137, dated the 13th January 1872.

12th January.—Reconnoitred yesterday as far Old Kholell, distance about four miles; the village was deserted some months ago, and burnt recently by the Looshais. The village extended for about half a mile in length, and Vonpilla's house for 40 yards. The tomb of this chief is carefully preserved in the village and hung round with skulls of animals and some emblematic curiosities. Elevation of the village 4450 feet, and of the hill about where we went with the survey party upwards of 5,000 feet. Our present camp is situated in latitude 24° 1′ 43″, and longitude 93° 10′. The country is much more open. Major Moore with Hedayut Alli's coolies is expected in camp to-morrow—all well.

TELEGRAM from General *Bourchier*, Station through Tipai Mookh, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, Calcutta; dated the 14th January 1872.

13th January.—The place in the map called Kolong Thlang is the hill above Old Kholel mentioned in my telegram of yesterday. It is situated in latitude 23° 58′ 10″, and longitude 93° 10′ 5″, and its elevation is 5,450 feet. The troops are employed in making the road onwards, and I shall advance towards Poiboi's villages as soon as supplies are collected here. Every care is being taken that the coolies are regularly fed and not overloaded. But the constant change of temperature, the dense chilly fogs of the early morning, and the incessant work they are called upon to perform, are very trying.

(No. 18 of 1872.)

(Separate.)

To His Grace the Duke of *Argyll*, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Military Department,
26 January 1872.

My Lord Duke,

IN continuation of our Despatch, No. 7, of the 19th instant, we have the honour to enclose copies of further telegrams relative to the progress of the Looshai field force.

2. It will be seen that both columns have continued to make satisfactory progress.

We are, &c.,
(signed) *Mayo.*
J. Strachey.
&c. &c.

TELEGRAM from Brigadier General *Brownlow*, C.B., to Brigadier General *Bourchier*, C.B., Tipai Mookh, Quartermaster General, Delhi, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, Calcutta, Private Secretary to Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, Calcutta, the Commissioner of Chittagong, Chittagong, No. 32; dated Sylhoo Savoonga, the 18th January 1872.

12th January 1872.—Syloo Savoonga. Latitude 23 degrees 15 minutes—longitude 92 degrees 41 minutes—elevation 3,300 feet. This village, the head quarters of the Syloos, which the enemy burnt on the 7th instant, contained 300 houses. Our last three marches have been most trying for the coolies; we are now moving eastward, and as the mountain ranges and rivers run north and south, the former being 3,000 and 4,000 feet, and the beds of the latter only 1,000 feet above sea level, the ascents and descents are very severe and frequent. It will be some days before our supplies will enable us to move against the Howlongs, the most important villages of which people are immediately in front of us. Van Kooea, who is said to have Mary Winchester, is on the third range from this and east of the Kolodyne. Captain Lewin started this morning with a suitable escort to put Rutton Pooea on Howlong territory, he having undertaken a mission to the chiefs of that tribe. We are now close on 70 miles by road from Demagiri, and it takes six days to communicate with that post.

TELEGRAM from General *Bourchier*, C.B., to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department; No. 188, dated No. 9 Station through Tipai Mookh, the 15th January 1872.

14th January.—I reconnoitred yesterday the road towards Chepuee, the first of Poiboi's villages, through which our road passes; it descends for 2,550 feet to the Tipai, a distance of two and a half miles, the latter portion being very precipitous. On the other side of the river the road is somewhat better, and at an elevation of 500 feet enters on some of the village Jhooms. This morning I inspected the coolies enlisted by Captain Hedayut Ali; they number only 387, many having been dropped at the sick depôt *en route;* those now with the a vance are a very serviceable looking set of men, and have been brought into capital ord . by Major Moore and Captain Hedayut Ali.

TELEGRAM from General *Brownlow*, C.B., to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 33; dated Sylhoo Savoonga, the 19th January 1872.

14th January 1872. Sylhoo Savoonga.—Captain Lewin returned to-day, having failed to open communication with the Howlongs; Rutton Pooea proceeds to-morrow by a more southerly route. He has been given 10 days to bring in the chief or the captives. This delay will enable me to accumulate the necessary supplies for further operations.

From General *Brownlow*, C.B., Sylhoo Savoonga, the 20th January 1872.

ELEPHANTS are now working on 30 miles of road in advance of Demagiri, and supplies are coming up well. In a few days there will be commissariat stores at and above the latter place for the whole force, up to the 1st of March. If any limit as to time could be fixed on our occupation of the country, a certain number of the 600 hill coolies or boatmen who are clamouring to be allowed to return to their homes in time for joining operations might be discharged. The civil authorities press very urgently for a consideration of this question. The Sylhoos, though they will not come in now, offer but a passive resistance. Their attacks on our convoys have been repulsed with such losses to themselves that our line of communication has been unmolested. For some time it is impossible to predict the result of Rutton Pooea's mission to the Howlongs; the restoration of the captives and the march of the force through their country are the only conditions I have yet referred to as the grounds on which we can treat; any demand for hostages would, I fear, alarm the chiefs, and drive them into the same line of conduct as the Sylhoos, thereby endangering the release of the captives.

From General *Bourchier*, C.B.

18th January.—Marched yesterday to Chipooee—latitude 24 deg. 0 min. 45 sec.; longitude 93 deg. 13 min. 30 sec.—the first village in Poiboi's territory, distance six miles; the road descends 2,350 feet to the Tipai, after crossing which it ascends a very difficult mountain, rising 2,850 feet in three and a half miles, the elevation of our present camp being

4,350 feet. Notwithstanding several deep rocky ravines, Captain Blackwood brought up this battery, on elephants, admirably and without any accident. On reaching the first jhoom we were met by about 200 armed and a crowd of unarmed Looshais, who protested against our advance. They said Poiboi was present, and would make his submission. I agreed to receive him, but let them understand that it was my intention to advance and reach Chipooee before dark. A chief was brought up, but as he turned out not to be Poiboi, I ordered him away, and the troops to advance. The Looshais remonstrated, but we moved steadily on, and are now encamped overlooking their village, the Rajah of which has been informed that no injury shall be done to his village or granaries so long as he remains friendly. Our position is so strong, and the effect of the guns being brought upon elephants so great, that I hope Poiboi may come in here; whether or no, I shall advance in a day or two. I reconnoitre onwards; to-day troops all well. Our carriage is my only anxiety, but every care is being taken by the cooly corps. On reaching this yesterday, I received a letter from General Nuthall, brought direct by Poiboi's people, dated Cheboo, 13th instant.

From General *Bourchier*, C.B., No. 10 Station, through No. 6 Station.

22nd January.—Move on to-day towards Poiboi, whose principal village is said to be six marches distant. The people here seem inclined to be friendly, but the women and children have not returned to the village yet. All property has been carefully preserved, and every endeavour has been made to restore confidence. Climate magnificent; health of troops good. Coolies are, I hope, improving, but many of them are still sick and weakly. The surveyors have had good opportunities of carrying on their work since we arrived here.

From General *Bourchier*, C.B., No. 11 Station.

24th January 1872.—Since my telegram of the 22nd, the head-quarters of the column has marched seven miles south-east of Chipooee, and is now encamped in latitude 23 deg. 57 min. 27 sec., and longitude 93 deg. 15 min. 30 sec. The road is very difficult, descending and ascending upwards of 2,000 feet to this ridge, which is crossed at an elevation of 4,125 feet. We have now passed over five ranges of mountains since leaving Tipai Mookh, and one or perhaps two more intervene between us and Poiboi's chief village; we march to-day five miles, having reconnoitred that distance yesterday. Health of troops good.

(No. 23 of 1872.)

(Separate.)

To his Grace the Duke of *Argyll*, K. T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Military Department, Fort William,
16 February 1872.

My Lord Duke,

In continuation of our Despatch, No. 18, dated the 26th January 1872, we have the honour to enclose copies of telegrams since received, relative to the operations of the Looshai field force.

2. The progress of the columns continues satisfactory, and General Bourchier's column has had two successful affairs with the enemy.

3. Her Majesty's Government will be gratified to learn that 215 captives (including 99 children) natives of Munnipore, have been already recovered; and that intelligence has been received of the surrender of the child Mary Winchester and of her delivery to Lieutenant Colonel Tytler of the right, or Chittagong column.

We are, &c.
(signed) *John Strachey.*
Napier of Magdala.
&c. &c.

From Brigadier General *Brownlow*, C. B., from Camp *viâ* Demagiri.

21st January 1872.—LATITUDE 23 degrees 23 minutes 30 seconds. Longitude 92 degrees 39 minutes. Lall Jeeka 10 miles north of Syloo Savoonga, attacked and occupied this village to day: it contained upwards of 300 houses, and belongs to one of Savoonga's sons, whose name it bears; naturally a strong position, it had been elaborately stockaded, and, without artillery, might have cost us many lives, but Colonel Hill's guns at a thousand yards had a most salutary effect. We are now on the borders of Sookpilal, whose villages we see within two marches of us. A company of Goorkhas goes to-morrow with the survey officers to a high peak four miles due north overlooking Bepaie Bazaar. I return to Syloo Savoonga by 25th, and hope immediately after to commence operations against the Howlongs, if they do not come to terms.

TELEGRAM from General *Nuthall*, Munnipoor, through Cachar, to Secretary to Government' Foreign Department, Calcutta; dated the 25th January 1872.

Two hundred and seven captives, subjects of Munnipoor, favoured by our position escaped from Looshais and arrived in our camp yesterday evening, escorted by a force sent to their assistance in the morning. There are 56 men, 52 women, and 99 children; some had been in captivity over 30 years. Not heard from General Bourchier since the 19th ultimo, dated 11th January 1872.

TELEGRAM from General *Nuthall*, Seboo Munnipore through Cachar, to Secretary to Government, Foreign Department, Calcutta; dated the 25th January 1872.

EIGHT (8) more captives, subjects of Munnipore, escorted into camp. Seven (7) women supposed to have been overtaken by Looshais in pursuit. No collision with our troops. Embassy from Poiboi, consisting of Damboom and others referred to General Bourchier with two of our messengers, 14th January.

TELEGRAM from General *Bourchier*, C. B., Camp, No. 12 Station through No. 6 Station, to Quarter Master General, Head Quarters Camp Delhi; Secretary to Government of India, Military Department, Calcutta; and General *Brownlow*, C. B., *viâ* Demagiree, No. 95; dated the 27th January 1872.

26th January.—MARCHED on the 24th instant about five miles, as I reported in my telegram of that date we should do, and encamped on the banks of a stream at an elevation of 3,000 feet. In the afternoon reconnoitred some miles onwards in the direction of Poiboi's villages. Heard gongs and saw several granaries. Yesterday we continued our march about a mile from camp. Poiboi's and Lalboora's men attacked us in great force. The ground was very precipitous and rocky, forest very dense. The troops behaved nobly; the 44th closed with the enemy and drove them before them, killing 12 on one spot alone. The enemy's loss must have been very heavy, as they left 13 bodies on the field and were seen carrying away others. We followed them up to the village of Koongnoom, situated in latitude 23° 55′ and longitude 93° 17′ 45′, elevation 5,500 feet. The road up the mountain was strongly stockaded in several places, but the enemy could not stand our steady and rapid advance. We now occupy the village. The baggage arrived in camp before dark, but the artillery elephants could not be brought over a very difficult part of the road until this morning. We shall make all the use we can of the grain, and will halt here a few days to bring up supplies and troops. Our casualties are two of the Peshawur Mountain Battery severely wounded, three of the 44th killed, and one very severely wounded. One police severely wounded, one coolie killed and three wounded. I am wounded in the left arm and hand, but not disabled. All are in good spirits. The Looshais from Kholel and Chipooee, &c., who have accompanied us hitherto, are still in camp, and orders have been sent to the rear not to molest any of the villages so long as the people remain friendly.

From the Deputy Commissioner, Cachar, to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal; dated the 26th January 1872.

"*Precedence.*—ROWA, Sookpilal's Muntri, with Alexandrapore, Khansaman's wife, and a Cachari, arrived at Jhalnacherra yesterday. Sookpilal has got Winchester's child and will send her down in a boat, which he asks me to send for her. From the Bengali report from postmaster at Jhalnacherra, it is not clear how Sookpilal got her. Rowa will be here to morrow."

From General *Brownlow*, C. B., to the Secretary to Government, Military Department, Calcutta; dated the 27th January 1872.

Clear the Line.—The Howlongs have surrendered the child Mary Winchester unconditionally. I expect Rutton Pooea on the 28th, with a satisfactory reply to my other demands. We have now overrun the whole Sylhoo country, and destroyed 20 villages. Savoonga and most of the chiefs have taken refuge with the Howlongs, and will, I hope, convince the latter of the consequences of opposition.

From General *Bourchier*, C. B.

27th January.—Yesterday a detachment, consisting of 100 infantry and two steel guns, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Roberts, attacked and burnt a large village called Taikoom, consisting of 200 houses, about five miles distant. The road leading to the village was very strongly stockaded, but on the first position being burned, the enemy appeared to lose heart, and retired to the village, which was situated on a naturally strong hill, and was also stockaded. The enemy were in great numbers, and evidently intended to defend the village. The artillery were brought into action at 1,200 yards, and made admirable practice; the second shell bursting in the middle of the village. The infantry then advanced under cover of the artillery fire, and stormed the village, which was taken without the loss of a man on our side. The road crossed a mountain 6,000 feet high, and Colonel Roberts reports heavier guns could not have been taken up the precipitous sides. A second detachment was sent towards our last camp to burn our dead, which had been hurriedly buried. The Looshais had not visited the spot; their dead were lying about as on the previous day: they are to be collected and burnt. The death of two of Poiboi's chief men is reported. Our smooth-bore ammunition was found on some of the dead bodies, thus identifying the men as connected with last year's raids. No attempt has been made so far to fire on us or our convoys, the result doubtless of the loss inflicted on the enemy, which the Looshais in camp report to have been very heavy. My wound is progressing very favourably.

From General *Brownlow*, C. B.

Syloo Savoong, 27th January 1872.—Rutton Pooea has not yet returned from his mission to the Howlongs. Bundoola and one or two other powerful chiefs have declared their willingness to give up their captives, and I am sanguine that the others will follow their example. As they are spread over a large extent of country, Rutton Pooea's mission may take more time than I have given him. My difficulty is so to act as not to lose time, and yet to avoid a collision with the minor chiefs nearest to us, which might alarm the rest and put an end to further negotiations. I have ordered Mary Winchester to be sent to Chittagong, where she will remain in charge of the Commissioner, pending instructions regarding her disposal.

EXTRACT TELEGRAM from General *Bourchier*, C. B., to the Secretary to Government of India, Military Department, Calcutta; dated the 29th January 1872.

We reconnoitre onwards to-day preparatory to a move in a few days. The wounded are all doing well; they leave to-day for the nearest hospital, at station, No. 10; my arm is getting on famously; weather very cold, but fine.

TELEGRAM from Personal Assistant to Commissioner, Chittagong, to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department, Calcutta; dated the 31st January 1872.

Mary Winchester delivered to Colonel Tytler at Demagiri yesterday. Commissioner has gone to Rangamuttee to bring her here.

TELEGRAM from General *Bourchier*, C. B., Station No. 12, through Station No. 6; dated the 1st February 1872.

Poiboi has been informed that in consequence of his opposing our advance on the 25th and 26th instant, he will not now be received until he has paid a fine of metnas, goats, pigs, fowls, and unhusked rice. We carefully spared his two first villages and sent messengers to him to say that no injury should be done to his people, villages, or crops, so long as we were unmolested. Some of the live stock, and a small quantity of rice was brought in yesterday, and there is every reason to believe that our demand will be satisfied without our having to use force. We have collected a good deal of rice in the neighbourhood, and all available coolies are busy husking it. The rice is of the best quality and very much appreciated. We march onwards to morrow. All well; weather lovely.

(No. 25 of 1872.)

(Separate.)

To His Grace the Duke of *Argyll*, K. T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Military Department, Fort William,
16 February 1872.

My Lord Duke,

IN continuation of our Despatch, No. 23, of this date, we have the honour to forward copies of further telegrams relative to the progress of the Looshai Field Force.

We are, &c.
(signed) *John Strachey.*
Napier of Magdala.
&c. *&c.*

From Brigadier General *Brownlow*, C.B.; dated 2nd February 1872.

30*th January*, *Syloo Savoonga*.—I WAS prepared to move against the Howlongs yesterday, when I learnt that a police subadar, who had been sent with Rutton Pooea to see him to a certain point on his mission to that tribe, had, contrary to instructions, followed him into their country where he now is. The subadar, who has been to the Howlongs before on political errands, writes that if we wait a few days the chiefs will come in, but that if we go on and there is any fighting, both Rutton Pooea and himself will be in danger of their lives. This has placed me in a very difficult position. If we are to meet the other column, it is all-important that we should come to terms with the Howlongs, but at the same time delay may be the object of the latter.

Captain Lewin strongly urges our remaining stationary till we hear again from the subadar. A detachment started on the 28th, with survey party, and their signal fires were seen last night 12 miles to the north. They return on the 3rd.

From Brigadier General *Brownlow*, C.B., dated 2nd February 1872.

Syloo Savoonga, 30*th January*.—Mr. COCHRANE, the civil officer at Raugamuttee, announces an attack on the police post of Paindoo, 69 miles to the south of this. He says the Bohmong reports them as Shendoos and Howlongs, but the jemadar in command states that they were coomies and Tipperahs living in our own district under the authority of the Bohmong, and that he can identify them. The deputy commissioner whose charge I made over the police posts to the south of Kassalong, has gone to Pyndoo to investigate matters. The attack was repulsed, one policeman killed and three wounded.

From Brigadier General *Bourchier*, C. B., No. 12 Station; dated 2nd February 1872.

IN the name of the column, I return sincere thanks to Government for the congratulatory message. We move to-day; hope to reach Sellam, Poiboy's head-quarters, to-morrow. Arm going on very well.

From General *Bourchier*, C. B.; dated the 3rd February 1872.

2nd February.—Marched yesterday eight miles towards Poiboi's stronghold, "Sellam," without a shot being fired; crossed a ridge nearly 6,000 feet high. Hope to reach the village to-day. Troops and coolies with the advance in good health and spirits. A few cases of cholera have occurred at Tipai Mookh and No 6 Station. Every possible care is being taken, under Dr. Buckle's able superintendence, to prevent the spread of the disease.

From General *Bourchier*, C.B.; dated the 5th February 1872.

3rd February.—Occupied "Sellam," Poiboi's principal village, yesterday, without opposition; elevation, 5,750 feet. The village is strongly stockaded, and consists of several hundred well-built houses. During the night a fire occurred accidently, which was with great difficulty put out by the troops. The fear of this occuring again, and the great advantage that will accrue from the people returning to the village have decided me on moving camp a short distance onwards towards Lalboora, where I shall halt until sufficient supplies are collected to enable me to make the six marches still left to Chumpaie Lalboora's chief village. Poiboi's people seem most anxious to come to terms, and have evidently had enough of fighting. I decline, however, dealing with anyone but Poiboi himself. There are no fresh cases of cholera in the rear, and from the last report the disease does not appear to be epidemic. All well in the advance.

From General *Brownlow*, C.B.; dated the 8th February 1872.

Syloo Savoonga, 5th February.—The police subadar has returned to Demagiri from the Howlongs, and reports that the chiefs, though desirous of making their submission, are afraid to come into camp. Two or three of them say they will send in their captives at once. These represent the southern section of the tribe, and can be dealt with hereafter from Demagiri, but as those in front of us have made no overtures beyond the surrender of Mary Winchester, I shall move against them, as soon as my commissariat arrangements will permit. Three formidable rivers and ranges intervene between us and Benkooeea, the most powerful of the northern chiefs, and it will take 20 days to reach him and return to this. Rutton Pooea has not yet come back, but I fear we cannot expect more from him than he has done.

From General *Bourchier*, C.B., to General *Brownlow*, C.B. *viâ* Dianapore, No. 14 Station, through No. 7 Station; dated the 9th February 1872.

7th February.—I congratulate you heartily on having rescued Mary Winchester; I am waiting for supplies to move on Lalboora; had rain; weather very cold; all well. Latitude 23° 47′ 52″. Longitude 93° 19′ 30″.

From General *Brownlow*, C.B.

Syloo Savoonga, 6th February 1872.—With reference to message to deputy commissioner, Cachar, dated 29th January. If Sookpilal has taken Lall Jee ka son of Saboonga, he should be required to keep him, pending arrangements hereafter for an exchange of captives with the Sylhoos in case they do not come to terms now. We have so much to do with the Howlongs, that we shall not be able to visit Sookpilal, but our close proximity will, I hope, enable the Cachar authorities to put some pressure on him if necessary.

From General *Brownlow*, C.B.

Syloo Savoonga, 7th February.—I expect to return from my raid on the northern Howlongs by the 1st March, when I shall commence to withdraw gradually along my present line of operations. Should an attack on the southern portion of the tribe be found necessary, I shall conduct it from Demagiri, and it will probably occupy us till the 15th idem. The want of coolies prevents my moving two columns simultaneously. Under any circumstances it seems to me that by the latter date, I can well spare one of my regiments, and beg that the means of transport from Chittagong to Calcutta may be made available accordingly, *id est*, on the 15th. A crowd of troops and coolies waiting below Demagiri for embarkation is to be avoided. I shall keep them on high lands as long as I can. Scurvy is beginning to show itself in the force. We are having stormy weather and rain.

From Brigadier General *Bourchier*, C.B., to Brigadier General *Brownlow*, C.B.; dated the 10th February 1872.

8th February.—I hope to leave this on the 12th instant, and reach Lalboorah, chief village, on the 17th, allowing for a few days' halt there. We ought, if all goes well, to commence our retirement from Dalboorah territory between the 20th and 25th of the month. The retirements of the two columns should, in my opinion, be simultaneous if possible, and I shall be glad to hear whether the above arrangements will suit you. In the event of my not receiving any reply from you, I shall prepare to leave the country about the time named, and hope to have everything cleared out of Tipai Mookh by the 20th March. The dates given above are of course approximate. I will therefore keep you constantly informed by telegraph of my movements.

From General *Bourchier*, C.B., No. 14 Station, through No. 7 Station, to General *Brownlow*, C.B., *viâ* Damagiri; dated the 11th February 1872.

9th February.—On reaching Lalboorah Chief's village we shall be in about latitude 23 degrees 30 minutes; longitude 93 degrees 25 minutes: this is of course only approximate. We start from this on the 12th, and hope to arrive at Lalboorah's village about the 17th; and as, from your telegram dated Syloo Savoonga, we learn you are moving eastward, it is possible we may be somewhere near each other by that time on the night of the 20th, therefore at eight o'clock I will fire rockets and burn blue lights, repeating the same the next night at the same hour. Reply by rockets if you see our signals. Rain has passed off; weather frosty and fine; thermometer at night 33 Fahrenheit.

TELEGRAM from General *Bourchier* C.B., No. 14 Station, through No. 7 Station; received 14th instant, No 157; dated the 13th February 1872.

12th February.—Just starting for Lalboorah with 400 infantry and two guns. Munnies from the two nearest villages ahead came in last night. Lolkum, Lalboorah's brother, is said to be awaiting our arrival at the nearest of the two. Colonel Rattray with men (one?) hundred of the 42nd arrived here yesterday, and will command in my absence. Weather very fine but frosty; all well. Arrangements will be made for letters being forwarded on daily.

From General *Bourchier*, C.B.; dated 15th February 1872.

13th February.—Marched yesterday 9½ miles in a south-east direction to Tulcheng, a village said to belong partly to Poiboi and partly to Lalboora; the road was very easy, and although we descended 1,600 feet and ascended near as much afterwards, the coolies all reached camp before dark. We passed through one village, and several stockades built with considerable skill, but encountered no opposition; a few armed Looshais retired as we advanced; the inhabitants remained in the village, outside of which we are now encamped. Poiboi followed us from "Sellam," and was seen this morning by Hurree Thakoor, an official of Mr. Edgar's, but intense fear seems to prevent his coming into camp. We continue our march to-day.

(No. 26 of 1872.)

(Separate.)

To His Grace the Duke of *Argyll*, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Military Department, Fort William,
16 February 1872.

My Lord Duke,

WITH reference to our letters, Nos. 370 and 380 of the 8th and 13th December 1871, we now beg to forward further detailed reports from the officers commanding the Looshai expeditionary force regarding the progress of their respective columns.

We are, &c.
(signed) *J. Strachey*,
Napier of Magdala,
&c. &c.

EXTRACT REPORT from Brigadier General *G. Bourchier*, C.B., Commanding Cachar Column, Looshai Expeditionary Force, to the Quarter Master General, No. 297 L; dated 4th December 1871.

I BEG to report, for the information of his Excellency the Commander in Chief, that the Muntrie Raipa not having returned, we were left to our own devices to find out the road towards Tipai Mookh; but as we were dependent on water carriage for our stores, as far as that place, it was evident our encampments must be as near as possible to the river. Previous to my arrival, Colonel Nuthall, with a small party of the 44th, had traced out a path some three miles into the forest, and with the Sappers, who arrived on the 28th, continued the trace for about six miles, where it struck the river, which spot has been cleared for Station No. 1. The head quarters wing of the 44th Regiment Native Infantry, following the Sappers, have completed this portion of the road, which to-day will be quite practicable for lightly laden elephants. The Sappers and Colonel Nuthall's detachment are 4 (four) miles ahead. Colonel Roberts has just returned after examining the first two miles, and reports the track admirable; the 44th Regiment of Native Infantry have moved upon this portion to-day. The head quarters wing 22nd Native Infantry and wing 44th, had in the meantime, been at work between Allnee and Bhoobundhur; but as I was anxious to put as much labour as possible upon this advanced portion of the road, and might require supports, I ordered both these detachments into Mynadhur, whence they will advance to-morrow and next day, the 5th and 6th instant; the 42nd Native Infantry and wing 22nd Native Infantry replacing them on the Allnee and Boobundhur road. The Royal Artillery march with the 42nd Native Infantry. The whole of the force, it will then be seen, is employed between Allnee and the advanced point, four miles ahead of Station No. 1.

Since my last report, the telegraph between Cachar and Mynadhur has been completed and opened to the latter station, and the wire is partially stretched past this towards the most advanced post.

I have great pleasure in reporting that the terrible outbreak of cholera among the coolies, brought up by Captain Hedayut Ali, has been completely stamped out; and I trust 550 will be available for the column.

I have requested the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar to entertain sufficient to fill up the casualties, which will not be as heavy as was at first anticipated.

I have the honour to forward two memoranda, the one detailing the precautions to be adopted in camp and on the line of march, the latter for regulating the quantity of baggage and its transport. Both these, with few alterations, were drawn up by Colonel Roberts, V.C., whose services are invaluable to me.

I also forward, herewith, copy of a Despatch from Mr. Edgar, to the Government of Bengal in the Judicial Department. I quite agree with Mr. Edgar as to the position which Sookpilal and Poiboi will probably be forced into, and previous to receipt of this letter had pointed out to Mr. Edgar the difficulty of Sookpilal's position, which might account for the non-return of *his* messengers from this chief. However this is, as he says, all surmise. Referring to the 5th paragraph of Mr. Edgar's letter, I cannot think all was done that might have been done for either the Bhoobun mountain road *viâ* Monierkhall to Mynadhur, or the road to that station *viâ* Luckeepore. Colonel Roberts reports that the road to Monierkhall was hardly passable, and over the mountains impracticable, and with regard to the road *viâ* Luckeepore, had inquiries been made from the planters, a road which I have lately travelled with Colonel Roberts, requiring scarcely any repair, and no bridges, might have been used on the left bank of the Barak as far as the ghat at the Allnee garden, and beyond that, the native track to the Mynadhur garden was perfectly well known to the planters, but required altering to adapt it for the transit of an army, and for this purpose the executive engineer's services should have been made available. The whole of the troops and coolies are in excellent health and spirits. The water in the Barak is falling, but I hope to get up our stores to Tipai Mookh.

Every detachment and man leaving Mynadhur is supplied with 2 0 days' food, besides which we have moving with us about 140 boats carrying supplies for 2,000 men for (15) fifteen days.

The services of Mr. Patch of the police have been made over to me by the Bengal Government; he is really indefatigable in the management of the boats, and will, when we have secured our position at Tipai Mookh, ply backwards and forwards to Mynadhur with his fleet.

From Colonel *P. S. Lumsden*, C.S.I., Quarter Master General, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, Calcutta, No. 75 (Looshai); dated Army Head Quarters, Delhi, the 22nd January 1872.

I AM directed by the Right Honourable the Commander in Chief to submit, for the information of Government, the accompanying copy of a Despatch, No. 334 L, dated 12th December 1871, received from Brigadier General G. Bourchier, C.B., commanding Cachar column, Looshai expeditionary force, showing the position of the troops and detailing the progress made up to that date.

2. His

2. His Excellency would draw the special attention of Government to the concluding part of para. 4 of the above Despatch, wherein Brigadier General Bourchier expresses his fears as to the ability of the already over-taxed commissariat officers to undertake the control of a large number of coolies, and to provide effectively for their care, and the constant supervision of which they are in need.

From Brigadier General *G. Bourchier*, C.B., Commanding Cachar Column, Looshai Expeditionary Force, to the Quarter Master General, No. 334 L.; dated Camp Tipai Mookh, the 12th December 1871.

In continuation of my last report, No. 297, dated 4th instant, from Camp No. 1, about six miles from Mynadhur, in which the disposition of force under my command was given, I have now the honour to forward, for the information of his Excellency the Commander in Chief, a memorandum showing their present position, and a sketch map from which it will be seen that we have advanced to and occupied in force the point which was considered the base of our military operations, and beyond which water carriage will not be available.

2. I had hoped on leaving Cachar that some information would have been obtainable from the Muntree Roopa regarding the road (he joined me at Mynadhur), and was as ignorant as a child as to any track which cou'd be possibly made available for our advance. Not 100 yards from Station 4, I was shown a track called "the Muntree's path," which led me up the almost perpendicular face of a cliff, and wherever a difficult point was reached, he was unable to assist us. We have made the road up to No. 4 Station (to No. 3 practicable for elephants), and about three miles further on; a distance we calculate 68 miles from Luckeepoor, so that I am not exaggerating the difficulties of the road we have had to find and make. I beg to state that for two days parties were out in all directions between Nos. 3 and 4 Stations, searching for a line of country on the right bank of the Barak, which might be made practicable for elephants, but without success.

3. We had then to search on the left bank, and last night succeeded in completing the track to No. 4; with a party of Sappers I have for the last two days been endeavouring to find a track onwards, still on the left bank. The first three miles was fairly easy, but when within two miles of Tipai, the hills on both sides fell almost perpendicularly with high cliffs into the river, and after spending the whole day in endeavouring to find a track, was utterly beaten: I got round the rocks, but to render the track passable for elephants would be the work of weeks. However, these are difficulties which with careful search I am confident we shall soon overcome. I mention them merely, thinking the Government may consider the progress of the column not so rapid as it might be.

4. Mr. Edgar, writing of the road from Luckeepoor to Mynadhur, says, "I am not at all surprised that you were astonished at the route when you saw it; it is a very nasty country." This was after traversing it himself, and after it had been immensely improved by our working parties.

On the 9th December, I proceeded by water to Tipai Mookh, and formed a sketch of the position; it is amply sufficient for our purposes, and requires little clearance. It is naturally very strong, but the forest will be cleared for some distance beyond our line of stockade. The whole of the commissariat stores arrived, have been landed there, go-downs and hospitals are under construction; it is occupied by 100 men of the 44th and the head quarters wing of the 22nd. The remainder of the force will be moved up as we advance, but from sanitary motives and economy of stores, not wishing to consume more provisions brought from a distance than necessary, I have distributed the different detachments along the road in my rear, where also they are employed on the roads.

The boat service will be continued under the management of Mr. Patch, until five months' supplies are collected at Tipai. There is at present plenty of water in the river, but between No. 3 Station and Tipai, the rapids are frequent and very strong. I have detained 56 canoes at No. 4 Station, in case the river should rapidly fall. I feel sure his Excellency will understand how anxiously I feel regarding my carriage, which will increase as I advance beyond Tipai. I cannot for some time bring the elephants to the front, and as the coolies brought up by Captain Hedayut Ali have cases of cholera lurking among them, I shall for some time be deprived of their services. I cannot conceive how the commissariat will take care of the coolies which will be made over to them; that they should be constantly supervised as to their loads, and being under cover at night, is essential, and the powers of the three commissariat officers are now over-taxed.

5. The telegraph has been brought up to Station No. 3, where a station will be opened to-morrow, but its further advance will be delayed from want of wires, that used between Company Gunge and Chattack having been supplied from the stock intended for this time, and the quantity so expended has not yet been repaid; it is expected in a few days; I cannot regret the delay when I think of the immense advantage the line to Chattack has been to us.

I have thought it right to bring the difficulties we have laboured under to notice, at the same time though not progressing quite as fast as I could wish. We have not any sickness in camp to signify; the climate is splendid, and the forests are far less infested with insects than

I had expected. Reconnoitring parties will proceed backwards from Tipai to hit the track towards No. 4, and another in the direction of Kholel onwards, the main body being employed in building and clearing the forest.

From Colonel *P. S. Lumsden*, C.S.I., Quarter Master General, to the Secretary to the Government or India, Military Department, Calcutta, No. 34 (Looshai); dated Army Head Quarters, Delhi, the 9th January 1872.

In forwarding Despatch, No. 367. D, dated 18th December 1871, from the Brigadier General commanding left column, Looshai expedition, I am directed by the Right Honourable the Commander in Chief to draw notice to that officer's anxiety regarding the debilitated and depressed condition of the coolies brought from the Darjeeling frontier, a also to the Government dhaos and kookries supplied in Calcutta being of the very worsst description.

2. The Right Honourable the Commander in Chief considers it most undesirable that the Munnipoor troops should undertake any operations not directed by Brigadier General Bourchier, and that any action taken by that force, except in conformity with the Brigadier General's plan of operations, may lead to unfortunate complications and inconvenient results.

From Brigadier-General *Bourchier*, C.B., Commanding, Cachar Column, Looshai Expeditionary Force, to the Quarter Master General, No. 367 L.; dated Camp No. 5, Station, seven miles beyond Tipai Mookh, 18th December 1871.

In my last Despatch, dated the 12th instant, I reported my arrival at Tipai Mookh, with the Sappers, the head quarters wing of 22nd Native Infantry, and 200 men of the 44th. In that letter I explained, for the information of his Excellency the Commander in Chief, the difficulties I had experienced in making the last portion of the road, but these difficulties increased as I reached the Tipai. The hills were, I may say, encased in rocks, but by leaving the river, and keeping our trace more inland, these difficulties have been overcome.

To illustrate how difficult and impossible it is to count on successful co-operations in this country, two parties started on the road, which still baffled us. On the 14th each had a bugler, and commenced work at different ends, hoping to meet, each knowing the direction the other was working on; they never saw or heard anything of each other during the day.

2. At Tipai Mookh, two hospitals and two commissariat go-downs have been built, and the port is being stockaded; a bridge has been built across the Tipai.

3. Mr. Edgar, who joined me on the evening of the 12th, and was very anxious that Kholel should be occupied as soon as possible for reasons I approved of, his reasons which are contained in his letter attached, and therefore on the 13th, after having reconnoitred the road myself, pushed on 200 men of the 44th to a camp about five miles towards Kholel; the road was well marked, and easily worked. In the meantime, I ordered onwards the 42nd from Mynadhur, and the remaining wing of the 44th straight into Tipai Mookh, where they arrived yesterday the 16th. The remainder of the 22nd will also be moved on in their turn. The Royal Artillery men are with their elephants at No. 2 Station, waiting until the road to Tipai Mookh is reported ready. Their guns and equipment, as also the ordnance park, have arrived at Tipai by water. Commissariat stores are collected there in abundance, and the quantity of water in the Barak is sufficient for 100 maund boats; there are, however, several strong rapids, which delay the fleets.

4. The Telegraph Department have opened a station between Nos. 3 and 4 Stations, and are working on. The wire they required has been sent on from Cachar.

5. I am still very anxious about the carriage of my column. I have heard that the coolies brought by Hedayut Ali are so debilitated and depressed, that they will never be fit for the purposes of the expedition. I have ordered Dr. White to report on this subject without delay, but I fear it is too true. The Deputy Commissioner of Cachar will, I believe, be able to supply some coolies, and I hope for the 300 ordered by the Bengal Government; still my progress must be slow, as long as I have such a small number at my disposal. Mr. Edgar has also assisted me very much by placing at my disposal a number of coolies originally entertained for civil purposes.

6. I left Tipai Mookh yesterday, and joined Colonel Nuthall's wing of the 44th and Sappers, at a camp five miles distant, and marched on four miles this morning, the road continuing very good.

7. I regret to say that the dhaos supplied by Government are of the very worst description, and are perfectly useless. I have requested the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar to send

send me 400 local dhaos, which are excellent. The Government kookries are as bad as the dhaos; the other tools are good.

8. We are entering upon a fine timber forest, and are now ascending gradually to the Senboong range. The weather is all we could wish, but the cold nights and hot days are conducive to attacks of fever, which, without proving serious, deprive us of the services of a certain number of men daily.

9. Mr. Edgar informs me that he does not anticipate any opposition this side of Kholel, but that further south-east, towards the villages of Vonolel and Poiboi, posts are being stockaded.

10. General Nuthall reports an attack on a Munnipooree working party between Nalpee and Cheeboo, south of Moirang (not marked) by Looshais, in which a Munnipoor subadar was killed, but that the Looshai loss was 12, five heads being brought into Munnipoor. I had directed General Nuthall, previous to my leaving Cachar, not to allow the Munnipoor troops for the present to proceed south of Yolpee, and have called upon him to explain why they were allowed to proceed towards Cheeboo, which it is said to be strongly stockaded.

11. I march onwards to-day, 4 miles, to near the top of the range, about 2,600 feet elevation. The road was reconnoitred by Colonel Roberts and Mr. Edgar yesterday, who reported favourably on it.

12. I trust nothing will prevent me pushing on to Kholel without check, for I feel that our presence there, and determined preparation for further advance, will drive the tribes to show their colours, either for or against us, which they would not do if by vacillating movements or delay we led them to doubt our being able to move into their country in such a manner as best pleased us.

EXTRACT Paragraph from Diary of the Civil Officer with the Cachar Column, Looshai Expeditionary Force.

14. "I have advised the Brigadier General to push on even a small advance party to Kholel, on political grounds. Situated as we are at Tipai Mookh, in a valley, we have not the same opportunities of opening communications with neutral or friendly villages that we should have if we were in occupation of a position like Kholel, which in a manner commands the villages of Impanu, Khalkom, and Salhi on one side, and those of Poiboi on the other. Besides this, it seems to me important that we should at once show the Looshais, by pushing on, that we really mean to go through their country. I have learned from various sources that there is an idea in the villages that we cannot get beyond our water carriage at Tipai Mookh, and that our intentions are to remain here, until the villages make some sort of submission to us. While such an idea remains in the minds of the chiefs and their people, they will naturally be undecided about the attitude most expedient to take towards us. But an advance to Kholel would probably have the effect of making them choose their course, and declare themselves either friendly or hostile. The Brigadier General in command of the force has approved of the move recommended by me, and intends to advance with a small force on the 16th instant."

Copy of the above forwarded for information to Brigadier General G. Bourchier, C.B., commanding Cachar column, Looshai expeditionary force.

(signed) *J. W. Edgar*,
Civil Officer.

Camp, 2 March, from Tipai Mookh,
18 December 1871.

From Brigadier General *G. Bourchier*, C.B., Commanding Cachar Column, Looshai Expeditionary Force, to the Quartermaster General, No. 444 L.; dated Camp, No. 7 Station, 31st December 1871.

IN my letter No. 411 L., dated 25th instant, I expressed my regret that I had been obliged at the outset of our operations to commence with open hostilities, but the sequel will show that the demonstration of our powers, the punishment inflicted on the enemy, and our determination to go when and where we pleased, have, both in a military and political point of view, been productive of apparently the most beneficial results.

2. On the morning of Christmas-day, I sent Captains Lightfoot and Robertson with a detachment of the 44th Native Infantry, with orders to burn every village and granary they could come across. Twenty-five granaries were destroyed with immense quantities of grain. They returned in the evening with the loss of one man, who was wounded close to the camp by a sharp-shooter. A Looshai was killed by their detachment; his arms and body were sent into camp and burnt. The enemy much exasperated at the loss of their

comrade, fired on the spot where his body was being burnt, and continued doing so until late at night.

3. Having now accomplished the object I had in view in making this detour, and being five miles from my line of communications and onward progress, and encumbered with many sick and wounded, I determined to return to the banks of the Tipai. This was effected without a single casualty on the 26th, and the care taken to protect the long line of coolies with stores and entrenching tools, the sick and wounded, &c., speaks volumes for the skill with which this duty was performed by the troops.

4. Convoys had been passing daily between our advanced position and the Tipai, and it was not until the village we occupied was fired, that the enemy had the least suspicion that we were evacuating it. An advanced guard of the 22nd Punjab Infantry led, followed by the column of non-combatants and wounded, guarded on each flank by a detachment of the 44th Native Infantry under Captain Lightfoot, the picquets still keeping up a fire on the enemy. Colonel Nuthall commanded the rear guard, on which the picquets, under the command of Captain Robertson, closed in extended order, keeping the enemy at bay.

5. When aware of our having burnt and left the village, the enemy followed howling and hooting, but kept carefully concealed in the forest, which continued along our route for about half-a-mile, but as soon as we emerged into the open jhooms, they commenced firing upon our rear guard, and I may say the manner in which Colonel Nuthall and Captain Robertson retired from hill to hill, each through the line of skirmishers in his rear, was as pretty a sight as I could have wished to witness.

6. My great object was to detract the enemy's attention entirely from the main column, which by this time was well on the road home. Half-way we halted, where Captain Robertson and a detachment burnt a few more jhooms, which had escaped us when we advanced.

7. During our absence, the head quarters wing of the 22nd Punjab Native Infantry had arrived, and on the 27th and 28th had been employed in clearing the forest. I had found that it was a mistake to clear the immediate vicinity, but that the most effectual protection was to leave a belt of forest round the camp, clearing beyond it as far as possible, piling the trees on the side nearest the camp, to form a rampart, with spaces cleared inside in the line of defence at intervals for picquets and sentries. This work was done by the 44th Native Infantry, while the Sappers and 22nd Punjab Native Infantry were employed on the advanced road towards Poiboi's villages. This road had previously been reconnoitered by Colonel Roberts and Mr. Edgar, and found to be very difficult and rocky, but it will be made practicable for elephants in a short time.

8. As the firing on our camp on the Tipai, and on our communications in the rear had sensibly increased, it became a matter of consideration to me whether our re-return from the burnt villages might not have released numbers of men from watching us and been interpreted into a sign of weakness, and as I felt constant harassing the only way to make these people who had commenced hostilities feel our power, having heard that there were more villages on the right of the Kholel ridge, I determined to proceed on the 29th instant with a wing of the 42nd brought up for that purpose in that direction.

9. Keeping along the crest of the mountain, our advance guard was fired into and a sepoy slightly wounded. After proceeding about three miles we met Dharpong, the muntrie, from Poiboi, who had come into Cachar, and left us on the 18th. He came to sue for peace on behalf of the Kholel people and Poiboi, acknowledging that the former have suffered severely, both in life and property. He wanted us not to go on; but as one object I had in view was to escort Captain Badgeley and his survey party to the highest hill of the ridge, I declined, and proceeded to the village which we had before occupied. Thus far only giving in to their earnest solicitation, that the sepoys, of whom they seemed to have an intense dread, should not press upon them, and that for the present at any rate hostilities should cease. To this also we agreed.

10. The muntrie decked in orange-coloured clothing and crowned with a plume of feathers, climbed a high dead tree, and uttered a yell, which might have frightened the dead. This was responded to from mountain to mountain all around, and from that moment every sign of hostility ceased. The Looshais emerging from rocks and caves came amongst us, and as confidence increased among them, a party accompanied Captain Badgeley of the survey to the upper village, which we had burnt. A woman and child also visited them.

11. At the time the muntrie came among us, I sent word to the officer commanding on the Tipai to cease hostilities, unless the camp or our communication were fired upon. A Looshai accompanied our messenger into camp, and there repeated the yells of peace to the neighbourhood, which had been initiated by his chief, the muntrie. A number of Looshais accompanied the muntrie on our return, and are now in our camp, some actuated by motives of curiosity, others perhaps waiting to accompany us, but their motives can only be matters of conjecture.

12. On

12. On the 30th and 31st all was quiet in camp, and Mora Muntrie from Impanu, and all the muntries from Kholel but two, arrived, Poiboi's people bringing with them an elephant's tusk as a peace offering.

13. I was struck, as the emissary Darpong followed me down the hill from Kholel, by his constantly saying "Bara dukh hooa," intimating the punishment and loss the Kholel people had sustained, some of whom asked Mr. Edgar if, as we had destroyed all their villages and crops, he would supply them from Cachar; of course no promises were made. He is now investigating their statements as to the cause of their having commenced hostilities.

14. They state, and I am inclined to believe it is true from their not having fired on our advance as we crossed the Tipai the first day, that they did not intend to attack us, but a few impetuous youths could not be restrained, which was the commencement of the general attack on the column. I may here mention that Mr. Edgar has accompanied me in every expedition, and is I believe becoming quite a soldier at heart. I am not relaxing one iota of my preparations for an advance hence; the road onwards is being made, and commissariat stores which I had run a little ahead of, are being here collected.

15. In a separate report to the Adjutant General, I have detailed the attack upon the elephants and camp at Tipai Mookh. It is much to be regretted, but is one of the contingencies of a wild field service such as we are engaged in, and will be met, and remedied as we best can.

16. I herewith enclose copy of a communication this day forwarded to Major General Nuthall, Officiating Political Agent at Munnipoor. On the 19th October I explained to the Munnipoor Rajah through him my views regarding the employment of the Contingent. Personally and by letter at Cachar, on the 23rd December 1871, I repeated and explained those views to the agent, which I informed him had the entire approval of his Excellency the Commander in Chief, and they had been forwarded to Government. I subsequently heard of the skirmish between the Munnipoor Contingent and the Looshais, and on the 19th December again addressed General Nuthall, directing that my orders were to be carried out in their integrity, and that he was not to advance beyond Tseklapi; this I did consequent on General Nuthall's report that the skirmish had occurred in advance of that post while a road was being cut for a reconnoissance.

17. On the 15th December he writes to me that the Rajah trusts I will not insist on the establishment of these posts, which, as a support to my left, is an essential point in my arrangements. Up to that date, no objection on the score of difficulties of country had ever been urged. At the same time, instead of doing this, General Nuthall establishes himself at Tseklapi with 1,803 of the Contingent (the whole effective force being 1,957). (*Vide* return attached to his letter No. 106 D., dated 25th August 1871, to the Foreign Department).

18. Poiboi's muntrie and emissary, the very first moment we met them, stated that the Munnipoor troops were far south even of Cheeboo, and although we might be willing to grant them a cessation of hostilities, they had no guarantee that they would not be attacked by the Munnipoories. They begged me to send a letter to General Nuthall across country; I shall do so, as also by the post.

19. On the 9th October, General Nuthall took his stand upon the idea, which he wrote to me, that although he was only to accompany them in a civil capacity, he would actually be the commander. He therefore is, I consider, entirely responsible for the disregard which has been paid to my orders regarding the employment of the Contingent.

20. These orders were sent after deep consideration. I consulted Mr. Edgar and Colonel McCulloch, the latter of whom plainly told me it was madness for me to think of entrusting to the Munnipoor Contingent the task of keeping open my communications, which, as I wished to employ them fully, I thought at one time of doing.

21. Of course beyond the statement of the Looshais, I have no evidence that the Munnipore Contingent has advanced even to Cheeboo, but I have reason to complain that the posts I ordered to be maintained on my left have not been established, and no intimation given me that there was any difficulty as to this arrangement.

22. The Looshais themselves state that, from the occupation of the advanced positions far south on the Cachar and Sylhet frontiers, the advance of a force from Chittagong and the rapid advance of this column, they were being encircled by a chain from which they could not escape, and it was in anticipation that such would be the result, that I wished my left supported by posts from a point somewhat eastward of Tipai Mookh towards Moirang.

23. Attached is a sketch of the ground we have traversed since leaving Tipai Mookh.

From Brigadier General *G. Bourchier*, C. B., Commanding Cachar Column, Looshai Expeditionary Force, to the Officiating Political Agent of Munnipoor, No. 1149; dated 31st December 1871.

No. 143, dated 15th December 1871.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter as per margin, reporting the arrival of the last detachment of the Contingent of Munnipoor at Tseklapi.

In reply to the 4th para. thereof, I beg you will be good enough to inform the rajah of Munnipoor that I can see no more difficulty in placing detachments along his frontier than along the frontiers of Cachar and Sylhet, where posts far south have already been occupied by our troops and police, and I beg that he will no longer delay to do his utmost to carry out the instructions already conveyed to him. The positions should be taken up at once, the roads of communication between them being made hereafter. The detachments should of course receive their supplies from the rear.

2. If I read your letter correctly, the rajah has massed some 1,800 men at Tseklapi, instead of putting strong detachments out for the protection of his southern frontier and to support the left flank of my advance, in the same way that the Sylhet and Cachar out-posts support my right flank. May I beg you to be good enough to report if this is the case, and to inform the rajah and the commander of his troops that I will hold them responsible, and will not fail to have their conduct called to account by the Government of India if they neglect to attend to or delay in the execution of the instructions you were requested to convey to them so long ago as the 19th October last.

3. I have now the honour to request you will favour me by informing the rajah and the commander of his troops that I have punished the village of Kholel, and that emissaries from them and from Poiboi are now in my camp, seeking terms from the Government of India. These men say they have heard of the presence of the Munnipore troops at Tseklapi and other places, and they fear that while I have suspended hostilities with their villages, they may be attacked by portions of the Munnipoor troops. I have therefore to request you will see that the commanders of all detachments understand perfectly that they are to make no advance beyond Tseklapi for the defence of the Munnipoor frontier, and that you will remind them of the orders sent by the Government of India in letter No. 2215 P., dated 15th October 1871, from the Secretary in the Foreign Department, to your address, that all negotiations with the Looshai chiefs, even those in the neighbourhood of Munnipoor, are to be made through me, and impress upon all that, as I am now making known to the villages of Kholel and Poiboi the conditions under which I will receive their submission, I must look to all officers in command not to hamper my action by exceeding in any way the orders sent for the position and conduct of the several detachments.

4. I hope you will favour me with the report called for in my second paragraph, as early as possible, and acquaint me of your having conveyed the orders contained in this letter to the rajah and his officers.

P. S.—Since writing the above, fresh men just in from Poiboi report that some of the Munnipoor troops are south of Tseeboo and close to the outposts of Poiboi's villages. I therefore send this letter through them, as the shortest route to reach yourself or some responsible officer of the Contingent, and I beg that on receipt of it, all men of the Contingent or others acting under the orders of Munnipoor officers, may be at once withdrawn to Tseklapi, a report of this having been done, being sent to me by the same channel that I forward this.

A copy of this letter will be sent to you by post *viâ* Cachar and Munnipoor, and to the Government of India through His Excellency the Commander in Chief.

From Brigadier General *G. Bourchier*, C.B., Commanding Cachar Column, Looshai Expeditionary Force, to the Quarter Master General, No. 451 L.; dated Camp Toweebhoom, the 3rd January 1872.

IN continuation of my letter No. 444 L., 31st ultimo, and especially with reference to paragraphs 16–22, I have the honour to forward herewith copy of a communication from Major General Nuthall, reporting the arrival at Tseklapi of a further party of armed Kookies, and 40 Khoonjoi Kookies; and that the Contingent was about to move forward from that post for reconnoissance. This confirms the evidence of Poiboi's emissaries, that the Munnipooree force was advancing, and in the letter describing the skirmish with the Looshais, he states that the road being cut was in the direction of Cheeboo.

When in Cachar, in November last, I had a long interview with General Nuthall, who complained bitterly of the ignorance in which he had been kept by the Government as to the object of the expedition. I explained fully to him that it was not to be considered simply as one of retaliation, but by a protracted occupation of the country was to exhibit to the Looshai chiefs the powers of the British Government, that their country was at any time

time accessible, and that any aggression on their part was certain to entail punishment upon them.

I gave General Nuthall the documents enunciating these principles to read, and moreover explained to him that the civil and military powers as to the operation of the column and employment of the Munnipoor contingent was entirely in my hands. That the part I had allotted to the contingent, namely, of establishing posts on the south frontier of Munnipoor, and holding Moirang with a small force to watch the eastern tribes, had met with the entire approval of his Excellency the Commander in Chief, but I positively informed General Nuthall, that no advance was to be made south of Tseklapi. He considered that the contingent should move as far south as Cheeboo, but that proposition I declined to entertain, certainly at that time, or until he received orders to do so from me. His letter No. 143 of the 15th December shows that the contingent has advanced beyond Tseklapi without any reference to me, and that the rajah has not established the posts on my left, but that the force is all concentrated at Tseklapi. I forward herewith a precis of orders, which from time to time have been sent to General Nuthall for communication to the rajah.

His Excellency will consider them, I trust, explicit and definite. The letter dated the 19th December was not received by him when he made his advance. The only possible excuse he could have had for acting in disobedience to the positive orders he had received would have been, if Kamhow, who was avowedly an ally of the Munnipoor and the British Government, had thrown in his lot with the relations of Vonolel (Lalboorah and Tangdong); but in his letter No. 143, dated 18th December 1871, he states that a deputation from Kamhow had waited on the rajah with friendly assurances, so that watching this tribe could not be an excuse for pushing on the contingent.

The advance of the contingent to Tseklapi has had a good effect in making the tribes of Vonolel feel that a net-work of troops was closing around them; but Mr. Edgar and I are both especially anxious to avoid all collision between Poiboi and the Munnipoorees. Our greatest hope of successfully reaching Lalboorah and Tangdong is by maintaining amicable relations with Poiboi, with whom we have no quarrel, and who with the Kholel people, could assist in keeping open our communications. The Munipoor rajah has however no such object, and his wish to advance is simply a matter of retaliation for past wrongs, natural perhaps, but which if encouraged, nay, if not entirely restrained, will, as Mr. Edgar expresses it in his journal, be a premature measure, and might seriously impair the prospects of our success.

From Major General *W. J. Nuthall*, Political Agent, Munnipoor, to Brigadier General *G. Bourchier*, C.B. Commanding Cachar Column, Looshai Expeditionary Force. No. 143, dated Camp Tseklapi, the 15th December 1871.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the last detachment of the Munnipoor contingent, now of strength as per margin, arrived here this day.

Native Officers	148
Buglers	36
Sepoys	1,619
Coolies	1,991
Camp followers	128

Koonjai Contingent.

Native Officers	14
Sepoys	241

2. There has been more delay in moving the contingent here than I expected, owing to the period being that of reaping the crops, and the difficulty of getting such portion as belong to the agricultural population together, until this was accomplished. Rice also could not be supplied for so large a force until it was reaped and cleaned.

3. Before returning from Cachar, I communicated your wishes to the rajah, to have detachments placed along the southern frontier of Munnipoor from about Koong Shangkool to Kowpoori; whilst the head quarters of the contingent took up this position, which I requested him to have occupied at once by a force of two or three hundred men, to be employed in the meantime in opening the communications, and preparing timber for a stockade, which has been done.

4. With reference to the positions of the detachments. the rajah requests me to say, he feels sure you will perceive the insuperable difficulties to his placing detachments in a country so intersected with hills, ravines, and morass, from any one particular place to another; keeping in view the necessity of open communications with them, so that they may support each other, and receive supplies.

5. The Twingching range of hills being already occupied by a strong armed contingent of Koonjai Kookies, under two trustworthy chiefs, Punksama and Ooltung, and the Munnipore Contingent having posted detachments in support, at the places noted in the margin between Moirang and Tseklapi, the rajah hopes that his having strengthened the posts of Bishenpoor, Kowpoom, and Kalanuggur, and placed detachments at the Limetak Noongba, and Koongberoong with a cavalry picquet at each of these places, on the main road, thus forming a complete cordon of troops from this to Kalanuggur, will meet your requirements, and receive your approval.

Lumtapoong.
Koomootsampaboong.
Muttarook.
Kekroo.

6. Before I marched from Neetipat, a deputation from Kamhow, which had waited on the rajah with friendly assurances, was sent by him to me. They expressed a strong desire to be allowed to go forward and attack Vonolel's tribes, and although they received strict injunctions to do nothing of the kind, the rajah and his Munuries are very uneasy and anxious lest they should take the opportunity of the near presence of the troops to effect this purpose.

From Major General *Nuthall*, Political Agent, Munnipore, to Brigadier General *Bourchier*, C.B., Commanding Cachar Column, Looshai Expeditionary Force, No. 144, dated Tseklapi, the 18th December 1871.

In continuation of my Report of the 15th instant, giving you a statement of the strength of the contingent at this place, I have the honour to inform you that yesterday 300 armed Kookies arrived in camp, and to-day 40 more armed Koonjai Kookies sent by the Maharajah.

With such a force, you will understand the safety with which the contingent can now move forward for reconnaissance, and it does so to-morrow.

From Brigadier General *G. Bourchier*, C.B., Commanding Cachar Column, Looshai Expeditionary Force, to the Quartermaster General. No. 478L., dated Camp No. 8 Station, the 8th January 1872.

My last weekly report, dated 31st ultimo, brought me up to the time, when after the punishment of the Kholel tribe, and their suing for peace for themselves and Poiboi through Darpong Muntrie, I returned to the banks of the Toweeboom, at its confluence with the Tipai, and up to the present time, not only our advance, but lines of communication, postal arrangements, &c., have been perfectly unmolested.

2. On the afternoon of the 31st December last, I sent all the wounded back to Tipai Mookh, viz:—

1 of the Sappers and Miners,	3 of the 22nd Punjab Native Infantry,
1 of the 42nd A. L. Infantry,	2 of the 44th Sylhet L. Infantry,
1 of Police and 2 coolies,	a man of the 44th Native Infantry,

shot through the head died after arrival, and one man of the 22nd Punjab Native Infantry was left too dangerously wounded to be moved, but is now doing well. The remainder of the wounded are, also, I am happy to say, progressing favourably at Tipai Mookh.

3. Mora Muntrie, from Impanu, went to Khalkom and Darpong to Poiboi, with information of all that had occurred; the punishment of the Kholel tribes, the cessation of hostilities, &c.; the latter carrying a letter to General Nuthall from me, begging that the Munnipoor contingent might not be advanced beyond Tseklapi, as any collision between it and Poiboi's people would have complicated our action, in a political point of view. No reply has yet been received.

4. On the 2nd instant, Looshais, young and old, came into camp, first timidly, then with more confidence, and seemed quite happy, watching intelligently everything new to them. They brought pumpkins, a few fowls, ginger and yams for barter, and soon seemed to learn that our coin was of some value; what they knew not.

5. I was agreeably surprised with them. They are far removed from the savages I expected to meet, and compare favourably as to cleanliness with other hill tribes. Their wonder at their pipes being lighted with a burning glass, the works of a watch, &c., was intense; there was nothing morose or surly about them, and I feel sure they would be easily managed and taught the value of civilization. Raipa Muntrie's sister and niece came into camp. The sister, who lives at Kholel, is old, and smokes a pipe.

6. In my former report, I stated that by my hurried advance on Kholel I had run ahead of my commissariat; meanwhile the elephants and Major Moore's coolies, 485 strong, have arrived at Tipai Mookh, and it was necessary to establish a postal service from the latter station to No. 7, distant about 20 miles, and there to establish our advanced depôt. Lieutenant Colonel Roberts' memorandum for the management of this service, I annex, and if its arrangements are carried out, we ought to have by the beginning of February two months' supply for everyone in the front, for before I left No. 7, Lieutenant Colonel Davidson had collected food there for 1,000 men for 14 days.

7. I have sent to the Adjutant General a letter from Lieutenant Colonel Davidson, requesting that the non-commissioned officers attached to the coolies, made over to the commissariat, may be left with them. To this I have consented, as it seems to me impossible that the commissariat can look after the coolies without assistance. Lieutenant Colonel Davidson is so short handed, both as to officers and subordinates, that he has never, but on two occasions, been able to meet my head quarters, and then for only a day each time, the whole of the details and the Commissariat Department arrangements for the advance having been made by Colonel Roberts and Captain Thomson. I have now, as a temporary arrangement, placed Captain Cookesley and Lieutenant Fitzgerald at his disposal until their services may be required in the front with their battery. The supply of food to the troops in advance of No. 7 has been arranged for.

8. With regard to the health of the officers, troops and coolies, I regret to say that sickness has been on the increase lately, but this is only what was to have been expected, considering the hard work all have gone through; the variable temperature, consequent

on

on the altitudes at which we have been working, varying from 4,050 to 7,000 feet, since we left Tipai Mookh. Two hundred and fifty of our coolies are now sick at the depôt hospitals between this and Cachar, not including Major Moore's coolies, and on the 1st January 1872, 177 of the troops were in hospital; many of them will join after a time of rest. The type of disease is chiefly diarrhœa, merging into dysentery, from which all have suffered more or less, officers more even in proportion than the men, but I am most thankful to say, up to date, we have had very few deaths from sickness, very little fever or any disease of an endemic nature, which has threatened to affect the corps materially.

9. With regard to our position in a military and political point of view, as far as we can at present see, we are in as good a way to carry out the objects of the Government as we can wish. We are progressing steadily, and the men who have come in from Poiboi seem to court our advance, as the people on their ranges who had a full view of the destruction of the Kholel villages and Jhooms, are naturally anxious as to their fate, and when once they find their property respected, they will in all probability continue their good offices in showing us roads, &c.

10. I may here mention that this morning we came upon an opening, which gave us a magnificent view of the villages and Jhooms of Kholel. Besides those we had burnt, there are many others, very large, and which, had they not submitted, I should have destroyed on the 29th December 1871, and I am convinced that the punishment they received, while not sufficient to inflict a permanent injury, but which they knew would be repeated, if necessary, was the most convincing proof to them of the British power, and the very existence of these unburnt villages, and our knowledge of their whereabouts, will themselves be a guarantee for the safety of our communications, and for the future peace of the frontier.

11. The Looshais in their own way, fought well, defending their villages and jhooms, houses, and had they continued their guerilla style of warfare, creeping up to our picquets and convoys, delivering their fire within a few paces, and flying like lightning down the hill side, our loss would have been more serious, and our communications only kept up under harassing conditions. It is now oozing out by degrees that their loss in men has been severe, and I cannot but feel thankful that the severe punishment dealt out to them had such a good result.

12. Our loss has been up to the present time—

3 Killed, 6 dangerously wounded (2 since dead).
5 Severely, and 3 slightly.

This is irrespective of the elephant attendants at Tipai Mookh. Every effort is being made to ascertain the fate of those who are said to be missing, as also to recover the missing elephants.

13. The survey party are prosecuting the labours at their leisure. I forward a sketch of the camp at Tipai Mookh and of the ground we have passed over since leaving that station.

Copy of a Letter from Brigadier General *Brownlow*, C.B., A. D. C., Commanding Chittagong Column, Looshai Expeditionary Force, to the Quartermaster General, No. 221, dated Demagiree, the 30th November 1871.

I have the honour to submit, for the information of the Right Honourable the Commander in Chief, the following report of the progress of the column under my command up to date.

2. On my arrival at Chittagong on the 28th October, I was met by Captain East, Assistant Quartermaster General, who had preceded me in the early part of the month, and had just returned from Burkhul with full particulars regarding the road and river communications up to that place, and of the work done under the orders of Captain Lewin, Deputy Commissioner of the Hill Tracts, in clearing jungle for encampments, running up sheds for commissariat stores, and temporary shelter for troops at Rangamuttee, Kassalong and Burkhul, on the banks of the Kurnafoolie river.

3. The commissariat arrangements under Major Mackenzie and Captain Case were in a very advanced and satisfactory state; two months' supplies for the whole force having already been pushed on towards Kassalong.

4. The Kurnafoolie is navigable by river steamers as far as Rangamuttee, a distance of 61 miles, thence to Kassalong, 17 miles; boats not drawing more than 18 inches can proceed, and above this latter place to Lower Burkhul, which is about 12 miles, it is only possible to employ country boats drawing some few inches of water.

5. The means at my disposal for moving troops and stores up the river I found to be as follows:—The river steamer "Koel," capable of conveying 270 men; the Commissioner's steam yacht "India," lent for the occasion, on which 150 men could be placed; and 20 large-

sized country boats, which I ordered to be furnished with rough bamboo decks, and each of which would carry 25 men. These numbers were to be carried for a short voyage only of one or one and a half days' duration. Eight of these large boats were retained below Rangamuttee to be towed by the two steamers before mentioned, and 12 were sent above that place.

There were also about 130 country boats with bamboo tops engaged by the Commissariat Department, and which were employed on the upper part of the river for the conveyance of both troops and stores. These boats carried on an average seven armed men. In starting from Chittagong the state of the tide had to be considered, and when this would not allow of the troops proceeding to Rangamuttee in one day, the vessels anchored for the night at Chandragoona, about half-way up, and the men were sent on shore to cook.

6. At Rangamuttee the troops landed and occupied the sheds before referred to, which are capable of sheltering 800 men.

7. Above this place the "Flame," which draws only 15 inches when filled with coal, was engaged in towing four large country boats as far as Kassalong; she does the journey to that place and back again in one day. The remaining large country boats and a certain proportion of those of smaller size were also employed in conveying troops between Rangamuttee and Kassalong; the latter took about seven hours in rowing up, and the former a whole day, and sometimes more.

8. The 2nd Goorkhas, under command of Colonel Macpherson, C.B., V.C., and the 3rd Company Sappers and Miners, arrived at Chittagong on the 5th November. They were encamped for one day at that place in order to rest the men, and to allow of their receiving a ration of meat. On the 7th I left Chittagong in company with the 2nd Goorkhas, and arrived at Rangamuttee on the following day, having left my Brigade Major, Captain Bates, at the former place to receive troops and coolies on arrival, and forward them up the river. On the 9th November brigade head-quarters and the 2nd Goorkhas moved to Kassalong.

9. At Kassalong, which offered great facilities of space, and in the opinion of Surgeon Major Allen, the Senior Medical Officer, promised to be healthy, I determined to establish my first depôt. I found that sheds had been erected here capable of covering about 1,200 men, and that two large commissariat godowns were completed. After my arrival, sites for hospital huts were determined on, and their construction was at once put in hand. The Ordnance conductor was ordered up with all the tools, forges, and stores of his department, with directions to leave only the third reserve of ammunition at Chittagong. I may mention that I had seen to the proper accommodation and protection of this reserve before leaving that place. The regimental camp equipage is all to be stored at Chittagong, as ordered by his Excellency the Commander in Chief, but at Kassalong I have directed each regiment to leave a small depôt in charge of a Naick and four men, from which such articles as boots, &c., which will have to be received from time to time, can be forwarded to the front.

10. Owing to the heat of the weather, the advanced wing of the 2nd Goorkhas proceeded from Kassalong to Lower Burkhul by small boats. Neither the "Flame" nor the large country boats can proceed to Lower Burkhul owing to rocks and the strength of the stream where the river narrows. This part of the journey occupies about seven hours.

11. A road of eight miles in length has been made from Kassalong to Lower Burkhul under the orders of the civil authorities. The work was, I believe, given out in contract, and as appears to be the custom with natives of the hill tracts, the path has been taken straight over hill and ridge, without any attempt to select the best line or to ease steep ascents by zig-zags. The consequence is that it is a good and rather severe day's march for troops to Lower Burkhul, and then on for two and a half miles more to Upper Burkhul.

12. On this latter piece of road Major Brown had been at work from the earliest date it was possible for him to arrive there, and when I marched along it I found that he had, with the coolies at his disposal, effected very considerable improvements, and had nearly succeeded in making a road passable for laden elephants. The work remaining to be done has since been rapidly completed by Lieutenant Hyslop and the sappers, and elephants are now regularly employed on it. On 12th November I arrived at Upper Burkhul with head-quarters and two companies 2nd Goorkhas; the rest of the regiment followed by detachments, part marching and part by boat from Kassalong, leaving a British officer and a sub-division at Kassalong, and the same number of men at Lower Burkhul, for the protection of those posts.

13. Upper Burkhul is just above the rapids, at a point where the river widens out to some 300 yards across.

The banks are rather steep, much broken by watercourses, and densely wooded to the water's edge. I found the ground had been to a certain extent cleared, two commissariat

sariat godowns had been completed, and a third was in progress; sheds to cover about 500 men had been finished, and a rough stockade to protect the place had been built. But the ground was very confined, and I found it undesirable to collect troops or coolies here in any number.

14. On the day after my arrival at Burkhul, the chief, Rutton Pooea, presented himself in camp, having anticipated a summons from Captain Lewin, whose messenger he met on the road. He expressed his desire to be friendly, and promised assistance, but appeared very much alarmed at the consequences to himself of an alliance with us against the other tribes. He was assured in general terms of future protection if he behaved well, and after a stay in camp of three days, during which he was chiefly engaged in drinking rum, he commenced his good offices by setting out on the 16th November to conduct a detachment of the 2nd Goorkhas under Major Macintyre to Demagiri; Captain East, Assistant Quartermaster General, accompanied this party, and his report of the march, which, owing to the difficulties of the country and the delay in marking out a road, occupied five days, is annexed. This road which succeeding companies of the Goorkhas and the Company of Sappers have since been working on, has now been rendered practicable for unladen elephants, but the hills are so steep, and the banks of the frequent watercourses so difficult, that the time and labour to render it of any use to laden animals could not be afforded without great delay to the expedition.

I trust that as the force advances and ascends, the slopes of the ranges may be found easier, and admit of the elephants being employed.

15. On the same day that Major Macintyre's detachment commenced its march by land, I started, accompanied by Captain Lewin, with head quarters, and a company of 2nd Goorkhas by the river route, arriving here on the 18th November.

The fleet consisted of 10 Chittagong boats, which had with considerable difficulty been dragged up the Burkhul fall and rapids, and about 30 canoes; the former carrying the Goorkhas, and worked by their own crews, assisted by the soldiers; and the latter manned by hill coolies, three coolies to each canoe, and carrying on an average five maunds of supplies.

The river which runs in a clear and deep but sluggish stream, except at the rapids, which are of frequent occurrence, is on an average 70 yards wide, the hills on either side being beautifully wooded to the water's edge.

The distance from Burkhul to Demagiri by this route is 38 miles. About half-way between these places are the rapids of Ootum Chuttra, which none but canoes can now ascend, as the river is falling daily. Below these rapids, I have established a temporary depôt for stores under a guard of 50 policemen, 20 of whom accompany the canoes on their journey up and down the upper half of the river; the larger boats work between Burkhul and Ootum Chuttra. By this arrangement, it is hoped that 400 maunds of supplies may reach Demagiri every third day, but the canoes' service, which is of vital importance to the advance of the force, not only to this place but some distance further up the river and into enemy's country, is, I fear, in a very precarious condition.

16. The canoes are worked entirely by hill coolies, no others understanding the management of them. These men were collected by Captain Lewin, and have been most usefully employed in various ways for the last two months, but of late they have been overcome by an unreasonable fear of the Looshais, and there have been so many desertions among them, that unless Captain Lewin's personal influence can keep them together, there is a possibility of the whole body, about 500, melting away altogether, and bringing matters to a dead lock. I have written to Mr. Hankey, the Commissioner at Chittagong, to whose cordial co-operation I am already much indebted, begging him to order up the Rajahs and Chiefs of the tribes to which their men belong, with a view of inspiring confidence and checking further desertions, but in the interim valuable time may be lost.

17. Captain Hood, whose services were placed at my disposal by the Bengal Government, has been put in charge of the coolies working on the river above Burkhul, and having had some experience in this district, he will, I trust, succeed in managing them.

18. At Demagiri, I found that Mr. C. P. Crouch, assistant superintendent of police, who had been sent on with 110 men from Upper Burkhul on the 8th of November, had done a great deal of work in clearing jungle, building a stockade, and preparing sheds for commissariat stores; the ground for these purposes he had selected with much judgment. Just below the falls, the river opens out into a large basin about 300 yards in diameter, on the left bank of which ample space exists for the sheds of some 800 men. The falls are at the foot of one of the northern spurs of the Oheepoon Range, on which, at about one mile from the river, I have stationed a company in a rough stockade.

19. I propose to explain now, for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, the arrangements I have made for the employment of the police placed at my disposal. Finding that according to custom, they had been withdrawn from the frontier posts for drill and instruction to head quarters at Rangamuttee during the rainy months when the swollen rivers and streams serve as a protection to the Hill Tracts against the Looshais, I requested Captain Lewin through the Commissioner Mr. Hankey to re-occupy these

these posts which will be garrisoned as follows, and remain in charge of the officers of police under the Commissioner.

1.	Kumida not hitherto occupied - - - -	40 men.
2.	Belesarree - - - - - - - -	50 „
3.	Phurwa - - - - - - - - -	40 „
4.	Painaoo - - - - - - - - -	50 „
5.	Thursa - - - - - - - - -	30 „
6.	Chima - - - - - - - - -	60 „

The portion of the frontier thus guarded extends over 60 miles as the crow flies to the south-east of Kassalong. It is liable to the incursions of the Howlongs and Shindoos; and considering the habits of these people as well as the nature of the country, which is a forest clad with succession of hills and valleys, this line of posts, connected by a mere path, cannot be considered altogether sufficient; my line of communication above Kassalong is also somewhat exposed on the right, but I trust that the enemy will be too much taken up with the operations of the force in front to attempt any raids so far from home. The stockade of Khagoorah to the north of Kassalong is garrisoned by 60 men, and I have requested the Political Agent at Tipperah to employ the portion of the rajah's contingent placed at my disposal in guarding his own frontier up to that point.

The arrangements leave 130 police under an officer for employment with the force.

20. Of the political aspect of affairs, I have little to report. Notwithstanding Captain Lewin's untiring exertions, added to his experience and influence on this frontier, I have been unable to open communication even with the Sylhoos, the first of the tribes we have to deal with, and whose villages are in sight. Rutton Pooea says, he is at enmity with these people, and cannot undertake any messages to them. He is equally unable or unwilling to give information or guides, and altogether his alliance is of the most passive nature, as might have been expected from his previous history. At Burkhul, he expressed a desire, which I could not accede to, to be allowed to lead a war party of his tribe against the Sylhoos.

On arrival here, I was met with a request for a guard to protect his village; 15 policemen were given him, and he appeared perfectly satisfied. When pressed for assistance of any sort, he declares he has no control over his tribe.

Captain Lewin, who is more troubled by his inconsistencies than I am, is of opinion, that as soon as we have struck our first blow, and it is apparent that our mission is of a different character to former ones, the alliance will be more profitable. I trust that such may be the case. At present, Rutton Pooea is in camp, under medical treatment, to which he submits with a faith which is astonishing, considering his distrust of our dealings with him in every other respect.

21. Surgeon Major Allen, the senior medical officer of the force, considers the health of the troops very satisfactory.

Though quite as hard worked as the coolies, in making roads and other fatigue duties, they are comparatively free from sickness; of the latter, there are already 200 in the hospital, and a large proportion of these will be unfit to go further.

Anticipating the necessity of a reinforcement to the cooly corps, I have telegraphed to you, suggesting the formation of a reserve in Calcutta. A copy of the message was sent to the Secretary to Government, Military Department, Calcutta.

The local or Chittagong coolies cannot be depended on any more than the hill men in the enemy's country; and though 200 of them are being enlisted, they will have to be employed in the rear.

The men of the cooly corps are working admirably, and with a very good spirit, and so far I have every reason to be satisfied with them.

2nd Goorkhas.
27th Punjab Infantry.
4th Goorkhas.
½ Peshawur Mountain Battery.
3rd Company Sappers and Miners.

22. The accompanying sketch map will show the position of the troops under my command, the whole of which, as noted in the margin, it will be observed, are now between this and Kassalong. It will also show my dispositions for the protection of the frontier by the police and the use I have made of the contingent of the Tipperah Rajah.

23. I propose making my first move in advance of this to-morrow, the 1st December.

From the Demagiri and Ohepoom ranges on either side of the gorge we occupy, a fine view is obtained of the country of the Sylhoos and also of the Howlongs, the furthest of the tribes to he dealt with.

The natural obstacles the force has to overcome are most formidable. The mountains rising to four and five thousand feet are very difficult and covered with forests to the summits, a mere track connecting the different villages; there are five such ranges to be crossed. The intervening valleys are intersected by rivers and streams, often unfordable. To the troops these obstacles are of no account, but they of course cause much delay in the movements of coolies and commissariat.

The water supply, except in the valleys, is also limited.

I refer to these difficulties not with any doubt of our power to surmount them, but to show His Excellency that to achieve satisfactorily the objects of the Expedition will take fully the time allotted for the purpose.

DESCRIPTION of ROAD from *Upper Burkhul* to *Damagiri.*

Stages.	Distance.	REMARKS.
1st Halting Ground.	5 Miles.	Path on ridge for 1 mile, easy, and thence for ¼ mile over steep and slippery ground to river; follow river upwards for ¾ mile, bed firm and pebbly, banks muddy, water in many places more than knee deep. Then ascend steep hill for ½ mile and descend on further side for ⅜ mile. A stream is then reached, which is descended for ¼ mile, and afterwards a small ridge is crossed for ½ mile, when the path goes down a stream for a few hundred yards, then crosses some undulating ground for about same distance, and continues for 1 mile going with short intermissions along three streams, up the first, down the second and up the third to the site selected for halting. When not along rivers, the path went through thick jungle of bamboo, the banks of the streams were thickly wooded and varied in height, rarely however exceeding 50 or 60 feet. In the smaller streams, the progression is often difficult, but a path along the edge can easily be made. The only difficulties which require heavy work are the descent to and ascent from the first river.
2nd Halting Ground.	8 Miles.	An easy path leads up a river bed for 3½ miles; after crossing a small ridge for ¼ mile, it descends a stream for 2½ miles and then goes over a steep ridge, which is covered with a very thick bamboo forest, and at about ⅜ mile reaches a point where two streams meet, on the further side of which a position for hutting the troops was selected. The principal difficulty on this stage was a distance of about 50 yards, where the river bed was of soft mud, into which the coolies sunk over their knees. There are also several places going into and out of streams where a little work is required to make the path more practicable.
3rd Halting Ground.	8 Miles.	Of the two streams, which meet near halting ground, the left one is followed upwards for 5 miles, and so far the path is easy, excepting at one place, where a little blasting would be required. The track then ascends rather steeply and passes through site of old Kookie village and afterwards descends rapidly to another stream, distance between the two streams ⅜ mile; the path then continues down stream for 2¼ miles and is generally easy.
4th Halting Ground.	10¾ Miles.	Followed up the path which led through our bivouac ground and which took us over the Mandaugh Klang in one hour, distance about 2¼ miles. The point where the path crosses cannot be more than some few hundred feet above sea-level, and on the map this range is shown more to the west than it actually is. Neither ascent nor descent of the hill is difficult. After crossing the range, a stream is arrived at, which is followed downwards for 2½ miles, and then after passing over small hills and through streams for 1½ miles, the bamboo suspension bridge over the river Thega is reached. This bridge is 50 yards in length and is about 40 feet above the water; it has to be renewed once a year, and the present structure having existed for more than that time, it is not now safe. The troops and coolies had therefore to cross the stream and after some little search, a ford 2′ 6″ in depth was found and marked off with stakes. The stream is from 35 to 40 yards wide, and flows with a sluggish current. The banks are about 50′ high and steep, and near the water the ground is in parts muddy; the bed of the river is however firm, and with ordinary care neither the banks nor the river would offer any difficulties to the passage of elephants; after crossing the "Thega," the path was in dry land for 1 mile, and then up a stream for 3¼ miles to a point where two streams meet, and where our halting ground was selected. This was a couple of hundred yards above the stream, and near a large joom on which rich crops of cotton and rice were ready to be cut. In the evening numbers of Kookies with their wives and children came into camp, and wandered about looking at us and the men's rifles, &c., with much astonishment and with no fear. There are two villages of Rutton Pooea in the neighbourhood, and from these they brought us presents of fowls and hill beer, which latter is like cider but with a smoky taste.
Demagiri.	10¾ Miles.	The path first went up a stream for 1½ miles and then across a joomed hill for about the same distance. A steep ascent then commences and continues for one mile through joom cultivation to the top of the Cheepoom range. The path then turns to the left and continues along the ridge for 1½ miles to Rutton Pooea's village. From this ridge a good view of the country to the north and east is obtained, and in those directions the ridges appear almost as thickly wooded as those to the south, although towards the summit they seem more practicable. There are from 150 to 200 houses in Rutton Pooea's village, which although far from clean, cannot be described as filthy. It is partly surrounded by a stockade which is in very bad order. From the village to Demagiri is 6 miles, the path being generally good with an easy descent, until within 1 mile of the Kurnafoolie river where the descent becomes very steep and difficult.

OBSERVATIONS.

The distance on the map, as the crow flies, from Upper Burkhul to Demagiri is only 16 miles, whereas the distance actually marched was 41½ miles as nearly as could be judged. The path followed was pointed out by Rutton Pooea, and is evidently a well-used Kookie track; two-thirds of it was through water, often knee deep, and this was the easiest part of the journey. Generally it led through thick jungle which could only be seen into for a few yards on either side; at times the forest was of bamboos, growing so thickly together that a man could not pass through them, whilst at others, it was somewhat more open with undergrowth of various descriptions, amongst which forest trees of a magnificent size were scattered. To obtain any view from a hill top, it took several men working for the best part of an hour to open out the forest by cutting lanes of vision through the trees, and often when this had been done, another range or hill near at hand would confine the view to a short distance.

Had time been available, a better and more direct line of road might undoubtedly have been selected, but to have made such a line practicable for even unladen elephants would have

have entailed more labour than can be devoted to it. In marching along, all that was attempted was to clear a certain amount of jungle, cut away trees which had fallen across the path, cut steps at the steepest ascents and descents, and shut up by newly cut trees all branch paths leading off the main track. Ground was also cleared at the halting places, and on these rough sheds of bamboos and leaves were constructed for the troops to sleep under.

A party of troops and the Sappers have since been employed in improving the road, and it is now divided into four marches of $7\frac{1}{2}$, $12\frac{1}{2}$, $10\frac{3}{4}$, and $10\frac{3}{4}$ miles respectively, and it has now been made passable for unladen elephants.

From Brigadier General *C. H. Brownlow*, Commanding Chittagong Column, Looshai Expeditionary Force, to the Quartermaster General, Head Quarters, Camp Delhi, No. 385; dated Savoonga, the 1st January 1872.

In continuation of my report from Demagiri of the 30th November, I have the honour to state, for the information of the Right Honourable the Commander in Chief, that on the 1st December, which was as soon as my commissariat arrangements would admit of an advance, I moved two companies of the 2nd Goorkhas under Major Macintyre to the village of Gnoora, with orders to improve the path to that place, and from thence to the Sahjuck river, intending that the force should follow the route adopted last year by Majors Graham and Macdonald in their ascent of the Phai Jan Klang range, but I found so many objections to this line that I determined on another, avoiding the high spur on which Gnoora is situated, and crossing the Sahjuck at Vanoonah's instead of Lem Shilong's old ghat.

This gave me water carriage for 10 miles further up the river, in the direction of an advance, and an easy road from thence to Vanoonah's village, where I was led to expect the first show of resistance from the Sylhoos.

2. For some distance above Demagiri, the Kurnafoolee runs through a narrow defile in a succession of rapids, which laden canoes cannot ascend. To get over this break in the water communication, a road had to be made along the right bank of the river, from the Falls where it is crossed by a bamboo bridge to a spot above the highest of the rapids where the stream again becomes navigable, and where a depôt was established as a fresh starting point for the canoes, and called "Hyslop's Ghat." This piece of road of about four miles was made practicable for laden elephants, which are now working on it. It was a heavy job, and the Sappers and Miners, the 2nd Goorkhas, and 27th Punjab Infantry, all had their share in it.

3. On the 3rd December, Colonel Macpherson, C.B., V.C., marched from Demagiri to Lingoorah's Ghat with two companies of his regiment, and the half company of Sappers. He was joined next day by Major Macintyre and his detachment at Lingoorah's old village, and proceeded on the 5th to Vanoonah's Ghat, improving the road as he advanced. At Vanoonah's Ghat, Colonel Macpherson at once commenced to clear ground and throw a temporary bridge across the Sahjuck, which however is fordable at this point.

4. On the 4th December, the Chief Sem Shilong, whose name is well known in connection with the affairs of this frontier, appeared at Demagiri. Captain Lewin received him with open arms, and it was hoped he might be made the means of communicating with the Sylhoos, with whom he has lived since his village was burnt, and his followers scattered by the Howlongs, but he was seized with some vague suspicion or alarm, and the same evening while sitting talking at a fire, he suddenly jumped up and plunged into the jungle, leaving his dao and only garment behind him. It is useless to offer any conjectures as to the cause of this extraordinary episode. He has since been heard of among the Sylhoos.

5. In my report of the 30th November, I referred to the desertions among the hill coolies that work the boats and canoes between Burkhul and Demagiri, the sole means of feeding the force at and above the latter place. These desertions at last reduced the 600 men absolutely necessary to carry on the service to 350, with every prospect of a continued decrease, and it became a question whether I should not have to make a retrograde movement, for our supply scarcely sufficed to meet consumption, much less to create a reserve. On my urgent representations, Mr. Hankey, the Commissioner, himself came to Burkhul, having previously ordered up all the rajahs and chiefs of the tribes from which the coolies were drawn. His energetic measures led to an immediate improvement in the state of affairs. A certain number of deserters were apprehended, fresh men were found and made over to Captain Hood, while those whom the good management of the latter officer had kept together were re-assured, and at the same time made to understand that they would be punished if they left their work.

6. For the river transport above Demagiri, 50 canoes were lifted over the falls on skids, and dragged up the rapids to Hyslop's Ghat.

The hill coolies were called on for volunteers to man these canoes, but they begged to be decapitated rather than asked to go a step further in the direction of the much dreaded Looshais. For fear of renewed desertions they were allowed to have their own way, and Mr. Crouch undertook the service with 100 of his own police, assisted by men of the 27th Punjab

jab infantry and a certain number of the regular coolie corps. The policemen can sit and paddle these canoes to perfection, but to utilise the unskilled supplement of hands, it was found necessary to lash two canoes together with a connecting deck, which formed a raft that could not easily be upset. These rafts were held in readiness to start on their first voyage the day the troops crossed the Sahjuck, viz. the 11th December, and they have been working steadily ever since, to the great credit of Mr. Crouch, whose good service and that of his men I have already had occasion to notice. From Hyslop's Ghat to Vanoonah's Ghat, the distance by river is about 12 miles, and the journey takes a day and a half or two days. There are no bad rapids between those places, either on the Kurnafoolee or the Sahjuck, otherwise rafts could not be used.

7. On the 9th December I marched with my head quarters to Lingoora's old village (11 miles), and on the 10th to Vanoonah's Ghat (6½ miles), where I found Colonel Macpherson with six companies of his own regiment, the half-company of Sappers and two guns of the Peshawur Mountain Battery, under Lieutenant Colonel J. Hills, v.c. On the 11th, the head-quarters and four companies of the 2nd Goorkhas were moved forward to the Belkai jooms (4½ miles), being a little more than half-way up to Vanoonah's village. On the 12th I followed with my staff, and on the 13th was joined by the artillery and two more companies of Goorkhas.

8. On the evening of my arrival at the jooms, Captain Lewin reported to me that a messenger of his had returned from Vanoonah's, saying that the Syloos intended fighting. This messenger was Lingoora, one of the sub-chiefs of Rutton Poea's tribe, and of the Looshai blood royal. To ensure his fair dealing and to neutralise his Sylhoos' tendencies, he being married to a daughter of "Savoonga," the chief of that tribe, and Rutton Pooea having expressed some doubt of his loyalty towards himself and us, Captain Lewin had made over his wife and child to the latter to be kept as hostages for his good behaviour. Lingoora found five chiefs or rajahs assembled at Vanoonah's, and notwithstanding his relationship to Savoonga, was not allowed to proceed on his mission, being told to return and inform us that we were not to come any further without incurring alarming consequences.

9. The village of Vanoonah occupies a very strong natural position on the Belkai portion of the Rai Jan Klang range, at an elevation of 2,700 feet. It is situated in a slight dip or hollow between two peaks, 1,700 feet above the jooms, on the western face, where we were encamped, and the ascent to it for the last few hundred yards is almost precipitous on every side, except the north. The path from the jooms to the village is not quite three miles, and had been prepared for our reception. Close to the village it runs along a scarped rock, above which we found an arrangement of loose stones and boulders, supported on logs of wood tied up with creepers, which was to do duty as an avalanche on the advancing troops.

10. On the 14th, while waiting for supplies, I ordered out two parties, one under Colonel Macpherson, and the other under Major Macintyre, of the 2nd Goorkhas, to reconnoitre the approaches from the north and south, in the hope of being able to surround the position when it was attacked the next day. Major Macintyre went to the north, and soon came upon the enemy's picquets, which fired on him and retreated. He followed up to within a short distance of the ridge, and having obtained the required information, returned to camp without any loss to himself, though he shot two of the enemy. Colonel Macpherson made for the south of the village, in which direction the jungle was very dense and unbroken by jooms as on the north. His guide misled him, and after three hours' hard climbing he found himself on the ridge some way beyond the point he wished to arrive at. With characteristic perseverance he adhered to his purpose, and late in the day reached unperceived the peak overlooking the village, of which the leading files of Goorkhas declared they saw Major Macintyre's party in possession. While his men were forming up, they suddenly became aware of their mistake and dashed down among the astonished Sylhoos; but the opportunity was gone, and they only succeeded in giving them a volley as they dived in the jungle below. A few guns and spears were taken, and seven or eight of the enemy were seen to fall, but the effect of a surprise so completely after their own fashion must have had a very demoralising effect on the Kookies. Colonel Macpherson returned to camp the same evening, and next morning the village was re-occupied by two companies of his regiment.

11. On the 18th, the head quarters and four companies of the 2nd Goorkhas were moved up to Vanoonah's. Just as they were starting, sharp firing was heard in our rear. Two parties of Goorkhas, under Captains Battye and Becher, at once dashed down the hill. Within half-a-mile of camp they came upon three of their own men who were bringing up letters from Vanoonah's Ghat, and had been attacked from behind an ambush. They found one Goorkha mortally wounded, having been struck by five bullets, and the two others standing over him keeping at bay some 20 or 30 of the enemy, of whom they had each accounted for a man, when assistance arrived. The Kookies fled, and were pursued for some distance, another of them being eventually killed. I am sure his Excellency will agree with me, that these two riflemen, by name Lulleetbum Mull and Martbur Thappa, displayed courage and good conduct of the highest stamp, and that they are deserving of the Order of Merit, for which they will be recommended in due form.

The Sylhoos finding themselves worsted in their own mode of warfare, have not attempted to renew it.

12. On the 19th, I established my head-quarters at Vanoonah's village, and on the afternoon of the same day Colonel Macpherson started with three companies and five days' provisions on a raiding expedition, to the east, at a right angle to our line of advance. Early on the third day after his departure, he reached the village of Lall Jeera, on the next range, distance eight miles as the crow flies, across a deep and difficult valley. On the 22nd, he made his way through another village to the one marked on the map Lallpore, about six miles further east, as the crow flies.

He met with faint resistance, and having destroyed the three villages referred to and an immense amount of grain, returned to Vanoonah's on Christmas-day.

On the 20th I dispatched Major Macintyre with 100 riflemen and three days' supplies, no more coolie carriage being available, in the north-easterly direction up the valley of the Kahoo Doong, in which lay the villages of Vanoyeh and Vanshuma, both of which he destroyed, with rice granaries supposed to contain 8,000 maunds. He also captured 50 gyal or tame bisons, which constitute the chief wealth of the Looshais, and are valued at upwards of 100 rupees each. Of these 25 broke away, but the rest were brought into camp. The reports of Colonel Macpherson, C.B., V.C., and of Major Macintyre, regarding their proceedings, are appended.

13. All the grain that falls into our hands, viz., unhusked rice, which we have not the time or the means to render fit for consumption, is found stored in houses on the jooms or patches of cultivation where it has been harvested, and I believe constitutes the whole stock in hand of the Sylhoos. It is of this year's growth, and requires to be dried before it undergoes the tedious process of husking, which in these countries is performed by the women according to the daily wants of the household. Were it not for this fact, our progress would be very different.

14. On the 26th I sent on 100 of the 2nd Goorkhas under Major Macintyre to the site of an old village (Vanoyeh's), three miles north of the Kotheer Klang, and on the 27th moved on there myself, with the head quarters of that regiment, and the half-company of Sappers, being followed next day by the half-battery of artillery. This is a severe march of 12 or 13 miles along the ridge; and though the coolies do it in one day, returning the next, I have established a post half-way. I hope to work elephants on a portion of it, but the difficulty of feeding and watering these animals is so great, and it takes so much time to make roads for them, that as yet they have only been employed between Upper and Lower Burkhul (2½ miles), between Demagiri and Hyslop's Ghat (4 miles), and between Vanoonah's Ghat, to within a short distance of Vanoonah's village (7 miles), being altogether something under 14 miles on the whole line of communication. This difficulty in using the elephants, the sickness among the coolies that arrived early in the season, as well as the quarantine, necessitated at different places by the outbreak of cholera among the Nepaulese coolies, and its spread up to Damagiree, have hitherto deprived us of nearly a fourth of our means of land transport.

15. It was my intention to have opened a road from the post on this side of the Kotheer Klang to the Sahjuck below, and to have extended my water communication another 12 miles, but the scarcity of canoes and boatmen, and the state of the river, which is falling rapidly, deterred me.

16. During the 28th and 29th the villages of Vanloolah and Vankoonga, on the continuation of the Rai Jan Klan range to the north, were destroyed.

17. On the 30th I marched with half the 2nd Goorkhas across a water shed to the village of Van Hoolan on the hill, marked in the Survey Map as Savoonga, the proper name of which is Towrong. Further up the hill is another village of the same name, which a party under Major Macintyre occupied on the 31st. The enemy had stokaded the approaches and defended it for a few minutes, slightly wounding one Goorkha. Yesterday, while destroying the jooms in the vicinity of this, one of Rutton Pooea's men was killed and another wounded.

18. Every endeavour has been made to induce the Syloos to come in and listen to terms. Proclamations in Bengalee and Burmese, which, it was hoped, some of their captives might be able to read, have been put up in villages, which they are known to have re-visited after our departure, and conversations have been held with them from a distance, but to no purpose. They continue their opposition, such as it is, and we have no alternative but to proceed in our work of destruction, which must bring them to starvation.

19. Our next move will be on "Syloo Savoonga," the head-quarters of the chief, and, excepting one which we shall pass on the road, the furthest and only remaining village of the tribe. I propose making it my most advanced post and depôt on this line, and from thence setting out on a 10 days' raid against the Howlongs in one or more directions at a time, returning for supplies and repeating it if necessary.

20. Messengers have been sent to the Howlongs, and Captain Lewin will spare no efforts in the political line to recover the captives, but in case of their removing them beyond our reach and rejecting all overtures, they must be dealt with like the Syloos. This is a possible,

possible, though I hope an improbable contingency, which I think it right to refer to, to enable Government to express its wishes on the subject.

21. The visitation of the southern Howlongs and of the Blue Mountain will have to be a separate operation after the northern portion of the tribe have been settled with, and some of the coolies now here can be sent back to Demagiri for the purpose. Fresh troops will be employed, and the column will start from the Ohepoom range. I beg to append a map showing the disposition of the troops under my command on this date, which I trust may elucidate the foregoing narrative.

(No. 32 of 1 87

(Separate.)

To his Grace the Duke of *Argyll*, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Military Department, Fort William,
23 February 1872.

My Lord Duke,

In continuation of our Despatch, No. 25, of the 16th instant, we have the honour to enclose copies of the telegrams, since received, relating to the operations of the Looshai field force.

We are, &c.
(signed) *J. Strachey,*
Napier of Magdala,
&c. &c.

From General *Bourchier*, C.B.

14th February.—Marched yesterday nine miles, road easy, running along the side of hills at an average elevation of 5,000 feet; the highest point reached being 5,800 feet. We met with no opposition. We march again to-day, and pass through two hills known as Lalboora's Gates. Our camp yesterday at Tulcheng was in latitude 23 degrees 43 minutes 30 seconds; longitude 93 degrees 20 minutes 45 seconds. To-day it is in latitude 23 degrees 38 minutes; longitude 93 degrees 26 minutes 30 seconds. All well.

From General *Bourchier*, C.B.

15th February.—Marched yesterday 5½ miles and encamped in latitude 23 degrees 34 minutes 20 seconds; longitude 93 degrees 25 minutes 30 seconds. Road very fair, descending gradually 1,900 feet. We halt to-day to rest the coolies, but hope to reach Lalboora's chief village of Chumfai on the 17th instant. Raining heavily. Troops and coolies well hutted.

From Brigadier General *Brownlow*, C.B.

Latitude 23 degrees 18 minutes; longitude 92 degrees 48 minutes. 13th February.—I made a march yesterday of 13 miles by road on a north-easterly direction, crossing the Dullessurree and two mountain ranges. As my means of carriage will not enable me to establish any more posts in advance of Sylhoo Savoong, I sent back every available coolie to-day for supplies, and on the 16th go on with 10 days' rations, giving up my communications with the rear.

From General *Bourchier*, C.B.

17th February.—The force marched 12 miles yesterday, and is now within three miles of Lalboorah's chief village, which I proceed to destroy this morning. Messengers have been sent to Lalboorah's mother that if she wishes to save her own and Lalboorah's other villages (Lalboorah himself having fled) her head men must come into my camp. Unless unconditional submission is made in 24 hours, I shall attack all villages in succession, and stay here long enough to enforce my demands. Everything is in train for a rapid retirement, and I anticipate no delay when once we commence our return march. The road yesterday was tolerably easy for laden coolies, although it ascended 3,100 feet, crossing a ridge 6,600 feet, the highest elevation we reached, and then descended 2,000 feet. The scenery was magnificent; forests of rhododendron in full bloom, pines, oaks, and other trees met with in the northern Himalayahs. The latitude and longitude of "Champai" will be telegraphed to-morrow.

From General *Bourchier*, C.B.

18th February.—Marched four miles yesterday to Champai, Lalboorah's chief village. It was unoccupied, and we destroyed it without opposition. The village contained about 500 houses, and there are signs of its having been much larger. The tomb of Vonolel is placed in the centre, on the most elevated spot, and is decorated with several skulls, the most recent offering being the head of a Looshai killed two or three days ago in a fight which Lalboorah's people had with Kamhow's tribe. We are now encamped outside the village in a valley, the features of which resemble very much those of the valleys beyond the north-west frontier, such as the Chumba and Agror. The head men from the village belonging to Lalboorah's mother have brought in a coat and musket belonging to the fourth Native Infantry, and a pouch of one of the police killed at Monierkhall, thus clearly proving Lalboorah to have been the leader of the attack on that garden in January 1871. I proceed to the mother's village this morning with a force to insist on all my demands being satisfied without delay, and to enable the survey party to see as much of the country as possible. We are now in latitude 23 degrees 26 minutes 32 seconds; longitude (approximate) 93 degrees 25 minutes; elevation 5,000 feet. All well.

From General *Brownlow*, C.B.

Choungooma between the Dullessur and Koladyne rivers, 18th February 1872.

Savoonga and Benkaya, the most powerful of the northern Howlong chiefs, made their submission yesterday, having gone through the usual ceremonies with Captain Lewin; they agreed to give up their captives, and bound themselves to keep the peace, and to allow us free access to their country now and hereafter. Some of the captives have already been sent in, and from their evidence I am satisfied we shall recover all in their possession, though the number is small. A survey party with a detachment of the 2nd Goorkhas will proceed to-morrow to Benkaya's village, which is a day's march from this east of the Koladyne. A party will also visit Jotomah's village on the Motee or Mowee Klang to our north; this will occupy about six days, after which I shall commence to withdraw the force.

(Separate.)

(No. 38 of 1872.)

To His Grace the Duke of *Argyll*, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Military Department, Fort William,
1 March, 1872.

My Lord Duke,

In continuation of our Despatch, No. 32, dated the 23rd ultimo, we have now the honour to enclose copies of further telegrams regarding the operations of the Looshai expeditionary force, from which it will be seen that there is every prospect of the speedy return of the troops.

We are, &c.
(signed) *Napier*,
Napier of Magdala,
&c. &c.

From General *Bourchier*, C.B.

20th February.—The tribes of Vonolel have surrendered unconditionally, and the whole country throughout which we have passed is completely at our mercy. I dictated my terms to Lalboorah's people in my camp, and afterwards at the village of his mother, where the inhabitants of Chumfai have taken refuge. We spent some time in the village, which is strongly stockaded, and situated on the top of a hill 6,000 feet high. I gave them 24 hours first, to deliver up the arms taken from the troops and police at Nangdigaon and Monierkhall; or, if these could not be procured within the time, an equal number of their own muskets; second, to send three of their head men into my camp as hostages for the safe conduct of the column to Tipai Mookh; third, to pay a fine of war gongs, ivory, metnas, goats, &c. These terms have all been complied with, two of the muskets belonging to the 4th Native Infantry; the remainder are flint locks, the loss of which probably tells more heavily on the Looshais than our own muskets, as the latter are useless without caps. We commence our retirement to-morrow, and will proceed continuously to Tipai Mookh, unless I receive orders from the Quartermaster General to the contrary. Poiboi will, I believe, come in; but if he does not, I shall burn his village *en route*. This may delay me a day or two, otherwise I hope to reach Tipai Mookh on the 9th March, and to have everything cleared out by the 11th March. All the tribes promise to receive native agents in their villages, and give them safe conduct. Rockets will be fired and blue lights burnt this evening

evening on a hill above our camp, and again to-morrow on the ridge 6,600 feet high, about 10 miles in our rear, in the hopes of attracting General Brownlow's attention. Severe frost yesterday, slight rain this morning, troops in high spirits. Our correct longitude is 93 deg. 21 min.

From General *Brownlow*, C.B.

Choungooma, 22nd February.—The detachment that went to Benkooya's returned yesterday; another party started for the Mowee Klang this morning, accompanied by the officers of the survey. The results of Captain Lewin's political arrangements have been most satisfactory. The camp has for the last few days been crowded with Howlongs, many of them from distant villages, who have carried on a brisk trade with local produce of all sorts, with the conviction, I think, that it is more profitable than fighting with us, and that they have played a wiser part than the Sylhoos, whose accounts of our Enfields and steel guns seem to have made a deep impression. The latter tribe still hold out, but have sent messengers to know how they will be treated if they come in; and I hope that the chiefs may meet us at Syloo Savoonga, to which I return to-morrow, with all the troops here except 200 Goorkhas. These follow on the 26th. I shall now hasten back to Demagiri to bring matters to a conclusion with the southern Howlongs, leaving Colonel Macpherson to effect the retirement along this line. By the 20th March a portion of the force will be in readiness to embark at Chittagong. I shall be glad to know that transport can be provided. It threatens heavy rains.

(No. 44 of 1872.)

(Separate.)

To His Grace the Duke of *Argyll*, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Military Department, Fort William,
8 March 1872.

My Lord Duke,

In continuation of our letter, No. 26, dated the 16th ultimo, we have now the honour to forward further detailed reports regarding the operations of the Looshai expeditionary force.

We are, &c.
(signed) *Napier*,
Napier of Magdala,
&c. &c.

From Brigadier General *G. Bourchier*, C.B., Commanding Cachar Column, Looshai Expeditionary Force, to the Quartermaster General, No. 380 L.; dated 19th December 1871.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of his Excellency the Commander in Chief, a copy of the communication received by me from Major General Nuthall Political Agent at Munnipoor, reporting the circumstances under which the Subadar of the Munnipoor contingent was killed, as also my reply to the same, which I hope will meet with his Excellency's approval.

From the Political Agent of Munnipoor, to the Officer Commanding Cachar Column, Looshai Expeditionary Force, No. 141; dated Camp, Me-tye-pat, the 3rd December 1871.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that a working party of the contingent, whilst employed the day before yesterday in clearing a pathway in the long grass and jungle between Tseklapi and Tseeboo for the purpose of reconnoissance, were suddenly attacked by Looshais.

2. The subadar of the party, a man of some importance and much valued by the Maharajah, was killed; but the working party being armed made a good stand, although only 35 strong, and killed 12 of the enemy.

3. They brought off five of the Looshai heads which I have seen, besides the head of their own subadar, for burial by his family, and they took five muskets, all in serviceable condition, marked thus:—

1,798, Wilson—1782—D. C. B.
18,400, R. E. A.—Sargant Brothers.
Tower.

P.S.—The working party was protected by another of 150 strong, but the grass being light, had worked ahead of the latter, and it did not come up in time to take part in the affair.

From the Officer Commanding Cachar Column, Looshai Expeditionary Force, to the Political Agent of Munnipoor, No. 381 L.; dated 19th December 1871.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 141, dated 3rd instant, reporting an attack made by Looshais on a party of Munnipooree troops, south of Tseklapi, and beg to call your attention to the instructions you received for conveyance to the officer commanding the force, to be held in hand, in the south of the Munnipoor valley, that no advance beyond Tseklapi was to be made without further orders from me; you will be kind enough to see that these instructions are carried out in their integrity. It was to prevent any such collisions as you report, that I was induced to issue these instructions. They irritate the tribes, from whom we are hoping to receive assistance to pilot the column towards Lalboorah and the more southern tribes, and can do no good.

The Looshais who are now in my camp, had heard of the affair, and report that the party were salt makers; that the Munnipoorees fell upon them when asleep and killed five of their number. So far their account agrees with yours as to the number killed, but as to the truth of their tale, as to the manner in which they were attacked, of course I have no means of judging.

The very fact of the working party having been protected by 150 Munnipooree sepoys, and who, neglecting their duty, left their charge, and allowed them to be (according even to their own statement) attacked, and their subadar killed, confirms me in the opinion that it is most unwise to push these troops further to the front than will actually show that the southern frontier of the valley is not left unprotected. You are requested to report what steps have been taken to establish the line of posts to the westward of the Munnipoor valley. A sketch showing their approximate position will oblige.

The column under my command is now marching on Kholel; all well. The climate and health of the men are good.

From Brigadier General *G. Bourchier*, C.B., Commanding Cachar Column, Looshai Expeditionary Force, to the Quartermaster General, No. 524 L.; dated Camp, No. 10 Station, the 19th January 1872.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith copy of a letter I have received from General Nuthall, and my reply. It is, I grant, fortunate that the contingent has not come into premature collision with Poiboi's force; at the same time, it in no way affects the question, raised in former correspondence, as to the responsibility incurred by General Nuthall in having recommended the advance of the contingent southward beyond the point named by me, until I was geographically in a position to afford it support, should it have been attacked by Poiboi.

From the Officiating Political Agent at Munnipoor, to Brigadier General *G. Bourchier*, C.B., Commanding Cachar Column, Looshai Expeditionary Force; dated Camp Seeboo, the 13th January 1872.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt last night of your telegram, No. 440 L., of the 30th ultimo (simultaneously with the copy thereof), informing me of negotiations pending on the part of Poiboi's tribes, and expressing anxiety that no action on the part of the Munnipoor contingent should disturb the same.

We have had several messengers from the same tribes, and there is at present an embassy consisting of Dalboom and others in our camp, in pursuance of their promise of September last; they came yesterday afternoon; they have invariably been referred to you, and been told that all negotiations on behalf of the Maharajah will be conducted by you. That the rajah being friends with the British Government is acting in alliance with it in the present operations.

They have now come to inform us that they have been to you and you have accepted their offerings, but as they have never done injury to British subjects and have to those of Munnipoor, it is the rajah's clemency they wish to seek. They express great regret for the past, but are again referred to you, and are informed that the rajah at least expects that they will deliver up to you the captives taken by their tribe in January last (1871) from the village of Namfow to the east of this, near Shoogoonoo.

We have had no collision whatever with the Looshais since that of 1st of December, duly reported, nor at this distance could we possibly have, except of their own seeking by invading the rajah's territory.

It is a cause of much satisfaction to me that my past policy with this tribe and the present position of the contingent have contributed so much as they undoubtedly have done to bring about results upon which you place so much importance.

I have

I have already reported to you that the presence of the contingent at Seeboo has favored the escape of no less than 215 captives, subjects of Munnipoor, from the village of Lenkom.

P. S.—"Noon."

Our messengers to Kamhow, absent since 26th ultimo, have just returned with information that his tribes have (as anticipated) been engaged with the Looshais to the south of this (Vonolel's), but apparently to no extent, only three of the enemy killed and one Kamhow wounded.

They say the Looshais erected a stockade on the boundary between their territories, and they drove them from it.

From Brigadier General *G. Bourchier*, C.B., Commanding Cachar Column, Looshai Expeditionary Force, to Major General *W. F. Nuthall*, Political Agent, Munnipore, No. 523 L.; dated Camp Chipooee, No. 10 Station, the 19th January 1872.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 13th instant, received while on the march to Chipooee village, on the 17th instant, from the hands of certain Looshais, said to be messengers from Poiboi. The latitude of the village is 24° 0′ 45″ and the longitude 93° 13′ 30″.

2. From the tenor of the 3rd para. of your letter under reply, I understand that the bearers were emissaries from Poiboi, come to tender his submission, and seeking clemency from the rajah of Munnipoor, and forgiveness for the past. I have several times received similar emissaries, but the Political Officer with my column cannot find that any of these messengers are men of note or influence, or have authority to treat on the part of Poiboi.

3. I am now marching direct towards Poiboi's own village; and it will be there, and with Poiboi alone, that I can treat either on the part of the British Government or the rajah of Munnipoor. But the terms expected by the latter, as to the release of the captives, will be borne in mind and attended to when I receive the nominal roll and details sufficient to identify the villages of the captors, called for by Mr. Edgar in November last.

4. Having arrived at a point when, after severely punishing the tribes in my rear and bringing them into submission to such an extent that my lines of communication are comparatively secure, enabling me to advance direct on Poiboi's own village, I should now have ordered the advance of the detachment to Cheeboo, which post you will direct the officer in command of the detachment to hold strongly, until you receive further orders from me.

5. The question of the rajah's having allowed his troops to be moved south of Tseklapi, you will inform him, is entirely separate from my present order to hold this post now. His having done so prior to my being in a position to operate on Poiboi might seriously have affected my plans by prematurely bringing on a collision between the latter and the contingent.

6. Should I on my arrival at Poiboi's own village, or prior to it, receive his submission, I shall proceed at once towards Vonolel's tribes, with my communications in the rear still secured, and you will receive, then, instructions as to whether I require any further movement of the contingent, during my advance on Lalboorah.

7. No report has ever been received by me of the escape of the 215 captives alluded to in the last para. of your letter, which I regret, as some account of the mode of their escape, the villages where they were kept in captivity, the date of their capture, in fact all particulars, would have been highly interesting.

8. I leave this on Sunday, the 22nd instant, when the road will have been fully completed for elephants to this spot. The severe punishment I inflicted on the people of Kholel has had, I observe, a most salutary effect on those villages now on our route, and has, so far at any rate, been accepted, I am glad to see, as an index of what others may expect who attempt to oppose the advance of the column.

From Colonel *P. S. Lumsden*, C.S.I., Quarter Master General, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, Calcutta, No. 172 L. (Looshai); dated Army Head Quarters, Delhi, the 10th February 1872.

I AM directed by the Right honourable the Commander in Chief to submit, for the information of Government, the accompanying Despatch, No. 506 L, dated 15th January 1872, received from Brigadier General G. Bourchier, C.B., commanding Cachar column, Looshai expeditionary force, detailing the progress of the troops up to that date.

2. His Excellency proposes to submit a further report to Government on the subject of Brigadier General Bourchier's remarks on the working of the commissariat coolies.

From Brigadier General *G. Bourchier*, C.B., Commanding Cachar Column, Looshai Expeditionary Force, to the Quarter Master General, No. 506L.; dated Camp Patchooee, No. 9 Station, the 15th January 1872.

I NOTICE, on re-perusing my letter, No. 478L., dated 8th instant, that although dated the Toweetoo river, no mention was made of my march from the Toweboom; my chief object in remaining there was to place the whole of the carriage at the disposal of the commissariat. On the 6th January, having collected at Toweeboom 14 days' provisions for 1,000 men, I marched towards the Toweetoo river, encamping a mile above it, in the sappers' camp, who, with a wing of the 44th Native Infantry, had been making and had nearly completed the road between the two rivers.

2. The highest point of the range we crossed (the Parbha Chang) was 3,400 feet above the sea. The ascent was very precipitous, the road for the greater part of the distance zigzagged, and it was with great difficulty that we could find even a small quantity of water for the working parties, except at the rivers.

3. On the morning of the 7th we crossed the Toweetoo river, encamped half-a-mile above it at an elevation of 1,550 feet. In the evening we reconnoitred the road towards Daidoo, our route for the following morning. The above description should have been entered in my last report, and my present one starts with my progress from the Toweetoo river.

4. On the 8th instant our track, which was the common Looshai path, not touched by the working parties, was a constant ascent for about two and a-half miles, when it opened upon a ridge covered with grass, probably an old jhoom, where the survey party had established themselves and had a fine view, both towards the east and west. As far as the eye could reach along the Vonbong to the west, were villages jotted here and there, and an enormous amount of farmlands extending down to the Tipai far below at our feet, while to the eastward were the precipitous rocky mountains on which were perched Poiboi's villages and jooms beyond a wide valley and across another bend of the Tipai, which takes a sharp turn, running first from north to south, then in a north-westerly direction.

5. Two of these villages, Chipoowee and Tingriding, were plainly visible. One mile further on, we arrived at the site of Daidoo village, which was built on two large plateaus. It had been deserted last year, and had been burnt prior to our arrival,

6. A considerable time was spent in searching for water: this delayed the selection of a site for our camps, and bamboos not being procurable, we had but scant covering of grass roughly strewn on sticks, and our mattresses on the ground. This was the first night we had been unable to raise our beds on small platforms, and our not being able to do so was most unfortunate. It was bitterly cold at an elevation of 4,100 feet; the rain came on soon after our arrival with a high wind, and under such conditions simply lying in little pools of water, it was not to be expected we should spend a happy night; but somehow, we none of us were the worse, and enjoyed the more a good sunning on the following morning.

7. Water was so scarce and bad at this village, that after drying our kits and bedding, we started for the village of Patchooee, distant about two miles, where the water, though not plentiful, was very good.

8. I did not quite like my position: I was face to face with villages of Poiboi, who' it was possible, might assume a hostile attitude, and the punished villages of Kholel were in my rear. I had with me only 140 of the 44th Native Infantry (31 had been sent back sick from the Toweetoo and 29 left at the Toweeboom), the sappers having been left two miles behind at Daidoo. I sent for the headquarters wing of the 22nd Punjab Infantry and 80 men of the 44th Native Infantry (rear wing), all of whom have since joined me, while a wing of the 42nd Native Infantry was ordered to the Toweetoo river, and the headquarter wing 44th Native Infantry and Artillery to No. 7 Station, each in fact being pushed on a step, leaving Lieutenant Colonel Sheriff with a wing of 42nd Native Infantry to occupy the posts between Tipai and No. 7 Station, and Lieutenant Colonel O'Bryen with a wing of the 22nd Punjab Infantry to garrison Tipai Mookh.

9. Since the 9th I have been detained at Patchooee very much against my inclination, for want of means of bringing on commissariat stores, but although I feel the delay may have an injurious effect upon the tribes a-head, my time has not been thrown away; the roads in my rear are now completed and onwards for some distance.

10. On the 11th I reconnoitred with Mr. Edgar and my staff what may be considered the real position of Kholel, not on our route, but in a southerly direction about four miles distant. The elevation of the villages was 4,450 feet, but the peak marked Kolong-Thlang about a mile beyond was 5,450 feet.

11. The site of this group of villages extended over half-a-mile square of area. This was Vonpilal's headquarters, and at his death the population emigrated to their present position, which we have designated new Kholel, but more properly Vombong on a range of that name. The villages were only burnt on the 3rd instant; the tomb of Vonpilal remains

remains perfectly unharmed, and is a stone riveted platform about 20 feet square and four feet high, surrounded by poles, on which were suspended the skulls of wild oxen (mytnas), deer, goats, &c., an elephant and other beasts mingled with enigmatical curiosities, fetters for his glares in paradise, drinking vessel, and the skull of a pony which was sacrificed at his death.

12. On the 12th our camp was filled with Looshais, both from Kholel and Poiboi's villages; they brought fowls and eggs for barter; but as they required cloth which we had none to spare, our dealings were very limited.

13. On the 13th I reconnoitred down to the Tipai, where the road crosses to Chepooee. The distance is about 2½ miles, but the last part is so terribly steep, that the Looshais even had found it necessary to make cane ropes to assist them up and down the track. The 44th Native Infantry and 22nd Punjab Infantry were put on this road on the morning of the 14th; it was curious to watch the effect on the traders directly they found out we meant to proceed onwards, first two men were sent back to sound the alarm note to the village, then every one left the camp. Their fear was natural; they knew that the Kholel villages had been severely punished, and perhaps conscious of deserving similar treatment for former raids were not sure what to expect.

14. Colonel Roberts proceeded up the ascent towards Chepooee about half-a-mile, and came upon some villagers who were hidden behind a rock, and called out to know his business. After some pressing one came forward to parley. He was told by Colonel Roberts, through an interpreter, that we meant to pass their villages *en route* to Poiboi and Lalboora, and nothing would stop us; but that if they behaved in a friendly manner towards us they would be unmolested, and that their head man, a minor chief, dependent I believe on Poiboi, must come to my camp on the following day. We returned to camp in the evening.

15. Sunday.—14th, I confess, contrary to my anticipations, Tongtoo, the head man of Chepooee, arrived in camp to-day. He seemed at first in a terrible fright, and doubtless his position is a difficult one. On the one hand, should he oppose us, certain destruction to his village and property will follow; on the other, incurring the further vengeance of Poiboi and the tribes of Vonolel, should they coalesce, which, although I have no reason to suppose it likely, may at any moment be the position I may have to face. Mr. Edgar explained to him pretty nearly what Colonel Roberts sent as a message to him yesterday. He seemed at any rate persuaded that he had nothing to fear from us, and remained in camp all night.

16. Major Moore, with Captain Hedayut Ali and 48 Tipperah coolies, I confess, with a few exceptions, I never saw men look more like work than this small balance, and as I inspected them I could not help feeling how different would have been my position had I had from the first the whole number intended for my column. I shall in another report express my opinion on the conduct of Major Moore and his officers in the difficult position in which they were placed.

17. I have acted directly in obedience to the orders of the Government in making over the whole of the commissariat coolies, about 1,400, to Colonel Davidson, and as already reported, the non-commissioned officers attached to them. I have done so under the positive orders conveyed to me, but utterly contrary to my own convictions. Instead of acting in an administrative capacity, Colonel Davidson's time is taken up, removing about from station to station, trying to find out where his coolies are on arriving in camp. There is no one to look after them, and from the commissariat officers being employed on duties alien to their legitimate position, I never can find out what commissariat stores are to the front, or how many days' supply I may depend on, or how far I can, with safety, move.

I have addressed Lieutenant Colonel Davidson as to his requiring assistanee, which I can give him, but as the Commissary General especially enunciated the opinion that the coolies should be directly under the superintendence of the commissariat officers, I cannot detach officers for this duty, until Colonel Davidson informs me he requires it.

18. At the present moment convoys are coming daily into the advance camp, where there is no officer to receive them, and the only gomashta is the man attached to the cooly corps was doing the work of the commissariat.

19. I cannot conceive on what principle it was supposed that while three officers were necessary for 600 coolies, the 1,400 commissariat coolies could be managed by commissariat officers, who had already too much work on their shoulders in the legitimate duties of their department.

20. I am at the present moment tied down by the insufficiency of the commissariat stores in the front, and the means of moving even the small body of troops I have with me, the whole of Major Moore's corps being employed in bringing on what was collected at Toweeboom. When I arrived here, I had not more than two days' supply in hand for the advance party; when I think of the short time which remains for forward operations, not more than seven weeks at most, and the distance I am still from the tribes of Vonolel, I feel bitterly the detention which I am quite unable to obviate. In fact, I am, as far as military movements are concerned, at the mercy of the commissariat, who have,

with the exception of the cooly corps, complete command of the carriage, which they use as they, not I, think best, and regarding whose whereabouts or efficiency I cannot get a report out of Colonel Davidson, although he has frequently been called upon for the information I require. Copies of two letters forwarded to him to-day are annexed.

21. Politically, I think, everything looks well. We are endeavouring, as far as possible, to separate the interests of the eastern from the western tribes, securing the services of those tribes around us as we go on, without forcing Poiboi to show his hand until we are near enough to him to attack his head-quarters, if necessary, and then proceeding towards Lalboorah's villages.

22. This is a sketch of our position just at present; should the Kholel people move a finger, which I do not anticipate, we have the means of inflicting immense punishment upon them from two points. We are now, since the last movement of troops, in a very strong position, and hope to be able to advance on the 17th.

23. I am glad to report a marked improvement in the health of the officers, and I trust soon to be able to report more favourably of the sepoys and coolies when the commissariat have procured some little comforts in the shape of spices, &c., absolutely necessary for their health.

From Brigadier General *G. Bourchier*, C.B., Commanding Cachar Column, Looshai Expeditionary Force, to the Quartermaster General, No. 535 L.; dated Camp Chipooee, the 22nd January 1872.

In my last report I informed you, for the information of His Excellency the Commander in Chief, that the head man of the village of Cheboee, one march ahead of our position at Pachoni, had come into camp, and that it was my intention to leave for the former village on the 17th instant.

2. On the 16th, to be nearer their work on the road, I moved the head-quarter wing of the 22nd Punjab Native Infantry to the Tipai river, about 2½ miles, and on the following morning, started with two guns of the Royal Artillery, the Sappers, and head-quarter wing of the 44th Native Infantry. When half-way down, we saw on the opposite bank a large crowd of Looshais (about 200 of them, armed) collected in an open field. From their position, and there being a number of children with them, I feel sure that they did not intend to fight.

3. On arriving at the bed of the Tipai, I thought a little display of our strength would be a salutary lesson, and drew up the guns, Sappers, 22nd Punjab Infantry, and 44th Native Infantry, line in along the bank. There were, as there had been for several days, numbers of Looshais in the 22nd Punjab Infantry camp, who all ran off to their comrades above. Directing Colonel Stafford to keep his men and the Sappers in hand, in case of hearing firing, I started at once with the 44th Native Infantry and Artillery, and was met almost immediately by Dharpong, Poiboi's messenger, so often mentioned before. He was much excited at our advance, and begged me not to go on, but to wait until night at the river, and there have a conference, as Poiboi was above. I refused to stop one moment, and pushed on by a steep ascent to the jhoom. I was not anxious to force these people into fighting; they had come there voluntarily; but I feel on these occasions the slightest show of vacillation is interpreted into weakness.

4. In about half-an-hour my advance guard debouched on the open field; the Looshais were drawn up across it. I followed, with Mr. Edgar, Colonel Roberts, and my staff, and marched the 44th Native Infantry into a position exactly parallel to the Looshais, in single line. I then requested Mr. Edgar to inquire what was wanted. Dharpong said Poiboi was there, and wanted us to come up the hill, through the Looshai line, to him. This I positively refused, and presently a man, representing himself to be Poiboi, came down and sat in front of us. A more terribly abject picture of fright I never saw.

5. We had with us a man, formerly a slave of Poiboi's, who distinctly stated it was not Poiboi, though one of his people. The meeting was at once broken up; the Looshais, as is their wont, vanished in the forest, a few only remaining in the rear, endeavouring to prevent our advancing by warnings as to the difficulties of the road ahead. I *immediately* ordered an advance, as I was determined to reach Cheboee that evening.

6. Mr. Edgar has an idea that Poiboi was at first present, but when I refused to go to meet him, could not be brought to the front, but sent on a man to personate him. I do not agree in this view, but all opinions on such a subject are speculative and useless.

7. The ascent, about 3½ miles by a Looshai path to the village, was very steep and rocky, but we were unmolested, and arrived at the village at 4½ p.m. I had, during the march, sent back for 60 of the 22nd Punjab Native Infantry as an extra escort to the guns, and wrote to Captain Blackwood, that if he found the road impracticable, he was not to hesitate to return. I did not think the laden elephants could get along; but I cannot speak too highly of the admirable manner in which Captain Blackwood, overcoming all difficulties, brought his guns into camp soon after the column, without an accident of any kind.

8. And

8. And here I must bear witness also to the manner in which the troops have slaved at making roads, besides their ordinary military duties. I must, without wishing to disparage in the least the efforts of the rest, especially notice the Sappers' and Miners' wing of the 44th Native Infantry under Lieutenant Colonel Nuthall, and the head-quarters wing of the 22nd Punjab Infantry, forming my advanced party; the road made by the two latter corps from Pachooee to the Tipai, zigzagged nearly all the way, and without even the assistance of the Sappers and Miners, was a marvel of pioneering work, done in a few days. The head-quarter wing of the 42nd Native Infantry have improved all the roads as we advanced, and worked capitally, but have not had the same opportunities as the more advanced wings. All are anxious to come to the front, but the duties in the rear are often the most important.

9. On my arrival near camp, I received from Major General Nuthall a letter of the 13th instant (copy already forwarded), direct by the hands of Poiboi's messengers, and as the deception they had tried to pass off upon us had some bearing on my reply, I must explain our position at present, keeping in view the main object of the column, namely, to reach Vonolel's relations, Lalboora, and Thangdong. I was particularly anxious to avoid all collision with Poiboi's people, and by preventing all destruction of property, at this, the first of his villages, near which I had encamped, show that the object of the force was not entirely retaliation. At the same time Mr. Edgar informed the emissaries that, in consequence of the deception attempted, I would listen to no terms, except from Poiboi himself, and at his village, and that as the head man of Cheboee had been a party of this insult, and has since not assisted us by showing the road onwards, but has tried to delay our progress, I should insist on his being punished by Poiboi, or if the latter disclaimed the village as his subjects, should inflict such punishment myself hereafter, as I may think necessary, every consideration being given to the manner in which the village may conduct itself during my absence in the front. In the meantime, I continue my march to-morrow for Poiboi's own village.

10. Since my arrival here, I have been reconnoitring in all directions with Colonel Roberts, and have on more than one occasion come across crowds of women and children, hidden in the forests, where they are taking their food, furniture, &c., from the village. They do not seem actually afraid of us; after a little time they came from their hiding places, sat down by us, seemed to appreciate biscuit, but as yet, we cannot persuade them to return to the village.

11. The men are constantly in our camp, leading an easy sort of life, smoking, bartering fowls, pigs, &c., and amusing themselves with all the novelties they see around them. Every article received from them is scrupulously paid for; they now appreciate coin, but especially covet cloth, and we are paying rent for the huts we occupy.

12. I can easily imagine why they do not like returning to their village; they have an idea that we may stay here for some time, and are, so to speak, in a dilemma. The fact of their village and property having been spared, will impress Poiboi with the idea that they have favoured our advance, and on our departure they will be punished accordingly, while if our advance is resisted by Poiboi, they feel pretty certain they will, with all Poiboi's subjects, receive punishment from us.

13. In the meantime everything is being done to induce them to return; their granaries close to camp, brimfull, have not been touched. Mr. Edgar is trying to pursuade them to return to their usual occupations, husking and selling rice for the use of the column.

14. I have already telegraphed that my greatest anxiety is regarding my carriage and commissariat arrangements which have much delayed my advance. Colonel Davidson yesterday joined my camp, agreeable to my orders: I hope hereafter to report more favourably of the working of this department. From the first, I felt certain the management of 1,400 coolies, travelling backwards and forwards along a long line of road, could never be properly conducted by the Commissariat Department. Colonel Davidson felt this as much as I did, but I have never been able until lately to obtain a report from him on the subject, and then only with regard to his want of non-commissioned officers which I supplied. Colonel Davidson has never grasped the idea that he was an administrative officer, at the head of a most important department, but as an executive officer, he has worked from early morn till late at night.

15. I could never find out what provisions I had to the front, where the coolies were working, and with upwards of 1,100 coolies (effective) and more than 100 elephants, I found myself almost without provisions in store at No. 9 Station; in fact, that we were living from hand to mouth, and I felt that it was absolutely necessary to lay down some system for employing and caring for the coolies and for securing a sufficient supply to the front. I directed Colonel Roberts to sketch out the system which I considered most advisable from my knowledge of the road, the places best adapted for elephants or coolies: at the same time I attached to Colonel Davidson for employment with the coolies,—

Mr. W. W. Daly - -
Mr. Bedford - - -
Inspector Dost Mahomed - } of the police;

and Lieutenant Stevens temporarily, of the 42nd Native Infantry, and I trust the working will now be more systematically managed.

16. I regret to attach also a letter from Major Moore regarding the health of the coolies under his command. Of the 840 originally dispatched, only 389 are now effective, and although Dr. Buckle's report is more favourable than I had hoped it would be, still their state of health gives me much anxiety. Of the 300 coolies started from Sylhet by the magistrate, 130 deserted bodily somewhere near Tipai Mookh. Another detachment is halted at No. 4 Station with cholera. I forward copy of a field-force order regarding the care I expect officers to take of the coolies passing their posts.

17. I am glad to say that since our arrival in these higher mountains, the health of the officers and men has much improved. Nothing can be finer than the climate, and I hope its effect may be felt by the men of the cooly corps.

18. The surveying party have been able to map the country around most extensively during the last fortnight, and have completed their work up to this point.

19. The Botanical Garden man has not made his appearance, the Taxidermist has gone with Captain Leech's survey party to the Bhoobuns, or somewhere in that direction.

20. I feel very anxious to get on, but the series of misfortunes to my carriage has much crippled my resources. Of 166 elephants sent for the use of my column, 118 only, including the artillery elephants, are available; 38 are reported useless, sick or untrained; two have died, and two lost in the forest.

From Colonel *P. S. Lumsden*, C.S.I., Quartermaster General, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, Calcutta, No. 166 (Looshai); dated Army Headquarters, Camp Delhi, dated 11th February 1872.

I AM directed by the Right honourable the Commander in Chief, in forwarding for the information of Government, the accompanying copy of a letter, with annexures, No. 557 L., of 29th ultimo, from Brigadier General Bourchier, C.B., to my address, to draw the attention of Government to the skilfully and judiciously planned and ably and boldly executed operation therein set forth, and to the praiseworthy services of Lieutenant Colonel Roberts, V.C., and the other officers brought to notice by the Brigadier General.

From Brigadier General *G. Bourchier*, C.B., Commanding Cachar Column, Looshai Expeditionary Force, to the Quartermaster General, Army Headquarters, Camp Delhi (No. 557 L.; dated Camp, No. 12 Station, the 29th January 1872).

MY last report, dated Chebooee, 22nd instant, was from what may be said to have been the western boundary of Poiboy's villages. By holding strongly the stations at the Toweeboom and Pachooee, the Kholel villages and crops were entirely at our mercy, and our communications to Pachooee thus guaranteed, while the occupation of Chebooee with the large village of Tingridong within reach, would afford some security for our onward posts. The head men of both these latter villages remained in camp, as also others from Kholel, and Dharpong, the oftnamed emissary from Poiboy.

2. On the 22nd January, with two guns and 40 men of the Peshawur Mountain Battery, 60 of the 22nd Punjab Infantry, and 200 of the 44th Native Infantry, I started south-eastward, and encamped on the banks of a stream, about three miles below. The road at first was very difficult, but the word difficult is unknown to Captain Blackwood, and Lieutenant Fitzgerald, of the Royal Artillery, who somehow hitherto have always arrived in camp with their guns, soon after the column, improving the road themselves where impracticable.

3. On the 23rd I continued our march to the top of the Knowpa range, at an elevation of 3,840 feet, and encamped about 1½ miles, beyond the site of the old village of Bhoomong, the whole march from Chebooee being seven miles. The water was scarce, but with the experience we had acquired of economising it, no want was experienced.

4. On the 24th we tried the experiment of an early march, starting at 7 a.m., and allowing all hands to eat half-way on the banks of the Toowee La; this we found to be a mistake. The coolies started hungry, had a hurried meal, and arrived late in camp.

5. In the afternoon, with Mr. Edgar, Colonel Roberts, and Captain Thompson, I reconnoitred onwards to the top of the Southalang range, upwards of 5,000 feet elevation, with a guard of 50 men of the 44th Native Infantry, under Captain Lightfoot. About a mile and a-quarter from camp, we came upon two roads, and fortunately as the sequel will show, took the wrong one to the left, which led to the nearest point of the ridge; it would eventually have brought us to the village of Taikoom. Had we taken the right-hand road, we should soon have arrived at the enemy's stockades, strongly guarded and impregnable by so small a party. We heard their gongs and shouts along the mountain sides, and in the jhooms.

6. On the 25th, Dharpong, who had been sent by Mr. Edgar to inform Poiboi of our approach, and who met Colonel Roberts on the ridge the previous day, appeared in camp.

camp. He plainly indicated that we should that day be attacked on our march, and by a large force, and to do this man justice, though in appearance and habits he is a perfect type of a savage, his information hitherto has been correct.

7. At 8½ a.m., I started with the wing of the 44th Native Infantry, 50 in advance, leaving the 60 men of the 22nd Punjab Infantry as a guard to the artillery and coolies, for whose safety I was deeply anxious.

8. Our line of march lay along as bad ground as can be imagined, forest thick, with, at close intervals, large rocks favouring in every way an attack from an enemy, such as we might expect, nimble as monkeys and flashing from point to point like lightning. On our right was the narrow rocky bed of a stream, so commanded on both sides, and with banks so steep, that with so small a force I could not search it as I went along, while on the left the hills again rose precipitously.

9. On arriving at a spot where the advanced guard had to climb up a steep wall of rock, the first shots were exchanged, and, as if by magic, from our front and flank opened a heavy fire of musketry. The advance guard of the 44th Native Infantry under Captain Robertson extended into the forest, as they crowned the rocky bank before them, and on the left flank, while Colonel Nuthall and Captain Lightfoot, with the remainder of the corps dived into the river bed, and up the opposite bank where they met the enemy, I may say, face to face, as by this route they had hoped to slip past our main column, and attack the rear.

10. I cannot write too strongly in praise of these three officers and their men; they hunted the enemy along the bed of the river, and up the mountain sides, never stopping until their front and flanks were cleared; the enemy's loss was heavy, 13 corpses being found at one spot alone; many others were lying about, and to have suffered the dead to fall into our hands is convincing proof of the blow inflicted.

11. Part of the enemy slipped past our column, and attacked the rear, and while the conduct of the advance was brilliant, the defence of the artillery and the disposition of the coolies, with regard to their protection, reflect the greatest credit on Lieutenant G. Hare, 22nd Punjab Native Infantry, who commanded the supports, Captain Udny, 44th Native Infantry, who commanded the rear guard, and Major Moore, who is ever indefatigable where the welfare of his charge is concerned.

12. As will be seen by the return of killed and wounded, our loss was not heavy, when the nature of the ground, and the difficulties of our position are considered.

13. A short distance beyond where we were first attacked, is the junction of the two roads before mentioned, and I can only think that we were indebted for their having left the ridge to their doubts as to which road we intended to take.

14. For a quarter of an hour the musketry fire was very heavy. I may here mention that at the outset I was wounded by two slugs in the left arm and hand, and although not disabled for the subsequent advance, I was so at the time, and I have to thank Colonel Roberts and my staff for carrying out the details, which ended so successfully.

15. After collecting our scattered column, we pushed on for a mile further, where we commenced a precipitous ascent, guarded by two stockades, admirably placed for covering the roads; the first had been deserted, the upper one however was held, and while the enemy kept up a fire on the road, the 44th Native Infantry swarmed up the side of the hill, and turned their left flank, seeing which the Looshais evacuated this strong position, and their stockaded village which we now occupy, at an elevation of 5,500 feet, rising 2,500 feet in 2½ miles from our former camp.

16. The whole of the baggage arrived in camp by 7 p.m., but the guns could not that evening be brought up, as the latter part of the track we had come by was simply climbing the face of a rock.

17. From the information I received from Dharpong and others, and from the ammunition found upon the slain, being the smooth-bore ammunition taken last year at Nungdigram and Monierkhall, it is conclusive that the attack made on the column was by Lalboorah and Poiboi's men; the latter, Mr. Edgar informs me, being overruled by his two muntries, who led the troops. The chief muntry was killed in the bed of the river. Such being the case, and Poiboi having been treated hitherto with the greatest consideration, I determined to punish and destroy his villages, and yesterday detached Lieutenant Colonel Roberts, V.C., with a party of 100 of the 22nd Punjab Infantry and 44th Native Infantry, and two mountain guns, to Taikoom, distant about five miles.

18. I forward herewith his report, and I need scarcely add one word to what he has described therein, except by acknowledging in the warmest terms the services, on this and every occasion, of this distinguished officer. The distance he had to travel was further than was anticipated, and he did not return to camp until half-past 10 at night. This was the first occasion on which the guns had been taken into action; and while I was perfectly confident in the officer to whom I had entrusted this expedition, I felt somewhat being unable to witness their first effect upon the enemy.

19. It now remains for me to dwell somewhat upon the position I now hold. Having passed through the villages of Kholel, known generally as Vonpilall's, and again the more westerly villages of Poiboi, I have divided the ground I have passed through into commands: Lieutenant Colonel O'Bryen, with a wing of the 22nd Punjab Infantry, holding from Mynadhur to Tipai Mookh, Lieutenant Colonel Sheriff, the three stations from Tipai Mookh to the ridge above the Toweeboom, Colonel Hicks, with the head-quarter detachment of his corps, from the Toweeboom to the Toweetoo, and Colonel Rattray, with more than half his corps, occupying the most important position of all, viz., from Pachooee on the ridge, commanding both old and new Kholel, to the point I now hold, which commands the Knonpa range, and the villages left undestroyed in my rear.

20. I shall have collected here in a few days Lieutenant Colonel Nuthall's wing of the 44th Native Infantry, the head-quarters and wing of the 22nd Punjab Infantry, two guns of the Peshawur Mountain Battery, and the Sappers, with, I hope, 15 days' supply, to enable me to move on to Poiboi's principal village, and then to Lalboorah.

21. I forward herewith letters from Colonel Stafford and Colonel Rattray, which will show how completely our advance has placed in our power the tracts of country through which we have passed, and how completely correct was the information given to Colonel Rattray of the intention of Lalboorah and Poiboi as to attacking us, even as to the actual spot; and I think, if all goes well, I see my way ahead to a successful termination of the objects of the Government; but I trust His Excellency the Commander in Chief will not deem the telegram I have this day sent, in reply to yours of the 24th instant, regarding my withdrawal from the country, as exhibiting in the least a wish to prolong our occupation contrary to the wishes of Government.

22. In your letter, No. 174, dated 12th October 1871, my line is so clearly laid down that I could not well mistake what was expected of me; and I have planned my advance so as to get as straight as possible to the tribes of Vonolel, punishing *en route*, and bringing into subjection those who resisted our advance.

23. By the end of next week, the 2nd or 3rd February, I hope to be at Poiboi's own village, whence I can open communications with General Nuthall; but the distance of Lalboorah's village is not satisfactorily known, and it is of paramount importance that I should proceed there and inflict heavy punishment on Lalboorah, not only from his having been the chief of the raiders of 1871, but for the resistance to our column on the 25th instant.

24. Mr. Edgar has sent to Poiboi to inform him that, even if he now comes in, the share his people took in the attack, whether with his consent or not, will only be condoned by heavy fines of rice, gyal, &c. &c.

25. I shall be back here about the end of February, I hope, and then arrange for the withdrawal of the force, commencing with those nearest Cachar. I have certain suggestions to make as to the arrangements for their return, which will be communicated hereafter.

26. It is with great pleasure that I report a marked improvement in the commissariat arrangements. The coolies under supervision are performing their stages regularly, while Lieutenant Colonel Davidson, who is at my head-quarters, is viewing his arrangements in the comprehensive light of an administrative officer, allowing his subordinates to work out details, which were simply killing him.

27. The health of the troops has visibly improved; there are a number of coolies sick, but not more, Dr. Buckle thinks, than might be expected under the circumstances.

28. I have never yet mentioned this medical officer, whose services have been indefatigable, and who, whenever he finds a moment of leisure, is to be seen wandering about, administering to the wants of the force. No matter whether the sufferer be officer or cooly, the one is as certain as the other of receiving attention.

29. His Excellency the Commander in Chief will see that my weekly reports are merely running commentaries on passing events. I have, as opportunities offered, jotted down notes on various subjects connected with the present expedition, equipment, and maintenance of similar future expeditions, which will form matter for a report hereafter, when I have more leisure.

30. I shall, as I have stated, endeavour, when I reach Poiboi, to open a communication across country with General Brownlow; but I have little hope of a message so sent ever reaching, nor, if it does, could I get a reply under a fortnight. The Chittagong column is, as the crow flies, upwards of 60 miles from me; and as it is advancing in a north-easterly direction, more perhaps easterly, while we are moving in a south-easterly direction, it is impossible we can meet; and I was glad to see by your letter, No. 174, dated 12th October 1871, above quoted, and by the tenor of your telegram of the 24th instant, that it was only after the important business of the expedition was completed that we were to attempt a junction, which I feared at first was considered of paramount importance by the Government.

31. I have

31. I have touched to-day in my telegram on the importance of the simultaneous withdrawal of the columns, the detachment of the Munnipoor contingent, and the detachments on the advanced outposts on the southern frontier of Cachar. I need hardly point out that the premature withdrawal of either column might release the tribes it was watching from surveillance, and facilitate their combined action to oppose the other.

32. Since writing the above, I have heard from Mr. Edgar that the Khansamah's wife, captured at Alexandrapoor, and a Cachari, have arrived at Jhalnacherra, and that Mary Winchester is on the road to be delivered up to the civil authorities by Sookpilall. How Sookpilall got hold of her from the Howlongs I have no idea, but I feel that such a result will be a matter of congratulation, arising, I may say, from the tremendous pressure brought to bear on Benkni, Sookpilall, and the Howlongs, by the advance of the two columns, and the detachment thrown so far south on the southern frontier of Cachar. I trust this may be the commencement of the rescue of all the captives.

(No. 45 of 1872.)

(Separate.)

To His Grace the Duke of *Argyll*, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Military Department, Fort William,
8 March 1872.

My Lord Duke,

In continuation of our Despatch, No. 38, dated the 1st instant, we beg to forward copies of further telegrams regarding the operations of the Looshai expeditionary force.

2. It will be seen that the officers commanding the columns are withdrawing their troops from the Looshai country, and Brigadier General Bourchier expected to be at Tipai Mookh on the 6th instant. Brigadier General Brownlow, however, has halted on his way back to Chittagong at Demagiri, where he was on the 6th instant, in case it may be necessary for him to take further steps in regard to the southern Howlongs, whose conduct has not altogether satisfied him.

3. Meanwhile all needful arrangements for the return of troops to the provinces from the bases of operations have been already made, and will be carried out as circumstances permit.

We are, &c.
(signed) *Napier*,
Napier of Magdala,
&c. &c.

From General *Brownlow*, C.B.

Syloo Savoonga, 28th February.—Lall Gnoora and Lal Jeeka, the sons of Savoonga, Vinoyah, Vanloola, and three other chiefs representing the whole of the Sylhoo tribe, came in yesterday and made their submission on the same conditions as the Howlongs. Savoonga excused his absence on the grounds of old age and illness arising from his recent troubles and wanderings, but sent a message that he would come in if we insisted on it, which I did not think it necessary to do. As the Syloos have suffered all the punishment we could inflict, their submission may be looked upon as undoubted evidence of a real desire of friendly relations with us. The chiefs say their followers are completely scattered, and that it will take time to collect and make over their captives, many of whom, I fear, have been killed. Major MacDonald, of the Survey, escorted by a party of the 2nd Goorkhas under Captain Battye, and accompanied by Sylhoo Karbarees, who will see them beyond their own border, proceeded this morning towards Sookipal's (Sookpilal's) country; they are provisioned for thirteen days, and will return by the Lysrah Klang, having, I hope, completed the connection between Chittagong and Cachar. The 2nd Goorkhas will remain on the Rai Jan Klang range. While this party is out, the rest of the force will be collected at Demagiri by the sixth of March.

From General *Brownlow*, C.B.

29th February.—Your telegram of the 23rd received. The northern Howlong chiefs tendered their submission, accompanied by the usual peace offerings of elephant tusks, gongs, gyal, and goats, and with the previous general understanding conveyed through Rutton Pooea, that if they give up their captives and bound themselves to friendly relation with the Government for the future, no harm would be done to them. Sangboonga and Benkooya, who

who were the first to come in, were undoubtedly concerned in the Cachar raids, but Captain Lewin, to whom I left all personal communications with the chiefs, assured me that to insist on any special penalties for their acts would so alarm them that they would abscond, negotiations would come to an end, and that we should lose the captives as well as the opportunity of bringing these tribes to a sense of the objects of the expedition. Their grain and property had been put out of our reach, and to burn empty villages which a few weeks would re-build, was the only and very easily alternative, had I decided on punishment. I therefore accepted their submission on the terms I have mentioned, which were ratified by oaths and ceremonies that Captain Lewin is confident will be respected. The next day the captives were sent in, and we were at liberty to go where we liked. Lalboorah, Totomah, and three other chiefs, against whom there was no proof of raiding, submitted in like manner, and their Karbarees accompanied us to Syloo Savoonga. All these rajahs have promised to come in to Captain Lewin at Demagiri, and that officer anticipates the best results from the intercourse he has opened with them.

From General *Bourchier*, C.B.

March 3rd.—We are continuing our retirement without any opposition; indeed, whenever we are in the vicinity of villages, our camps are filled with Looshais; rain is holding off, and I trust we shall be able to clear everything out of the country by the 10th instant.

TELEGRAM from Brigadier General *Bourchier*, C.B., Commanding Cachar Column, Looshai Expeditionary Force, to the Quartermaster General; dated Camp, No. 7 Station, the 5th March 1872.

March 5th.—REACHED the Toweeboom yesterday, and hope to be at Tipai Mookh to-morrow. The last detachment of troops will arrive here on the 7th; a wing of the 22nd Punjab Infantry, and of the 44th Native Infantry, and a large number of sick soldiers and coolies have left Tipai Mookh for Cachar; Looshais very friendly. All well.

TELEGRAM from Brigadier General *Brownlow*, C.B., Commanding Chittagong Column, Looshai Expeditionary Force, to the Quartermaster General; dated Demagiri, the 6th March 1872.

DEMAGIRI, 6th March.—The Southern Howlongs have sent in some captives, and the chief Sypoea is on his way to make his submission, but I am not altogether satisfied with their conduct, and move out to-morrow in the direction of the Long Seh Klang, due east of this, with 100, 4th Goorkhas, and 100, 27th Punjab Native Infantry. I shall be absent from 10 to 15 days.

(No. 50 of 1872.)

(Separate.)

To his Grace the Duke of *Argyll*, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Military Department, Fort William,
15 March 1872.

My Lord Duke,

IN continuation of our letter, No. 44, of the 8th instant, we beg to forward the accompanying Despatch, dated 29th January 1872, from Brigadier General C. H. Brownlow, C.B., commanding Chittagong column, Looshai expeditionary force, detailing the progress made by his troops up to that date.

We are, &c.
(signed) *Napier*,
Napier of Magdala,
&c. &c.

From Brigadier General *C. H. Brownlow*, C.B., commanding Chittagong Column, Looshai Expeditionary Force, to the Quartermaster General, No. 500 L.; dated Camp, Syloo Savoonga, the 29th January 1872.

I HAVE the honour to report, for the information of the Right honourable the Commander in-Chief, the proceedings of the column under my command since the 1st instant.

2. On that date, I was joined at the village of Lower Hoolien, on the Towrong range, by the half-battery of artillery and half-company of Sappers. The day following I moved with the

the whole of the advanced force three miles further up the range to the village of Upper Hoolien? From this place, which is 4,000 feet high, or rather from a peak beyond it 700 feet higher, where the survey had cleared a station the day before, for even at this elevation though the undergrowth is not so great, the hills are clothed with forest to their summits, a fine view could be obtained of the surrounding country.

Syloo Savoonga, the capital of the chief, lay 10 miles to the east, or a little to the north of east, but separated from us by a deep and difficult valley intersected by the head waters of three rivers (running like the ranges north and south, two towards Cachar and one into the Kurnafoolee), and a confusion of minor ranges and spurs involving, as we afterwards found, ascents and descents, aggregating, in this comparatively short distance, 4,200 feet of the latter and 3,300 feet of the former. Further to the east, and on the third and fourth ranges from the one on which we stood, were to be seen the most important of the Howlong villages, and our direct road to their country was clearly through Savoonga's. About 10 miles due north stood the deserted village of Lall Gnoora, and eight miles beyond that again, a large and newly-built one belonging to the same chief, one of the sons of Savoonga. The road to these villages was a comparatively easy one along the Towrong range, and I determined on destroying them before turning eastward.

3. Captain Battye, with two companies of the 2nd Goorkhas, was ordered to proceed at once and occupy the deserted village. On the 3rd January, Colonel Macpherson joined him with two more companies of the regiment, and the day following marched and attacked Lall Gnoora's, which he found strongly stockaded, and in taking which he lost one Goorkah killed, an officer (Captain Battye) and nine men wounded by bamboo stakes. The village was burnt and a large quantity of grain destroyed. Colonel Macpherson's report is appended, and I beg strongly to endorse his recommendation of Major Macintyre for gallant conduct on the 4th inst. This officer has been in the advance all through the expedition, and his eye for country, as well as the care and skill with which he works his men, have rendered his service with the column invaluable. The claim to the Order of Merit, put forward by Colonel Macpherson on behalf of Rifleman Inderjeet Thappa, will be duly submitted as soon as a committee can be assembled.

4. During the 4th and 5th, raiding and reconnoitring parties were sent out in different directions from Upper Hoolien, and on the 6th I moved with two companies of Goorkhas, the half battery Royal Artillery, and the half company Sappers, to Lall Gnoora's village, in the valley to which I have already referred. This march of seven miles took the troops as many hours, and the coolies were not up till three hours later. Where the path did not ascend or descend at angle of 35 degrees, it followed the tortuous bed of a mountain torrent overhung by trees and precipices and blocked up with rocks and boulders, through which we waded, and stumbled for three miles, chilled by the cold clammy atmosphere, and feeling that 50 determined men might do as they liked with us, for there was no possibility of protecting our flanks. The Looshais engineer their tracks with considerable skill and at tolerable gradients along the top or face of a range, and keep to the high ground as much as possible, but when they have to cross a valley, they do so by the shortest lines, and a day's journey such as I describe is a fair specimen of its kind.

5. On arriving within 1,000 yards of Lall Gnoor, an open joom or clearing on a spot where a bend of the hill afforded a view of the village and its defences gave me an opportunity of using the artillery for the first time. Colonel Hill's 7-pounder steel guns, which are carried by coolies and keep up with the column on any ground, fired some very effective shots, while a company of the 2nd Goorkhas, under Captain Nash, accompanied by Captain East, Assistant Quartermaster General, worked round under cover and drove out the enemy. Rutton Pooea, who is our exponent of Kookie thought, remarked when he heard the shells burst, "you fire one gun out of another, who can fight against you?"

6. On the 9th, I was rejoined by Colonel Macpherson and the Head-quarters 2nd Goorkhas. The same day the post of Upper Hoolien was abandoned, as being off the direct line of communication, and the village of Lall Shooma to the south-east of it was occupied as a halting ground between Kothir Klang and Lall Gnoor; the whole distance between these places being about 18 miles by road.

7. I may here mention, in the order of time that the particulars reached me, another attempt of the enemy to way-lay a convoy. On the 6th instant, while a small guard of the 2nd Goorkhas and a few Sappers were marching in charge of coolies along the Towrong range, they came suddenly upon some 30 Kookies in act of preparing an ambush. There were only four Goorkhas in front, who at once dashed at the enemy, drawing the fire of the whole party, and yet killing one and wounding two without any loss to themselves. Such conduct needs no comment, and is the third or fourth instance of the kind. It is due to the material training and matchless spirit of this regiment, that the column has suffered so little at the hands of the Sylhoos, who I feel sure would have given us very much more trouble had they met with the slightest success in their encounters with small bodies, or their attacks on our line of communications.

I am happy to say that not a single follower has been killed or wounded up to the date of this report, our only losses having been among the fighting men.

8. On the 11th I started for Syloo Savoonga with 200 Goorkhas, the half battery of Artillery and half company Sappers, intending to reach it the same day; but the march was a difficult and tedious one, and at four o'clock in the afternoon, finding we had

still an ascent of 2,000 feet before us, and expecting more than usual opposition at the head quarters of the tribe, I determined to halt. For the sake of water, the spot selected was just above a stream. It was covered with jungle, but the force has now had considerable experience in bivouacking, and enough space was soon cleared to enable us to get through a very unpleasant night, for the thick mist which gathers in these valleys immediately after sunset penetrates everything, and the drip from the trees as it condenses can only be compared to rain. The wood in such places is too damp to burn, and altogether the situation, not unfrequent in this campaign, is trying to the strongest. Next morning a dose of quinine was administered to every soldier and follower, and after a steep ascent of two hours we occupied Syloo Savoonga without a shot being fired. The village, which consisted of between 300 and 400 houses, had been burnt on the 7th instant. It occupied a fine position at an elevation of 3,200 feet, with the river Klongdoon or Dulesurree flowing under it to the east, and two tributaries, one of the Gootur and another of the Kurnafoolee, rising at its western base.

9. The Howlong villages are in full view; those of Ben Koea and Sangboonga, the sons of Lalputang, the late chief of the tribe, who were known to have Mary Winchester and a number of the Cachar captives of last year's raids, being immediately in front of us. On the third range to the east and beyond the Koladyne, about three days' journey to the north, are visible some of Sookpilall's villages; and I am thoroughly confirmed in the correctness of the views which led me to adopt the line by which we have advanced, and of the importance of this position in every respect, strategical and political, as well as scientific, for the Motee or Mowee Klang, a peak over 5,000 feet high, which I can reach in three days, is more than half way from Chittagong to Cachar, and even if the two columns fail to combine, the officers of the Survey Department should be able to connect their operations.

10. On the 13th January Captain Lewin proceeded with an escort of 50 Goorkhas to put Rutton Pooea across the Kloong Doong, which river is the boundary between the lands of the Sylhoos and Howlongs. I have already mentioned that Rutton Pooea is at enmity with the former, but allied by marriage and other ties to the chiefs of the latter, whom he has always confidently declared he could bring into camp whenever we reached this point. Captain Lewin returned with his whole party next day, having failed to carry out this object.

A small village on the other side of the river was burnt at his approach, and there were so many signs of Sylhoos having fled in that direction, that Rutton Pooea declined to go any further, saying that to do so might precipitate a collision with the Howlongs, and put it out of his power to mediate. He begged to be allowed to proceed by a more southerly route, and urged that we should not cross the Kloong Doong before the 25th. As we had barely one day's rations in camp, and it was necessary to my plans to have a reserve of 10 days at least before moving, I consented, and the chief started next morning, accompanied, as far as it was safe for him to go, by Subadar Mahomed Azeem of the police, an officer whose services with the expedition have been most valuable, and shall be brought to the notice of the Bengal Government. The only conditions to which I referred, as the grounds on which we could treat with the Howlongs, were the restoration of the captives and an unmolested march through their country.

11. As the 2nd Goorkhas had recently done very severe work, having, since the 3rd instant, marched over some 60 miles of bad road, carrying everything on their backs, except their cooking pots, and when not marching or fighting, been employed at long distances from camp destroying jooms, it was necessary to give them a few days' rest. During the next week parties were sent out in various directions for reconnoitring and survey purposes.

12. On the 20th I moved out with the head quarters and 160 of the 2nd Goorkhas, the half battery Royal Artillery and half company Sappers, five miles in the direction of Lall Jeeka, the village of one of Savoonga's sons, whose name it bears. The next day, after a march of seven miles, I attacked and occupied it. Naturally a strong position, it had been elaborately stockaded, and without artillery could not have been taken without a certain number of casualties, had the Sylhoos defended it even for a few minutes. I thought, too, that it was advisable, if not absolutely necessary, to use the guns for the sake of the moral effect they are likely to produce on the minds of these savages, who have hitherto been so ignorant of our power. Colonel Hill's battery was therefore brought into action, and at distances of 700 and 1,000 yards fired 10 rounds of shell and shrapnell, with a precision that soon put the enemy to flight, and enabled the Goorkhas to pull down the defences and enter the village without loss.

13. It being an object to economise the rations at Lall Jeeka, and to employ every available coolie in bringing in supplies on the main line, I sent back the artillery on the following day to Syloo Savoonga, and on the 22nd returned there myself, leaving Colonel Macpherson with orders to remain till he was rejoined by a company of his regiment under Captain Battye, which had proceeded on the 22nd, as an escort with Major Macdonald and Captain Tanner, of the Survey Department, to a range of hills about four miles to the north and overlooking Beypari Bazar. This party was unable, in the three days which was considered by those officers sufficient for the purposes of the expedition, and for which it was rationed, to reach the desired point, owing to dense jungle and the absence of anything like a path.

a path. Colonel Macpherson returned to Syloo Savoonga on the 25th. As the erection of a station on the range just referred to is very important to the operations of the survey when we move eastward, I have given Major Macdonald the opportunity of repeating the attempt, and he started on the 28th with a company of Goorkhas and seven days' supply. I have thereby deprived the column of the services of these soldiers and 100 coolies at a most critical period, and hope my care for the interests of science may not interfere with the other objects before us.

14. Our endeavours to open communications with the Syloos have failed so completely that I have little to say of our political relations with that tribe. They have systematically opposed us, with what success I have already narrated, and their punishment has been such as to lead me to hope it will have a lasting effect on this frontier, and facilitate very much our immediate dealings with the Howlongs, and possibly with Sookpilal, who have doubtless witnessed our progress from their hill-tops, and had time to consider the consequences of a like visitation.

15. I have already referred to the feud existing between Rutton Pooea and the Sylhoos, and his inability or unwillingness to mediate between us and them. I have also mentioned that he is on most friendly terms with the Howlongs, his own sister being married to one of their chiefs, and his wife likewise being of that tribe. Nearly a month ago, or as soon as we were in a position to show that the Sylhoos were not too formidable for us, and that such a step was not dictated by any doubt as to our ability to reach them, I pressed Rutton Pooea, through Captain Lewin, to send a message from himself to the Howlongs, advising them to come to terms. The chief made the usual objections to do anything at once, and said, he would open his mouth in council when we reached the Kloong Doong; but I insisted on the messengers going, if only to give evidence of the futile efforts of the Syloos to oppose us. They started accordingly, but I learnt about a week later that an accident had prevented their reaching their destination.

I urged Captain Lewin to make the chief send again, and two more men were despatched, who so far fulfilled their mission that, when Rutton Pooea and Subadar Mahomed Azeem were on the way to the Howlongs, after the failure to communicate with them across the Kloong Doong, referred to in paragraph 10 of this letter, they met these men and some Howlongs returning with the child, Mary Winchester, who was made over to the Subadar, and brought on by him to Rutton Pooea's village, near Demagiri, while the rajah continued his journey, and has since reported that Bundoolah and some other powerful chiefs have declared their willingness to give up all their captives.

He expressed a hope that the rest would follow their example, and begged me not to invade Howlong territory till the 28th instant, when he would appear in camp. Taking the unconditional surrender of Mary Winchester as an earnest of their desire to come to terms, I thought it advisable to accede to the request. The date fixed has passed without his return, but considering the extent of the Howlong country, and the slow progress of Kookie council, I am not surprised that he has been unable in so short a time to get the whole tribe to be of one mind with regard to our demands.

16. Every day's delay in advancing is, of course, against us, but at the same time I feel that any further display of our power is unnecessary, and that the results to be obtained by negotiation are likely to be so much more satisfactory in respect of the captives than forcible measures, that though I may make a forward movement to-morrow to show that we are ready to move, I hope it may not lead to bloodshed, which, with such a suspicious people, would put an end to negotiations at once, and leave us no alternative but to deal with them as we have done with the Sylhoo Savoonga; and most of the chiefs of the Sylhoos have taken refuge with the Howlongs, and I am sanguine that the submission of the latter will be followed by that of the former, and their consent to the same terms.

17. It may not be out of place here to remark that the Looshais, or Kookies, for the former term, properly speaking, applies only to the family from which the chiefs of all the so-called tribes are descended, appear to me, in spite of their misdeeds, very far removed from the savages they are supposed to be. They live in comfortable houses on high and healthy ranges. Their mode of cultivation yields the most abundant and certain crops. They are surrounded by pigs and poultry, goats and gyal (a domesticated bison). They fish and shoot, and brew both beer and whiskey. Their domestic and tribal arrangements appear most happy, and altogether their condition contrasts very favourably with that of many of our own subject races, so much so, that I am not surprised to hear the majority of the captives, whom they treat as their own people, would look upon a return to civilisation as a doubtful boon. The men are of middle height, well-limbed, and fair, with the Indo-Chinese type of face. Most of those who have hitherto fought against us are armed with flint muskets, but I imagine a spear or javelin and the universal dâs are the more common weapons. We have seen no others.

18. Mary Winchester has been forwarded to Chittagong, where she will remain in charge of the Commissioner until the wishes of Government are known with regard to her. She is described as a very pretty girl, of six or seven years of age, with hazel eyes and good feature; she talks nothing but Kookie, smokes a pipe, and orders about the Looshais with an air of authority, which shows that she has been well treated.

19. I must bring to his Excellency's notice the very great assistance I have derived from the new system of army signalling with flags.

On many occasions I have been able to send instructions to detached parties, and posts at distances of 10 and 12 miles, and to receive replies in a few minutes, which otherwise must have taken three or four days in transmission, and have given extra and trying work to the troops detailed for carrying orders. It appears to me that in mountain campaigns in this country, the system of army signalling, when properly carried out, must be of the very greatest utility, and I venture to express an opinion that every British officer should learn it as part of his drill, and that an apparatus for night signalling, under a specially qualified officer, be attached to every expedition that may in future take the field.

20. With the exception of 16 unfit for work, the whole of the elephants with this column have been working regularly since the 22nd January on seven stages along my line of communications. On this side of the Sajuck, road-making has been steadily carried on by the 27th Punjab Infantry and the half-company Sappers which I placed at Colonel Doran's disposal, and I am much indebted to this officer for the efficient arrangements made by him for opening out a good elephant path as far as Lall Schumma. This has enabled me to move the whole of the coolies hitherto occupied in carrying commissariat stores, in advance of that post. Lieutenant Brough, Royal Artillery, temporarily employed in bringing the elephant service into working order, has rendered good service, and has been of good assistance to Major Mackenzie, the Executive Commissariat officer.

I may mention that the 65 elephants in advance of Vanoona's Ghât are fed entirely on dhan or unthrashed rice collected from jhooms near the several posts, and which have been spared for this purpose.

21. I am now in a position to move into the Howlong country with 400 coolies carrying commissariat rations, leaving 200 at each of the two stages in rear of me. These numbers are exclusive of baggage coolies and of men in hospital. I much regret that I have not yet been able to carry out the liberal intentions of Government, regarding the issue of rum to these men, for I am convinced that many of those now in hospital or about to be discharged, and who must be replaced by fresh men at a considerable expense to Government, would still have remained efficient had it been possible to give them a timely dram when arriving in camp, and finding perhaps little shelter for the night after a long and fatiguing day's march.

22. I have already explained for his Excellency's information the nature of my communications as far as Vanoona's Ghât, the highest point on the Sajuck to which water carriage has been employed. In advance of that place eight posts are now established, at each of which a company of not less strength than 50 men is stationed; from these posts the necessary escorts for elephants and coolies, consisting as a rule of a section, are furnished. Each post is protected by a rough stockade of heavy timbers, and these have been efficiently and rapidly constructed by the Sappers, assisted by the fatigue labour of the troops, under the very zealous superintendence of Lieutenant Hyslop, R.E.

23. The Commander in Chief will have learnt from my telegrams that cholera has occurred at Demagiri and the stations below it. In nearly every detachment arriving at Chittagong through the Soonderbunds, one or two cases took place, the first being amongst the 2nd Goorkhas and 3rd Company Sappers and Miners, which troops formed the advanced part of this column. Amongst the coolies and followers despatched by sea route, I have not heard of a single case during the voyage. No serious outbreak took place, however, until the disembarkation of the Nepaulese coolies on the 7th December, when 297 men arrived, having lost 14 of their original number since their departure from Doobree. The healthy men were at once forwarded up the river, on the advice of the medical officer in charge of the Depôt Hospital at Chittagong. Subsequent to their arrival there have been several outbreaks of the disease, and up to date the number of cases which have occurred in the force is as per margin.

Chittagong.	
7th to 17th December.	
Attacked	27
Died	9
Kassalong.	
13th December to 18th January.	
Attacked	23
Died	15
Upper and Lower Burkul.	
17th December to 19th January.	
Attacked	9
Died	8
Demagiree and Camp on Cheepoom range, &c.	
13th December to 4th January.	
Attacked	19
Died	12

Every precaution has been taken to isolate all men attacked, and to prevent the spread of the disease; considerable delay and confusion on the movements of both troops and coolies being occasioned by these necessary measures, putting men into quarantine who were urgently required in the front. I am afraid that in the low belt of moist and thickly-wooded country extending from the sea-coast to the first range of high hills, cholera must be looked upon as endemic, and I much fear that, despite all precautions, an occasional, though I trust not a serious, recurrence of the disease must be expected.

24. The health of the troops in other respects has been satisfactory, though the change in the weather, the monotonous diet, and want of shelter, added to the very hard work that both the troops and coolies have lately been doing, are beginning to tell, and sickness is steadily on the increase.

I fear that more than 25 per cent. of the coolies are unfit for work. In all sanitary arrangements I am assisted by the very able and practical advice of Surgeon Major F. F. Allen, of the 2nd Goorkhas, the principal medical officer of the force, whose care and exertions leave nothing unprovided for.

25. I enclose

25. I enclose a map showing the present distribution of the troops under my command, and the extent of country covered by the operations of the force up to this date. In addition to the 70 miles of road constituting our main line of communication in advance of Demagiree, columns have gone over an aggregate of 200 miles to the right and left of it, and attacked and destroyed 20 villages, the jhooms of which frequently lay at long distances from them, and the search for which had to be carried out with all military precautions, entailing severe exertions on both officers and men.

From Lieutenant-Colonel *Macpherson*, Commanding 2nd Goorkha Regiment, to the Brigade-Major of Brigadier-General *Brownlow*, Commanding Chittagong Column, Looshai Expeditionary Force; dated Savoonga's Village, the 19th January 1872.

I HAVE the honour to report, for the information of Brigadier General Brownlow, C.B., that I moved from brigade head quarters at Upper Hoolien on the 3rd instant with Major Macintyre, Captain Becher, Lieutenant Hill, Surgeon Major Allen, 100 Goorkhas, and joined Captain Battye, who had preceded us on the 2nd at Lal Gnoora's old village.

2. On the following day, leaving Lieutenant Hill with 30 Goorkhas to hold the post, started for the village of Lal Gnoora, the eldest son of Savoonga, which had been sent from the survey station on the Towrong. The four paths to the north which presented themselves were somewhat perplexing, but choosing that which appeared most frequented, leading round the west side of Burhee Klang, that towered 1,000 feet straight above us, we marched for one hour along a very narrow path, cut out of the almost precipitous mountain side. At this point we came upon a strong palisade which, though unoccupied, was found to be of very recent construction, and this fostered our anticipations of being on the right track; these were presently confirmed on our emerging to open ground which bore evidence of old cultivation and the sites of two villages. For five miles the road was excellent, along the gentle undulations of the ridge in a northerly direction; at six miles, descending gradually some 600 feet, we sighted Lal Gnoora's, and from a mound to our right had a good look at his western stockade, which lay, as the crow flies, about 400 yards east by north, and 300 feet above us; distant by the path 1,200 yards. While waiting for the rear guard to close up, some rifle practice was made at the stockade in hopes of making the enemy show himself (he had already fired a few of his houses), but he would make no sign, and the advance was continued.

3. The path here takes a bend to the east under the hill on which the village stood. Over this ridge, the sides of which were very difficult, the advanced line and flankers climbed in extended order, the movements along the path being very gradual to ensure having a good front on arrival at the point of attack.

4. The advance was led by Captain Battye, the flankers by Major Macintyre and Captain Becher. On nearing the stockade to within 25 yards, or so, the Looshais, who had evidently expected the attack by the pathway, suddenly discovered their enemies above them, and opened at first a desultory fire; this was replied to by a rush on the palisade, and drew a smart volley by which one Goorkha was mortally wounded.

5. Captain Battye, two havildars, and seven riflemen were disabled by bamboo spikes, four of which went through and through the legs of as many Goorkhas.

6. Major Macintyre was the first to reach the stockade (on this side from eight to nine feet high); to climb over and disappear among the flames and smoke of the burning village was the work of a very short time. I need not say that he was rapidly followed by the Goorkhas who scrambled over with great cleverness.

7. This rapid assault and following up gave the enemy no opportunity of making a stand at any of the five transverse stockades which intervened between him and the point at which he must abandon his stronghold.

8. I beg to recommend this very forward gallantry of Major Macintyre to the special notice of the Brigadier General, and I venture to hope that General Brownlow will recommend him for the Victoria Cross.

9. I would also recommend for the third-class Order of Merit, Rifleman, No. 658, Interjeet Thappa, B Company, who immediately followed Major Macintyre.

10. It will be seen from the accompanying sketch, for which I am indebted to the kindness of Major Macdonald, Deputy Surveyor General, who accompanied me, that this was a first-class Looshai fortress, quite impregnable, I should say, to any Kookie attack. It overlooks Sookpilal's country to the north, and is the Sylhoo northern frontier defence, situated on a commanding ridge running east and west, with precipitous sides. The only assailable point from this side was where we had the good fortune to touch it.

11. It is impossible to say to what extent the enemy suffered. The pursuit was continued down the hill for about an hour, and one body was brought back, also a seer weight made at Wolverhampton which appeared significant that these Looshais had raided in Cachar. There was ample shelter for the Goorkhas and followers in the houses left unburnt.

The officers occupied that of the chief; in its front 37 new forked sticks were carefully enclosed, each of which, the friendly Looshais assured us, was an emblem of a human sacrifice.

12. On the 5th, I employed the men on light work in destroying the stockades; this was done effectually. On the 6th, strong parties were sent out, they destroyed some 3,000 maunds of grain; on the 7th I marched, and rejoined head-quarters on the 9th.

(No. 51 of 1872.)

(Separate.)

To His Grace the Duke of *Argyll*, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Military Department, Fort William,
15 March 1872.

My Lord Duke,

IN continuation of our Despatch, No. 45, of the 8th instant, we enclose copies of further telegrams relating to the operations of the Looshai expeditionary force.

2. It will be seen that Brigadier General Brownlow has found it necessary to advance against the Southern Howlongs, leaving Colonel Macpherson at Demagiri to carry out the arrangements for sending back the rest of the column to Calcutta; but we trust that this necessity will not materially, if at all, delay the return of the troops.

We are, &c.
(signed) *Napier*,
Napier of Magdala,
&c. &c.

TELEGRAM from Brigadier General *G. Bourchier*, C.B., Commanding Cachar Column, Looshai Expeditionary Force, to the Quartermaster General; dated Tipai Mookh, the 6th March 1872.

ARRIVED here this morning with the Peshawur Mountain Battery and head-quarters of 22nd Punjab Infantry. Wing of the 44th Native Infantry one march behind; will be here to-morrow; retirement progressing most favourably. The Artillery and 22nd leave for Cachar by water to-morrow.

TELEGRAM from Brigadier General *C. H. Brownlow*, C.B., Commanding Chittagong Column, Looshai Expeditionary Force, to the Quartermaster General; dated Demagiri, the 6th March 1872.

Demagiri, 6th March. DURING my absence in the Southern Howlong country, Colonel Macpherson will command at Demagiri, and in communication with Captain East, Assistant Quartermaster General, who proceeds to Chittagong, will carry out the arrangements for the return of the force to Calcutta. The heat is already very great, and I fear that if all the troops and coolies are not embarked by the first week in April, considerable sickness may be expected. If the whole of the 27th is to go to Calcutta, there will be of the former including followers, about 2,100 men, and of the latter about 2000.

TELEGRAM from General *Brownlow*, C.B., Demagiri, to Quartermaster General, Calcutta.

10th March 1872. SOYPOYA, latitude 22 degrees 52 minutes, longitude 93 degrees 48 minutes. I left Demagiri on the 7th instant and reached this last night, having in three days marched 40 miles over four mountain ranges. Yesterday we ascended 4,300 feet, and and encamped close to the village of Soypoya, the younger brother of Vandoola, the chief of the Southern Howlongs. The latter is two days' journey to the north-east, and I advance against him to-morrow unless he comes in.

(No. 57 of 1872.)

(Separate.)

To His Grace the Duke of *Argyll*, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Military Department,
Fort William, 22 March 1872,

My Lord Duke,

In continuation of our letter, No. 50, dated 15th instant, we beg to forward the accompanying Despatch, dated 12th February 1872, from Brigadier General G. Bourchier, C.B., commanding Cachar Column, Looshai expeditionary force, detailing the progress made by his troops up to that date.

We are, &c.
(signed) *Napier*,
Napier of Magdala,
&c. &c.

From Brigadier General *G. Bourchier*, C.B., Commanding Cachar Column, Looshai Expeditionary Force, to the Quartermaster General, No. 593 L.; dated Camp, No. 14 Station "Sellam," 12th February 1872.

I have, since my last report, been obliged to halt at this station, awaiting the arrival of provisions sufficient to make a rapid move on Lalboorah. Nothing is positively known as to the distance to Chumfai, his stronghold, but it is believed that it will take about six days to get there.

2. I start this morning with 12 days' food, and a further supply will follow, as it will certainly take some days there to settle matters with the tribes of Vonolel.

3. The delay in advancing has not been altogether without beneficial results. The inhabitants of these five villages closely grouped together within three miles from the first to the last, have visited the camp daily, and have learnt the lesson, that although we hit hard when fighting is necessary, we are not actuated in our advance by a desire for revenge; the villages have all been spared, but should Poiboi not come in, will be destroyed, and nothing but the fine imposed in the shape of a few metnas, goats, pigs, &c., and as much rice as required, has been appropriated by the force. The men have been forbidden except on duty to enter the villages.

4. It is strange how the numbers returning to their homes, and visiting our camp, varies on different occasions, and we hear that it is under orders from the chief Poiboi that the 3,000 inhabitants of the villages refuse to return home. We see their fires in the forests at long distances.

5. I have determined to advance on Lalboorah with the smallest amount of baggage possible, a scale of which is attached. I have brought up to Sellam 100 of the 42nd Native Infantry under Colonel Rattray, C.S.I., who during my absence will command here.

6. I have been much pleased with the intelligence of this distinguished officer, and only wish it had been in my power to bring him and his regiment more to the front, but while I only required two wings actually as the advance, I required also a man on whom I could thoroughly depend as a support, not only so, but to carry out the various political questions pending in the rear, should either Khalkom or Poiboi come in.

7. Mr. Edgar cannot obtain any information as to the whereabouts of the latter, but his munnies report that the head muntrie has gone to him to force him to come in. Whether this is true or not, I have no means of judging, but we still are determined not to spare his villages if he has not come in, before we return from Chumfai. I confess I do not expect he will come, as they seem to consider doing so to be an utter loss of position never to be re-established; this, I fancy, is the real reason why none will come in, either that or fear.

8. No delay in my advance has been caused by entering into negotiations; we have never sought to enter into any. The Kholel people submitted of their own accord, and faithfully kept their promise that our communications should not be molested; and with regard to Poiboi's people, so far at any rate, since the 26th January 1872 not a shot has been fired, and our mails arrive as punctually daily as at any station in India. I do not think we have missed one day's dawk since leaving Cachar.

9. For three days last week the weather was cold, bleak, and very windy, with constant rain squalls, but this has passed off, and now the weather is frosty and clear. In the morning the ground is covered with hoar frost, the thermometer falling to 33° Fahr.; the scenery is magnificent, reminding me much of the Northern Himalayas about Nagkundah;

the hills are covered with cleared jhooms, which, however, they have not yet begun to dig up for next year.

10. There is nothing in the appearance of the hills to denote a heavy rain-fall; the golden tints of the hill side covered with fine but long grass, are very beautiful, but onwards towards a gorge in the mountains, known as Lalboorah's gates, about 10 miles distant, the mountains look severe.

11. The survey party are daily out, and quite unmolested.

12. The strength of the party I take on will be as follow:—

2 steel guns.
200 of the 22nd Punjab Native Infantry.
200 of the 44th Native Infantry.

Colonel Rattray with the 42nd Native Infantry will take the first post out from this, and supposing that I establish posts from my advanced column, I hope to arrive at Lalboorah's villages with 300 men and the guns.

13. During the week I have stockaded this position ready for Colonel Rattray, C.S.I., to hold, and also established a stockaded picquet on the ridge above, at an elevation of 6,150 feet. It is not exactly the position I should have selected, being too much commanded, but is the only place where I could find water sufficient for any number of men.

14. We all feel sincerely glad that it has been the good luck of the Chittagong Column to rescue Mary Winchester. Since my last report, two captives have been brought into our camp; one an old woman, who years ago was carried off from Munnipore; the other a mere child, about five years of age, said to have been carried off from either Nugdigram or Alexandrapoor.

15. I have to-day received reports that the hospitals, &c., at Cachar are getting crowded, and as the season advances, the danger of cholera increases. In consultation with Dr. Buckle, C.B., I have ordered the sick and wounded of the 42nd Native Infantry, and 44th Native Infantry, and Nepaulese coolies to Sylhet, and temporary accommodation to be prepared there for them, and more temporary hospitals at Cachar.

16. I had hoped at one time to be able to send them to Shillong, so far on their road home, but Dr. Buckle's medical resources are so limited, he cannot spare a medical officer or Native doctor to accompany them, and considering they will be better at Sylhet, until we can on our return make proper arrangements for their being forwarded to their homes.

17. You will have received copies of two telegrams to General Brownlow; one regarding the arrangements I propose for the simultaneous withdrawal of the columns, and the other as to certain signals by rockets, &c., to be fired on the evenings of the 20th and 21st instant, should I on that day be at Lalboorah's village of Chumfai.

18. From the lay of the mountains, and from the little information we can pick up, I fancy we shall be travelling either in a south-easterly or south-westerly direction; if the latter, and if General Brownlow is working the Howlongs in an easterly direction, we may not be very far from each other; certainly we may be within sight of rocket signals; at any rate it is worth the experiment.

19. I have this morning received three letters from General Nuthall; one No. 17, of the 29th ultimo, reports the reduction of his force at Seeboo, chiefly from sickness and aggravated by want of sufficient clothing, to 850 rank and file; this, to me, is incomprehensible, as in his letter of the 12th January 1872, his force is quoted at 2,084 armed men. It is reported by the Looshais that he has retired altogether from Seeboo towards Munnipoor, but this I can hardly believe.

20. His second letter reports the arrival of Poiboi's emissary Dalboom, who was anxious on his chief's part to make terms with the Munnipoor rajah, but General Nuthall states that as Dalboom had not been to me, no negotiations could be held with him.

21. The 3rd letter, however, I forward in full: it is a most extraordinary document, full of mis-statements from beginning to end, but General Nuthall labours under even greater disadvantages than we do; the story being first repeated in Kookie language, then interpreted into Munnipooree, and lastly into Hindustanee. No presents were returned; the ones he alludes to were brought in at Toweeboom by the heads of Tingridoom and Chipooee villages, with whom we have ever been on the very best of terms ever since our occupation of these villages, which, although they are under Poiboi, are at such a distance from "Sellam," that it is hardly probable Poiboi had any cognisance of the presents having been brought; the story of the earrings I know nothing about, nor does Mr. Edgar.

22. As to my anger when I received General Nuthall's letter, I can only say I was especially pleased to get it, as I had hoped direct communications were opened between us. His messengers received presents, and the chief emissary who brought the letter (Dalboom) remained with us from the 31st January to the 2nd February 1872, when he received a reply, which however he never conveyed to General Nuthall, as he had promised to do, by other

other hands, he being permitted to go and visit his village which had been burnt on the 26th ultimo.

23. The real English of Poiboi's disinclination to come in, is his knowledge that his people were engaged with us on the 25th and 26th ultimo, and I fear from what Mr. Edgar tells me, there is some truth in the idea that the betrayal and transportation of Lalchokla in 1845, may still be rankling in their minds.

24. His Excellency will believe how difficult it is to obtain anything like reliable information on any subject connected with the operations or feelings of the tribes. We must simply act as we best can, as events crop up to the surface.

25. Mr. Edgar has furnished me with the following notes on captives:

1st. *With Lalboorah.* There were three captives taken from Nugdigram in 1871, viz., two Nagas and a Bengalie girl. These have been acknowledged by the Looshais, who say that Lalboorah has since made them over to Kamhow as part of the ransom of Tangdong's wife taken prisoner by Sokter last year. There was a cooly missing from Monierkhall not traced, and he is not supposed to have been taken prisoner. It is thought that a woman was taken captive in 1869 at Nowarbund, but nothing certain is known on this head.

2nd. *Captives taken in the Western Raids of* 1871. There were 78 men, women and children (including Mary Winchester) taken or missing from Alexandrapoor, Kallacherra, and the Amoorkhal Cachari village. As far as we know at present, all these were divided between Saboonga and Bherykooe. The men are said to have been killed. Two of the women escaped to Sookpilal who sent them into Cachar. Mary Winchester has been given up. We think the little girl now in camp was an Alexandrapoor captive obtained from Saboonga by the eastern chiefs; this we make out from her own statements. One of the captives who escaped to Sookpilal states that many women have been sold to the Pois for arms, at the rate of one woman for five flintlocks.

3rd. *Munnipooree Captives.* There can be no doubt that there are among the Looshais many captives taken from Munnipoor; we have got possession of four, and traces of at least three more, but the information obtained from the Political Agent throws no light on the subject, and we are obliged to depend entirely on our own exertions in finding out whether there are any, and if so, what Munnipore subjects are captives in the villages we come to.

26. Mr. Edgar, you will observe, differs materially with the Political Agent of Munnipoor, who reports that the whole of the captives have been recovered; whereas Mr. Edgar thinks that those who have come in are Kookies who were residing in Looshai land somewhat under restraint, but are not the Nagas captured in 1869 and 1871. Colonel McCulloch has been addressed on this point by Mr. Edgar.

COPY of a LETTER from Major General *Nuthall*, Officiating Political Agent, Munnipore, to Brigadier General *Bourchier*, Commanding Cachar Column, Looshai Expeditionary Force, No. 19; dated Camp Seeboo, the 29th January 1872.

IN continuation of my letter of yesterday's date, reporting the arrival of an embassy from Poiboi, I have the honour to inform you that, on further questioning Dalboom, he says he believes that nothing will now induce Poiboi to interview you, as he has lost faith in consequence of your having in the first instance accepted his presents, and subsequently on nearing his villages returned them, and refused to accept coral earrings, which you expressly ordered his people to bring. He alludes, also, to the betrayal and transportation of Lalchokla many years ago.

He says you manifested great anger on receipt of my letter of the 13th instant, and then this change of demeanour has happened since. They naturally attribute it to something written by me, and I have had great difficulty to induce them to take another letter.

(No. 58 of 1872.)

(Separate.)

To His Grace the Duke of *Argyll*, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Military Department,

My Lord Duke, Fort William, 22 March 1872.

YOUR Grace will have learnt from our Despatch, No. 51, dated 15th instant, that Brigadier General Brownlow, C.B., commanding the right column of the Looshai Expeditionary Force, had found it necessary to advance against the Southern Howlongs prior to quitting the Looshai hills.

2. From the telegram now enclosed it will be seen that the tribes in question have tendered their submission; and the troops composing this column are now on their return.

We are, &c.,

(signed) *Napier*,

Napier of Magdala.

&c. &c.

TELEGRAM from Brigadier General *Brownlow*, C.B., Commanding Chittagong Column, Looshai Expeditionary Force, to the Quartermaster General; dated Camp Viâ Demagiree, the 13th March 1872.

SYPOEA, 13th March 1872. I made a march yesterday in the direction of Vandoola, and was met by his eldest son, who tendered submission on behalf of his father, and accompanied the force to-day on its return to this place. Sypoea, the brother of Vandoola, and another chief, by name Vantonga, representing the whole of the southern Howlongs, having also submitted, the column under my command has concluded its task. The results of the four months' campaign being the complete subjection of two powerful tribes inhabiting upwards of 60 villages, of which 20 that resisted were attacked and destroyed; the personal submission of 15 chiefs and their solemn engagement for future good behaviour; the surrender of Mary Winchester and the release of upwards of 100 captives, not including the quota still due by the Sylhoos. In addition, its operations extending over a very large area, have enabled the officers of the survey to triangulate 3,000 square miles of country, of which more than half has been surveyed in detail, and to complete the connection between the districts of Cachar and Chittagong.

(No. 45 of 1872.)

Government of India, Foreign Department, Political.

To His Grace the Duke of *Argyll*, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

My Lord Duke, Fort William, 22 March 1872.

IN continuation of our Despatch, No. 72, dated 9th May 1871, we have the honour to forward papers, as per accompanying abstract, on the subject of a recent attack on the Paindoo police post in the south of the Chittagong hill tracts.

We have, &c.,

(signed) *Napier*,

Napier of Magdala.

&c. &c.

TELEGRAM, dated 22nd January 1872.

From Commissioner, Chittagong, to Secretary, Government of Bengal, Calcutta.

PAINDOO guard in Sungoo attacked by Shindoos. Attack repulsed with loss of one man. Deputy Commissioner has gone to Bunderbun.

TELEGRAM, dated 23rd January 1872.

From Secretary, Government of Bengal, Calcutta, to Commissioner, Chittagong.

"REPORT particulars of the attack on Paindoo guard as soon as possible. Has anything been done to trace or follow raiders?"

TELEGRAM, dated 23rd January 1872.

From Commissioner, Chittagong, to Bengal Secretary, Calcutta.

ONE Naib and three constables wounded in the attack on Paindoo. Reported yesterday. No further particulars reported.

From *A. Mackenzie*, Esq., Junior Secretary to the Government of Bengal, to Commissioner of Chittagong, No. 824; dated Fort William, 5th February 1872.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 824, dated 27th ultimo, reporting on the recent attack on the Paindoo stockade on the Chittagong hill tracts, and to say that the Lieutenant Governor awaits a further and fuller report, especially as regards the identity of the raiders.

From *H. Hankey*, Esq., Officiating Commissioner of the Chittagong Division, to *A. R. Thompson*, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department, No. 824; dated Chittagong, 27th February 1872.

IN continuation of my telegrams of the 22nd and 23rd ultimo, in connection with the recent attack on the Paindoo stockade in the Chittagong hill tracts, I have the honour to report the following particulars:—

2. At about 6.30 a.m. in the morning of the 17th January 1872, a party of savages, estimated at about 500 or 600 strong, made a sudden and an unexpected attack on the Paindoo guard; and the sentry posted at the entrance doorway having given alarm on the first appearance of the raiders, the sepoys or constables in the stockade gathered together, arranged themselves as best they could, and opened fire on the approaching enemy. The marauders returned the fire, and a general contest ensued which lasted till 8 o'clock a.m., when the enemy beat a retreat, some towards the north, and the rest towards the west. The jemadar in charge of the outpost calculated the losses inflicted on both sides on the termination of the skirmish, and found that one Naik and three constables had been wounded on our side, and that probably 10 to 15 men on the side of the enemy received wounds; but the latter escaped to a man, leaving some articles behind, which have been forwarded to the Deputy Commissioner. The jemadar further reports that, having resisted the enemy face to face in broad daylight, he had ample opportunity of observing that some Mooroongs, Khoomees, and Tipperahs were among the raiders.

3. The above version of the attack reported by the jemadar commanding the Paindoo outpost does not perfectly coincide with the information received from the Bohmong, who supposes that the outrage was committed by the Shindoos. The distinct assertion of the jemadar regarding the complicity of our hillmen is certainly worthy of note; but no definite conclusion as to the identity of the raiders can be arrived at without receipt of further and more certain intelligence from the Deputy Commissioner, who has proceeded to the spot with the object of collecting facts, which will enable him to sift the matter to the bottom.

From *A. Mackenzie*, Esq., Junior Secretary to the Government of Bengal, to Lord *Ulick Browne*, Commissioner of Chittagong, No. 1046; dated Fort William, 13th February 1872.

I AM directed to acknowledge receipt of your letter, No. 865, dated 6th instant, giving cover to a report by the Officiating Deputy Commissioner of the hill tracts, regarding the late attack upon the Paindoo stockade. There is much in Mr. Cochrane's letter upon which the Lieutenant Governor would have liked to have had your views more at length, and it does not appear that you have given the Deputy Commissioner any precise orders in anticipation of those of Government.

2. It appears from Mr. Cochrane's letter that, owing to the carelessness of the jemadar in charge of the stockade, and the utter want of proper discipline and watchfulness, the post was, on the morning of the 17th ultimo, surprised and all but taken by a large body of hill raiders, some of whom did, indeed, effect an entrance through one of the gates. But for the courage displayed by Hira Sing and a few men who had recently joined the post, there can be little doubt that the whole guard would have been massacred. The jemadar would seem to have failed to redeem his previous carelessness by any display of conduct or courage, and it is alleged by some of the subordinate officers that he fled to the jungle at the beginning of the attack. This man should be removed immediately. An example must be made of him, and of the other police who deserted their comrades, while promotion or other substantial reward must be given to those who distinguish themselves. You are requested to report further the action taken to this end. You are also requested to state of what races the police at these frontier posts chiefly consists. It is most important to have fighting men in such dangerous positions. The Lieutenant Governor was under the impression that the hill tracts police had been specially selected and organised on this theory; but the facts now reported throw considerable doubt upon the quality of the force.

3. The statements made in Mr. Cochrane's 3rd and 4th paragraphs, regarding the excitement in connection with this attack among the Bohmong's villagers round the Thursa outpost, are worthy of notice. Taken in connection with the dissatisfaction already reported, as arising out of the demand for coolies for the expedition, and with the assertions made as to the nationality of some at least of the Paindoo raiders, it would seem more than probable that the attack, although, perhaps, directly made by Shindoos, was aided and abetted by tribes living in our territory. Further and careful inquiry must be made as to the Bohmong's conduct in connection with this affair. Has he been supplying his joomeas with guns, or sending them out nominally against the Shindoos?. Since he was relieved of the defence of the south of the hill tracts, a duty which he never performed, he has no pretence for any action of the kind attributed to him.

4. Mr. Cochrane anticipates further raids in April and May, especially in the neighbourhood of Thursa. The measures proposed by him and yourself for the location of a European officer in this neighbourhood and the strengthening of the southern posts are approved. The return of the expedition will, no doubt, place a sufficient number of police at your disposal before the necessity becomes very pressing. Meantime you must make the best disposition you can of the force at your disposal. General Brownlow might, perhaps, be able to spare a few men now that his column has been so successful. But of this he must be the sole judge. The Bohmong must be compelled to clear paths to enable a proper cordon of patrols to be established between the posts. Mr. Cochrane states that this chief has received 2,500 rupees for this purpose. I am to ask if this refers to the annual remission made to him, or to some special grant. The other steps taken by Mr. Cochrane for strengthening the posts and stockade seem to be judicious, and are approved. The Lieutenant Governor begs that you will keep yourself fully informed of the state of things in the Bohmong's country generally, reporting to Government all matters of importance.

From *H. Hankey*, Esq., Officiating Commissioner of Chittagong Division, to *A. R. Thompson*, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department, No. 865; dated Chittagong, 6th February 1872.

I HAVE the honour to submit the enclosed copy of a letter from the Officiating Deputy Commissioner, hill tracts, giving full particulars of the late attack upon Paindoo.

2. The Deputy Commissioner's remarks in his 4th paragraph have, I think, a good deal of truth in them. It is certainly a curious and a suspicious circumstance that the raiders selected a defended position, such as they might expect a police stockade to be, for their attack in preference to undefended villages. It is unlikely that the neighbouring villages would have remained so quiet if an enemy were in their vicinity, whom they had real cause to dread, and with whom they had no secret understanding; and it is almost impossible that the presence of the enemy in the neighbourhood could have been altogether unknown and unsuspected by them.

3. I think

3. I think it is very probable that the raiders were Shindoos; but I also think there is strong reason to suspect the existence of a secret understanding between them and the friendly Kookies. Whoever they were, I think it is exuremely probable that they will return later on in the season; and as soon as more police are available, the posts will be strengthened. I think it is very advisable to place an active energetic police officer with military proclivities in charge of these posts. I propose to send either Mr. Knyvett or Mr. Bignold, they are both good officers; but the former being senior, I have given him the choice. It is, however, absolutely necessary to have two officers at Rangamuttee to enable one to be away from time to time, and until I get another police officer available I cannot move Mr. Knyvett.

4. It so happens that, with the view of strengthening my hands in the event of any difficulty occurring with the Hill Cooly Corps (and we are now approaching the most critical period of its existence), I wrote to the brigadier to know whether he considered it still necessary to keep an officer at Khurkurreah; and if not, whether I might consider Mr. Bignold available for general duty. If the brigadier consents, one of the two officers will be sent as mentioned above, and I shall utilise Mr. Cooke's services in whatever place they seem to me to be at the time most urgently required.

From *A. W. Cochrane,* Esq., Officiating Deputy Commissioner of Chittagong Hill Tracts, to Lord *Ulick Browne,* Commissioner of Chittagong Division, No. 98; dated Bunderbun, 2nd February 1872.

I HAVE the honour to report with reference to the late attack on the police post of Paindoo.

2. On the morning of the 22nd ultimo information was brought to me that the post of Paindoo, on the Sungoo, had been attacked early on the 17th January, and that some of the police had been wounded in repelling the attack. I was then alone in the station, Mr. Knyvett having left a few days before with coolies for Uttan Chuttur. As it seemed to me important that an inquiry should be made on the spot at once, and there was at the time no officer in Bunderbun, I sent after Mr. Knyvett to recall him, and left the same day for Bunderbun, which I reached on the 24th. Next morning I left for Paindoo with Mr. Cooke, who had just arrived, and some 20 policemen, and got to the post early on the 26th. I found that four men had been wounded in the affair, and that three of them, together with a man who had been accidentally shot by a comrade in a night alarm that had occurred some few days afterwards, had been sent down to Chittagong. The jemadar, Adul Sing, told me the attack had been repulsed with loss to the enemy, and made it appear the conduct of the police had been on the whole satisfactory. Next day early I started for Chyma, and arrived there on the morning of the 28th, and inspected the post, which I found in satisfactory order. The Subadar in command informed me that previous to the attack on Paindoo a patrol party of his men had found, not far from Chyma, traces of Kookies and some bamboos that had been used in cooking food, after the fashion of the wilder hill tribes, and also that on the 12th January he had heard guns towards the south, up the Sungoo. A policeman now here from Chyma, says that drums were heard beating for some two hours the same day. After giving him some instructions as to the order he was to keep, I returned to Paindoo the same day; and as, from what I had heard, I suspected that there would be some difficulty in getting at the truth as to all that had occurred at Paindoo, I examined separately the jemadar and some of the men who had taken an active part in the fight. In the minor details, as might be expected, there was a good deal of discrepancy, as also as regards the numbers of the enemy, and of the killed and wounded, and the duration of the attack. The jemadar put the number of the enemy at 500 or 600, and the wounded at some 30 or 40 men, and the duration of the fight two hours; other accounts represent the enemy to have been less than 100 strong, and their wounded to have been 15 or 20. There was a discrepancy in the estimates of the number of guns with the enemy. I am disposed to believe the enemy some 300 strong, and their wounded some 20 or so, and the number of guns to have been 30 or thereabouts. Some of the enemy had their bodies clothed, but the most of them were attired as the wilder Kookies generally are, there was also a drum with them which they kept beating. The attack commenced about half-past six in the morning, and lasted, I am of opinion, after hearing the various statements, about three-quarters of an hour. It was agreed that the entrances were not closed at the time of the attack; that the jemadar and a good many of the police were in the jungle at the commencement; and that three (some say five) Kookies got inside the entrance to the west, and were dancing in triumph till driven out, and three, if not four, men never took any part in the fight at all, but were outside from first to last. The jemadar, I was told by two of the inferior officers who were allowed by all to have shown pluck, was in the jungle till the enemy had retreated; but he himself and the others say that he got in at once, and had used two guns against the enemy. I cannot as yet make up my mind as to the truth of that charge, but I am quite of opinion that he showed gross carelessness in allowing the enemy to surprise him and his men in the way they did, and that he did not inflict on the enemy as much loss as he might have done. As soon as I can fill his place I shall remove him; he is certainly not fit to be entrusted with the charge

of a stockade. The four men who did not take part in the defence were Tiloke Sing, who was fishing at the ghât at the bottom of the hill on which the post is—he was unarmed, and it would not have been easy to get in to the post; Obhy Dhun and Joynarayan, who are said to have been in the jungle at the commencement of the attack, and to have had their kookries only; and Joybeer Thappa, who bolted with arms and accoutrements; this he does not deny himself. Joynarayan was shot in an alarm some nights afterwards, and is now in Chittagong. Obhy Dhun and Joybeer Thappa are both under arrest, and I am considering what shall be done with them. With the exception of some 10 men, the other police were in too great a fright to be of any use, and though they discharged their guns repeatedly, I doubt that they hit any of the enemy. Hira Sing showed great courage, and was the first to engage the enemy; it was, I am of opinion, principally owing to him that more of the enemy did not get inside, and he shut or helped to shut the gates, in doing which he was wounded in the leg. Brindabun had been sent by Rattray to Paindoo a few days before with some men, and he and those men turned out at once on the alarm being given, and behaved well throughout. Magun Sing, too, is said by some to have behaved well; he did not, at all events, show any decided cowardice; he and Hira Sing, by firing on the enemy who had entered the stockade, drove them out and shut the gates; he had the presence of mind to order the other gates to be closed, and I believed helped to rally the men. But for the men I have mentioned, I have no doubt there would have been a repetition of the Chyma disaster. The others were wavering, and I think would have followed the example of Joybeer Thappa, but for the closing of the gates.

Strength of Paindoo Guard—1 Jamadar, 2 Havildars, 2 Naiks, 30 Privates.

3. I returned to Bunderbun on the 29th, and left for Thursa on the 31st, getting back here on the 1st idem. The stockade is a new one, and a good deal of work has been expended on it, but it is not quite to my satisfaction. I have directed alterations to be made. I learned there that on the 18th, the 20th, and the 24th ultimo, night alarms had occurred; on the first two occasions noises were heard in the jungle adjoining; on the last, two men were seen by the sentry creeping up to the stockade with guns, about 1 a.m.; he fired and they ran away. The officer in charge is careful and sends out patrol occasionally. Up to the 20th occasionally reports of guns were heard from the villages of neighbouring friendly Kookies, and Mughs of the Pooring Raja's para, which is near the stockade, had said that they were going off with their wives and children, because they heard the Kookies firing guns, and knew that they were making ready for a feast. He sent Bhuruth Naik with some six men to Waichelon's para, where he found the entire population drunk. Waichelon gave as a reason for the firing of the guns, that his people had been to fight the Shindoos, as the Bohmong on the Sahib's order had directed them; he said he had got powder and ball and guns from the Bohmong for the purpose, but that his people had returned on seeing, near Techol Khal, the traces of a large party of Shindoos, and he supposed that they were coming to attack some of the stockades or villages. His people, he also said, had suffered a good deal from illness. He further told the Naik that he had heard some days ago firing at Paindoo, and he supposed that there had been fighting there; he gave as a reason for not having given information at the Thursa stockade, that he had sent men to Paindoo who had not yet returned. The Naik then went on in the direction of Paindoo, and came to Benkoo's village, where the people were all drunk too. Benkoo said that there had been a great fight at Paindoo, and said that he did not know the way to the stockade, and had not, therefore, given information of the affair. Benkoo also said he did not know the road to Paindoo, and therefore could not show it; his para is only two hours' journey off it. A Mugh, who was in the village, showed the road. The Mugh pointed out Kookie marks on the trees as they went along. The jemadar further informed me that between the 20th and the 28th December friendly Kookies had passed some 300 or 400 altogether, going to the south, armed with old Government muskets, and supplied with ammunition and Government pouches. The Mughs about had told him that the Bohmong had sent those men at the Sahib's instance to fight the Shindoos. These men had not as yet returned.

4. The country round Thursa seems thickly populated, and numbers of friendly Kookies live about. They are called tenants of the Bohmong, though they pay him no rent. They do not give us any assistance or information, and I think if they were driven away altogether it would be an advantage. They keep up an intercourse undoubtedly with the enemy, and must be on good terms with them, for we do not hear of their being attacked by them. By being allowed to live so close to our borders, they get well acquainted with the jungle paths, and I strongly suspect, if they do not actually join in attacks, act as guides to the enemy. They ought to be informed, that in the event of any more attacks they will be driven away from our territory. They ought to be compelled to have out scouts the whole cold season.

5. As to the nationality of the persons who made the attack on Paindoo, I am not able to say now. Adul Sing Jemadar says that there were Mroos, Tipperahs, and Shindoos, but I have not much confidence in his ability to say. The Bohmong told me his men had followed the paths by which the enemy had returned for some distance, and that the enemy appeared to have been Shindoos. It is not unlikely that such is the case, for though the Rang-Jan-Thaluq range is not very distant, the Howlongs have too much to think of at present. I have directed the Bohmong to send out scouts and to get me correct information. I have sent for the men who first gave information to Mr. Rattray. As I leave for Rangamuttee to-day, Mr. Cooke will examine them when they come in.

6. I do

6. I do not think that there is any chance of overtaking or coming up with the enemy when not encumbered with plunder or captives. They evidently know the country well, and would in any case have two or three days' start. I think 20 picked men should be kept in readiness here under a European officer up till the end of May. I have no doubt all the tribes who shall have lost their food supplies during the expedition will raid in April and May along the entire frontiers for food, if not for revenge. The country about Thursa, as I have mentioned, is thickly populated, and there is food in abundance; they will probably be coming here. I cannot strengthen the post more at present. I put seven more men into Paindoo, and three into Chyma, but each of the posts have lost men who have been sent down for illness. I have no fear but that with common precaution and common courage the posts will be safe; but patrols ought to be kept afoot, and the paths have not yet been properly cleared by the Bohmong's men. He has got 2,500 rupees for that purpose, and I have threatened to resume the grant if the roads are not cleared forthwith. The Bengal police would be of no use in a pursuit, and I should not care to put them into a stockade. There are a large number of sick in Rungamuttee, and there is a good deal of sickness in the posts. As soon as I get the old police from the Brigadier General I shall put them into the posts.

7. I shall send Mr. Knyvett to inspect Belai Serri and Phorona. I have sent a circular to the Bunderbun posts (and have given oral orders) as to how the posts should be constructed, and to keep supplies of water and food always in hand. I have also ordered the officers in charge never to have less than half the number of men in the stockade at one time. Through a neglect of this common precaution, Paindoo was nearly taken. Adul Sing Jemadar has had very little work done in Paindoo, and a great deal has still to be done. I am looking about for a smart officer.

From *A. Mackenzie*, Esq., Junior Secretary to the Government of Bengal, to *H. Hankey*, Esq., Officiating Commissioner of Chittagong, No. 1337; dated Fort William, 28th February 1872.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 914, dated 19th instant, reporting further regarding the late attack upon the Paindoo stockade, with reference to Government Orders, No. 1046, dated 13th idem.

2. Adverting to the explanation given in your 2nd paragraph, the Lieutenant Governor desires me to point out that what his Honor took exception to was, that you had apparently issued no instructions to the Deputy Commissioner of the Chittagong hill tracts when you got his report made *after* inquiry.

3. The Lieutenant Governor approves of the measures taken in reference to the conduct of the police on the occasion of the attack, as reported in your 3rd and 4th paragraphs; but his Honor at the same time agrees with you in thinking that judgment regarding the quality of the Sylhet men employed in the hill tract police, may be reserved till the force has had further opportunities of showing its real worth.

4. The result of Mr. Bignold's deputation to Bunderbun, in view to establishing the identity of the raiders, is awaited.

5. The disposition of the police in the posts in the south of the Chittagong hill tracts, as detailed in your 11th paragraph, is considered satisfactory at present, pending the return of the Looshai expeditionary force.

6. Under the circumstance stated by you in your 12th paragraph, the Bohmong chief must certainly be compelled to clear the paths, &c., as already intimated in the orders of the 13th instant.

7. The Lieutenant Governor will await the explanation called for from the Bohmong chief regarding his sending out armed men against the Shindoos.

From *H. Hankey*, Esq., Officiating Commissioner of the Chittagong Division, to Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department, No. 914; dated Chittagong, 19th February 1872.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 1046, dated 13th instant, and to submit the further information therein called for.

2. With imperfect information in my possession, I considered it would be unwise to fetter the Deputy Commissioner with any specific instructions. I could only generally advise him as to the course to follow, as from the nature of the case his action must have been regulated by what he might learn on the spot. I had already referred the question regarding the advisability of tracking the raiders, by sending a small force after them, for

the decision of Government, and did not feel justified in issuing orders on the subject in anticipation of reply.

3. Adul Sing Jemadar has been degraded, and the Deputy Commissioner reports that if charges of previous bad conduct which have been made against him are substantiated, he will be dismissed. The constable who ran with his arms and accoutrements out of the stockade has been punished with imprisonment, after being disgraced on parade before his comrades. The others, whose conduct the Deputy Commissioner reports was not so much to blame, in that they did not run away, but being in the jungle unarmed failed to get in, will be transferred to the civil police. Hira Sing will be promoted to a havildarship with effect from the date of the attack, and Magun Sing will be promoted to a jemadarship as soon as a vacancy occurs.

4. These orders seem to be sufficient, with the exception of the case of Adul Sing Jemadar, for whom degradation is an inadequate punishment. I have directed the Deputy Commissioner to dismiss him from the force.

5. The greater part of the police at present in the posts were recruited in Sylhet. The Deputy Commissioner writes of them as follows:—"They are perhaps better drilled and smarter than the old police, but I do not think they would fight as well. In the affair of Paindoo only one man of the Sylhet detachment behaved well." He adds, that for certain unavoidable reasons the worst men were put into Paindoo. The Deputy Commissioner would have none but Goorkhas, Bengalees, and Pathans in the police. He says, "Tipperahs are now and then plucky." Brindabun and Hira Sing are both Tipperahs.

6. It is necessary to remark that I believe the Deputy Commissioner stands alone in his condemnation of the Sylhet men. Both Mr. Baker, the deputy inspector general, police, and Mr. Knyvelt, the district superintendent, police, hold very different opinions concerning them. Mr. Cochrane evidently does not like the Sylhet men, but I believe he totally fails to carry Mr. Knyvett with him in his view. Regarding their actual behaviour at Paindoo, it must not be forgotten that the Deputy Commissioner was not present; he only reports information gained second hand, and it is extremely difficult to separate truth from falsehood or unintentional exaggeration in a matter of the sort.

7. Presuming, however, that the facts as narrated are to be depended upon, and that only one man of the Sylhet detachment did behave well, I by no means think this is alone sufficient to condemn the Sylhet detachment concerned, and it is certainly insufficient as against the main part of them who were not concerned. That there were certain individual acts of cowardice admits of no doubt, and these have been dealt with as they deserved; but taking the force of the post as a whole, it is hardly fair to say anything harsher than that they were taken by surprise, and lost their presence of mind, as many better and more disciplined troops have so often done before them.

8. Under the above circumstances, I think it is safer to reserve judgment until the force has had further opportunities of showing its quality. So far I really do not see any real grounds for disappointment. It must be remembered that a large proportion of the Sylhet force is composed of young and raw recruits, who require a great deal of drilling and instruction before they can be called efficient or reliable; but when they have had this, I do not doubt that they will do credit to the officers who selected them.

9. Every endeavour will be made to ascertain the nationality of the raiders. The Bohmong has been ordered to send out spies; but independently of these, Mr. Cochrane has sent for two spies from Cox's Bazaar, men who are reported to know the locality well, and who will be entirely free from the influence of the Bohmong. Mr. Cochrane had the two roajahs of the villages, who were reported to be merry-making just after the Paindoo attack, examined by Mr. Cooke. One of them denied everything, but the other admitted as much as he had done to the police, whilst another man stated he had given information to the Paindoo jemadar of Kookies lurking about before the attack.

10. Mr. Bignold has been sent to Bunderbun, and has been instructed to search the neighbouring friendly Kookie villages with the view of discovering wounded men. If any such are found, it will prove conclusive of their complicity in the attack.

11. The stockades are not so strongly garrisoned as they should be, but there are no means of adding to their strength. What with a large percentage of sick, a number of almost useless raw recruits, and the necessity for more than the ordinary number of guards at Rangamuttee, the nominal strength of the force is very much in excess of the actual. Before, however, the period arrives for anticipating further raids, the brigadier will probably have released a good number of the police he has with him, and the posts will then be strengthened. There are at present about 35 men at Paindoo, the same number at Thyma, and about 45 at Chyma. Besides this there will be about 25 moveable men at Bunderbun under Mr. Bignold, who will be ready to move on any point on which an attack is threatened.

12. The sum of 2,500 rupees referred to in the 4th paragraph of the letter under reply is not the annual remission, but a special grant made for the express purpose of clearing paths, &c. The Bohmong will be compelled to clear these paths, but Mr. Cochrane reports

that

that many of the coolies first sent up had received advances for the purpose, but as coolies were scarce, he could not let them go.

13. Regarding the conduct of the Bohmong in sending out armed men against the Shindoos, an explanation has been called for. I think, however, it will turn out that this was done by the express orders of Captain Lewin, with the approval of the Brigadier General.

From *H. Le Poer Wynne*, Esq., Under Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal, No. 639 P.; dated Fort William, 15th March 1872.

WITH reference to the several communications noted on the margin, on the subject of the recent attack on the Paindoo Police Post, I am directed to convey to you the entire approval of the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council of the prompt and vigorous action taken by the Government of Bengal in the matter.

From Government of Bengal:
No. 493, dated 23rd January 1872.
No. 581, „ 26th „ „
No. 825, „ 5th February „
No. 1047, „ 13th „ „
No. 1338, „ 28th „ „

2. His Excellency in Council will now await the result of the inquiry into the constitution of the frontier police, and into the alleged complicity of the villagers in British territory.

3. I am to take this opportunity of inviting your attention to the communication marginally noted from this office, and to intimate that His Excellency in Council will be glad to receive an expression of the views of his Honor the Lieutenant Governor on the question raised in paragraph 9 of that letter.

No. 17 C.P., dated 11th April 1871.

(No. 61 of 1872.)

(Separate.)

To his Grace the Duke of *Argyll*, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Military Department, Fort William,
28 March 1872.

My Lord Duke,

IN continuation of our Despatch, No. 57, of the 22nd instant, we have now the honour to forward further detailed reports from the Officer commanding the left column of the Looshai Expeditionary Force.

We are, &c.
(signed) *Napier.*
Napier of Magdala.
&c. &c.

From Brigadier General *Bourchier*, C.B., Commanding Cachar Column, Looshai Expeditionary Force, to the Quartermaster General, No. 575 L.; dated Camp, No. 14 Station, 5th February 1872.

AT the date of my last Despatch (the 29th ultimo) I was at Koongnoong, one of Poiboi's villages, whence my object was to get to Sellam, his stronghold and head quarters, said to be two or three marches distant.

2. On the afternoon of that date, I received a telegram from General Brownlow, that Mary Winchester had been unconditionally surrendered by the Howlongs; but as it was not mentioned to whom she had been delivered, and connecting this information with that received from the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar on the previous day, it is doubtful to me whether she has been given up to Sookpilal to be sent to Cachar, or to Rutton Pooea to be conveyed to General Brownlow. The latter course is most probable, as Rutton Pooea is a relative and ally of Bandool, the great Howlong chief, while Sookpilal is constantly at war with the Howlongs, from whom he stated he tried to get the child by force. The Deputy Commissioner of Cachar has sent a boat up the Dullessur to receive her, in case she possibly should be sent into Cachar.

3. The emissary Dharpong also came into camp, and reports that Lalboorah and Thangdung were both present at the fight on the 25th, and have fled to the Pois to obtain assistance.

4. On the 31st, in the morning, a great noise was heard from the southward of the camp. A classie of the Survey Department had gone outside the picquets, and met on the road two Looshais who had brought fowls for sale into camp; some altercation took place,

ending in the classie being seriously wounded. He managed, however, to escape with his life. Strange to say, in the afternoon, the same Looshai returned to camp, bringing in a metna, part of the fine, from Poiboi: he was recognised and made a prisoner; he confessed what he had done in the morning, and seemed to attach no weight to the act. He was fettered and secured in the 44th Native Infantry Guard, and, on the march of that regiment the following morning, he was made over, fettered, to the Sapper Guard, by whom he was allowed to escape. I have ordered Colonel Rattray to try the non-commissioned officer and sentry summarily by court martial, on charges to be framed at Chepooe by Lieutenant Harvey of the Royal Engineers.

5. A second prisoner was brought in that same day; he was wandering about unarmed, looking for the dead body of a companion on the spot where the engagement took place on the 25th ultimo. He was released on arriving in camp.

6. Danghboom, a muntree of Poiboi's, also came into camp on the 31st with other Looshais; they brought a letter from General Nuthall, saying that they had been to his camp, and expressed a wish for friendship, but that they had been referred to me. In consultation with Mr. Edgar, I determined still to hold to my former resolution to treat only with Poiboi personally, and *at* his head quarters at Sellam, and that only after he had paid the fines imposed for the part taken by his men in the engagements of the 25th and 26th; these emissaries were ordered to accompany the column to Sellam, where they would receive my reply to General Nuthall.

7. Several communications having been received from the Political Agent at Munnipoor, that the rajah's stock of provisions was nearly exhausted, and that he was being put to heavy expenses by the lengthened occupation of the frontier, I begged that the whole of the contingent might be withdrawn from the southern frontier except 500 men, the number I intended originally to hold Seeboo and Tseklapi; and as General Nuthall stated in his letter, No. 8, dated 8th January last, that, if left to his own judgment, he would move the contingent south, to facilitate communication with Kamhow, and arrange with him to intercept the retreat of the tribes of Poiboi and Vonolel. After consultation with Mr. Edgar, I replied that Kamhow would require no such encouragement as the advance of the contingent would give, and that after the full submission of these tribes to me, Kamhow would more probably require to be restrained from making inroads upon them, driving them northward towards Cachar, and eventually give as much trouble as the present occupants who have now been taught such a salutary lesson.

8. General Nuthall still complains that he has, "as an officer in the field," been fettered by the instructions I have issued, and that he would have been wrong to allow himself to be strictly and literally bound by these orders. I have pointed out to him that this is the mistake he has made from the beginning; that he was not in the position of an officer in the field, but that, as he had been informed by Government, it was only in a civil capacity he was employed, and that the contingent was placed absolutely at my disposal, and that my orders were to call upon it, through him, to carry out specific duties, and nothing more.

9. All the captives expected by the Munnipoor State, 223 in number, have joined the camp of the contingent.

10. Danghboom did not like accompanying us to Sellam; this was somewhat natural, as his village, Taikoom, was the one destroyed by Colonel Roberts' column on the 26th ultimo, and his family were all hidden in the forests; he, however, came with us.

11. Since we have reached the high elevations of Poiboi's villages, the roads have become much better defined, and the forests are far more open; there was no difficulty for coolies; but as making roads for elephants was a matter of serious delay, I determined to send back those attached to the artillery, carrying the two steel guns, with a supply of ammunition rockets and blue lights, on coolies.

12. Thus equipped, and accompanied by the wing of the 44th Native Infantry and 150 of the 22nd Punjab Native Infantry, I started from "Koongnoong" on the 1st February 1872, crossing two ridges, the highest 5,850 feet elevation, and finally, after a march of eight miles and a rapid descent, encamped on the banks of a stream in a dense bamboo jungle. The cold was bitter, the thermometer at night falling to 39 Fahr. Nothing of consequence occurred during the march.

13. On the following morning we started early, and ascended a ridge about 5,800 feet elevation (by aneroid), to the top of the Lengting range. Here we had a magnificent view of the Sellam range, crowned by Poiboi's villages, running along the crest for several miles distant, about three or three and a-half miles, admirably chosen; and to top this position, without running the gauntlet of a long wall of rock, it was necessary to leave the road, and reach the summit some distance to the north. But I am anticipating events, and cannot refrain from describing a scene which took place while the column was halted on the ridge, taking stock of the position before us.

14. Had it not been absurd, it would have been deeply touching. Bhoma, a man of Kholel, had been reported as having in his possession a woman he had captured in a raid on Munnipoor in 1869. He had accompanied our camp for several days, and an investigation was set on foot to discover whether the woman was in his possession. Dharpong, so often mentioned,

mentioned, was sifting the matter, and, be he what he may, a man with a more wonderful talent for theatrical effect I never met, be it on the top of a tree decked in peacock's feathers and amber-coloured garments, proclaiming an amnesty at Kholel; acting as master of the ceremonies at the meeting with the fictitious Poiboi on the Tipai, or his sudden advent into our camp on the 25th, to warn us that we should be attacked on the march, his arrival has had a marked dramatic effect, and his acts ever showed a business-like earnestness in the matter he had in hand.

15. On the present occasion he arrived among us as if risen from the earth: in his wake were other Looshais bearing elephant tusks, fowls, goats, &c., and the inevitable pig; while accompanying the cortége was the interesting captive whom Dharpong had released. Bhoma was standing by my side; but instead of seeking British protection, the woman burst into tears and clung hysterically to Bhoma. It was really a most touching scene: with one hand in his, and clinging to his shoulder, she looked tenderly at her husband, from whom she begged not to be separated, and who comforted her with a chew of tobacco, which she seemed to relish.

16. The position was becoming embarrassing, especially when Mr. Edgar appealed to me for my decision as to their separation, and her restoration to Munnipoor. I saw no object in doing what would really have been a cruelty, and we decided that she should not be separated from her husband; they have continued ever since in our camp, where they will remain for the present.

17. We continued our onward route to a river running through the Sellam valley, and commenced a very steep ascent to the point on the ridge which commanded the villages. The elevation of the highest point was 5,850 feet.

18. Not a shot was fired, and we occupied Poiboi's own village; there are five in all, numbering about 500 houses. A few Looshais armed appeared in the farthest, to whom I sent to-day, that if we were unmolested, their property would be respected; we took possession about 4 p.m.; the coolies all arrived before dark.

19. Poiboi has vanished with his followers; his house was enormously large, about 100 feet long, and decorated profusely with skulls of animals and antlers; all furniture and effects had been removed; there were numbers of pigs, a few fowls and goats.

20. It may easily be imagined that the occupation of a village, every house of which was of inflammable materials, was a matter of danger, particularly when the temptation of plenty dry firewood and a hearth in each hut was at hand, added to its being a bitterly cold night; but we had no choice, as the coolies and baggage arrived too late to hut. At midnight I was roused by a report that a fire had broken out. After a very short delay, a portion of the troops were employed pulling down buildings, and thus creating a gap between the burning and still unharmed houses. Every officer and man worked with an earnestness that showed they knew that the success of the expedition was at stake, still despite every exertion, house after house caught fire, and it seemed a hopeless task; in the meantime, anticipating that it might be the work of the enemy, and an attack made under cover of the confusion, the guards were doubled, half the garrison were left under arms, and the ammunition removed to a place of safety.

21. I had made up my mind that if a large house next to the one in flames took fire, I must beat a retreat as best I could, when the wind providentially lulled, and by slow degrees the flames became then under control, and were eventually extinguished at about 2 a.m.; I cannot too strongly praise the exertions made by one and all, military and civil.

22. On the following morning I shifted camp a mile to the south-west of the group of villages to an open spot, where we are now comfortably hutted.

23. Yesterday I reconnoitred onwards with Colonel Roberts; the road is well defined, and requires little mending to make it quite easy. A large village is to be seen about five miles from us in the direction of Lalboorah; it belongs, I believe, to Poiboi, and is on our line of route.

24. The Looshai men, women, and children are returning to their villages, and are constantly in our camp; it seems quite a holiday time to them.

25. I am now halted for provisions, for bringing which beyond Chipooee I am entirely dependent on the cooly corps and Mr. Edgar's civil coolies. The commissariat can only work up to that station.

26. I have, at Colonel Davidson's solicitation, placed Lieutenant Hare (of the 22nd Punjab Native Infantry) at his disposal, his services in the Commissariat being entirely subordinate to his regimental duties. I have supplied for the superintendence of the Commissariat coolies:—

Lieutenant Sterens, 42nd Native Infantry.
Mr. W. W. Daly, District Superintendent of Police.
Police Inspector, Dost Mahomed.
Mr. Bedford of the police and 14 non-commissioned officers, while Mr. Patch has been in command of the fleet of boats between Mynadhur and Tipai Mookh, and Colonel Angus and Captain Barnard Smith have been added to the Commissariat staff since we commenced operations.

27. I have just received your reply telegram regarding his Excellency's placing the date of our withdrawal in my hands in consultation with Mr. Edgar; for this I feel most thankful.

28. I am sure the Commander in Chief will be glad to hear that the advanced posts on the southern frontier of Cachar have been connected to within a very short distance by water carriage with the sudder station of Silchar, and by the following paths which have been cut by the troops, namely:—

1st.—Bongkong with the Sonai running close under it, and also by a path direct to Monierkhall, which hitherto we have not been able to find.

2nd.—Koolooseeb by a path with the Rooknee river.

3rd.—The police post on the Chata Choora range with the Dullessur.

29. The Deputy Commissioner of Cachar addressed me regarding further opening out and keeping these roads as a relief to the cooly carriage of the district. I cannot too strongly urge the advisability of this, and have sanctioned his doing so as part of the frontier operations.

30. While on the subject of communications, I think it well worth consideration whether the road we have made between Luckeepoor and Chepooee, a distance of nearly 100 miles, in the Looshai country, passable for elephants, should be allowed to go to ruin. This, however, is a point of more importance than would come within the scope of my diary.

(No. 64 of 1872.)

(Separate.)

To his Grace the Duke of *Argyll*, K T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Military Department, Fort William,
5 April 1872.

My Lord Duke,

In continuation of our Despatch, No. 61, dated 28th ultimo, we have now the honour to forward the accompanying copy of a despatch received from Brigadier General G. Bourchier, C.B., Commanding Cachar Column, Looshai Expeditionary Force, dated 20th February 1872, detailing the progress made by the troops up to that date.

2. The troops composing the two columns have now all quitted the Looshai territory and are *en route* to their respective destinations.

We are, &c.
(signed) *Napier.*
Napier of Magdala.
&c. &c.

Copy of a Letter from Brigadier General *G. Bourchier*, C.B., Commanding Cachar Column, Looshai Expeditionary Force, to the Quarter Master General, No. 619 L.; dated 20th February 1872.

My last report, dated 12th instant, was despatched from Sellam, Poiboi's head quarters, just before I started for Chumpai, the stronghold of Lalboorah and the tribes of Vonolel. Our baggage was, as I have already reported, reduced to the very smallest quantity possible.

2. The force detailed for this service was 400 infantry, 31 artillerymen with two 7-pounder steel guns. For three miles our road kept along high lands to the village of Rahmong, which had been only just deserted on a signal of three musket shots given by the enemy to intimate that we were approaching. Our advance was evidently watched, and as we passed out of the village, which was not destroyed, we saw a party of about 40 men retreating before us, I sent to them to say that if some of them did not join me, I would open fire upon them; about half a dozen returned at once.

3. The country was very bold. The rocks above Rahmong were precipitous, and the jaws of Lalboorah's Gates stood out in fine relief. We crossed a stream, the Dinkai, at the bottom of the valley, at an elevation of 4,150 feet, and here we might have encamped, but about two miles above was the village of Toolcham, which I was anxious to reach. About half way between the river and the village, after an arduous ascent, we arrived at a very strong position accessible only by a narrow rocky track, and here, above, below, and across the road the forest trees had been felled in all directions, forming, in front of a stockade, a space

space of about a hundred yards of the very strongest abattis, naturally interlaced in all directions, and most difficult to scramble across when unmolested.

4. Besides the long stockade which crossed the road at a re-entering angle, smaller ones flanking it had been built here and there in all directions along the hill side. This was a most formidable position for infantry, but would easily have been shelled. It was entirely abandoned, as was a second about half a mile nearer our camp. The chief stockades were destroyed. We arrived about 5 p.m. at Toolcham, and the coolies about an hour after.

5. The inhabitants of the village begged that we should not occupy it. They brought out eggs, straw for us to sleep on, fowls, &c. We were informed that the tribes of Volonel wanted the other tribes to make a stand there again, which they declined, and finding that they were left alone, had retired.

6. In the evening it was announced that Poiboi had arrived at the stream we had crossed in the afternoon, with a view to paying me a visit of submission. The arch diplomatist Dharpong was sent to invite him into camp, repeating the assurance that if he did come in, no harm would happen to him or his villages, but that if he still held back, my threat of burning Sellam would faithfully be carried out. The march was a long one, but we were uncertain how far distant Chumpai was from us, and every day was an object, as the season for operations was fast slipping away.

7. On Tuesday morning the 13th, Dharpong returned to camp with information that Poiboi with his muntries was on the adjacent mountain, and that fear alone kept him aloof. Hurree Thakoor, Mr. Edgar's agent, was despatched to meet him, and thus by degrees accustom him to our followers. He conversed with Hurree Thakoor for some minutes, when something frightened him, and he took to his heels with his muntries in full pursuit, the latter doing all they could to reassure him, but in vain.

8. At 9 a.m. on the 14th, we again marched in a south-easterly direction. At first the good people of Soolcham objected to our passing through this village, but I wanted to impress into their minds that our march was conducted with order, and would entail no injury to them as to life or property. I over-ruled their objections as far as the troops were concerned, the coolies were sent round outside; as I entered, one of the head men presented me with a Looshai courier bag, in exchange for which I presented him with a bill hook (Dhao). The women and children had not left the village.

9. Passing on about a mile, the road becoming more and more rocky, we came to a spot where it became a perpendicular drop of about 20 feet, descended by a shaky ladder, down which the troops scrambled with great difficulty, each man taking fully 30 seconds; the guns and ammunition boxes were lowered by ropes. A second path was afterwards found for the coolies, but it was near one o'clock before the whole force had passed this serious obstacle. At about two we came upon a small stream which was said to be the last water we should arrive at for six miles further.

10. Time was too precious to stop so early in the day after only advancing three miles, but the report was true. After pushing on for about six miles, we came to a spot where water was procurable, but in very small quantities. There was more in a stream about half a mile off, but night set in before the coolies arrived in camp.

11. This was the first time that the followers, &c., had really suffered from want of water. There was enough to satisfy the wants of the small neighbouring village of Bhoonfong, which with another further to the north-east, are said to have been inhabited by Kookies, who, on our approach and the retirement of the troops of Vonolel, returned bodily to Munnipoor. This confirms Mr. Edgar's views of those reported by General Nuthall as having escaped, not actually being captives from Munnipoor, but Kookies living under surveillance.

12. From a spot about half a mile from our encamping ground, we had a magnificent view of the valley behind "the gates," with ranges over ranges of mountains tinted by the setting sun, piled one above the other far far away in the horizon. It was by far the finest view we had seen; we were well among the firs at an elevation of about 5,500 feet.

13. Major Stafford, 22nd Punjab Native Infantry, returned from this march, being reported unable to proceed by the medical authorities.

14. 14th—We started again at 10 a.m., and commenced an immediate descent of 1,700 feet to a river, the Towee Towar, and following its course for about three miles along a plain covered with long grass and stunted oaks, encamped at its junction with the Toowai. Both these rivers were running southwards, and the Looshais who accompanied us from the village above, confirmed the idea that we had crossed the watershed, and were now among the streams running either to the Irawaddy or the Koladyne. This valley was at an elevation of 3,850 feet. The weather looked very threatening, but before evening we were well hutted.

15. 15th—Since leaving Sellam, we had made three marches, two of nine and one of four miles, and as the coolies had previously made eight continuous marches, four unladen and four laden with provisions, I was obliged to give them a day's rest.

16. Two men who had been sent on with Dharpong to ascertain the road and the atti-

tude of Lalboorah, returned with the news that heavy firing had been heard in the direction of his villages, and that he had been attacked by the Sookties under Kamhao, who had been defeated. This turned out afterwards to be true, and was what Colonel McCulloch had predicted prior to the starting of the expedition, but thinking at the time that this report might possibly have been raised to cover an attack on a convoy hourly expected, I despatched Colonel Stafford to the rear with the 22nd Punjab Native Infantry to escort it into camp. It arrived during the day.

17. I have already reported the withdrawal of the Munnipoor Contingent from Cheboo, consequent on sickness, want of provisions, and clothing. They had somewhat restrained Kamhao, who probably made his attack on hearing of their withdrawal.

18. I have omitted to draw attention in my former report to the coincidence of the defeat of the tribes of Vonolel, who attacked Monierkhall and Nundegram on the 26th and 27th January 1871, having occurred on the 25th and 26th of January the following year.

19. Another strange fact has been brought to my notice. General Nuthall reports, and I have often heard it stated, that the transportation of Lalchoklah, who surrendered to Colonel Blackwood, after, as it is supposed, his pardon had been promised in 1846, has deterred Poiboi and other chiefs from coming into camp and tendering their submission. His son, Captain Blackwood, commands the artillery with the Cachar column. Rain commenced falling about 10 a.m., and continued till nightfall.

20. Friday, 16th.—Morning broke fine, and we started at 10 a.m., really not knowing where we were with reference to Chumpai, except that we believed that it would take us two or three days to get there. Our road, and it was a very good well beaten one, started from the bed of the river, continuously ascending for 3,000 feet to the villages of Moorthlang, distant four miles; a ridge a little beyond we crossed at an elevation of 6,600 feet.

21. The village was small, but had more old people in it than any other we had come across. On the arrival of the head of the column a strange scene was enacted, paying a flattering tribute to the reputation of the force, whose character for discipline and good conduct must have preceded it. Men, women, and children, old and young, flocked out to meet us. There was little or no fear amongst them; we were surrounded on all sides, watches, telescopes, everything was greedily examined; but what was most strange here and at other places, nothing but turning up our coat and shirt sleeves, and allowing them to feel our arms and faces, would make them believe our white skins were real. The women, especially, were very clean and good-looking, their hair tastefully arranged in coronets over their heads. They seemed very happy and cheerful. One old man, who said his age was a hundred, knelt at my feet, placed his head on the ground, offered me his blankets, and said all they had was at my service. We afterwards heard that they said we were gods. Mr. Edgar produced a necklace, which I put on his neck. They were evidently delighted with our visit and its happy termination.

22. I can only describe our march beyond this village as lovely. Still at a very high elevation, though gradually descending, we wended our way through a forest of oaks, rhododendrons, and enormous fir trees, and two miles further on we came upon a ridge overlooking, so to speak, a plateau on which the villages of Vonolel were mapped out before us. In the far distance south-eastward, at the end of a valley, was Chumpai, the chief village of Lalboorah, and more westward Chumsim, occupied by the widow of Vonolel. Onwards we marched, passing a burnt village of Peema, but for want of water we could not halt as we had intended, but passed on, and only reached a stream at sunset, after travelling 12 miles. It was in a valley at an elevation of 4,800 feet; the dew was during the night tremendous, our waterproofs were dripping inside and out, but the plentiful supply of firewood was a great comfort. I and Mr. Edgar agreed that whatever might be the eventual terms offered to Lalboorah, the immediate destruction of Chumpai was a necessity. This was arranged for the following morning.

23. Saturday, 17th, at 10 a.m., we started along a road on the right of the valley, which is on an average about a mile across, and, after a march of about four miles, arrived at the foot of the hill, on which, above our heads, at an elevation of about 300 feet, the village is perched.

24. The 22nd Native Infantry led the advance guard, which extended across the spur in skirmishing order, and was supported by its main column; then came the guns and the 44th in reserve, and furnishing the rear guards. The stronghold was abandoned. In the centre was the tomb of Vonolel, surrounded by skulls of deer, metna, tigers, wild boars, &c. &c., and on the centre post was hung the head, arm, and foot of a Sooktie fresh slain. It was a ghastly sight, the flesh looked hardly cold. They have been buried in our camp.

25. Feeling that from this point we must return, the object of the expedition having been essentially carried out (although we might be obliged to remain here a few days to see completed

pleted the terms we might dictate), I drew up the force round the tomb and congratulated them (officers and men) in the name of the Viceroy, the Government, and the Right honourable the Commander in Chief, not only for their success, but for the admirable spirit of discipline which had pervaded all ranks. Three hearty cheers were given for Her Majesty, as the British colours were hoisted on a tree hard by.

26. The 22nd Punjab Native Infantry and Artillery withdrew, and the village, containing about 500 houses, was fired in all directions by the 44th. The tomb has escaped destruction.

27. The scene of the troops surrounding the tomb, and the interior of it, have been photographed by Captain Cookesley, who has done about 12 views of striking scenes connected with the expedition.

28. In consultation with Mr. Edgar, the terms to be insisted on from the tribes were settled as follows:—

That the whole of the arms taken at Monierkhall and Nundegram were to be delivered up, or, if not, a similar number of their own, amounting in all to 12, in addition to one already sent on to Munnipoor; that Lalboorah be either brought into camp, or that three muntries belonging to Vonolel's widow's villages should proceed with the force as hostages to Tipai Mookh; that a fine of

2 Elephant tusks,	10 Goats,
1 Set war gongs,	10 Pigs,
1 Rajah's necklace,	50 Fowls,
4 Metnas,	20 Maunds husked rice,

be paid into camp by the evening of the 19th, and that agents from the Government should have free access to the country, and safe conduct when found necessary by the civil power, failing in submission to any of these terms, their villages and crops would be destroyed. I also sent word to the village of Chumsin that it was my intention at once to march there; this they did not seem to like, and Dharpong, on hearing the terms dictated, seemed to doubt their being submitted to, and wanted to leave. I told him that he was perfectly at liberty to go if he liked; that what I dictated I meant to carry out, and moreover intended to go exactly when and where I pleased; that I would not let them off one iota of the fine I had imposed, or one of the number of guns and gongs demanded.

29. 18th, at 10 a.m., I marched with 150 infantry and the survey party, reaching the hill below the village at noon, where a small stockade had been erected, since partially destroyed by the Sooklies, this being the village which they had attacked; above and outside the village we saw about 150 men, 100 of them perhaps armed. They shouted and yelled at us not to advance, but this we were accustomed to; steadily the advance guard moved up the steep mountain side, and the Looshais retired before us to a precipice where I believe all their women and children were concealed. I drew the troops up in single rank round the village, and entered with 20 men and the survey party, remaining there until four in the afternoon.

30. The people seemed more suspicious than at other places, but after a time came among us. The village was surrounded by a very strong new stockade with a banquette, but could easily have been destroyed by the guns from a spot about 400 yards distant. The palisading near the gateway was riddled by bullets, and a Socktie (beheaded) corpse lay in the ravine below. They had been repulsed from this village with a loss of six of their number; Lalboorah only lost one man.

31. At 4 p.m. I withdrew from the village, and before starting repeated the terms I demanded. I confess I had some fears as to the guns and gongs; it was like squeezing blood out of a stone. First one came, then two, and by night four or five, and the gongs. The neighbourhood of the camp was full of fowls, metna, pigs, and goats, but still six guns were wanted, and I would not allow the minor presents to be left in camp until the whole of the more important articles were brought in. Dharpong, who changed his mind as to leaving the camp, was indefatigable in his efforts to secure entire submission of these tribes.

32. One muntrie who is to accompany us in camp; the remaining two will come in a few hours. This evening rockets and blue lights will be burnt from a high range behind my camp; this will be repeated to-morrow from the ridge before mentioned, Moorthlang, 6,600 feet high, in the hopes of General's Brownlow's attention being attracted, but I fear he is too far distant. Unless anything unforeseen occurs, I shall commence my return on the 21st, and continue my march to Tipai Mookh and Cachar. I hope to arrive at the former place on the 9th March.

33. I trust that Poiboi may come in at Sellam; if not, I shall destroy his villages *en route*. I am in great hopes to return without firing a shot.

34. Lalboorah's Muntries have promised to convey a letter from me to General Brownlow.

low. I have entrusted one to their care, and Mr. Edgar has promised a good reward if a reply is brought before I leave Tipai Mookh.

35. So far, I sincerely trust his Excellency the Commander in Chief will consider that the orders and wishes of the Government have been carried out.

36. I have sent Captain Thompson to Tipai with orders for the gradual withdrawal of the force.

37. I more than ever feel the advantage of marching the 42nd and coolies to Gowhatty, and thus reducing to a minimum the time they will be crowded on board a steamer, by the fact that I have just heard of a steamer arriving at Gowhatty from Goalundo, having had 22 deaths from cholera on the passage.

(No. 82 of 1872.)

(Separate.)

To His Grace the Duke of *Argyll*, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Military Department, Fort William,
3 May 1872.

My Lord Duke,

In continuation of previous Despatches, we have now the honour to enclose correspondence received from the Quartermaster General, detailing the whole of the operations of the Looshai Expeditionary Force, which have been recently brought to a successful termination.

2. The expedition has been ably conducted by Brigadier Generals Bourchier and Brownlow, and the officers and troops under their orders have earned our warm approbation.

3. We annex a copy of the order we have issued, publishing the official Despatches received from the Commander in Chief, and we trust that all engaged will receive the commendation of Her Majesty's Government.

4. We have intimated to his Excellency the Commander in Chief that we shall be glad to receive any proposals his Excellency may desire to make in recognition of the services rendered by the officers and troops.

We are, &c.
(signed) *Napier.*
Napier of Magdala.
&c. &c.

From Colonel *P. S. Lumsden*, C.S.I., Quartermaster General, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department (No. 497—Looshai, "Field Operations," Army Head Quarters, Calcutta, the 26th April 1872).

I. Brigadier General Bourchier's No. 696 L, dated 19th March 1872.
II. Brigadier General Brownlow's No. , dated 3rd April 1872.

I AM directed by the Right Honourable the Commander in Chief to submit to Government the Despatches, as per margin, from Brigadier General G. Bourchier, C.B., and Brigadier General C. H. Brownlow, C.B., commanding the columns of the Looshai Expedition, detailing the operations which led to the successful accomplishment of the objects of Government, as set forth in Military Department letter, No. 294, of the 13th July last.

2. These operations have been conducted with the view of preventing the recurrence of the raids and outrages which for many years have been committed by the Looshai tribe on the British frontier of Eastern Bengal; and for permanently establishing the security of the Cachar and Chittagong borders.

3. The officers commanding were especially instructed "that the object of the expedition "was not one of pure retaliation; that while punishment should follow the proof of guilt, "the surrender of all British subjects held in captivity should be insisted on, and every "effort made for their deliverance; the main end in view was to show these savages that "they are completely in our power; to establish friendly relations of a permanent "character with them; to make them promise to receive in their villages from time to "time our native agents; to make travelling in their districts safe to all; to convince "them

"them of the advantages of trade and commerce; and to demonstrate to them effectually "that they have nothing to gain, and everything to lose, by placing themselves in a "hostile position towards the British Government."

4. The Government of India deprecated the employment of a large force. While it impressed economy upon all concerned, it at the same time required that "nothing should "be omitted in the organisation of the force which the military authorities might consider "necessary to make complete success a certainty."

5. Our knowledge of the country to be operated in, and of the character of the enemy to be opposed, was limited. Certain facts were known, viz., that the climate in the lower lands was deadly; that dense tropical jungles covered the whole of the lower ridges; that some of the mountain ranges reached heights from 5,000 to 6,000 feet; that water communication existed to the contemplated basis of operations; and that the physical difficulties to be overcome were of a nature which would test the utmost skill of our commanders, and the endurance of the troops.

6. The Governor General in Council was pleased, on his Excellency's recommendation, to place the entire political and military conduct of the operations in the hands of the military commanders.

7. The Commander in Chief, in the earliest consideration of the operation, felt that its success depended more upon the efficiency of carriage than on any other contingency. The sudden and severe outbreak of cholera which attacked the coolies proceeding to the bases of operations during the month of November threatened the success of the expedition, and its continuance from the commencement to the close of the operations has been the cause of much anxiety and delay.

8. Notwithstanding disease, the opposition of the enemy, and the physical difficulties which the formidable nature of the country presented, the operations entrusted to Brigadiers General G. Bourchier, C.B., and C. H. Brownlow, C.B., have, by the energy and discriminating judgment of these officers, been, in his Excellency's opinion, carried to what the Commander in Chief hopes the Government will consider a most successful issue.

9. The detailed reports of these officers, together with the Despatches now submitted, have placed the Government of India in possession of their progress, terminating in the realisation of all the objects required by Government. These reports show that no smaller force could have accomplished the task of creating and maintaining such long lines of communications, and have supplied a body in advance sufficient to overcome all opposition, and ensure success.

10. Throughout the expedition, whenever opportunity offered, conciliatory measures superseded all recourse to force, but when those failed, and when, from fear, or with ulterior objects, the Looshais disregarded the demand for release of captives, restitution of plunder, or compensation for past offences, the destruction of their stockades, villages, and jooms was imperatively necessary. It is only by making all the members of the tribes which are devoted to aggression feel the pains of war that a strong public opinion in favour of peace can be created.

11. Payment of the fines and tribute demanded, together with the entire submission of the tribes of Vonolel, and those of the Howlong and Sylhoo factions of the Looshai race, the recovery of Mary Winchester, and the restoration to our ally the Rajah of Munnipore of more than 2,000 of his vassals, with the rescue from slavery of several hundreds of our own subjects, has been the result of the operations.

12. The Right Honourable the Commander in Chief desires to commend to the notice of Government Brigadier General G. Bourchier, C.B., and Brigadier General C. H. Brownlow, C.B., commanding the respective columns, for the able manner in which they have exercised their commands, in which, in his Excellency's opinion, they have evinced high military qualities.

13. Brigadier General Bourchier advanced 193 miles from Cachar, and 110 from his first base in the enemy's country at Tepai Mookh, until he reached the stronghold of Lalboorah, the most powerful of the Northern Looshai chiefs.

14. Brigadier General Brownlow advanced 213 miles from Chittagong, and 83 miles from his first advanced base into the Howlong country, and his progress was only arrested by the complete submission of that powerful tribe.

15. For four months their lines of communication were maintained, and the columns left for the last and crowning operations were reduced to 400 and 300 infantry respectively. The Commander in Chief would more particularly invite notice to the spirited action of the 25th January of the left column on the Moorthlang range; the surprise of La Gnoora's stockade on the 3rd January by the right column, with the subsequent dash of the latter into the South Howlong country.

16. His Excellency would solicit especial notice of the very marked manner in which these General Officers have described, in their Despatches, the efficient and zealous support

which they received from the regimental, departmental, staff, and medical staff, officers attached to their respective columns.

17. The Commander in Chief entirely concurs with the General Officers commanding the columns in the commendation of the troops of their respective commands; but his Excellency will not enter into the details of the services of particular corps or individuals, which have been so fully reported. His Excellency, however, cannot refrain from one exception in the conduct of the two soldiers of the 2nd Goorkha (the Sirmoor Rifle) Regiment, Lulleetbum Mull and Murtbur Thappa, who defended their dying comrade against overwhelming numbers of the enemy, and whose gallantry reflects so much honour on their regiment and the Native army.

18. The valuable results of the labours of the officers of the survey are brought to the notice of Government; these officers have made a very important addition to the geography of India.

19. The Telegraph Department successfully constructed and maintained the lines of its communication.

20. His Excellency entirely concurs in the terms in which the general officers have mentioned the civil officers attached to their columns.

21. The assistance afforded by the police has been most creditable to the officers and men of that service.

22. The Rajah of Munnipore appears to have taxed the resources of his country to the utmost, in order to equip efficiently the column which co-operated on the left of Brigadier General Bourchier's line of operations, and to have earned the approbation of Government.

23. The services of the transport coolies were invaluable, and the Government are much indebted to the meritorious officers by whom they were organised and superintended.

24. In conclusion, the Commander in Chief trusts that the Government will feel satisfied with the success that has attended the Expedition.

CASUALTY RETURN of the Cachar Column of the Looshai Expeditionary Force.
Shillong, 25 April 1872.

Corps or Department.	Fighting Men.			Followers.		
	Killed.	Wounded.	Died.	Killed.	Wounded.	Died.
General Staff	–	1*	–	–	–	–
Peshawur Mountain Battery	–	2	1†	–	–	–
Sappers and Miners, 1st Company	–	1	1	–	–	–
22nd Punjab Native Infantry	–	4	7	–	–	–
42nd Native Infantry	–	1	38‡	–	–	2
44th Native Infantry	8	3	35	–	–	–
Police	–	2	3	–	–	–
Nepaulese Cooly Corps	–	–	–	1	2	234
Commissariat Cooly Corps	–	–	–	1	3	80
Kookie Cooly Corps	–	–	–	–	–	53
Boatmen	–	–	–	–	–	17
TOTAL	8	14	85	2	5	386

* Brigadier General G. Bourchier, C.B.

† Captain Cookesley, attached.

‡ Includes one officer, Captain Harrison.

CASUALTY RETURN of the Chittagong Column of the Looshai Expeditionary Force.
Calcutta, 17 April 1872.

Corps or Department.	Fighting Men.			Followers.		
	Killed.	Wounded.	Died.	Killed.	Wounded.	Died.
Peshawur Mountain Battery - -	–	–	1	–	–	–
3rd Company Sappers and Miners -	–	–	–	–	–	2
2nd Goorkha Regiment - - -	2	12	9	–	–	2
4th Goorkha Regiment - - -	–	–	16*	–	–	–
27th Regiment, Punjab Native Infantry.	–	–	4	–	–	1
Coolie Corps - - - - - -	–	–	–	–	–	89†
Commissariat Department - -	–	–	–	–	–	24‡
Rutton Poeeu's Contingent - -	2	1	–§	–	–	–
TOTALS - - -	4	13	30	–	–	118

* Includes one man killed by accidental discharge of rifle. † Includes one man killed accidentally by fall.
‡ Includes a Mahout killed with his elephant falling over the khud, also a coolie killed by a branch falling on him when cutting fodder for elephants. § No information.

(signed) *C. H. Brownlow*, Brigadier General,
Commanding Chittagong Column, Looshai
Expeditionary Force.

Examined,
(signed) *C. E. Bates*, Captain, Brigade Major.

From Brigadier General *G. Bourchier*, C.B., Commanding Cachar Column, Looshai Expeditionary Force, to the Quartermaster General, Army Head Quarters, Calcutta, (No. 696 L., dated Cachar, the 19th March 1872).

IN submitting, for the information of his Excellency the Commander in Chief, the accompanying copy of field force orders published on the breaking up of the Cachar Column of the Looshai Expeditionary Force, I hope it may not be considered out of place to forward a slight sketch of our operations.

2. Consequent on each year's raids, a line of posts was established along the southern frontier of Sylhet and Cachar, but as I considered these posts were not sufficiently south to cover my right flank, nor to bring any pressure upon Sookpilall and Khalkom, should they throw in their lots either with the Howlongs or the more eastern tribes, I established others at Bongkong on the Noon Vaie range, Kooloo Rub, on the Rengtipahar, and near Chuttachoora peak, in the latitude of Julnacherra, cutting roads from them respectively to the Sonai Chem and Dalleus river, thus bringing the posts nearly into communication with Cachar by water carriage.

2A. In a similar manner General Nuthall was, in October last, requested to move the Raja of Munnipore to put detachments on the southern frontier. Flanked again by a force of about 500 men near the Moirang lake, their posts were never established, or intimation given that any difficulty in doing so existed, until the receipt of a communication from him dated 15th December 1871.

3. The Cachar Column consisted of half a battery of artillery, a company of sappers and miners, and 500 men each of the 22nd Punjab Native Infantry, 42nd Assam Light Infantry, and 44th Native Infantry, with 1,200 commissariat coolies, and 178 elephants, and a coolie corps of 800 men under Major Moore. This was the actual number sent for the expedition. The coolie corps at starting was reduced by cholera to 387 men, and of the elephants, 14, either from galls, sickness, or general unfitness, never carried a load for the column.

4. The special equipments of the corps, water-proof sheets, boots, tools, Norton's pumps, &c., had been sent on by water to Cachar, where each corps, on arrival, received its proportions. The kits and coolie loads were reduced to the prescribed weights, and every detachment was thus inspected in field-marching orders.

5. On the 21st November we broke grounds from Cachar; the 44th Native Infantry marched from Luckeepore, 14 miles, whence the road onwards had to be made. The road selected was *viâ* Mynadhur, on the Barak, where 2½ months' provisions had been

stored for the force; and thence to Tipai Mookh, the junction of the Tipai and Barak rivers, our advanced base of operations.

6. Much difference of opinion existed as to whether this was the proper point of departure; but as our work was definitely to punish the eastern tribes, I now, after the campaign, feel strongly the selection was a right one.

7. Not only had we to make a road, but to find a track of mountains over which we could carry it. This fell to Captain Harvey and the Sappers; the track once found, parties of troops were at intervals laid along it, those in rear completing the work of their predecessors.

8. On the 12th December the first detachment reached Tipai Mookh, where Mr. Edgar joined me the following day; and on the 15th I had there collected the head quarters and wing of the 22nd Punjab Infantry, a wing of the 44th Native Infantry, and the company of Sappers and Miners.

9. The position was admirable; a wide shingly beach with extensive plateaux rising above, on which barracks, hospitals, storehouses, and officers' quarters rose as if by magic.

10. It was considered advisable that we should make a rapid advance on new Kholel, the location of the descendants of Vonpilall, as the Looshais did not yet believe in our intention of advancing into the limit of their country.

11. On the 16th December I made a fresh start with the Sappers and Lieutenant Colonel Nuthall's wing of the 44th Native Infantry, leaving the 22nd Punjab Infantry to garrison Tipai Mookh. As other troops arrived, this wing was pushed on, and a continuous chain of road-making detachments, extending along the whole line, was formed, my object being to bring a wing of each corps in succession to the front.

12. On the 18th we came upon a small picquet of Looshais, who fled at our approach; two of the party, however, returned and accompanied us. They informed us that the Looshais were assembled in large numbers at Toweebhoom, but for what reason they could not tell.

13. We found the road-making here slow work; but on the 22nd December, with a wing of the 44th Native Infantry and 50 of the 22nd Punjab Infantry, made a rapid descent by a Looshai path to the Toweebhoom, where we suddenly came upon a party of about 50 Looshais, with Mora Muntree from Impanee. They yelled at us, and warned us not to cross the stream, which we did by a large weir, and secured the picquet house on the opposite bank. Not a shot was fired; they were too frightened to stand long to parley, and disappeared in the forest.

14. On the 23rd December, following the track of the party who left us the previous day, we mounted to the jhooms (farm lands) of the Vonpilal tribes. As we emerged from the forest, the advance was met by a heavy fire, which, as the Looshais fell back before us, was continued throughout the day. A young policemen and havildar of the 22nd Punjab Infantry were the first to fall; we destroyed an immense quantity of corn in granaries and three large villages; we occupied a fourth.

15. The 24th and 25th December were occupied in punishing those tribes who had commenced hostilities; parties were sent out to destroy their villages and crops; but as I was some miles off my direct line of communications, I determined on the 26th to return to my position on the Toweebhoom, and carry the sick and wounded to a place of security, returning, if necessary, to inflict further punishment.

16. The retirement was accomplished without a casualty, the 22nd Punjab Infantry forming the advanced guard, the 44th Native Infantry under Captain Lightfoot, the convoy for the sick, wounded, and coolies, while Lieutenant Colonel Nuthall, collecting the picquets in rear of his column, covered the retirement, passing through his reserves under Captain Robertson from hill to hill, as if on parade.

17. The 27th and 28th were employed in camp in clearing the jungle in the neighbourhood, while the Sappers and 42nd Native Infantry were completing the road to No. 6 Station.

18. The sharpshooters, released from watching us at Kholel, commenced to attack our working parties. The only remedy for this was more punishment at Kholel. On the morning of the 29th I took 200 of the 42nd towards the villages we had burnt. As we stated, the column was fired into, and one man wounded. About three miles on we met Dharpong, Poiboy's emissary, who came to sue for mercy, and begged me not to proceed. One of my objects in coming the second time was to escort the survey; and laying it down as a principle to do what I intended and then negotiate, I proceeded to the point I started for, and there listened to Dharpong.

19. He begged us to stop devastating these valleys, and that not only should all firing cease, but our communications would be kept open for us. To this we agreed. Dharpong mounted on a dead tree, sounded the cry of peace far and near. From that moment the effect was marvellous; not a shot was fired near us. In the evening we returned to camp.

20. Our

20. Our losses from the 24th to the 29th December were—

22nd Punjab Native Infantry	- 4 wounded, 1 dangerously, 3 severely.
42nd Native Infantry - -	- 1 wounded, slightly.
44th „ „ - -	- 5 killed, 2 wounded.
Sappers and Miners - -	- 1 wounded.
Police - - - - -	- 1 „
Coolies - - - - -	- 1 killed, 2 wounded.
Total - - -	- 6 killed.
„ - - -	- 11 wounded.
	17

21. Muntries from Kholel and others, said to be emissaries from Poiboy, came into camp, bringing elephants' tusks, goats, &c.

22. In my rapid march on Toweebhoom I had somewhat overrun my provisions, and left the roads in my rear unfinished, which until made were almost impracticable, even for laden men. This necessitated a halt for some days, during which time I continued clearing the position, and sending working parties onwards.

23. Water was somewhat scarce, but on the 4th January the road was sufficiently completed to warrant my pushing on 44th Native Infantry and Sappers, the former to the Toweetoo River, a distance of eight miles, the latter to a spot near it where water was procurable. The same process as before, of extending detachments along the road, was carried out.

24. The head quarters left Toweebhoom on the 6th, and arrived at Pachooee on the 9th. This was a most important position, as it not only commanded the road down to the Tipai, and the southern portion of the valley and villages of new Kholel, which existed in dozens along the Voombong range, but also the country to the westward, where stood the site of old Kholel, and the village of Dhallong, one of Khalkom's. In addition to these advantages, it effectually covered our communication with the Toweebhoom. I eventually placed Colonel Rattray, C.S.I., in command of Pachooee and the neighbouring posts, and Colonel Hicks in a like capacity at Toweebhoom.

25. Our position to the rear of Pachooee was thus perfectly secured. Two forces could operate on the Kholel villages from two points within easy communication. Such being the case, Poiboy and his tribes were the next to be looked after.

26. We had again run ahead of roads and provisions, and were obliged to halt until the 17th January 1872, but our time was well occupied in making the road onwards, and completing it in rear.

27. Poiboy was never believed to have committed any overt act of aggression on British territory; and provided he would come in, and tender submission personally, we had so far no ground for quarrelling with him, and information to this effect was sent to him.

28. On the 17th January, I marched with a wing of the 22nd Punjab Native Infantry, 44th Native Infantry, and two guns, for the Tipai, *en route* to Chipooee. When half-way down to the river, we saw collected on the opposite side about 500 Looshais, 200 perhaps armed. I drew up the force in the bed of the river, and commenced the ascent. Dharpong, Poiboy's emissary, and his brother, an arch savage, arrived on the scene, and by threats and entreaties begged us to halt until night, and then parley in the darkness. This was not according to my principles. I pushed on up a steep ascent, and drew up the 44th Native Infantry in line, facing a similar line of Looshais, while Mr. Edgar and I, with the advance guard and staff, occupied the ground between.

29. A Looshai, said to be Poiboy, was brought forward, but on Helloong, an attaché of Mr. Edgar's, and formerly a slave of Poiboy's, declaring he was not the veritable chief, our meeting broke up; still they did all they could to delay our advance, but Chipooee was the point I started for, and there I was determined to go; the force arrived at the village by the evening, without encountering any opposition. We occupied a portion of it, and the Looshais soon flocked among us with poultry, eggs, &c. &c., for sale.

30. From Chipooee we were fairly puzzled as to our route; the Looshais tried to persuade us from what appeared the direct road, but after some trouble, we succeeded in hitting off the right line, and as the elephants for commissariat purposes were not to work beyond this point, I determined to trust to the country roads, repairing them here and there where not passable for the Artillery.

31. We halted at Chipooee until the 22nd January to collect supplies, and then marched nearly eastward, continuing to move on the 23rd and 24th, on the afternoon of which date, I reconnoitred to the top of the Moorth-lang range with Lieutenant Colonel Roberts, V.C., and Mr. Edgar. There are two roads to the top; fortunately we took the wrong one, or

would have been brought up by a very strong force of Looshais, who were collected at Koongnoong. We heard their gongs and shouts, and returned to camp.

32. Early on the morning of the 25th January, Dharpong, whom we had met on the previous day, came into camp, and said Poiboy's and Lalboorah's troops had joined to stop our progress, and would attack us on the march.

33. I made my dispositions as follows:—
An advanced guard of 50 men of 44th Native Infantry, under Captain Robertson, followed by 70 men of the same regiment in support; the 22nd Punjab Native Infantry furnishing the gun [advance guard?] and the 44th Native Infantry the rear guard.

34. Our route lay above and parallel to the bed of a nullah, about a mile and a half from camp. The advanced guard was fired into, and presently, from front and flanks, a formidable fire was opened. The advanced guard was at the time climbing an almost perpendicular wall of rock. As they reached the top they extended right and left, clearing their front and flanks; while the rest of the corps, as it arrived, dived into the bed of the rocky stream, where they met the enemy in force trying to get to the rear, to attack the long line of coolies. The 44th Native Infantry drove them back splendidly at one spot; 13 corpses alone were found. Some few of the enemy slipped past the column, and attacked the rear, but were repulsed by the 22nd Punjab Native Infantry. We have since learnt that the enemy acknowledged to about 50 killed, and a larger number wounded.

35. After getting our forces in hand, we pursued the enemy up a precipitous mountain side for 2½ miles, through two stockades, the latter of which was defended, but turned by the 44th Native Infantry. We ascended 2,500 feet in this distance, and by evening all baggage, &c., was brought within the stockade surrounding Koongnoong, which we occupied.

36. The English ammunition found on the slain was proof of their having been the raiders last year on Monierkhal and Nundigram.

37. Our loss was as follows:—

General Staff - - -	Brigadier General Bourchier, C.B., wounded in hand and arm, 1.	
Royal Artillery - - -	Wounded, 2.	
44th Native Infantry - -	Killed, 3; wounded, 1.	
Police - - - - -	Wounded, 1.	
Coolies - - - -	Killed, 1; wounded, 3.	
Total - - - - - -	Killed - -	4
	Wounded - -	7
		11

38. On the 26th, I detached a column under Lieutenant Colonel Roberts, V.C., consisting of 50 of the 22nd Punjab Native Infantry, 50 of the 44th Native Infantry, and two mountain guns, to Jaikoom, a village of Poiboy's, distant about seven miles. The enemy were posted behind a strong stockade, which was turned, but the village was attacked under cover of the fire of the artillery, whose practice is reported to have been admirable. The village was burnt. The column did not return to camp until 10½ P.M.

39. From the 27th to 31st January I was detained at Koongnoong, collecting commissariat stores, and sending out parties to bury and burn the dead.

40. On the 1st February we marched with ten days' provisions for Sellam, Poiboy's stronghold, which we reached on the following day. The group of villages, five in number, is situated in the Longtong range of mountains, at an average elevation of 5,800 feet. We occupied the largest, which I believe accidentally caught fire at night; the fire was with difficulty extinguished. Next day we moved camp to an open plain, and prepared for our last advance on Lalboorah.

41. Our baggage was reduced to a minimum; one suit off, one suit on, with bedding, was our allowance. All ponies were sent to the rear. The nights were freezing, so that an ample supply of bedding was a necessity.

42. Intimation was sent to Poiboy that if he did not come in, his villages would on my return be burnt.

43. Here I received intimation that from sickness and mortality among the Munnipore Contingent, General Nuthall had retired from Cheeboo. As it happened, having thoroughly secured our communications, and the whole country in our rear being at our mercy, this did not matter, otherwise this was exactly the time when the Contingent might have assisted us by holding Poiboy's villages while I advanced on Lalboorah.

44. On the 12th January, with a column, composed of two mountain guns, 400 infantry, drawn from the 22nd Punjab Native Infantry, 42nd Native Infantry, and 44th Native Infantry, I started from Sellam for Lalboorah's locality, the distance or whereabouts of

which

which no one knew. We carried two days' food in havresacks, and 10 on coolies; the guns also were carried on coolies. Three guns were fired by the enemy as a signal that we had left camp; the mountains on each flank of Lalboorah's valley, known as the "Gates of Lalboorah," loomed stupendously in the distance.

45. About four miles on the road we passed the deserted village of Romong, 40 or 50 Looshais retiring before us. We sent to tell them if they did not come in, we would fire upon them; several came, the rest disappeared in the forest. It was evening before we arrived at Julcheng, a distance of nine miles at least. We passed through one very strongly stockaded, but deserted position, built in a re-entering gorge of a precipitous mountain. Not only was the stockade strong and provided with flanking defences, but the trees felled within 50 yards of it formed an almost impassable barrier, a natural abattis. From 500 yards the guns would have rendered it untenable; without guns, taking it would have involved much loss of life, as the flanks rested on precipitous rocks.

46. On the 13th and 14th we marched; on the 15th, halted in a curious valley, about half a mile across at the junction of two streams whose waters were running southwards either to the Koladyne or Irrawaddy.

47. On the 16th, we crossed a range of mountains near the village of Moorth-lang, at an elevation of 6,650 feet, and passed through magnificent forests of oaks, firs, rhododendrons, and ash. The head man of the village, the oldest man I have seen in these mountains, crawled out to meet me, knelt at my feet, and taking off his blanket said we were gods, and that "their all" was at our disposal; women and children flocked round us; they told us, Lalborah, who owned their village, wanted them again to fight us, but that as they saw we did not come to take their wives and children, they refused, and feared they would suffer for their refusal.

48. The village was stockaded all round, not to defend it from us, but from the Sookties, Kamhow's people, who were constantly at feud with them.

49. In the evening we debouched on a narrow plain or series of extended valleys, at the head of which we encamped, and on the following morning, the 17th February, marched to Chumfai, Lalboorah's chief village, which we found deserted.

50. In the centre of the village was the tomb of Vonolel, an elevated platform surrounded by a palisading, on every point of which was hung skulls of metnas, elephants, deer, tigers, &c., while in the centre on a pole, was the fresh slain head of a Sookti, with his arm and foot. It was a ghastly sight.

51. We had here got to the length of the tether; as far as we could see, our work was done, we had subdued the tribes of Vonpilal. Poiboy and Vonolel, had marched unmolested to the capital of the latter, and it now only remained to dictate such terms as would save the remainder of the villages from destruction, and this I determined to do at Chumpsin, the village of Vonolel's widow.

52. I drew up the column round Vonolel's tomb, addressed a few words to the troops, thanking them in the name of the Viceroy, the Government, and the Commander in Chief, for their devotion to the cause we had at heart, and the fine spirit of discipline evinced by all. Three cheers for Her Majesty were given as the British colours were hoisted over a spot no British eye had ever before seen. The troops were withdrawn, and the village, consisting of 500 houses, was burnt.

53. On the 18th, I marched to Chumpsin. The inhabitants armed, and unarmed, seemed well inclined to resist us, but dispersed before our steady advances. The troops were drawn up around the village, which I occupied by a detachment, for the protection of the survey party. Here I dictated the terms on which this and the other villages of Lalboorah alone would be spared, and warned the inhabitants that if not acceded to within 24 hours, I would return and destroy Chumpsin to begin with.

54. The terms were, 1st,—That agents from the Government should have free access to Lalboorah's villages, and transit through his country;—2ndly, that three hostages, responsible for our unmolested return, should accompany the column to Tipai Mookh; 3rdly, that the arms taken at Monier Khal, or Nundigram, or an equal number of their own, should be surrendered; and 4thly, that a fine of two elephants' tusks, one set of war gongs, one necklace, four metnas, 10 goats, 10 pigs, 50 fowls, and 20 maunds of husked rice, should be delivered within 24 hours.

55. The arms were the difficulty; they came in by ones, but before morning, everything except a small portion of rice was delivered.

56. Dharpong on hearing the terms, as was his wont, grew furious, and said he would leave the camp. I told him he was quite free to do so, which brought him to his senses.

57. I halted on the 19th, as although nominally halting, we were daily on the move somewhere.

58. On the 20th, signal rockets were fired, hoping to attract General Brownlow's attention; we were then in —

Latitude 23° 26′ 32″
Longitude 93° 21′ 0.″

59. On the 21st, after considering thoroughly the possibility of forming a junction with General Brownlow, whom we had not heard of since the 6th February, and then he had not given me the direction in which he was moving, I determined to withdraw the column, and on that day commenced my march, which was continued with only one halt at Sellam to Tipai Mookh. In the evening of the 21st, we again fired signal rockets, and burned blue lights from the high ridge above the Moorth-lang village.

60. We arrived at Tipai Mookh on the 6th March, and left it on the 8th, after making all necessary arrangements to enable the remainder of the force to start the following day.

61. I arrived on the 10th of March at Cachar, the actual date on which the Government hoped, I might be clear of the country.

62. We acknowledge with gratitude the Almighty power which has protected us through so many dangers, and brought us back in safety.

63. The story of our return is soon told. Not a shot was fired; the villagers as we retired, flocked around us, and although Poiboy had not come in at Sellam, his not doing so was the abject fear of a boy. Three of his head muntries accompanied me as hostages to Tipai Mookh. To have burnt his villages, whence some thousands of inhabitants had been driven for weeks to find scanty shelter in the forest, would have been cruelty, especially as my lines of communications while *en route* to Lalboorah had never been harassed.

64. This was the only case in which I threatened and did not keep my word. Scores of the inhabitants came within the enclosed compound of my hut, and there implored forgiveness, and tendered submission.

65. The above is a slight sketch of the proceedings of the Cachar column, Looshai expeditionary force. On our return to Tipai Mookh, the hostages were released, and other Looshais who had hung about us pretty nearly from first to last left us with apparent regret.

66. The Looshais (particularly those living in the heart of the country) are far from being the savages we supposed. They are to me a highly interesting intelligent race, given at present in war to savage habits, but I am convinced that they are capable of being brought gradually into a state of high civilisation.

67. It is a gratifying part of my duty to bring to notice the services of the officers to whom I am especially indebted.

68. To the civil officer of the column, Mr. Edgar, I return my best thanks for the energy with which he performed his difficult duties, and for his cordial co-operation. He accompanied me into action.

69. To the officers of the staff, I am especially indebted. Lieutenant-Colonel Roberts untiring energy and sagacity are beyond all praise; working without guides, even without map and geography, thwarted by the Looshais, whose game was to delay our progress, he seemed never at a loss; but, not only in his own department was it that he exerted himself, whether piloting the advanced guard through the trackless forest, or solving a commissariat or transport difficulty, his powerful aid was willingly given.

70. The Deputy Inspector General of Hospitals, Dr. Buckle, C.B., was indefatigable in his department. When at leisure, he was constantly to be seen administering relief to all who required it, whether officers or coolies it was all the same. He brings to notice especially the services of Dr. White, Assistant Surgeons Harvey, Nicholson, and Monteath.

71. Captain Thompson, brigade major, ably sustained the very high opinion I had already formed of his merits and abilities.

72. Captain Butter, my aide-de-camp, deserves my best thanks for the alacrity with which, under difficult circumstances, my orders were conveyed to the detachments on the march and in action.

73. Lieutenant Colonel Davidson, and the officers of the Commissariat Department, carried out their duties to the best of their ability with the means at their disposal. Captain Marriott was indefatigable in the performance of his work.

74. Captain Blackwood, and the officers of the Royal Artillery, nobly sustained the reputation of the corps; the word "difficulty" was unknown to them.

75. Captain Harvey and the sappers were indefatigable in pioneering and driving roads through almost impenetrable forest, and along rocky mountain sides.

76. Of regimental officers, Colonel Stafford, 22nd Punjab Native Infantry, Colonel Rattray, C.S.I., 42nd Native Infantry, and Lieutenant Colonel Nuttall, 44th Native Infantry, deserve especial mention. They commanded the advanced wings of their regiments. Each wing had a share in the actual fighting of the column. The 44th Native Infantry had most opportunities, and have earned a brilliant reputation for themselves and Colonel Nuttall. Captain Lightfoot and Captain Robertson, who were with the advanced wing of the 44th, deserve especial mention. The latter commanded the advance guard on the 25th January, and to his cool courage under a heavy fire much of our success is due.

77. Major Moore, and the officers of the cooly corps, performing from first to last a most disagreeable duty, devoted themselves wholly to their work. Major Moore's example acted as a stimulus to all around him. Captain Hedayut Ali, whose services have been of the greatest importance, has already received my thanks, and the thanks of the Bengal Government.

78. The police under Mr. Daly did good service, patrolling the roads, escorting the post, and performing other duties as required. Mr. Daly was with me during the military operations at Kholel, and afforded me every assistance.

79. I beg to mention and thank with especial praise the services of Mr. Patch, the Sylhet District Superintendent of Police, who was placed at my disposal by the Bengal Government for the boat service between Mynadhur and Tipai Mookh. For 3½ months he has been travelling up and down the Barak, performing with intelligence and cheerfulness as disagreeable a duty as I could well imagine.

80. Mr. Pitman, and the officers of the Telegraph Department, afforded me invaluable aid; they made no difficulties, but did their work ably and efficiently.

I must not omit to bring to notice the severe strain which has been borne by the civil authorities, in the supply of boats, coolies, and supplies, especially on the collectors of Dacca and Sylhet, and the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar. But, while I feel thankful for their co-operation, I have some delicacy in saying much on a subject which more legitimately comes under the report of the Commissioner of Dacca.

81. In conclusion, to the whole of the officers, non-commissioned officers, and men of the column, I return my very best thanks. Some were more conspicuously brought to the front than others, but all did well the duties assigned to them.

82. I beg to enclose a sketch map, showing the line of route taken from Mynadhur to Lalboorah's village, and also a list of the marches, with the latitude, longitude, and elevation of the several encamping grounds.

Field Force Order by Brigadier General *G. Bourchier*, C.B., Commanding Cachar Column, Looshai Expeditionary Force, No. 64; dated Cachar, the 19th March 1872.

1. On the breaking up of the Cachar Column, Looshai Expeditionary Force, the Brigadier General Commanding feels deep pride in the reflection that he has received the congratulations of the late Viceroy, of the Governments of India and Bengal, and of his Excellency the Commander in Chief on its services.

2. The Brigadier General does not presume to offer an opinion as to whether the success of the column has equalled the expectations of the Government, but he has unfeigned pleasure in recording his belief that its discipline, energy, and devotion to the service could not have been surpassed.

3. From the beginning of November when the troops were first put in motion, to the present time, every man has been employed in hard work, cheerfully performed, often under the most trying circumstances of heat and frost, always bivouacking on the mountain side, in rude huts of grass or leaves, officers and men sharing the same accommodation, marching day by day over precipitous mountains, rising at one time to 6,600 feet, having made a road fit for elephants from Luckeepore to Chipowee, a distance of 103 miles, the spirits of the troops never flagged, and when they met the enemy, they drove them from their stockades and strongholds until they were glad to sue for mercy.

4. The history of the expedition from first to last has been sheer hard work.

5. On the advanced wings of the 22nd Regiment Native Infantry, under Colonel Stafford, the 42nd Regiment Native Infantry, under Colonel Rattray, C.S.I., and the 44th Regiment Native Infantry under Lieutenant Colonel Nuttall, the hardest work has fallen; each has shared in the actual fighting, the 44th more than either of the other corps; but to the officers in the rear most important duties were assigned, in protecting a line of communication extending over 110 miles from Tipai Mookh to Vonolel's stronghold of Chamfai, and watching, through spies, the attitude of the inhabitants of the

neighbouring villages, conveying provisions and the post, and keeping the road constantly patrolled. The frontier police did equally good service with the troops in this way. Each field officer in the rear had assigned to him a certain number of posts, for which he was responsible, and to their vigilance may be attributed the fact, that our communications have not for a day been interrupted.

6. Young officers may especially feel glad at having had such an opportunity of gaining experience in mountain warfare.

7. Before taking leave of the column, the Brigadier General would tender his heartfelt thanks to the officers, civil and military, non-commissioned officers and soldiers, who for so many weeks have co-operated with him, and to whom he feels he is entirely indebted for any success which may have attended the operations. He will have much pleasure in bringing their conduct and that of the officers of the several departments, civil and military, with the column to the notice of his Excellency the Commander in Chief for submission to the Government of India.

By order,
(signed) *H. Thompson*, Captain, Brigade Major.

ROUTE from *Cachar* to *Lalboora's* Village of *Chumfai*.

Names of Stages.	Distance. Of Stage.	Distance. Total.	Rivers and Streams.	Latitude.	Longitude.	Elevation.
	m. *f.*	*m.* *f.*		° ′ ″	° ′ ″	
Luckeepore - - - -	14 0	14 0	Barak, a ferry	24 47 30	93 2 10	700 feet.
Allnee Tea Garden - -	6 0	20 0		24 44 40	93 5 15	
Camp in the Forest - -	9 0	29 0	Barak, a ferry			
Boobundhur Tea Garden -	10 0	39 0		24 36 0	93 6 40	
Mynadhur Tea Garden - -	10 0	49 0		24 32 0	93 5 30	750 „
No. 1 Station - - -	5 0	54 0	Barak, a ferry	24 28 0	93 5 30	
„ 2 „ - - -	6 0	60 0		24 24 10	93 4 0	
„ 3 „ - - -	9 0	69 0		24 21 0	93 5 0	
„ 4 „ - - -	10 0	79 0	Barak, a ferry	24 16 10	93 3 0	
Tipai Mookh - - -	5 0	84 0		24 13 48	93 3 30	850 „
No. 5 Station - - -	6 0	90 0	Tipai, bridged	24 11 25	93 4 30	1,575 „
„ 6 „ - - -	6 0	96 0		24 9 10	93 6 15	3,850 „
„ 7 „ - - -	8 0	104 0		24 5 50	93 7 20	750 „
„ 8 „ - - -	8 0	112 0	Toweeboom, fordable.	24 4 10	93 10 0	1,475 „
„ 9 „ (Pachoee) -	5 0	117 0	Toweetoo, fordable.	24 1 40	93 9 45	3,850 „
„ 10 „ (Chipoee) - -	5 0	122 0	Tipai, bridged,	24 0 45	93 13 30	4,350 „
„ 11 „ - - -	7 0	129 0	Siroomloee, fordable.	23 57 27	93 15 30	3,840 „
„ 12 „ (Koongnoong) -	8 0	137 0	Toweela, fordable.	23 55 0	93 17 45	5,500 „
„ 13 „ - - -	8 0	145 0				5,175 „
„ 14 „ (Sellam) - -	9 0	154 0		23 47 52	93 19 30	5,750 „
„ 15 „ (Toolcheng) -	9 0	163 0		23 43 30	93 20 45	5,650 „
„ 16 „ (Bocljong) -	9 0	172 0		23 38 0	93 26 30	5,450 „
„ 17 „ - - -	5 0	177 4		23 34 20	93 25 30	3,600 „
„ 18 „ (Pema) - -	8 0	185 4				Crossing a ridge 6,600 feet.
Lalboora's village of Chumfai -	8 0			23 26 32	93 21 0	5,000 feet.
25 Marches Total - - -		193 4				

F. S. Roberts, Lieutenant Colonel,
Deputy Quartermaster General.

From Brigadier General *C. H. Brownlow*, Commanding Chittagong Column, Looshai Expeditionary Force, to the Quartermaster General, Army Head Quarters; dated Calcutta, the 3rd April 1872.

I HAVE the honour agreeably to your instructions to submit, for the information of the Right Honourable the Commander in Chief, the following abstract of the reports furnished by me from time to time of the operations of the column under my command in the Looshai country. The paragraphs are numbered respectively as they were in the reports from which they are extracted, and of which the dates are given.

REPORT, dated Demagiree, 30th November 1871.

2. On my arrival at Chittagong, on the 26th October, I was met by Captain East, Assistant Quartermaster General, who had preceded me in the early part of the month, and had just returned from Burkul with full particulars regarding the road and river communications up to that place, and of the work done under the orders of Captain Lewin, the Deputy Commissioner of the hill tracts, in clearing jungle for encampments, running up sheds for commissariat stores, and temporary shelter for troops at Rangamattea, Kassalong, and Burkul, on the banks of the Kurnafoolee river.

3. The commissariat arrangements under Major Mackenzie and Captain Case were in a very advanced and satisfactory state, two months' supplies for the whole force having already been pushed on towards Kassalong.

4. The Kurnafoolee is navigable by river steamer as far as Rangamattea, a distance of 61 miles; thence to Kassalong, 17 miles, boats not drawing more than 18 inches can proceed; above this latter place to Lower Burkul, which is about 12 miles, it is only possible to employ country boats drawing some few inches of water.

8. The 2nd Goorkhas, under command of Colonel Macpherson, C.B., V.C., and the 3rd Company Sappers and Miners, arrived at Chittagong on the 5th November. They were encamped for one day at that place, and on the 7th I started with them and arrived at Rangamattea on the following day, having left my Brigade Major, Captain Bates, at the former place, to receive troops and coolies on arrival, and forward them up the river. On the 9th of November Brigade head-quarters and the 2nd Goorkhas moved to Kassalong.

9. At Kassalong, which offered great facilities of space, and in the opinion of Surgeon Major Allen, the senior medical officer, promised to be healthy, I determined to establish my first depôt.

10. Owing to the heat of the weather, the advanced wing of the 2nd Goorkhas proceeded from Kassalong to Lower Burkul by small boats. Neither the "Flame" nor the large country boats can proceed to Lower Burkul, owing to rocks, and the strength of the current where the river narrows. This part of the journey occupies about seven hours.

11. A road of eight miles in length has been made from Kassalong to Lower Burkul. It is a good and rather severe day's march for troops to the latter place, and then on for 2½ miles more to Upper Burkul.

12. On the 12th November, I arrived at Upper Burkul with head-quarters and two companies of the 2nd Goorkhas. The rest of the regiment followed by detachments, part marching and part by boat from Kassalong, leaving a British officer and a sub-division at Kassalong, and the same number of men at Lower Burkul, for the protection of these posts.

13. Upper Burkul is just above the rapids, at a point where the river widens out to some 300 yards across.

I found the ground had been to a certain extent cleared; two commissariat godowns had been completed, and a third was in progress; sheds to cover about 500 men had been finished, and a rough stockade to protect the place had been built. But the ground was very confined, and I found it undesirable to collect troops or coolies here in any number.

14. On the day after my arrival at Burkul, the chief, Rutton Pooea, presented himself in camp, having anticipated a summons from Captain Lewin, whose messenger he met on the road. He expressed his desire to be friendly, and promised assistance, but appeared very much alarmed at the consequences to himself of an alliance with us against the other tribes. He was assured in general terms of future protection if he behaved well; and after a stay in camp of three days, during which he was chiefly engaged in drinking rum, he commenced his good offices by setting out on the 16th November to conduct a detachment of the 2nd Goorkhas under Major Macintyre to Demagiree. Captain East, assistant quartermaster general, accompanied this party, and his report of the march, which, owing to the difficulties of the country and the delay in marking out a road, occupied five days, is annexed. This road, which succeeding companies of the Ghoorkas and the company of sappers have since been working on, has now been rendered practicable for unladen elephants; but the hills are so steep, and the banks of the frequent watercourses so difficult, that the time

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and labour to render it of any use to laden animals could not be afforded without great delay to the expedition. I trust that, as the force advances and ascends, the slopes of the ranges may be found easier, and admit of the elephants being employed.

15. On the same day that Major Macintyre's detachment commenced its march by land I started by the river route, accompanied by Captain Lewin, with the head quarters and a company of the 2nd Aoorkhas, arriving here on the 18th November. The fleet consisted of 10 Chittagong boats, which had with considerable difficulty been dragged up the Burkul falls and rapids, and about 80 canoes, the former carrying the Goorkhas, and worked by their own crews, assisted by the soldiers; and the latter manned by hill coolies, three coolies to each canoe, and carrying on an average five maunds of supplies. The river, which runs in a clear and deep but sluggish stream, except at the rapids, which are of frequent occurrence, is on an average about 70 yards wide, the hills on either side being beautifully wooded to the water's edge. The distance from Burkul to Demagiree by this route is 38 miles. About half way between these places are the rapids of Ootunchuttra, which none but canoes can now ascend, as the river is falling daily. Below these rapids I have established a temporary depôt for stores, under a guard of 50 policemen, 20 of whom accompany the canoes on their journey up and down the upper half of the river. The larger boats work between Burkul and Ootunchuttra. By this arrangement it is hoped that 400 maunds of supplies may reach Demagiree every third day; but the canoe service, which is of vital importance to the advance of the force, not only to this place, but some distance further up the river and into the enemy's country, is, I fear, in a very precarious condition; the canoes are worked entirely by hill coolies, no others understanding the management of them. These men were collected by Captain Lewin, and have been most usefully employed in various ways for the last two months; but of late they have been overcome by an unreasonable fear of the Looshais, and there have been so many desertions among them, that unless Captain Lewin's personal influence can keep them together, there is a possibility of the whole body, about 500, melting away altogether and bringing matters to a dead-lock. I have written to Mr. Hankey, the Commissioner of Chittagong, to whose cordial co-operation I am already much indebted, begging him to order up the rajahs and chiefs of the tribes to which these men belong, with a view of inspiring confidence and checking further desertion; but in the interim valuable time may be lost.

18. At Demagiree I found that Mr. C. P. Crouch, Assistant Superintendent of Police, who had been sent on with 110 men from Upper Burkul on the 8th November, had done a great deal of work in clearing jungle, building a stockade, and preparing sheds for commissariat stores: the ground for these purposes he had selected with much judgment. Just below the falls, the river opens out into a large basin about 300 yards in diameter, on the left bank of which ample space exists for the sheds of some 800 men. The falls are at the foot of one of the northern spurs of the Oheepoom range, on which, at about one mile from the river, I have stationed a company in a rough stockade.

17. I propose to explain now, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, the arrangements I have made for the employment of the police placed at my disposal. Finding that, according to custom, they had been withdrawn from the frontier posts for drill and instruction to head-quarters at Rangamattea during the rainy months, when the swollen rivers and streams serve as a protection to the hill tracts against the Looshais, I requested Captain Lewin, through the Commissioner, Mr. Hankey, to re-occupy these posts, which will be garrisoned as follows, and remain in charge of the officers of police under the Commissioner:—

	Men.		Men.
1. Kainda (not hitherto occupied)	40	4. Paindoo	50
2. Bilasorrie	50	5. Thursa	30
3. Phurwa	40	6. Chima	60

The portion of the frontier thus guarded extends over 60 miles as the crow flies to the south-east of Kassalong. It is liable to the incursions of the Howlongs and Shendoos; and, considering the habits of these people, as well as the nature of the country, which is a forest-clad succession of hills and valleys, this line of posts, connected by a mere path, cannot be considered altogether sufficient. My line of communication above Kassalong is also exposed on the right; but I trust that the enemy will be too much taken up with the operations of the force to attempt any raids so far from home. The stockade of Khagoorea to the north of Kassalong is garrisoned by 60 men, and I have requested the Political Agent at Tipperah to employ the portion of the Rajah's contingent placed at my disposal in guarding his own frontier up to that point. These arrangements leave 130 police under an officer for employment with the force.

18. Of the political aspect of affairs I have little to report. Notwithstanding Captain Lewin's untiring exertions, added to his experience and influence on this frontier, I have been unable to open communications even with the Sylhoos, the first of the tribes we have to deal with, and whose villages are in sight. Rutton Pooea says he is at enmity with these people, and cannot undertake any messages to them. He is equally unable or unwilling to give information or guides, and altogether his alliance is of the most passive description, as might have been expected from his previous history. At Burkul he expressed his desire, to

which I could not accede, to be allowed to lead a war party of his tribe against the Sylhoos. On arrival here, I was met with a request for a guard to protect his village; 15 policemen were given him, and he appeared perfectly satisfied. When pressed for assistance of any sort, he declares that he has no control over his tribe. Captain Lewin, who is more troubled by his inconsistencies than I am, is of opinion that as soon as we have struck our first blow, and it is apparent that our mission is of a different character to former ones, the alliance will be more profitable. I trust that such may be case. At present Rutton Pooea is in camp, under medical treatment, to which he submits with a faith which is astonishing, considering his distrust of our dealings with him in every other respect.

22. I propose making my first move in advance of this to-morrow, the 1st December. From the Demagiree and Oheepoom ranges, on either side of the gorge we occupy, a fine view is obtained of the country of the Sylhoos, and also of the Howlongs, the furthest of the tribes to be dealt with. The natural obstacles the force has to overcome are most formidable. The mountains, rising to 4,000 and 5,000 feet, are very difficult, and covered with forests to the summit, a mere track connecting the different villages. There are five such ranges to be crossed. The intervening valleys are intersected by rivers and streams often unfordable. To the troops these obstacles are of no account, but they must of course cause much delay to the movements of coolies and commissariat. The water supply, except in the valleys, is also limited. I refer to these difficulties, not with any doubt of our power to surmount them, but to show his Excellency that to achieve satisfactorily the objects of the expedition will take fully the time allotted for the purpose.

REPORT, dated Savoonga, 1st January 1872.

1. On the 1st December, which was as soon as my commissariat arrangements would admit of an advance, I moved two companies 2nd Goorkhas, under Major Macintyre, to the village of Gnoora, with orders to improve the path to that place, and from thence to the Sahjuck river, intending that the force should follow the route adopted last year by Majors Graham and Macdonald in their ascent of the Rhai Jan Klang range, but I found so many objections to this line, that I determined on another, avoiding the high spur on which Gnoora is situated, and crossing the Sahjuck at Vanoonah's instead of at Lemshilong's old ghat. This gave me water carriage for 10 miles further up the river, in the direction of our advance, and an easy road from thence to Vanoonah's village, where I was led to expect the first show of resistance from the Sylhoos.

2. For some distance above Demagiree the Kurnafoolee river runs through a narrow defile in a succession of rapids, which laden canoes cannot ascend. To get over this break in the water communication, a road had to be made along the right bank of the river, from the falls, where it is crossed by a bamboo bridge, to a spot above the highest of the rapids, where the stream again becomes navigable, and where a depôt was established as a fresh starting point for the canoes, and called Hyslop's ghat. This piece of road, of about four miles, was made practicable for laden elephants, which are now working on it. It was a heavy job, and the Sappers and Miners, the 2nd Goorkhas, and 27th P. I., all had their share of it.

3. On the 3rd December, Colonel Macpherson, C.B., V.C., marched from Demagiree to Lingoorah's ghat with two companies of his regiment and the half company of Sappers. He was joined next day by Major Macintyre and his detachment at Lingoorah's old village, and proceeded on the 5th to Vanoonah's ghat, improving the road as he advanced. At Vanoonah's ghat Colonel Macpherson at once commenced to clear ground, and to throw a temporary bridge across the Sahjuck, which, however, is fordable at this point.

5. In my report of the 30th November, I referred to the desertion among the hill coolies that work the boats and canoes between Burkul and Demagiree, the sole means of feeding the force at and above the latter place. These desertions at last reduced the 600 men absolutely necessary to carry on the service to 350, with every prospect of a continued decrease, and it became a question whether I should not have to make a retrograde movement, for our supply scarcely sufficed to meet consumption, much less to create a reserve. On my urgent representations Mr. Hankey, the Commissioner, himself came to Burkul, having previously ordered up all the rajahs and chiefs of the tribes from which the coolies were drawn. His energetic measures led to an immediate improvement in the state of affairs. A certain number of deserters were apprehended, fresh men were found and made over to Captain Hood, while those whom the good management of the latter officer had kept together were reassured, and at the same time made to understand that they would be punished if they left their work.

6. For the river transport above Demagiree 50 canoes were lifted over the falls on skids, and dragged up the rapids to Hyslop's ghat. The hill coolies were called on for volunteers to man the canoes, but they begged to be decapitated, rather than asked to go a step further in the direction of the much-dreaded Looshais. For fear of renewed desertions, they were allowed to have their own way, and Mr. Crouch undertook the service with 100 of his police, assisted by men of the 27th P. I., and a certain number of the regular cooly corps. The policemen can sit and paddle these canoes to perfection, but to utilise the unskilled supplement of hands, it was found necessary to lash two canoes together, with a connecting deck, which formed a raft that could not easily be upset. These rafts were

were held in readiness to start on the first voyage the day after the troops crossed the Sahjuck, viz., the 11th December, and they have been working steadily ever since, to the great credit of Mr. Crouch, whose good service, and that of his men, I have already had occasion to notice. From Hyslop's ghat to Vanoonah's ghat the distance by river is about 12 miles, and the journey takes a day and a half or two days. There are no bad rapids between those places, either on the Kurnafoolee or the Sahjuck, otherwise rafts could not be used.

7. On the 9th December, I marched with my head quarters to Lingorah's old village (11 miles), and on the 10th to Vanoonah's ghat (6½ miles), where I found Colonel Macpherson with six companies of his own regiment, and the half company sappers, and two guns of the Peshawur mountain battery under Lieutenant Colonel J. Hills, v.c. On the 11th the head quarters and four companies of the 2nd Ghoorkas, were moved forward to the Belkai jooms (4½ miles), being little more than half way up to Vanoonah's village. On the 12th I followed with my staff, and on the 13th was joined by the artillery, and two more companies of Goorkhas.

8. On the evening of my arrival at the jooms, Captain Lewin reported to me that a messenger of his had returned from Vanoonah's, saying that the Sylhoos intended fighting. This messenger was "Lingoora," one of the sub-chiefs of Rutton Pooea's tribe. To ensure his fair dealing, and to neutralise his Sylhoo tendencies, he being married to a daughter of Savoonga, the chief of that tribe, and Rutton Pooea having expressed some doubt of his loyalty towards himself and us, Captain Lewin had made over his wife and child to the latter, to be kept as hostages for his good behaviour. Lingoora found five chiefs or rajahs assembled at Vanoonah's, and notwithstanding his relationship to Savoonga, was not allowed to proceed on his mission, being told to return and inform us that we were not to come any further.

9. The village of Vanoonah occupies a very strong natural position on the Belkai portion of the Rhai Jan Klang range. It is situated in a slight dip or hollow between two peaks, 1,700 feet above the jooms on the western face, where we were encamped; and the ascent to it, for the last 400 yards, is almost precipitous on every side except the north. The path from the jooms to the village is not quite three miles, and had been prepared for our reception. Close to the village it ran along a scarped rock, above which we found an arrangement of loose stones and boulders, supported by logs of wood tied up with creepers, which was to do duty as an avalanche on the advancing troops.

10. On the 14th, while waiting for supplies, I ordered out two parties, one under Colonel Macpherson, and the other under Major Macintyre, of the 2nd Ghoorkas, to reconnoitre the approaches from the north and south, in the hope of being able to surround the position when it was attacked the next day. Major Maicntyre went to the north, and soon came upon the enemy's pickets, which fired on him, and retreated. He followed up to within a short distance of the ridge, and having obtained the required information, returned to camp without any loss to himself, though he shot two of the enemy. Colonel Macpherson made for the south of the village, in which direction the jungle was very dense, and unbroken by jooms, as on the north. His guide misled him, and after three hours' hard climbing, he found himself on the ridge, some way beyond the point he wished to arrive at. With characteristic perseverance, he adhered to his purpose, and, late in the day, reached unperceived the peak overlooking the village, of which the leading files of Ghoorkas declared they saw Major Macintyre's party in possession. While his men were forming up, they suddenly became aware of their mistake, and dashed down among the astonished Sylhoos, but the opportunity was gone, and they only succeeded in giving them a volley, as they dived into the jungle below. A few guns and spears were taken, and seven or eight of the enemy were seen to fall, but the effect of a surprise, so completely after their own fashion, must have had a very demoralising effect on the Kookies. Colonel Macpherson returned to camp the same evening, and next morning the village was re-occupied by two companies of his regiment.

11. On the 18th the head-quarters and four companies of the 2nd Goorkhas were moved up to Vanoonah's. Just as they were starting, sharp firing was heard in our rear. Two parties of Goorkhas, under Captains Battye and Becher, at once dashed down the hill. Within half a mile of camp they came upon three of their own men, who were bringing up letters from Vanoonah's ghat, and had been attacked from behind an ambush. They found one Goorkha mortally wounded, having been struck by five bullets, and the two others standing over him, keeping at bay some 20 or 30 of the enemy, of whom they had each accounted for a man, when assistance arrived. The Kookies fled, and were pursued for some distance, another of them being eventually killed. I am sure his Excellency will agree with me that these two riflemen, by name Lulleet Bum Mull and Martbur Thappa, displayed courage and good conduct of the highest stamp, and that they are deserving of the Order of Merit, for which they will be recommended in due form.

12. On the 19th, I established my head-quarters at Vanoonah's village, which is at an elevation of 2,800 feet, and on the afternoon of the same day, Colonel Macpherson started with three companies and five days' provisions on a raiding expedition to the east, at a right angle to our line of advance. Early on the third day after his departure, he reached the village of Lal Heera on the next range, distant eight miles as the crow flies, across a deep and difficult valley. On the 22nd he made his way through another

village to the one marked on the map "Lalpooethel," six miles further east as the crow flies. He met with faint resistance, and having destroyed the three villages referred to, and an immense amount of grain, returned to Vanoonah's on Christmas-day. On the 20th I dispatched Major Macintyre with 100 riflemen and three days' supplies, no more coolie carriage being available in a north-easterly direction up the valley of the Kahoo Doong, in which lay the villages of Vanoeyeh and Van Shuma, both of which he destroyed, with rice granaries supposed to contain 8,000 maunds. He also captured 50 gyals or tame bisons, which constitute the chief wealth of the Looshaies, and are valued at upwards of 100 rupees each. Of these 25 broke away, but the rest were brought into camp. The reports of Colonel Macpherson, C.B., V.C., and of Major Macintyre, regarding their proceedings, are appended.

13. All the grain that falls into our hands, viz., unhusked rice, which we have not the time or the means to render fit for consumption, is found stored in houses on the jooms or patches of cultivation where it has been harvested, and, I believe, constitutes the whole stock in hand of the Sylhoos. It is of this year's growth, and requires to be dried before it undergoes the tedious process of husking, which in these countries is performed by the women, according to the daily consumption of the household. Were it not for this fact, our progress would be very different.

14. On the 26th, I sent on 100 of the 2nd Goorkhas, under Major Macintyre, to the site of an old village (Vanoyeh's), three miles north of the Kothier Klang, and on the 27th moved on there myself with the head-quarters of that regiment, and the half company of sappers, being followed next day by the half battery of artillery. This is a severe march of 12 or 13 miles along the ridge, and, though the coolies do it in one day, returning the next, I have established a post half way. I hope to work elephants on a portion of it, but the difficulty of feeding and watering these animals is so great, and it takes so much time to make roads for them, that as yet they have only been employed between Upper and Lower Burkul (2½ miles), between Demagiree and Hyslop's ghat (4 miles), and between Vanoonah's ghat, to within a short distance of Vanoonah's village (7 miles), being altogether something under 14 miles on the whole line of communication. This difficulty in using the elephants, the sickness among the coolies that arrived early in the season, as well as the quarantine necessitated at different places by the outbreak of cholera among the Nepaulese coolies, and its spread to Demagiree, have hitherto deprived us of nearly a fourth of our means of land transport.

16. On the 30th, I marched with half the 2nd Goorkhas across a water-shed to the village of Van Hoolien on the hill marked in the survey map as Savoonga, the proper name of which is Towrong. Further up the hill is another village of the same name, which a party under Major Macintyre occupied on the 31st. The enemy stockaded the approaches and defended it for a few minutes, slightly wounding one Goorkha. Yesterday, while destroying the jooms in the vicinity of this, one of Rutton Pooea's men was killed, and another wounded.

17. Every endeavour has been made to induce the Sylhoos to come in and listen to terms. Proclamations in Bengali and Burmese, which it was hoped some of their captives might be able to read, have been put up in villages which they are known to have re-visited after our departure; and conversations have been held with them from a distance, but to no purpose. They continue their opposition, such as it is, and we have no alternative but to proceed in our work of destruction, which must bring them to starvation.

REPORT, dated Sylhoo Savoong, 29th January 1872.

2. On 1st January I was joined at the village of lower Hoolien, on the Towrong range, by the half battery of artillery, and half company of sappers. The day following I moved with the whole of the advanced force three miles further up the range, to the village of Upper Hoolien. From this place, which is 4,000 feet high, or rather from a peak beyond it, 700 feet higher, where the survey had cleared a station the day before, for even at this elevation, though the undergrowth is not so great, the hills are clothed with forest to their summits, a fine view could be obtained of the surrounding country. Sylhoo Savoong, the capital of the chief, lay 10 miles to the east, or a little to the north of east, but separated from us by a deep and difficult valley, intersected by the head-waters of three rivers (running like the ranges north and south) two towards Cachar, and one into the Kurnafoolee, and a confusion of minor ranges and spurs involving, as we afterwards found, ascents and descents, aggregating in this comparatively short distance 4,200 feet of the latter, and 3,300 feet of the former. Further to the east, and on the third and fourth ranges from the one on which we stood, were to be seen the most important of the Howlong villages, and our direct road to their country was clearly through Savoong's. About 10 miles due north stood the deserted village of Lal Gnoora, and eight miles beyond that again a large and newly-built one belonging to the same chief, one of the sons of Savoong. The road to these villages was a comparatively easy one along the Towrong range, and I determined on destroying them before turning eastward.

3. Captain Battye, with two companies 2nd Goorkhas, was ordered to proceed at once and occupy the deserted village. On the 3rd January, Colonel Macpherson joined him with two more companies of the regiment, and the day following marched and attacked Lal Gnoora's which he found strongly stockaded, and in taking which he lost one Goorkha, killed, and an officer (Captain Battye) and nine men wounded.

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The village was burnt, and a large quantity of grain destroyed. Colonel Macpherson's report is appended, and I beg strongly to endorse his recommendation of Major Macintyre, for gallant conduct on the 4th instant. This officer has been in the advance all through the expedition, and his eye for country, as well as the care and skill with which he works his men, have rendered his services with the column invaluable. The claim to the order of merit put forward by Colonel Macpherson on behalf of riflemen, Indvajeet Thappa, will be duly submitted as soon as a committee can be assembled.

4. During the 4th and 5th, raiding and reconnoitring parties were sent out in different directions from Upper Hoolien, and on the 6th I moved with two companies of Goorkhas, half battery of Royal Artillery, and the half company of Sappers, to Lal Ngoor, a village on the road to Savoong's, situated on a ridge in the valley to which I have already referred. This march of seven miles took the troops as many hours, and the coolies were not up until three hours later. Where the path did not ascend or descend at an angle of 35°, it followed the tortuous bed of a mountain torrent overhung by trees and precipices, and blocked up with rocks and boulders, through which we waded and stumbled for three miles, chilled by the cold clammy atmosphere, and feeling that 50 determined men might do as they liked with us, for there was no possibility of protecting our flanks. The Looshais engineer their tracks with considerable skill, and at tolerable gradients along the top or face of a range, and keep to the high ground as much as possible, but when they have to cross a valley, they do so by the shortest lines, and a day's journey, such as I describe, is a fair specimen of its kind.

5. On arriving within 1,000 yards of Lal Ngoor, an open joom or clearing on a spot where a bend of the hill afforded a view of the village and its defences, gave me an opportunity of using the artillery for the first time. Colonel Hills' 7-pounder steel guns, which are carried by coolies, and keep up with the column on any ground, fired some very effective shots, while a company of the 2nd Goorkhas, under Captain Nash, accompanied by Captain East, Assistant Quartermaster General, worked round under cover, and drove out the enemy.

6. On the 9th I was rejoined by Colonel Macpherson, and the head quarters 2nd Goorkhas.

The same day the post of Upper Hoolien was abandoned, as being off the direct line of communication, and the village of Lal Shumah to the south-east of it was occupied as a halting ground between Kothier Klang and Lal Ngoor, the whole distance between these places being about 18 miles by road.

7. I may here mention, in the order of time that the particulars reached me, another attempt of the enemy to way-lay a convoy. On the 6th instant, while a small guard of the 2nd Goorkhas and a few Sappers were marching in charge of coolies along the Towrong range, they came suddenly upon some 30 Kookies in the act of preparing an ambush. There were only four Goorkhas in front, who at once dashed at the enemy, drawing the fire of the whole party, and yet killing one and wounding two without any loss to themselves. Such conduct needs no comment, and is the third or fourth instance of the kind. It is due to the material training and matchless spirit of this regiment, that the column has suffered so little at the hand of the Sylhoos, who, I feel sure, would have given us very much more trouble had they met with the slightest success in their encounters with small bodies and in their attacks on our line of communications. I am happy to say that not a single follower has been killed or wounded up to the date of this report, our only losses having been among the fighting men.

8. On the 11th I started for Sylhoo Savoong with 200 Goorkhas, the half battery of Artillery, and half company of Sappers, intending to reach it the same day, but the march was a difficult and tedious one, and at four o'clock in the afternoon, finding we had still an ascent of 2,000 feet before us, and expecting more than usual opposition at the headquarters of the tribe, I determined to halt for the sake of water; the spot selected was just above a stream. It was covered with jungle, but the force has now had considerable experience in bivouacking, and enough space was soon cleared to enable us to get through a very unpleasant night, for the thick mist which gathers in these valleys immediately after sunset penetrates everything, and the drip from the trees as it condenses can only be compared to rain. The wood in such places is too damp to burn; and, altogether, the situation, not unfrequent in this campaign, is trying to the strongest. Next morning, a dose of quinine was administered to every soldier and follower, and after a steep ascent of two hours, we occupied Sylhoo Savoong without a shot being fired. The village, which consisted of between 300 and 400 houses, had been burnt on the 7th instant. It occupied a fine position, at an elevation of 3,200 feet, with the River Kloong-Doong or Dullesurree flowing under it to the east, and two tributaries, one of the Gootur, and another of the Kurnafoolee, rising at its western base.

10. On the 13th January, Captain Lewin proceeded with an escort of 50 Goorkhas to put Rutton Pooea across the Kloong-Doong, which river is the boundary between the lands of the Sylhoos and Howlongs. I have already mentioned that Rutton Pooea is at enmity with the former, but allied by marriage and other ties to the chiefs of the latter, whom he has always confidently declared he could bring into camp whenever we reached this point.

Captain Lewin returned with his whole party next day, having failed to carry out his object. A small village on the other side of the river was burnt at his approach, and there were so many signs of Sylhoos having fled in that direction, that Rutton Pooea declined to go any further, saying that to do so might precipitate a collision with the Howlongs, and put it out of his power to mediate. He begged to be allowed to proceed by a more southerly route, and urged that we should not cross the Kloong-Doong before the 25th. As we had barely one day's rations in camp, and it was necessary to my plans to have a reserve of 10 days at least before moving, I consented, and the chief started next morning, accompanied, as far as it was safe for him to go, by Subadar Mohamed Azim, of the police, an officer whose services with the expedition have been most valuable.

The only conditions to which I referred, as the grounds on which we could treat with the Howlongs, were the restoration of the captives, and an unmolested march through their country.

11. As the 2nd Goorkhas had recently done very severe work, having, since the 3rd instant, marched over some 60 miles of bad road, carrying everything on their backs except their cooking pots, and, when not marching or fighting, been employed at long distances from camp destroying jooms, it was necessary to give them a few days' rest. During the next week parties were sent out in various directions for reconnoitring and survey purposes.

12. On the 20th I moved out with head quarters and 160 of the 2nd Goorkhas, half battery Royal Artillery, and half company Sappers, five miles in the direction of Lal Jeeka, the village of one of Savoonga's sons, whose name it bears. The next day, after a march of seven miles, I attacked and occupied it. Naturally a strong position, it had been elaborately stockaded, and, without artillery, could not have been taken without a certain number of casualties, had the Sylhoos defended it even for a few minutes. I thought, too, that it was advisable, if not absolutely necessary, to use the guns, for the sake of the moral effect they are likely to produce on the minds of these savages, who have hitherto been so ignorant of our power. Colonel Hills' battery was therefore brought into action, and, at a distance of 700 and 1,000 yards, fired 10 rounds of shell and shrapnel, with a precision that soon put the enemy to flight, and enabled the Goorkhas to pull down the defences and enter the village without loss.

13. It being an object to economise the rations at Lal Jeeka, and to employ every available coolie in bringing up supplies on the main line, I sent back the artillery on the following day to Sylhoo Savoong, and on the 23rd returned there myself, leaving Colonel Macpherson with orders to remain till he was rejoined by a company of his regiment under Captain Battye, which had proceeded on the 22nd as an escort with Major Macdonald and Captain Tanner of the Survey Department, to a range of hills about four miles to the north, and overlooking Bepari Bazaar.

15. Nearly a month ago, or as soon as we were in a position to show that the Sylhoos were not too formidable for us, and that such a step was not dictated by any doubt as to our ability to reach them, I pressed Rutton Pooea, through Captain Lewin, to send a message from himself to the Howlongs, advising them to come to terms. The chief made the usual objections to do anything at once, and said he would open his mouth in counsel when we reached the Kloong-Doong, but I insisted on the messengers going, if only to give evidence of the futile efforts of the Sylhoos to oppose us. They started accordingly, but I learnt about a week later that an accident had prevented their reaching their destination. I urged Captain Lewin to make the chief send again, and two more men were despatched, who so far fulfilled their mission that when Rutton Pooea and Subadar Mahomed Azeem were on the way to the Howlongs after the failure to communicate with them across the Kloong-Doong, referred to in paragraph 10 of this letter, they met these men and some Howlongs returning with the child Mary Winchester, who was made over to the Subadar, and brought back by him to Rutton Pooea's village, near Demagiree, while the Rajah continued his journey, and has since reported that Vandoola, and some other powerful chiefs have declared their willingness to give up all their captives. He expressed a hope that the rest would follow their example, and begged me not to invade Howlong territory until the 28th instant, when he would appear in camp. Taking the unconditional surrender of Mary Winchester as an earnest of their desire to come to terms, I thought it advisable to accede to this request. The date fixed has passed without his return, but, considering the extent of the Howlong country, and the slow progress of Kookie councils, I am not surprised that he has been unable, in so short a time, to get the whole tribe to be of one mind with regard to our demands.

17. It may not be out of place here to remark that the Looshais, or Kookies, for the former term, properly speaking, applies only to the family from which the chiefs of all the so-called tribes are descended, appear to me, in spite of their misdeeds, very far removed from the savages they are supposed to be. They live in comfortable houses, on high and healthy ranges. Their mode of cultivation yields the most abundant and certain crops. They are surrounded by pigs and poultry, goats, and gyals (a domesticated bison). They fish and shoot, and brew both beer and whiskey. Their domestic and tribal arrangements appear most happy, and altogether their condition contrasts very favourably with that of many

many of our own subject races; so much so, that I am not surprised to hear the majority of their captives, whom they treat as their own people, would look upon a return to civilisation as a doubtful boon. The men are of middle height, well limbed and fair, with the Indo-Chinese type of face. Most of those who have hitherto fought against us, are armed with flint muskets, but I imagine a spear or javelin, and the universal dao, are the more common weapons; we have seen no others.

18. Mary Winchester has been forwarded to Chittagong, where she will remain in charge of the Commissioner until the wishes of Government are known with regard to her. She is described as a very pretty girl of six or seven years of age, with hazel eyes and good features. She talks nothing but Kookie, smokes a pipe, and orders about the Looshais with an authority which shows that she has been well treated.

19. I must bring to his Excellency's notice the very great assistance I have derived from the new system of army signalling with flags. On many occasions I have been able to send instructions to detached parties and posts at distances of 10 and 12 miles, and to receive replies in a few minutes, which otherwise must have taken three or four days in transmission, and have given extra and trying work to the troops detailed for carrying orders. It appears to me that in mountain campaigns in this country, the system of army signalling, when properly carried out, must be of the very greatest utility, and I venture to express an opinion that every British officer should learn it as part of his drill, and that an apparatus for night signalling, under a specially qualified officer, be attached to every expedition that may in future take the field.

20. With the exception of 16, unfit for work, the whole of the elephants with this column have been working regularly since the 22nd January, on seven stages along my line of communication. On this side of the Sahjuck, road-making has been steadily carried on by the 27th Punjab Infantry and the half company Sappers which I placed at Colonel Doran's disposal, and I am much indebted to this officer for the efficient arrangements made by him for opening out a good elephant path as far as Lal Shumah.

21. I have already explained, for his Excellency's information, the nature of my communications as far as Vanoonah's ghat, the highest point on the Sahjuck to which water carriage has been employed. In advance of that place eight posts are now established, at each of which a company of not less strength than 50 men is stationed. From these posts the necessary escorts for elephants and coolies, consisting as a rule of a section, are furnished. Each post is protected by a rough stockade of heavy timbers, and these have been efficiently and rapidly constructed by the Sappers, assisted by the fatigue labour of the troops under the very zealous superintendence of Lieutenant Hyslop, R.E.

22. The Commander in Chief will have learnt from my telegrams that cholera has occurred at Demagiree, and the stations below it. In nearly every detachment arriving at Chittagong through the Sunderbuns, one or two cases took place, the first being among the 2nd Goorkhas, and 3rd Company Sappers and Miners, which troops formed the advanced part of this column. Amongst the coolies and followers despatched by sea route, I have not heard of a single case during the voyage. No serious outbreak, however, took place until the disembarkation of the Nepaulese coolies on the 7th December, when 297 men arrived, having lost 14 of their original number since their departure from Dobree.

Subsequent to their arrival, there have been several outbreaks of the disease.

Every precaution has been taken to isolate all men attacked and to prevent the spread of the disease, considerable delay and confusion in the movement of both troops and coolies being occasioned by these necessary measures; putting men into quarantine, who were urgently required in the front.

I am afraid that in the low belt of moist and thickly wooded country extending from the sea coast to the first range of high hills, cholera must be looked upon as endemic, and I much fear that, despite all precautions, an occasional, though I trust not a serious, recurrence of the disease must be expected.

23. The health of the force in other respects has been satisfactory, though the change in the weather, the monotonous diet and want of shelter, added to the very hard work that both troops and coolies have lately been doing, are beginning to tell, and sickness is steadily on the increase.

In addition to the 70 miles of road constituting our main line of communication in advance of Demagiree, columns have gone over an aggregate of 200 miles to the right and left of it, and attacked and destroyed 20 villages, the jooms of which frequently lay at long distances from them, and the search for which had to be carried out with all military precautions, entailing severe exertions on both officers and men.

REPORT dated Chittagong, 30th March 1872.

MY last Report was submitted on the 29th January, from Sylhoo Savoong.

2. IT was my intention the following day to have made a forward movement into the Northern Howlong country, and orders had been issued accordingly, when intelligence reached me that Mahomed Azeem, the Police Subadar, to whom I have already referred, had followed Rutton Pooea to the village of Sypooea, the brother of Vandoola, the chief of the southern section of the tribe. The Subadar, whose instructions were on no account to put himself in the power of the Howlongs, but whose mistaken zeal admitted of much excuse, wrote to say that the whole tribe was most anxious to submit, that the chiefs were ready to come in and give up their captives at Demagiree, but would not approach the advanced portion of the force at Sylhoo Savoong, owing to the disturbed state of the country, and other reasons.

3. On this, Captain Lewin urged upon me very strongly the advisability of remaining stationary still longer, suggesting that the commencement of hostilities with the Howlongs, while the Subadar was in their country, might endanger his life or liberty, and pointing out very forcibly the many political advantages to be gained by the success of Rutton Pooea's mission, and the opening of communications with the chiefs, as compared with the results of merely punitive measures, to which we should otherwise be reduced. His arguments, recorded in a memorandum on the subject, appeared to me so unanswerable, that I again delayed the advance, to the confusion of all my commissariat arrangements.

4. Neither the numbers of troops or coolies at my disposal allowed of my continuing the chain of posts which connected my line of communications up to Sylhoo Savoong, beyond that point, and my plan was to start with 10 days' supplies, sending back for more, according as circumstances might demand or permit. For this purpose, the requisite number of coolies had been taken off the posts below and collected at the front in readiness for the move on the 30th. With these additional mouths to feed, every day's delay of course helped to reduce the accumulation of stores, and it became necessary to redistribute the coolies on the line, some having to go back three or four stages.

5. On the 5th February, I heard that the Subadar had returned to Demagiree, which left me free to advance, but it was not till the 11th that I felt myself in a position to take advantage of it, having determined not to do so till I had 20 days' supplies in reserve at Sylhoo Savoong, so as to be quite safe in case of any interruption of communications in rear.

6. The Sylhoos had recently fired on two or three convoys, and on the night of the 3rd had made an attempt on the pickets at head-quarters, when a Goorkha was severely wounded. It seemed, therefore, highly probable that they would be more active in their attacks when they saw that we were engaged with the Howlongs as well.

Colonel Doran, commanding at Lal Shumah, finding them becoming troublesome, sent out parties of his regiment to make reprisals, one of which surprised an encampment of the enemy, and pursued them with great spirit and success, killing four, wounding three, and making three prisoners. This happened on the 4th February, and was followed by the best results.

7. The information brought by the Subadar was not satisfactory. The Southern Howlongs were prepared to do everything we desired at Demagiree whenever Captain Lewin and myself returned there, but would not come to the camp. From the Northern Howlongs there was no message whatever, so I determined to attack them.

8. After providing a sufficient garrison for Sylhoo-Savoong, I found I was able to advance with the following troops:—

300 2nd Goorkhas.
½ Peshawur Mountain Battery.
½ Company Sappers and Miners.

This small column was barely sufficient for the work before us, and it was all I could afford, and all I could feed.

9. I may take this opportunity of remarking that the force placed at my disposal for the expedition did not exceed what was absolutely required to achieve its objects satisfactorily. A reference to the accompanying map will show how it was disposed on the date of my move against the Howlongs, with the troops above detailed. The original advance from Demagiree was necessarily to the north east, for the reason that the principal villages of the Sylhoos, the first and nearest tribe to be dealt with, were in that direction, as were also those of Sookpilal, and the northern and most important section of the Howlongs, and because I started with the idea of an ultimate junction with General Bourchier's column. The settlement with the Southern Howlongs I determined to leave to the last, but as my chain of posts from Kassalong upwards was almost parallel with their border, and therefore liable to attack from them along its whole length, as well as by the Sylhoos in their own country, it was necessary to garrison each of these posts with 50 men, so as to allow of sufficient escorts with the coolies daily passing up and down the line of communication. I

moreover

moreover thought it advisable to keep a wing of a regiment at Demagiree ready to move, when possible, against the Southern Howlongs, and to act as a support not only to the troops in front but those in rear, for more than once I received intimation from thence of threatened attacks on Burkul and Kassalong. I may also point out that in advance of Demagiree we were operating within four or five (Kookie) days' journey of the whole of the Sylhoo and most of the Howlong villages, some 60 in number; and, considering their raiding propensities, can only ascribe the absence of combination and greater enterprise in their attacks upon convoys to the severe and rapid blows administered at the very commencement of the campaign.

10. I knew that there was no intention to contest the passage of the Dullessur river, and could see that the nearest villages beyond it were deserted, except by a few men ready to burn them at our approach. On the 11th I moved forward a portion of the 2nd Goorkhas and the Sappers under Colonel Macpherson to occupy one of these. After a severe march of 13 miles in a north-easterly direction, he bivouacked within a short distance of Lienrikoom and Choongmama, which were close to each other, and which the Howlongs burnt immediately they saw the troops, though not a shot was fired during the day.

11. On the 12th, I followed with the remainder of the column. From Sylhoo Savoong to the Dullessur is a steep descent of 2,300 feet; the path then ascends 1,500 feet, runs along a ridge for a short way, and again descends 1,100 feet into the bed of a stream, which it follows for a couple of miles; another spur of 1,200 feet is crossed, and a final ascent of 1,600 feet on to a rolling upland, the drainage of which flows into the Dullessur on the west and Kolodyne to the east, and on which the two villages were situated, finishes a day's journey that took the greater part of the coolies 12 hours to accomplish.

12. On the 13th the force halted, and the whole of the coolies were sent back to Sylhoo Savoong for more supplies. The same day two reconnoitring parties had proceeded a short distance out of camp, when they were hailed by some villagers. Captain Lewin happened to be with one of these, and after some trouble induced the Howlongs to approach and converse, and finally to return with him. They said that they did not wish to oppose us, and that their chiefs were ready to come and make their submission. On being informed that until the latter presented themselves we should continue our advance, one or two among them who appeared to be Karbarees or head-men replied that they would take the message to Lalboorah and Benkœa, and started at once.

13. On the 14th I moved the force to Choongmama, and resolved to modify my plans so far as to establish a post there. To the east of it, and beyond the deep valley of the Koladyne, at a distance of one and two days' march, were the villages of Benkœa, Sangboonga, and their mother, the widow of Lalpitang, consisting of 300 or 400 houses each. On the Mowee Klang, and about as far to the north, were four others belonging to the brothers Lalboorah and Jatoma, containing altogether about 1,000 houses. The ranges on which these two great groups of villages stood were between 4,000 and 5,000 feet high, and had been so well cleared for cultivation, that they could be ascended through a succession of jooms and open ground likely to afford full scope for both our artillery and rifle fire, and inviting attack under the most favourable circumstances. The weak point of our position was that in moving against one we should be exposed both in flank and rear to the other. I counted though on the chiefs remaining at home to defend their own hill sides, as the Sylhoos had done, and hoped that a post at Choongmama (where the roads to the two points of attack met almost at a right angle), sufficiently strong to allow of a sortie if necessary, would check any serious attempt to annoy our rear; a rough stockade was accordingly constructed.

14. On the 15th I sent out reconnoitring parties of the 2nd Goorkhas in both directions, one under Major Macintyre, accompanied by Major Macdonald of the Survey, towards the north, and the other under Captain Battye, accompanied by Captain East, assistant quartermaster general, to the east. The former returned in a couple of hours, with all the information required. The latter on reaching a stream just below camp came upon a small body of the enemy, who said that their chiefs were then on their way to make their submission, and that, if they were met by a large armed party, they would probably get alarmed and go back; Captain East halted, and sent for instructions, on which I directed him to return to camp.

15. On the 16th Sangboonga and Benkœa arrived, preceded by their Karbarees, who said that under Rutton Pooea's assurances, the chiefs were anxious to make their submission, and comply with our demands. On discussing with Captain Lewin what those demands should be, he expressed his opinion that the restoration of the captives and an oath of friendship towards the British Government, with the pledge to commit no more raids, and to allow us free access to their country now and always, were the only terms we should insist on. He thought that to demand hostages for future good behaviour, or to propose any conditions that might not be complied with, or be evaded hereafter, would be impolitic. Though both these chiefs were concerned in the Cachar raids of last year, he deprecated the imposition of any special penalty on that account, as likely to alarm them, and put them to flight. They were represented to be in the most abject fear of treachery on our part. The old story of Lall Chokla, the chief who is said to have given himself up at Sylhet or Cachar many years ago, on a promise or expectation of pardon, and to have

been afterwards transported for life, was revived, and it was quite clear that no considerations whatever would have any weight against those of personal safety, of which they said they could not be sure until Captain Lewin had sworn friendship. Before taking the oaths, our ultimatum had to be given, and on this depended whether they remained or absconded. If they absconded, there would of course be no further hope of seeing them, or any other of the Howlong chiefs, and, together with the captives, we should lose the opportunity of showing that our object was not retaliation, but security against future raids, and to instil into them some ideas of our policy in addition to our power, which had been amply demonstrated. In a congratulatory telegram, dated only a few days before his death, the late lamented Viceroy, while doing me the honour to express his pleasure at the recovery of Mary Winchester, had referred to the liberation of the captives as one of the main objects of the expedition. This object would certainly be sacrificed by a persistence in punitive measures. The Howlongs had removed all their grain and property out of our reach, and, with the example of the Sylhoos before them, as well as the most exaggerated ideas of our guns and rifles, it could not reasonably be supposed that they would stand and take any punishment by fighting. We might burn their empty villages, or they would probably do so themselves immediately we advanced, but then our present ability to hurt them would end. After a careful consideration of all the circumstances of the case, I determined to accept their submission on the terms proposed by Captain Lewin, and the next day that officer, to whom I left all personal communications with the chiefs, went through the required ceremonies with Sangboonga, Benkœa, and Choongmama, each of whom, in addition to the usual peace offerings of elephant's tusks, gongs, and gyal, presented him with either his gun, dao, or plume of bhimraj feathers (worn only by chiefs), as tokens of allegiance and friendship. They expressed a wish that Captain Lewin should settle on the Sirthay or Demagiree range, where they might come and see him, which they could not do while he lived at such a distance as Kassalong or Rangamattea.

16. On the 18th Lalboorah, Jatoma, and Lienrikoom, who together with those already named, represent the whole of the Northern Howlong villages, came in and made their submission on similar conditions. The same day the first instalment of captives was sent in. From the evidence of the latter, Captain Lewin was satisfied we should get all that survived of those that were taken from Alexandrapore and the adjacent garden, the only places on the Cachar side that the Howlongs are known to have raided. They, the captives, in describing their adventures subsequent to being carried off, said that some days before reaching the limits of the latter tribe, the Kookies broke into three or four parties, and that of these one only, to which Mary Winchester and some 20 of their number belonged, came as far south as Sangboongas. It may therefore very fairly be assumed that the others went to more northern villages, and that Sookpilal or his sons, through whose country the raiders must have passed, which they could not have done without invitation or consent, shared in the expedition, as well as its results. Each tribe, I believe, has its own raiding ground, which is very jealously preserved. As a rule, the Shendoos prey on Arracan and the southern portion of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, the Howlongs on the country to the south and east of the Kurnafoolee, while the Sylhoos attack Hill Tipperah. The more northern tribes resort to the Sylhet and Cachar Districts, and having the credit of doing so, would naturally object to incur suspicion, and the chances of a visitation for raids in which they did not participate, and would certainly prevent them.

17. On the 19th, Major Macdonald, Deputy Surveyor General, escorted by a detachment of the 2nd Goorkhas under Captain Battye, started for Benkœa's village, from which he returned on the 21st. The day after, he proceeded with another party of the same regiment under Lieutenant Hill to the villages of Lalboorah and Jatoma on the Mowee Fan Klang, one of the peaks of which, 5,200 feet high, and known as Silam, had long been a conspicuous object in our front, and on which it was important to erect a survey station.

18. On the 23rd, leaving Colonel Macpherson and the greater part of his regiment at Choongmama to wait the return of Major Macdonald, I marched with the remainder of the force to Sylhoo Savoong, intending to hasten back to Demagiree to bring matters to a conclusion with the Southern Howlongs.

19. Immediately after the submission of the chiefs, and during the remainder of the time that the force was at Choongmama, the camp was crowded with Howlongs (men, women and children), and a brisk trade in every kind of local produce was carried on. The impression left on our minds was, I think, that the Looshais could bear comparison with most eastern races in physique, natural intelligence, and character. Their thews and sinews and well turned limbs indicated health and freedom from want or toil; their faces showed a happy genial disposition, without any expression of cruelty, and very little of courage. They were all clad in home-spun cotton; the sheets or plaids worn by the men being often a dark tartan, and the highland sporan a frequent article of apparel among them.

20. On the 24th, Captain Lewin received intimation that all the Sylhoo chiefs were assembled at Lal Jeeka, and that there was some division in their councils as to whether they should submit or make a combined attack when we commence to retire. In either case, I thought it better to halt till Colonel Macpherson rejoined me, which he did on the 26th.

21. On

21. On the 27th, Lal Gnoora and Lal Jeeka, the sons of Savoonga, Vanooyah, Vanloolah, and three other chiefs, representing the whole of the Sylhoo tribe, made their submission, under the same forms and conditions as the Howlongs. Savoonga excused his absence on the grounds of old age and illness arising from his recent troubles and wanderings, but his sons said he too would come if we insisted on it, which I did not think it necessary to do. Having suffered all the punishment we could inflict, the giving in of the Sylhoos at this stage of the expedition was most satisfactory evidence of a real desire for friendly relations with us. The chiefs said that their followers were completely scattered, and it would take time to collect, and make over their captives, of whom they acknowledged to a very few. In reply to Captain Lewin's inquiries as to why they had so persistently opposed us, and shut their ears to the repeated messages of peace conveyed to them, they said that their young men would fight in spite of their elders, that Lemshilong had told them the most alarming stories of our intentions, and that they, the chiefs, were afraid to put themselves in our power.

22. On the 28th, Major Macdonald, with an escort of the 2nd Goorkhas under Captain Battye, and accompanied by Sylhoo Karbarees, who undertook to see them beyond their own border, started towards Byparee Bazaar. They were provisioned for 13 days, and were, if possible, to reach a peak called "Riek" in Sookpilal's country, and from thence return by the Lysrah Klang, completing, it was hoped, the communication between the Cachar and Chittagong Districts. The same day I resumed the march towards Demagiree, with the head-quarters of the brigade, the two guns Peshawur Mountain Battery, and two companies of the 2nd Goorkhas, leaving Colonel Macpherson, with the remainder of his regiment, to withdraw along the line, according as the stores at the different posts were removed or consumed, until he reached the Rai Jan Klang range, where he was to wait for Major Macdonald's party, or until further orders, which would depend on the arrangements for the embarkation of his corps for India.

23. I pushed on with my staff by forced marches to Demagiree, on arrival at which place I learnt from Captain Lewin, who had preceded me by a day, that the Southern Howlongs had sent a certain number of captives, but that the chiefs hesitated about coming in to make their submission personally. He recommended a show of force in the direction of Sypooea and Vandoola, whose villages were said to be three and five marches respectively to the east of Rutton Pooea, and expressed his opinion that immediately we advanced they would present themselves.

24. Leaving the officer commanding at Demagiree in communication with Captain East, Assistant Quartermaster General, who was to proceed to Chittagong for the purpose to carry out the gradual withdrawal and embarkation of the rest of the force, I started on the 7th with the following troops:—

One gun Peshawur Mountain Battery, under Lieutenant Colonel Hills, v.c.

Two companies 4th Goorkhas, under Captains Hay and Hinde.

Two companies 27th Regiment, Punjab Infantry, under Colonel Irvine and Major Ogilvie.

The column marched 40 miles over as bad a country as we had yet encountered, and on the third day, after a final ascent of more than 4,000 feet, reached Sypooea's village, the chief himself coming out to meet Captain Lewin, and at once doing all that was required of him.

25. Vandoola, the brother of Sypooea, and their cousin, Vantonga, who together represent the whole of the Southern Howlongs, were said to be hourly expected, and their further hesitation to come in seemed so unlikely, that I halted during the 10th and 11th. As they did not appear in that time, I made another forward movement on the 12th, and was met at the Kloong or Dullessur river by Vantonga, whose captives were brought into camp at midnight, weeping bitterly at parting with their captors. The next morning Sangliena, the eldest son of Vandoola, presented himself, with excuses from his father, who was said to be ill. Rutton Pooea and Sypooea declared that such was really the case, and that they would vouch for the father fulfilling the engagements of the son, whatever they might be. I felt that the most satisfactory settlement of the doubt would be to continue my advance, but Vandoola's villages were two, if not three, long marches to the east,—much further than I had anticipated; the heat was becoming excessive, and the coolies were quite exhausted by five months' continuous labour. My supplies, moreover, were barely sufficient, and hasty retirement under any circumstances was to be avoided. I therefore decided on accepting the young chief's submission on behalf of his father, and, accompanied by him, returned to Sypooea's. He took the oaths next day, and agreed to give up 30 captives, which Captain Lewin is confident will be made over in due time. The relationship of Rutton Pooea to Sypooea and Vandoola (he is married to their sister) will, I hope, now that our power has been demonstrated, prove the means of bringing the two last within the same pale of civilisation as the first. Sypooea is a very distinguished looking and intelligent Looshai, who so far succumbed to the animal magnetism of Captain Lewin, as to express a desire to accompany him and Rutton Pooea on a visit to Calcutta, which the latter chief is quite prepared for.

26. During the 14th and 15th, Captain Tanner, of the Survey, by dint of very hard

walking, reached a peak to our south, 5,300 feet high, and added considerably to the valuable work he had already accomplished. On the 16th, I commenced the return march to Demagiree, which the troops reached on the 19th, the two companies 4th Goorkhas and the Artillery proceeding down the river the same day. The head-quarters and six companies of the 4th Goorkhas, the whole of the 2nd Goorkhas, the company of Sappers, and all the ordnance stores, had already been dispatched towards Chittagong, where the head quarters, 4th Goorkhas, and six companies embarked for Calcutta on the 18th. Captain East, Assistant Quartermaster General, had proceeded to Chittagong, where, by means of the telegraph, he arranged for the downward despatch of troops and coolies, so that they should reach that place as required for embarkation, and that no crowding, which at this season of the year is especially to be avoided, should take place at any of the posts along the line. The same system will be pursued until the last cooly has been embarked, and there will not at any time be collected at Chittagong more than 600 men of the cooly corps. On arrival at Demagiree, I found that all that remained for me to do was to establish a small stockaded post, to hold 100 men, near Rutton Pooea's village, and to provision it for seven months. Having satisfactorily arranged this matter, I started on the 20th from Demagiree, and arrived at Chittagong on the 24th.

27. The force under my command had now accomplished its task, and I may sum up briefly the results of the four months' campaign as being,—the complete subjection of two powerful tribes inhabiting upwards of 60 villages, of which 20 that resisted were attacked and destroyed; the personal submission of 15 chiefs, and their solemn engagement on behalf of themselves and tributaries for future good behaviour; the recovery of Mary Winchester, and the liberation of upwards of 100 British subjects who had from time to time been made captives. In addition, the operations of the column, which by frequent departures from the main line of advance, as shown by the red lines on the map, covered a large area, enabled the officers of the survey to triangulate 3,000 square miles of country, more than half of which was surveyed in detail, and also to complete the connection between the Cachar and Chittagong districts.

28. Political and military considerations have been so mixed up in the conduct of this expedition that, though I have been compelled to refer a good deal to the former, the very able civil officer with whom I have been associated in endeavouring to carry out the objects of Government, will submit in his own department a full report showing the important part he has so successfully played. It is due to Captain Lewin's strong personal influence over these tribes, his knowledge of their language and habits, added to his patience and sagacity in dealing with them, that a single chief submitted, or a single captive was recovered. In expressing my thanks and acknowledgments for the assistance I have received from him, I am bound to record my belief that if he were located with 200 or 300 men for the next year, or even a few months, on the Demagiree range, while the impressions of our power and of the friendliness of our intentions are still fresh, he would bring the Sylhoos and Howlongs into the same relations with us as Rutton Pooea and his men, to the permanent pacification of at least a portion of this frontier. Such a measure would be quite feasible without any increase to the local police force, as the nature of the position in question, apart from political considerations, would render unnecessary so many of the present small posts, which seem only to invite attack. It would also, in addition to its other recommendations, insure the health and efficiency of a certain number of men who are now every year prostrated by fever at a time when their services are most wanted.

29. As my periodical reports of the progress of the campaign will have shown the difficulties, privations, exposure, and sickness which the force has had to contend with in fighting its way through an unknown country, which presented unexampled physical obstacles to military operations, and which offered no resources whatever that could he turned to account, I have only now to commend to the notice of his Excellency, the Commander in Chief, the admirable spirit and devotion with which those difficulties were overcome, and for which my thanks are due to every corps and department, and to every officer and man, under my command.

I. The three fine regiments composing the infantry of the column, viz., the 2nd Goorkhas, under Colonel Macpherson, C.B., V.C.; the 27th Regiment Punjab Infantry, under Lieutenant Colonel J. Doran, and the 4th Goorkhas, under Lieutenant Colonel J. A. Tytler, V.C., were pushed to the front in the order of their arrival, and, though the submission of the Southern Howlongs deprived the two last of the same opportunities as the first, their posts and patrols were always liable to attack, and all shared equally in the cheerful performance of the most harrassing duties for a period of nearly five months.

II. The (half) Peshawur Mountain Battery, under Lieutenant Colonel J. Hills, V.C., with coolie carriage, accompanied the head quarters of the brigade throughout the expedition, and kept up with the infantry over the worst description of ground, coming into action whenever required, with a certainty, celerity, and effect which induces me to venture the opinion that, for mountain warfare, the 7-pounder steel gun is unequalled.

III. The third company Sappers and Miners, under Lieutenant R. Maxwell Hyslop, R.E., worked all through the campaign with a willingness and intelligence worthy of the distinguished regiment to which they belong.

IV. The

IV. The police of the Chittagong hill tracts, under Mr. C. P. Crouch, rendered very valuable services, which have been referred to in my former reports.

V. The medical department, of which the duties were necessarily very severe, was most ably administered by the senior medical officer, Surgeon Major F. F. Allen, of the 2nd Goorkhas, who, in addition to his own work, as well as that of the head-quarter camp, performed the office of Deputy Inspector General with a care and foresight which relieved me of all anxiety, and for which I cannot sufficiently thank him. Surgeons W. C. Smith and G. C. Chesneye, in medical charge of the 27th Regiment Punjab Infantry and 4th Ghoorkhas respectively, and Assistant Surgeon R. T. Lyons, who acted as medical storekeeper, at Kassalong, to Dr. Allen's complete satisfaction, and who displayed much energy and judgment during the prevalence of cholera at that place, and Staff Assistant Surgeons E. R. Johnson and C. J. W. Meadows also rendered excellent services.

VI. The Commissariat Department, under Major A. Mackenzie, assisted by Captain C. Case and Lieutenant C. Hallett, maintained its high character in the face of difficulties which I believe to be without precedent in the annals of Indian expeditions. The staff at his disposal was insufficient for the long line of communication, and a great deal of the work of the department had to be done by officers commanding posts, yet little was left to be desired, and Major Mackenzie is entitled to my hearty acknowledgments for the untiring energy and the cordiality with which he carried out my plans and wishes.

VII. The Survey Department, under Major J. Macdonald, Deputy Surveyor General, with whom was associated Captain H. C. B. Tanner, Assistant Surveyor General, achieved results which I have already referred to, and which Major Macdonal's report more fully describes. These officers were almost invariably present with the head quarters of the brigade, and, in addition to their other duties, afforded me much valuable advice and assistance. Major Macdonald attached himself to the 2nd Goorkhas throughout the campaign, and took part with them in all their encounters with the enemy.

VIII. The Coolie Corps, under Major G. A. Brown, on which so much depended, surpassed my highest expectation. Notwithstanding sickness, and the continued strain on their powers, the men, particularly the Punjabees, laboured to the end with a spirit and discipline that reflected the greatest credit on Major Brown, who was ably assisted by Captain C. H. Palmer.

IX. The Hill Coolie Corps, employed on the canoe service between Burkhul and Demagirie, which at one time threatened to break down, owing to the desertion of the men, was brought into perfect working order by Captain F. H. Hood, and I am much indebted to him, and to Mr. Cochran, the Deputy Commissioner Hill Tracts, who, under great difficulties, kept up the coolies to the required strength, for their exertions in the matter of vital importance to the force.

X. The telegraph line to Demagiri was rapidly erected under the orders of Mr. Flindell, superintendent, assisted by Mr. Hare. It proved of the greatest service, and has throughout been most efficiently worked.

30. In addition to Captain Lewin, whose political services I have before acknowledged, and Mr. H. Hankey, the Commissioner, to whose energetic measures of assistance and unflagging interest in its welfare the expedition owes so much, I would beg specially to recommend to the notice of his Excellency the Commander in Chief and the Government of India, the following officers:—

Colonel H. T. Macpherson, C.B., V.C., 2nd Goorkhas, whose services, and those of the officers and men of the distinguished regiment he commands, are recorded in almost every page of my reports, and to whose high character and reputation I feel I can add nothing. Lieutenant Colonel J. Doran, Commanding 27th Punjab Infantry, and Lieutenant Colonel J. A. Tyler, V.C., Commanding 4th Goorkhas, who, in addition to the charge of their own corps, exercised important commands on the line of operations, and who gave me the most active support throughout. Lieutenant Colonel J. Hills, V.C., Commanding Peshawur Mountain Battery, who with his guns played a prominent part in the campaign. Major A. Mackenzie, Assistant Commissary General, Major G. A. Brown, Commanding Coolie Corps, Major J. Macdonald, Deputy Surveyor General, and Surgeon Major F. F. Allen, Senior Medical Officer, all whose names are mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, acknowledging the services and efficiency of their respective corps and departments. Major D. Macintyre and Captain A. B. Battye, 2nd Goorkha Regiment, and Lieutenant R. Maxwell Hyslop, R.E., who have been so frequently noticed in my periodical despatches.

Finally, I would beg to commend to his Excellency's protection my own staff, whose labours and anxieties for the last six months have been incessant, viz., Captain C. J. East, Assistant Quartermaster General, whose services have been second to those of no other officer under my command. I need only refer to the nature of the expedition, and the constant movements of troops and coolies up and down a long line of communication by road, river, and sea, to show what the duties of his department have been; to the clear-

ness, promptness, and tact with which those duties were carried out, as well as to the active assistance in the field rendered me by this able and accomplished officer, I am indebted for any measure of success that may have attended the operations of the column.

Captain C. E. Bates, Brigade Major, to whose energy, ability, and official experience as such I can bear the highest testimony, and who also rendered valuable service in the Quartermaster General's Department in the Southern Howlong expedition, where he was the only staff officer present with me, and when detached from head quarters, both at the beginning and close of the campaign, for the purpose of facilitating the movements of troops.

Captain J. G. Cockburn, my Aide-de-Camp, who, in addition to his own duties, which he discharged with a zeal and intelligence worthy of a higher post, made himself most useful in signalling, and by his previous experience on the Brigade Staff, both in quarters and in the field, added materially to my assistance in every department of the command.

(No. 480 of 1872.)

GENERAL ORDER by his Excellency the Governor General of India in Council, Military Department, Fort William, 30 April 1872.

His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General in Council is pleased to direct the publication of the accompanying letter from the Quarter Master General, dated the 26th instant, forwarding, by direction of his Excellency the Commander in Chief, copies of despatches from Brigadier Generals G. Bourchier, C.B., and C. H. Brownlow, C.B., commanding respectively the left (or Cachar) column, and the right (or Chittagong) column of the Looshai Expeditionary Force, detailing the operations carried out under their command, which have resulted in the successful accomplishment of the objects which led the Government of India to organise and despatch the force.

The Governor General in Council concurs with the Commander in Chief in highly appreciating the excellent services which have been performed, and desires cordially to congratulate his Excellency on the satisfactory conclusion of an expedition which owes much to the thoughtful and unremitting interest his Lordship has throughout taken in the operations.

His Excellency in Council wishes also to acknowledge the material assistance rendered by his Honor the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal and the officers employed under his Honor's orders, especially Mr. Hankey, Commissioner of Chittagong, in applying the resources of the province in aid of the military requirements.

To Brigadier Generals Bourchier and Brownlow, the Governor General in Council offers his sincere thanks for the great skill and energy they have displayed in the conduct of the troops under their command, in the face of great difficulties, and for which they have so justly received and merited the marked commendation of the Commander in Chief.

To Lieutenant Colonel F. S. Roberts, V.C., and Captain C. J. East, of the Quartermaster General's Department, the two senior army staff officers with each column, and who are both very specially mentioned; to that experienced officer, Deputy Inspector General of Hospitals, H. B. Buckle, C.B., and Surgeon Major F. F. Allen, the heads of the Medical Department; to Lieutenant Colonel R. Davidson and Major A. Mackenzie of the Commissariat; to Captains H. Thomson and C. E. Bates, Brigade Majors to the columns; and to the other officers of the staff and of departments accompanying the force, the Governor General in Council desires to convey an expression of his appreciation of their valuable services.

It further affords the Governor General in Council high gratification to express entire concurrence in the testimony borne by the Commander in Chief to the efficient and zealous support afforded to their generals by the officers commanding regiments and corps, as named in the margin, and his Excellency in Council cordially recognises the unfailing cheerfulness and good conduct of all ranks under circumstances of much fatigue and exertion. The Governor General in Council especially thanks all those who are named by their commanders.

Left (or Cachar) Column.

Captain G. F. Blackwood, Royal Artillery, Commanding half battery of the Peshawur Mountain Train.
Captain E. Harvey, Royal Engineers, Commanding No. 1 Company Sappers and Miners.
Colonel W. J. F. Stafford, Commandant 22nd (Punjab) Regiment Native Infantry.
Colonel T. Rattray, C.S.I., Commandant 42nd (Assam) Native Light Infantry.
Lieut. Colonel J. M. Nuttall, Commanding Advance Wing, 44th (Sylhet) Native Light Infantry.

Right (or Chittagong) Column.

Lieut. Colonel J. Hills, V.C., Royal Artillery, Commanding Royal Artillery.
Lieut. R. M. Hyslop, Commandant No. 3 Company Sappers and Miners.
Colonel H. T. Macpherson, C.B., V.C., Commandant 2nd Goorkha Regiment.
Lieut. Colonel J. Doran, Commandant 27th (Punjab) Regiment Native Infantry.
Lieut. Colonel J. A. Tytler, V.C., Commandant 4th Goorkha Regiment.

His Excellency in Council desires to convey to Mr. Edgar and Captain Lewin, who accompanied the force in a civil capacity, a full expression of approbation for the valuable services rendered, and not less for their cordial co-operation with the military commanders.

The valuable results of the labours of the officers of the Survey Department under Major Macdonald are fully appreciated by the Governor General in Council.

The successful construction and maintenance by the Telegraph Department of its lines of communication demands full recognition.

The

The Governor General in Council has pleasure in acknowledging the zeal and ability of Major Moore, whose exertions were most successful, Major Brown and Captain Hedayut Ali, who organised and superintended the transport coolie corps, whose services were so valuable to the Expedition, and his Excellency in Council fully recognises the good service of the police under Mr. Daly and Mr. Crouch.

The approbation of the Government of India will be communicated through the proper department to the Rajah of Munnipoor for the ready assistance rendered by him to the British Government in furtherance of the object of the Expedition.

The Governor General in Council will have much gratification in bringing the services of all concerned to the favourable notice of Her Majesty's Government.

(No. 657 P., dated Fort William, 16th March 1872.)

From *H. Le Poer Wynne*, Esq., Under Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal.

THE operations of the Looshai Expeditionary Force having now been brought to a conclusion, I am to state that the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council will be glad, at the early convenience of his Honor the Lieutenant Governor, to receive a final report of the expedition of the nature indicated in the concluding words in paragraph 3 in resolution from this office, dated 11th July, which was communicated to the Bengal Government by docket, No. 1646 P.

2. It would, I am to state, be well that this report should include an account of the measures taken by the Rajah of Tipperah in the way of co-operation with the expedition.

(No. 658 P., dated Fort William, 16th March 1872.)

From *H. Le Poer Wynne*, Esq., Under Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Officiating Political Agent, Munnipoor.

THE operation of the Looshai Expeditionary Force having now been brought to a conclusion, I am to state that the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council will be glad, at your early convenience, to receive a final report of the part taken in the way of co-operation by the Munnipoor Contingent.

(No. 22, dated Camp Eksuree, 25th March 1872.)

From *A. W. B. Power*, Esq., Political Agent, Hill Tipperah, to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department.

I HAVE the honour to report my return from a tour along the south-eastern frontier of Hill Tipperah, of which the following is a short account.

2. Our party consisted of a subadar, a havildar, and 20 sepoys. We started from here on the 13th, and marched in a south-westerly direction; the night was spent in the jungle. Next day, after a fatiguing march of eight hours along the course of a stream, we reached a Tipperah village, where we stopped for the night. I made inquiries as to the whereabouts of some Chuckma and Mugh coolies who absconded from the right column and are supposed to have taken refuge in Hill Tipperah. Nothing was known of them here.

3. Next day we marched about eight hours in the direction of Ramghur, and stopped for the night in a Tipperah village. Shortly after noon on the 16th we reached Ramghur.

4. Here we remained during the 17th (Sunday). I took this opportunity of going into the question of tolls on the Fenny, concerning which there has been some correspondence between the Commissioner of Chittagong and the Raja. The matter in dispute has, I hear, been temporarily settled since; but as the existing arrangements are, I think, unsatisfactory, I propose shortly to submit a separate report on the whole question.

5. The Raja's police have been searching for the coolies who absconded, but hitherto without success; the officer in charge of the Ramghur (Government) Police Station can give no clue to their whereabouts.

6. There is another matter brought to my notice at Ramghur which requires some remarks. It seems that the River Fenny is the acknowledged boundary as regards present

possession between Hill Tipperah and the Chittagong Hill Tracts. A considerable number of Tipperahs for various reasons have left Hill Tipperah and settled in Government territory. Many of these villagers, as well as some Chuckmas or Mugs, have cut "jooms" in the Hill Tipperah side of the Fenny, and refuse to pay the raja any rent for them. A list of 11 Chowdhrees was given to me, some of whom, it is alleged, paid rent regularly hitherto, but have refused to do so this year. Subsequently I ascertained that the facts, as stated, are substantially correct; but the Chowdhrees, Chuckmas, &c., refuse to pay, because, they say, even if they do so, the officials sent to collect the rent pocket the amount themselves, and report to the raja that the villagers have refused to pay. I propose to report at length on this question after communicating with Captain Lewin; meantime I directed the raja's officials to refrain from interfering with "jooms" already cut.

7. On the 18th we marched northwards to Sabrong-Magrong, where there is a guard of about 20 Tipperah peons, called "Benindeas," armed with old flint muskets. The next day, still marching northwards, we reached Pulamuwa, where there is a guard similar to that at Sabrong-Magrong but somewhat stronger. From the top of the hill there is a splendid view of the Fenny valley. I could see the villages in Government territory, and some of the "jooms" on the raja's side. There are no villages belonging to the raja between the Pulamuwa range and the Fenny; but on the Government side of the river the villages lie along the bank for three days' journey north of Ramghur.

8. The path from Pulamuwa to Eksuree through the hills is a long round, and very bad for marching, lying mostly along the beds of mountain streams. I determined, therefore, to take the direct path along the Government side of the Fenny, notwithstanding the fears of the Tipperahs, who made sure that they would be carried off, and never return to their homes. Their apprehension, however, was nothing compared to that caused by our appearance in the Tipperah villages in Government territory. All these villages are inhabited by former ryots of the raja; they absconded owing chiefly to the high rent they had to pay, the heavy duty on cotton, and the "dustoree" and "salamee" levied from them by the officials sent to collect the rent. They were, however, re-assured by our passing on quietly; the Chuckmas and Mughs readily understood our object, and showed us the way without hesitation. In the evening we reached a village belonging to Kristo Chunder Thakoor, the furthest north in a direct line from Ramghur and close to the source of the Fenny. Kristo Chunder is a relation of the raja's; he was found guilty of several murders at Agurtollah many years ago, and sentenced to imprisonment for life. Having managed to effect his escape, he took refuge in Government territory, and has remained there ever since. Such is the current story, but I cannot vouch for the facts. He was not at home, but his mukhtar received us; the latter is a relation of Kangalee, the Tipperah Head Constable of Police, who accompanies me, and also of a sepoy, who was one of our party. He did his best to get us a guide to show us the way to Eksuree, which is less than a day's journey from there, but nothing would induce any one to volunteer; the villagers were persuaded that I was the raja's private agent, and that I had brought the sepoys to take all that could be induced to step over the boundary to Agurtollah as prisoners.

9. The next morning the mukhtar himself brought us to a village to the north-east, where the promise of a "bucksheesh" procured four guides for us in five minutes. Here we dismissed the mukhtar with a gratification, and no doubt by this time confidence is restored in his village. Our guides were Tipperahs, of the Kali Nawaitye tribe. I strongly suspect that their abode is the "independent Chuckma village," which so frightened the coolies who were to go to Gungaram. (I alluded to the circumstance in my No. 20, dated the 13th instant.) It is about three-quarters of a day's march from Choupphoo, and no doubt our Tipperah scouts saw the "jooms" belonging to it, and, not expecting to find Government villages so far north, came to the conclusion that it was independent. We reached Choupphoo the same evening, having been compelled to abandon the direct route to Eksuree.

10. The next day (the 22nd) we reached Eksuree. I found a good number of sick, notably the native doctor, who had a sharp attack of dysentery. I sent him off to Comillah with all the sick.

11. I have allowed 20 men to return to Agurtollah, and in a day or so I go with the remainder of the contingent to Odeypoor, leaving a garrison of Benindeas and Feringhees (30 in all) to look after the stockade. At Odeypoor I shall await further orders.

(No. 26, dated Commillah, 4th April 1872.)

From *A. W. B. Power*, Esq., Political Agent, Hill Tipperah, to the Officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department.

In reply to your No. 1898, dated the 20th ultimo, I have the honour to submit the following report of the action taken by the Rajah of Hill Tipperah in the Looshai expedition, and, as directed, append an account of the hill tribes subject to the rajah's control, whether real or nominal.

2. When

2. When it was signified to the Rajah that he might be called on to furnish a contingent to co-operate with the expeditionary force, he promptly placed his sepoys at my disposal, and spared no expense in endeavouring to secure their efficiency. Subsequently, in giving effect to the orders of Government, 100 men were chosen to form the main body of the contingent, while the remainder, about 200, were distributed among the various thannahs along the frontier.

3. The contingent having been placed under the command of Brigadier General Brownlow, C.B., commanding the Chittagong Column, I wrote to that officer for orders regarding its disposal. He replied that the contingent would be most usefully employed in guarding the eastern frontier of Hill Tipperah against a possible attack while the column was in the Looshai country, and recommended a series of patrols to reach, if possible, as far as Khagorea or Gungaram.

4. Measures were taken for the protection of the north-eastern frontier as described in my No. 27, dated the 23rd November 1871, and in the month of October proceedings commenced in the south-east by working parties being sent out to construct godowns and huts at the following places: (1) Odeypore; (2) Omersagar; (3) Jarimura; (4) Eksuree; (5) Choupphoo; (6) Tulamura; and, (7) Subroog-Mugroog. Supplies were also collected, but from want of system and experience on the part of the persons who were entrusted with the commissariat arrangements, matters were greatly mismanaged at first.

5. On the 23rd December 1871 the main body of the contingent left Agurtollah, and proceeded to Commillah; thence by boat to Odeypore, where it remained a few days to allow some supplies to be sent ahead; leaving Odeypore on the 5th January 1872, it arrived at Omersagar the next day. Here we had to stop 10 days as our supplies ran short, and there were none further on. The rajah was much annoyed by the conduct of his subordinates; he sent them a warning all round, and from that time everything was to be had in profusion. On the 16th we reached Eksuree, which was fixed upon as head-quarters. On the 19th a patrol party went to Choupphoo, where there were traces of a recent visit, most probably from Kookie scouts. The party followed their footsteps for some miles north eastwards through the jungle, but soon lost the track.

6. Returning to Eksuree we commenced to construct a stockade of stout trees faced with bamboo *chevaux de frise* and with earthworks breast high. The stockade is a very large one, and was not completed till the middle of March. Meantime patrols went to Jarimura and to the Doomra Falls, and parties of Jamaityas (the fighting caste of Tipperahs) were constantly going two or three days' march in the direction of the Syloos, and in the supposed direction of Gungaram, but they never succeeded in finding the latter place.

7. I calculated from the map that Gungaram must be about five days' journey from Choupphoo, so I determined to take 40 men five days' march in that direction, in the hope of hitting upon the locality. The men were told off and supplies sent to Choupphoo on the 5th March. All was ready on the 7th, but during the night every coolie in the place absconded. I have explained how this was managed, and the cause for the panic, in my No. 20, dated the 13th March last. It being impossible to collect a number of coolies sufficient to carry out the original project within a reasonable time, the plan had to be given up.

8. On the 13th a patrol party started from Eksuree and reached Ramghur after four days' march. It returned by Subroog-Mugroog, Tulamura, and Choupphoo in five days. An account of this patrol was given in my No. 22, dated the 25th March last. It is now clear that by marching due south from Choupphoo for one day, communications can be opened with Gungaram through inhabited Government territory; whereas by going straight from point to point as we intended, we should have met nothing but jungle.

9. The presence of the contingent restored confidence among the Tipperahs to a considerable degree. During the raid in the south last year, 22 villages were utterly destroyed, and five suffered severely, 23 persons, mostly women and children having been killed, and, by a curious coincidence, exactly the same number having been taken prisoners. Of those who escaped some took to living on rafts, ready to flee at a moment's notice; others moved westwards, and picked up a precarious livelihood by selling forest produce. These persons are coming back by degrees, and some of the boldest are prepared to work a "joom" this year at Eksuree.

10. In concluding this portion of the report, I would beg to bring to notice the excellent spirit prevalent generally among the men who composed the contingent, notably among the Goorkhas. Fate willed that the contingent should have no opportunity of distinguishing itself in any marked manner, but I think it is to the men's credit that they did their duty as far as in them lay.

11. It may not be out of place here to mention that the Rajah sent 107 coolies to fill up the vacancies in Captain Heday Ali's corps; he advanced them 1,054 rupees, and declines to be reimbursed that amount, professing himself satisfied with the robakari of thanks sent to him by the Collector of Sylhet.

12. In dealing with the question of the Rajah's authority in the east, I beg to observe that I have personal acquaintance with the south-eastern frontier only. All the knowledge

I possess regarding the inhabitants of the north-east is derived from the accounts of others, who are, however, presumably well acquainted with them. I have arranged to visit the north-eastern part of Hill Tipperah before the rains, and shall therefore soon be in a position to write from personal observation.

13. The hill tribes of Tipperah are divided into two distinct races, the Tipperahs and the Kookies. They differ from each other in language, custom, and religion, but are capable of amalgamation without much difficulty on the score of caste. The Tipperahs are divided into four classes: (1) the Pure (Asl) Tipperahs, *i.e.*, the stock from which the rajah's family has sprung; (2) the Jamaityas; (3) the Nowaityas; (4) the Riangs. The pure Tipperahs are again sub-divided into five or six castes, differing but slightly from each other, and having reference to the duties they are severally obliged to perform according to immemorial custom. The Jamaityas are the fighting caste; they are bound to assemble and take the field for the rajah whenever there is any need of active service. As an equivalent they are excused from forced coolie labour, a privilege of which they are very tenacious, and the infringement of which caused a serious rebellion about 10 years ago. The Jamaityas are sub-divided, much like the pure Tipperahs, into five or six classes, differing slightly from each other. The Riangs are considered the lowest class, perhaps also the most useful. In them we commence to see an affinity with the Kookies. There are several subdivisions, differing from each other in minute and unimportant particulars only. In this class we begin to lose sight of caste as an institution.

14. Intermarriage among the Riangs and Kookies gave rise to a class called Hálám, subdivided into Ramkhol, Kypeng, Morsum, and Koloi. All these can intermarry with Kookies or with Riangs, and other Tipperahs may intermarry with Riangs (such marriages are, however, rare), and thus the two races may possibly coalesce in process of time.

15. The Kookies in Hill Tipperah do not seem to differ in any way from each other, though known by distinguishing names. In the north are the Dolong and Chorai Kookies; in the south the Chithang and Khypeng; their language, religion, &c. is said to be exactly the same as that of the Looshais, who are known here by the name of "Kutcha Kookies," or "Koozaks."

16. Of the rajah's nominal authority it is difficult to speak with any exactness. The eastern boundary in the olden times is supposed to have been Burmah; till lately much of the Looshai country was vaguely spoken of as being within the rajah's territory, and when it was known that there was to be an expedition, a suggestion was thrown out, probably as a feeler, that the boundary should be fixed as follows: In a straight line from Ramghur to to Ruttun Pooea's territory, then northwards along the range of hills west of Byparee Bazar, and so on straight to Chutter Choora. It was expected, it seems, that Government would reduce the Looshais to subjection, and leave a permanent force in the country. The territory over which the rajah has a *bonâ fide* nominal control is bounded on the east by a range of hills running southward from Chutter Choora to Sorpheul Peak, and from there in a zigzag line to Surdaing. On the east of this line the Looshai land commences, and on the west there is a much uninhabited and unexplored jungle.

17. North of Amlighatta the Fenny is the acknowledged boundary between Hill Tipperah and the Chittagong Hill Tracts. The rajah ceases to have any control over a subject of his who has once crossed the river and settled on the left bank, and I doubt whether he can produce even the shadow of a claim for the proposed continuation of his boundary on the south.

18. There is no communication, either openly, or, as far as I am aware, in secret, between any of the hill tribes in the south and the Looshais. In fact, there are no Kookies anywhere near the south-eastern boundary. There are many sites of old Kookie villages about Eksuree and Choupphoo, notably at some salt springs near the Doomra Falls, but the Kookies there absconded and became "Kutcha" about 20 years ago. A few who were prevented from going were deported to the neighbourhood of Odeypore, where they still are.

19. On the north it is said that marriages are still common between the Dalong Kookies and those who are independent, and that visits are frequently made by the "Kutcha Kookies" to the Dalongs and Chorois, but all these matters are arranged quietly and unobtrusively, so that no information goes beyond the tribes immediately concerned. These Kookies pay considerably less rent than the Tipperahs; in some instances merely presenting nuzzers of ivory, cattle, &c. in token of subjection. They are separated from the "Kutcha Kookies" by a belt of uninhabited jungle, and at present there is no known tribe between the acknowledged subjects of the rajah and the actually independent Kookies.

20. I greatly regret that the information given in the preceding paragraph cannot be entirely relied on, being merely what I have been able to pick up from persons acquainted with the hills, but I could not delay this report till after my visit to Koilashur.

(No. 2731.—Judicial Department.—Judicial.)

From *A. Mackenzie*, Esq., Junior Secretary to the Government of Bengal, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

Sir, Calcutta, 29 April 1872.

I AM directed to acknowledge receipt of your letter, No. 892 P., of the 12th instant, intimating that the post, the temporary establishment of which the Governor General in Council has been pleased to sanction, is the same as that recommended by Colonel Brownlow and the Lieutenant Governor on the Demagiri Range. The Lieutenant Governor, immediately on becoming aware of the intention of the Government of India, gave instructions to Captain Lewin to proceed forthwith to occupy the post in question with all the men available from the existing force of the Hill Tracts. The Commissioner of Chittagong was at the same time informed by telegraph of the proposed step, and was requested to make all preliminary arrangements pending Captain Lewin's arrival from Calcutta. The Lieutenant Governor is, however, disappointed to find from telegrams and demi-official letters received from the Commissioner, that great, if not insuperable, difficulties lie in the way of the immediate establishment of the post in question. It appears that all the necessary barracks, stockades, and other buildings for a force of 100 men have been already erected at Rutton Pooea's present village, and that it would be very difficult to provide shelter on the new site before the setting-in of the rains, which are now daily expected. It is reported further, that the provisions left at Rutton Pooea's village by the commissariat are bad and unfit for consumption, the rice being full of insects, and the atta and ghee turning sour. The boat service above Burkhal had also been dispersed, and altogether the difficulties in the way of providing shelter and provisions for the post before the rains are so great, that the Lieutenant Governor has been reluctantly compelled to agree that if the Sirthay Tlang (the true name of the Demagiri Range) cannot be occupied at once, the local authorities must do what they can to maintain the guard at Rutton Pooea's present village during the rains at its full strength of 100 men, moving out to occupy the new site as soon as practicable in October or November. Captain Lewin has left for Chittagong with general instructions to take charge of his district, and do as much as he can in pushing matters forward.

2. I am to take this opportunity of forwarding, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a report by Captain Lewin on the late expedition and our future policy in the hills, with a covering letter* from Mr. Hankey, the Commissioner of Chittagong, in whose views the Lieutenant Governor generally agrees. His Honor will, however, defer the detailed expression of his opinion until he is in possession of Colonel Brownlow's report, and of correct maps of the country, which are now, it is understood, in preparation.

* No. 1, dated 1st instant.

(No. 1, dated Chittagong, 1st April 1872.)

From *H. Hankey*, Esq., Officiating Commissioner of the Chittagong Division, to the Officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department.

REFERRING to Government letter, No. 1897, dated 20th March, I have the honour to submit the accompanying two letters from Captain Lewin. It will be seen that, for unavoidable reasons, the report is incomplete, and that the whole of the information desired by the Government cannot, at present, be supplied. As, however, the discussions on Looshai policy will probably take place during the ensuing week, when the Brigadier General is in Calcutta, I have thought it better to submit the reports at once, rather than delay for the completion of the information.

2. The only remarks that seem to be called for from me relate to the bearing of the results of the expedition upon our future policy, and on this question I have already expressed myself, when reporting upon the establishment of the guard in Rutton Pooea's village. I will, however, take this opportunity of briefly expressing my views on the subject, and showing how far I agree with Captain Lewin, and at what precise point our opinions cease to coincide.

3. In the first place, then, it must be conceded that it is absolutely necessary to do something. The success achieved by the expedition has been only partial; it has supplied the means to a successful termination, but has not effected any final results in itself. It is true, that, in a military point of view, the success achieved by our arms has been unquestionable and complete; but unless we do what this success has enabled us to do, and follow it up by a policy of action, its effects will be transient, and will speedily pass away, and we shall gradually drift into the same state of things which preceded the expedition, and which

is so forcibly described by Captain Lewin in the 4th paragraph of his most able and succinct report.

4. Having then established the absolute necessity of action of some kind, the next point is to determine first the specific object we have in view, and then the best means of attaining it. Unquestionably, then, I think the grand, and I had almost said the one, object in view is the security of our frontier. We do not desire annexation; we do not wish to extend our boundary line, or to assume jurisdiction over one inch of country that we do not at present exercise rights of ownership over; but what we do insist upon is, that there shall be peace within those limits; that our subjects shall be able to enjoy property and follow avocations of trade or agriculture free from apprehension of raids by savage tribes.

5. To effect this end I cannot conceive any scheme or measure that has more to recommend it than that advocated by Brigadier General Brownlow, viz., the establishment of a strong police post on the Demagiri Range, close to the side of Rutton Pooea's old village, which would patrol the whole range from that point down to the Blue Mountain on the Arracan frontier. The line should then be carried on by the Burmese Government, and it is then thought that the whole of our present stockades might be given up. A reference to the map will at once show the peculiar recommendations this site possesses as a post of observation.

6. Whatever view may be taken of the probable success of this scheme as a measure of defence, it must be remembered that it does not stand or fall according to the verdict given from this single point of view. It is not only a defensive measure, it is also a political, and in this lies more than half its merits. Its advantages as a measure of policy far outweigh its advantages as a measure of defence. Compared with a system of detached outposts, the establishment of one strong post in a commanding position, from which it is possible to patrol for long distances at all seasons, may be, and no doubt is, preferable. I confess myself, however, somewhat sceptical of any system of pure defence being by itself alone sufficient to prevent raids if savage tribes are really determined on raiding; I mean, of course, without incurring a very lavish expenditure. The most vigilant guards or patrols will occasionally slumber, and along a long line of country at some point or other raiders could slip through and escape detection.

7. I have far more faith in the eventual pacification of the tribes, which I believe will be the sure and certain result of more frequent intercommunication with ourselves and the gradual development of trade. Such a result is possible, or rather inevitable, by the establishment of a strong post on the site proposed, and I would call prominent attention to one of its chief recommendations, viz., that it enables us to communicate with the tribes direct, instead of through the medium of Rutton Pooea.

8. I would also ask that particular attention be directed to the nature and character of the tribes themselves. General Brownlow, who has had considerable experience of the warlike tribes over north-west frontier, appears particularly impressed with this fact, and the paramount importance of its bearing upon the question of policy. I completely concur in his views, which have been given by Captain Lewin in the 30th paragraph of his report. It appears to me impossible to adopt one hard and fast rule of policy in dealing with savage tribes without taking into consideration the character of the tribes to whom the policy is to be applied.

9. It has never been claimed for the line of posts that they have any political object. Their advisability must therefore be considered from the single point of view of a defensive measure, and in this light their success would seem to be uncertain. It might, perhaps, be almost doubted whether they do not form a source of weakness and invite attacks. Witness the late attack on Pyndoo, and that of the previous year on Chyma.

10. Captain Lewin, in the 28th paragraph of his report, advocates the establishment of a bazar at Demagiri, and I cordially support his recommendation. The bazar at Kassalong is altogether too far off to be of any practical value as a centre of communication, and I believe that the effectual pacification of the tribes will be accomplished more through the medium of trade than by any other influence.

11. So far, then, I am entirely in accord with Captain Lewin. I disagree with him, however, in thinking that the duties of the proposed frontier officer are compatible with those of the Deputy Commissioner, Hill Tracts; and that if he were appointed, he could also retain this appointment. The administration of the Hill Tracts affords ample occupation for the Deputy Commissioner and his assistants during the cold weather, and he would be wanted in his own district for the entire period when I should expect the best seed of the frontier officer's appointment to be sown. Personal communication and acquaintance with the tribes and their chiefs is one of the principal objects of the appointment, and the season when this could best be cultivated is the cold weather. It would be highly unadvisable for the frontier officer to absent himself during this season.

12. In future years the appointment might very well be held by a junior officer subordinate to the Deputy Commissioner, but for the first year an exceptional arrangement would have to be made, and Captain Lewin should himself be nominated to the appointment if it is created. He would, of course, be subordinate to the Commissioner, and not to the Deputy Commissioner.

Commissioner. Captain Lewin's abilities peculiarly fit him for such an appointment, and indeed it would be difficult to select an officer with higher qualification, or one in every respect more specially fitted for the special duties of the position.

13. Captain Lewin would, however, propose, with a view to render the amalgamation of the two offices possible, to curtail very considerably the existing boundaries of the Hill Tracts, by throwing a great portion of them into regulation Chittagong. As far as I can understand, he would throw off all that portion from which any administrative work of any sort arises, and leave little else but political duties behind. I do not imagine that this proposal would meet with approval, and I therefore think it sufficient merely to mention it and to record my dissent from any such project.

14. I had intended to have expressed my views more fully on the subjects treated of in this letter, but, as it must go by the mail steamer, I am reluctantly compelled to abridge it. I trust, however, I have said enough to show the general tenor of my opinion.

(No. 25, dated Chittagong, the 28th March 1872.)

From Captain *T. H. Lewin*, Civil Officer, Right Column, Looshai Expedition, to the Commissioner of Chittagong.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith, for submission to the Government of Bengal, my final report on the operations of the right column Looshai Expedition.

2. The Government letter, No. 1897, dated 20th instant, forwarded to my address under cover of your memorandum, No. 1080, dated 27th instant, reached me subsequent to the completion of the enclosed report, and I therefore propose to furnish the supplementary information required as far as lies in my power, in this letter.

3. Our dealings with, and present relations towards, such tribes as we were brought into contact with have been already related by me in detail in my weekly diaries, and are recapitulated and summarised in the final report herewith submitted. I regret that I am unable to furnish maps as called for by the Lieutenant Governor. I endeavoured on several occasions to procure some such sketch maps as are now called for, but the survey officers attached to the expedition were not then in a position to supply my wants. On reaching Calcutta, however, I shall with pleasure obtain maps from the Surveyor General, and mark out all that is known to me of the geographical position of the tribes.

4. With regard to the people and country between Cachar and Chittagong, I am of course only in a position to speak positively of such portion thereof as came within the sphere of observation of the right column. There are no tribes between Sookpilal and the Kurnafoolee river in a northerly direction with whom we have not had relations.

5. The limits of Sookpilal's authority are conterminous,—south with the "joom" boundaries of the chief Laljeeka, son of Savoonga, the head of the Syloo tribe; east with those of Lalbura and Jo-htoma, Howlong chiefs; while to the west his tribe is supposed to join, and have relations with certain Kookie clans living within the bounds of Hill Tipperah. I know nothing of the country north of Sookpilal's clan.

6. I can furnish more detailed information as to the western neighbours of Sookpilal on resuming charge of the Hill Tracts, when I shall have round me men who are acquainted with that part of the country. I would suggest meantime that the political officer, Hill Tipperah, would probably be able to furnish valuable information on the subject.

(No. 22, dated Chittagong, the 26th March 1872).

From Captain *T. H. Lewin*, Civil Officer, Right Column, Looshai Expedition, to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Calcutta.

IN compliance with the directions contained in the concluding portion of paragraph 3, Proceedings of the Government of India, Foreign Department, Political, No. 1645 P., dated Simla, the 4th August 1871, forwarded under cover of your letter No. 5244, dated 19th October 1871, I have the honour to submit, as required, the final report on the operations of the right column Looshai Expedition in as far as relates to the political aspects of the campaign.

2. The object of the expedition against the Looshais, which has just been concluded, was not solely that of retaliation; for although punishment was, if possible, to be meted out to

the guilty participators in the late raids on Cachar, a still more important end to be gained was the deliverance of British subjects carried away into captivity; while paramount to both these considerations was the necessity for conducting our operations with a view to establishing permanently the security of our frontier.

3. At the very commencement of operations in November last year, difficulties of some importance were encountered at the outset; the knowledge we possessed of the Looshais, of their language and customs, was very imperfect; and throughout the whole of the Chittagong frontier line but six men were found capable of acting as interpreters. The information possessed by the civil authorities as to the identity of the actual perpetrators of the raids was vague and incomplete, and our knowledge of the paths and local difficulties before us next to nothing. Never perhaps has an English force advanced into an enemy's country with less knowledge of what was before it, or with more uncertainty as to obtaining in any way the desired information.

4. The causes of this not unforeseen dilemma are easily appreciable. The local officers had no communication with the Looshais save once a year, when some few hundreds of them came to the annual méla held at Kassalong. The head-quarters of the Deputy Commissioner of the Chittagong Hill Tracts were from nine to twelve days' journey from the nearest Howlong and Syloo villages; no direct trade was carried on by our own tribes with the Lushais, save such desultory traffic as occurred at Kassalong; the Looshais themselves were strongly opposed to any of our people entering their territory, from the not unfounded idea that new diseases would be introduced among them by closer intercourse with us; and lastly, our ally Rutton Pooea reaped considerable advantages from being the sole intermediary between us and the other tribes; and therefore, by every means in his power, either of indirect opposition or passive resistance, sought to limit our knowledge of and dealings with the Looshai tribes in general.

5. At the commencement of operations, indeed it was a moot question whether the chief Rutton Pooea would not secede altogether from his friendly alliance with us and espouse the cause of his friends and relatives, the Howlongs. I had been informed that this course had been strongly urged upon him by his brother-in-law Vandoola, the principal chief of the southern Howlong tribes, while it was known to me also that the Syloos, with whom Rutton Pooea was not on good terms, had sent him intimidating messages as to results likely to be incurred by him if he assisted us in any way.

6. Eventually, however, he chose his course, and cast in his lot with us, his determination doubtless being somewhat influenced by the imposing display of force that soon began to assemble close to his village at Demagiri, and from that time forth until the close of the expedition he served us loyally and faithfully, accompanying the force personally, with a contingent of his own villagers, during the operations against the Syloos, and afterwards himself going out among the Howlong villages to urge upon them the desirability of submission. It was indirectly owing to Rutton Pooea that Mary Winchester was given up, and I attribute it directly to his influence that, in our subsequent advance upon both the Northern and Southern Howlongs, we were met with confidence by the chiefs, and a basis laid upon which terms could be imposed, and our future relations regulated.

7. It must, however, be remembered that by his loyal co-operation with us the chief Rutton Pooea, has drawn down upon himself the undying resentment of the Syloos, who assert, with some show of reason, that it was he who showed us the way to their country; while even the Howlongs cannot but attribute their humiliation to his agency, and will certainly bear him no goodwill for the part he has taken in the matter. Indeed, one of Saipooea's head men, in my presence (ignorant that I understood him), charged the chief with treachery in having brought the English forces to their village, contrary to his pledged word.

8. Rutton Pooea was fully aware of the danger and delicacy of his position, for, before our advance from Demagiri, he formally represented his difficulties to the General, and it was not until I had assured him with General Brownlow's concurrence) that at the close of the operations a guard should be left for his protection, that he became wholly and individually our friend.

9. The first advance of the force and head-quarters from its base at Demagiri was made against the Syloo tribe on the 9th December 1871. It was determined that our first movement should be directed against the Syloos, for the following reasons:

(1.) It was the most direct road to Sangboongâ's and Benkuiâ's, the only two Howlong chiefs who were positively known to have been concerned in the Cachar raids, and in whose possession was Mary Winchester.

(2.) There was strong presumptive evidence that the Syloos themselves had been concerned in the same raids.

(3.) Rutton Pooea was not on good terms with the Syloos, and would cordially co-operate in any movement against them, while his aid would probably have been but half-hearted had we in the first place determined to attack his own brother-in-law Saipoœa, who was the nearest of the Howlongs.

(4.) The

(4.) The route in question was better known, it presented greater facilities for the carriage of supplies, and from a military point of view was considered the most eligible for advance.

10. It was of course necessary, before carrying fire and sword through the Syloo country, to endeavour to open communication with them and invite their submission. To attain this end I had relied on two means, viz. the intermediarism of a chief of the Syloos, one Lemsiloung, who was an old acquaintance of mine, and over whom I believed I had considerable influence; and that of one of Rutton Pooea's subsidiary chiefs, by name Lengoora, who had married the daughter of Savoonga, the head chief of the Syloo tribe. Some days before our advance Lemsiloung had come in to me, but he had scarcely been a few hours in camp when he was seized by an unaccountable panic, and, starting up, fled naked into the jungles to re-appear no more.

11. On arriving before the nearest Syloo village therefore (that of Vanloola) on the 12th December, I sent Lengoora forward alone to the village, telling him clearly why we had come and what we wanted, to communicate with the inhabitants. He was absent only a short time and returned in some trepidation to inform me that no less than five of the Syloo chiefs were assembled there with their men, and that they were determined to oppose our advance; he had, he said, faithfully delivered my message, but they had only abused him in return, and he seemed to think he had had a narrow escape for his life; nor on any subsequent occasion could threats, promises, or cajolements, move Lengoora to serve a second time as our emissary. Within a short time of his return, I was myself fired upon by an ambush close to camp, and the Syloos having thus refused to treat, and thrown down the gauntlet of defiance, there was nothing left but to resort to sterner and more easily understood arguments. The village was therefore attacked and taken on the 14th of December.

12. From this date up to the 25th January 1872 the military operations of the force were continuous. Blow after blow was dealt in quick succession to the leaders of the tribe, and wherever any stand was attempted, our attacks were equally rapid and decisive.

13. From time to time the enemy would from a distance call out to us, sometimes at night to our sentries, at other times to parties of our men out foraging, to the effect that they wished us to discontinue our destroying course, and that their chiefs were coming in to make terms with us. To such messages a friendly reply was always given, but the parleyers were at the same time distinctly given to understand that our progress could only be stayed by the appearance of the chiefs themselves and their speedy compliance with our demands. No chiefs, however, came; neither did the Syloos, whenever occasion offered, desist from attempts to shoot our men. Under these circumstances the General, much against his will, had no option but to continue his course to the end.

14. Meantime I had sent emissaries of my own, accompanied by some of Rutton Pooea's men, to the chief Benkuiá, to demand his submission and the release of Mary Winchester. My messengers were obliged to make a long détour by the rear, as we were fast approaching Benkuiá's country, and if they had gone by the front, they saw great risk of being shot from an ambush as spies or enemies before they could have had time to give any explanation of their errand. The chief Benkuiá, whose village was now in sight on a distant hill, had had ample opportunity of marking the steady progress of the column in his direction, annotated as it was by burning villages, and on my messengers reaching him, he at once gave up Mary Winchester, reserving, however, all question as to submission or the release of the other captives in his possession. This he did evidently under the impression that Mary Winchester was the main cause of our invasion, and believing that, having recovered her, we should not think it worth while to advance any farther. He was known, moreover, to have expressed his disbelief in our ability to penetrate so far into the country as his village.

15. We had now reached the village of the chief Savoonga, and the punishment of the Syloo tribe was complete. The chief (Rutton Pooea) who had accompanied us thus far, had, on being pressed with regard to the Howlongs, oracularly replied that upon our arriving at the Tlong Doong (the Dullesur river) he would "open his mouth in council" (he also was apparently at one time doubtful of our ability to reach this spot); and we had now reached the appointed place. It was arranged, therefore, that I, accompanied by the chief, should advance with a small escort and open communication with the nearest Howlong village.

16. On the 13th January, therefore, I started with the chief, and made direct for the nearest village to the east. On approaching the place we saw people moving about, and hailed them; they responded, inquiring our business. But as soon as they learned who and what we were, they incontinently fired their houses, while the men armed themselves and showed every intention of offering resistance. The chief, Rutton Pooea, seemed much disconcerted at these unexpectedly hostile demonstrations, and strongly urged upon me that, under the circumstances, it would be unwise to proceed any further, as he said that undoubtedly the whole border land of the Howlongs was now filled with fugitive Syloos, and if by any accident we were brought into collision with the tribes in the Howlong country, or with any of the fugitives who had sought shelter with them, his future good offices as a mediator would be of no avail, and, war once declared, we should have no option but to commence a fresh campaign against the Howlongs, with a strong probability of being unable

to recover a single captive. On consideration I deemed the chief's reasons valid, and accordingly returned to camp, where, after consultation with the General, it was agreed to send Rutton Pooea round by the south, and thus attempt to open communication with the Howlong tribes. The next day, therefore, the chief departed on his errand, accompanied by Subadar Mahomed Azim, of the police, whom I thought it wise to attach to him as a species of moderator or impeller, as occasion might require.

17. A variety of causes combined now to keep us inactive for some days, chief among which was the unaccountable delay in the carrying out of Rutton Pooea's mission to the south; but, as the event showed, his efforts were well directed and the time not mis-spent. Having at length received intimation of the return of Rutton Pooea, and after in vain waiting for the appearance of chiefs or emissaries from the front, the General determined to advance, and accordingly, on the 12th February, the force crossed the Tlong Doong and entered the Howlong country.

18. I had instructed Rutton Pooea, before his departure for the south, to inform all the Howlong tribes that a white flag was universal sign of a desire for peace, and that any persons bearing such a flag would be respected, and allowed safe conduct through our lines. On crossing the Tlong, the first thing we encountered was a white flag, which the Howlongs had hung in mid-stream as a token of their desire for peace, and on the day following I was successful in opening communication with them through the medium of some men of Rutton Pooea's, whom I had retained with me. After this everything went smoothly, chief after chief came in, all telling the same story of their desire to submit and make peace. Example was contagious; for even the Syloos, who had lost everything they had in the world, and were past further injury at our hands, made their submission in a body.

19. The names of the different chiefs, and the dates on which they delivered up the captives in their possession and made their peace with Government, have been from time to time reported in the diaries which I have periodically submitted. The terms insisted upon were alike with all. They were briefly the surrender of all captives; an engagement on their part (ratified in the most solemn and binding manner which Looshai custom prescribes) to live for the future on terms of peace and amity with all British subjects from Munnipoor to Arracan (including Hill Tipperah), with free right of access to our people throughout their whole country. I append a list of the chiefs who have submitted to the British arms during this expedition.

20. I did not think it right to insist upon the giving of hostages for their future good behaviour:—

1st. As we had no means of ascertaining whether the persons they might offer in pledge were of sufficient social importance to be accepted.

2nd. Hostages could not be kept in durance, and these hillmen, wild as hawks, would certainly never voluntarily submit to expatriation.

3rd. Any hostages so taken would run great risk of illness and death if removed from the comparatively healthy hill country to the miasmatic terai of the hill tracts, and any such death would be sure to give rise to future complications.

21. Neither did I recommend to the General that any punishment should be inflicted upon Sangboonga and Benkuia, although they were known to have been concerned in the raids, for the simple reason that we were not in a position to inflict any. The grain and valuables of these chiefs had been all removed and placed in safety. We were fully able, it is true, to march through the length and breadth of their country, but beyond the loss of an empty village or two, which they would themselves burn, we could have inflicted no punishment upon them; while, on the other hand, we should not have recovered a single captive, nor obtained the submission of any one chief.

22. My ideas on this subject were fully justified by after results. The submission of the brothers Sangboonga and Benkuia, who were the first chiefs to come in, led, I believe, to the subsequent arrangements which were entered into with the whole of the great Howlong and Syloo tribes. When it was seen that two great chiefs had personally made terms and given up their captives; when it was found that the terms imposed were neither unjust nor oppressive; that the persons of the chiefs had been respected, and that no treachery on our part was intended, it became then simply a matter of time and distance as to what chiefs could first come in.

23. The Syloos, on being questioned as to their reasons for having opposed us, and for not having made peace before so much calamity had befallen them, replied that they had been afraid, not knowing our customs of warfare, and being only too well acquainted with our weapons. They said that the first collision at Belkai had been brought on by certain hot-headed young chiefs, and that the main body of the tribe had nothing to do with it, but that after war had once begun they were powerless to stop it, having, they said, no peacemaker.

24. Operations in the northern Howlong and Syloo countries being thus successfully terminated, the General then turned his attention to the south, the submission of the tribes there

there being all that was now required to render the work of the expedition complete. No difficulty was expected in this quarter, owing to the intimate relationship existing between Rutton Pooea and several of the leading chiefs. The course of events having been fully detailed in my diaries, it will be sufficient for me to say here that our expectations were fully realised, and after a short expedition, lasting some 10 days, the whole of the southern chiefs made their submission on the same terms as had been previously imposed on the northern tribes.

25. I have the honour to annex a nominal roll of the captives who have been released from durance by the right column Looshai Expedition. A noteworthy fact is apparent from the perusal of this list. It had originally been supposed that the raids made by these tribes along the whole line of frontier from Arracan to Cachar were attributable, not to any one section or tribe, but to bands of unruly spirits, drawn by inclination and at hazard from different villages, attracted by the desire for plunder or the love of adventure to the leadership of some favourite chief. Such, however, would seem not to be the case, as the list shows that the captives recovered were, without exception, carried off from such part of British territory as was most contiguous to the villages of the tribe in whose possession they were found. Thus the raids on the northern Hill Tracts and Arracan are attributable to the southern Howlongs and the Shindoos; the outrages on Cachar to the northern Howlongs and to the tribes of Poiboi and Lalboora, with which latter the left column have been dealing; while the inroads upon Hill Tipperah and the northern Hill Tracts are clearly traceable to the tribes of Rutton Pooea and the Syloo, whose tribal *habitat* is conterminous with those parts of British territory. (B.)

26. I also append some depositions taken from the captives given up by the chiefs Sangbooga and Benkuia, from which it will be seen that the Cachar raids were committed in concert with other chiefs to the north. In connection with this circumstance, it is deserving of mention that not a single Cachar captive has been recovered or heard of south of the villages belonging to Sangbooga and his brother. (C.)

27. A remarkable circumstance transpired with reference to the people held in captivity by the Looshais, viz., that all unite in describing the treatment they received as kind in the extreme. In no case has it been ascertained that any violence had been offered to a female captive, while, as the list shows, many of them have actually married, and becoming incorporated with the tribe, decline positively to be released. The captives given up by the Southern Howlongs had to be brought forcibly into the camp, and clung to their Looshai friends, weeping piteously and entreating that they might not be made over to us. Among the number of these suppliants was the wife and grown-up daughter of one of my own interpreters, and he was much disturbed by such an inopportune exhibition of unnatural feeling, ascribing it to Kookie magic. Magic, it is true, but I imagine that it was the white magic of kindness and human sympathy.

28. In addition to the captives actually released, some 250 persons, residents of the Hill Tracts, who had been compelled by menaces and fear of danger to leave our territory and seek the protection of Looshai chiefs, have taken the opportunity offered by the presence of our troops to return to their old haunts, casting off as it were the Kookie yoke. A considerable number of the Syloo tribe, and one entire Howlong village, have also expressed a wish to settle under my protection in the event of "my village," as they phrased it, being built on the Sirthay Tlang. The principal chiefs also, in the event of such a contingency, have promised to visit me, and they also asked that, for the greater convenience of trade, a bazaar might be established at Demagiri, alleging that the present market at Kassalong was situated at an inconveniently long distance from their villages.

29. The political results of the campaign have in my opinion been great and manifold, fully justifying the magnitude of the expedition, and affording every reason to hope that the permanent pacification of the frontier may be attained. The Looshai tribes have been forced to recognise the existence of a superior Power, able alike both to reward and punish; a firm and secure basis has been laid for our future relations with them, whether commercial or political; their whole country is open to us, and I believe that any European could now walk unarmed from one end to the other. The severe lesson that this year has taught them cannot, at any rate for some time, be forgotten, and a wise future policy on our part will render these tribes as inoccuous and peaceful as are now the once troublesome inhabitants of the Copyah and Jynteah Hills, or to carry the simile nearer home, our own Chittagong hill tribes. We have gained the entire confidence and allegiance of Rutton Pooea, and we have but to stretch out our hands to obtain in like manner the obedience and subserviency of the other tribes. We have, in short, sown the seed, and it would be a poor husbandman who should omit to reap the harvest.

30. The line of policy which Government has hitherto been induced to follow, viz., the establishment of a line of defence coincident with that of effective jurisdiction, is doubtless a wise and necessary measure on such a frontier as the north-west, where the tribes are preeminently warlike and audacious, and where the establishment of a Government officer or soldiers beyond reach of support would be almost equivalent to their destruction; but among the tribes on this frontier such policy would be out of place, the circumstances, the people, the country, their social habits and character, are all different, and our mode of dealing with them should, I think, be different also. Conciliation with these tribes is worse than

useless; it merely invites aggression, unless we are in a position to punish as well as reward.

31. I have, in the letters marginally noted, previously discussed at some length the future policy which in my opinion should be pursued on this frontier. I have now merely to add that subsequent events have in no way modified, but have, on the contrary, rather strengthened the views therein expressed.

1. Letter, No. 6, from Civil Officer, Right Column, Looshai Expedition, to Brigadier General Brownlow, C.B., Commanding, dated 22nd December 1871. Copy forwarded to Bengal Government under Memorandum, No. 6A, dated 22nd December 1871, from Civil Officer.

2. Letter, No. 13, from the Civil Officer, Right Column, Looshai Expedition, to Brigadier General Brownlow, C.B., Commanding, dated 27th January 1872. Copy forwarded to the Bengal Government under cover of Civil Officer's letter, No. 15, dated 31st January 1872.

32. In all matters connected with these tribes, it should be remembered that they are not a nation but a segregation of villages, a collection of small separate republics having no coherence; we are not dealing with the fagot, but the severed bundle of sticks. The chief Saipoiya, in conversation with me, himself said that in any future action of Government against them it was hoped that discrimination might be used, and that many might not suffer on account of one. He went on to say—"All our chiefs are now your sworn friends; if any one of them does wrong, you should punish him; and if he has broken his oath of friendship and is in fault, no one of us will assist him against you."

33. It would, I think, be a grave error to retire to our former position; we have put forth our foot, and where we have planted it, it should remain. No permanent pacification of this frontier can be hoped for, save by bringing these people into closer intercourse with us, by encouraging trade, and by permitting the Government representative to exercise a near and direct influence upon them. None of these ends can be gained so long as our nearest bazaar is nine to twelve days' journey from their villages, and while the frontier officer's intercourse with these tribes is limited to the yearly mêla, to which comparatively but few Kookies resort, and those only from interested motives. The mêla is a legitimate means to a good end, but it utterly fails of its purpose on account of its distance from the homes of the people whom we wish to attract. The prime cause of every human fair or festival is amusement: the excuse may be religion or fat oxen, or what not; but from the Roman clamour of *panem et circenses* to the festival of Juggernath, or the bathos of Greenwich fair, the main reason for the gathering is novelty and destruction. What the children wish to see, will bring the parents in train; where the maidens go, thither are the young men gathered together, but our so-called mêla at Kassalong attracted none of the Looshais save a few middle-aged men-of-war sent in by their chiefs, who, leaving their weapons a few miles from Kassalong in the jungle, came in with a motley following to carry away a congeries of articles, which, for some unknown reason or by a providential interposition, fell to their share every year in much the same way as did their harvest, save that this latter crop was not sown nor reaped with toil.

34. Mention has been made from time to time in previous correspondence of the desirability of raising a Kookie levy for the defence of the frontier. I cannot but think this would be a mistake. The frontier force should be as different from the Kookies as possible, for like does not fear like, and the border tribes have learnt a wholesome reverence for the black coats and short rifles of that splendid regiment the 2nd Ghoorkas; and for the present at least it would be most inexpedient to instruct these people in any way as to the force of discipline and coherence, it being the want of these very qualities which gives us our greatest advantage over them.

35. It has also been urged that another way of dealing with these people would be to strengthen the hands of some particular chief, and so consolidate them under one head; but surely it is first necessary to have a more intimate acquaintance with both chiefs and people ere any such choice could be made. Indeed, I am disposed to think that such a plan, although possessing many advantages among an ambitious race whose chief was struggling with chief for pre-eminence, would fail in practice among these tribes where such a spirit, if it exists at all, is found only in a very modified degree. We are at any rate only just emerging from the utter darkness of ignorance as to all that concerns these tribes, and any such plan can well afford to lie by until perfected knowledge should bring it to maturity. Too much importance, however, cannot be attached to the fostering and encouragement of trade with these people, but all commerce should, I think, for the present be restricted to certain recognised centres and be subjected to careful supervision.

36. I cannot conclude this Report without mentioning how greatly my work has been facilitated by the courtesy and kindness of Brigadier General Brownlow, commanding, and his staff. To the advice of the former is due almost entirely whatever political success our expedition has obtained; but although acting in the strictest subordination to him, he consistently assigned me the most prominent place in all negociations with the chiefs, and by every means in his power exalted my position in their eyes and added to my influence over them. I regard my association with him in the expedition as most fortunate.

37. Finally, I would beg to bring prominently to the notice of Government the services of Subadar Mahomed Azim, of the Hill Tract Police, who, by his knowledge of the language and a large experience among the Looshais, combined with an untiring and fearless zeal, has done much to aid the attainment of the objects which we had in view. His long acquaintance with Rutton Pooea had given him considerable influence with that chief, and it

is to this circumstance, combined with the Subadar's personal exertions, that the entire and speedy submission of the Southern Howlongs is mainly attributable. I would respectfully submit that the Subadar's services render him worthy of some special mark of favour at the hands of Government.

38. At the close of the expedition a guard of 100 men (police) was left at Rutton Pooea's village for his protection. Pending the final orders of Government on the subject, and to mark his sense of the chief's loyal co-operation and valuable assistance, the General presented him with 1,000 rupees as an instant token of appreciation. Such also among Rutton Pooea's own immediate followers who had rendered special service, or had suffered loss by our occupation of the country, receive minor rewards. With these exceptions no gifts or rewards whatever were given to any chief or Looshai in the country we have just vacated.

(A.)

LIST of the LOOSHAI CHIEFS who submitted and swore Friendship during the Looshai Expedition of 1871–72.

TRIBE.	NAME.	REMARKS.
Syloo	Savoonga	Represented by his sons.
	Lal Ngora	Sons of Savoonga.
	Lal Jeeka	Sons of Savoonga.
	Vanhnoya and two brothers	Step brother to Rutton Pooea.
	Vankoonga	Subject to Savoonga.
	Vanhnoona	Subject to Savoonga.
	Vanhoolen	Subject to Savoonga.
	Dowtyeyva	Subject to Savoonga.
	Vanloola	Subject to Savoonga.
	Vanshooma	Subject to Savoonga.
	Lalhleera	Subject to Savoonga.
Howlong (north)	Sangboonga	These chiefs are brothers. The former has married Rutton Pooea's sister.
	Benkuia	These chiefs are brothers. The former has married Rutton Pooea's sister.
	Vansanga	Subject to Sangboonga.
	Chongmama	Subject to Sangboonga.
	Lien-u-koom	Subject to Sangboonga.
	Lalboora	Brothers: independent.
	Jo-htoma	Brothers: independent.
Howlong (south)	Vandoola	Represented by his son Sanghena.
	Vantonga and two brothers	Cousins of Vandoola.
	Sanghena	Eldest son of Vandoola.
	Saipooea	Brothers of Vandoola and brother-in-law of Rutton Pooea.

(B.)

NOMINAL ROLL of PERSONS released from Captivity among the Looshai Tribes during the Expedition of 1871–72.

Number.	Names.	Race.	Age.	Residence.	From what Tribe Recovered.	REMARKS.
1	Mary Winchester	English	6	Cachar	Howlongs (north)	Sent to Calcutta.
2	Poonoo	Bengalee	–	Burdwan	ditto	Sent to their homes through the magistrate of Chittagong.
3	Ghunnoo	Dangur	19	Hazareebaugh	ditto	Sent to their homes through the magistrate of Chittagong.
4	Suree	ditto	–	Purulia	ditto	Sent to their homes through the magistrate of Chittagong.
14	Benga	Tipperah	17	Fenny, Chittagong	Howlongs (south)	Declined to leave the Kookie village, and was therefore left.
15	Thinkekha	ditto	20	ditto	ditto	ditto – – ditto.
16	Thinchiongee	ditto	17	ditto	ditto	ditto – – ditto.
17	Chinga	ditto	21	ditto	ditto	Made over to his brother Mooktee Ram, interpreter.
18	Nanbúngee	Bengalee	18	Cachar	ditto	Was with child. Refused to leave the Kookie village. Purchased from Benkuia.

Number.	Names.	Race.	Age.	Residence.	From what Tribe Recovered.	Remarks.
19	Neylalee	Bengalee	10	Cachar	Howlongs (south)	Adopted by Subadar Mahomed Azim. Bought from Northern Howlongs.
20	Bhúa	Mughs from the Southern Chittagong Hill Tracts	28	Bundrabrun, Southern Hill Tracts	ditto	Made over to the chief of their tribe, the Bohmong, to be sent to their homes.
21	Ua		45			
22	Fúa		25			
23	Arae		8			
24	Nanrúlee	Chukma	8	Kurnafoolee Chittagong Hills.	ditto	Purchased from Rutton Pooea. Made over to father.
25	Chounpa	Bumjo	19	Chittagong Hills (south).	ditto	Made over to her father.
26	Tharchung	Pankwa	18	ditto	ditto	Declined to leave the Kookie village, being engaged to be married.
27	Hathdanga	ditto	11	ditto	ditto	Delivered to her friends.
28	Tchongnang	ditto	18	ditto	ditto	Taken charge of by mother.
29	Tchanionlan	ditto	16	ditto	ditto	ditto „ maternal uncle.
30	Niunjiwey	ditto	12	ditto	ditto	ditto „ father.
31	Chamlay	ditto	15	ditta	ditto	Did not wish to leave the Kookies.
32	Pankera	Tipperah	18	Hill Tipperah	ditto	ditto ditto.
33	Bhuchai	Kumi	25	Arracan Hills	ditto	Made over to her countrymen, who accompanied the expedition for the purpose.
34	Chaifenee	ditto	26	ditto	ditto	ditto ditto.
35	Chunee	ditto	20	ditto	ditto	ditto ditto.
36	Khew	ditto	28	ditto	ditto	ditto ditto.
37	Ayey	ditto	20	ditto	ditto	ditto ditto.
38	Karoo	ditto	18	ditto	ditto	ditto ditto.
39	Keyoo	ditto	10	ditto	ditto	ditto ditto.
40	Beboy	ditto	29	ditto	ditto	ditto ditto.
41	Fréla	ditto	14	ditto	ditto	ditto ditto.
42	Kangthour	ditto	28	ditto	ditto	ditto ditto.
43	Sreang	ditto	11	ditto	ditto	ditto ditto.
44	Thugothuing	Mugh	14	Chittagong Hills (south).	Howlongs (south)	Made over to the Bohmong.
45	Baikam	Bumjo	15	ditto	ditto	Taken charge of by Nikwae, interpreter, to convey to her friends.
46	Charchul	ditto	14	ditto	ditto	
47	Antenang	Tipperah	18	Chittagong Hills (north).	Rutton Pooea	Declined to leave Kookie village.
48	Thenangjogai	Pankwa	30	ditto	ditto	Made over to her husband.
49	Bancla	ditto	10	ditto	ditto	Have been sent to their father.
50	Chuichanang	ditto	8	ditto	ditto	
51	Khatchen	ditto	30	ditto	ditto	Sent to her husband.
52	Changlen	Tipperah	18	ditto	ditto	Has married. Refused release.
53	Junkham	ditto	16	ditto	ditto	Released, but absconded back.
54	Lachni	ditto	41	Hill Tipperah	ditto	Will go to her relations.
55	Tai	ditto	23	ditto	ditto	ditto.
56	Shunai	Bengalee	28	Oodeypore, Tipperah	ditto	Sent to her home. Was bought from the Syloos.
57	Baiangain	ditto	28	ditto	ditto	Did not wish to leave Kookies.
58	Duronia	ditto	25	ditto	ditto	
59	Kuia	Tipperah	27	Chittagong Hills (north).	ditto	Has married. Wished to remain.
60	Maca	ditto	18	ditto	ditto	Stayed with the above, her brother.
61	Banonlan	Pankwa	3	ditto	ditto	Have been made over to their relatives.
62	Chongnang	ditto	33	ditto	ditto	
63	Jowlath	Tipperah	14	ditto	ditto	
64	Pankholoti	ditto	16	ditto	ditto	
65	Felavee	Chukma	18	ditto	ditto	
66	Naknobee	ditto	16	ditto	ditto	
67	Thola	ditto	20	ditto	ditto	Declined to be released.
68	Bhoichaka	ditto	25	ditto	ditto	ditto.
69	Kurmoputh	ditto	23	ditto	ditto	Made over to her brother.
70	Dhunnoputtee	ditto	16	ditto	ditto	ditto.
71	Gohara	Bumjo	11	Chittagong Hills (south).	ditto	Sent to their homes in charge of Nakway, Government interpreter.
72	Nokchil	ditto	20	ditto	ditto	
73	Heraputtee	Chukma	25	ditto (north)	ditto	Has married, and refused to leave.
74	Thangan	ditto	7	ditto	ditto	Made over to her brother.
75	Jangpanee	Bumjo	16	ditto (south)	ditto	Sent to her home with Nakway.
76	Bugluth	Chukma	4	ditto (north)	ditto	Made over to her mother.
77	Chongkal	Bumjo	24	ditto (south)	ditto	Sent with Nakway.
78	Chondam	ditto	24	ditto	ditto	ditto.
79	Niangman	ditto	25	ditto	ditto	ditto.
80	Jolut	Tipperah	20	ditto (north)	Syloos	Has remained with me (interpreter).
81	Bhuchonee	Bengalee	25	Oodeypore, Tipperah	ditto	Have been sent to their homes through the magistrate of Chittagong.
82	Amina	ditto	30	ditto	ditto	
83	Monobee	ditto	46	ditto	ditto	

Besides the above-named persons, there are 27 additional captives now in course of collection, among the Southern Howlongs, to be delivered up at the post of Demagriri, and it is believed that there are others, inhabitants of Hill Tipperah, still in the hands of the Syloos, whom it will be no difficult matter to procure at an early future date.

Such of the captives as are noted above as having declined to leave the Looshai villages, preferring not to be released, were personally interrogated by me, and I ensured that such declaration on their part was not made under pressure, but was an actual expression of will.

(C.)

1.—The Statement of *Suree**; by caste a Rajbunsee; her father's name *Sroop*; a resident of the village Kalidan, in the pergunnah of Purulia, District Purulia; 19th February 1872.

*No. 4 on the List, p. 439.

About two years ago I was enlisted as a labourer for one of the Cachar tea gardens on 4 rupees a month. After I had served at this work about a year, one day about noon, in the month of Magh last year, as I was engaged in plucking tea leaves, there suddenly arose a great noise and confusion, every one called out "Kookie, Kookie!" and all ran and tried to hide themselves. I ran like the rest to save my life, but soon fell into the hands of one, who tied me with a rope and took me off to another spot, where others of our people were bound and collected together. My daughter, who is with me now, was hidden a short distance off in the jungle along with my husband, but they were soon found out, and the Kookies stabbed my husband with a spear, so that he died before my face. I wept much, but it was now of no use. I saw also Mr. Winchester's dead body; it lay there where it was shot. I saw it. The Kookies captured 18 of us altogether, and took us away. We went straight through the jungles for ten days and nights, halting at no other village, but we passed other Kookies going to Cachar armed. When we got to the Howlong country I saw many villages, and in some of them I saw captives like myself. Another party also came bringing captives, but these did not stay at Benkuia's village; they went away further to the east. I was never ill treated by the Kookies; they never tried to force me. I and another woman, Banee, tried to run away and went into the jungles, but we could find no road; and after two months we again were taken by a strange Kookie, who gave us up to our old masters on receiving a reward, but we were not hurt for this. There were 18 of us including Miss Winchester. Two died; four were sold to other villages, and two have been left behind. They do not wish to come, as they saw their parents killed, and they have no one to go to. I saw no other captives in Benkuia's village, but I have heard there are others to the north. I was put to heavy work, hewing wood and drawing water. In case I did not understand what they said, they used to beat me, otherwise I was kindly used.

(C.)

2.—The Statement of *Poonoo*†; father's name, *Goluck*; caste, Bagdee; residence, Bhastara, in the District of Burdwan; 19th February 1872.

†No. 2 on the List, p. 439.

About three years ago I was at Calcutta, and one day, when I was in the Bazaar, I was forcibly laid hold of and carried off by an emigration agent. I was kept in confinement for some time till we were sent to Cachar. I was not told that I should work on a tea garden; the agent said I should be employed at a rajah's house. At last I and others were put on a boat and sent off to Mr. Sellar's. Here I worked for some time; but one day, at about noon, some hundreds of Kookies entered the tea garden, and commenced slaughtering us. They made a frightful noise, so that we were all afraid and tried to run away. I tried to run also, but was soon caught, bound, and taken away by a Kookie. I saw several bodies of people who had been killed as I was takenalong. There were 18 of us altogether, besides Miss Winchester, four men, ten women, and four children. One woman died three or four days ago; she died of grief; and one had died before that. These 18 include Miss Winchester. I do not know what has become of Miss Winchester; they sold her, I think. They also sold four of our people who were captives. I do not know where they went to. Other captives were brought from Cachar, but not by Benkuia's village; the people to the east brought them. I never saw any, I heard of it from the Kookies, and our captives talked of it. Suree knows about it; she can talk Kookie. Two of our people were left behind at Benkuia's yesterday, because they did not wish to come as they had no parents. The journey from Cachar to Benkuia's occupied 10 days. There were many Kookies before and behind. I know not how many. All did not come with us to Benkuia's. Many left us going east, the day before we reached there. I do not know anything more.

(C.)

*No. 3 on the List, p. 439.

3.—The Statement of *Ghunnoo**; caste, Munda; residence at village Poonoo, in Hazareebaugh; 19th February 1872.

I WAS a coolie on Mr. Sellar's tea garden in Cachar. I came there with my parents, who worked there also. I do not recollect the name of the emigration agent, nor can I say how many were brought from our country. I wish to go back to my own people. It is about a year, I should think, since I was captured by the Kookies. It was in Magh, at about 11 A. M., when many hundreds of Kookies fell upon the garden and captured us all. I should say not 500 Kookies, not so many, about 300 perhaps, but very many, and all armed with guns and spears. They murdered many people on our garden, and captured 17 of us. Two of this number have died from sickness, and three were sold to the villages south of us, in that direction (points south-east). I had no hope of escape, but was very glad when I heard that the sahibs were coming to release us. We were all glad and wept. I and others were taken south in a great hurry some days ago, but now we have been brought back again. I saw eight men captives in three villages to the east of us. I went there with some of the Kookies. I had a brother, but the Kookies sold him for two guns. I do not know what village people he was sold to. Another woman also was sold with my brother. They did not beat us, nor were they cruel to us, but we had to work hard, because we were afraid for our lives. We came 10 days' journey from Cachar; there were other Kookies on the road, and they had people tied with them. I do not know who they were. I have not seen them since, and the Kookies would not let us stop; they said 'kuldro,' and pricked us with spears. Other villages and gardens, I heard, were burnt in Cachar besides ours; the Kookies to the south did not do it. They buy captives because they have none of their own. Our women were not insulted, but we had no meat or vegetables; only rice to eat. It was a hard life.

P. S.—The depositions of the other captives were similar in purport to these three, it was not therefore thought necessary to add them.

(No. 2752.)

From *A. Mackenzie*, Esq., Junior Secretary to the Government of Bengal, to the Secretary to the Government of India.

Sir, Foreign Department, Calcutta, 29 April 1872.

Judicial Department. Judicial. No. 61, dated 9th instant.

IN continuation of my letter of this date, No. 2731, I am directed to forward, for the information of the Government of India, the accompanying copy of a further report from the Commissioner of the Chittagong Division, communicating the names of 12 captives who arrived at Chittagong subsequent to the submission of Captain Lewin's report on the Looshai Expedition, No. 22, dated 26th ultimo, forwarded to your office under cover of my letter above quoted.

No. 61, dated Chittagong, the 9th April 1872.

From *Baboo Hurry Churn Ghose*, Personal Assistant to the Commissioner of the Chittagong Division, to the Officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department.

IN continuation of letter No. 1, dated 1st instant, I have the honour, by direction of the Commissioner, to forward the names of 12 captives who arrived here from the village of Benkooeah or Sanboonga subsequent to the submission of Captain Lewin's report on the Looshai Expedition, No. 22, dated 26th ultimo, to your address. These names should be inserted in the list of captives enclosed in Captain Lewin's expedition report above referred to.

Names.

(1) Ghunnoo.
(2) Alhadu.
(3) Thakoree.
(4) Lukshmee.
(5) Chumba.
(6) Punah.
(7) Sharee.
(8) Benee.
(9) Chookaree.
(10) Ram Charan.
(11) Manee.
(12) Mungal.

No. 1249 P., dated Simla, 4th June 1872.

From *C. U. Aitchison,* Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, with the Governor General, to *C. E. Bernard,* Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal.

I AM directed by His Excellency the Viceroy and Govenor General in Council to acknowledge your No. 2731, dated 29th April 1872, reporting on the present difficulties attending the temporary establishment of a post on the Demagiri range, and to express His Excellency's approval of the arrangements proposed in paragraph 1 of your letter.

2. With regard to the general question of the measures to be adopted for the defence of the Chittagong frontier, and the policy to be pursued towards the tribes on that frontier, his Excellency in Council hopes that now (as appears from the "*Gazette of India*") that General Brownlow's report has been submitted, he may be favoured with the Lieutenant Governor's opinion on the general question of policy and frontier defence at an early date.

3. His Excellency in Council has noticed with much pleasure the services of Subadar Mahomed Azim, and the conduct of Rutton Pooea, alluded to in paragraphs 37 and 38* of Captain Lewin's final report of 26th March. *pp. 438 and 439 of Return.

(No. 3342.)

From *A. Mackenzie,* Esq., Junior Secretary to the Government of Bengal, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

Sir, Calcutta, 31 May 1872.

Judicial Department. Judicial.

IN continuation of paragraph 2 of the letter from this office, No. 2731, of the 29th ultimo, I am directed to submit the accompanying copy of a communication* from the Commissioner of Dacca, giving cover to a general report by Mr. Edgar on the political aspects of the late Looshai Expedition. The Lieutenant Governor has little doubt that the clear and exhaustive character of this report will commend it to the attention of the Government of India.

* No. 75, dated 30th April 1872.

2. On the question raised in the communication from your office, No. 751 P, of the 27th March last, of keeping up the road to Chipoowee, I am to invite the attention of his Excellency in Council to the views expressed in paragraphs 61 to 63 of Mr. Edgar's report.

3. With reference to paragraphs 15 to 17 of the report and the statements regarding the inclusion of hill villages in waste land grants, I am to say that during the last two years there has been much correspondence on the subject with the Home Department and the Department of Revenue, Agriculture, and Commerce. The accompanying copies of the later papers† on the subject will enable the Foreign Department to see precisely how the case stands at present.

† Revenue Proceedings for November 1871, Nos. 98–101. Revenue Proceedings for December, Nos. 124–5. Note by Mr. Edgar.

4. With reference to paragraph 45 of the report, I am to say that the conciliatory policy there described seems to have been singularly successful, and we may hope that the result has been to make the people of many villages familiar and almost friendly, rather than to leave nothing but bitter recollections behind. It will be an excellent thing if we can establish fairs and continue intercourse with those people, as proposed in paragraph 48.

These Papers are given at pp. 487 to 499 of Return.

5. Touching paragraph 56 of the report, I am to refer to the recent correspondence regarding the Kookie colony in the hills to the north and the discussion in connection with the Munnipoor boundary, terminating with my letter No. 3341 of this date.

6. The belief that the Looshais have overjoomed the country points to their having arrived at a stage when inducements might be offered to them to adopt a more permanent form of cultivation. The Angami and other Nagas have, it appears, done so to a large extent, and the Looshais are by all accounts a tolerably civilized and capable race.

7. I am to take this opportunity to forward herewith a copy of Captain Lewin's remarks‡ on Mr. McWilliam's letter of the 30th January last, on the subject of certain statements made by Rowa Muntree, a copy of which was submitted to the Government of India with Memorandum No. 1013 of the 10th February last.

‡ Letter, No. 18, dated 24th February 1872.

8. The Lieutenant Governor has just received from the Military Department, copies of the Quarter Master General's letter No. 505 L, dated 10th May, enclosing reports by Generals Bourchier and Brownlow on the best mode of protecting the Cachar and Chittagong frontier in future. These shall have his Honor's early attention.

No. 75, dated Dacca, the 30th April 1872.

From *A. Abercrombie*, Esq., Officiating Commissioner of the Dacca Division, to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Judicial Department.

I HAVE the honour to submit a most interesting report by Mr. Edgar, Deputy Commissioner, Cachar, drawn up by him with reference to the order conveyed in your letter, No. 1896, of 20th March, together with enclosures, as per margin.*

* From Dr. Brown to Government of India, No. 27, dated 22nd March 1869.
From Major General Nuthall to General Bourchier, No. 43, dated 12th March 1872.
From Mr. J. W. Edgar to General Bourchier, No. 6, dated 21st March 1872.
From Major General Nuthall to General Bourchier, No. 46, dated 16th March 1872.
From Mr. Edgar to General Bourchier, No. 470, dated 8th April 1872.
A map in original.

2. It would appear from the circumstances of so large a number of Looshais, as that stated in paragraph 52, having migrated into Munipore territory, that the tribes have become sensible of the error they committed in carrying their raids into British territory; and judging from the length of time during which Colonel Lister's comparatively unsuccessful expedition sufficed to keep them quiet, it is a reasonable conclusion that we may now fairly look forward to many years of exemption from raids, during which it should be our policy to cultivate friendly relations with the hillmen by giving every facility for trade and communication with the plains, while at the same time we keep them always mindful that we are their masters.

3. One of the first things necessary will be, as soon as the character of the country has been ascertained from the reports of the survey officers with both detachments, to open a road through from end to end. The question of the maintenance of the road, which was made this year by the expedition, does not press for attention at present, because it is already too late in the season to do anything even if ordered at once; and if after the rains it should be found to have stood fairly well, it can then be determined, in the event of its lying so far from the direction of the main road through to the Chittagong frontier, as to be of service to a distinct tract of country, whether or not it should be maintained.

4. A fair at Tipai Mookh, if it could be once established, would do much towards promoting a good feeling among the hillmen; and I would suggest that an attempt should be made to get up one as soon as the country is open after the rains, to be followed by a second as late in the cold weather as is considered convenient. The first would probably be poorly attended, but there is reason to think that the second might be more successful.

5. One of the most important points in connection with our future relations with the hillmen appears to be the relative position of the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar and the Political Agent at Munnipoor. Numerous changes in the constitution of the Government of the Assam Provinces may, perhaps, if carried into effect, place these two officers under one head; but if the districts are to remain as at present constituted, some measures should be adopted to place the management of our relations with the whole of those tribes under the guidance of one hand. For it is clear that weakness or inability in the Political Agent to control the Munnipoorie courtiers may at any time derange all our plans.

6. The revival of the Kookie levy in some shape appears to be a suggestion worthy of consideration. These men, if not drilled out of all semblance to their original selves, ought to be most useful for collecting information and escorting officers about the hill country, and communicating to the tribes what they must, and what they may not, do hereafter; and I think that the next cold season should not be allowed to pass away without the hillmen being made to see that this year's expedition was not a mere reprisal for last year's raid, and that some acknowledgment of allegiance, however trifling in money value it may be, will be rigidly enforced now and hereafter.

7. To avoid the delay which attend copying Mr. Edgar's report, I have submitted it in original, and shall be obliged if you will send me a printed copy for record.

No. 548, dated Cachar, the 3rd April 1872.

From *J. W. Edgar*, Esq.,.Civil Officer with the Cachar Column of the Looshai Expeditionary Force, to the Commissioner of Circuit, Dacca Division.

I HAVE the honour to submit to you the general report on the political aspects of the Looshai Expedition, called for in Mr. Junior Secretary Mackenzie's Letter, No. 1896, of the 20th ultimo, forwarded with your No. A of the 25th idem.

2. Of course my review will be in the main confined to the operations of the Cachar column and its dealings with the tribes with which it was brought into contact; but I shall have incidentally to take notice of the political results of the action of the Munipore Contingent, and the present and future relation of that State with the tribes on its southern frontier. I shall also give a brief preliminary sketch of so much of the history of the Looshais since we first came in contact with them, as may help to explain the objects at which the commander of our column aimed, and to show the amount of success he has had in attaining those objects.

3. From the earliest times about which there are any traditions in Cachar, the high ranges of hills to the south of this district and Munnipoor have been inhabited by tribes, who, though very wild in some of their characteristics, and constantly engaged in fierce disputes amongst themselves, or with cognate but still more ferocious tribes living east of them, seem to have long ago advanced far beyond a state that could fairly be called savage. These tribes seem to have been practically independent as long as they were able to maintain their position in the higher hills. The Rajah of Tipperah, indeed, claims supremacy over all the villages west of the Tipai, but practically his authority was never acknowledged east of the Chatterchoora range, up to which he used to exact a partial and, probably, fitful obedience. Neither the Cachar nor the Munnipoor chief had the slightest authority in the hills south of Tipai Mookh, and it is evident from all the early Cachar traditions that they did not claim any. But from time to time some village, or group of villages, grew stronger than its neighbours, and reduced the latter to subjection, or forced them to take refuge in the hills, which were acknowledged by all to belong to Munnipoor, or Cachar, or Tipperah. The newcomers theoretically became subjects to the State within the limits of which they had taken refuge, and in the case of those who took refuge in Cachar and Munnipoor hill territory previous to the Burmese invasion, the facts agreed pretty well with the theory; but, as mentioned above, this does not appear to have been the case with Tipperah. It seems to have been the custom with the conquering villages, at least for many years back, to encourage families of the wilder tribes to the east to settle down in the places vacated by the refugees, and in this they seem to have been tolerably successful. Meantime the old feud did not always cease when the weaker chief and his people took refuge in a neighbouring State; he was often followed up and attacked in his new position. Less frequently he was able to make a successful raid, and do much harm to the stronger villages. But it is probable that previous to the Burmese invasion both Cachar and Munnipoor were able to protect their own people, and possibly to assist them in attacking their enemies; but for many years previous to the death of Gobind Chunder, Rajah of Cachar, in 1830, neither State was able to afford any protection against the independent hillmen. Each movement of the tribes in the direction of Cachar or Munnipoor was followed by horrible massacres of the refugees, and at last the Bengali settlers in the south of Cachar were attacked and driven out of the cultivated low lands near the hills.

4. During the entire period of which we have any record or reliable tradition, the tract above mentioned, at least as far south as the present northern boundary of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, has been held by families of the great tribe known to us as Kookies. Colonel M'Culloch, indeed, states that there are traditions both among the Kookies and Nagas which seem to indicate that the latter tribe at one time occupied the southern hills, but I have not been able to find any corroboration of this tradition. The name "Kookie" has been given to the tribe by the Bengalis, and is not recognised by the hillmen themselves; and I have never found any trace of a common name for the tribe among them, although they seem to consider different families as belonging to a single group, which is certainly co-extensive with what we call the Kookie tribe. This tribe is again sub-divided by the Cacharees and Bengalis of this district into "old" and "new" with reference to the time at which the people of this district first came in contact with each family of hillmen. The "old Kookies" are democratic communities with very doubtful traces of having been once organised under chiefs. The "new Kookies" are subject to chiefs whose families are regarded as almost sacred, and whose power is only limited by the possibility of a malcontent transferring his allegiance to a more popular chief of the same or some other semi-divine race. The difference between the political organisation of the "old" and "new" Kookies probably accounts for the fact that the former communities were driven out earliest, and that there are now no traces of them in the villages of the Looshais and other new Kookies who occupy the hills from which they were driven. On the other hand, each family of "new" Kookies that took refuge in Cachar or Munnipoor left behind many of its members in the villages of its conquerors, many of whom again, when their turn came, had to submit to live under some chief still stronger than their own.

5. When we took possession of Cachar, and for many years afterwards, the families whose feuds attracted most attention, and from whose raids we suffered most, were the Thlangums, Changsels, Thadoes, and Poitoos. But somewhere about 1840 the Looshais (a new family) made its appearance, which by degrees has reduced to submission, or driven out all the others, and for the last 20 years has kept possession of all the southern hills. The first chief of this family, of whom we have any mention, was named Lalool; his village seems to have been originally further south than most of those of his descendants, and he is said to have come of the same stock as that from which the Howlong and Sylhoo chiefs are descended; but all the earlier traditions are very vague. We know, however, that he had at least four sons, Laling Vhoom, Lalsavoong, Mongpir, and Bhoota. The last, who was probably the youngest, is said to be still alive, and it is likely that at his father's death he succeeded to the original village, as often happens among the Kookies. Previous to this the elder brothers had each started a village on his own account, and being undoubtedly brave and capable men, had widely extended the influence of the family. At this time (about 1840) Mongpir's villages were situated on some of the spurs of the Chatterchoora, from which the Looshais were rapidly pushing out the Poitoo chief who had previously occupied the hills on each side of the valley of the Gootur. Laling Vhoom's villages were situated on the hills east of the Dullessur, a considerable way south of Peak Z of the great trigonometrical survey: all the hills north of this and west of the Sunnai were held by Thadoes, who, however, were beginning to be hard pressed by him. Lalsavoong had pushed further east, and was struggling with the Singsol Thadoes for the Chumfai Valley and the range to the north of it.

6. About this time the Poitoos applied for assistance against Mongpir to two Munnipoorie Rajpootras, who had been settled by us some years previously in South Hylakandy, to protect that part of the district against the Poitoos themselves. In consequence of this application, the Munnipoories with their armed followers made a sudden and successful raid on the village of Mongpir, which was then situated on a hill near the Pukwacherra, somewhat to the south of the Chatterchorra range. The chief was taken prisoner by the Munnipoories, but released on his payment of a ransom, and making a promise that he would not attack Cachar, or again trouble the Poitoos. After this the Looshais withdrew towards the south, but they kept up friendly relations with the Munnipoorie Rajpootras, and after the death of the latter, with their descendants. This seems to have been the origin of the connection between the Looshais and the exiled Munnipoorie Rajpootras, about which so much was heard in 1869, and again last year. The promise to refrain from attacking the Poitoos was possibly not without some effect. For although they were ultimately driven by Mongpir and his son Sookpilal to take refuge in Sylhet and Hill Tipperah, still there have always since been relations between Mongpir's family and that of the Poitoo chiefs of a kind different from those existing between the other Looshai chiefs and the chiefs dispossessed by them. A more detailed account of this matter will be found in my Report C. of the 13th March 1871.

7. Meantime Laling Vhoom, Lalsavoong, and Vonolel, son of the latter, were prospering even more than Mongpir. Lalsavoong, having driven out or subdued all the chiefs north of the Chumfai Valley, died before 1849, leaving at least three sons, all of whom became powerful chiefs. One of these, Lalpoong, was head of the great village of Sellam, and the other villages now belonging to his son Poiboi; but he seems to have been to some extent subordinate to his brother Vonolel, who was undoubtedly the ablest and most powerful chief that the family of Lalul has yet produced. In his youth he seems to have been constantly fighting, and always apparently more or less successful; he fought various tribes to his south known to the Kookies by the general name of Poi, and carried off, or induced to accompany him, numerous families of those villages, whom he settled down either in separate villages or in the villages of his own Kookies. He followed the same policy towards the Soktes, another family of Kookies, whose head is Kamhow, the powerful chief of Molbhem, and we found hundreds of Sokte families settled among the Lushais in whose villages we have lately been. He made numerous attacks on the Naga villages under Munipore, until somewhere about 1850, Colonel M'Culloch, who was then Political Agent, by judicious management induced him to come to terms, which I believe he kept faithfully as long as Colonel M'Culloch remained in Munnipoor. He seems to have avoided quarrels with the other chiefs of the Lalul family, over whom, however, he had great influence, and by whose people he was invariably spoken of as the "great chief."

8. In 1849, Laling Vhoom was the chief next in influence and importance to Vonolel. He had driven the Thadoe chiefs from the Rengti and Noongvai ranges, and had made a village for himself a little way south of the great bluff of Nisapwee (Peak Z). This seems to have been a larger village than even Vonolel's. He is said to have been preparing to occupy the sites from which the more northern Thadoe villagers had been driven, when he died in 1849. His death was followed by a raid, conducted by his son Mora or Moollah, against the Thadoes of Kaimong, a chief whose village had been situated on the hill south of Bongkong, but who had some years previously taken refuge in Cachar, and settled about 10 miles south of the station. He had taken with him two sets of gongs claimed by the Looshais, and it was on account of this dispute that his villages were chosen for attack. Lieutenant Colonel Lister, Political Agent in the Copyah Hills, was directed by Government to find out and punish the perpetrators of this outrage and some others that were committed at about the same time in Sylhet and Tipperah.

9. It

9. It is needless here to give any detailed account of Colonel Lister's operations, which are described by Mr. Mackenzie in his memorandum on the north-east frontier. It is sufficient to mention that his little force marched under the guidance of refugee Kookies along the Rengtipar range to a point a little north of its junction with the Noongvai range. From here Colonel Lister with a portion of his force made a rapid march eastward, crossing the Rookni near its source, and surprised Mora's village. Most of the inhabitants, however, had time to escape, but some were killed, and the village burnt. Colonel Lister remained for some little time on the range; but the Looshais, after their first fight, commenced to annoy him in the way that the same clan tried to annoy us last December at Kholel. But in his case their tactics proved successful to a certain extent, for Colonel Lister, thinking his position untenable, destroyed a large quantity of stores, which were in his advance depôts, and retreated rapidly to Cachar, followed by parties of Looshais, who killed any of the coolies or guides they found straggling.

10. In spite of this, the effect of the destruction of Laling Vhoom's village, which was at that time probably the largest Kookie village in existence, was very great. Next cold weather messengers came in, who stated that they had been sent by Vonolel or Barmoilene, as it was then written, his brother Lalpoong or Lalpow, Bhoota, Sookpilal, and another chief of little note, to ask for our friendship and assistance against the Pois. Probably their more immediate, though unavowed, object was to find out whether any further operations against Mora were contemplated. They all seem to have come from Sookpilal's village, and the chief among them was a Munnipoorie, who had settled among the Looshais. He went back after a short stay in Cachar, and returned in December with Sookpilal himself, who spent some time here. I may remark that this visit is denied by all the Kookies, and after reading all the correspondence on the subject, I think it possible that the Munnipoorie finding that the Superintendent of Cachar refused to give any presents, except to Sookpilal in person, got some one to personate the chief. However, rather friendly relations were formed by degrees with Sookpilal's people; messages and presents were frequently exchanged, and when tea gardens were first opened in South Cachar, the Looshais from time to time came down and worked upon them, while traders and woodcutters from Cachar made annual visits into their country. We had less communication with Mora's villages; but there was considerable trade with them, and occasional messages of a friendly character were interchanged.

11. But while the Looshais showed some desire to keep on good terms with the Cachar authorities, they, perhaps accidentally, followed a line of conduct which looked as if they suspected and feared us. Sookpilal, who before 1849, had advanced north of Chatterchoora Peak, moved his own village by degrees southward to his present position close to the Syloos. Mora died some time after the destruction of his village, leaving an infant son Vonpilal, whose mother Impanoo eventually removed the chief villages to the site that we call "old" Kholel, which is practically very much further from what was then our cultivated frontier than Nisapwee. The intention of taking up the village sites abandoned by the refugee Kookies was given up; but what the Looshais call guard villages were established on points commanding the different routes from our frontier to the chief Looshai villages. All intercourse between our Koookies and the Looshais was discouraged by the chiefs of the latter, and traders and woodcutters were obliged to go by water to certain points fixed by the Looshais, from which they were occasionally allowed to go to the villages of the chiefs. In this way, in course of time, the Looshais succeeded in putting between our frontier and their villages, a tract of forest which was not only unexplored by us, but to a great extent unknown to any of our Kookies, except a few old men who had not been over the grounds for years. It was a mistake on our part to allow this to happen, particularly as for many years after 1849, we had in the Kookie Levy an instrument which, if properly used, would have been admirably suited to break down the barrier which the Looshais were putting up between themselves and us.

12. For some years after Colonel Lister's expedition, there were no raids on either Cachar or Sylhet. But in 1862, Sookpilal made a raid on Hill Tipperah and some villages in the south of Sylhet, in which several British subjects were killed or carried off. He was instigated and assisted by Gnoorshailon, a chief of the Poitoos, whose father had been transported for a similar outrage about 1845, and by two of his relatives, named Rungbhoom and Lal Hoolien. Sookpilal's complicity in this raid does not seem to have been suspected until 1864, when four of the captives escaped into Cachar from his village. During the three following years many attempts were made by the Cachar officers to induce Sookpilal to give up the remainder of the captives, and more than once a hostile expedition was thought of. Finally, however, Sookpilal gave up four of the captives, stating that of the remainder, some had been sold to tribes on the south and south-east, and some were unwilling to leave, having married in the Looshai villages.

13. In the course of these negotiations, an agreement was made with the representatives of Vonpilal and Sookpilal, that each of these chiefs was to receive an annual sum of 600 rupees on his agreeing to do his utmost to preserve peace on the frontier, and to send each year certain specified articles by way of tribute. Some time after this proposal was made to the Looshais, some people, who represented themselves as sent by Vonolel, came in to say that Vonpilal had informed the former chief that he must pay a share of the tribute, the amount of which was greatly exaggerated. The messengers were informed of the real state of the case, and went away apparently satisfied. About the same time some mes-

sengers from Vonpilal complained of the extension of tea gardens to the south as likely to encroach on their hunting grounds. Their real objection clearly was that the advance of our cultivated frontier sensibly narrowed the belt of seemingly impenetrable jungle between them and us. Major Stewart told them that tea cultivation would doubtless extend as far as the streams were navigable, but pointed out that the Looshais would benefit greatly thereby. The general result of these negotiations was however thought very satisfactory, but it came out afterwards that our principal agent in dealing with the Looshais—a Kookie named Manjihow—had, all through, grossly deceived both parties for his own purposes.

14. In the beginning of 1867, Major Stewart, who was then Deputy Commissioner of Cachar, tried, without effect, to induce Sookpilal to meet him at the Pollycherra tea garden on the Dullessur. In 1867-68 the Sunnai was surveyed as far as it is navigable, and an attempt was made to survey the northern part of Sookpilal's country with his consent and assistance; but one of Manjihow's people, in a drunken squabble, wounded one of Sookpilal's people, and the survey party was in consequence withdrawn to avoid possible complications. The uneasiness which this affair caused was somewhat allayed by the reports brought down during the rains by traders who had gone up the Dullessur and Soonai; according to them, both Sookpilal and Vonpilal were most anxious to remain on good terms with us. I believe that they meant to tell the truth, but subsequent events showed that their information was very incorrect. The truth is, that in spite of all these negotiations and messages and trading, payments of tribute and police allowances, we knew much less about the Looshais and what they were about in 1868, than we did ten years previously, while they were in a much more dangerous state, as far as we were concerned, than they had been at any time since Colonel Lister's expedition. I do not think that the district officers were altogether to blame for this state of things. Doubtless we had made mistakes. The local officers did not act wisely in recommending to Government to do away with an establishment of Kookie scouts kept up since 1849, for the purpose of collecting intelligence connected with the Looshais. I think that Major Stewart was wrong in the way he treated the objection made to the advance of tea cultivation, and I am convinced that I allowed my desire to get information about the country to influence me most unfortunately when I tried to push the survey further than was safe or judicious at the time, particularly as I was unable to accompany the survey party, owing to my presence being still more required in North Cachar; but I feel that our chief fault was in not boldly and persistently calling the attention of Government to evils which we saw clearly. I think a right understanding of this question is so important, that I shall go somewhat minutely into the evils alluded to.

15. Almost all the officers who have had any practical knowledge of this frontier—Colonel Lister, Colonel McCulloch, Major Stewart and myself—have all agreed in thinking that we should keep a constant watch over the Kookies in our territory and Munnipoor, and, above all things, that we should spare no trouble to get correct information about any dealings they might have with Looshais, and of all they learned of what was going on beyond the frontier. This was one of the chief objects of the Kookie levy; it was the leading principle of Colonel McCulloch's Kookie policy; and Major Stewart has often told me that both he and Colonel Verner had always felt the necessity of looking well after our own Kookies. But I remember perfectly that when I came to the district in the end of 1863, he complained to me that the Kookies were slipping out of his hands. The abolition of the establishment of Kookie scouts in 1860 had been the beginning of a series of changes, all which tended to weaken our hold over the Kookies, and lessen our means of finding out what they were about. Then the Kookie levy had been taken over from him and made over to the police, then, practically, an almost independent department, with results which I shall describe lower down; lastly, owing to the occupation of the waste lands of the district by persons actually engaged in, or far more often purposing to commence tea cultivation, and the action of Government in remitting the house tax payable by hillmen living on grants, the control of our own Kookies was passing from the official head of the district to grantees of waste lands.

16. The question of the inclusion of villages in grants has been lately discussed so fully that I shall not say more of it here; but I may in passing suggest that it may be worth while to consider whether we ought not to take some kind of tribute from all hillmen settled in Cachar, whether they live in grants or not. At present, owing to the cordial support we get from tea planters, we are able to a certain extent to look after the Kookies living on grants; but in 1863 the general attitude of the non-official community was markedly hostile to the district authorities, and a large number of planters were inclined to look with dislike and suspicion on any interference with Kookies settled on their gardens. Some went so far as to encourage and support their Kookies in disobeying extra-judicial orders given by the Deputy Commissioner, and generally no Kookie living on a tea grant was allowed to perform any service for us, unless we had first asked for and obtained the permission of the planter. The result of all this was, that in a few years we entirely lost sight of the majority of the Kookies. In South Cachar, villages moved from garden to garden without our knowing anything of it. In spite of the discouragements of the Looshai chiefs, there was considerable intercourse between their people and our Kookies; parties of the latter often met parties of the former in the uninhabited jungle while hunting or collecting rubber, and heard from them news of what was going on in their villages. Our Kookies occasionally went by water to the Looshai villages, and several Looshais from time to time came into Cachar and settled down in villages on tea gardens. Nothing of all this, however, ever reached our ears till after the raids of 1869. But if our relations with our own Kookies had

had remained what they had been for some years after 1849, we should either have got the intelligence direct from the Kookies themselves, or our scouts would have found out all about it. The case of the alleged murder of three of Sookpilal's people by Kookies of a village at the time situated on one of the Kunchunpore Company's grant shows very clearly how little was then known of the doings of the Kookies living on tea gardens. Worse even than our ignorance of what was going on between Kookies and Lushais was the exclusive reliance we were ultimately forced to place on Manjihow. As the other Kookies slipped away from us, and after the abolition of our fixed scouting establishment, we were obliged to depend upon him in all matters connected with Looshais, and I have since his death found out that messengers who had been sent by the chiefs to complain against him, have been of necessity put under his care while in the district, while he and his people interpreted what they had to say. Besides this, the information obtained from the traders, Bengalees, or Munnipoories, imperfectly acquainted with the Kookie language and entirely ignorant of Kookie politics, was never sufficient to enable us to check Manjihow's representation; or even if they did bring down any suspicious intelligence, he with his superior knowledge was able to give it any appearance that suited him.

17. There was another result of the passing of the influence of the district authorities over our Kookies to the grantees of waste lands, the extent and importance of which I am not yet able to measure, and which it is very difficult to indicate, owing to the enormous chasm between our mode of thinking and that of the people about whom I am writing. The Kookies, as I have more than once pointed out, seem to be unable to conceive any political system differing in essence from their own, and they look upon the district of Cachar, for instance, as a group of villages held together by the superior power, natural or supernatural, of the European head of it. The formation of tea gardens on unoccupied ground by Europeans would appear to them analogous to the formation of new villages by the sons of chiefs, and they would instinctively look on the owners as rather dependent on the great central chief, than subject to him. More than this they could without difficulty believe that a planter could make his garden independent, or even grow so powerful as to change places with the great chief of the district, and reduce him to dependence. Now when the planters forced the Deputy Commissioner, by some means which the Kookies could not comprehend, to relinquish his claim to tribute from hillmen settled in grants, the deduction drawn by the Kookies was, that each planter had to a certain extent made himself independent, though it was clear that, as yet, he was weaker than the Deputy Commissioner. Still it seemed to the Kookie that the power of the latter, which he thought very great after 1849, was decreasing, and the race is very quick indeed to take advantage of the decline of a great chief's supremacy. Of course, the Looshais would very soon learn, either during their visits to Cachar, or from what they heard in other ways from our Kookies, of the imaginary change in the power of the Deputy Commissioner, and of the rise of so many apparently independent chiefs on the frontier. It was from this point of view that I think Major Stewart's answer to the objection against the extension of tea gardens was so dangerous. The meaning the Looshais attached to it was, that he was unable to prevent the formation of fresh tea gardens in the southern hills; that is, that he was unable to protect the Looshais from the encroachments of planters.

18. I have several times since 1867 pointed out the mistake which I consider we made in amalgamating the Kookie levy with the police, particularly in my report C,* dated 13th March 1871. I need not here repeat what I then wrote, but I must correct a too sweeping accusation of cowardice against the Kookies in the police. We had some very brave Kookie constables with us on the late expedition, and one, Panek, the lad who was wounded at Kholel, distinguished himself very much. But while I gladly bear testimony to the courage and good conduct of all the constables who accompanied us, I feel bound to point out that they were completely useless for scouting, the work for which they ought to be most fitted, and for which they were expressly brought to the front.

* Pages 130 and 131 of Return.

The utter worthlessness of the police as scouts necessarily comes out very prominently in my work. It was of course my duty to get intelligence about roads, and I frequently accompanied General Bourchier and Colonel Roberts when reconnoitring. We tried in every possible way to utilise the Kookie and other constables who were with us, but could make nothing of them. Still more conspicuous was their failure when employed in an attempt to "stalk" the sharp-shooters who gave us so much annoyance after our attack on Kholel. It seems to me that this is the result of the disproportionate importance attached by some police officers to drill and uniform, and their desire to give their men the set-up and finish of regular soldiers. I do not think any attempts have ever been made here to keep up and strengthen those habits of the war trail which every Kookie recruit has learned in his boyhood.

Even if it be really necessary that the police on the frontier should be highly trained soldiers, I do not think that such necessity should prevent our having a body of hillmen well and suitably armed, trained as nearly as possible in their own manner of fighting, in scouting, in tracking fugitives, in hunting out water and paths, and in all the other accomplishments of jungle warfare, with just so much military discipline as may be needed to keep them together, and as little as possible of a soldier's dress or equipment.

19. But the abolition of the Kookie levy was not the only mischief which it seems to me the introduction of the new police system into Cachar entailed. Whatever may be thought of the policy of depriving the magistrate of all control over the internal organisation of the

police in other districts, I am convinced that it worked mischievously in Cachar; for, while the entire management of the political work of the district was still left to the Deputy Commissioner, he was made practically powerless to regulate the machinery on which he had mainly to rely to carry out the work. I pointed out this in reporting on the state of North Cachar in 1868, and I think it desirable to state here that my opinion on the subject is still unchanged, although I hope that the recent changes in the relations of the police force to magistrates will do away with many of the evils and difficulties to which I allude.

20. Meantime there were very important changes going on almost unperceived by us in the midst of the Looshai community. I mentioned above that Mora's widow after his death removed their chief village to the Kholel hill on the east of the Tipai; she fixed her own village, however, on the range between the Tipai and Sonai, and still claimed superiority over the villages between the Sonai and the Dullessur. When Sookpilal's sons grew up, however, and started villages on their own account, they found the hills west of the Dullessur too narrow for them, and pushed forward towards the Sonai, at first probably with the consent of Vonpilal's mother. In 1868 Khalkhom, the most energetic of Sookpilal's sons, had a large village of his own, on the same range as Peak Z, but further south, and had gained considerable influence over the surrounding villages. This was looked on with dissatisfaction by Vonpilal, who had lately taken over the management of his villages from his mother, and married the sister of his neighbour Poiboi, who had succeeded to the villages of his father Lalpoong. Another son of Lalpoong by a mother of inferior birth, named Lalroom, had gone further south, and managed the village of a very old woman, the widow of Lalsavoong. Vonolel, as he grew old, seems to have lost some of his great influence, and pressed hard by the Soktes, Howlongs of Lalpitang's villages, and Pois, to have made a kind of treaty with a powerful chief of the latter, known to us as the Pallam chief, who agreed to assist Vonolel against all enemies on the payment of a tribute in cotton and some other articles. One of Vonolel's sons, Lenkom, had started a village about 20 miles north of the Champai valley. Another Deowte had gone off to the west, in the direction of Bhoota's villages. Tongdong, a son of a dead brother of Vonolel, had a village in the direction of Munnipoor.

21. As might have been expected, all these young chiefs and the young men of all their villages were eager for fighting, but they seem to have felt that they could not do more than defend themselves against the tribes on the south and east. There were, however, left the Poitoos of Tipperah and Sylhet, with whom Sookpilal's people had a standing feud, the gardens of Cachar, and the Naga villages of Munnipoor. The old people, the women especially, who remembered Colonel Lister's expedition and felt that it somehow differed from one of their raids, advised them to avoid our territory; but the young warriors who had not been born in 1849, or who were infants at the time, were unable to understand their fears. They could not see any difference between what they heard of the expedition and what they saw of Kamhow's or Lalpitang's raids. Besides, they probably thought that the Cachar chief was not so strong as he had been 20 years before, and they knew that they were much further away than Mora had been, and believed that no force from Cachar could reach them. Then Colonel McCulloch had left Munnipoor in the end of 1867. He was succeeded by a civil assistant surgeon, quite inexperienced in frontier matters, and unable to control or even to understand the intrigues of the Munnipoor officials who, though they knew very little more about the Looshais than he did, were resolved that no Political Agent should again keep the entire arrangement of the Kookies in his own hands, as Colonel McCulloch had done.* The Lushais soon found that the firm and judicious hand which had kept them in order for nearly 20 years was withdrawn, and thought that they might with safety attack the Munipore villages.

22. In November 1868, the Naga village of Mentha, in Munipore territory, was attacked and burned by Vonpilal and Poyboy, and several captives carried off. In December of the same year some of Sookpilal's people encountered and killed some of Rungbhoom's Poitoos in the jungles of Hill Tipperah; they afterwards took Rungbhoom's village, which I think was in Sylhet, but were driven out of it by the men of a neighbouring police guard. On the 10th January 1869, the garden of Nowarbund was plundered and burned, and some of the coolies killed by Lalroom. On the 14th, Deowte attacked the garden of Monierkhall, where there was a police guard, which however was unable to prevent his plundering the garden and destroying the buildings. Early in February a great attack was made on the Kala Naga stockade, which was strongly garrisoned by Munnipoorie sepoys, by several chiefs, among whom Lenkom was prominent. The stockade was taken, and a Munnipoorie officer and several sepoys killed. Some Naga villages were attacked and destroyed about the same time.

23. We did not find out who were the actual perpetrators of each raid till long after, but we suspected Vonpilal and Sookpilal from the first, and an attempt was made to punish them. The original proposal was to send a small column of soldiers and police up the Dullessur, in the direction of Sookpilal, where it was, if possible, to meet another small force

* To show that I have not exaggerated the ignorance about the Looshais that prevailed in Munnipoor previous to the raids of 1869, I append a Report from the Political Agent, dated 22nd March 1869, after we had left Moizal. *See* Appendix (B)., pp. 483, 484 of Return.

force advancing from the south of Sylhet, along the return tracts of the raiders. Another small body was to go up the Sonai to Looshai Bazaar, and then across through Impanoo's village to that of Vonpilal, where it was hoped it would meet a Munnipoorie force working across from the point taken up by the Munnipoorie contingent this year.

These plans were materially altered, and were not carried out successfully in their new shape.

24. The parties sent up the Dullessur were forced by the weather to turn back after having gone three marches beyond our furthest tea garden. The party from Sylhet got within sight of one of Sookpilal's villages, but unfortunately had to retire owing to want of provisions, having had some rather unintelligible dealings with Looshais, and having lost two men killed; it is not clearly shown by whom.

The Munnipoorie contingent were prevented by the weather from doing anything. A portion of the force which went up to Sonai got to one of Vonpilal's villages and within sight of that of his mother's, the head men of which, as well as those of Vonpilal's village, came to the occupied village and offered to make submission. They declared that Vonpilal had lately died; that he had taken no part in the raids; that the raid on Mentha in November had been made by Poiboi alone; and that both he and his mother had always been anxious to keep on good terms with us. We have since discovered that Vonpilal was really dead; that he had not taken an active part in the raids on Cachar, but that he, with Poiboi, had committed the outrage on the Munnipoor village; and that he was really hostile to us, but had been restrained by his mother, who had great influence over him, and who dreaded a repetition of the affair of 1849. With regard to all the other raids, the Looshais gave very accurate information, and they promised to do all in their power to induce Deowte, the principal offender, and the other chiefs of Vonolel's family, to come to terms. They also agreed that they and the head men of Vonpilal's village would meet a Cachar officer, at some place to be appointed by him, during the next cold season, and they would try to induce the other eastern chiefs to do likewise. They of course denied that they had any captives taken in the recent raids, but they promised to do what they could to get back those that were in the villages of other chiefs.

25. After the return of the expedition there was much discussion about the measures to be taken for the future protection of the frontier. I have not materials to enable me to describe here all the proposals made, but I shall give an outline of the views which I laid before Government. In the first place, I recommended that an expedition on a smaller scale than, but organised on similar principles to, the one of this year should be sent to attack Sookpilal in the first instance; I had then satisfied myself that Sookpilal had not been concerned in the Cachar or Munnipoor outrages, and that the attack on the Kookies on the Sylhet frontier was much less serious from a political point of view than the other raids; but Sookpilal was an old offender, and I feared that the results of the two attempts made to reach him would make him more insolent than ever.

I also proposed that while the military expedition was operating against Sookpilal, I should go up the Sonai with a guard sufficient for defence, and make an effort to prevail on the eastern chiefs to make a voluntary submission; and in this I hoped to be aided by vigorous pressure exercised by Munnipoor in communication with me on the villages of Poiboi and Vonolel. If we should fail in our attempts, I proposed that the military expedition should, if it had time after bringing Sookpilal to reason, work eastward, through the villages of Deowte and Lalroom, towards Vonolel. After all the tribes had been reduced to submission, I proposed to carry out fully a policy somewhat similar to that which had been commenced after 1849, but which, as I have shown above, had not been fairly tried, and to try to obtain influence over the Looshais by inducing them to settle on the uninhabited tract between their villages and our cultivated frontier, by fostering trade, by constant communications with the people and chiefs of all the villages, and by encouraging them to serve in an irregular levy to be composed mainly of hillmen belonging to the frontier. I also proposed to lay down a boundary line between the Cachar district and the Looshai hills.

26. The Government of India refused to sanction the expedition, and I now think that this was a most fortunate circumstance. Our knowledge of the country and of the real position of the villages was then so imperfect that the expedition would have had very great difficulty in even getting to Sookpilal's village, and certainly the whole season would have been occupied in dealing with him. Anything done in his direction would have very little effect upon the eastern villages, who would in all probability have thought they were safe from all danger of retribution if we found it so difficult to reach Sookpilal. The proposition to re-organise a Kookie levy was not accepted. This, I think, is to be regretted, for it might have been very useful during the late expedition. I was permitted, however, to pay a visit to the Looshai hills for the purpose of meeting as many chiefs as possible.

27. I proposed to proceed first to Looshai Bazaar on the Sonai, and to use the influence of Vonpilal's people to induce the chiefs of Vonolel's family on the one side, and those of Sookpilal on the other, to meet me. If I were successful with the former, I intended to make an effort to work across through their country to Munnipoor, and I asked the Rajah to do his utmost to help me in dealing with them, as I had found, from the statements of the Looshais who came in to see me at the end of the rains, that the eastern people still looked upon Munnipoor with some of the feeling with which Colonel McCulloch had tried to inspire them. I also asked the Deputy Commissioner of the Chittagong Hill Tracts to

make an attempt to meet me, if he could spare time, and at all events to do all in his power to open communication with me.

28. The Deputy Commissioner was unable to make any attempt to meet me, but he sent a letter which, strange to say, made its way into Munnipoor through the Howlongs and Sylhoos. Some days after we got to Looshai Bazaar, I had a meeting with the headmen of Vonpilal's villages, and with Khalkom, Sookpilal's son, and some other chiefs. I found that there was no chance of opening direct communication with the chiefs of the family of Vonolel and his brothers, that it would not be safe to attempt to make my way through their hills to Munnipoor, and that it was more than probable that no real attempt to aid me had been made by that state. Consequently, as Sookpilal had shown some anxiety to come to terms, I determined to march across to the Dullessur, in the hope of having a meeting with him. I got across to Beparee Bazaar, and made with him there a provisional settlement of the boundary.

29. It will be seen from the above that whatever may have been the value of the arrangements made with the western Looshai villages, I had entirely failed to do anything with the eastern ones, and the Lieutenant Governor, Sir William Grey, felt great uneasiness about this at the time. It was thought, however, that in forming friendly relations with the nearer portions of the tribe, especially with Sookpilal, the object of most immediate importance had been to all appearance attained. I had come to the conclusion besides, that owing to the geographical position of Munnipoor, and the relations which had previously existed between the Looshai and that State, the Political Agent there was in a much better position than I could be to carry out the wishes of Government; and I at the same time believed that hitherto the action of the Munnipoor Rajah and his officials had been quite inconsistent with a loyal adhesion to the declared policy of the paramount power. Consequently, although Munnipoor affairs are superintended by the Government of India in the Foreign Department, I, with the approval of the Lieutenant Governor, wrote to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal a letter, the greater part of which I shall quote, because I am still convinced that the views about Munnipoor are correct, although at the time I under-rated the danger to us from the eastern Looshais.

30. "The Looshais look upon the Tipai as the boundary between the clans, which are, to use their own phrase, 'the Munipooree Rajah's men,' and those which are 'the Cachar Saheb's.' It is not easy to define exactly their idea of the relation indicated by this phrase; but the clans west of the Tipai certainly consider that they are in some way connected with Cachar, and those to the east, with one exception, have the same feeling about Munnipoor. The exception is the village of Kholel, which, though now situated on the east of the Tipai, still is considered to be one of the Cachar villages. East of Kholel, at the distance of about one day's journey, is the village of Poiboi, son of Lalpoong. He is at present very much dissatisfied with Munnipoor, and according to the statement of the Looshai Dorpong, forwarded to the Commissioner of Dacca with my letter of the 6th, he accuses Thado subjects of the Rajah of having murdered seven of his people this year. In spite of this all the Looshais of his village whom I saw spoke of their making friends with the Rajah ultimately as a certainty, and the chief and his headmen did not seem to wish to have anything to do with Cachar.

"In the same way whenever I spoke about Vonolel or any of his sons, except Deowte, I was told that they sent muntries and presents into Munnipoor, and that they wished to be 'the Rajah's people.'

"But, while I think that Munnipoor is in a better position than Cachar to gain an influence over the clans east of the Tipai, it is nearly as important for the latter as it is for the former that friendly intercourse should be kept up with these villages. The chiefs are all nearly related to those south of Cachar; they are continually intermarrying, and their people keep up a constant intercourse for trade and other purposes. The result of this close connection is that the minds of the Cachar Looshais will be unsettled as long as Munnipoor continues on bad terms with the eastern clans. Dorpong, in the statement alluded to above, mentions that Poiboi had sent to ask the Kholel people to join in an attack on Munnipoor. It is true that they refused on that occasion, but something might happen at any time to make them change their minds. Even if they were to keep the promises they have made to me of not engaging in any quarrels with Munnipoor, Cachar might still suffer in the case of hostilities between the Eastern Looshais and the Rajah. For instance, the chief complaint made by the Looshais against Munnipoor is that some of their people were murdered by Thadoes this year, and as long as the present bad feeling exists, there will probably be many similar occurrences. Now, as a general rule, the Looshais would not find it easy to get at the Munnipoor Thadoes to make reprisals; but there are several Thadoe villages in Cachar, and the Looshais might be tempted to attack the people of them in revenge for the injuries done by their relatives in Munnipoor. Again, there are all along the frontier villages of Munnipoories, who are our subjects, and who owe no allegiance whatever to the Rajah. But if the Looshais were to get exasperated with the Munnipoorie race generally, they might attack the people living in Cachar without caring whose subjects they were.

"I have long felt the importance to Cachar of a good feeling being kept up between Munnipoor and the clans to its south, and in 1867 I went in, with the permission of His Honor the Lieutenant Governor, to confer with Colonel McCulloch, who was then Political Agent, on this subject. At that time the Looshais were, apparently, on very good terms

terms with Munnipoor, and with the Thadoes and other Kookies living in that state. Messengers were sent from time to time to the Looshai chiefs, nominally from the Rajah, but really from the Political Agent, and presents were sometimes sent down. These messengers were always Kookies, in whom Colonel McCulloch could put trust. He tells me that he 'never allowed any Munnipoories to mix in these affairs, fearing their inveterate habit of inventing, which would bring mischief.' Occasionally, also, influential Looshais went in to see Colonel McCulloch, and I believe that when his messengers carried his silver-mounted Burmese dao to any of the nearer villages, the headmen looked upon it as the summons to appear before him, which they were bound to obey. The Munnipore Kookies used at that time to shoot over the hunting grounds of the Looshais near the great salt spring, called Chiboo, and when they killed anything, they left a hind leg at the spring for the Looshais, who in their turn, when lucky, used to leave a leg for the Thadoes.

"All this is changed. It was at this very spring of Chiboo that, according to the Looshai story, the Thadoes this year killed Poiboi's men, four of whom were hunting, and three making salt. Munnipoories were sent down by the Rajah to negotiate with the Looshais. They went back saying, that they had been threatened with death; that the eastern clans had become most boastful and insolent; that they looked upon our tour among the western clans as an act of submission; that they described the presents which we gave the headmen as tribute; and that they were going to attack Munnipore in the middle of April. This attack, however, was never made, and the Looshais who came in to me spoke as badly of the Munnipoories who had been sent to them as the Munnipoories had done of them; they also said, frequently, that Poiboi and the other chiefs would not come to terms with Munnipoor until a 'good' messenger were sent to them. When I asked them what they meant by a good messenger, they said one who was honest, who meant really to settle matters, and not one merely sent to spy out the land, and find out how most mischief could be done to them. I could not find out exactly what they meant, but I suspect that the messenger had talked in the usual boasting style of Munnipoories about the punishment the Rajah meant to inflict on the Looshais, and of the ease with which their villages could be got and destroyed. I was rather surprised to hear the Agent of the Munnipoor Rajah in Cachar talking in the same way, for the Munnipoories generally think differently, and seem very anxious that both the Rajah and our Government should be friendly with the Looshais.

"I think that the change in the relations of the Looshais with Munnipoor may be accounted for. After very much opposition Colonel McCulloch, in the time of the present Rajah's father, got practically into his hands the entire management of all matters connected with the Kookies. Of course he always worked in the name of the Rajah, and obtained his consent to everything of importance, but he did not allow the Munnipoor officials to interfere in any way. The latter have always disliked the arrangement excessively, and when Colonel McCulloch retired, they at once set to work to prevent his successor getting the same power. I believe they were successful in this. The influence exercised by Colonel McCulloch was not directly connected with his position as Political Agent, and his authority over the Kookies was not conferred on him by our Government. It was based on his great experience, on his power of conversing freely and directly with the hillmen, and on his minute knowledge of their affairs. It was impossible that his successor could be possessed of these qualifications, or that without them he could keep the exclusive management of the Kookies, and consequently the Munnipoor officials of the Rajah began to interfere. The result is the present unhappy condition of the frontier. The Munnipoor officials now see that as long as their interference is allowed to continue the Looshais are not likely to live on friendly terms with Munnipoor; and as they are unwilling to be excluded from the management of frontier matters, they are doing all in their power to induce the Rajah to take hostile measures and bring the villages into subjection. For some reason or other they think that our Government is likely to assist the Rajah in doing this, and they seem unable to understand that if we were forced to attack any of the clans, it would be those on our own border which give us trouble, and not those to the far east, which are the only ones that Munnipoor has anything to do with.

"In my opinion, the first thing to be done, in order to remedy the existing evil, is for our Government to make an arrangement with the Rajah under which the Political Agent should get, officially, the same position in Kookie matters that Colonel McCulloch made for himself. The Munnipoor officials of the Rajah should not be allowed to interfere unless when directed to do so by the Agent, and the Rajah should agree to pass no orders and adopt no measures affecting Kookies without first consulting the Agent. The Thadoes should not be allowed to carry on their feud with the Looshais, and occurrences like the alleged murder of the seven men at Chiboo should be carefully guarded against and severely punished.

"Trustworthy messengers might be sent down to the eastern villages not to settle any terms with the Looshais, but to induce the chiefs, if possible, and if not the muntries oft he eastern villages to meet the Political Agent. If they could not be induced to go into the valley of Munnipoor, I think it might be worth while to consider the advisability of the Agent going to meet them, say somewhere to the south-west of Moirang or the south of Kowpoom, or even nearer their villages.

"If, in such a meeting, the causes of the attacks on Munnipoor of last year could be found out, very much would be done. I think I have been able to discover the circumstances which led to the attacks on our territory, and I am ashamed to have to acknowledge that the latter might have been averted if we had been less ignorant of the Looshais, and had

taken more trouble to find out and redress their grievances. In the same way it will probably be found out that the eastern Looshais have suffered real or fancied injuries from the hillmen who are subject to Munnipoor. The Looshais told me that the Rajah had either fixed or promised to fix a boundary between their lands and those which he claimed for his own hillmen. I hope that this is true. Among all the tribes on the frontier there is a very strong feeling about boundaries. Each village has its limits which are known and respected by the tribes around as long as they are at peace with it, and any attempt made, except in time of hostilities, by one clan to occupy lands belonging to another clan would be condemned by every one. If the Rajah of Munnipoor were to fix a boundary for the Looshais, and to tell them that it would be respected only as long as they behaved well, he would have no small security for their future good conduct. The effect of this would be still greater if the Political Agent were to go over some of this boundary with the Looshais, and if the Rajah were to give them a sunnud countersigned by him.

"The Looshais would probably meet the Political Agent with presents, some for the Rajah and some for himself. The Rajah might be encouraged to make some return presents, and the Political Agent might be allowed to give something of small value on the part of our Government.

"When friendly intercourse had once been established, it would not be difficult for the Political Agent to find out if there were any prisoners in the villages of the Looshais, and if there were, to get them released.

"I believe the Munnipoor chief would be willing to support the Political Agent in carrying out a consistently friendly policy. He knows that the Looshais are not the only, or even the most formidable of the foes on his southern frontier. Kamhow of Molbhem, the great Sokte chief, who is said to have burned Moirang this year, is much more likely to give trouble to Munnipoor than the Looshais are, and I have heard that the powerful and savage tribes, called by the Looshais Khyrees, are creeping up towards Munnipoor. It would be clearly to the Rajah's advantage to have in the Looshais, a strong friendly tribe, to break the attack of the outside tribes when they begin to press on his frontier. The selfish and ignorant Munnipoories who surround him do not see this, but I think he might be made to understand it."

I do not say that the Political Agent would have been ultimately successful if he had tried vigorously to carry out the policy above indicated; but I think it almost certain that the eastern Looshai chiefs would not have dared to make the raids of last year if he had gone down to Chiboo with a sufficiently strong guard, and taken up a position there in December 1870.

31. Towards the end of 1870 information which I had previously received of the death of Vonolel was confirmed. In December I went down to Chandsil, a point on the Dullessur River, where I met Sookpilal, and finally settled the boundary fixed provisionally the year previous. After I had seen Sookpilal, and just before I started to march across to the Sonai, I heard rumours that some of Vonolel's family were on their way to attack Cachar. I did not believe this at the time. But some time after I reached the Sonai, Looshais came in with intelligence that Vonolel's son, Lalboorah, had attacked the outpost at Monierkhal Garden, had killed several soldiers and police, but had eventually retired with a loss of over 50 killed. I heard also that Tangdong, Vonolel's nephew, had made an attempt to reach the Nowarbund Garden; but, owing to none of his people knowing anything of the country, he had missed his way and came out at Nugdirgram, where he got three prisoners, and that during his absence on the raid his village had been destroyed by Kamhow, and his wife and many of his people taken captives. The Looshais also told me that Lienukoom had made another attack on Munnipoor. Some days later news was brought that the Howlongs under Benkhooya and Sangboong, sons of Lalpitang, had attacked a garden in south Hylakandy, killed a European and many natives, and taken off several prisoners, among whom was a little girl, who, as I understood from the description, was European or of European extraction. My informant said that the Howlongs were even then debating about giving up this child either through Rutton Pooea or Sookpilal. I also heard that the Syloos and Gnoorshailon's Poitoos were probably implicated in the western raids, but there was nothing more than suspicion against them. During the remainder of my stay in the hills I was employed in collecting information about the perpetrators of the raids, the exact position of their villages, and the easiest way to get at them. As I was on my way back, Khalkom, Sookpilal's son, came to meet me at Looshai Bazaar; he corroborated the above statements, and promised to assist us if we undertook an expedition to punish the eastern tribes. On the 22nd, just before I started on my return, I heard that some Howlongs were on their way to attack some of the gardens of South Hylakandy.

32. On my return to the station I found that the information given me by the Looshais as to the outrages in this district was to a great extent correct, but that very little was known here about the perpetrators. Whatever had been found out, however, confirmed the statements I had heard, and left no doubt on my mind that the raids on Munnipoor, Monierkhall, and Nugdirgram had been committed by the relatives of Vonolel, and those in South Hylakandy, Sylhet, and Tipperah, by the Howlongs of Lalpitang's family, possibly assisted by Syloos and guided by Poitoos. It would be superfluous for me to give a detailed account of these raids, but I wish to point out a difference between the character of the attacks on Nugdirgram and Monierkhall and those made on Alexandra-Cherra and Jhalna Cherra, which was not sufficiently brought out in any of the reports at the time.

33. The

33. The people at Alexandrapore were taken so completely at unawares, by the Howlongs suddenly emerging from the adjoining jungle in which they were concealed, that they were unable to make the slightest attempt to defend themselves, and Mr. Winchester, who was at breakfast when the attack was made, seems to have been killed before he had time to load his weapon. The bungalow at Cutley Cherra is so situated that Messrs. Bagshaw and Cooke had sufficient warning to be able to arm themselves and a few of their people, with whose assistance they not only drove the Howlongs from the garden, but forced them to set free some captive coolies whom they were carrying off. The Howlongs returned to the garden next day, but were again driven off with ease by Messrs. Bagshaw and Cooke, this time aided by nine policemen, who had come up during the night. The party which attacked Jhalna Cherra, said to be 120 strong, were repulsed by a patrol party of one head constable and four constables, who were in the lines at the time; and the Howlongs seem to have been driven across the river before some more police, sent to the assistance of the patrol party arrived from the stockade, half a mile distant. The manager of Monierkhall had received a warning of a threatened raid, and had taken away his coolies before the attack was made; but he, with two more well-armed Europeans, remained in the stockade, which was held by 37 soldiers and police, who were reinforced next day by Mr. Daly and 39 soldiers. Lalboorah's Looshais, however, besieged the stockade for two days, keeping up such a heavy fire that, as Mr. Daly described it, a man could not show himself outside without getting a shot, and they successfully met two *sorties* made by Mr. Daly, who each time took out about 26 men, but was driven back with the loss of seven killed and one wounded. Five men had been wounded on the previous day.

Tangdong's party, after killing some Nagas and Bengalees, whom they came upon in trying to find the path they had lost, came out on the Nugdirgram road, where they met Mr. Daly's rear guard, consisting of eight soldiers and a constable. The soldiers behaved most gallantly, keeping the Looshais in check long enough to allow the coolies they were escorting to get off in safety, and then selling their lives dearly, for they are said by an eye-witness to have killed 25 of the enemy; but at length they were overpowered; six were killed and one wounded. The Looshais got possession of 13 muskets taken from the dead soldiers and police, and I heard in the hills that this was a matter of great exultation with them.

It will be seen from the above that the Howlongs, although they carried off great booty and many captives, had shown themselves unable to withstand any armed opposition when met with; while, on the other hand, the Eastern Looshais got little plunder and only three captives, but had decidedly obtained what they would consider a great triumph over our troops.

34. I have tried in the foregoing paragraphs to show clearly, but without unnecessary detail, the main facts relating to the Looshais, on which were based the advice given by me in the first instance, and the ultimate decision and action of the officer commanding the force; and I shall now quote the original proposition for the punishment of the outrages of 1871, made by me last March.* *Given at pp. 128 and 129 of Return.

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It must be borne in mind that the proposals for dealing with Lalboorah after our arrival at Chamfai were made on the supposition that we should meet with no opposition from the people of Kholel or Sellam; that we should consequently be able to march on Lalboorah as quickly as our transport would allow us; and above all, that we should have no hand-to-hand fighting with any of the Looshais. The choice of Tipai Mookh as a starting point was contingent on the force being directed against the chiefs of Vonolel's family.

35. In July 1871 the Governor General in Council decided on sending an expedition into the Looshai country. The main force was to consist of two columns, one starting from Chittagong, and one from Cachar; but there was to be a contingent supplied by the Rajah of Munnipoor. The Government of India in adopting these measures did not allude to the proof produced by me of the guilt of the Eastern Looshais; indeed, it was expressly stated that the most prominent offenders came from the country of the Howlongs and Syloos, and no indication was given of the portions of the Looshai tribe against whom the Cachar force was intended to act. In the end of September I saw a letter from the Quartermaster General, in which it was mentioned that His Excellency the Commander in Chief was inclined to recommend that the point of departure of the Cachar column should be Tipai Mookh, as recommended by me, but it was *not* stated in the letter that the attack was to be directed against the eastern chiefs, and some circumstances had occurred since I had made the recommendation in March, which I thought ought to be taken into consideration. One of these was the arrival in Munnipoor of some Looshais, who said that they had been sent by some of the chiefs of Vonolel's family to seek the friendship of the Munnipoor authorities, and permission to settle in the south of that state, and to ask the Political Agent to visit their villages during the ensuing cold season. About the same time some messengers came down from Sookpilal, who said that that chief was anxious that we should attack the Syloos from the direction of the Chatleechoora range, and promised that he would assist us in every possible way. It then became a question for consideration whether we ought not to make a junction with the Chittagong force south of Sookpilal's country our first object, and let Munnipoor attempt to settle the eastern villages, particularly as the Political Agent was then opposed to my idea of the desirability of the Munnipoor troops working in the direction of Chiboo, and was anxious to take a route south of the Kowpoon valley, which I thought would bring the contingent into dangerous proximity to a column advancing from Tipai Mookh.

36. I therefore asked to have the question of the point of departure re-opened. The matter was referred for final decision to Brigadier General Bourchier who had been selected to command the expedition, and I went up to Shillong to give him, personally, all the information I could. After a very careful consideration, the Brigadier General came to the conclusion, in which I fully concurred, that we ought to adhere to the Tipai Mookh route.

37. As I have not had hitherto an opportunity of explaining the reasons for this decision, I shall here go into them at some length. It may seem at first sight that we should have obtained some great advantages if we had taken the western route. In the first place, we knew much more about the hills north of Bepari Bazaar and Nisapwee than we did of the country east of the Tipai. Besides this, on the east side there is no water communication further south than Tipai Mookh, while the Sonai and Dullessur are navigable for very small boats as far as Punchunkai and Bepari Bazaar respectively. Then, if Sookpilal could have been relied on, the assistance that we should have got from him and his people would have been extremely valuable. Lastly, we should have had a fair chance of meeting the Chittagong column in the Syloo country. But it seemed to us that these advantages would be wholly or to a great extent neutralised if we could not put implicit confidence, not merely in Sookpilal's friendly feeling toward us, but in his belief that we were able to protect him afterwards from the vengeance of the rest of the Looshais. The route proposed by Sookpilal's messengers had not been explored, and was less known to me than that from Tipai Mookh; besides which it did not admit of our making use of water carriage south of Julna Cherra. If we had taken either the route along the Rengti or that along the Noongvai range, we should have been obliged to establish the depôt at Bepari Bazaar very much earlier in the season than was necessary at Tipai Mookh, on account of the impossibility of taking large boats up the Dullessur during the cold weather, and, unless Sookpilal could have been depended on to protect the boats going up, as well as the depôt, a considerable portion of the force must have been employed in the jungles at the most unhealthy period of the year. Then, although we knew the country as far as Sookpilal's villages, we had not the slightest information about the hills beyond. None of our people had ever been in them, and all I knew about the position of the Howlong or the Syloo villages had been learned from Sookpilal's people; we should have been, therefore, entirely in his hands after we got outside the limits of my personal knowledge; and if the southern people could by any means have induced him not to guide us against them, we might have found it almost impossible to communicate with the Chittagong force. Besides this we believed that the villages of the Howlong chiefs, who were known to be the worst offenders on the Chittagong side, are situated considerably to the east of the Syloos, and thought that the right column would have operated chiefly against them, in which case I considered that we should have had nearly as good a chance of effecting a junction from the east as from the west. It appeared to us, therefore, that the advantages of the western route were not in themselves so great as to counterbalance the risk of the surrounding chiefs being able to induce Sookpilal by threats or promises to withhold his assistance, particularly as we knew that he was very much afraid of the Howlongs, and that all the Looshais disbelieved in our ability to reach the more distant villages. On the other hand, although both General Bourchier and I thought that it would not be safe to allow the success of the expedition to depend in the slightest degree on Sookpilal's assistance, we at the same time saw no reason to suspect his friendliness, and considered that an armed visitation of his country was not essential to attain the objects desired by Government.

The rumours of his complicity in last year's raids had been shown to be unfounded. Information brought down by some Cacharies of the Ainakhall Poonjee, who went up to his villages during the rains, made it almost certain that he had none of the captives, and the conduct of his people towards me while in the hills last year showed that he at least desired that we should think him friendly. Then he knows perfectly well that we can reach him at any time, and we calculated that after we had reduced to submission his more powerful neighbours he would not be likely to give trouble.

38. Our position with regard to the family of Vonolel was quite different. These chiefs had made no direct overtures to us, and there was nothing really tangible in the message sent to Munnipoor, which was besides taken in by men of no account from small villages dependent on Poiboi. These men did, indeed, make over to the Rajah one of the muskets taken from our soldiers in the raids, but the fact of this being sent to the Munnipoor chief instead of to us was extremely unsatisfactory. Then we knew that Vonolel's people had, both in 1869 and 1871, obtained signal advantages over our fighting men and those of Munnipoor; that in 1869 Lenkom had taken the Kala Nagas' stockade, though held by a Munnipoorie force, which, I believe, was superior in number to the attacking party; that Deowti, in the same year, had plundered and burnt Monierkhall in spite of the efforts of the police guard there, and that in 1871 Lalboorah and Tangdong had killed, and plundered the bodies of several of our soldiers and police, besides driving before them a European officer and his men. Besides this we knew that they were the remotest and the least accessible of all the Looshais from either this side or that of Chittagong. It seemed to us very unlikely that they, secure in their distant fastnesses, and confident that they were more than a match for our troops in jungle fighting, would be induced to make a voluntary submission by the terror inspired by our punishment of nearer and less warlike tribes than their own. General Bourchier considered, and I fully agreed with him, that the only way in which we could force these people to submit, and to recognise that they must behave properly in future, was to show them that we could reach them, and that we had the power of crushing any opposition

opposition they could make to our occupation of their country. I think that the result of the expedition showed that we were right, but I must confess that I for my part did not venture to expect that the Looshais would give us such an opportunity of showing them what our troops can do as they did on the 25th January at Koongnoong.

39. Strong advanced guards were posted on the ranges mentioned in paragraph 34, to provide against any possible wavering on the part of Sookpilal, and the Brigadier General requested the Munnipoor Political Agent to advise the Rajah to post guards along his south frontier, and to advance a small force to Tseklapee, a point south of Moirang, so as to be in readiness to take up a position at Chiboo when the time for such a measure arrived. At the outset, there was some reason to hope that we should be able to induce the people of the villages of Lalhi and Poiboi to separate themselves from those of Lenkom, Lalboorah, and Tangdong, and that we might induce them to be friendly or even neutral, in which case it was General Bourchier's intention to advance to Chamfai with as little delay as possible, and to make that place his head-quarters until he had attained the objects of the expedition.

40. But, even before we started, we found that this would not be so easy as I had hoped, and that it was possible that we should have to fight every village south of Tipai Mookh. In November eight Looshais came in, who represented themselves as sent by Poiboi and the headmen of Kholel, to ask for our friendship, to deny that Poiboi had anything to do with the raids, and to offer to bring in Vonolel's sons to make submission to us at Tipai Mookh. In my letter of the 2nd December, to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal,* I mentioned my suspicions about the reality of these assurances, and that I was inclined to think that Poiboi would consider our advance from Tipai Mookh a hostile measure. I had known one of the men, whose name was Dorpong, since 1869, when he belonged to Vonpilal's village, but he said that he had since left it and gone over to Poyboy, and we afterwards found out that all the men came from Kholel, Chipowee, and Tingreedoong, two villages dependent on Poiboi, but on this side of the great Moothilen range. By degrees we learned from these people that the Looshais believed that we should not be able to advance beyond Tipai Mookh for some time at least, and that they thought it probable that they might induce us to make some terms with them there, and then to return. We also gathered from them that at the time they left, the tribe had not definitely decided on its general course of action in the event of our going beyond Tipai Mookh, but that if we should by any chance succeed in getting as far as the great range of Moothilen or Lengteng—a very unlikely event all the Looshais thought—and attempt to cross it, it was to be defended with the entire strength of the tribe. In consequence of what I heard from these people, I advised General Bourchier on political grounds to advance at once to the Kholel village, as mentioned in my diary for the 14th December. But before describing the political results of this move, I shall attempt to give a slight sketch of the country in which the force operated.

41. Between Luckipore and the Voombhong hill, on which—what for convenience sake we call—the new Kholel villages are situated, our route never got out of the uninhabited and uncultivated jungle mentioned in paragraph 11, except when it passed through the Mainadhur and Bhubondhur tea gardens, themselves specks in an ocean of forest. The Barak from Tipai Mookh to Luckipore flows between ranges of high hills, which send down innumerable spurs to the edge of the river. The path that did duty for a road was carried over these spurs sometimes on the Munnipoor side of the river, sometimes on the Cachar side, but always through a country in the highest degree difficult and repulsive. Between Tipai Mookh and the Voombhong range the route was easier and far pleasanter. We ascended gradually a spur of the Senbong range, which is, I think, itself a spur of the great ridge overlooking the valley of Kowpoom. On our way we passed the sites of villages which had been deserted in consequence of the aggressions of the Looshais, and not occupied by the latter through fear of us. We found exquisitely fragrant limes growing near these sites, and walnut trees which may have been planted by the former inhabitants of the hills. From the Senbong range, the highest point of which is probably under 5,000 feet, we descended to the Tepai, which flows between it and the Voombhong range—a wide mass of hill with sloping sides, from much of which the luxuriant forest had been lately cleared for the villages and joom cultivation of the Looshais. Of course we had to cross the Tipai to get to these villages, but our route onwards still lay within the curve made by that river in its way to the Borak. After crossing Parbachung, which is merely a spur of the real Kholel range, we had to ascend the latter, which is, I believe, the continuation of the Kowpoom hill. Its average height is much greater than that of Senbong, and the highest point on it reached by the survey party was 5,450 feet. The range ends abruptly a little to the south of this peak, round the base of which the Tipai flows. Further south are more and probably higher hills, some of which belong to Poiboi, some to Vonpilal; still further south is Bhoota's country. On the wide sloping side of this peak is the site of Vonpilal's village, which is now broken up into the Voombhong group. North of this were the two smaller guard villages of Daidoo and Pachowee, some of the households of which have moved west to Voombhong, but probably more east to Poiboi's villages. The Tepai flows between the Kholel range, and the hills to the east, which may be described as a cluster of spurs thrown out towards the south by a great block of hill. On the northern slopes of this

* *See* Appendix (A).

this block is the Tingridoong village. That of Chepoowee is situated on the first of the spurs crossed by us. We gave the name of Gnowpa to the next spur which runs far to the south, where it meets a spur of the high Rengteng or Moothilen range. Along the ridge of Gnowpa are the sites of many villages now deserted. Poiboi people have, however, again begun to occupy this range, and his mother is about to remove her village to a point upon it.

42. After leaving these hills we came on a great range to which I have more than once alluded. I do not know any general name for it, and I do not think there is any; but we used the name of one of three high peaks on it, Soorthlong, Moothilen, and Lengteng, to describe it. It is very steep and rocky, and the highest point on it must be 7,000 feet high. Koongnoong, the village at which we halted after the fight of the 25th January, was 5,500 feet. To the east of this range we could see several lower ranges between us and Chiboo which was pointed out to our north-east. On these hills were many villages all dependent on Poiboi, but some of which have since moved to Munnipoor. To the north-east was Taikoong, the village destroyed on the 26th January. The country to the east and south of Koongnoong differs very much in character from that of the west of Moothilen. The general levels are higher, the climate is colder and pleasanter, there is much less forest, and the flora is of a decidedly different character, pines and rhododendrons replacing, as typical varieties bamboos and the great family of ficus; the hills too are more rocky, and the soil far less fertile, or at least less suited to grow rice and other products which flourish in the hills to the west. Between Koongnoong and Sellam to the north-east of the latter, were two villages, but our route did not pass through them as we took a more direct road. On our way we met with the first of those curious moor-like patches of flat grassy land of which we found so many afterwards. The next we came to was the valley of the Dinkai between Sellam and Tulcheng, a large village chiefly inhabited by Pois.

43. After we left the latter place we crossed the watershed which separates the streams flowing into the Barak, and with it into the Bramaputra; from those falling into the Taow, which I think must be the Koladyne. From this watershed we got into the flat valley of the Tooeetow which flows eastward into the Taow between two great peaks which we used to call Lalboorah's Gates, but the real names of which are Dilthlong and Moorthlong: we ascended the latter of these, crossing it at the height of 6,700 feet; at this point was situated the village of Engow, composed entirely of Soktes of Kamhow's tribe. Not far from this is a village of Pois, but I was unable to find out from them anything to identify them with any family known by name to us. From Engow's village there was a pretty gradual descent to the Chumfai Valley. This is the largest of all the flats we actually met; but I think, judging from the little I could see of the valley of the Taow, that the latter is larger still. East of the Taow, but at a long distance, is a very high range of hills beyond which the Looshais say there is a valley inhabited by Burmese. They mean the Shans inhabiting the southern part of the Kubbo Valley, who are governed, I think, by a *Woongye* of their own race living at Khambat, about 60 miles due east of Sellam, or possibly at Kendat some miles further east; but before getting to these high distant hills it would be necessary to cross many ranges inhabited by Looshais under Tangdong and Lenkom, and by the various families of Kookies that look on the Sote chief, Kamhow, as their head. I was unable to make out much about the country to the south and west of us. It seemed to me unusually confused and broken, but I daresay that when the observations of Captain Badgely and those of the survey party with the right column are pieced together, a very tolerable reconnoissance may be made out. We saw one or two villages which were said to belong to Lalboorah, and further west, as we were told, are the villages of Lalroom and Bhoota,* with the latter of whom the Munnipoor or Cachar authorities have not yet had any relations.

44. I fear that the foregoing sketch may seem meagre and imperfect, perhaps unintelligible; but I hope it will be remembered that the direct distance from Luckipore to Chumfai is 94 miles; that all the country between consists of hills ranging from 200 to about 7,000 feet high, and to a great extent covered with dense forests; that the actual length of our route was 167 miles; and that the difficulties of this route are so great and continuous that even after the road was made, Chumfai was 24 marches from Silchar and 15 from Tipai Mookh. When these circumstances are taken into consideration, I think it will be seen that it is almost impossible to give within the limits of a report like this an adequate account of a tract of country so great in extent and so diversified in natural features, or of a route full of difficulties so numerous and so varied in character. I wish very much that Captain Badgely, or Lieutenants Leech and Woodthorpe, two very accomplishing engineer officers who accompanied his survey party, could be induced to write an account of the country. They are very much better fitted for such a work than I am, and if they would consent to do it I should be very happy to help them in any way I could.

45. The General with a small part of the force marched from Tipai Mookh on the 16th;† I accompanied him and took with me Dorpong and the other Looshais who had come to Silchar in November, and who now agreed to guide us to Kholel. We did not see any other Looshais till the 18th, when we met a number of men from Kholel, from whose manner and talk we learned that we should very likely have to fight Poiboi, and perhaps the Kholel people as well. That evening Dorpong and six more out of the eight Looshais said they

* Since my arrival in Calcutta, I have heard by telegraph from the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar that Bhoota has resolved to solicit our friendship.—*J. W. E.*

† A more detailed account of the operations of the column will be found in my diaries reprinted in Appendix (A.) to this Report.

they wanted to leave us and go to their own village, as their families would suffer if any collision were to occur while they were with us. The remaining Looshai had determined to return with us to Cachar, and was of course considered a traitor by his comrades. The loss of these men was likely to be very embarrassing to us, and we were naturally annoyed at their breach of faith, but General Bourchier had determined not to attempt to detain any one who joined us voluntarily, if he should afterwards wish to leave us, and so we let the men go. It was most fortunate that we did so. It is probable that all or most of them fought against us at Kholel, but it was Dorpong who, on the 29th December, risked his life to bring us information of the intention of the Kholel people to submit, and from that time till we returned to Tipai Mukh he never ceased to work for us. In this connection I may quote a passage in a letter to me from General Bourchier: "Another man I think deserving of reward is Dorpong, a Looshai of the Looshais; but, be he what he may, in his peculiar manner he rendered us immense service and faithfully warned us that we should be attacked." But it is certain that if General Bourchier had attempted to keep this man on the 18th December, he would not have been able to write in those terms of him at the end of the expedition. The policy begun in this instance was followed throughout. Looshais from all the villages with which we were not actually fighting at the time were always encouraged to come into camp, and they were allowed to leave when they liked, of course subject to the restriction that they could not pass the sentries after night-fall without permission from the officer commanding. I am convinced that much of the success of our column was owing to the consistent way in which General Bourchier carried out this policy. It may be thought at first sight that it enabled the Looshais to get information about us which they otherwise could not have got, and which ought to have been concealed from them. This danger was carefully considered by the General, and he came to the conclusion that ordinarily it would be advantageous to let the Looshais know as much as possible about our strength and movements, and that if at any time operations requiring secrecy were in preparation there would be no difficulty in preventing the Looshais who might be with us from leaving the camp. It is worthy of remark, that the almost unrestricted intercourse which we kept up with the Looshais could not have been maintained but for the perfect discipline and order of the head-quarters' camp, and the good conduct of all the men we had with us. What seemed to me most admirable in this discipline and order was that it was kept up with no apparent effort. No soldier ever appeared to commit an offence, and there appeared to be no punishments. The conduct of the coolies with us was nearly as good as that of the soldiers.

46. On the 22nd we crossed the Tipai after some altercation with Looshais whom we met at the stream. They were told that we meant to visit their village, but that we did not mean them any injury, as we were going against Vonolel's people. Next day while we were ascending the hill towards the village our advanced party was fired upon, and that day was spent in skirmishes with the Looshais, and in burning villages and grain. We encamped for the night in a village where we remained until the 26th, annoyed night and day by the Looshai sharpshooters, who kept firing into the village under cover of the surrounding jungle. On the 26th we returned to the Tooweebhoom, and in my diary for that day I have mentioned how admirably the manœuvre was effected.* During the two following days the Looshais, themselves completely protected by the dense jungle, gave us much trouble by firing upon coolies and working parties. An attack was also made on the elephants when out for fodder near Tipai Mookh, in which several mahouts were killed and some elephants wounded. It must be remembered that all this time we had no means of communicating with the Looshais, of learning what they were about or aiming at, or of letting the mknow our wishes and intentions. This made my position, as civil officer, a very trying one. On the 29th General Bourchier again ascended the Voombong hill to hunt for more villages. At first there was some firing between our troops and the Looshais concealed in the jungle; but half way up the hill we met Dorpong and some other Looshais who said that the people of Kholel wanted to make submission, as Poiboi had told them he could not help them. From that time there was no more fighting with the Kholel people, although they were not informed that their submission would be accepted for some days after.

47. I shall now try to give the Looshai side of the Kholel affair as far as I could learn it from themselves. Of course many of their statements were not to be trusted, and I have to depend on conjecture for several points on which they could not be induced to give me any information, but I think that the following account is in the main correct. The people of all that are left of Vonpilal's villages have been for some time, as I have more than once reported, divided into two factions, one of which adheres to Impanoo, Vonpilal's mother, who lives at Dollong, and the other to his widow, who lives at Kholel, and claims to manage the whole community in the name of her son Lalhi. The younger widow is the sister of Poiboi, who of course supports her in her disputes with her mother-in-law. The latter has in consequence sought the assistance of Sookpilal's son, Kholkom, who has moved his village across the Sonai to the same ridge as that on which Dollong is situated. When it was found that the expedition was really advancing in the direction of Kholel, and the headmen of all Vonpilal's villages had to decide on the course they were to adopt with regard to us, it was found that the adherents of Impanoo were anxious to make at least a pretence

* *See* Appendix (A.)

pretence of being friends with us, and to help us to get away towards the east, or at all events not to hinder us in any way; while the other party were eager to oppose our advance. There were two reasons for this difference of opinion. The adherents of Impanoo are generally the older people of the different villages, many of them witnesses of the destruction of Mora's village, which they did not wish to have repeated; while the minds of the younger members of the community, who mainly formed the other party, naturally dwelt chiefly on the fact that in 1849 the force had to hurry out of the country.

Then again, if the Kholel people were to oppose us unsuccessfully, there was danger of our next attacking the rest of Vonpilal's villages which all lay to the west, in which case both Impanoo and Kholkom would have suffered; while it was equally the interest of Poiboi that the force should be opposed before getting as far as his country. The two parties do not seem to have come to any decision, but probably there was a tacit compromise that if we did not attempt to visit the Voombong villages we should not be opposed, and that in this case the Kholel people would keep in outwardly friendly terms with us unless we met with some disaster ahead, or had to return unsuccessfully, when they might fall upon us with perfect safety. Of course it would have been impossible for us to accept such a situation. It was almost a necessity to make every village behind safe before taking a step in advance. From the position of the new Kholel group of villages, it could have done us more injury than any other, and we could not make sure of this group without visiting it and leaving a party in a position to command all the villages. Of course after matters had been brought to a crisis by the attack on our advance guard on the 23rd, both parties were forced to join and do their utmost to get rid of us, and they were helped by people from Poiboi's villages of Tingreedong, Chepowee, and perhaps some others. After the General had taken up his position in the village they tried to make it untenable and to force him to retire, as they think they forced Colonel Lister to hurry out of the country by similar measures in 1849, and they thought they had succeeded when we returned to the Tooweebhoom on the 26th, leaving several villages and much grain untouched. The owners thought that they were now quite safe, and began to reoccupy their houses, which they had deserted, and bring back their families from Tingreedoong, Chepowee, Dollong, and other villages where they had been sent for safety. At the same time they commenced to harass our communications as they did in Colonel Lister's case.

48. On the morning of the 29th they had no idea of giving in, but when they saw General Bourchier marching towards their villages again, instead of hurrying back to Tipai Mukh as they expected, they were seized with a sudden panic. The owners of property which had escaped the previous destruction, and who had congratulated themselves that they were safe, could not bring themselves to run the same risk a second time; a village council was hastily held in which they clamoured for instant submission. In this they were supported by the people present from the western villages, who saw that their turn must come next, and Poiboi's people and the people whose villages had been already destroyed had to yield very reluctantly, as I was afterwards told by one of the latter. After they had decided to submit, there was a difficulty about letting us know that they had done so, for they knew that it was almost certain that any Looshai seen in the jungle would be taken for one of the sharpshooters who were annoying us, and shot down before he could make the friendliness of his intentions understood; but Dorpong undertook the risk and came to meet us waving a red cloth which I had given him. One of the soldiers of the advanced guard was just about to fire at him, when Captain Butter, General Bourchier's aide-de-camp, who was most fortunately in front at the time, recognised Dorpong, and told the man not to fire. From that day we never had the slightest difficulty in communicating with the Looshais. The terms imposed on the village of Kholel were designedly lenient. Our great object was to get to Chumfai as quickly as possible, and General Bourchier considered that to enable him to do this the safety of his communication was essential. The headmen agreed to make themselves responsible for the safety of our communications between Tipai Mukh and the Tooweebhoom, and they gave three of their number to remain with us as hostages until our return from Chumfai.

These men behaved admirably all through the remainder of the expedition, and did us excellent service more than once. We knew that there were no captive British subjects in the village, but I found out afterwards that there were two Naga women who had been taken prisoners when the village of Mentha in Munnipoor was destroyed in 1869. One of these was given up while we were in the country, and accompanied me back. She is now with her relatives who have come into Cachar. Another was brought down to Tipai Mookh after I had left, but as she showed a disinclination to come further unless some of the Looshais accompanied her, which they were unwilling to do, Colonel Nuthall, the officer commanding there, did not like to force her or the Looshais in the matter, and allowed her to return on her promising to come down with the next set of Looshais visiting Cachar. I think Colonel Nuthall exercised a wise discretion, particularly as cholera had made its appearance between Tipai Mookh and Cachar. On my way back I arranged with the Kholel headmen that they are to meet me or some other officer next cold season at any place that may be appointed, and have promised to get up a fair for them at Tipai Mookh.

49. There was a rumour that Khalkom was wounded at Kholel. I could not find out the truth of it. He was certainly very ill at one time, and no one seemed able to explain his disease. It is quite possible that he may have taken part in some of the fighting at Kholel, and more than probable that people from his village and that of Impanoo did. But there is equal reason to believe that he did not at the outset wish the Kholel people to oppose

oppose us, and that his party were eager to submit on the 29th. Indeed, I have heard from the people of Lalboorah and Poiboi that Khalkom had the principal share in bringing about the submission, and they spoke very bitterly on the subject. They also accused him of having induced us to attack them to save himself, and I have heard them say that as soon as we had left the country all the eastern villages would unite and take vengeance on him. This, however, was before the affair at Koongnoong and the subsequent disintegration of the eastern villages. Khalkom is now stronger than the entire family of Vonolel. But it will be more convenient for me to treat this subject lower down, when I attempt an estimate of our relations with Sookpilal.

50. Our next political object after having settled the Kholel difficulty was to come to such terms with the people of Tingridoong and Chipoowee that we could rely on their not giving us trouble in the rear in the event, which now seemed probable, of Poiboi's joining the sons of Vonolel, and opposing us when we attempted to cross the Lengteng, which we should have had to do if we had taken the route we then contemplated. But we were not able to leave the Tooweebhoom till the 6th January, although the road ahead had been pushed on a considerable way previous to that date. On the 10th and three following days 225 Thadoo Kookies, the inhabitants of a village formerly subject to Vonolel, arrived at Cheeboo, to which place the Munnipooree contingent had advanced. The people of this village it seems had taken advantage of the confusion into which the Looshais had been thrown by the events at Kholel and our threatened advance to make their escape and take refuge with the Munnipoorees. There were afterwards more than one exodus of a similar kind, the causes and probable effects of which I shall discuss lower down.

At the same time, although the south-eastern Looshais were getting very uneasy, I am sure that they still believed we should be unable to reach Chumfai; and our own hill men, as well as the Looshais with us, were equally incredulous, particularly when they saw us forced to halt on the Kholel ridge from the 15th to the 18th January, waiting for supplies. However, we did get to Chepoowee on the 18th. On the road the Looshais made an impudent attempt to palm off on us a personated Poiboi, a very common trick of theirs, and when we found out the cheat and showed our anger, there seemed to be some danger of a collision. This, however, was avoided to my great satisfaction, for a fight at Chepoowee, unless it were a real trial of strength between us and all the south-eastern villages, would only have delayed us without doing any good. In the course of a few days, during which we halted at Chepoowee, we made very satisfactory arrangements with that village and Tingridoong, the people agreeing to guarantee the safety of our communications between the Tooweebhoom and Chepoowee, and sending with us men of each village as hostages. Among these was the headman of Tingridoong, whom I suspected of being an arrant old schemer, but I thought that if I had him with us, I might be able to turn his intrigues against us to our advantage. The Chepoowee chief, who was comparatively trustworthy, remained near the officer commanding the station as a kind of hostage. These arrangements were very successful; and I may here mention that from the time of our agreement with the Kholel people there was never the slightest attempt made to disturb our line of communications—not even when the south-eastern villages were making their great effort to force us back from Moothelen,—an effort which was mainly directed to the destruction of our means of transport.

The Chepoowee people gave up to us two Naga women who had been taken away from Munnipore many years ago. One of them could only speak Looshai, and both refused to leave the village. We kept them with us in camp apart from the Looshais for some time, and did all in our power to induce them to accompany us willingly, but all our efforts failed, and we did not think ourselves justified in forcing them to be rescued. So they were allowed to remain with the Looshais. On our way back several families of Kookies belonging to the village joined us and accompanied us into Cachar, but this subject can be fully treated more conveniently in connection with the exodus of Kookies into Munnipoor.

51. We left Chepoowee on the 22nd. Our original intention was to follow the Guonpa ridge from No. 11 (Bohmong) as far south as a point due west of Sellam, and then to cross the Lengting by a very steep and difficult ghaut. I have marked this route approximately in blue on the map. It was the one which the Looshais expected us to take, and they had stockaded many strong points on it, and here all the villagers had resolved on making a great stand. For some time previous to our arrival at Bohmong, the information which we received about the intended defence of the Lengting had been getting more and more definite, and we had heard that it was the intention of the chiefs, if they should succeed in turning our force back, to lose no opportunity of harassing us on our retreat, and not to cease pursuing us till we reached the cultivated part of the Cachar district; while I was given to understand that if we succeeded in crossing the Lengting in spite of all the efforts of the Looshais, no further opposition would be offered to our advance on Chumfai. When, however, we got to Bohmong, General Bourchier decided to cross the great range by Soorthlong or Moothelen, and so avoid the very rocky and difficult Lengting. But of course, in taking this route it was not his object to avoid any opposition that the Looshais were prepared to make, and it was most undesirable that they should think so. Consequently, immediately on the change of route being decided on, I made it known to the headman of Tingridoong who was with us, and told him that he should go ahead of us in the morning with Dorpong, and inform Poiboi that he must give up any Munnipooree captives that might be in his villages, and come in person to make submission to us. Shortly after dinner the Tingridoong headman asked to be allowed to send away two young

Looshais who were with us to warn the villagers ahead that we are going in their direction. Dorpong gave me to understand that these lads were sent to recall the men stationed on the Lengting. This the General did not think was at all to be objected to; so the lads were allowed to go. Next morning the headman of Tingridoong and Dorpong were sent on. That evening Colonel Roberts met them on the top of Soorthlong, coming from the village of Taikoong. They told him that the surrounding villages were full of armed men. That night there was held at Koongnoong a great council of all the chiefs of the families of Vonolel and his brother Lalpoong, and their headmen. At this meeting the Looshai plan of operations for the following day was settled, which really was a very well designed one, and if it could have been carried out successfully, would have been a tremendous blow to us. The Looshai force were to be divided into two parties, one of which was to attack our main body while marching along a very rocky stream flowing between precipitous hills, covered with, I think, the thickest jungle we had met since we left Kholel, and was then to retire slowly up the hill disputing every difficult bit. In the meantime the other party was to steal down the bed of the stream and attack the coolies, who, they thought, would be left unprotected during the pursuit of the party retreating up the hill. They thought that if they could kill a large number of our coolies, the remainder would get so terrified that they would run off into the jungle, whence we should never recover them, and that the force would be starved out of the country. Dorpong who, with the headman of Tingridoong, came back to camp on the morning of the 25th, gave me private information of this scheme, chiefly, I think, to spite the old Tingridoong headman with whom he had a quarrel, which of course we carefully fostered. The idea of attacking the coolies had probably been originated by the headman who had more than once been overheard to use expressions implying that he saw that our weak point was the enormous line of coolies that followed the main body. I need not dwell at length on the complete failure of this attempt. In my diary for the day I quoted General Bourchier's description of the fight.* I may add, however, that I under-estimated the Looshai loss. Judging from accounts which I got afterwards, I think that there must have been more than 60 killed and wounded. I have heard the names of 32 who were killed.

52. This affair at Koongnoong, and the destruction of Taikoong on the following day, made all further resistance impossible. Some of the chiefs, indeed, would have liked to try once more, but they could not get their people to support them. The Looshais saw clearly that they had been completely beaten in what they had themselves chosen as a trial of strength, and they frankly accepted the situation. The chiefs, too, probably saw that resistance would be unavailing, but they saw also that in any case they were in danger of utter ruin. For, after the 25th January, entire villages deserted them and went off to Munnipoor, Kamhow, the Poies, and Sookpilal. On the 13th February, 373 Satês, with 28 muskets, arrived at Munnipoor; and on the 14th and 18th, 392 Thado and other Kookies. On the 4th or 5th March, 962 men, women, and children, with 44 muskets, left some of the eastern villages under the escort of a party of Kamhow's people. On the 14th March the whole of Bohmong's village, 672 people with 70 muskets, joined the Munnipooreés. I have got all these numbers from the Munnipoor Political Agent, so that they are absolutely correct. Of course I cannot give equally accurate particulars of the numbers of those who succeeded in reaching Kamhow or the Poies or Sookpilal, but I know that they were very great. It will easily be understood that the chiefs, seeing themselves in such a position, might think that they had nothing more to lose, and become reckless in consequence.

53. The Tingridoong headman had been made very useful to us, but I thought it just as well not to let his conduct go unpunished, so I took the opportunity of his leaving the camp without permission on the day Taikoong was destroyed to inflict a heavy fine on him. It was paid at once, and I did not find him out in any more intrigues. General Bourchier and I also thought it advisable to inflict a fine on Poiboi's villages, which was paid before we reached Sellam. We were also very anxious to get Poiboi into the camp; but we found it impossible to get over his dread of us. He followed us to Toolcheng, and evidently made a great effort to summon up courage to meet us there, but he could not do it. Possibly this may have been in some measure owing to my refusing to swear on water poured out of a gun that he should come to no harm. His headman said that if I were to do so they thought he might pluck up courage enough to come in; but I have a strong conviction of the impolicy of a European officer submitting to take oaths prescribed by hillmen, and neither General Bourchier nor I thought a meeting with Poiboi of importance sufficient to warrant me in making a concession of which I so thoroughly disapproved. Ultimately, on our return, General Bourchier, at the solicitation of the people of the village, dispensed with Poiboi's personal appearance on condition that three of his headmen accompanied us to Tipai Mookh. One old woman belonging to Munnipoor was given up at this village, and a little coolie child who had been purchased by Lalboorah from the Howlongs and sent to me in lieu of a little Bengali girl whom I was very anxious to recover, but who, it was said, had died. We cannot find out anything about the identity of the coolie child. The old woman died on the way into Cachar.

54. Since my return I have heard that some of Poiboi's headmen were going into Munnipoor towards the end of last month, and that it was the intention of the Political Agent to advise the Rajah to enter into an alliance, offensive and defensive, with Poiboi, and to protect

* *See* Appendix (A).

protect him from the encroachment of Kamhow. I hope the Political Agent will succeed in effecting this, for all I have learned during the expedition has strengthened the opinion I had previously formed, that the eastern Looshais and the tribes bordering on them can be best managed through Munnipoor.

There can be little doubt that if the Munnipoorees had tried to fight the men whom we met at Koongnoong they would have been utterly worsted; but now that the Looshais have been well beaten and require support rather than further weakening, Munnipoor can help them, and I do not see how we can. But we cannot depend on the interference of Munnipoor being beneficial, unless the Political Agent have complete control over the relations of that State with all the Kookie tribe, and unless each Political Agent remain in Munnipoor for a longer time than Dr. Brown and General Nuthal have done; for the effect of such constant changes must be to lessen the effective control of the European officers over the intriguing Munnipoor officials. It is essential, too, that the Political Agent should be brought into much closer relations with the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar than he has been hitherto.

55. Our relations with the people of Sellam, Toolcheng, and Lenkom's villages were in the highest degree satisfactory to the end. The people were clearly anxious to be on friendly terms with us, and always ready to give us any assistance we called for. Of course there was necessarily a difference in the case of Lalboorah's own people. We had always put forward Vonolel's own village as the one which we considered had committed the greatest offences against us, and had all through declared that the immediate object of the expedition was to inflict punishment on that village, and force it to give up the muskets it had taken from our troops. All through our advance we had been getting information, which left no doubt that the view we took about Chumfai was right. The Lushais all considered that this village gave the signal for every raid, even for those conducted by the chiefs of independent villages. The headmen confessed this to me, and they acknowledged that all the guns and uniforms taken in 1871 had been brought to Chumfai in the first instance, and then distributed among other villages.

Immediately on our arrival the village of Chumfai itself was destroyed. The villages of Vonolel's widow was spared on the people giving up two of our muskets and 10 of their own in lieu of the remainder, some of which they said they had sent to different Poi chiefs, and some to other Looshai villages, and they had to pay a fine which, however, was somewhat limited in consequence of our discovering that the effects of the expedition had already weakened the tribes beyond what we considered desirable. They had also to give three of their headmen to accompany the force as hostages to Tipai Mookh. It was impossible for people towards whom we took such an attitude to be on very familiar terms with us, and we had to leave too soon after the payment of the fine to allow a feeling of confidence in the good faith of our assurances of forgiveness to grow up. However, the headmen of this village and some of those of Lenkom's who accompanied us to Tipai Mookh seemed to have very friendly feelings towards us, when we parted on the 7th of March, the day before I left Tipai Mookh on my way to Cachar.

56. I have already alluded to the swarms of Kookies who, during the expedition, took refuge in the Munnipoor territory. The total number who passed over from the Looshais was 2,549 up to the 23rd March, and they took in with them 156 muskets. As my estimate of the advantages of this exodus differs very much from that of the Political Agent, I append to this report two letters from him to General Bourchier on the subject, and my remarks on them.* I mentioned in a previous paragraph that a number (in all 54) of Thadoos and Waiphies accompanied our force on its return from Chepoowee. A brief account of the antecedents of these Thadoos, and the reasons they assign for so many Kookies now leaving the Looshai villages, may help to illustrate the accounts I have elsewhere given of the composition of the Looshai communities.

These Thadoos say that some 30 years ago they belonged to a powerful village under a chief of their own family, whom they call Mongpilal, and occupied various sites on the hills around the Tipai; but in course of time the Poitoos of Lalchokla's family began to press hard upon them, and at length their chief took refuge with Toosoong, the head chief of all the Thadoos, who was much more powerful than the Poitoo chiefs. But while some of Mongpilal's Thadoos accompanied their chief to Toosoong's village, many more took refuge with the Looshai chiefs who were then getting powerful, and who soon after drove the Poitoos westward to the Chaterchoora range. Some time after this, when Toosoong, who was father of Koodingmang, the chief who massacred a cutcha Naga village last year, was driven to take refuge in Munnipoor, Mongpilal and the people who had accompanied him to Toosoong's village again formed a separate village under the protection of the Looshais, moving about from place to place, until this year, when they left for Munnipoor. But those of his people who had originally taken refuge among the Looshais remained in the villages of the latter, sometimes living in the villages of Lalpoong, sometimes in those of Moora, until three years ago, when they went to Chepoowee. The reasons these people give for the desertion of so many of the people once subject to the Looshai chiefs are, that the hills have been over-joomed, and no more land fit for cultivation left; that for the last four years, since the younger chiefs have been able to do what they like, there has been nothing but raiding, and that they are tired of it; lastly, that while their chiefs were engaged in making raids on Munnipoor and Cachar, in the course of which the lives of many of their people were lost, Kamhow and other chiefs were getting more daring in their aggressions on their villages, while the result of the expedition has destroyed whatever faith they had left in the power

* *See* Appendix (C).

power of the Looshai chiefs. The Munnipoor chief means I believe to settle the people that have taken refuge with him in hills to the south of the Munnipoor valley. I think that it would have been much better if they had remained under the Looshai chiefs, and settled in that portion of the same tract which lies south of the Cachar boundary, and which is much better suited for cultivation than the more eastern hills. It is quite probable that Kamhow and the Poies will still continue their attacks on these Kookies, and the Munnipoor State will probably have to take measures for their protection. But it is possible that these people will not be satisfied with the restrictions and burdens of the Munnipoor supremacy, and that they will follow Kodingmang into the Naga Hills, where they would be a constant source of trouble both to us and Munnipoor. There can be no doubt that the villages to the east have of late been pressed hard by Kamhow and others, so hard that the people have taken to stockading, which they never do unless when they feel themselves weak; but it is to be feared that unless the Political Agent can direct the Munnipoor policy into a better course than it has followed of late, the Kookies who have this year moved into the Rajah's jurisdiction will not be much less exposed to attacks in future than they had been while living under the Looshai chiefs.

57. It will be understood from the foregoing paragraphs that I do not now attach so much importance as before to the eastern villages, or to our relations with them. On the other hand I think one result of the expedition may, and probably will be, to increase the strength of the villages belonging to Sookpilal and his sons, and the influence of that family of chiefs; in short, to put them in a position in which they will have more ability to help us than they have had hitherto, while at the same time the fright they have all got will make them very anxious to be on good terms with us. But I cannot speak positively of the ultimate effects of the expedition upon Sookpilal's power until I know more than I do at present of the dealings of the Chittagong force with the Lalpitang Howlongs. These have been for some years back his chief foes, and although his people boasted a good deal last year about all he was going to do in forcing them to give up the captives, I know that they have very lately dispossessed him of his chief salt springs; and Rowa was no doubt telling the truth when he said that Sookpilal had told him to advise an attack on Sangboonga and Bhenkooya, as mentioned in paragraph 4 of Mr. McWilliam's letter, No. 132, of the 30th January. Sookpilal knew very well that the Howlongs would attack him hereafter if they felt themselves strong enough, just as the eastern chiefs were determined to attack his son Khalkom. The facts related in that report show that Sookpilal was then really anxious to be on good terms with us; his kindness to the women, his sending them down, and even his attempt to make them tell lies about his having redeemed them and recovered Mary Winchester. We have not heard from him since, but some of our people are with him, and a man of his is still here. Another, Rowa, unfortunately died of cholera some time ago. The Kookies here are quite satisfied that Sookpilal is no longer to be feared by them, and they are very anxious to move down their villages far south of the existing outposts. The Kookies who came in from Chepoowee, who probably know the state of feeling among the Looshais, assure me that there is no danger in this, and are themselves going to set up a village between Kolosheep and Chatterchoora.

58. One result of the expedition will be to make Poiboi unable to give any further support to his sister's party in Vonpilal's villages; and as both parties are thoroughly frightened, and feel that their villages are absolutely in our power, Khalkom can only hope to retain any influence in them through our acquiescence. The unanimous adhesion of Vonpilal's people would probably make the family of Sookpilal a match for any of the tribes that border on their villages, for it would eventually give them complete control of all the villages west of the Moothilen range; consequently, we may reckon confidently that Khalkom's interests will co-operate with his fears in making him desire to stand well with us. On our return his two chief muntries accompanied us from Pachoowee to Tepai Mookh, and I expect that he or one of his brothers will come in to visit Silchar at no distant date as soon as the dread which Rowa's death is likely to cause them has had time to pass away.

59. Sookpilal says that he has no influence west of the range on which Chatterchoora is situated, but we do not accurately know what direction the ridge takes south of that peak. The country to the west of Sookpilal's territory is nominally subject to the Tipperah chief, but the eastern boundary of the territory of the latter is very uncertain. According to Pemberton and all the earlier maps, Independent Tipperah, as it was then called, extended as far as Tipai Mookh. But some years ago the name of Hill Tipperah was in some mysterious way substituted for the older name, and all the hills between the south of Cachar and the Chittagong Hill Tracts seem to have been at about the same time silently included in the Cachar district. The boundary between Cachar and Hill Tipperah, shown in the maps of that period, is the same as the line I have assumed to be the western boundary of Sookpilal's territory. But in the maps published lately, a "supposed watershed and boundary" is laid down west of the supposed course of the Lungai, a little stream flowing into the Sylhet district. I should think that the best geographical boundary between Hill Tipperah and the Looshai Hills would be the continuation of the watershed that divides Sylhet from Cachar. I cannot say what amount of authority the Tipperah chief actually has over the Kookies living in the hills west of Sookpilal. That he has some, is generally acknowledged; but I should think that it can be little more than nominal. These Kookies belong chiefly to the Dorlong and Poytoo families; the former of whom seem to have settled chiefly towards the south, while the

Poytoos

Poytoos are more in the direction of Sylhet. Both families formerly occupied some of the hills in which our column worked, and both were driven westwards by other families, among whom the Looshais were prominent. The Poytoos of Lalchookla's village have been already mentioned in connection with the Thadoos, who accompanied us from Chepoowee. This is the Lalchookla who was transported in 1845. But even the above meagre bits of information must not be taken as all absolutely correct. I know very little about the Dorlongs, except what I have heard incidentally from Looshais. I have told all I know of the Poytoos in paragraphs 19, 20, and 21 of my Report C,* dated 13th March 1871. It is probable that the civil and survey officers with the right column have collected some information about the south-eastern part of Hill Tipperah, and that the Political Agent's report for last year will add much to our knowledge of the country and its inhabitants.

* Pages 124 and 125 of Return.

60. I should prefer to delay my final report on the defensive and protective measures to be adopted on the Cachar side, and the means to be taken to cultivate friendly relations with the tribes, until I have had an opportunity of learning all that is known about the Tipperah Kookies mentioned above, as well as about the present and probable future position of the Howlongs and Syloos. I should like also to get some information about the relations of the authorities of British Burmah with the tribes on the Kolodyne before submitting the report asked for in the correspondence forwarded to me with your No. 57 of the 20th March. I have long had a conviction, which has steadily deepened as my experience in frontier matters has increased, of the impolicy and uselessness of attempting to deal in detail with the Kookie difficulty. We cannot hope for success, or even for safety, if we allow ourselves to be misled by what really are accidents of political geography, and treat the relations of each district or dependent State with the Kookies on its border as a separate question, in dealing with which measures can be taken without any reference to any of the others, even though the measures may be based on principles diametrically opposite, perhaps hostile, to those adopted elsewhere, and may possibly have a most injurious effect on the relations between some other district or State and the tribes without. Looking simply to the interests of Cachar, and if I could with safety leave out of sight the considerations which must influence our treatment of the parts of the question in which other districts are concerned, I should at once submit a detailed scheme based on the principles which I have advocated consistently during the last four years. But I feel that such a scheme could only be a provisional one, and that I might have hereafter to alter all the details, possibly even to modify some of the principles, after I had learned all that there is to be known about the Tipperah Kookies, the Syloos, the Howlongs, the Shindoos, and the geography of the tracts which they inhabit.

61. The proposal to keep up the road to Chepoowee, on which you called for a report in your No. 64 of the 9th April, is a good instance of the impossibility of dealing with the subject of our future Kookie policy entirely from a Cachar point of view. The expediency of keeping up the road depends entirely on the decision that may be come to on the advisability, firstly, of making a road between Cachar and Chittagong; and secondly, of taking such road through the Chumfai valley. For, if the road to Chittagong should not be decided on, there would be no possible advantage in keeping up a road as far as Chepoowee, unless, indeed, it were contemplated to retain there permanently the European officer and force which would have to be stationed there during the construction of the road. If any other line should be adopted for a road between Cachar and Chittagong, there would obviously be even less advantage in keeping up a road to Chepoowee. Now, it is impossible for me to come to a conclusion, either on the desirability of making the road to Chittagong, or of taking such road through the Chumfai valley, without knowing the exact character of the results obtained by the right column, and the geography of the country in which it operated. Of course, the question of the practicability and expense of completing and keeping up the road as far as Chepoowee can be treated independently of the above considerations; but previous to doing so, I wish to point out that the road in its present state is not more than a fair-weather path. The bridges put up by us, even if still standing, will be carried away during the rains, and much of the road will become impassable, and next cold weather will be scarcely better than the original track. If the road is to be kept up, it would be absolutely necessary at the outset to do so much additional earthwork as would be sufficient to keep the road from falling altogether to ruin during the rainy season, and to put up substantial timber bridges strong enough to withstand the floods, and, as a rule, not requiring renewal more than once in three years.

If the road to Chepoowee be undertaken, it will probably be found necessary to divide it into four sections, for each of which separate estimates and specifications would have to be framed. The first of these sections would be from Luckipore to Mynâdhur tea garden; the second would be from Mynadhur to Tipai Mookh; the third from Tipai Mookh to the Tooweebhoom, and the last from the Tooweebhoom to Chepoowee.

62. I have got two estimates for the section between Luckipore and Mynadhur, one from the executive engineer and the other from the superintendent of local roads, both of whom know the present track, and are therefore in a position to state what would be required to make it passable throughout the year. The executive engineer estimated for a slightly improved road, six feet wide, with rough timber bridges; the whole to cost 28,850 rupees at the outset, and to be kept up with an annual outlay of about 5,000 rupees, not including the cost of replacing the bridges every third year. The superintendent of local roads proposes to make the road eight feet wide, and considerably improved in gradient, with less

substantial bridges than those proposed by the executive engineer. The cost, as estimated by the superintendent, would be 29,943 rupees, and the annual expense, including the amount necessary to replace worn-out bridges, would be 6,544 rupees. Both these estimates are framed on the assumption that we could get the work done at rates scarcely exceeding those current in the district. But I think it likely that we should have to pay much higher rates, as the people employed would have to camp in the unhealthy and hated forest, while they would have to carry with them sufficient supplies to last while employed on the work. The rates would have to be still higher between Mynadhur and Tipai Mookh. Indeed, I doubt very much whether this part could be done with the labour available in the district, which needs some rest after the tremendous strain of the last few months. The superintendent of local roads has, however, framed an estimate, which he has sent in to me, on the assumption that the work might be done at rates slightly in advance of those now current in the district. This estimate amounts to 33,022 rupees for the construction of the road, and 8,350 rupees for its maintenance. If imported labour were employed, this estimate would be very much exceeded. I should add, that to the estimated cost of making the road there should be added the expenses connected with a guard of at least 50 police, required to give confidence to the people working south of Mynadhur. Exclusive of this item, the entire cost of completing the road from Luckipore to Tipai Mookh would, if the estimate of the superintendent of local roads be correct, be about 65,000 rupees, and the cost of keeping it in repair nearly 16,000 rupees a year, and I have not the slightest doubt that in reality the work would be found to cost much more than double these estimates. But this portion of the road would be practically unused. For even after all this money had been spent upon it, the road would still be a bad one, scarcely fit to be called a bridle track, and would not at any season of the year bear competition with the river.

63. The third section of the road would be less difficult, and would require very few bridges; but one of these, that over the Tipai, would be very expensive. The cost of the work done on this portion of the road would of course increase in proportion to the distance from Nipai Mookh, and a larger guard than that required on the second section would be needed. On the other hand this portion of the road would be constantly used at all seasons of the year by Looshais coming down to Tipai Mookh to trade. Indeed, I think that it would be practicable to induce the Lushais to keep up this portion of the road, and this would be far the cheapest and best way of maintaining it. I may add, that whatever might be the decision on the subject of the Chittagong road, I should recommend that this bit between Tipai Mookh and Voombong should be kept open if the Looshais could be prevailed on to undertake the work. Of course if it were not to form part of a continuous road between the two districts, there would be no need for the bridge over the Tipai at the mouth of that stream. I think it very doubtful whether the road to Chittagong should adopt our route between the top of Sengbong and Pachoowee. It is even possible that it ought not to pass through Chepoowee. It must be remembered that from the time we got to Sengbong, and had from time to time to make a choice between two or more routes, our choice was necessarily guided by military and political considerations. We had to descend to the Tooweebhoom near its junction with the Tipai in order to get at the Voombong villages. After we had settled with them, we had to go to Pachoowee on the great ridge, before being able to decide on the line to be taken in dealing with Chepoowee and Tingridoong. When we decided on going to Chepoowee, we had to give up an alternative route to the Gnowpa, range which seemed much easier. Now, we might have descended from Senbong to the Tooweetoo much nearer its source, consequently at a higher level, and have got to the top of the Kholel ridge, at a point much further north than Pachoowee, thereby avoiding the crossing of the steep Parbachung range. We might then have crossed the Tipai near Tingridoong at a comparatively high level, and got round to the Gnowpa range, without having to make the descent to and ascent from the Saireemloowee. It is probable that the Chittagong road would take this line, which I think would be found shorter as well as more practicable, and far less costly than the one we took. Of course it might turn out on exploring the alternative line that there are difficulties in it of which I have no suspicion at present, but I do not think this likely from what I have heard from the Looshais and what I have myself seen of the country. Finally, we could scarcely hope to gain any political advantages in compensation for the probable physical disadvantages of our route. The people of Chepoowee say that they do not intend to remain on the present site of their village much longer, and they talk of settling on Sengbong, while, under any circumstances, the bit of our road between Sengbong and the Tooweebhom might be kept up.

64. Before concluding this report, I wish to put on record my testimony to the very great assistance we received from Mr. McWilliam, the Officiating Deputy Commissioner, who was before, as well as during the progress of, the expedition indefatigable in collecting coolies and boats, in searching for routes, and generally in attempting to carry out the wishes of the military authorities. But in addition to this he had very hard work in complying with my demands. I had undertaken to supply food to the police who accompanied the column, and to the local coolies whom I was able to induce to serve with it. There were more than 500 of the latter for whom, as well as for great numbers of boatmen and others, Mr. McWilliam had to provide sufficient supplies from the district resources, and to forward them to Tipai Mookh. He had also to provide carriage, &c. for the advanced outposts on the south frontier. All this was a tremendous strain on a district so small as Cachar, and Mr.

McWilliam

McWilliam deserves very high credit for the way in which all demands were met, as well as for his success in distributing the pressure so as not to let it fall with undue weight on any class in the district. His efforts were well seconded by Baboo Ram Rutton Endo, his collectorate nazir, a most useful and deserving public servant, who seems in the present case to have performed the almost impossible task of at once satisfying his superiors and the people of the district. In this connection I may call attention to the good spirit showed by Mr. Harlow, Manager of the Eastern Bengal Company, who once, when asked to supply 30 coolies to carry on food to one of the outposts, sent 50, and offered to give 100 twice a month if required. I regret to say that there was very heavy mortality among the hill coolies locally employed, notwithstanding the unceasing care of Dr. Buckle and the medical officers under him, especially Drs. Nicholson, Harvey, and Monteath. I am deeply grateful to all these gentlemen for their unremitting and self-sacrificing kindness and attention to myself and all my people throughout the expedition.

65. Almost all the persons employed under me did well on the whole, but I can only mention here Baboo Hurri Churn Surmah, to whom I owe a great debt of gratitude for the service he did me throughout the expedition. Some passages in a letter from the Brigadier General commanding the column corroborate so strongly my own opinion of the Baboo, that I must do myself the pleasure of quoting them here. General Bourchier says—"I look upon it that Hurri Thakoor deserves especial notice. He was, as it appeared to me, indefatigable when even in very bad health, and he certainly was devoted to the interests of the column. One of the most difficult parts of your* duty was, so to speak, sifting the wheat from the chaff, and discriminating between reports palpably false and others likely to be correct, while you had no means of obtaining information except through Looshais whose aim would naturally be to mislead. From what you have told me, I feel sure in this department the assistance Hurri Thakoor gave you was invaluable. I look upon it that a man of his stamp should be liberally rewarded, and I am sure it is the very best policy to bind such men to our interests. He always seemed to me to be of a stamp we so seldom meet among natives, possessing firmness, self-possession, no cringing, in fact, a most gentlemanly demeanour." I can add little to this emphatic testimony to the worth of Baboo Hurri Churn. But I may remark that his usefulness was not confined to helping me to collect information. His assistance was invaluable in every department of my work, especially in the management of my coolies and the often difficult task of making the Looshais clearly understand the nature and meaning of the terms imposed upon them. I am very anxious that he should be permanently relieved from his present appointment of tehsildar of Hyakandy, and put into such a position that I could make use of his services in hill work exclusively. He has, I may add, one qualification for such work in a rare degree. He seems absolutely devoid of physical fear. I have had the opportunity of seeing him more than once under fire, and each time he was as calm and self-possessed as if he had been in his tehsil cutcherry.

* Mr. Edgar's.

APPENDIX (A.)

(Given at pp. 332 and 333 of Return.)

DIARY of the Civil Officer with the Cachar Column of the Looshai Expedition.

ON the 6th December I left the station for Mynadhur. On that day reached the ferry near Alni; found the road up to that point tolerably good. On the 7th marched to the Dubhedhur garden. The country is very bad, being a constant succession of steep, though low hills and streams, with almost perpendicular banks and muddy beds between. Much had been done by the 44th and 22nd to make the road practicable, but nothing of a permanent nature could be done with the means at the disposal of the expedition. It is probable that the path will be practicable on our return, but there will be few vestiges of it at the end of next rains. Mr. Aird, the superintendent of Dubhedhur and other gardens in the neighbourhood, informed me that for all practical purposes he considered the river preferable as a means of communication to almost any road that could be constructed through a country of the nature of that between Alni and Mynadhur. I reached Mynadhur on the 8th. The country between that place and Dubhedhur is rather better than that passed through by me on the previous day, but it is still very difficult.

Halted at Mynadhur on the 9th and 10th, making arrangements about supplies and boats for Tipai Mookh.

11th.—Marched to a place about 20 miles from Mynadhur, in the direction of Tipai Mookh. The country was rather better than that north of Mynadhur, and a tolerable fair-weather road had been made all the way.

12th.—Marched for some miles along a path on the left bank of the river, which had been found preferable to the original route on the right bank. The 44th and coolies under Mr. Daly were at work on this track, which promised to turn out a practicable road. After marching some miles, I got into a boat and came on here, as no practicable route had been yet found for the last few miles into camp. I found that the Brigadier General and Colonel Roberts had during the day attempted to explore a road towards Kholel, under the guidance

of one of the Looshais from Poiboi. They found the path extremely steep and rocky, and scarcely capable of being made practicable for elephants. On the way back Dorpong hinted that he might be able to find a better way, if paid; so on my arrival I told him and Rapai muntri to go out in the morning and explore the country about, and return before our usual hour for starting. Our camp lies south of the great bend which the Barak makes after receiving the Tipai, and is on both sides of that stream. There are high hills all round. Close to our huts is a massive pillar, built to mark the tri-junction point of the boundaries of Munnipoor, Cachar, and the hill territories.

13th.—Started with the Brigadier General to explore the country south of Tipai Mookh. After proceeding a little way along the path taken the previous day by the Brigadier General and Colonel Roberts, we met Raipa and the Looshai returning. They said that they had found a new route. We followed them for some miles along an elephant path capable of being turned into a very fair road with little difficulty except in one place, where it winds round the base of a perpendicular rock, apparently some hundred feet high. Even here a comparatively small amount of labour, scientifically applied, would overcome all difficulties. The path tried on the previous day led right over the rock, which must have presented an almost insuperable obstacle. A short time after turning the rock we came to a level, well-watered spot, where the General resolved to send a working party on the following day. From this the path is said to ascend with a moderately easy gradient to the top of the Senbong range, the first that has to be crossed on the way to Kholel.

14th.—I have advised the Brigadier General to push on even a small advance party to Kholel on political grounds. Situated as we are at Tipai Mookh in a valley, we have not the same opportunities of opening a communication with neutral or friendly villages that we should have if we were in occupation of a position like Kholel, which in a manner commands the villages of Impanoo, Khalkom, and Lalhi on one side, and those of Poiboi on the other. Besides this, it seems to me important that we should at once show the Looshais, by pushing on that we really mean to go through their country. I have learned from various sources that there is an idea in the villages that we cannot get beyond our water-carriage at Tipai Mookh, and that our intentions are to remain here until the villages make some sort of submission to us. While such an idea remains in the minds of the chiefs and their people, they will naturally be undecided about the attitude most expedient to take towards us; but an advance to Kholel would probably have the effect of making them choose their course and declare themselves either friendly or hostile. The Brigadier General in command of the force has approved of the move recommended by me, and intends to advance with a small force on the 16th.

15th.—Halted at Tipai Mookh. The General has been employed for the last two days in attempts to explore the singularly difficult country through which the Barak flows after receiving the Tipai. The hills here are so precipitous and the jungles so dense, that for some time all efforts made to push a road through were baffled. To-day, however, the Brigadier General succeeded in connecting our camp with station No. 4, and he expects that a couple of days' labour will make the road practicable.

16th.—Advanced to-day from Tipai Mookh. Halted for the night at the place already occupied by the working party mentioned in my entry of the 13th, but Colonel Roberts and myself explored a few miles further on. Found the route a very easy ascent as far as we went. There is water in two places; both are the beds of partially dried-up streams, but with a little management either could be made to yield sufficient for a far larger force than we have with us at present.

17th.—Marched to the point chosen yesterday for our camp. Colonel Roberts and I went on to explore. Found the ascent at first a little steep, then very gradual for about a thousand feet to the site of a village once occupied by the ancestors of some of our coolies, who had been driven from it by the aggressions of other tribes. Not far from here the path winds round a rocky hill, and is at present very difficult. After this the path rose easily to a plateau about 2,650 feet high, with water near. This place was fixed on for next day's camp.

18th.—Marched this morning for camp fixed yesterday. On the road Dorpong informed me that there were Looshais in the jungle, and that it would be well if he were to warn them of our approach. He was told to wait until we got to the top of the hill. As we got to our camping ground we found some Looshais at an old halting place; they ran away on seeing us. Dorpong and Raipa went after them and told them that there was nothing to fear; but they could not be induced to return. The General, Colonel Roberts, and I, went on to explore the route in advance, and, after a little, came up with some of the Looshais, who said they belonged to the village of Kholel. After going on for some time by a very fair route we got on a steep hill, which had once been cultivated, but which was now covered with very high grass, through which it was not easy to make our way. As we were going through, the Looshais who were on ahead tried more than once to stop our progress, but we kept on to the top of the hill, from which we could see the old site of Kholel some miles to the south-east. To the north of it, but on the same ridge, were large clearances said to belong to some of Poiboi's villages. To our south was the Voombhong hill, the present site of the Kholel village. We brought back to camp with us two young Looshais of those whom we met on the road. They told us that a large number of Looshais from all the villages were collected at the junction of the Tooweebhoom and the Tipai to meet us. They represented

sented the intentions of these people as friendly, but one of them, in talking, apparently inadvertently, let it appear that they had been ordered by Poiboi to oppose our crossing. They said that Poiboi was very indignant because some of his people who were engaged in salt-making at Cheeboo had been surprised while asleep by a party of Munnipoories, who killed five of them, and took away the guns they had with them for hunting purposes. They added that one Munnipoorie of importance had been killed. This is evidently the Looshai version of the affair reported by General Nuthall. The Looshais also said that a party of between 100 and 150 armed men had gone in the direction of the Bhoobuns to find out what was going on. In the evening Dorpong and the men with him came up and said that they wanted to be allowed to return to their villages; that they had been sent by their chief to make friends with us; and that if any collision were to happen now, they would be regarded as traitors, and their wives and children killed. The General agrees with me in thinking that nothing could be gained by forcing them to remain, so he decided to let them go in the morning. It is now pretty clear that Poiboi's friendliness is not to be depended upon, and that Kholel is entirely under his influence.

19th.—We sent off the Looshais this morning, telling them to inform their chiefs that we were going to recover our subjects who were held captives by Lalboorah and Tangdong; that we did not want to fight with the people of Poiboi or Lalhi, but that we should treat them as they behaved. One of the eight men who came down from Poiboi remains with us; he has no relations in the Looshai villages, and wishes to settle ultimately in Cachar. We halted at the foot of the hill covered with grass mentioned above.

20th.—Halted to-day to get up stores and prepare a depôt at our present camping ground. Colonel Roberts and I went on to explore, and when we got to the top of the hill we found that the route to old Kholel had been closed by the Looshais. We also learned that there was a direct route along the ridge of the hill leading straight to new Kholel. We followed this route, which turned out a capital one, till we found water and good camping ground at the beginning of a spur said to lead to the Tooweebhoom. We saw no traces of Looshais.

21st.—After arriving in camp I accompanied Colonel Roberts to explore the route towards the Tooweebhoom. After we had descended for about three miles, we found, from the statements of our guides, that we could not hope to reach the Tooweebhoom and to return to camp before night; we therefore turned back.

22nd. Marched to the Tooweebhoom. On our way we met some Looshais, who wanted to make us halt until they brought up Mora, Impanoo's muntri, who, they said, was at the stream; we, however, pushed on. In one place we found the path obstructed by a small model of a gallows, made of bamboos, with two rude attempts to represent men hanging from it. In another place strips of bamboo had been struck into a fallen tree, from which, when the bark is cut, a red, blood-like juice exudes. This was intended as a warning of what was to happen to us should we advance further. A little below this last emblem we came on the Tooweebhoom, at a place where a weir made of bamboos and stones for catching fish had been thrown across the stream. On this weir, and in a watch-house on the bank opposite to us, there were collected about forty Looshais, some of whom had firearms. They yelled to us not to come on. One man took up a stone to throw at us, and another knelt down to fire, but did not. The General, however, gave orders to his men not to fire unless actually attacked. As they advanced over the weir the Looshais retired, still shouting at us. A little way after crossing we came upon the stream again. Here some of the Looshais asked to have Sham Singh, a Munnipoorie interpreter, sent to them. They told him to ask us to wait where we were, and that their muntries would come to us. I answered, with the General's approval, that we intended to cross the Tipai before halting. The Looshais then retired, and we went on till we came to another crossing, where we found Mora, the muntri of Impanoo. He said he had brought some fowls and eggs for us, that Khalkom and the western people would be with us in a day or two, and that he had been sent for by the Kholel people to act as a mediator. I told him that we had no intention of hurting Kholel, provided the people behaved themselves; that our business was with the village of Vonolel, but that it was necessary for us to go to the Kholel village on our way. He seemed quite satisfied, but disappeared before we got to the Tipai at its junction with the Tooweebhoom. We encamp for the night on the other side of the Tipai, and the General has resolved to march in the direction of Kholel to-morrow with 200 men. This move seems necessary from a military point of view, for by waiting here we should simply give the Looshais time to stockade if they mean to fight, and, on the whole, I think an advance advisable on political grounds.

23rd.—Marched to-day up the hill; the ascent was very steep at first through forest. After we had ascended for some time we heard shots in front, and hurrying on got into a jhoom clearance, at the very edge of which we found a very promising young Kookie policeman, named Panek, lying wounded in his chest, arm, and thigh. A little further on there was a man of the 22nd also wounded. We afterwards learnt from Colonel Roberts, who accompanied the advance party, that as he and the constables, who were a little ahead of the rest of the men, came to the edge of the forest, Panek pointed out that there were some Looshais in a storehouse in the midst of the clearance. In consequence, they waited to get the men together, but owing to the narrowness of the path this was not found easy. Immediately on their leaving the forest a volley was fired by the Looshais, which brought down Panek. They fired one more volley as the 22nd's men charged them, and then disappeared

over the crest of the hill above. The storehouse was found to be full of grain, which was of course destroyed, and the Looshais pursued from jhoom to jhoom. They sometimes attempted to make a stand on the crests of hills, but were always dislodged, apparently with loss, for we constantly came on marks of blood on the road ahead of us. In one of these skirmishes another of the 22nd was wounded in both legs, one of which was broken. There was a storehouse in each jhoom we came to, generally full of grain, which was destroyed. After advancing this way more than two hours, always ascending, we came upon two villages which it was plain had been recently evacuated; these were both burnt down. Soon after we came upon another village, near which was a stream of water; this the General determined to occupy, and he sent back to our camp of the morning for our baggage. Meanwhile we went on to look for the chief village of the group, which he had seen from Senbong, near the summit of the ridge which is known as the Voombhong range. The ascent to this village, which was found after a little searching, was very steep, and its site turned out to be more than 3,300 feet higher than the point we had left in the morning. An attempt was made to defend the village, but the Looshais were driven out, and the village burnt. In this affair two men of the 44th were killed. We then descended about 1,000 feet to the village fixed on for our camp. Soon after our arrival the Looshais commenced firing into our camp under cover of the forest which surrounds the village, and they have wounded a havildar of the 22nd since we came in. The policeman Panek's wounds are dangerous, but we hope not deadly. I have promised him promotion to the post of head constable, which I hope he will get, should he recover. He is a fine young fellow, and was of much use to me on previous occasions.

[Note to Diary of the 23rd December 1871.—Since last Saturday I have received from Mr. McWilliam some particulars of Abbai Baboo's visit to Sookpilal. His statement to a great extent explains the conduct of the people of these villages. If the Looshais had once taken up the idea that we were determined to attack them all, each village south of Tipai Mookh must have looked upon our advance as a hostile measure directed against itself; and when the Kholel people found that we were resolved to advance to their village, they, not unnaturally, looked upon our denial of any intention to injure them as a device to keep them quiet until we could get possession of their property and families. I hope soon to be able to give a detailed account of the political results of the destruction of the Kholel villages.]

24th December.—We encamped in the village occupied yesterday. The Looshais and our pickets kept interchanging shots all through the night. At least one Looshai seems to have been wounded, and two flintlocks were picked up in the morning under the left picket. The ground all round was stained with blood. The General and Colonel Roberts went out to-day and burnt a village and several large granaries. They met with some opposition from the Looshais, who made an unsuccessful attempt to defend the village.

25th.—A party of the 44th Native Infantry, under Captains Lightfoot and Robertson, burnt down more than 20 well-filled granaries to-day. They got possession of the body of one Looshai killed by them, and of his musket, both of which were sent into camp. We have had four casualties during the day. The General has determined to return to-morrow to the Tooweebhoom, and after bringing up supplies to a depôt to be formed there, to advance in the direction of Poiboi's villages. This move has been resolved on by him after a thorough discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of every possible course. I was at first, on political grounds, averse to withdrawing the troops from this range until we had forced the Kholel people to make submission; but after hearing and considering the General's views, I felt that his reasons had so much weight that I should not be justified in pressing my objections.

26th.—This morning a man of the 44th Native Infantry was shot through the heart while standing in the officers' quarters within the village. The Looshais, hidden by the dense jungle, used to creep up to within a few yards of the pickets, then deliberately take aim at some of our men, fire and escape, still under the protection of the jungle, and it seemed to me that they were getting daily more deadly in their aim, and more wary in their approach. Even if the General had decided to remain on the Voombhong range, he would have been obliged to remove from the occupied village to some spot which could be made more secure; and in this case there would have been a difficulty about water. The return from the village to the Tooweebhoom was effected most skilfully and successfully. The great danger to be feared was, that the Looshais, thinking that we were retreating before them, would (following their usual tactics) lie in wait along the road for our immense string of coolies and followers, and fire into it as it passed. To obviate this, the baggage and sick were sent ahead under a guard of the 22nd Punjab Native Infantry. As this party had patrolled the road to the river during the two previous days, and as the usual firing between the sharpshooters in the jungle and our pickets was kept up, the Looshais had no suspicion of the intended move until the rear guard set fire to the village on leaving it. By this time the column had got well ahead, and the rear guard between it and the Looshais. There was a constant succession of skirmishes almost to the foot of the hill, the Looshais (when the nature of the ground gave them an opportunity) trying to get past the rear guard to attack the coolies, but invariably repulsed by the 44th Native Infantry, who were admirably led by Colonel Nuthall and Captain Robertson. On their way down, the latter destroyed several granaries which had escaped on previous occasions. We arrived

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at the Toweebhoom without a single casualty, and have encamped on a level space of considerable extent close to the fishing weir which we crossed on the 22nd.

27th.—Went up with Colonel Roberts to explore the route towards Poiboi's villages. It ascends the hill almost immediately after leaving the weir, and is very steep. As it runs up an uncommonly narrow spur, it will be rather difficult to make a good road out of it. We returned to camp before reaching the top of the hill, in order to get in before dark. The Looshais have been annoying us to-day. A Sapper and a Kookie coolie were wounded.

28th.—Remained in camp. The General has sent for the head-quarter's wing of the 42nd Native Infantry, and intends to take them to-morrow to the highest village burnt by us, partly to assist Captain Badgley in his survey work, but chiefly to show the Looshais that we do not intend to give them any rest until they make submission to us. We have just received the first intelligence of an attack on the elephants at Tipai Mookh. It appears that some mahouts have been killed, and that some elephants are missing.

29th.—Soon after we left camp this morning some shots were interchanged between the Looshais and our men; one of the latter was slightly wounded. When we got to the place where Colonel Roberts and the advance guard were fired at on the 23rd, there was some more firing, and one Looshai fell, but he was got off into the jungle before our men reached the top of the hill, and all search for him failed. His musket, however, and some other things, were picked up near where he was seen to fall. After this we ascended the hill without further opposition. Not far from the first village burnt on the 23rd, the advanced guard were met by Dorpong, the chief of Poiboi's men, let go by us on the 19th. He waved a red cloth and told the sepoys not to fire at him, as he wanted to speak to me. Fortunately Captain Butter, who was in front, recognised Dorpong and kept the sepoys, who did not understand what Dorping said, from firing. As soon as the General and I heard of this, we went up to the front and heard what Dorpong had to say. He told us that Poiboi had sent him to make the Kholel people stop fighting, and to mediate between them and us; and that Poiboi's brother was on his way to make terms for their own villages. The General consented to a temporary cessation of hostilities; upon which Dorpong climbed up a tree, and called out to the people concealed in the jungles that they were to stop firing. After this we went to the village which we had occupied, and remained there until Captain Badgley returned from the top of the hill. Many Looshais appeared and talked to us while at the village. They showed some fear at first, but this wore off by degrees. Captain Badgley also saw several Looshais at the top of the hill; among them were a woman and a child. We returned to camp in the evening, accompanied by Dorpong and some of the people with him. The Kholel people are to come in hereafter, when some preliminaries have been settled; meantime messengers have been sent in all directions to call in all Looshais between this and Tipai Mookh.

30th.—This day has been spent by me in endeavours to collect sufficient information to enable the General to decide on the course now to be adopted with regard to Poiboi and the Kholel people. At present it is not easy to make out distinctly how matters really are. The Kholel people say that the village authorities meant to meet us in a friendly manner, but that they could not restrain some hot-headed youngsters, who forced on a collision. Two subordinate village chiefs, one under Lalhi and one under Poiboi, came in to see us. They were received civilly, but of course we could have no direct dealings with them at present. Mora, from Impanoo's poonjee, came up in the course of the day. He said he had run away on the 22nd through fright, and that when Khalkom and Impanoo were asked for assistance by the Kholel people, they refused through loyalty towards us. He afterwards let out, however, that they were not uninfluenced by the presence of our soldiers at Bongkong and the Rengtipahar, which evidently causes them great uneasiness. The advance of the Munnipoor Contingent south of the valley has had a similar good effect on Poiboi, whose people seem to think that it is actually marching on to attack them. It is, however, very much to be hoped that this is a mistaken idea, for a premature move on the part of Munnipoor might seriously impair our prospects of success.

31st December 1871.—To-day Mora came in from Impanoo, and I saw some of the Kholel muntries, who seemed very penitent, but nothing definite was settled. The road over Parbachung towards Poiboi's village is being pressed on, and supplies pushed up from the rear.

1st January 1872.—The Kholel headmen have at length been put out of suspense and informed that no further hostile measures will be taken against their village if they behave properly. They say that they will be responsible for the safety of our communications between their village and Tipai Mookh after we move eastward, and that they will send some of their number on with us to guide us and supply us with information as we advance. To-day Mora, Raipa, Amoo Singh, and one of the chief men of Daidoo, the village on the hill above the Tooweetoo, went to westwards to inform Khalkom that we were very much dissatisfied with his conduct, and to warn him that he had better decide quickly whether he meant to help us or not.

2nd January 1872.—The General has received letters from the Political Agent, Munnipoor, from which it appears that the posts along the south frontier of the Munnipore State, mentioned in paragraph 6 of my letter* to the Secretary, Bengal Government, of the 2nd December

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December 1871, have not been occupied; that almost the entire strength of the contingent has been massed at Cheklapee, the point on the Cheeboo route at which the Political Agent has been directed to remain until further orders; and that he was on the 18th about to advance apparently in the direction of Cheeboo. At the same time we received information from the Looshais that Poiboi's villages were threatened by the Munnipoor force. Indeed, there were rumours believed in by some at least of the Kholel people that some villages had actually been burnt. General Bourchier has written to the Political Agent, calling that officer's attention to the instructions already given him, and requesting him to obey them and not to advance beyond Cheklapee. He has given me a copy of this letter, which I have to-day sent by Dorpong, through Poiboi's village, to General Nuthall. I hope this letter will reach him in time to prevent any collision between the Munnipoorees and Poiboi's people, for whatever might be the immediate result of such an encounter, it could not fail to have a most injurious effect on the prospects of the expedition.

4th January 1872.—Nothing of importance happened yesterday. We are still engaged in preparing ourselves for our advance into Poiboi's country, where we expect to meet greater physical difficulties than we have done hitherto.

To-day Colonel Nuthall with two companies of the 44th, and the sappers under Captain Harvey, marched to the top of the Parbachung, where they halted for the night. To-morrow the 44th descend to the Tooweetoo, but the Sappers will still work on the ascent of the range, which is very steep.

5th January 1872.—The people sent to Khalkom have returned to say that he is very sick, but that his headmen are on the way in, and will be here to-morrow. I have sent to them to say that we leave this to-morrow, and that if they want to see us they had better come on to Daidoo. Some of Poiboi's people have come in, bringing a pig and some fowls as a present. They say that the Munnipoorees are still near Cheeboo; that no hostilities have yet taken place; that Dorpong went on with the letter, but had not returned when they started; that he would probably meet us at Daidoo; and that Poiboi had desired them to tell us that he was very anxious to keep on good terms with us, and had no interest whatever in the fate of the Lalboorah and Tangdong. This is all very satisfactory, so far as it can be depended on.

6th January 1872.—Marched to-day to the top of the Parbachung range; the road has been very much improved since we first explored it on the 27th, but it is still uncommonly steep.

I am now making arrangements to get up a big mart near Tipai Mookh. This measure, if successful, will do much to ensure the safety of our communications, and will be still more useful in proving to the Looshais that while determined to punish offenders severely, we mean well to the tribe, and that it is their interest to be on good terms with us.

7th January.—Marched to-day to the Tooweetoo, a small stream falling into the Tipai. On our way we had a capital view of the east face of the Voombhong hill, on which the Kholel villages are at present situated. Besides those burnt by us, there are several large villages still further south, which were spared on the submission of the tribe. The elevation of the Tooweetoo at the point where we crossed it was about 1,500 feet.

8th January.—Ascended this morning from the Tooweetoo to Daidoo, the site of a deserted village on the ridge, the highest point of which is marked Kholong Thong on the map. The ascent to Daidoo is not very steep, and there were traces of rude attempts at road-making along the route. From the site of the village, the abandoned houses of which had been burnt some days before by the Looshais, we got a very clear view of the hills inhabited by Poiboi's people. On the hill opposite to the east are the jhooms of Tingreedoong.

The village itself is on the other side of the ridge. Further south is the large village of Chipoowee, the chief of which, Tingtow, came to see me on the 30th of last month. We could not see Poiboi's own village from here. As after much searching, we were unable to find a sufficient supply of water for the force, the General resolved to march next day to Pachowee, another deserted village site further south on this range.

9th January.—During the night it rained very heavily, but cleared up in the morning. After breakfast we marched to Pachowee, leaving the sappers at Daidoo to complete the road between that place and the Tooweetoo. At Pachowee we found an uncommonly good supply of water, considering the elevation, and capital camping ground at the height of 3,850 feet. Mora and Ruttuh Singh came in to-day. They said that Khalkom was still ill; that Sookpilal and two of his sons, Lalchung and Zarrock, were on their way to see him, and if we were willing to forgive the delay that had occurred hitherto, they would now join us at once. Both the men were unusually humble in their manner, and evidently thoroughly cowed. I conjecture from this that Savoonga has at last made submission to General Brownlow, and that Sookpilal is anxious to make the best terms he can for himself. Soon after this, Dorpong came in with the letter which we had given him for General Nuthall. He said that a few days ago Poiboi had sent some messengers to the Munnipoor Rajah; that General Nuthall had given these messengers a letter for General Bourchier or myself, which was taken from the messengers by one of the Rajah's officers, after the messengers had left General Nuthall, and that, in consequence, they were all afraid to take General Bourchier's letter. In all probability this story is false, and the real reason for not

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giving the letter to General Nuthall was an idea that it might contain orders to attack the Looshais at once. The General agrees with me that our best course now is to try to separate the tribes on our west from those in the east, and at the same time to avoid forcing Poiboi to declare either for or against us until we have sufficient supplies with us here to enable us to march rapidly on his village in case he should ultimately decide to oppose our advance against Lalboorah.

10th January.—This day's post brought a telegram from General Brownlow, saying that Savoonga had made overtures to him on the 3rd; but the Looshais in camp state that Savoonga's village was seen on fire about four days ago. I have sent back Mora and Ruttun Singh to Khalkom, to tell him that we could not accept messages as proofs of his friendly intentions, and that if he wished to be on good terms with us, he had better come in sharp. I sent Dorpong with a somewhat similar message to Poiboi; but unless the latter chief really means to take our side without reserve, and to throw over his cousins Lalboorah and Tangdong, which I can scarcely hope he will do, I am not very anxious that he should come over here, as I think we shall be in a much better position to deal with him when we have crossed a range, reported to be rocky and difficult, which lies between us and his village.

11th January.—To day I accompanied the general and his staff to reconnoitre the old site of Vonpilal's village. It is on the same ridge as this, immediately under the Kholel Peak, the highest point in this range, the elevation being 5,450 feet. The latitude of the point has been found by Captain Badgley to be 23° 58′ 10″, and its longitude 93° 10′ 5″. The village must have been a very large one. Probably the statement of the Looshais, that it contained more than 1,000 houses was not much exaggerated. The site is now abandoned, and its inhabitants have moved to Voombhong Range, which we for convenience sake call New Kholel. All the houses, including that of the chief, have been burnt; but the tomb of Vonpilal is carefully preserved. The tomb, or more properly group of tombs, is composed of three stone platforms, the largest of which is about 20 feet square and 3½ high. Under this Vonpilal is buried. I have not been able to find out the meaning of the smaller platforms. All these are surrounded by posts, on which are fixed the heads of various animals—a pony, the gift of the Munnipoor Rajah to Vonpilal, an elephant, several metnas, goats, pigs, deer, and birds of many kinds. On other posts drinking vessels were hung up, and wooden fetters used for securing captives. All are intended for the use of the chief in the other world, where he will be served for ever by the animals whose heads surround his tomb. I looked carefully for human skulls, but found none, though I have heard that at least one Naga captive was killed after the death of the chief.

13th January.—Nothing of importance happened yesterday. To-day the General, with Colonel Roberts and Captain Thompson, reconnoitred the route to the Tipai. We had a choice of three routes from here. One represented as level for a hill path, and leading direct to Lalboorah's village without passing near Poiboi's, was rejected in consequence of the scarcity of water along it.

The one finally chosen leads from here to the village of Chipoowee, and thence by a somewhat circuitous track to the foot of a range called the Lengting, represented to be very steep and rocky. We expect that after we have overcome the difficulties of this hill we shall find the road to Lalboorah's village comparatively easy. The descent to the Tipai is steep, particularly as it nears the river; but the General considers that a good road can be made.

14th January.—We are still busy in completing our arrangement for an advance into the absolutely unknown country to our east. Our Looshai, Engloom, is the only man at our disposal who knows anything whatever of the route or the position of the villages, but we hope to be able, by judicious management, to extract information from the Looshais in the villages ahead, if we can succeed in avoiding a collision with them. To-day Tingtow, chief of Chipoowee, the village on the opposite range, came into camp. He was one of those who visited us at the Tooweebhoom. He is represented to belong to the Khenga or Khengti family, which seems to be considered by the Looshai chiefs as equal in rank to their own; his mother is said to have been sister to Vonolel, and his wife to be of the same family. His power and influence, however, do not equal his rank in the tribe, and his actual position is that of headman of a subordinate village. He said that he was very much afraid of our destroying his village and crops, and was informed that he would suffer no injury, provided he or his people did not oppose our advance.

15th and 16th January.—Both days have been spent in getting up supplies, in making the road ahead, and in settling that representatives of the Kholel, Chipoowee, and Tingridoong villages should accompany us during our advance into Poiboi's country.

17th January.—Marched to-day to Chipoowee. The descent to the Tipai has been improved very much by the parties of the 44th and 22nd who have been working on it, and there is now a good road down the hill. Soon after the force left the river, we met the chief of Chipoowee, who had left our camp on the 15th. He and Dorpong, who was with him, proposed that the force should halt for the night at the river, where they said Poiboi would come to meet us. The General, however, decided to push on, and we ascended the hill till we reached a broad jhoom, where a large number of Looshais were assembled. About

200 armed men were drawn up in line in front, and some 200 more with arms were collected in groups between the advanced line and the jungle. Among the latter were several young children. The General extended the wing of the 44th, which he had with him, so as to front the line of armed Looshais, and gave direction that Poiboi should come to meet us in the space between the two lines. After a considerable amount of running backwards and forwards, and hurried consultations among the Looshais, a well-dressed young fellow came forward to us with a considerable following. From the manner and bearing of this man I suspected that he was not a considerable chief, and before entering into conversation with him I had Engloom, who had fallen behind, called up. The latter at once said that the man was not Poiboi, but a favourite companion of his. Upon this the assemblage was at once broken up, and I told the Looshais that the General would have no dealings with Poiboi or anyone else until he got to Chipoowee. The armed Looshais, and the greater number of those who were unarmed, sloped away into the jungle; the few who remained attempted to deter us by words and gestures from ascending the hill. They were again informed that, unless they opposed the progress of the force, they would not suffer in life or property, but that the General intended to encamp at Chipoowee to-night, and the force advanced steadily to the top of the range. Near the end of the march the General was met by two Looshais from Poiboi's village, bringing a letter from the Political Agent at Munnipoor, in which the latter stated that he had referred various messengers sent to him by Poiboi to General Bourchier.

Near the main village of Chipoowee we have found another, of about 20 houses, in course of construction. Two or three houses are finished; the rest are still incomplete. We have hired the village from the owners, and purchased all the firewood they have collected, and on the whole are more comfortably housed than we have been since we left Cachar.

20th January.—Owing to indisposition, I was unable to write up my diary for the 18th and 19th, but there has been nothing of any importance to record. After considerable trouble and delay, caused by the unwillingness of the people at this village to point out any route onwards except a roundabout one which passes close to the village of Tingridoong, and which I was strongly inclined to believe was the only practicable one, Colonel Roberts succeeded in finding a path (which can be made into a good road with little difficulty) going straight across the valley which separates this from Gnowpa Range, and we shall march on Monday. I have pointed out to the General the advisability, on political grounds, of doing all in our power to keep on good terms with the people of this village and of Tingridoong. Setting aside the advantage to us of having the villages along the line of our communication, friendly or neutral, too much stress cannot be laid on the importance of our being in communication with some at least of these Looshais in case of our coming into collision with Poiboi. The messengers of that chief have been informed that the General will only consent to treat with him in person. I consider that it was absolutely necessary to make this declaration, whatever its result may be; but even if Poiboi advances to us, and the Munnipoor Rajah were sincere, it is not improbable that he may suspect that some treacherous meaning underlies it, and that out of pure fright he may do something before we reach his village which would necessitate hostile measures on our part. If this were to happen, and if we should be unable to use the people of these villages as messengers between us and Poiboi's people, there would be great danger of our finding the same difficulty as the Chittagong force seems to have found in dealing with the Syloos, and we might have to go on burning villages and destroying crops until the end of the season without being able to open communication with the enemy, even after the latter wished to make full submission. If we could keep up uninterrupted friendly relations with even one village, this danger, which I look upon as the most serious likely to be met with by us, would, in all probability, be avoided.

Chipoowee, 21st January.—Although the village and the neighbouring one of Tingridoong are considered to be subject to Poiboi, still, owing to their distance from his head village and the difficulty of the intervening country, they are practically so far independent as to be able to form friendly relations with us without reference to the intentions of the big chief; consequently we cannot rely on the friendly attitude of these people as any guarantee that our further progress will not be opposed by Poiboi. Still, in the event of hostilities, their neutrality would be of great value to us. The General has therefore taken every possible precaution to keep the villages in our rear from giving us trouble hereafter. He has instructed Colonel Rattray, who commands at Pachowee, to explore the road in the direction of the village of Khalkom, and in other ways to put pressure on that chief, whose conduct is still far from satisfactory. At the same time Colonel Rattray will do all in his power to make the Kholel people understand that provided they continue to behave well, they will run no risk of being confounded with Khalkom in case it should be found necessary to take hostile measures against the latter. Colonel Stafford has been posted here with instructions to keep a careful watch over the people of this village and Tingridoong, but to treat them kindly and protect them from any annoyance as long as he is satisfied with their conduct, without reference to the relations that may exist between us and the villages beyond this. The headman and two others from Tingridoong, three men from Chipoowee, and three from Kholel, accompanying us on our advance to-morrow.

22nd January.—Marched to the Sairoomloowee, a stream between the Chipoowee and Gnowpa ranges. As we passed through the village we saw numbers of women who had come back to their houses from their hiding places in the jungle, and who are now employed in husking rice for the supply of our camp. The descent to the stream is not difficult; one very rocky bit has been made quite practicable for elephants since our arrival at Chipoowee.

Chipoowee. Soon after we got into camp two Looshais came in from Tingridoong with a rumour that the Munnipoor contingent had gone back from Cheeboo, leaving 100 men at that post. I can scarcely believe that this is true; but if it is, I must say that the movements of the contingent have been singularly unfortunate for us; for its advance to Cheeboo was made long before we had reached any point from which we could make use of it, and its withdrawal now would in all probability considerably increase our difficulties as we advance from here.

23rd January.—Marched to a point on the Gnowpa Range, a little south of the site of the old village of Bohmong. Colonel Roberts went on to explore the road ahead, taking with him Engloom, the Looshai of one of Poiboi's village, who has deserted to us. A little way from the camp the path was found to divide into two: one running along the ridge in the direction of the Lengteng, the other leading down the east face of the hill towards the Soorthlong and Moothelen mountains. The latter path was blocked up by a sort of gallows, with pieces of wood rudely cut into the shape of men hanging to it. Near to this was an attempt to represent a human body with the head scalped. They went down this path, which they found led to the Tooweela stream with a rather sharp descent; a still steeper ascent of a few hundred feet took them over a shoulder of the Soorthlong to another small stream, near which they found very good camping ground. On Colonel Roberts' return, I called up the headman of Tingridoong and the other Looshais, and told them that we had decided on taking the Tooweela route, which goes past several of Poiboi's villages, but that we should not injure the people in any way provided we did not meet with opposition; and I directed the Tingridoong headman and Dorpong to go on ahead to inform Poiboi of our intention, and to tell him that he must give up certain captives which he is said to have taken from Munnipoor, and come in person to meet us.

The Looshais appeared very anxious when they heard all this, and begged very earnestly that we should take the Gnowpa route instead of crossing the Tooweela. I told them that this was impossible, and sent them away. After dinner they asked me to allow the two lads who joined us yesterday to leave the camp at once, to give notice of our coming to the villages beyond the Tooweela. All through the expedition the General has agreed with me in thinking that the advantage to be gained by keeping up uninterrupted intercourse with the Looshais is far greater than any mischief that could possibly happen from their obtaining full information of all our movements; and in the present case, although we strongly suspect that these two lads are going to warn their friends to resist our approach, still permission has been given to them to go off.

24th January.—Marched to-day across the Tooweela to the point reached by Colonel Roberts yesterday. The Tingridoong headman and Dorpong started very early for Poiboi's village, promising to give him my message; but of course I do not place much dependence on them. Just before we left camp one of the Kholel Looshais warned me that an attack would probably be made on us on this side of the Tooweela, but this turned out to be a false alarm. After we reached camp the General, with Colonel Roberts and Captain Thompson, went on to explore the road ahead. For some way the path winds along the bank of the stream which flows near our camp from the valley between the two great hills Soorthlong and Moothelen. It then breaks into two—one leading up the side of Moothelen to the village of Koongnoong, and the other over Soorthlong to the village of Taikom. Our exploring party took the latter, as it seemed likely that we should get a better view of the country between us and Poiboi's village from the top of Soorthlong. We also hoped to find an easier route to Koongnoong than that over Moothelen, which was reported steep and difficult. On reaching the top of the ridge, however, it was found that Sellam could not be seen over the high intervening hills, and the route to Koongnoong over Soorthlong would in all probability turn out more difficult, as it certainly is much longer, than that over Moothelen. While exploring the ridge Colonel Roberts came upon Dorpong and the Tingridoong chief, who said that they had been to Taikong to give notice of our advance, and that the villages Koongnoong and Lellai were all full of armed men. They promised to meet me on the road in the morning.

25th January.—Koongnoong village. This morning, just before we started, the two Looshais came in and informed us that we were to be attacked by Lalboorah's people, a little way from camp, and that two armed parties had gone along the Gnowpa and Kholel ranges. Upon hearing this nearly all the Looshais whom we had in camp ran off into the jungle, but I sent Dorpong to call them back, and explained to them that nothing would happen to them as long as they remained with us, but that we should hold their villages responsible if they left us. They have all come on with us to this village. After this was settled, Dorpong warned me that the Looshai plan of operations was to make their main attack on our coolies after the main force had got well ahead. The idea of the leaders was, he said, that if a large number of our coolies were killed, the rest would get so disorganised that our carriage would break down and we should be starved out of the country. I sent off intimation of this to the General, who had already left camp. Soon after I started, heavy firing was heard from the direction in which the General had gone, and a few minutes later two of my Cacharry coolies, who were clearing the jungle for the artillery elephants, were wounded. As I found that my coolies were much depressed at this, I thought it right to remain with them, and consequently saw nothing of the very brilliant little action between our main body and the Looshais. General Bourchier has, however, kindly promised to give me an extract from his report to the Quartermaster General describing it, which I shall forward with this diary.

The day was a most successful one. It will be seen that the Looshai plan was completely foiled, and our casualties were not heavy, considering the severe loss inflicted on the enemy and their complete consequent demoralisation. I am happy to say that the medical officers consider that the general's wounds are not of a nature to cause us very grave anxiety, and that a few days' rest will in all probability ensure his speedy recovery from them. It will be seen from General Bourchier's Despatch* that we have evidence to show that the people of Poiboi's village, as well as those of Lalboorah's, were engaged in the attack.

* Pages 372 and 375 of Return.

On the 26th January the village of Taikom was taken and destroyed by Colonel Roberts, who has submitted the following report to General Bourchier, to whom I am indebted for a copy of it :—

"In obedience to the instructions received from you, I have the honour to report that I proceeded yesterday, with the force given in the margin, to burn the village of Taikom, situated about five miles distant in a north-easterly direction.

Two 150-lb. steel guns of the Peshawur Mountain Battery, under Captain Blackwood, R.A.
Fifty of the 22nd Punjab Native Infantry, under Lieutenant G. Hare.
Fifty of the 44th Sylhet Light Infantry, under Captain B. Robertson.
Assistant Surgeon Nicholson in medical charge.

"2. As only a small portion of the road had been previously reconnoitred, and as it was apparent, from the nature of the country, that the mountain presented considerable difficulties, it had been decided, with your concurrence, that the elephants should be left behind and the guns carried on coolies. Sixteen men were told off for each gun, viz., six for the gun itself, six for carriage, and two for each wheel, besides four men for the two ammunition boxes, each box containing nine rounds. There was some delay in leaving, as the battery had only reached camp in the morning, and the men, who had been without food and water nearly the whole of the previous day, required a short time for cooking, &c.; however, we were enabled to make a start by noon.

"3. Captain Robertson's detachment of the 44th Native Infantry formed the advance guard, then came 30 of the Punjab Infantry and the artillery, the remainder of the 22nd Punjab Infantry bringing up the rear.

"4. The road led along the side of this hill for about 1½ miles, descending gradually 1,000 feet; it then crossed the head of the stream over which we had passed on the 25th instant when advancing on this village, and afterwards ascended a steep hill.

"5. At this point the forest became a little less dense, and I was enabled to see that a very strong stockade was built across the road, about 2,000 yards in front, and that a large number of the enemy were prepared to defend it. Could I have got nearer, I would have advanced the infantry under cover of the artillery; but the nature of the ground would not admit of this, and as the troops must have suffered very severely in carrying the work, I thought it better to make a *détour*, and endeavour to turn the position. This was effected with considerable labour, the guns having to be dragged up the precipitous sides of a mountain, the summit of which was 6,000 feet high.

"6. The movements had been observed by the enemy, who were evidently so disheartened by our getting up their rear that, without running the gauntlet of the work they had thrown up with much trouble and no little skill, they instantly disappeared, and made for the village without attempting to defend any other position.

"7. We followed them up as rapidly as the coolies carrying the guns could travel, and at 5 p.m. arrived in sight of the village, which, containing nearly 200 houses, was situated on a naturally strong site, surrounded by a high palisading.

"8. We were then distant about 1,200 yards, and as the position was peculiarly well adapted for artillery fire, I requested Captain Blackwood to bring his guns into action, while I prepared to advance against the village with the 44th Native Infantry and a portion of the 22nd Punjab Infantry.

"9. Nothing could have been better than the practice of the artillery; the first shell burst a little to the right of the village, whilst the second fell in the midst of a large crowd of armed Lushais, who were collected on the crest of the hill round which the village was built. The effect on the enemy was quite marvellous; for a few seconds they seemed unable to realise what had happened, and remained almost motionless, but as soon as they had recovered from their astonishment they commenced to beat a hasty retreat.

"10. Directing Captain Blackwood to fire two more rounds, I advanced with the infantry; a few shots were fired as we approached, but the enemy were on the run, and we entered the stockade and captured the village without a single casualty. The enemy succeeded in carrying away their killed and wounded; but the third shell bursting just beyond the village, caused them to drop the bodies of three men, who must have been killed by the artillery fire.

"11. It was then nearly dark, so, after burning the village, I formed up the troops and retraced our steps, arriving in camp at 10½ p.m.

"12. As the question of the best description of gun for mountain service is still under consideration, I may here mention that, had the battery been equipped with a heavier gun, I don't think it would have been possible to have taken it over the ground we traversed yesterday.

yesterday. Even with the assistance of the gunners, it was all the coolies could do to carry the 150-pound steel guns, and the length of time we took returning to camp, nearly five hours, shows how difficult it is to transport even the lightest gun in a mountainous country.

"13. Both officers and men worked most cheerfully, and my being able to carry out your instructions without the loss of a man was entirely owing to the cordial assistance I received from one and all. I would especially mention Captain Blackwood, by whose exertions the artillery were enabled to do such good service, and Captain Robertson, who led the advance throughout.

"14. Captain Badgley and Lieutenant Woodthorpe, of the Survey Department, accompanied the troops, and in addition to giving information of the country, afforded me valuable aid."

27th January.—Just after Colonel Roberts started yesterday I heard that the Tingridoong chief was missing, and that it was supposed he had gone in the direction of Taikong. I sent information of this at once to Colonel Roberts, who met the Looshai, with three others, on the road near the first stockade, and made them accompany him to the village. The terror that the performance of the guns has inspired in the minds of these men is almost ludicrous; and if anything like the same effect has been produced on the minds of the people who were in the village, we have good reason to be satisfied with the day's work. As the Tingridoong headman had left the camp without my leave, I have thought it necessary, with the general's consent, to fine him; and one of his men goes to his village to-day to tell his people to deliver at Chipoowee 130 baskets of rice (one basket for each house in his village), a pig, and a goat.

I have allowed Dorpong to go on to Poiboi's village with one of the men from Kholel. He is to tell Poiboi that the general has altered the terms on which he will consent to receive him in consequence of his attacking us on the 25th; and now, in addition to giving up any Munnipoor captive he may have in his villages, he must pay a fine of rice, metnas, pigs, goats, and fowls, and accompany the force to Lalboorah's village.

Komgnoong, 28 January.—This morning the general received the following telegram from the Quartermaster General:—

"No. 77 of 1872, Lushai.—You are to carry out, as appears to yourself and the political officer attached to you, in the manner most conducive to secure the greatest result, the following instructions of Government:—

"It is desirable that the two columns should communicate with each other before the force is withdrawn from Looshai territory; but there may be still more important objects for them to carry out, and it must be distinctly understood that, under any circumstances, the columns must be back at Cachar and Chittagong respectively by 10th March next, or such other approximate date as will secure them from being overtaken by the rains.

"See Clause 5, paragraph 7, Foreign Department Proceedings, No. 1453 P., of the 11th July 1871, sent with this office No. 3980, dated 2nd September 1871."

Both the general and I are convinced that the most important thing to be done at present is to reduce to submission the family of Lalboorah.

If there had been any doubt in our minds that they had been engaged in the Monierkhal and Nugdigram raids of last year, it would have been removed by our finding on the body of one of Lalboorah's men killed on the 25th, cartridges which could only have been obtained by the Looshais in the attack on the rear-guard of the 4th at Nugdigram. Since the raid, Lalboorah's people have made no attempts to come to terms either with us or Munnipoor, and all that we have been able to learn about them from the time we started until they attacked us on the 25th, shows their attitude to have been one of defence all through. It is now said that Lalboorah has sought aid from the Palam Chief, one of the so-called Pois, as he is resolved not to make submission until he has tried every means of resistance. It seems clear to us, therefore, that we should risk the loss of all the advantages we have gained, and probably endanger our prospects of ultimate success in securing the safety of the frontiers, if we allowed any object to divert us from marching as soon as possible to Lalboorah's villages with a view to forcing him and his people to submit to our terms. Chumfai, the chief of these villages, is, according to the best information I have been able to collect, south of the Chittagong watershed. Indeed, one account makes the Taow stream, which flows past it, fall into the Kurnafoola, but I think it is more likely to be a tributary of the Koladyne. Of course, any attempt to conjecture the position of the village must be liable to error, but I think its latitude will be found to be about 23° 30′, and its longitude 93° 25′ or approximately, 40 miles to the north-east of General Brownlow's position of the 21st January. Unless therefore the Chittagong force makes very much more easting between this and the time of our arrival at Chumfai, I fear it will be impossible for us to effect a junction with it this year. In any case, I do not see how the column can be back at Cachar by the 10th March. We cannot hope to leave Sellam for Lalboorah's village much before the middle of next month, and under the most favourable circumstances we can scarcely reach Chumfai, do the work required to be done there, and return to Sellam in less than three weeks from the date of starting. This would bring us on almost to the 10th of March, and the return to Cachar must take something like three weeks more. The Sunai column of the expedition of 1869 did not reach Cachar until the beginning of

April, and it will be remembered that our health did not suffer so much as that of the party with General Nuthall, which returned early in March. In 1869-70, the party with Major Macdonald and myself enjoyed excellent health, although we did not return till the end of March; and last year the troops under General Bourchier did not return to Cachar till well into the month of April, nor to Shillong till the month of May.

The force now with General Bourchier is working under much more healthy conditions than any of the above-mentioned parties, and I do not see any reason to anticipate any unusual danger from sickness during our return in the latter part of March.

In the evening, I got the following telegram from Mr. McWilliam—

"Precedence.—Rowa, Sookpilal's muntree, with Alexandrapore khansama's wife and a Cacharie, arrived at Jhalnacherra yesterday. Sookpilal has got Winchester's child, and will send her down in a boat, which he asks me to send for her. From the Bengali report from the postmaster at Jhalnacherra, it is not clear how Sookpilal got her. Rowa will be here to-morrow.

Of course, the information about the child Winchester may turn out to be true, but it seems in the highest degree improbable. The General's wounds are doing well.

29th January.—Colonel Roberts and Captain Thompson reconnoitred the road to greater Koongnoong, a village at which we intend to halt on our way to Poiboi. The second stage will be to a village called Lellai, and on the third day we expect to arrive at Sellam. The General got a telegram from General Brownlow to the effect, that the Howlongs had surrendered Mary Winchester unconditionally, but he did not say to whom. Looshais who came in to-day say, they have heard that the child has been made over to the Chittagong force; they say that Poiboi is trying to recover the other captives from the Howlongs.

31st January.—Yesterday and to-day the Looshais have been bringing in metnas, goats, pigs, fowls, and rice, in payment of the fine inflicted on the 26th; but we have decided on not taking any until the whole amount has been collected. This morning, as two Looshais who had slept last night in camp were leaving, they met one of the survey khalassies returning with water. Some dispute seems to have arisen about the path, which ended in one of the Looshais wounding the Hindostanee severely in the head and arm with a dao; he then ran away. It was ascertained that the two men belonged to greater Koongnoong, and notice was at once given that the village would be burnt unless the guilty man was given up. In the course of the day, a Looshai who came in with a metna, was recognised as one of the men who left in the morning, and on being questioned, he at once confessed that he had cut down the survey khalassie, who he said had insulted him.

Dombhoong, headman of the Taikom village, taken on the 26th, has come in, bringing letters from General Nuthall, mentioning that there is some sickness among the Munnipoor force, and that he finds much difficulty in feeding it. I am glad to see, however, that he does not talk of retiring. It is of great importance to us in our present position that the Munnipoor contingent should continue to occupy Cheeboo. Dombhoong, who is by far the most important of all Poiboi's headmen, says that he was away at Cheeboo during the fighting of the 25th and 26th, but he gives the following account of Poiboi's action in the matter. Poiboi, according to him, was all through anxious to make terms with us, but was kept back by a strong party in his village, which was determined to stick to the family of Vonolel at all risks. There was a great council held at this village on the night of the 24th, at which Poiboi, Lenkom, Lalboorah, and other chiefs, were present. At this meeting, Poiboi tried hard to induce his relatives to submit, or at least to keep his own people from joining them in opposing our advance, and when he failed in both objects, he went back to his own village, while the headman of Tingreedoong with Dorpong came on to warn us of the projected attack. Poyboy has now gone down to the Howlongs to get as many Cacharie captives as he can, in the hope of making his peace with us by restoring them. Such is Dombhoong's story. It may have some fragments of truth in it, but I confess I do not believe much of it. It seems to show, however, that Poiboi's people have had enough fighting, and are anxious to make the best terms they can for their chief and themselves. A shorter route to Sellam than that by Greater Koongnoong has been found and partly explored. We march to-morrow, and expect to reach Sellam in two moderately long stages.

Camp Toowingnow, 1st February.—Marched to-day to a fine stream called Tooweegnow, on the bank of which we encamped on a piece of flat forest, at an elevation of about 5,200 feet. Dombhoong has accompanied us, and we have every reason to be satisfied with his conduct. Soon after arriving in camp, the General got a report from Koongnoong to the effect that the man who had wounded the survey khalassie has escaped. Some time ago, I got information that Bhoma, one of the Kholel men who accompanied us, had got a captive Naga woman, taken from Munnipoor in the raid of 1869. The other day, when Dorpong returned, I told him to go to Chipoowee, where this woman was said to be concealed, and if she were there, to bring her on to us. This evening I have received a letter from Rajkissun, who is at Chipoowee, informing me that Dorpong has got the woman and will bring her on to us to-morrow.

Sellam, 2nd February.—Marched to this village to-day. On our way, we were overtaken by Dorpong and many other Looshais with the captive woman. She did not show any joy at her rescue. On the contrary, she wept profusely on Bhoma's shoulder, and would not be comforted

comforted until I told her, with the General's assent, that we should not take her away against her will. She and Bhoma then followed us hand in hand. She says that she has a daughter in Dollong village, for whose recovery we should take steps as soon as possible. There are said to be two more captives at Chipoowee, about whom inquiries are now being made. Between our camp of this morning and Sellam, we crossed two fine streams, called the Greater and Lesser Laiba. The lower crossing of the two was at an elevation of 3,700 feet. From there we ascended sharply to Sellam, which is situated on a ridge, of which the highest point measured by us was 5,850 feet high. It is a very large village, or rather collection of villages, for there are four on adjoining heights. The total number of houses must be at least 500. All the inhabitants have left. We encamp for the night in the one usually occupied by Poiboi himself.

Camp near Sellam, 3rd February.—Last night a house in the village took fire, and the flames, in spite of the exertions of the troops, spread to several others. At one time it seemed doubtful whether the village could be saved, as there was no water to be got; but we at last succeeded in isolating the burning part of the village by pulling down houses between it and the portion still unharmed. This was no easy matter, for the houses were very strongly built; but officers and men worked together with a will, and with results which, if I had not seen, I should scarcely have believed. To-day, the General removed his camp to this place, which is about a mile from the village.

The people began to come into the village even before we left, and from what I see of them, I am inclined to hope that we shall soon be on friendly terms.

Camp near Sellam, 10th February.—I have been prevented by continued illness from noting down the events of the past week as they happened, and I have in consequence thought it better to draw up a general narrative for the week than to attempt to construct a diary from my imperfect recollection of the dates of occurrences.

The General has halted here during the week in order to get up from the rear a sufficient supply of food to enable him to march without halting on Lalboorah's village of Chumfai, which, as well as we can make out, is six days' distance from here.

The intervening country is said to be less difficult than that already passed through by us, but what we can see of it from here looks very stiff.

Everything in our power has been done during our detention here, to induce the people of this village and the other villages in our rear, to bring in their women and children from the jungle and settle down quietly. We have been to some extent successful in this; but our efforts have been very much impeded by the failure of Poiboi to come in to meet us. All the Looshais between this and the Tipai have been informed that unless Poiboi comes in before we leave this on our return to Cachar, all their villages, and the remainder of their crops will most certainly be destroyed; and of course, as long as Poiboi's submission to this demand remains uncertain, his people naturally hesitate to return to villages the safety of which is so insecure. Meantime no efforts have been spared on our part to induce Poiboi to come in. I believe that he would do so if it were not for his fear of being either killed or carried off captive. Almost all his chief men have been constantly in camp. They profess to do all in their power to induce him to come in; but they constantly bring up that unfortunate case of Lalchokla, which seems to have made a deep impression on the minds of all the Kookies. General Bourchier will leave Colonel Rattray here in command when we go to Chumfai; and I am convinced that during our absence no efforts will be spared by that officer to get Poiboi in, and thereby save us from the necessity of carrying out the severe measures which we have declared to be the alternative of his continued recusance. I sincerely hope that Colonel Rattray will be successful—quite as much for the sake of the Looshais themselves as for that of the success of the expedition. During the week Colonel Rattray reported from Chipoowee that two Naga captives, a mother and daughter, had been brought in to him. They seemed unwilling to leave the Looshais: so they have been allowed to remain in the village for the present, and the General will decide about them on our return. On the 7th a little girl, about four years old, was brought in to us here. She is said to have been brought from Sangboonga's village by either Lalboorah or Poiboi (I cannot make out which), and seems to be meant as a substitute for the little Bengalee girl taken at Nugdigram, who apparently cannot be produced.

The child herself now speaks no language but Looshai, and forgets both her own name and those of her father and mother; but she says that she was taken off from a garden, and speaks of a white child being taken off at the same time. She says that the chief of the village from which she comes is named Sangboonga, and that just before she was brought away another chief went to the village.

We have heard a rumour that another of the Howlong captives is on her way in, but it is impossible to place any reliance upon information of this kind. The day after we reached Sellam, Dombhoong, the headman of Taikoong, was allowed to go back to look after the re-building of his village, destroyed on the 26th. At the same time he got a letter for General Nuthall, which he promised to send on; but it was returned a few days after, with a statement that the Munnipoor contingent had retired from Cheeboo.

The Looshais say that a previous letter of General Bourchier's has been sent after the Political Agent, and will follow him into Munnipoor, if necessary. I am very much afraid that the information about the Munnipoor force will turn out to be correct, as there had been for some time previous to the 29th of January, the date of the last advice from General Nuthall, much sickness among both men and coolies, and constantly increasing difficulties in getting up his supplies, some of which had been destroyed by water and some by fire.

On the 12th, at his muster of the armed men of the contingent, there were 2,084 fighting men; while on the 27th he reports his strength at 850, stating that the reduction was mainly attributable to sickness, aggravated by want of proper clothing.

The withdrawal of the contingent may materially increase the difficulties of General Bourchier's march in Chumfai, for a Munnipoor force at Cheeboo must have held in check the northern village of the sons of Vonolel, which of course are now free to act as they please.

The General proposes to march on Monday with 400 men of the 44th and 22nd and the half battery of artillery; this force will start as lightly equipped as it is perhaps possible for any force to be. The baggage of both officers and men has been reduced even below the original not very extravagant allowance, and it is no exaggeration to say that scarcely anything besides a very limited allowance of bedding and food for 12 days will be carried for us. It would be useless at present to attempt to predict the line of action which the villages ahead will take; all the intelligence I have been able to collect seems to indicate that they do not know what they will do. I am inclined to think, however, that if they mean to oppose us, they will fight soon after we leave this.

General Bourchier has telegraphed to General Brownlow, informing him of our intended movements and of the approximate date of our arrival at Chumfai. On that and the following night the General intends to send up rockets and blue lights, in the hope that General Brownlow will be near enough to see and answer them, in which case communication between the two columns might be effected. From what I have been able to learn during the past week, I begin to think that Chumfai may be farther west than I conjectured it to be in my last diary, and as General Brownlow seems to be now moving eastward against the Howlongs, there may be some chance of his seeing our signals.

11th February.—I omitted to mention in my previous diaries that I have lost the services of Mr. T. Burland owing to his ill health. He was very well at Tipai Mookh, and got on to Tooweebhoom with great difficulty. He was ordered back from the last-named place by the medical officer there. Mr. McWilliam reports to me that he arrived at Silchar in a state of extreme weakness, and there seems to be considerable doubt of his ultimate recovery.

To-day the General with his staff reconnoitred the road ahead, in the direction of a small village called Rohmong. On their way they met Dorpong coming back from the more distant village of Toolcheng with a large following. He announced that Lenkom and the other members of Vonolel's family had given up all ideas of further resistance, and that Lalboorah had taken refuge among the Poies, leaving his village to its fate. He added that the widow of Vonolel had done all in her power from the first to induce her sons to sue for pardon, and that she and her people were ready to comply with any demand we chose to make.

12th February.—Before starting to-day, I heard that Poiboi had come to the village and wanted to meet us. He was, however, too much frightened to come, although Dorpong and his own muntries did all in their power to encourage him. On our march we passed through the village of Rohmong, which was deserted. The people were collected on the neighbouring heights, and were spoken to by the General. Some miles further on we came to a fine stream, named the Dinkai, running through level ground. Here we met some of the people of Toolcheng, a village on the top of a hill rising from the Dinkai. Two of these men joined us. The General thought it desirable to halt at the village for the night; so after a short rest we ascended the hill, which was 1,500 feet above the point where we crossed the Dinkai.

About 500 feet from the top, the road passed through a narrow and rocky gorge, and here a stockade of a very formidable character had been thrown up. On either side of this, big trees had been felled in such a manner as to render any attempt to turn the stockade extremely difficult, while the side of the hill to the left was dotted with breast-works, from which the defenders of the stockade could fire on their assailants as they struggled through the fallen trees in the ravines below. This fortification had been recently made, and avowedly for the purpose of opposing our advance, but we found it unoccupied and pulled it down after passing through. Another, but less pretentious, stockade some way further on was also destroyed by us. On reaching the village we were met by a number of people, who asked the General not to occupy it, as their women and children were all there. Since the fire at Sellam, the General had resolved not to halt in a village, so there was no difficulty in granting the request of the Toolcheng people, who however were told to bring out materials for our huts. They did this readily. There were a great number of Poies among these people, and I think on the whole they were the best-looking and pleasantest we have met with yet. During the night, Dorpong, who had remained behind at Sellam, came into camp and informed me that Poiboi had followed us on the march and was now at the Dinkai. I told Dorpong to return to the stream and tell the chief to come up and meet us in the morning.

13th February.—This morning Dorpong came in and said that Poiboi was in the village close by. I sent Hurree Thakoor with Engloom and another Looshai fugitive to identify him. It turned out to be the true Poiboi this time; but after a few words, assuring Hurree Thakoor of his determination to be faithful to us in the future, he took fright at something or other and ran off into the jungle pursued by his muntries, who for some time vainly

vainly tried to stay him with assurances that he was in no danger whatever. At last he stopped; but when Hurree Thakoor got up to him, he again ran off like a frightened animal and hid himself in the depths of the jungle. Soon after this we started. The soldiers marched through the village—a very large and fine one, but the coolies went round the stockade on the outside. I stood on the hill over the village to see them pass, and was quickly surrounded by a crowd of Looshais, among whom were some women and little children. While I was there, Durpong came to me and said, that Poiboi was on an adjoining hill and wanted to come to see me. I told him that the chief must come on and see the General, who had gone ahead with the advance; but he could not be prevailed on to do this. I then explained to his headmen, all of whom were present, that it was absolutely necessary that Poiboi should meet us either now or on our way back, if he wished to save his villages from destruction. The road, soon after leaving the village, went down a steep, rocky descent, which considerably delayed the force. It then went up a high hill, and along the edge of the steepest precipice I ever saw. After this we found no water till evening, when we halted near a deserted village named Booljong, formerly inhabited by Lenkom's people. Further on was another village which had been inhabited by Thadoes, who were detained there against their will by the Vonolel family of chiefs, but who had taken advantage of the presence of the Munnipoor force at Cheeboo to effect their escape, as reported by General Nuthall. A curious circumstance connected with this flight may be worth relating here as an illustration of the way in which different families of Kookies are mixed up in these villages. Soon after we reached Booljong, two little children, a boy and a girl of the Thangow subdivision of the Thado family, took refuge in our camp, and told us the following story. Previous to the flight into Munnipoor they had lived in the village with their father, who is a widower, with three more children younger than themselves; on the night fixed on by the villagers for their flight, their father took one of the younger children on his back, while another clung to his neck, a third held on by one of his hands, and the two elder followed him. In the darkness and confusion, however, the latter missed the path and got lost in the jungle, where they wandered for several days, living on such roots and berries as they could find. At last they made their way to a village, where they remained until they heard of the approach of our force, and that there was with us their mother's brother, a Waiphai, who had come into Cachar from Vonolel's village about three years ago. As soon as they found out that the force was at Toolcheng, they left the village they were at and made their way through the jungle to Booljong—a distance of about 10 miles, and waited for our arrival there. Some time after this their father's brother, who lives in the village of Chepni, came and claimed them; but as their father had taken refuge in Munnipoor, and they wished to go to Cachar with their maternal uncle, we thought it right to keep them with us.

14th February.—This day's march was very much shorter than either of the two former ones. The road ran for a little way along the ridge of a great watershed; thereafter descending about 1,700 feet, it lay along a stream flowing through a flat alluvial valley.

The name of the stream is Tooweto, which means "sitting water," an allusion to its comparatively level course. The Tooweto flows into a very much bigger stream, called the Taow, which drains a great alluvial valley to the east. It is very difficult to make anything of the geographical information which I get from the Looshais, but I am strongly inclined to think that the Taow is the same river as the Koladyne. If so, it must make a great sweep to the west, somewhere south of this. I do not think that it can be one of the tributaries of the Irrawaddy, as the Looshais, who seem to know most about this subject, state that a high range of hills to our east is the water parting between the Taow, which they say flows south to the sea, and a stream which they call Ghoon; now the latter certainly falls into the Ningtee, and eventually into the Irrawaddy.

15th February.—Halted on the Tooweto to give our coolies a rest, which was much needed. It rained rather heavily during the day. In the morning some of our Looshais, whom we had sent ahead to reconnoitre, returned to say that heavy firing had been heard in the direction of Chumfai, and the Kamhow's Soktes were said to have attacked the village of Vonolel's widow. We at once sent off some more Looshais to inquire into the truth of this story. We have now with us in camp Looshais from almost every village in our rear, from Kholel onwards; these men are primarily in a manner hostages for their villages, but they are extremely useful to us as guides, scouts, and the like. Their conduct has been generally very good, and we have begun to feel that we can to some extent trust their fidelity. Many Looshais from a village of Lenkom on the hill ahead, and Poies from a village also subject to Lenkom, on the same range, came into the camp during the day bringing presents.

16th February.—Before we marched to-day a very intelligent old man from the village ahead came in with some followers to accompany us on our way. He said the village of Vonolel's widow had been attacked on the day before by Soktes, who had been repulsed with the loss of four men. One of the Looshais was killed and four wounded.

From the camp we ascended about 3,000 feet to a small village situated near the edge of a precipitous cliff. Here we were met by the headman, an old man named Engow, and all the people of the village, old men, women, and children. One old man, who declared that he at least was 100 years old, first fell at the General's feet, and then got up and blessed him. The people of the village are of the Pyte stock. They complained much of the oppression of their Looshai masters, and I think it not improbable that they will follow us into Cachar. They told us that 10 armed men from their village had formed part of the

force that opposed us on the 25th; that they had fought us because they had been told that we should destroy all their villages and crops, kill their children, and carry off their women; but that they had found out that there was no truth in this, and therefore, when they were called upon by their chiefs to oppose us at Toolcheng, they, as well as the people of all the other subject villages, refused, and said, "Why should we go out to be killed for your sake by people who do not hurt us unless we oppose them?" Upon hearing this the Looshais, according to Engow and his people, found that there was no use in attempting further resistance, and were obliged to make immediate submission. Some way after leaving the village we came on a place from which we could see the great Chumfai valley lying below us, with the village of Vonolel on a low hill at the further end, and that of his widow on a high ridge to the right. From this point we descended for about 2,000 feet, chiefly through forests of magnificent pine trees, and after passing the sites of two burnt villages, we at last, just before nightfall, reached the Chumfai plain, where we found water and abundant fire-wood. Messengers were at once sent on to the village of Vonolel's widow to say that unless the headmen came in at once and submitted to the General's terms, the village would be destroyed.

17th February.—Marched this morning to Lalboorah's village. Our path lay through a flat alluvial valley, which evidently had once been the bed of a lake, and which is still swampy in many places. There are low hills dotted over it, which look isolated at first sight, but which seem to be really the highest peaks of ranges, the lower portions of which have been covered up by alluvial deposit. The soil of the plain appears to be very fertile, but it is uncultivated.

The village was about four miles from our camp. It contained some 500 houses built in rows along the side of a sloping hill. We found it completely deserted. In the middle was the tomb of Vonolel; a stone platform, surrounded by a railing of timber, surmounted by rows of beads. Inside the tomb there was hung up the head of a lately-killed human being, said to be one of the Soktes killed in the late attack. After a few appropriate words from the General, congratulating the officers and men under him on the success of the expedition, and commending the discipline and admirable conduct of the force, we left the village, which was at once destroyed. Vonolel's tomb, however, was preserved.

Meantime, some of the headmen of the village of Lalboorah's mother came into camp, but I refused to see them until they produced some at least of the plunder taken at Monierkhal and Nugdigram. In the course of the evening a policeman's musket, pouch, and coat, a uniform coat of a man of the 4th Native Infantry, and some brass articles used by Bengalees, were produced. This proved, beyond the possibility of a doubt, the complicity of Vonolel's family in the Monierkhal and Nugdigram raids of last year. For my part I had scarcely any doubt of their guilt, but still it is very satisfactory to get such convincing proof as the clothes of the men killed in the raid. After the plundered property had been brought in, a message was sent to the headmen, informing them that the General meant to visit the village next day, and that they must appear in the morning to hear the terms to be imposed on them.

18th February.—When the muntries appeared this morning, the terms fixed by the General, after consultation with me, were explained to them.

Firstly, that in case of their being unable to produce Lalboorah, three headmen of the village should return with us as hostages to Tipai Mookh.

Secondly, that they should agree to receive agents of Government in their villages when demanded.

Thirdly, that they should restore all the fire-arms taken at Monierkhal and Nugdigram; and in case they should be unable to collect the full number of 12 at once, that they should give up an equal number of their own weapons.

Fourthly, that they should deliver, by way of fine, a war-drum, a set of gongs, large and small, an amber necklace, two large tusks, four metnas, 10 goats, 10 pigs, 50 fowls, and 20 maunds of husked rice.

The headmen were informed that in case of their non-compliance with the two last of these conditions before the morning of the 20th, immediate measures would be taken for the destruction of the village and property of their tribe. Before making these terms, we had ascertained that there are no British subjects now in captivity in the village, and, as far as we could make out, no subjects of Munnipoor.

The headmen, when they heard the terms, declared that they could not comply with them, and Dorpong, as his manner is when in a difficulty, said that he was very sick, and asked for leave to return home. The General told him that he might go if he liked, and I told the headmen that they must make their choice between submission and destruction of their village. We then went up the hill at some little distance from Chumsim, as the village is called. We were met by some of the headmen who had not come down in the morning; they returned with us. As we neared the village, a crowd of armed men standing on the crest of a hill in front of a stockade shouted at us, but the headmen ran on in front of us, and said something to the people above, who dispersed as we reached the top. The General then drew up his men outside the stockade, and went into the village with a guard of 20 men and the European officers who had accompanied him. We remained in the village for more than three hours, while Captain Badgley was employed in work connected with

his

his survey. I took advantage of the opportunity to get our terms fully explained to the headmen who were present, and after we left the village these terms were again formally declared to them. The headmen said that they would do all in their power to comply with them, and we went off.

There were marks of bullets in the strong stockade which surrounds the village, which were pointed out as results of the firing of Kamhow's men two days previously, and a little way below we saw a corpse, said to be that of a Sokte.

19th February.—Parties were sent out to-day to search for villages; I remained in camp. From time to time during the day portions of the fine were tendered, but we refused to receive anything until the muskets had been brought in. The Looshais promised to bring the latter during the night, but urged that they had immense difficulties in collecting them. Of course, however, we could listen to nothing, but answered their excuses by pointing out the alternative of their failure to comply with our demands.

The Looshais have offered to take a letter across to General Brownlow, and to return with an answer in 10 days. It is very doubtful whether they could get a letter through, or whether they would have the perseverance to take one the whole way even if they could. However, the chance is worth trying, if the Looshais comply with our demands; should they fail to do so, of course we should have no communication with them until they had been reduced to submission.

20th February.—During the night the muskets were brought in, and the remainder of the fine.

The muntries who are to accompany us have been chosen.

The General proposes to send up to-night the signals agreed on with General Brownlow, to whom he has to-day sent off a letter through the Looshais. He proposes to make the first march on our return to-morrow, and will send up another batch of signals from Moorthlong, the great hill, 6,600 feet high, between this and the village of the Pyte Engow.

If Poiboi can summon up enough courage to meet us on our way back, we shall have obtained compliance with all our demands; and, in any case, I think that the tribes we have been amongst are very unlikely to cause any trouble on the frontier for a long time at least.

Appendix (B.)

No. 27, dated the 22nd March 1869.

From Dr. *R. Brown*, Political Agent, Munnipoor, to *W. S. Seton-Karr*, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I have the honour to inform you that recently, in the course of conversation with the Rajah here, I asked him to favour me with what information he possessed as to the Looshai tribe, and his ideas as to the causes which have led to the recent serious and extensive disturbances both in his and British territory. His information and ideas on the subject are contained in what follows.

2. The Rajah states:—"There are three tribes of Looshai Kookies; first, those who reside in the hills near to Cachar and Munnipoor; second, Gombows or Khonjas, who inhabit the country from Sogoono (due south from Munnipoor valley) to Burmah; third, Pooe Nagas, who inhabit the hills towards Chittagong. Formerly the whole of these tribes were only armed with daos, bows and arrows, and spears; now they have fire-arms.

3. "The principal chiefs among the Looshais are named Sookpilal, Langnow, and Pookna; Vonpilal and Vonolel are not so powerful. They are all connected by blood.

"Formerly there was great estrangement among the chiefs on this account. Vonolel's father had two wives; one of his own family, the other of another and lower caste. This woman had a son before the other (the mother of Vonolel), named Tongpoong, who is now dead. Tongpoong and Vonolel never agreed together. Now we hear that the above chiefs have become friendly. It is also rumoured that among them are some mutinous sepoys (from Chittagong) who escaped into that country (in 1857).

4. "There has never been any association between the Looshais and Munnipoories. About 20 years ago, when my uncle was alive, the Looshais attacked the village of Moyrang, in Munnipoor territory. At that time they had very few muskets, and were easily driven off. Again, in my time, about 11 years ago, the village of Kalla Nago (the same as recently burnt by the Looshais) was attacked; they were defeated, and 11 made prisoners; among them was Nontoorow, the maternal uncle of Vonolel. They were eventually liberated on condition of good behaviour for the future. Since then the peace has been kept with this country until lately. I cannot say with certainty who is the present leader of the Looshais.

5. "Fire-arms, and also nitre and sulphur, are supplied by Bengalees and Munnipoories who live near the hills where the Looshais are. It is a very profitable trade, and will be difficult to put a stop to. I heard some time ago of a party of Munnipoories from the

Cachar district who went to cut bamboos at the Tipai Mookh; when there, they came across a party of Lushais, and were afraid, and about to run away, when the Looshais told them not to fear, saying, 'You are our friends; by your help we get powder; do not fear us.' The Munnipoories did not then have any fear.

"It would do much good if the trade in fire-arms could be stopped, as also sale of sulphur, &c."

6. The Rajah, in making the above communication, is anxious to have it known that he cannot depend on its correctness absolutely; he can only give what is accepted as true here. I think it likely that there may be a good deal of truth in his reason given for a want of unanimity among the chiefs formerly existing, and which has been made up between them. There can be no doubt that there has lately been an amount of alliance and combination amongst the Looshai tribe of an unusual kind, as shown by recent disturbances.

7. There can be no doubt of the greater danger to the peace of the British frontier and to this country in the event of any extensive combination among any section of the hill tribes either to the north or south; such combination is certain to be followed by the disturbances and raids. Fortunately their internal quarrels and want of common language prevent in great measure any attempt at combination on a large scale, and such combinations are therefore unfrequent.

8. To sum up briefly as to what I consider to be the causes which have led to recent outrages; they are, the possession by the Looshais of fire-arms and ammunition in larger quantity than they have ever before had; their lawless and predatory habits so frequently manifested by raids on British territory, &c., &c.; their belief in the impregnability of their country; and, lastly, the existence lately of a combination among the principal chiefs of an unusual kind.

9. I have been again inquiring of the Munnipoories if they possessed any information as to the existence of any disturbances on the part of the Burmese frontier infringed on by the Khonja tribe of Looshais. I am informed that there has been no news of any very recent disturbances in that direction; but some months ago a report was current that some time in October last, probably the beginning of the month, several villages had been cut up, situated in the plain, in Burmese territory, and near the hills occupied by the above. Should this be correct, it will show how extensively the various tribes of the Looshais have been disturbed, and complete the circle of places attacked.

10. I have not, in any of my letters on the Looshai raids, alluded to what I consider the proper remedy for the continual disturbances by that tribe; but should it be desired by Government, I will be glad to submit my views on the subject.

Appendix (C.)

No. 43, dated Munnipoor, the 12th March 1872.

From Major-General *W. F. Nuthall*, Political Agent, Munnipoor, to Brigadier General *Bourchier*, C.B., Commanding Cachar Column, Lushai Expeditionary Force.

Having on the 5th instant received your telegrams bearing the Cachar Telegraph Office dates 21st and 25th February, I have the honour to inform you that, in accordance with instructions contained in the latter, the Munnipoor contingent retired from Seeboo on 6th instant, and met with rather an unexpected adventure.

I must premise by mentioning that the contingent always marched late in the morning, after cooking and eating; I therefore went ahead.

On the morning of the 7th instant, before starting from Sitol Subbom (our advanced depôt of supplies about nine miles from Seeboo) several hundred men, of whom upwards of one hundred were armed with muskets, suddenly appeared at the camp coming from the west.

Having become accustomed to receive captives in large numbers (many even armed), the Majors commanding were off their guard, but fortunately a Kookie chief named Lumlayboong, one of our auxiliaries, recognised amongst them a chief named Kokatung, of a clan of Kamhow's tribe, residing on the borders of Burmah, who had lately made a raid upon one of the Rajah's vilages in that direction, and carried off its inhabitants. Kamhow had been referred to on this subject, and declared it was done without his authority, and that he had very little control over the clan in question.

Lumlayboong cautiously communicated to the Majors what he knew, who sent round the camp to tell the sepoys to load quietly and unperceived, and be on the alert.

The Majors then admitted them into the camp, taking up a good central position, and a conference ensued, during which the sepoys closed round and got behind each armed man in groups of three.

With Kokatung were two other chiefs, Toonggum his son and Kamlel his brother. The Majors asked them whence they came and where they were going. They said they had been

been on a friendly visit to the village of Lokstow and Kowtung, the inhabitants of whom numbering 962, were with them, and were desirous to join Kamhow's tribe.

The Majors then told Kokatung that as they had disobeyed my instructions and crossed over into the Looshai country, he must come to where I was—the encampment ahead—and explain himself. He replied that he could not go so much out of his way. The Majors then ceased to urge this point, and got the chiefs into familiar conversation; handed them a percussion musket to try, and asked to try theirs, and having in this way discharged the three muskets of the three chiefs at once, had them seized, whereupon Kokatung, putting his forefinger in his mouth, gave a war alarm (a whistle), and his force stood to arms, and a momentary struggle ensued; the sepoys however, overpowered and made prisoners of 56, and took 52 muskets, with injury to themselves of only four men wounded, all of whom are doing well.

The chiefs acknowledge that they had 100 armed followers, the rest, 44, made their escape, firing into the contingent as they ran off. Their intention was to attack the depôt.

The captives, who are Poitoos, were all released, and their property, consisting of metnas, gongs, clothing, &c., restored to them. Amongst them are two children, who were taken away in the raid upon Nunfow in January 1871, and two women of Moontha and one woman of Moongdang, who were taken in the raids of 1869. The captives have come to Munnipoor, and for the present have been settled in the valley south of Moirang, and the Rajah will have lands allotted to them, and every arrangement made for their future welfare and for provisioning them until they raise crops for themselves.

The Sooti prisoners have all been placed in irons in gaol, and will there remain until their families come, when the Rajah intends to release them and settle them in the hills to the north-east of the valley. He seems quite confident of reconciling them, and anticipates obtaining much useful service from them in event of future strife with Kamhow's tribe.

The loss of so many arms to that tribe will tend to break its power and restrain its preying upon the Looshais at this time of their weakness. The advantages of this fortunate incident, therefore, form a happy conclusion to the expedition, and I trust you will solicit the Right Honourable the Commander in Chief to move the Viceroy and Governor General in Council to acknowledge the judicious and resolute conduct of the two Majors, Sewai Chumba and Tungal, to whom the success was due.

No. 6, dated Cachar, the 21st March 1872.

From *J. W. Edgar*, Esq., Civil Officer with the Cachar Column of the Looshai Expeditionary Force, to Brigadier General *Bourchier*, C.B., Commanding Cachar Column, Lushai Expeditionary Force.

I HAVE the honour to return letter, No. 43, of the 12th March, from the Political Agent, Munnipoor, forwarded to me with your No. 697L. of the 18th.

2. The story related by the Political Agent is, as you remark, a strange one, and scarcely intelligible in its present form; but, of course, the Political Agent is only able to give the version which it has suited the Munnipoor officials to put forth. I have obtained certain information which leads me to think that this version differs materially from the real facts.

3. Kamhow is the great chief of the Kookie family, known to us as Soktes or Pytes. It is possible that the two names represent sub-divisions of the family; but the fact remains, that they are indifferently used by the Looshais, by us, and by the Soktes themselves, to describe the branch of Kookies of which Kamhow is the head. These Kookies have been long at feud with the Looshais. At present, the chief cause of contention is the detention by the latter of several villages of Soktés or Pytes who were settled down in Vonolel's country by that chief when he was young and powerful. These Sates are now dissatisfied, and wish to return to Kamhow; but, as they have frequently told me, they are deterred by fear of the Looshai chieftains falling on them and killing their women and children before they could get into Kamhow's country. This year, many of them took advantage of the presence of our force and the disorganisation of the Looshai villages, to escape to their own country, just as so many Kookies belonging to families settled in Cachar or Munnipoor took refuge with us or with General Nuthall. When we were at Toowetoo on the 3rd, I received intelligence that about 100 armed men from Kamhow's villages had come to the Looshai villages to the south-east of us for the purpose of protecting the Soktes who wished to leave. This was confirmed on the 5th by Dorpong, who came in to say, that nearly 1,000 Soktes had gone off to Kamhow, under the protection of the armed party sent by the latter, and that they had taken with them all their property. There can be no doubt that these were the people who appeared two days later at the Munnipooree camp.

In considering the affair that followed, it must be borne in mind that Kamhow has acted as the ally of Munnipoor all through the campaign, and that the Munnipoorees have never expressed the slightest doubt of his fidelity. The armed men of Kokatung's party were outnumbered by the Munnipoorees in the proportion of at least three to one, probably

much more. They evidently went into the midst of the camp in perfect reliance on the friendliness of the Munnipoorees, for, as the result showed, they put within reach of the latter the women and children, as well as the property of the refugees. Their suspicions were not even aroused when the Munnipooree officer fired off the muskets of the chiefs, and when each armed man was surrounded by a group of three sepoys. I do not believe that the Soktes had the slightest intention of attacking the Munnipooree camp. The charge was, in all probability, afterwards invented by the Majors to excuse their own conduct. It is evident that the latter could not resist the temptation of getting possession of the refugees, for the Munnipoorees are even more eager than the hill chiefs themselves to get hold of Kookie and Naga subjects.

4. Of course, we have no direct interest in the relations between Munnipoor and Kamhow; with the latter we have never had any dealings whatever. But the possible results of the affair of the 7th May indirectly affect us in an unpleasant manner. Kamhow is very unlikely not to resent what he will naturally look on as gross treachery on the part of Munnipoor, and he may see that his best chance of revenge is an alliance with the Looshais, while, from our point of view, such an alliance would be about as undesirable a thing as could happen.

No. 46, dated Munnipoor, the 16th March 1872.

From Major General *W. T. Nuthall*, Political Agent, Munnipoor, to Brigadier General *Bourchier*, C.B., Commanding Cachar Column, Looshai Expeditionary Force.

REFERRING to my letter, No. 43, of 12th instant, I have thehonour to inform you that it appears Kokatung, Kamhow's chief, and his force first attacked the village of Boombong of Poiboi's clan, drove them from their houses, to which they set fire, and took all their cattle. They then went to the villages of Lokstow and Kowtung, the inhabitants of which, being unable to offer resistance, at once submitted, and were being carried off, together with all their property, when the contingent fell in with them.

2. The chief Boombong and his followers, numbering 672, have come to seek the Maharajah's protection and settle in Munnipoor, and all their property found in the possession of Kokatung has been restored to them.

3. Besides the above, I have the honour to report that 110 Soomtis, subjects of Kamhow, have come to seek the Rajah's protection. Their story is, that Poiboi's clan having made overtures with Kamhow for assistance against the British, he consented to render it for the time being, and set out with all his fighting men; but on arrival at Seeboo, the strength of the Munnipoor force encamped there alarmed them, and they returned.

4. The Soomtis are vassals of the Kamhows, and on their return found that all their pigs, poultry, &c., had been taken from their families and consumed during their absence. Incensed at this treachery, they determined to flee the country as soon as an opportunity offered. Soon after, Kokatung and his party set out on their raiding expedition, and the Soomtis then arranged to carry out their projected flight.

5. This makes a total of 2,749 captives and refugees who have fled to Munnipoor for safety and protection. They have from time to time brought 173 muskets with them, which, with the 52 taken from Kamhow's raiding party, makes a total of 225.

6. I cannot trace that any of these muskets have been obtained through Munnipoor; they have almost entirely been obtained from the tribes south, which goes a long way to confirm a statement made to me in 1869, and reported by me to Government, of a certain Frenchman having been engaged in this trade.

7. It is most essential that the importation of sulphur through Chittagong and Arracan should be stopped.

No. 470, dated Cachar, the 8th April 1872.

From *J. W. Edgar*, Esq., Civil Officer with the Cachar Column of the Looshai Expeditionary Force, to Brigadier General *Bourchier*, C.B., Commanding Cachar Column, Looshai Expeditionary Force.

I HAVE the honour to return letter, No. 46, dated 16th March 1872, from the Political Agent, Munnipoor.

2. I have delayed reporting, in the hope of being able to find out something about Kamhow's conduct during the early part of the expedition, as towards the end we know that, so far from siding with the Looshais, he attacked them a few days before we reached Chumfai. Bohmong's village was situated to the east of the Gnowpa range; it had formerly been on that range. I had heard that the village was likely to have Poiboi's country.

3. It

3. It was undoubtedly better that these people should have gone to Munnipoor than that they should have gone to strengthen Kamhow or any other tribe to the east or south; but it would have suited our policy better if they had remained under Poiboi, who, in consequence of this defection, has ceased to be of much importance either as a friend or foe.

From *V. H. Schalch*, Esq., Member in charge, Land Revenue Department, Board of Revenue, to the Under Secretary to the Government of Bengal; dated Dacca, the 28th September 1871.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to state, with reference to your letter, No. 2235, of the 15th June 1871, that I have taken advantage of visiting Dacca to examine, in company with the Commissioner, the records relating to the cases therein referred to, and herewith forward a statement in full, showing "in each case by whom, when, and under what circumstances the lands therewith connected were given away."

2. It will be observed that out of the 15 instances in which the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar has reported that village sites and cultivated lands have been included in the grants and leases given for the cultivation of tea in eight* mention of sites and of such lands was made in the measurement papers and maps of the ameen, who was deputed to make the local examinations; but in none of these instances was the fact of the existence of such sites and land brought prominently to the notice of the Superintendent of Cachar by the ameen in his final report. In the remaining cases, no mention whatsoever of the existence of such sites and land is to be found anywhere in the ameen's papers.

* Nos. 190, 201, 11, 178, 88, 235, 170, 147.

3. In all the cases referred to, a report was duly made by the Superintendent to the Commissioner of Revenue, and by him a tabular form of the application, with his remarks, was submitted to the Board for sanction, in accordance with the order laid down in the waste land rules of 30th August 1862, but by neither of these officers is any mention made in their reports of the inclusion of such site and land within the area of which it was proposed to the Board either to grant or lease.

4. No doubt no such sites and cultivated lands should have been included in the grant and leases, for these latter were to be given merely for *waste lands*, under which denomination no village sites or cultivated lands would be properly included; but as far as the member in charge can, after this lapse of time, form on opinion of the principles which then governed the local officers in proposing the grants of these lands, it was considered sufficient to ascertain whether any objection had been raised against the inclusion of any lands within the areas granted; and, as it appears from the record, that, after due notice, no such objections were raised by the ignorant classes whose rights were affected, no valid objections were deemed to exist against the submission of the applications for the sanction of the Board, who would appear to have had no means of ascertaining the fact of the improper inclusion of village sites and cultivation within the areas it was proposed to grant or lease.

Grant No. 190, Jeerighat (area 4,830 *a.* 2 *r.* 10 *p.*)

MR. MCWILLIAM, Officiating Deputy Commissioner of Cachar, states that 10 acres 1 rood and 26 perches of land were occupied by a Naga village, and that the fact was not taken into notice in any of the subsequent proceedings connected with the settlement of this grant, which, it appears, from a subsequent letter, has been occupied and is to be revised under clause 4A, sec. 6, cap. 26 of the Board's rules.

2. From the record it appears that on the 20th June 1862, Mr. E. Rushton filed a petition praying for the settlement of this lot, for the cultivation of tea, and the usual notices were issued, upon which no objection was raised. Subsequently an ameen was sent to survey the land. From his Khytin paper, bearing date the 24th November 1863, it appears that a Naga village, consisting of a little above 2 hals (10 acres) of land, was included and measured within the boundaries of the lot, but the ameen omitted to note this fact in his report. Captain R. Stewart, the then superintendent of Cachar, submitted to the Commissioner for orders with his letter No. 69, dated 29th March 1864, a tabular statement showing the quantity of land applied for, its boundary, date of application, &c., and a map of the land in which the site of the Naga village was entered, with the remark "that the grant seems to be in every way unobjectionable." Upon this, Mr. Commissioner Buckland transmitted the tabular form of application to the Board of Revenue with the same remark. The Board, in their letter, No. 72, dated 15th April 1864, sanctioned the settlement under the Assam rules, dated 23rd October 1854. Accordingly the settlement was made by the superintendent's rubacari, dated 20th May 1864, in which also no mention was made of the Naga village above referred to.

Grant No. 16, Jeerigha, Mirashdari tenure (area 8,917 acres).

3. Mr. McWilliam reports that Jujung village of Nagas was on this lot, which was fired in 1864 by Mr. Patten, manager of the tea grant; that no mention of the village was made in the settlement proceedings, &c.; that the Nagas made no objections when notices were issued on them to assert their objections; and that this lot is occupied.

4. The records show that on the 11th July 1863, Hurry Churn Surmah applied for the settlement of the lot under the Mirashdari rules. Notices were issued, upon which no objection was raised. The land was then measured and mapped by an ameen, from whose papers nothing can be ascertained as to whether any hill villages or jooms were included within the boundaries of the lot or not. In 1866, Messrs. Jardine, Skinner & Co., and certain other gentlemen filed a petition to the Board of Revenue, stating that the lands were taken possession of, and operations were commenced on them, in the full belief that the lease would have been granted at the rates current, instead of those subsequently introduced. They, therefore, solicited that they be either allowed to purchase the lands in fee-simple at *Rs.* 2. 9. per acre without the lots being advertised and put up to public auction, or that the new rates be enforced only in the cultivated area, leaving the remainder of the lands to be applied for in fee-simple under the waste land rules. After some correspondence in regard to the terms of the grants and the area, &c., the Government, by order No. 344T., dated 8th May 1866, sanctioned a lease of 15 years accordingly; a settlement for 15 years was made by the Deputy Commissioner's rubacari, dated 31st December 1866, in which no mention was made as to the inclusion of any hill village in the lot.

Grant No. 201, Alni (area 9,433 *a.* 2*r.* 28 *p.*)

5. Mr. McWilliam states that at the time of application for settlement about 45 acres of land in this grant were occupied by Kookie and Naga villages; that the subsequent settlement proceedings make no allusion to the fact; that in 1865–66 the revenue survey gave the area as occupied by Kookie villages to be six acres only, and that the grant is occupied and is to be revised under Rule 4.

6. From the record it appears that on the 12th July 1862, Mr. A. D. McLeod submitted a petition praying for the settlement of this lot for the cultivation of tea. On the service of usual notices, Mr. Davidson preferred an objection that certain lands of his tea grant were included within the boundary, but his objections were rejected. The land was measured and mapped by an ameen, from whose measurement papers it appears that more than 9 hals (45 acres) of land, consisting of Kookie Naga Poonjee, were included within the boundaries. This fact, it appears, was also noted in the map prepared by him, but he omitted to note the same in his report. Captain R. Stewart, the then Superintendent of Cachar, submitted with his letter, No. 199, dated 23rd July 1864, a tabular statement showing the quantity of land applied for, its boundary, date of application, &c., and a map of the land to the Commissioner for orders, with the remark "that the grant seems to be in every way unobjectionable." Upon this Mr. C. T. Buckland, the then Commissioner, transmitted the papers to the Board with the remark that he could not support the application as the area was excessive. The Board by their No. 225, dated 29th August 1864, called for the original papers, and a report as to how much of the area has been brought under cultivation. In reply the Commissioner by his letter, No. 259, dated 30th September 1864, submitted the papers to the Board, who by their No. 303, dated 31st October 1864, accorded their sanction to the grant of the lease. Accordingly, the settlement was made by the Superintendent's rubacari, dated 17th August 1865, in which also no mention was made of Kookie Naga Poonjee above referred to.

Grant No. 11, Borachung (area 2,691 *a.* 14 *p.* 4 *q.* 8 *f.*)

7. Mr. McWilliam states that 1 acre 1 rood and 4 perches of land were occupied by a Naga village; that the fact was totally disregarded in proceeding to settlement; and that the grant is occupied and redeemed in fee-simple.

Lieutenant Bensile, 3rd January 1856.

Messrs. John Borradaile and Company, 21st June 1856.

Kanchanpore Tea Company, 19th December 1862.

7½. It appears that the applicants noted on the margin severally applied for the settlement of this plot of land on the dates specified against their names. On the service of usual notices, Brijo Soondry Chowdrine and another, of Sylhet, preferred an objection in connection with the western boundary of the lot, but their objection was disallowed on the ground that it was raised after the expiration of the time allowed in the notice, and that the Board of Revenue had also ordered, by their No. 220, dated 28th October 1862, that the boundary disputes should be adjusted hereafter. The lands were measured by an ameen, and on a reference to his papers it appears that 3 kedors 5 joyote 13 puns, being little above one acre of land (Bhitte Tilla), were entered in dag 22 of the chitta as the dwelling of Dhonai Matoe and others, but no mention of this fact was noted in his report. On the 14th December 1858, Captain R. Stewart, by his letter, No. 227, submitted five tabular statements, of this and other grants, showing the quantity of land applied for, its area, boundaries, &c., and maps and papers for Commissioner's order, with the remarks, "that the boundaries of the lots are in most places vague, and in many ideal." Upon this the then Commissioner, Mr. Davidson, transmitted the papers and tabular form of application to the Board of Revenue with similar remarks, and suggested that the Board should withhold their sanction to the leases until Borradaile & Company should consent to take up the land lying to west of that for which they had applied; but the Board, by their No. 47, dated 29th April 1859, directed that if Messrs. Borradaile & Company were willing to take the land lying between their present grants and the Sylhet boundary, the superintendent might give it to them, otherwise the whole land must be broken up into convenient lots, with a river frontage reserved to each, and Messrs. Borradaile & Company might apply for any they wish. This was communicated to the superintendent by Commissioner's No. 8, dated 10th May 1859. Upon which, the superintendent, Captain R. Stewart, in paragraph 2 of his letter, No. 138, dated 21st September 1859, reported that Messrs. Borradaile & Company were willing to take up all the lands between that applied for by them and the Sylhet boundary. Mr. Davidson, the then Commissioner, transmitted the papers to the Board

Board by his letter, No. 111, of 28th September 1859, and recommended the sanction of the grant. The Board, by their letter, No. 173, dated 11th November 1859, accorded their sanction to the grant of the leases, and requested the submission of a report on the completion of the settlement. A correspondence then took place in regard to the boundary between Sylhet and Cachar not having been determined, and as to the necessity for the survey of the land in question; and, finally, the Board, in their letter, No. 220, dated 28th October 1862, observed that they did not see any necessity of keeping any cases pending till the settlement of the Sylhet boundary, and directed that a special clause should be inserted in the grant binding the grantee to take, and the Government to give, on the same terms all lands which may be found to be between the boundary of the present grant and the Sylhet frontier as eventually laid down. Accordingly a settlement was made by Captain R. Stewart's rubacari dated 21st March 1863.

Grant No. 178, Koylashpore (area, 5,073 *a.* 26 *p.*)

8. Mr. McWilliam reported that 9 acres 3 roods and 17 perches of land consisted of a Cachari village, and 31 acres and 31 perches of joom lands were included in this lot; that no mention of the fact was made in the settlement proceeding; and that the lot being uncultivated is to be resumed.

9. The records show that on the 9th of May 1862, Mr. Peterson applied for a settlement of this grant, but subsequently solicited that, having sold his tea garden to Cachar and Sylhet Tea Company, the settlement might be made with them. This company subsequently intimated the transfer of their rights to Messrs. Stewart & Fergusson, who again made a transfer of their rights, &c. to the British India Tea Company. Prior to the disposal of the grant, usual notices were issued, upon which no objection was raised. The land was also measured and mapped by an ameen, from whose measurement papers it appears that a Cachari village and a few plots of joom land were included within the boundary of the lot, the site of which was also marked in his map, but he omitted to note the fact in his report. The Superintendent of Cachar, Captain R. Stewart, submitted a report, No. 193, dated 23rd July 1864, with tabular statements of this and two other grants, showing the details of area, dates of application, &c., and maps of the land for the Commissioner's order, with the remark "that the grants seem to be in every way unobjectionable." Upon this, Mr. Buckland, the then Commissioner, transmitted the papers to the Board of Revenue, with a remark, that he could not support the application as the area was large. The Board of Revenue, by their No. 239, dated 30th August 1864, accorded their sanction to the grant of the lease. Accordingly a settlement for 99 years was made by Captain R. Stewart's rubacari, dated 25th August 1865, with the British India Tea Company, Limited, to whom the land had been ultimately transferred. In this rubacari no mention was made of the existence of the joom land and Cachari village referred to above.

Grant No. 148, Khashpore (area 3,491 *a.* 2 *r.* 15 *p.*)

10. Mr. McWilliam reported that he was informed by Mr. J. P. Stuart that at the time of settlement of the grant there was a Kookie village; that no mention of this is to be found in the settlement proceedings; and that the lot is to be revised under Rule 4 A.

11. The facts are, that on the 10th of February 1862, Mr. J. P. Stuart applied for a settlement of this plot of waste land. Notices were issued, upon which no objection was raised. Subsequently the land was measured and mapped by an ameen, from whose measurement papers it does not appear that any village lands, &c., were included within this lot. Mr. Sherer, the then officiating Superintendent of Cachar, submitted a report, No. 260, dated 21st December 1863, with tabular settlements of this and two other grants showing the quantity of land, date of application, &c., and maps of the land to the Commissioner for orders, with a remark that the grants seem to be in every way unobjectionable. Upon this, the then Commissioner, Mr. Buckland, transmitted the papers to the Board of Revenue with the same remark, for their sanction. The Board of Revenue, by their No. 32, dated 19th February 1864, conveyed their sanction to the grant of the lease. Accordingly, a settlement was made, without specification of the Kookie village, by Captain R. Stewart's rubacari, dated 25th August 1865, with the British India Tea Company, Limited, to whom the grant had been transferred on the application of Mr. J. P. Stuart.

Grant No. 210, Bowalla (area 998*a.* 16*p.*)

12. Mr. McWilliam stated that two acres of village land were shown in this lot by the revenue survey; that no trace of its existence is to be found in the settlement papers; and that it has been occupied and redeemed.

13. The papers show that on the 1st of August 1862, M. R. A. Wood applied for a settlement of this grant. On the issue of usual notices no objections were preferred. Subsequently the land was measured and mapped by an ameen. From his measurement papers there does not appear that any village land was entered as within the lot. A report, No. 75, dated 29th March 1864, with a tabular statement, showing the quantity of land applied for, its boundary, date of application, &c., and a map of the land, was submitted by Captain R. Stewart, the then Superintendent of Cachar, to the Commissioners, for orders, with a remark "that the grant seems to be in every way unobjectionable." Upon this, Mr. Buckland, the then Commissioner, transmitted the same to the Board of Revenue with the same remark. The Board, in their letter, No. 77, dated 18th April 1864, sanctioned the settlement, under the Assam rules, dated 23rd October 1854. Accordingly, a settlement, without any allusion to the village lands, was made by Captain

R. Stewart's rubacari, dated 19th April 1865, for a term of 99 years, with Mr. W. D. McNeile, to whom the land had been intermediately transferred.

Grant No 124, Dinnonathpore (area 3,830 *a.* 1 *r.* 34 *p.*)

14. Mr. McWilliam reported that a Kookie Poonjee is to be found in this lot; that its existence is not mentioned in the settlement papers; and that the lot is occupied and is to be revised under Rule 4A.

15. It appears that on the 30th November 1861, Mr. Hume applied for a settlement of this lot. Usual notices were issued, upon which no objection was raised. The land was afterwards measured and surveyed by an ameen, from whose measurement papers no trace can be had as to the inclusion of any village site and joom lands within the boundaries of this lot. A report, No. 210, dated 6th October 1863, with a tabular statement, showing the quantity of land applied for, its boundary, date of application, &c., and a map and other papers were submitted by Captain R. Stewart, the then Superintendent of Cachar, to the Commissioner for orders. The then officiating Commissioner transmitted the tabular form of application to the Board of Revenue, with a remark "that the grant seems unobjectionable." The Board in their No. 260, dated 18th December 1863, accorded their sanction to the grant of a lease under the old rules. Accordingly a settlement was made by Captain R. Stewart's rubacari, dated 21st December 1864, which contained no mention of the Kookie Poonjee, for a term of 99 years with the Northern Cachar Tea Company, to whom the land had been transferred.

Grant No. 25, Bengalnugur (area 2,095 *a.* 2 *r.* 38 *p.*)

16. Mr. McWilliam reported that the revenue survey gives 11 acres of land as a village site in this lot, and that the grant is occupied and is to be revised under Rule 4A.

17. The record shows that on the 27th October 1856, Mr. William Hoolet, on the part of the Bengal Tea Company, applied for a settlement of this plot of land; on the service of notices, no objections were raised. The lands were then measured and mapped by an ameen, from whose papers it does not appear that any village site was included in the lot. Captain R. Stewart, the then Superintendent of Cachar, submitted with his letter, No. 9, dated 20th January 1859, a tabular statement showing the quantity of land applied for, the name of the grant, and a map of the land to the Commissioner for orders, with the remark "that it is objectionable, in so far that a strip of land between the western boundary and the frontier of Sylhet is left khas and unavailable to any other party, being shut out from natural frontage." Upon this, Mr. Commissioner Davidson transmitted the report to the Board of Revenue, with the remark "that this grant be sanctioned only on the condition that the applicant includes the land which the Superintendent represents will be unavailable to the public." The Board of Revenue, by their No. 75, dated 31st May 1859, accorded their sanction, on the condition that Bengal Company would include in their application the strip of land up to the Sylhet frontier which would otherwise be cut off from the public. The Commissioner by his letter No. 32, dated 22nd June 1859, communicated the above to Lieutenant R. Stewart, who in paragraph 3 of his letter No. 166, dated 29th November 1859, intimated the acquiescence of the Bengal Company in the terms referred to by the Board of Revenue, and finally, after some correspondence relative to the determination of the boundary between Sylhet and Cachar, the then Superintendent Captain R. Stewart, by his rubacari, dated 18th March 1863, concluded a settlement for 99 years on the terms referred to by the Board of Revenue, without any reference to the village site.

Grant No. 88, Bowalipore (area 1,506 *a.* 3 *r.* 26 *p.*)

18. Mr. McWilliam stated that the revenue survey gives 4·5 acres of village site in this lot; that no mention of it is made in the settlement papers; and that the grant has been occupied and redeemed.

19. From the records it appears that on the 14th January 1861, Mr. R. A. Wood applied for a settlement of this lot. The usual notices were issued, upon which no objection was raised. Subsequently an ameen was sent to survey and measure the land: from his measurement papers, it appears that five kedar, two powa, two josts (about two acres), consisting of a Bengal tilla, were included and measured within the boundaries of the lot, the site of which was also laid down in the ameen's map, but this fact was omitted to be noted in his report. The then Superintendent of Cachar, Captain R. Stewart, submitted with his letter No. 99, dated 26th July 1861, tabular statements of this grant and grant No. 61 for Commissioner's orders, with the remark "that the grants are in every respect reasonable, and he sees no objection to their being confirmed." Upon this, Mr. Davidson, the then Commissioner, transmitted the report for the favourable consideration of the Board of Revenue. The Board, in their letter No. 183, dated 23rd August 1861, sanctioned the grant. Accordingly, Captain R. Stewart, by his rubacari, dated 25th October 1861, concluded a settlement with Mr. R. A. Wood for a term of 99 years, but no mention of the Bengal tilla was recorded in it.

Grant No. 119, Chingjoor (area 238 *a.* 3 *r.* 19 *p.*)

20. Mr. McWilliam stated that the revenue survey shows 1·25 acres as a village site; that this does not appear in the settlement papers; and that the grant has been occupied, and is to be revised under Rule 4A.

21. It appears that on the 12th of November 1861 Mr. D. Steel filed an application for a grant of this lot, and the usual notices were issued, but no objection was raised. Subsequently the land was measured and mapped by an ameen, from whose measurement paper nothing can be ascertained as to the inclusion of any of the hill villages, &c., within the boundary.

boundary. The then Superintendent of Cachar, Captain R. Stewart, submitted with his letter, No. 103, dated 29th May 1862, tabular statements of this and other grants showing the quantity of the land, &c., to the Commissioner for orders, with the remark, "that the grants are in every way unobjectionable, and may therefore be confirmed." Upon this, Mr. Abercrombie, the then officiating Commissioner, transmitted the report for the confirmation of the Board of Revenue, who, by their letter, No. 148, dated 7th July 1862, sanctioned the grant of leases under the old rules. Accordingly Captain R. Stewart, by his rubacari, dated 18th September 1863, concluded a settlement with Mr. D. Steel, without any reference to the village site.

Grant No. 113, Burthol (area 2,010 *a.* 3 *r.* 26 *p.*)

22. Mr. McWilliam reported that a large Cachari village was included in this grant, and that the grant has been occupied.

23. The papers show that on the 1st of October 1861, Mr. James Davidson applied for the lease of this grant, for the cultivation of tea. The usual notices were issued, but no objection was raised. Subsequently, an ameen was appointed to measure and survey the lands, and from his paper no clue can be had as to the existence of any hill villages. The then Superintendent of Cachar, Captain R. Stewart, submitted, with letter No. 160, dated 21st August 1862, plans, paper, and maps of this and of four other grants for Commissioner's orders, with the remark, "that the grants demarcated have considerable areas of land lying in among them, which he has marked with a cross within dotted lines, which become perfectly unavailable to the public, as none but the present grantees could ever make use of them, although they have not taken them up, and that they will thus be entirely lost to Government, unless those grantees are made to take them up, together with the land they had selected." Upon this, Mr. Buckland, the then Commissioner, by No. 92 C., dated 12th September 1862, requested Captain Stewart to call on the applicants for the grants to amend their applications on the terms proposed by the Superintendent, so as to include the area marked in such portions as may be most convenient to their respective lots. On the receipt of this, the Superintendent caused an ameen to be deputed to ascertain the quantity of land within the dotted places in the map. This ameen, on the 8th December 1863, submitted a report, stating, with other particulars, that about 41 hals (205 acres) of land solicited by Ram Mohun Debal and others for settlement were included in days 76-79 of his measurement chitta in the western parts of the tea grant, No. 113, and that their dwellings are situated therein. This report having been found unintelligible, a clear explanation was called for from his substitute, who, on the 27th of March 1864, reported that the above plots were surrounded with the lands applied for by Mr. Davidson, and they did not include the land applied for by Mohun Ram and others. Captain R. Stewart then submitted with his letter, No. 133, dated 23rd May 1864, a tabular statement of this and other grants showing the quantity of land, &c., and maps of the land to the Commissioner for orders, with the remark, "that the grants seem to be in every way unobjectionable." Upon this, Mr. Commissioner Buckland transmitted the report to the Board of Revenue with a similar remark. The Board, by their No. 133, dated 1st July 1864, sanctioned the lease. Accordingly the settlement was made by the Superintendent's rubacari, dated 28th April 1865, with Messrs. Laboe's Tea Company, to whom the land had been transferred.

Grant No. 170, Laboarbund (area 2,641 *a.* 1 *r.* 26 *p.*)

24. Mr. McWilliam reported that two villages (Ghermadissa and Abeung) are included in the grants, No. 235, Modhurapore, and No. 170, Laboarbund, but, as the grants were measured and surveyed together, he is inclined to think they are both in 235, which grant is to be revised under Rule 4.

25. It appears that on the 10th April 1862 Mr. McMakien applied for the settlement of this grant, and the usual notices were issued. On the 2nd June following he amended his application, and on the 22nd July 1862 Dhoniram Debal and another filed a petition, alleging that Mr. McMakien had caused the inclusion of certain adjoining lands of the petitioner's joom cultivation in the ameen's measurement papers as land to be included in his tea garden, and solicited that that portion of the land which adjoins to their settled joom land be separately settled with them. The measurement ameen also, in his report, noted that Muni Ram Burmon and others preferred objections as to 26 hals (130 acres) of land, which fact was duly noted on the chitta. Upon this, Captain R. Stewart, the then Superintendent of Cachar, by his rubacari, dated 22nd April 1863, having excluded the land objected, ordered an amendment of the measurement, and the ameen, after amending the same, filed his papers on the 15th May 1863. Subsequently, the then Superintendent, Captain R. Stewart, submitted, with his letter, No. 74, dated 29th March 1864, a tabular statement, showing the quantity of land applied for, its boundary, date of application, &c., and a map of the land to the Commissioner for orders, with a remark, "that the grant seems to be in every way unobjectionable." Upon this Mr. Buckland, the then Commissioner, transmitted the report to the Board with the same remark. The Board, in their letter, No. 78, dated 15th April 1864, sanctioned the lease of the grant under the Assam rules, dated 23rd October 1854. Accordingly, a settlement was made by the Superintendent, rubucari, dated 26th May 1864, without any reference to any village land.

Grant No. 235, Madhurapara (area 5,018 *a.* 1 *r.* 36 *p.*)

26. As regards this grant, it appears that on the 21st August 1862 Mr. Ruchus filed an application for the settlement of this lot. On the service of notices, Mr. McMakien and Mr. Brown preferred objections, alleging that certain lands of their tea plantations were included within the boundary of the lot applied for, but their objections were rejected. Subsequently they applied, severally, for the settlement of this plot of land, stating it to

appertain to their tea gardens, but, as it appeared, from the boundaries specified in their petitions that applications had been made for the same land, Captain R. Stewart, the then Superintendent of Cachar, under the Assam waste land rules, put up the lot to auction to the highest bidder, and fixed the date on the 4th November 1862 for its sale. On this date the lot was purchased by Mr. Abarndy and Mr. McMakien. Subsequently the lands were measured and mapped by an ameen, from whose measurement chitta it appears that a few plots of land, entered in days 132-136, consisted of Kookie Poonjee and joom, but the fact was omitted to be noted in the map and in the ameen's report. Captain R. Stewart, the then Superintendent, submitted, with his letter, No. 132, dated 23rd May 1864, a tabular statement of this and another grant, showing the quantity of land applied for, its boundary, date of application, &c., and a map of the land to the Commissioner for orders, with the remark, "that the grants seem to be in every way unobjectionable." Upon this, Mr. Commissioner C. T. Buckland transmitted the same to the Board of Revenue with the same remark. The Board, in their letter, No. 155 of 8th July 1864, sanctioned the settlement under the rules dated 23rd October 1854. Accordingly, the settlement was made by the Superintendent's rubacari, dated 12th September 1864, in which also no mention was made of the inclusion of the Kookie Poonjee and joom land, as referred to above.

Grant No. 147, Salgunga (area 2,057 *a.* 1 *r.* 21 *p.*)

27. Mr. McWilliam reported that in this lot 1 acre 2 roods and 28 perches of land were occupied by a Kookie Poonjee, and 433 acres 2 roods and 35 perches were Kookie jooms, that the grant had been made over without reference to the existence of the village; and that the grant is to be revised under Rule 4 A.

28. The papers show that on the 10th of February 1862 Mr. J. P. Stuart filed an application, praying for the settlement of this grant for the cultivation of tea. On the usual service of notice, no objections were preferred. The land was then measured and surveyed by an ameen, from whose measurement paper (chitta) it appears that a few acres of land in certain days were entered as Kookie Poonjee and Kookie joom, but the ameen omitted to note this fact in his report. From the record of grant, No. 147, it also appeared that Gopaul Burmon and another filed a petition on the 19th of September 1862 before the Superintendent of Cachar (Captain R. Stewart), alleging that they were forbidden by the amlah of Mr. Stuart to cut their crop on the joom land which was included in the plot applied for by their client for plantation of tea, and solicited that an order be issued on Mr. Stuart to allow them to bring home their crops. On this, the Superintendent, on the 4th November 1862, ordered a perwannah to be issued on the applicant for the grant to allow the petitioners to cut their crops, and a perwannah was accordingly issued on Mr. Stuart's pleader on the 6th idem. Captain J. F. Sherer, the then Superintendent of Cachar, submitted with his letter No. 245, dated 23rd November 1863, tabular statements of this and other grants, showing the quantity of land applied for, its boundaries, date of application, &c., and a map of the land in which the sites of the Kookie Poonjee and Kookie joom were entered to the Commissioner for orders, with the remark "that all of these grants seem to be in every way unobjectionable." Upon this, the then officiating Commissioner transmitted the application for the favourable consideration of the Board of Revenue, who, in their letter No. 11, dated 12th January 1864, sanctioned the grant of the lease, under the Assam rules dated 3rd October 1854. Accordingly, Captain R. Stewart, the then Superintendent of Cachar, by his rubacari dated 25th June 1864, concluded the settlement, but no mention of the Kookie Poonjee and Kookie joom was recorded in the rubacari.

(No. 4027.—Revenue Department—Land Revenue.)

From *C. Bernard*, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal in the Revenue Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Agricultural Department.

Sir, Fort William, 31 October 1871.

I AM directed to submit the following report on the subject of the Home Department's letters, Nos. 3970, dated 30th August 1870, and 1750, dated the 30th March 1871, calling for information regarding the inclusion of certain Naga villages in waste land grants in Cachar. I am to explain that there has been delay in the submission of this report owing to misconception of Government orders on the part of the local officers. The Lieutenant Governor has at last received the Board's letter of the 28th September, giving an account of the principal cases of the character referred to in the correspondence to which Messrs. Edgar and McWilliam have pointed.

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Note.—The vernacular papers were made over to the Secretary to Government of Bengal on Board the Yacht "Rhotas" on the 27th September 1871.

2. I am to observe that most of these waste land grants were obtained, not under the rules for sale of waste lands referred to by the Government of India, but under the Assam rules, which were allowed to operate, side by side, with the others for some years, and which were very commonly taken advantage of, inasmuch as they were in the first instance more advantageous to settlers, requiring no payment whatever for several years. The caution, however, which had been given by Her Majesty's Government in regard to the sale of waste lands was equally applicable to grants under the Assam rules, and the principal distinction in the mode of proceeding was, that while the Assam rules were less detailed they required a reference to the Board of Revenue for sanction in each case.

3. In truth, it appears that in those cases the very precautions suggested for the future by paragraph 4 of Home Department's letter, No. 3970, dated 30th August 1870, were actually taken; that is to say, the grants were re-surveyed, and each case was referred for the orders of the Board of Revenue.

4. It will be seen from the report that in most cases the cultivated land and villages were marked in the map and measurement papers of the ameen who made the survey. The Lieutenant Governor has ascertained by inspection that they were clearly delineated, and it seems impossible that they can have escaped observation.

5. It will also be observed that in one or two cases, where the occupants of the land came in and made objection within the time given by the proclamation, their objections were attended to; in one case the land was excluded, in another case the claimants were allowed to cut and carry away their crops; but in all the other cases, where no formal objection was made by these ignorant people, the local officers seem to have taken no notice whatever of the fact of the existence of villages and cultivated lands as marked in their own survey papers, and the Deputy Commissioner, Captain Stewart, forwarded the papers and maps to the Commissioner of the division, with the recommendation that the applications should be granted. It does not appear that the officers holding the appointment of Commissioner of Dacca when these occurrences took place made any objection on the ground of the existence of the villages and cultivated lands in the areas applied for, nor did they send in the papers and maps to the Board of Revenue. Ordinarily they only sent a tabular statement to the Board, who upon that statement sanctioned the grant. But it does so happen that in several cases the Commissioner objected on other grounds, viz., that the areas applied for were excessive, and other reasons noted; and that in consequence of such objections the papers of those particular cases were forwarded to the Board of Revenue. Those papers showed that villages and cultivated lands were included in the proposed grants. But the Board in all those cases took no notice of the circumstances, and over-ruled the objection of the Commissioner; and the grants were made under the orders of the Board. The Board, as constituted in 1862-64, must be considered responsible for the system as well as the local officers. But the then Members of the Board have left the country; the present Members were not then on the Board.

6. Indeed, in granting excessive areas contrary to the opinion of the Commissioner and contrary to the whole spirit of the waste land rules, the Board seem to the Lieutenant Governor to have been even more responsible than the local officers; for this excess of area, consisting of wild country, of which the tea planters could make no use, and which has usually only been held so long as there was no payment for it, was one of the main causes of the continuance of a most objectionable state of things, namely, legal right of the tea planters under a grant; possession by savage tribes, who did not recognise the right of the tea planters. The Lieutenant Governor has himself seen this season one of the oldest tea gardens in Cachar, and the nearest to the station, which has till now been allowed to hold under an Assam grant the whole tract of country between Cachar and the northern hills, in which both Kooike and Naga villages were settled.

7. The facts have been stated. The only explanation of the very unaccountable conduct of the revenue officers in giving away villages and cultivated lands as waste which the Member of the Board now in charge of the Department can afford, is that "it was considered sufficient to ascertain whether any objection had been raised against the inclusion of any lands within the areas granted." This explanation certainly seems insufficient; the more so as the people whose lands were included actually paid Government revenue. This latter point was the subject of a subsequent correspondence, the result of which was that the revenue was abandoned or given up to the planters.

8. The truth seems to be, as suggested by the present Deputy Commissioner of Cachar, that not only were the facts perfectly well known at the time, but it was thought by the planters an advantage to get grants containing hill villages, as it was supposed that they thus obtained a supply of labour. This feeling was made evident in the case referred to previously in this correspondence, where a planter burned down a village because the people would not work.

9. It is much more difficult to account for the conduct of the officers of Government. That conduct at first sight seems utterly unintelligible. Captain Stewart, the officer principally concerned, is absent from India, but from all the Lieutenant Governor can learn, he believes he was not an officer given to over-ride native rights in a reckless way; he is said rather to have deplored the march of events by which they suffered.

10. The only true explanation seems to be that which, in the course of the Lieutenant Governor's inquiries, Mr. Edgar has suggested, viz., that in the height of the land-jobbing excitement, under the influence of what is called the "tea mania" (but was more properly the "company mania"), and of the waste land rules, commonly known as Lord Canning's Rules, the officers of Government were carried away by the popular current. The pressure on the part of people anxious to receive large tracts of land and get up companies was very great. Everyone who stood in the way of these endeavours to make money was denounced as an obstructive, ignorant of the laws of political economy, an enemy to British enterprise, and everything that was bad; and most officers yielded and let the current have its course. The truth must be told; land was at that time given away in the most reckless manner in many quarters. The evidences of this state of things met the Lieutenant Governor at every turn. In the Chittagong district large quantities of land already settled were given away as waste, and the work of redressing the complications which remained has occupied the officers of that district for years. His Honor had hoped that such cases had not occurred in Assam, as they had not come to the notice of Government so far as he could trace; but during his late visit to Upper Assam, his Honor found that a case was under inquiry (not yet reported) in which a large Assam village had been included in a waste land grant, and, strange to say, the grant was resumed for non-fulfilment of conditions, and again granted away without discovering the village. During his present visit to Darjeeling, the Lieutenant Governor is informed by the local officers that considerable quantities of cultivated lands have been included in waste land grants, especially in a great grant of a very large area in the Terai which also contained some valuable saul forest. If these things occur in cases where the lands were surveyed, or in localities under the very eyes of the district officers, it is impossible to say exactly how many have occurred in case of enormous grants given away without any survey, or the most conjectural boundaries, and without any payment beyond 50 rupees to meet the expense of future survey, as was sometimes the case. But the privileges given under former rules have now come to an end; planters are required to pay for the land or abandon it; much is being surrendered; justice will be done to the aboriginal inhabitants wherever it is possible, and great care will be exercised for the future. In some places the people have settled down into tea labourers, and in that case it may be hoped that the district officers will be able to secure to them their village sites and a measure of independence combined with profitable labour.

MR. EDGAR'S NOTE.

EXTRACT.—Revenue Proceedings for November 1871, Nos. 92–101.

There are three questions raised in this correspondence:—

1. The manner in which we came to ignore the fact that portions of the lands dealt with by us as unassessed waste were, and had been from a period anterior to our annexation of Cachar, occupied by villages of hillmen;

2. The steps now to be taken to repair, as far as may be in our power, the injury done to the people whose village sites were included in tea-grants; and,

3. The precautions to be taken to avoid such things happening again.

I suppose Mr. McWilliam's letter of the 10th January has shown beyond possibility of contradiction, that villages of hillmen have been included in both Assam rule and local tenure grants; but it does not, and from the nature of the cause could not, show to what an extent this inclusion went.

Most of the cases mentioned were supplied to him by me from memory, and I could give others, of which no record exists.

But I did not get to Cachar till 1863–64, nearly eight years after the beginning of tea planting and tea grants. I did not take much interest in the land question at first; and when I did begin to inquire into the present subject, many of the villagers had left for other parts of the district, or for Tipperah, Sylhet, or Munnipor.

It would, in cases of this kind, be now almost impossible to trace out the connection of the people with the land once occupied by them, unless they were of their own accord to give information on the subject.

Still it may be safely assumed that the cases, of which mention is made in the collectorate records, form a small proportion of the whole number. This applies to the 16 grants sold in fee simple even more than to the 207 Assam rule and old Merasdary lots. How little the silence of our records, about the existence of village sites, implies in the case of the former, may be guessed from the history of one grant, situated within four miles of the station

which

which I had to submit to the Board for orders not long ago. The purchaser of this grant under the fee simple rules, bought from neighbouring Merasdars' portions of their tenure, which he supposed adjoined his grant. I had to to inquire into the matter after survey, for the grant had been sold without any survey or other effectual definition of boundaries in the field. I found that considerable portions of the Merasdary land was situated within the boundaries of the fee simple grant. In this way the grantee had been for years paying revenue to Government for land which he had bought in fee simple, and he had paid to the original proprietors the market price of land which he had dealt with as the absolute property of Government, and which, under the action of Section 19 of Act XXIII. of 1863, had become the absolute property of the grantee. Cases like this show that in the disposal of waste lands there was not sufficient provision made to define and protect the rights and interests of Government, or the auction-purchaser, or the inhabitants of the district, but I do not think that local officers were mainly to blame for this. The fault seems to have been in the entire system of dealing with the waste lands of this part of India and the principles on which the system was based.

To make my meaning clear, it will be necessary to give a brief history of the question. I shall chiefly confine myself to Cachar, about which I know most, as there may be differences of detail in other districts of which I have not heard. When we first annexed the district, we found a small proportion of the area in the possession of the descendants of Bengallee colonists, who had settled in Cachar during the time of the native hill rajahs, and of some few Cacharees, who had imitated the Bengallees and taken up land for permanent cultivation. These lands were partly cultivated and partly waste, but the holders had undoubted rights of a proprietary nature in them. The rest of the district was held to be the property of the State, but was subject to two classes of what I may call customary privileges. The permanent landholders were allowed to use the unassessed lands for grazing and other similar purposes; and the wandering hillmen were allowed to cultivate the hill forests as joomeas. When any portion of the unassessed lands became permanently occupied, both privileges were withdrawn. The Merasdar could no longer cut timber, bamboos, or thatching grass, or turn his cattle to graze in it, and the hillman could no longer appropriate it for his temporary cultivation. But both classes retained their privileges with respect to a practically unlimited area still undisposed of. And until tea planting commenced, the hill forests which were occupied by the jooming tribes were almost untouched by the Settlement Department.

In fact, the early officers, not only in Cachar, but in the permanently settled district of Sylhet, seem to have thought that the hill wastes were not likely to be at any time brought under permanent cultivation. The papers of the settlement of very many of the villages in South Sylhet contain clauses giving the owners of the villages a right of jooming over a certain number of acres within an apparently undefined area of hill forest.

In Cachar there is an official tradition that one of my predecessors made a grant of all the hills south of the Barak to a Kookie chief, who would be, if the deed were now in existence and valid, the owner of more than half of the tea gardens in the district. But whatever truth there may be in this story, it is certain that we still took a house tax from the hillmen, both north and south of the Barak, in lieu of other revenue, and levied tolls at the Sealteah ghât on all wood cut in the unasssessed forests and exported from the district.

In January 1856, the Assam rules of 1854 were extended to Cachar. These rules did not define what was meant by the phrase waste lands, nor did they lay down any principles for dealing with legal or equitable rights, if any were found to exist in the lands applied for. But from what I have heard from Major Stewart and other persons, I believe that local officers at first considered that it was their duty to exercise great discretion in dealing with the waste lands, and above all to take measures to protect, as much as possible, the interests of the inhabitants of the country.

Major Stewart has told me that when the rules were first extended, his predecessor, Colonel Verner, thought it necessary to require from each applicant some proof that he had sufficient means to cultivate the lands for which he had applied. This was objected to by Messrs. Borrodaile, Schiller, and Company, of Calcutta, and on a reference to Government the objection was allowed. I think that this was in 1858 or 1859.

In March 1858 the superintendent of the Cachar Company applied to Mr. Allen, of the Board of Revenue, who was then on special duty at Cherra Poonjee, to have the house tax paid by certain Kookies settled on the company's grant, remitted. Major Stewart opposed this on several grounds, but his chief objection was, that the hill men would consider that their allegiance had been made over from Government to the planters if the tax, which was the sole sign of their subjection to us, were remitted. Mr. Allen did not agree with this, but the Government of Bengal at the time apparently took the same view as the local officers. In February 1862, however, on a fresh application made by the representative of the Cachar Company direct to Government, orders were passed that the tax should be remitted. I think that this decision was very unfortunate, There can be no doubt that it had a tendency to make the hill men believe that the owners of tea grants have a political position somewhat analogous to that of minor village chiefs among themselves, and that this position carried with it some, if not all of the jurisdiction which our Government had hitherto exercised over the villages of hill men already settled, or to be settled hereafter, within the limits of the tea grants. Another effect of the order was to strengthen the belief that had been growing up in the minds of local officers that it was the deliberate intention of the State to postpone minor considerations to the paramount object of encouraging the colonisation of the wastes of East Bengal.

This belief had been mainly produced by the discussion of the principles on which the present fee simple, rules, and legislation are based: but of conrse it influenced the action of all officers who had to deal with the waste land question in any form. Now, in February 1862, although there had been 143 applications for land under the Assam rules, only 16 lots had been finally granted.

One hundred and seventy-seven grants were finally made between February 1862 and August 1866.

I was in Cachar, as assistant, during the greater part of this time, and can speak from personal experience of the extent to which the way in which these grants were dealt with was influenced by the action of the supreme Government in dealing with the question of giving grants of waste lands in perpetuity. I shall therefore give a *resumé* of the most important orders and letters on this subject.*

* Revenue Despatch to India, dated 16 March (No. 1), 1859.

In a despatch dated 16th March 1859, the Secretary of State for India directed that a return should be submitted to him, showing the extent of land capable of cultivation at the disposal of Government throughout British India, and the conditions which the Government of India would propose for disposing of such lands to persons desirous of bringing them into cultivation.

The Government of India called for the required information, and a very long correspondence seems to have taken place between it and all the local Governments.

In Bengal Proceedings, Nos. 77, 78, for 8th March 1860, there is an abstract of returns about culturable lands at the absolute disposal of Government, in which the amount available in Cachar is stated to be 200,000 acres, besides "an area of some thousands of miles of mountains and plains covered with forests, but to what extent this latter tract is culturable is not known."

At the same time, the Board of Revenue submitted a copy of draft rules, which had been previously under the consideration of the Bengal Government, for the sale of waste lands in the Dacca and Assam divisions. As these rules never came into force, the only one that is of importance for my purpose is the last.

"The land to which these rules apply is such as is not suited for the ordinary crops of the country, but is fit for the cultivation of tea, coffee, cotton, and other products not usually raised by the people."

The resolution of the Governor General in Council of the 17th October 1861, contains the decision of the Government of India, come to after a consideration of all the information to be obtained on the subject of waste lands. In paragraph 4 it is stated that, "as regards the sale of waste lands, there can be no question of the substantial benefits both to India and to England which must follow the establishment of settlers, who will introduce profitable and judicious cultivation into districts hitherto unreclaimed. His Excellency in Council * * * confidently expects that harmony of interests between permanent European settlers and the half civilised tribes, by whom most of these waste districts or the country adjoining them are thinly peopled, will conduce to the material and moral improvement of large classes of the Queen's Indian subjects, which, for any such purposes, have long been felt by the Government to be almost out of the reach of its ordinary agencies."

Before going on to other parts of the resolution, I wish to point out that in the February following its date, the order remitting the house tax on hillmen whose villages were within the boundaries of tea grants was passed; and that it was the opinion of Major Stewart, as it is my opinion, that it was the tendency of that order to remove the hillmen still more out of the reach of the ordinary agencies of Government, and to bring them under the influence of the permanent European settler, from whom so much benefit was expected.

In paragraph 6, the Government state it to be their firm conviction that it is indispensable not only that no violence be done to the long existing rights which sometimes in a rude, sometimes in a complicated form, are possessed by many of the humblest occupants of the soil in India, but that these rights be nowhere slighted or even overlooked.

Clause 1 of paragraph 8 limits these rights to, first, rights of proprietorship; second, rights of exclusive occupancy, either in existence or capable of revival if in abeyance. Paragraphs 16 and 17 propose that if the district revenue officer should find no recorded claim of property or occupancy in lands applied for, he should advertise the application for 30 days. Paragraph 18 lays down the rule, that if no claim should be preferred within 30 days, or if such claim should be disposed of, the collector should give the applicant a deed of allotment. Paragraph 19 provided that if any person were to establish a right of property in the allotted land within a year, the allottee was not to be disturbed, but the claimant was to receive compensation from Government. Section 20 laid down that in dealing with the land no reference should be necessary, or even ordinarily made, to revenue boards or other distant authorities. A careful comparison of these provisions with one another will show anyone acquainted with the extremely vague nature of all rights in our jungle lands that they practically nullified the principle laid down in paragraph 6. But there was a provision in paragraph 34 which at first sight may appear to give more effectual protection to a large class of rights. The paragraph is as follows:—

"Where there are exclusive rights of occupancy, pasturage, wood-cutting, turf-cutting, or other like rights in unassessed waste land, such waste land may be sold under the above rules, but only to those who shall satisfy the collector that they possess such rights by prescription, or have obtained them by purchase. It will be an important part of the collector's duty to make certain that any transfer of such rights shall have been made with a complete and fair understanding on the part of all concerned." Probably, if this paragraph had stood by itself, it would have been effectual, but it was always applied, and, as far

far as I know, it was understood that it was meant to be applied, under the limitations laid down in paragraphs 16 to 18. There was ordinarily no record of any exclusive rights of occupancy, &c., and, as I have tried to show above, there were, strictly speaking, no such exclusive rights. There were what I have called customary privileges, but these were not exclusive, and they were not legally tangible. The only practicable way of reconciling the interests of the inhabitants of the district with the settlement of the unassessed lands on a large scale would have been to allot to the former certain portions for the exercise of their customary privileges. In the case of hill villages actually existing within the limits of our territorial jurisdiction, but having no recorded rights, the difficulties were even greater, and the need for special provisions more urgent, and this seems to have been to some extent recognised by the Home Government.

The Secretary of State for India (paragraph 5 of his Despatch of the 9th July 1862),* after quoting the concluding part of paragraph 4 of the Resolution of the 17th October, remarked, "I cannot but fear that such anticipations are little likely to be realised in frontier districts, such as the Huzara Mountains, the hilly tracts on our north-eastern boundary, and other similar localities which are inhabited by warlike and predatory clans. It is assumed that half-civilised tribes will be ready to appreciate a community of interests between the European settlers and themselves."

* Revenue Despatch to India, No. 14.

"I apprehend on the contrary that, passionately attached as they are known to be to their ancestral lands, they might rather regard the intrusion of European strangers as an encroachment and a wrong inflicted on themselves. Differences and quarrels ending in affrays and bloodshed might arise, which would lead to the necessity of employing an armed force for their suppression. Such has been the result of our experience in many of our colonial possessions, of which a single example may be found in the recent unhappy occurrences in New Zealand. It is unfortunately the case that situations, such as those referred to, are, from their climate, the best adapted to European constitutions, and therefore not unlikely to attract British settlers; but placed as they are, to use the words of the Resolution, beyond the reach of the ordinary agencies of Government, the necessity of affording protection to such scattered Europeans as might settle on them, would render their occupation, by British subjects, a source, in a political sense, rather of weakness than of strength to the Indian Government, and would certainly involve an amount of expenditure far outweighing any advantages which could be expected from it. I must, therefore, desire that the greatest caution be exercised in allowing grants of land in outlying districts, when the arrangements for the protection of life and property are still imperfectly organised." In paragraphs 13 to 16 the Secretary of State pointed out that legislation was indispensably necessary to enable the Indian Government to deal with claims in the manner proposed in paragraphs 17 to 19 of the resolution, and he adds in paragraph 17—"The whole question requires deliberate and mature consideration."

"Under any circumstances, I am of opinion that the greatest caution will be required in making grants of land irrespective of claims which may subsequently be advanced by third parties, except within tracts of country in which there may be a reasonable approach to certainty that valid claims will not be put forward, or at any rate, to no considerable extent. If it should be deemed expedient to bar by law the right of re-entry on the land after so short a period as 30 days, the right to compensation should at all events remain in force for a longer period. The necessary provision in both cases can obviously be effected only through the means of a legislative enactment."

In forwarding the above despatch to the Government of Bengal, the Government of India requested that rules should be drawn up modifying the Resolution of the 17th October 1861, on certain specified points. In this letter no allusion was made to the remarks made by the Secretary of State in paragraphs 5 and 17 of his despatch.

The rules were notified in the "Gazette" under the date of the 30th August 1863.

The first is "all unassessed waste lands, in which no right of proprietorship or exclusive occupancy is known to exist or to have existed, and to be capable of revival, are available for purchase under these rules, unless specially reserved under rule 21."—(Rule 21) "Reserves of grazing and forest land, of land for growth of firewood near towns and stations, building sites, parks, recreation grounds, and the like, and of land required for other special purposes, are not to be sold, under these rules, without the express sanction of the Government. A list of these lands is under preparation by the Board of Revenue, and when it has been approved by the Government it will be published in the 'Gazette.'"

It is evident from the list above alluded to that all, or almost all, the local officers considered that the lands to be reserved were only such as were likely to be required for public purposes. There were no lands reserved in Sylhet or Cachar, and in all the districts of Assam except Luckimpore it is stated that the lands reserved were for the use of the Government.

Rule 23.—"From and after the date of the promulgation of these rules, no fresh applications for grants of waste land, under any previous rules, will be entertained." This abrogated the old Assam rules, but there were still 164 applications for grants under the latter rules undecided, and, as before stated, they were almost necessarily dealt with by the local officers on the spirit of the fee simple rules and Act XXIII. of 1863. This Act, to provide for the adjudication of claims to waste lands, differs materially from the resolution of October 1861. Among other things, it extends the period of advertisement from 30 days to three months, and the limitation for a suit from one year to three years; but it keeps the principle that the purchaser's title becomes unimpeachable immediately on

delivery, and that claimants to the lands are to be compensated by Government if they can prove their claims. It was the opinion of Major Stewart, in which I concur, that no village of hillmen living in Cachar had, or has, rights of which a court constituted under Act XXIII. could take cognisance. There was no record of any kind on which they could rely, and their own theory was that they had been allowed to settle down by the governing power without getting anything of the nature of proprietary, or even occupancy rights. They always allowed that the Government could legally (if I may use the word) turn them out at any time, but from past experience they believed that the Government would not do so. They felt even less uneasiness at what appeared to them a mere assignment of our rights over them to the European settlers. It was apparently analogous to a common custom in Munnipoor and under the Cachar Rajahs. It was not until the grantees began to exercise fully their legal rights that the hillmen became aware of the real consequences of the inclusion of their villages in lands granted to private holders. Major Sherer, and, I think, to some extent even Major Stewart, at first expected that the hillmen would receive much benefit from the settlers, and that there would be between the two sides the harmony of interests hoped for by the Government of India. But by the time I got to the district Major Stewart had become convinced that we ought to have taken some steps to protect the interests of the hillmen, although he did not then see his way to doing anything.

Since then, many of the grants have become liable to resumption under the clearance clauses of the Assam rules; in others a reduction of area is being made. Both of these operations, the resumption and the revision, will leave a considerable area of land available for any purposes. I propose to divide the land so resumed into two classes. In the one I should put all the higher hills, and such other portions as are not likely to be taken up for any kind of permanent cultivation, at least for the present. Such lands should be reserved, and declared not to be liable to sale under the fee-simple rules. The remainder of the lands would be available.

At the same time, I cannot help thinking that the time has come for a reconsideration, and, if necessary, a revision of the principles on which these rules and the legislation of 1863 are based. In fact, I am of opinion that the whole subject of our wastes, and the way in which they are dealt with, might be looked into with advantage. It is possible that we should find that in many instances the measures we have taken to foster (I might even say to force) colonisation, and the introduction of European capital and energy, has had the effect of weakening what we meant to strengthen, and ultimately of killing what we were trying to nourish.

From *C. Bernard*, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal, to the Member in charge of the Land Revenue Department of the Board of Revenue, No. 4028; dated Fort William, the 31st October 1871.

Sir,

I AM directed to acknowled the receipt of your letter, dated the 28th September, submitting a report of the circumstances under which certain Naga villages were included in waste land grants in Cachar, and, in reply, to ask that you will have the goodness to impress upon local officers the necessity for administering justice to the aboriginal inhabitants who have suffered by the deprivation of their villages, and to exercise great care in this matter for the future.

2. I am also to request that in those places in which the people have settled down into tea labourers, the district officers should secure to them their village sites and a measure of independence combined with profitable labour.

3. I am further to request that you will favour the Lieutenant Governor with an exact statement of the progress which has been made in revising grants and resuming those in which conditions are not complied with in each district.

From *D. J. M'Neile*, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Board of Revenue, Lower Provinces, to the Officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Revenue Department, No. 285 A.; dated Fort William, the 18th November 1871.

Sir,

THE Member in charge, before issuing instructions, as directed in Government letter, No. 4028, of 31st October, to the Commissioners of Dacca and Assam, within whose divisions alone cases such as those contemplated in the Government letter can arise, requests to be informed whether, by the order "to impress on the local officers the necessity for administering justice to the aboriginal inhabitants who have suffered by the deprivation of their villages," it is intended that any further action in regard to the restoration of the inhabitants to their former residences should be taken.

2. If such be the intention of Government, the Member in charge solicits further instructions as to the exact measures to be adopted, because he is unable to perceive what further steps can be taken than those already suggested in my letter, No. 115 A., of 1st June last.

3. With

3. With reference to the second paragraph, the Member in charge does not clearly understand whether it is the desire of Government that the local authorities should now make inquiries into the existing condition of the tea labourers, in view to ascertain on what terms they may hold their lands, and in what manner their independence, combined with profitable labour, can be secured, or whether the object of Government will be sufficiently met by directing care to be taken to avoid, in future, cases similar to those which have originated this correspondence, and to afford redress when any complaints from tea labourers, of illegal interference on the part of their employers, may be substantiated.

4. The Member in charge, while anxious that the tea labourers should receive the full measure of protection to which the law entitles them, would deprecate the spontaneous interference of the local authorities between the two classes, and would limit the exercise of their judicial functions to the special instances in which, whether on complaint duly made, or in consequence of what may have come to their knowledge, injustice may have been apparently suffered by either party.

5. The statement called for in the third paragraph will be forwarded at an early date.

(No. 4691.—Revenue Department—Revenue.)

From *R. H. Wilson*, Esq., Officiating Under Secretary to the Government of Bengal, to the Secretary to the Board of Revenue in the Land Revenue Department.

Sir, Fort William, 28 December 1871.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 285 A., dated the 18th ultimo, and, in reply, to state that the Lieutenant Governor does not propose a general crusade to redress the possible wrongs of all sorts of tea labourers. His Honor, however, insists on the necessity of doing all that lies in the power of the Government to redress the plain injustice done to those natives of the soil whose homes and lands have been sold or granted away as waste land; and he wishes that in all such cases which have come or may come to light, full inquiry should be made to ascertain whether the expropriated people are still on the land or within reach of it, and whether justice can be wholly or partially done to them. It is hoped that in a large proportion of the cases mentioned in the reports which formed the immediate origin of this correspondence, the people may be provided for on land which is liable to lapse owing to non-fulfilment of conditions; and that, in making the arrangements consequent on such non-fulfilment, this object should be specially borne in mind. For instance, taking the case of the estate near Cachar, where there is a Kookie village, and some Naga villages have also claims, a large portion of the grant is liable to lapse. In arranging the boundaries of the land to be retained by the planter, and the land to lapse (regarding which it is understood that a somewhat wide discretion is to be exercised), the Deputy Commissioner should keep in mind the claims of the aborigines and satisfy them.

2. In many other cases in which there has been no failure to fulfil conditions, the tenure is such that Government has the power to redress the injustice done by unwitting expropriations, the matter should be settled as equitably as possible.

3. In those cases in which a fee-simple has been acquired by the grantee, any reasonable compromise should be effected.

4. In any case where the expropriated people are, by special law, shut out of their lands, and no compromise can be effected, a special report should be submitted, with reasonable proposals for compensation, if possible.

From Captain *T. H. Lewin*, Civil Officer, Right Column, Looshai Expeditionary Force, to the Junior Secretary to the Government of Bengal, No. 18; dated Camp Savoonga, the 24th February 1872.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Memorandum, No. 1017, dated 10th February 1872, forwarding, for report copy of letter No. 132, dated 30th February 1872, from the Officiating Deputy Commissioner of Cachar, on the subject of certain statements made by Rowa Muntree. I should not have wished to remark on the letter in question, had not his Honor the Lieutenant Governor wished me to do so.

Para. 1.—The two captives sent in are, doubtless, persons who escaped from the Eastern Looshais and sought refuge with Sookpilal. I hear that he has in his possession more such captives.

Para. 2.—The statement of Rowa Muntree to the postmaster is false, both as regards Mary Winchester and the son of Savoonga.

Para. 3.—The same conditions of untruth apply equally to Rowa's statements made before the Officiating Deputy Commissioner of Cachar.

Para. 4.—As far as our experience goes, these Looshai tribes have no coherence, but seem to be forest Ishmaels; their hands being against every one, and every one's hand against them. Thus Sookpilal recommends that we should attack Benkina and Sangboonga, while these chiefs advise that Sookpilal should be compelled to give up his captives; the object of each being to strengthen himself at the expense of the other.

Para. 5.—The information given by the muntree as to the position and burning of the principal Looshai villages to the south is substantially correct.

Para. 6.—The distance between Sookpilal's and Sangboonga's villages is four days only, and there is a fair hill road between them.

Paras. 8, 9, and 10.—The statement of Busseerun seems correct, and is borne out by the information obtained from the captives on this side. The Pois referred to are the tribes of Sai Poi, &c., known to us as the Southern Howlongs.

Para. 11.—At this early period of her capture, the woman Busseerun appears to display very considerable acquaintance with the Looshai vernacular. The women given up on this side know but a very few words of the language. I think it would be a mistake to attribute (at least at present) any such intentions to Sangboonga's tribe.

The remainder of the letter does not, I think, call for any remark from me.

From *C. U. Aitchison*, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal, No. 1570 P.; dated Simla, the 18th July 1872.

YOUR letter, No. 3342, dated the 31st May 1872, forwarding the report of the civil officer who was attached to the left column of the Looshai Expeditionary Force, has been received and laid before the Viceroy and Governor General in Council.

2. His Excellency in Council has perused that report with much interest, and desires that the cordial thanks of Government be conveyed to Mr. Edgar for it and for his valuable services with the column. I am also to request that the thanks of Government may be conveyed to Mr. M'William for the services which he was able to render to the expedition while officiating for Mr. Edgar in Cachar. That officer should also inform Ram Ruttun Endo, the Collectorate Nazir, and Baboo Hurry Churn Surma, that their good service has been brought to the notice of his Excellency in Council, by whom it is fully appreciated. The Governor General in Council will be glad to know whether his Honor the Lieutenant Governor would suggest any reward for the last-named Native gentleman.

3. As regards Mr. Edgar's several suggestions with respect to the future policy to be adopted on this frontier, the views of Government may most properly be expressed when a reply is sent to your later letter, No. 3837, dated 25th ultimo, which is now under consideration. As, however, that letter does not deal with the question of reviving the Kookie levy, which Mr. Edgar has repeatedly advocated, and regarding which the late Lieutenant Governor was, in my letter, No. 659, dated 13th May 1869, requested to submit a rough or general estimate of the cost, I am to request that the Government of India may be favoured with an expression of the views of his Honor the Lieutenant Governor in this matter.

4. Adverting, lastly, to Mr. Edgar's recommendations regarding the dealings of the Maharaja of Munnipoor with the Looshais, I am to state that the officer who is now officiating as Political Agent will be reminded of the instructions issued to Dr. Brown in letter from this office, No. 1127 P., dated 30th June 1870, copy of which was forwarded to your office with docket No. 1128 P., dated 30th idem. The Political Agent will be informed that His Excellency the Governor General in Council looks to him to see that no deviation from the policy therein laid down is permitted. If friendly relations be cultivated with the Looshais, in conformity with those instructions, it will, in the opinion of his Excellency in Council, not be necessary to define a hard and fast boundary between their territory and that of Munnipoor. The circumstances of Munnipoor are entirely different from that of British territory, and it is quite conceivable that the definition of a rigid boundary between Munnipoor and the Looshais might provoke rather than prevent quarrels. The Political Agent will further be directed now to place himself in direct correspondence with the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar. On all frontier matters there should be the freest communication between these officers. In the meantime, also, the Political Agent will be requested to send all letters regarding matters connected with Looshai affairs through your office, in order that the Governor General in Council may be favoured with the opinion of His Honor regarding them.

(No. 1571 P.)

EXTRACT, paragraph 4, forwarded to the Officiating Political Agent at Munnipoor for information and guidance.

From Major General *W. F. Nuthall*, Political Agent, Munnipoor, to *C. U. Aitchison*, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, No. 59; dated Munnipoor, 12th April 1872.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 658 P., dated 16th March 1872, calling upon me, by order of the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council, for a final report of the part taken by the Munnipoor Contingent in the way of co-operation during the Looshai Expedition.

2. The contingent was placed by Government at the disposal of Brigadier General Bourchier, C.B., Commanding Cachar Column, and the earliest instructions I received from that officer on the subject of co-operation were conveyed to me in a letter, No. 1063, dated 19th October 1871, as follows: "I have to request that you will take steps for occupying strongly a line of posts along the southern frontier of Munnipoor, and keeping in the valley near Moirung a small compact force capable of supporting itself to act againt the most eastern tribes (Kamhow's) should information reach you that they have been tempted to join Lalboorah, Tangdoong, and others against whom the column I command will advance.

"The selection of spots for these posts will entirely be left to you, but, as has been done in Cachar, the summits of the ridges are the natural highways, and seem the most desirable positions, extending as far eastward perhaps as that on which Koongshangkool is marked on the map."

3. These instructions were repeated with slight modifications in letter, No. 1095, dated 29th October 1871, viz.:—"In continuation of my letter, No. 1063, dated 19th instant, I have the honour to request that you will consider the instructions therein contained as definite and final. The details of this co-operation as to selecting posts in the southern frontier, and judging of the necessity of an advance from the neighbourhood of Moirung, I leave to you."

4. Being of opinion that if the head-quarters of the Contingent were placed so far north as Moirung, I should be quite out of the way of even obtaining any information of the movements of the eastern (Kamhow's) tribes, much less of watching them, or of rendering prompt co-operation to the Cachar Column if required, I represented this to the Brigadier General in my letter, No. 134, dated 3rd November 1871, and suggested that the head-quarters should be moved to Seeboo. To this the Brigadier General replied in letter No. 1125, dated 23rd November, as follows:—

> "The only point now requiring reply is the best position for the force acting from Moirung. Numerically you inform me it will be 500 strong. It was never my intention that the officer commanding should be tied down to Moirung, but that it should be moved to the south of the Munnipoor Valley, but not further than the point marked Tseklapi in your map (spelt Yolepee by Colonel McCulloch), and which is about 'the southern frontier' of Munnipoor.
>
> "There, as you propose, a stockade should be erected: I consider it would be most injudicious for the balance of this force, after leaving a sufficient garrison at Tseklapi, to go as far south as Cheeboo, for the present at any rate."

The above comprise the nature and extent of co-operation required, and may be briefly summed up as follows:—

> 1st. That a line of posts was to be established along the southern frontier of Munnipoor, and the selection of spots for those posts was "entirely left to me."
>
> 2nd. That the duty assigned to the main body of the Contingent was to watch the most eastern tribes (Kamhow's), and for this purpose its head-quarters were to be established in the "neighbourhood" of Moirung (subsequently explained to mean any place within the point marked Tseklapi), and that it was "left to me" to judge of the necessity of an advance from that "neighbourhood," but that for the present (*i. e.*, until such necessity arose) it was considered injudicious to move to Seeboo with so small a force as I was erroneously supposed to have.

Had there been any doubt on my mind as to the duty of watching Kamhow's tribe, and the authority delegated to me to advance against that tribe in case of necessity, and of the reliance placed on my professional judgment, the instructions conveyed to me by Brigadier

General Bourchier in his letter, No. 1112c., dated the 11th November 1871, now made these points more clear, namely:—

> "It is obvious that the eastern tribes will require watching, and this will be the special duty of the Contingent, and will be one of a delicate nature. Kamhow's present hostile attitude towards the other tribes might be turned by us to immense advantage, and it is to be hoped this state of things will continue, but, on the other hand, should he undoubtedly have cast in his lot with the other tribes 'you' will be in a position to attack him."

In accordance with the above instructions, the Maharaja and his officers concurred with me that it would be sufficient for all useful and practicable purposes to increase the strength of the previously existing posts along the southern frontier, and to add a few more to them, and the following were determined upon:—

	Rank and File.	Cavalry.	Stockade.
1 Kowpoom	110	2	1
2 Limetak	50	2	—
3 Bishenpoor	50	10	—
4 Moirung Hills	100	10	1
5 Koomos Chumbupoong	30	—	—
6 Koongshangkool in the Hills in advance of No. 5	100	10	—
7 Muttarook	50	10	1
8 Tseklapi Head-quarters.			
To the East North of Kamhow's Tribe:			
9 Shoogoonoo	24	- -	1
10 Manchangoway	150	- -	1
11 Kengyang	150	- -	1
12 Koogamaroo	156	- -	1

These posts were all occupied in the above strength early in December.

In reporting this disposition of the force to Brigadier General Bourchier, I informed him that the position had been selected with special reference to easy communication, mutual support, and rapid concentration, and control of supply, advantages which would have been lost had they been placed in more isolated positions.

Early in November, before the force took the field, I requested the Maharaja to send a few men to cut the jungle which had sprung up during the rains, and open a road from Moirung down to the frontier south of that place; I then did not know that Seeboo was on the frontier, and was claimed by the Maharaja, and I gave no specific orders as to the distance the party should go, but merely general instructions to make a road in case I should find it necessary to advance against Kamhow. The Maharaja accordingly sent a working party of 35 armed and trained Kookee sepoys, and another armed party to support it. This party worked by reliefs from the support, and by the end of the month reached Seeboo, when being discovered by some Looshais of Poiboi's clan, who were making salt at the wells there, they were suddenly attacked, and their subadar (Laitolbah, a man of some importance amongst the Kookies, and much respected by the Maharaja) was killed. Being armed, they were able to defend themselves, although they had worked ahead of the support, and killed (they said) 12 of the enemy, of whose heads they brought in five, besides that of their own subadar, to be buried by his family, there being no merit in killing an enemy in the opinion of most of these tribes without securing his head. The muskets of the five were also brought in.

During the same month, and also before we started, a deputation arrived at Munnipoor from Kamhow. They were of course brought to me. They expressed a wish to be employed in the approaching expedition, and particularly requested to be allowed to go forward and attack Vonolel's clan. Apprehensive lest any such proceeding on their part should derange Brigadier General Bourchier's intended line of policy, I strictly forbade anything of the kind, at which they seemed much displeased, and made remarks amongst themselves indicatory of an intention to do as they liked. This being communicated to me, I advised the Majors to give them orders to have delegates in our camp by the 14th December, which would enable us to curb their warlike proclivities. This was accordingly done, and a report of the circumstances was made to Brigadier General Bourchier.

The head quarters of the Contingent* marched from Neetyepat, the camp at Munnipoor, on the 8th December, and, having halted at Bishenpoor, Moirung, and Koongshangkool to complete the outposts and push forward supplies, arrived at Tseklapi on the 15th December.

Up to that date, no envoys had arrived in our camp from Kamhow, and the two Majors commanding having heard from the Maharaja that none had been to him, waited upon me and expressed apprehension of Kamhow's intentions, as he had always been a doubtful ally, and had never come in himself, or rendered

* Rank and File:

Munnipoorees	1,303
Koonjai Kookie Auxiliaries	255
Total	1,558

rendered implicit submission, and they therefore urged that the force should be moved sufficiently south to make its influence felt by that tribe, and restrain any hostile designs on their part.

Before giving any decided answer to this request, I determined to reconnoitre further south and judge for myself as to intended direction, the practicability of maintaining our communication, and the advantages of the position suggested, with reference to control over Kamhow without inducing collision with the tribes to the west.

On the 19th December, I accordingly moved forward with a strong reconnoitring party, advancing slowly and carefully, widening the road, and bridging it, and establishing supports, and depôts as we proceeded.

This movement was duly reported to Brigadier General Bourchier, but not its intention, as it was not yet fully resolved. He had, however, been informed by me of Kamhow's apparent contumacy, and telegraphed back "Restrain Kamhow."

On the 24th December we reached Seeboo (about lat. 23° 58′, long. 93°, 43) without encountering any enemy, though from foot-prints we discovered it was evident our movements were being watched by some of the tribes, but which we could not tell.

The superiority of this position, as afterwards proved, for the object we had in view, viz., to watch and restrain Kamhow, was so apparent, that I at once resolved to remain here. It not only commanded frequented roads to the tribes east, west, and south of us, but opened to us an alternative route of communication to the Munnipoor Valley by the Toorel River *viâ* Shoogoonoo, and had the additional advantages of plenty of space for a standing camp, and an abundant supply of good water, besides being within the Maharaja's territory, the salt well and tank there having been excavated by Rajah Jaee Sing in about 1790. In fact it was the military position of that part of country, "the southern frontier of Munnipoor."

I have thought it necessary to go into these particulars because it was a cause of much regret and disappointment to me that the occupation of this position at the time it took place did not subsequently meet with the approval of Brigadier General Bourchier, although he has not pointed out in what way he intended that "Kamhow should be restrained," or in what other way it was practicable. I trust, however, that the following narrative of events will conclusively show that the movement was judicious.

Indeed so vague was the knowledge of the country I was about to enter, and upon which my instructions were based, for it had never been surveyed or mapped, that I was informed that "Yolpee was another name for Tseklapi, and was about on the southern frontier of Munnipoor," whereas it actually proved to be the point marked "far off peak" in the map corrected up to 1st April 1847.

The salutary effects upon the neighbouring tribes of our occupation of Seeboo by a force sufficient to overcome all opposition soon became evident. From time to time they visited the hills around to see our camp; our Kookies who were constantly out shooting large game, were never once molested, and not an unfriendly shot was fired; on the contrary, Poiboi's tribe, the nearest, (whose villages, I afterwards learnt from Captain Badgeley of the Survey Department, were about 30 miles in a direct line from our camp) showed much earnestness to negociate for peace.

On the 31st December two messengers visited us from that chief, bringing with them a little girl of 11 years of age, who had been captured about two years previously from a Munnipoor village south of Shoogoonoo. They had been instructed to express regret for their past misdeeds and amendment for the future, but of course were referred to Brigadier General Bourchier.

On the 5th January, two other messengers arrived from the same chief, and informed us that he had deputed Damboom (himself a chief of some importance) to assure us of his contrition, and that Damboom would be with us in a few days if we would receive him. They were informed that we had no power to negociate terms, but that if Damboon wished to come he would be received in a friendly manner.

Early in the morning of the 10th January a courier hurried to our camp to inform us that the greater part of the Kookee inhabitants of the villages of Boonjong, numbering over two hundred captives, formerly subjects of Munnipoor, favoured by our proximity, had made their escape from Lenkoom, and were hastening towards us, but were so much overcome with fatigue and hunger (Boonjong being over 40 miles from us), and had so many children with them, that they feared being overtaken. A strong escort with food was at once sent to their assistance, and between that date and the 27th idem brought safely to our camp 64 men, 58 women, and 105 children, total 227. Amongst them was the eldest son of a late Kookie chief of great influence, whom Colonel McCulloch had for years been trying to recover.

The escape of these poor creatures, threading the jungles with the Sooties and Poois on their right, and Poiboi's tribe on their left, I can only attribute to the strength of the Contingent, its position, and the wholesome fear it had established. Had it been at Tseklapi they could never have reached that place in safety in such number.

Some of them were very old. The account they gave of themselves was that they were carried into capitvity about 30 years ago, most of them from villages in the vicinity of Seeboo (the hereditary home of the Koonjai Kookies) dependencies of Munnipoor. They had since resided together about a mile from Lenkoom's and had been employed in cultivating for that clan, and some few in shooting game for them, hence their possession of muskets, of which they brought 24.

They said that on the 8th January five men had come from Lenkoom to summon them

bodily before him. That they believed the intention was to make them over to the Pooïs in return for assistance against the British troops, and they at once resolved to escape if they could, and with this view, proposed to the messengers that before abandoning their village, they should have a grand feast of the surplus stock, which was accordingly done. They then took the opportunity of making the five men very drunk, and escaped after dark, and it rained the whole of that night, which probably prevented Lenkoom obtaining an early knowledge of their departure.

One man was in great distress at having left two young sons behind. He said he had sent them to wait at a certain place on the road, but when the party set out they took another direction. This at least shows that the flight was sudden.

Many of those who fell behind and came in last were severally wounded by "vanjees" (spikes made of bamboo, charred and sharpened), with which the road had been staked by those who were in front in their anxiety to evade pursuit.

On the 12th January the Looshai Chief Damboom made his promised visit to us. He is rather a tall, wiry man, fairer than the generality of Looshais, and much cleaner in appearance, with a keen intelligent expression, and very observant of everything about him. I was much engaged by his frank and manly way. He his not an hereditary chief, but from his relation with Poiboi through his minority (having been entrusted by his father, Lalpoong, at his death, with the care of Poiboi), he has acquired great power and influence with that clan.

He brought with him a large number of armed followers. I therefore had a Durbar shed constructed outside the camp, and admitted to it only those who accompanied him unarmed.

In open Durbar he said he came to assure us of the sincerity of Poiboi's regret for their past misdeeds, and promise of future goodwill, but entreated that the troops should not be allowed to advance upon their villages. He was told that the Maharaja being friends with the British Government, was acting in alliance with it, and that all negotiations would be conducted by the commander of the British column, but was assured that if no opposition was offered to that force, and Poiboi made due submission, they would be considerately treated.

Whilst in conversation with Damboom I made a remark that, after all, "promises were mere words," whereupon he turned suddenly to the east, and raising his hands impressively repeated some words, which I was informed was a solemn affirmation of future goodwill. The next day also before returning he sent word to me to say that, in order to convince us he was sincere, he would take the oath usual amongst themselves, and the Majors solicited my permission to allow him to do so. This I accorded with strict injunctions that it should be perfectly voluntary on his part, and that no promises of any kind or sort were to be made to him, or to be exacted from him. He accordingly went down to the river, and there made oath by sacrificing in midstream a dog, previously consecrated with spirits, and incantation, swearing never again to make raid upon the Maharaja's territory.

On Damboom's return I sent with him two Kookies, Ooltung Chief of the Tungching Hills and Oomuk, his subadar, with a letter to Brigadier General Bourchier, and gave them instructions to get an interview with Poiboi if they possibly could, and assure him it would be much to his advantage, and that of his clan, to submit to all the General's demands.

They left on the 14th January, and Damboom told me he would visit us again in about 10 days. I was very glad, and expressed pleasure, as I had taken a liking to the man; and have made it a rule to obtain the personal acquaintance and friendship of as many of the chiefs of the surrounding wild tribes as possible.

On the 25th January, the day Brigadier General Bourchier's force was attacked at Bogodoong, our Kookie messengers returned from Poiboi, and informed us that Damboom had come accompanied by at least 300 armed followers and several inferior leaders. They said they had seen Poiboi, and had communicated my message to him. That he was much elated at the reception his people had met with and danced with joy.

The next day, 26th January, taking additional measures of vigilance against the force outside our camp, Damboom and his subordinate leaders were invited into camp without arms. The names of the latter were:—

Lallkhoop - - - - -	Chief of Lairee Village.
Woolpas - - - - -	„ of Boomhang Village.
Khomelell - - - - -	„ of Khoongnoong Village.
Hambang - - - - -	„ of Noongshoom Village.
Putoh - - - - -	„ of Noongtuo Village.
Mongshwe - - - -	„ of Toorsee Village.
Loyetong - - - - -	Muntri of Poiboi.
Dalkhoom - - - -	Chief of Dalkhoom.
Puchoie - - - - -	„ of Mimboong.

They brought with them a little girl who (with her mother, who subsequently escaped) was captured in a raid on the village of Numfow, near Shoogoonoo, in January 1871.

Talking of Poiboi, Damboom said, he believed nothing would induce him to appear before General Bourchier. That all his people had been trying to pursuade him to do so, but

but he had refused. That he was a young and nervous man, and was afraid of being carried "across the sea," as Lalchokla had been in 1846, although promised pardon. This I communicated to General Bourchier.

They informed us that Brigadier General Bourchier was steadily advancing towards their villages, though yet at some distance, and so great was the excitement and anxiety about the safety of their houses, and varied the opinion as to the course of action they should adopt, that nothing had yet been decided upon; but this, as I will presently show, was a ruse.

They remained with us and were entertained and feasted by our Kookee auxiliaries up to noon of the 29th January, Damboom little conceiving that his house and property had in the meantime been destroyed by the British force. Brigadier General Bourchier had been frequently informed of this chief's friendly visits to us and assurances, and I do regret that before his house was set on fire (for the chief's houses are easily distinguished and well known), some inquiry was not made as to where he was when the attack on the British column took place.

The act might have made a lasting enemy of a Chief who exercises a vast influence in the heart of the Looshai country, and from whom by judicious management we may expect much good.

Damboom is now at Munnipoor. He has come at my invitation, although delegated by Poiboi to make terms of future friendship with the Maharaja. He says he kept his promise and never fired a shot from first to last. Moreover after his return on the 29th January, nothwithstanding the injury he had sustained during his absence, he went to Brigadier General Bourchier and acted as his guide to Lenkoom's villages. That the General informed him the destruction of his property had been unintentional, and promised to indemnify him on his return, but had forgotten to do so.

He confesses that the force he brought with him to Seeboo was intended to oppose any attempt on the part of the contingent to unite with the British force, and states that it was supported by another equally strong under Lenkoom and Poiboi in person at the Toepail River. That the reason of their bringing so large a force was on account of the strength of ours, and the dread they had of our Kookie auxiliaries taking revenge upon their women and children.

It cannot be doubted that this diversion saved the British force from much greater loss than it sustained when attacked. And that the contingent would not have been at Seeboo to create the diversion, to succour the captives from Lenkoom, or to restrain Kamhow, had I not advised the movement, is equally clear from the following extract from Brigadier General Bourchier's letter, No. 513, dated 19th January, which I received as late as the 1st February, and could not, therefore, have acted upon earlier than that date:—

"Having arrived at a point when after severely punishing the tribes in my rear, and bringing them into submission to such an exent that my lines of communication are comparatively secure, enabling me to advance direct on Poiboi's own village, I should now have ordered the advance of the detachment to Seeboo, which post you will direct the officer in command of the detachment to hold strongly until you receive further orders from me."

That Brigadier General Bourchier's instructions, and repeated expressions indicatory of reliance upon my professional judgment, justified my using discretion in giving such advice, I trust I have now convincingly shown.

On the morning of the 29th January Tangal Major, being ill with fever, sent word to me that the supplies in store at Seeboo would only last the force until about 2nd February, and he heard of no more coming. That the coolies, who had lately, from time to time, been sent back for supplies, had not returned owing, he believed, to sickness.

I had already made several reports to Brigadier General Bourchier of the sickness and mortality in our camp. We had been over a month halted, and the effluvia arising from want of proper sanitary arrangements (for they were not understood, and were deemed vexatious) was most offensive, and no doubt aggravated other causes. One of the streams moreover, from which we drew our water was from its effects supposed to have been corrupted, if not poisoned.

Although the force had been considerably reduced from these causes, I felt the importance of holding Seeboo until Brigadier General Bourchier's retirement, and therefore determined to satisfy myself as to the state of supplies in our rear depôts, and with this view I made arrangements to ride back immediately after Damboom left camp. Accordingly, at 1 p.m. I set out and visited the depôts of Situl, Subbum, Tseklapi, and Lultubboong, and reached Munnipoor, a distance of about 75 miles, before noon on the 1st February. At the first-named place I found no supplies; at the second only two days' supplies, and at Lultubboong supplies for five or six days, but no coolies to convey it to the front, hence my visit to Munnipoor.

On passing through Bishenpoor *en route* to the capital, I received Brigadier General Bourchier's letter of the 19th January above alluded to, regarding the occupation of Seeboo, and at once despatched an express by pony to the Majors in command, urging them not to retire beyond what was absolutely necessary for supplies until I had seen the Maharaja and arranged with him to have supplies sent.

On arriving at the capital the Maharaja immediately waited upon me, and I told him of our requirements. He informed me that, in the absence of definite information, he had only collected supplies for about two months; the people of the country, however, had evinced so much willingness to assist the expedition that he had no doubt he could obtain

more rice, but that he was really helpless in the matter of carriage, as so many of the hill coolies had died and returned sick that it had caused a panic throughout the hills, and he feared if he attempted to press them, especially at this their joom season, they would probably flee the country.

He told me he could relieve the sick sepoys, and would order the force to halt at Lultubboong until he saw his majors, and with their assistance determined what could be done for carriage.

The Majors arrived at Munnipoor on the 8th February, and the next day informed me they feared the difficulty of obtaining carriage could not be overcome. I at once saw that if I remained at Munnipoor nothing would be done, and probably the force would be broken up, and, therefore, returned to camp at Lultubboong, and from there expressed my solicitude to resume the post of Seeboo.

On the 15th February I received a communication from the Maharaja, which gave me hope that my request would be complied with, and two days afterwards another in which he led me to expect that in a few days he himself would be at Lultubboong with a sufficient number of sepoys to make up the force to 500 (exclusive of auxiliaries) and unarmed militia, and a few coolies to carry the supplies for the re-occupation of Seeboo.

There are two points connected with this retirement which I must notice :—

First.—That notwithstanding the sickness it might have been avoided had we had more supplies at Seeboo, and it is quite possible we should have had more supplies there had the Maharaja been informed as to the probable period the contingent would be required in the field (or even the period for which the commissariat of the British columns was provided), information twice asked for.

Secondly.—That immediately after it took place, Kamhow threw two forces across the frontier, to attack the Looshais; one to the south, which attacked Lalboorah's clan about the 13th February, and the other to the north, which attacked Boomhang's clan about the end of that month, and not knowing that the contingent had returned to Seeboo, fell into its hands and were captured by it.

Can there be stronger evidence that during the previous 40 days the contingent was at Seeboo its presence there restrained that tribe?

*133 men.
122 women.
118 children.

On the 13th February, whilst the camp was at Lultubboong, we received 373* Sooti or Sooktie refugees (with 18 muskets) from Poiboi's northern villages. They said they had gone over to that clan at a time of great scarcity in their own country, and had now fled on account of the present disorganised state of the Looshais, and had come to ask to be allowed to settle in the Munnipoor hill territory, which was gladly granted.

†Men 130.
Women 140.
Children 122.

On the next day, 14th February, a subadar from the outpost of Koonshangkool brought into camp 392† Koonjai Kookie captives, subjects of Munnipoor, who had from time to time in years gone by been carried off from the hills west and south-west of the valley.

They also escaped from Poiboi's northern villages. They sent word to the detachment that they intended to escape and wanted assistance, and a party went, accompanied by three Kookie chiefs, and were absent three days on this enterprise.

On the 20th February the Maharaja arrived at Moirung with a sufficient force to make up the strength of that at Lultubboong to a column of 500 rank and file (besides Kookie auxiliaries) to resume Seeboo, and smaller detachments to maintain our communications. The next day the whole concentrated at Lultubboong, and on the 22nd idem proceeded on its march, headed by the Maharaja, who accompanied the force as far as the road striking off the Koongshangkool. His object was to give encouragement by his presence both to the force, which had been disheartened by sickness and disappointment, and to the people of the valley whom he had reluctantly pressed to carry the supplies, such employment being foreign to their habits.

The feeling which induced him to put himself to so much personal inconvenience is very commendatory, and will, I trust, receive the approbation of Government.

On the 27th February the force reached Seeboo, reports of its movements having in the meantime been made to Brigadier General Bourchier *viâ* Cachar. Direct communication between us had been somewhat precarious, only one of his letters having reached me across the hills, whereas all mine had reached him; and an answer to a letter had in most instances occupied a month.

When previously at Seeboo, we had cleared and deepened the salt well and manufactured a large quantity of salt, which we freely distributed to the Looshais, when they visited us, and this was probably the first experience they acquired of the civilised character of our system of war.

Relying upon the friendly intercourse I had established especially with Damboom's clan, on return to Seeboo I at once dispatched two messengers, Ooltung, chief of the Tungching Hills, and Oomuck, his subadar, with a letter to Brigadier General Bourchier, and gave them particular instructions to try and bring Poiboi or Damboom on their return. When they reached there, Brigadier General Bourchier had retired beyond our latitude, and the letter was sent after him; and on the 1st March I received a letter from him *viâ* Cachar, informing me that the expedition had been brought to a conclusion, and he no longer required the services of the contingent.

Accordingly, the next day, the force set out on its return to Munnipoor, no one having the remotest knowledge of the fact that, during the period of our temporary retirement, a considerable

considerable armed force of Kamhow's had, in violation of the orders given to that chief, crossed the frontier to prey upon the Looshais.

Late the following morning, 7th March, whilst encamped at Situl Subbum (for the contingent always cook and eat before marching) about nine miles north-west of Seeboo, our Kookie auxiliaries, who were always on the alert, discovered a large body of men to the west of the camp, coming from the direction of Poibei's northern villages.

Having been accustomed to receive captives and refugees in large numbers (many even armed) all were off their guard, and the Kookies went to meet them, when one of our chiefs, Lumlayboong, fortunately recognised amongst them a chief of Kamhow's tribe, named Kokatung, who it was believed had within the last month made a raid upon Tobekul and two others of the Maharaja's villages to the east and carried off all the inhabitants. Their rendition had been demanded from Kamhow, but, subtle as he has always proved, he repudiated his responsibility for Kokatung's conduct, and the villagers* are still in captivity.

* 67 men, women, and children.

Lumbayboong cautiously communicated to the Majors commanding the contingent what he knew, and they sent round the camp to tell the sepoys to load quietly and unperceived, and be on the alert.

Kamhow's force was then admitted into camp, the Majors taking up a good central position, and a conference ensued, during which the sepoys closed round and got behind each man in groups of three.

With Kotakung were two other chiefs, his son Toonggum, and brother Kamlel. The Majors asked them where they had been to, and whence going. They said they had been on a friendly visit to the Looshai villages of Loktsow and Kowtung, the inhabitants of which, numbering 962,† were with them, and were desirous of joining Kamhow's tribe, their hereditary enemies.

† Men 302. Women 311. Children 349.

Our Kookies, however, soon learn that these people were being forcibly carried off, and the Majors consequently determined at all hazards to disarm and capture the force, especially as Kamhow had for years past given incessant troubles. With this view they got the chiefs into familiar conversation, handed them a percussion musket to try, and asked to try theirs, and having by this means discharged the three muskets of the three chiefs at once had them seized, whereupon Kokatung putting his forefingers in his mouth gave a whistle and his whole force stood to arms. A momentary struggle ensued, in which his force was overpowered, and besides the three chiefs 53 of their followers were made prisoners, and 54‡ muskets taken. Four of the contingent were wounded.

‡ "52 previously reported, an error."

The chiefs acknowledged that they had 100 armed followers; the rest, 44, escaped in the struggle, firing into the contingent as they made off.

The captives, who were chiefly Pythis and resided among the Looshais, were all released, and their property, consisting of metnas, gongs, clothing, &c., restored to them; amongst them were two children who were taken by the Looshais in a raid upon Numpow, a Munipoor village, in January 1871, and two women of Moontha, and one woman of Noondang, also Munnipoor villages, in the raids of 1868–69.

The whole of the party rescued elected to reside within Munnipoor territory. The Maharaja has consequently settled them in the hills and valley south-west of Moirung, has had lands allotted to them, and has made arrangements for their future safety and protection, and for provisioning them until they raise crops for themselves.

The prisoners of Kamhow's tribe are all in gaol and will there remain until their families come, when the Maharaja intends to settle them in the hills to the north-east of the valley. He is quite confident of reconciling them, and anticipates much useful service from them in his future relations with Kamhow.

The loss to that tribe of so many musketeers and muskets will tend to cripple its power for harm, and restrain its preying upon the Looshais at this time of their weakness, and the advantages of this fortunate incident for the peace of the whole country cannot in my mind be over-estimated. I do not say this merely to give *eclât* to the Munnipooree "coûp," but from a solemn and honest conviction, the soundness of which time will confirm.

As this event took place when I thought it probable Brigadier General Bourchier's political powers still remained, I reported the circumstances to him, and on the 18th instant I received a reply, which for his own sake I regret. He says I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 43, dated 12th instant (March), which I submitted to Mr. Edgar, Political officer with the Cachar column, as without explanation it was impossible for me to forward to Government what appeared to me an act of treachery on the part of the Munnipoor contingent, Kamhow whose party was disarmed and made prisoners having ever been the ally of the Munnipoor State.

"Mr. Edgar takes exactly the same view of the affair."

No two officers could be more sensible of the fact that Kamhow's alliance had never been more than simulated.

Mr. Edgar knows well that, in 1860, the Maharaja found it necessary to proceed in person with a force against Kamhow's tribe, and in consequence of not having secured his communications or established depôts of supply retired with loss.

Since then Kamhow's attitude has been that of a knave; one of alternate pretence of submission, raid upon the Raja's distant villages, and assurance of non-participation.

Last year Kokatung committed a raid upon Numpow, and this year upon villages as per margin. Kamhow's messengers received strict orders from both the Maharaja and myself to take no part whatever against the Looshais, not to cross the frontier, and to send representatives to our camp, injunctions which he treated with contempt, and in my frequent

Tobeekul.
Ngajan.
Koonbee.

correspondence with Brigadier General Bourchier during the operations; regarding this chief, I have invariably termed him "at best a subtle and treacherous ally."

Moreover, the special duty assigned to the contingent was to "restrain Kamhow." That success in that duty should now be characterised as "treachery" is to say the least most inexplicable, and in the face of the following instructions I respectfully submit it is most unfair:

Extract from Letter, No. 1184, dated 30th January 1872, from Brigadier General Bourchier to Major General Nuthall.

"The only point requiring reply in No. 8 is the last paragraph, and after consultation with Mr. Edgar, I am of opinion that Kamhow will require no encouragement to intercept the retreat of Poiboi's fugitives, such as might be given by the advance of the contingent, and if anything he will, after I have obtained the full submission of Poiboi, require to be restrained from making inroads on these tribes after our departure, and perhaps driving them back from their present location, and holding it themselves, and giving us as much trouble as the present occupants."

Providence alone has interposed to arrest Kamhow's career of devastation. He was gathering power, and his prestige was already great, and had he succeeded in this one instance, it is impossible to contemplate, in my opinion, the extent to which the hill tracts would have been overrun, or where his rapacity would have ended. Indeed, so impressed was I of the expediency of bringing this chief and his tribe (the only one from whom we have to apprehend any disturbance) to entire submission, that I strenuously urged the Maharaja to follow up his success if it were possible to provide carriage and supplies, and not to break up his force before doing so, but his resources for such a purpose were exhausted.

It was this tribe against whose ravages the Burmah authorities complained last year, and on the present occasion, before capturing these Poitoos, they had attacked and driven from their homes the inhabitants of Boomhang's villages, which they destroyed by fire. A few days afterwards, Boomhang and his followers, numbering 672* Looshais, came and sought the protection of the Maharajah, and permission to reside in his territory, which was accorded.

*192 men. 204 women. 276 children.

On the same day, 14th March, 110 Soomtis, vassals of Kamhow's, also came to seek shelter in Munnipoor territory. Their story was that Poiboi having made overtures to Kamhow for assistance against the British force, he consented to render it for the time being, and set out with all his fighting men, but on arriving at Seeboo the strength of the contingent encamped there alarmed them, and they returned. They were of the party, and on their return found that all the pigs and poultry had been taken from their families and consumed by the Sooties during their absence. Incensed at this faithless treatment, they determined to migrate when they got an opportunity; soon after Kokatung and his party set out on a course of raiding, and they then carried out their projected flight.

This makes a total of 649 captives and 2,112 refugees, who during the expedition have received the assistance of the contingent, and support from the Munnipoor State (*vide* accompanying Return†). The Maharaja has assigned lands to them, and shown much interest in their settlement, and as their intercourse with the tribes amongst whom they have resided for the best part of their lives will to some extent be continued, it may naturally be expected that in the course of time they will promote trade and exercise a civilising influence.

† Page 512 of Return.

These people have brought with them 171 muskets, which, with the 54 taken from Kamhow's force, makes a total of 225 extracted from the hands of the raiding tribes.

I must now revert to the messengers whom I dispatched from Seeboo on the 28th February to the Looshai Chief, Damboom, with a letter for Brigadier General Bourchier.

They returned on the 31st March, having been absent over a month amongst the Looshais, whom they describe as in a very disorganised state and very subdued. They were treated with great civilities, and Ooltung having a sore foot was put into a litter, and carried by them all the way back.

They report there had been a great meeting of the chiefs to arrange for the distribution of such food as had been spared by the invading column, so that they might tide over their distress until the ensuing crops, also to arrange for the joom cultivation of the present season.

These chiefs also delegated Damboom and four other men of importance to the Maharaja to assure him of their wish for future friendship, and desire to put it on a permanent footing by entering into terms of mutual accommodation.

The propositions on both sides were submitted to me, and I drew the following Treaty, which, having met with the approval of both parties, was ratified in due form.

We, the undersigned, viz., Damboom, Raja of Tikung, on the part of Poiboi; Daloom Muntri, on the part of Lenkoom; Lalkoop, Raja of Laireek; Koonga, Raja of Puchoohi, and Bohool, Muntri of Dalkoom, hereby swear, according to our custom, that mutual friendship shall always be maintained by us towards the British Government and the Maharaja of Munnipoor, and we will faithfully abide by the following Articles of Treaty with the Maharaja:—

Article I.

We engage never again to be guilty of acts of aggression towards the subjects of the aforesaid Powers, and to renounce making human sacrifices for the obsequies of our chiefs.

Article II.

We engage to hold no communication whatever of a designing nature with any tribes hostile to the aforesaid Powers, and we promise to give due notice of any inimical intentions on their part that may come to our knowledge.

Article III.

We engage to give free passage through our country to any forces which the aforesaid Powers deem necessary to send through it to reach other tribes, and we promise to give any assistance to such forces as we may be called upon to render.

Article IV.

We promise to afford support and encouragement to traders from British and Munnipoor territory.

Article V.

The Maharaja of Munnipoor on his part promises to forgive all acts of aggression against his subjects committed by us previous to this Treaty, conditionally that none of his subjects who are in captivity shall be detained against their will.

Article VI.

The Maharaja further promises to support us if unjustly attacked by any of our neighbouring tribes, and in such case to assist us in recovering any of our people who may be carried into captivity.

Article VII.

The Maharaja also promises, in the event of drought or famine, to assist us with food, also to exact no dues whatever for a period of five years from merchants or traders going to or coming from our country.

(signed) *Damboom*, Raja of Tikung.
Daloom, Muntri of Lenkoom.
Lalhoop, Raja of Laireek.
Koonga, Raja of Puchoohi.
Bolool, Muntri of Dalkoom.

At the signing of this Treaty the Maharaja held a grand open Durbar in front of his palace. All his ministers and the officers of his army attended. Two guns and his personal guard were placed in front, and four companies of the Soor Pultun on the flanks. The Treaty was then read and explained to all present, and the Looshai delegates signified their entire acquiescence in its terms. Before signing it they took the pen, and raising it above their heads repeated an oath. They then washed their guns with water and drank it, and successively signed it.

At the end of the ceremonies the Maharaja distributed the following presents:—

Poiboi - -	A fine broad cloth covering, a silk dhootie, a turban, sheet, and 20 hill spuds.
For Lenkoom -	Ditto - - ditto - - ditto.
To Damboom -	A broad cloth, a turban, a dhootie, a sheet and 20 spuds.
To the four other chiefs	Ditto - - ditto - - ditto.

He also gave four rupees in cash to each of the chiefs, and two rupees and a dhootie to each of their followers.

They then made obeisance to the Maharaja, and Damboom on rising said if they had sinister intentions they would not accept the spades or spuds, iron being held sacred by them.

I am convinced that they were perfectly sincere in this covenant, and intend to observe it in its integrity, and if I have any knowledge of character, I should now have unfeigned confidence in accompanying Damboom to any part of his country. To have established such relations with the clans in the very centre of the Looshai country, will, I trust, be pleasing to Government.

Before concluding, I ought to mention that Damboom informed me that the party who fired upon a detachment of sick in the Bobun Hills on Brigadier General Bouchier's retirement was Khalkon, son of Soopilal.

In conclusion, I venture to hope that the services of the Maharaja (and his contingent) will be viewed by the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council with the approbation he has striven to earn.

His two commanders, Majors Sewatrie Chumbah and Tangal, have done well and deserve notice; likewise Gokool Thakoor, the commissariat officer and interpreter, to whom I feel specially indebted for his zeal.

No. 61, dated Munnipoor, 16th April 1872.

From Major General *W. F. Nuthall*, Political Agent, Munnipoor, to *C. U. Aitchison*, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department.

REFERRING to my letter, No. 44, dated 15th ultimo, reporting, for the information of the Right Honourable the Viceroy and Governor General in Council, the capture and imprisonment of the greater part of Kamhow's force which had destroyed a number of Looshai villages on Brigadier General Bourchier's retirement, and was intercepted in the act of carrying off 962 of the inhabitants of the above to their own hills, I therein informed you that this tribe had lately committed raids upon the Maharaja's subjects, but that Kamhow had repudiated all participation in these crimes.

The raids alluded to were:—

1stly. Upon the village of Lengoole Numfow District in December 1870; on this occasion one man was killed and seven were carried into captivity.

2ndly. Upon the villages of Toobeekong, Tooyal, and Ngajan on the 15th December 1871. On this occasion seven men and four women were killed, and 17 men and 50 women and children were carried into captivity and remain there.

Of the men who were carried into captivity, one Kora Sunnaputty has recently escaped and come in. He has been brought face to face with the leader of the force, Kokatung, and deposed that he was carried off by that chief, and has been residing in his village ever since; and that there is still a woman, a fellow villager, residing there. He also asserts that there are at the present time, over the tomb of a chief in that village, three of the heads of his villagers who were killed in the raid.

These accusations Kokatung does not deny, and therefore, they are alone sufficient to justify the arrest and imprisonment.

They show that Kamhow has long been playing a fast and loose game; although true to his repudiation up to this time, he has made no overtures for the release of his people. Some of their relations, however, have visited them.

The above facts are, I submit, quite sufficient to dispose of the accusation of "treachery," brought by Brigadier General Bourchier and Mr. Edgar, against the Maharaja's officers in the capture and imprisonment of Kamhow's force; but I would further add that the occupation given to the contingent "to watch and restrain Kamhow," and "to act against his tribe should information reach me they had been tempted to join Lalboorah, Tangdoong, and others against whom the Cachar column advanced," shows the opinion these gentlemen had of that chief's friendly alliance.

P.S.—On the eve of posting this letter, I have received your telegram of 9th instant. I believe the capture of Kokatung and followers has broken Kamhow's power for evil, has strengthened the relations of Munnipoor with all the surrounding tribes, and will ensure a long absence of raiding.

No. 62, dated Munnipoor, 17th April 1872.

From Major General *W. F Nuthall*, Political Agent, Munnipoor, to *C. U. Aitchinson*, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for submission to the Right Honourable the Viceroy and Governor General in Council, copy of a letter which I have addressed to the Maharaja, conveying my appreciation of the services rendered by his contingent during the expedition, and which, after consideration of all I have explained, will, I trust, receive unqualified approval.

Dated Munnipoor, 16th April 1872.

From Major General *W. F. Nuthall*, Officiating Political Agent, Munnipoor, (demi-official), to *Chunderkirtee Sing*, Maharaja of Munnipoor.

ON the return of your contingent from the small share assigned to it during the Looshai Expedition, I request you will do me the favour to convey to the officers and men my congratulations on their humane success.

I cannot even surmise whether the policy pursued in our frequent intercourse with the Looshais and their chiefs will meet with the approbation of Government, but I am quite sure the Government will not fail to notice approvingly the enduring, subordinate, and moderate spirit which has pervaded all ranks of the contingent.

Having marched to the southern frontier of Munnipoor, a distance of nearly 80 miles from the capital, the force was there encamped for a period of 40 days in a close valley, where the nights were bitterly cold and fogs rose as regularly as sunset, and remained until noon the

the following day. The men consequently suffered a good deal in health, but I heard no repining, and am not aware that a man returned before being permitted to do so.

The same causes, combined with deficiency of clothing, prostrated most of the coolies upon whom the force depended for the conveyance of its supplies, and produced privations which compelled its temporary retirement.

A panic spread through the hill population which rendered it impossible to replace the coolies from that source, and I am aware how great trouble you had to meet the exigency, but you did so, and when the sick were replaced and supplies replenished, the force resumed its post, a measure which relieved me of much anxiety, and for which, therefore, I feel personally indebted to you.

The services of the contingent may be summed up as follows:—

Our Kookie auxiliaries were the first to come in actual conflict with the enemy; they lost a subadar, who was much esteemed both by yourself and by their own race, but it was a consolation to them that the attack, which was within your own territory, was avenged by five of the enemy being killed.

In January the force sent out escort and food to captive fugitives from Lenkom's villages, and brought into camp 227 men, women, and children. In February it afforded like assistance to 392 captives from Poiboi's northern villages. In the escape of these it may be said to have been directly instrumental; other captives have also from time to time reached the camp, numbering altogether 649 men, women, and children.

In addition to the above, the force has afforded protection to 2,002 refugees from Looshai villages, and 110 refugees from Kamhow's villages, making a total of 2,112 refugees, men, women, and children.

The escape of these poor creatures is, of course, primarily due to the movements of the Cachar column.

All the above have found an asylum in your territory; lands have been allotted to them and arrangements made for providing them with food until they raise crops for themselves; the interest you have evinced in them has been most gratifying to me, and I trust that, under your fostering care, they will soon perceive the advantages of a more civilized life, and prove a valuable medium in our future intercourse with the Looshais.

The excellent position of "Seeboo" taken up for the contingent by your officers with my concurrence had all the strategetic advantages we anticipated; whilst there the force held Kamhow's tribe in complete restraint; it compelled the Looshais to so divide their force in order to watch its movements that, on the 25th January, when Brigadier General Bourchier's column was attacked by Poiboi's clan at least half that chief's force, with his principal leader "Damboom," and nine subordinate leaders were in front of our camp, a diversion to my mind of great importance, in so far that it saved the British force from much greater loss.

The day after the final retirement of the contingent from Seeboo, it had the good fortune to intercept a force of Kamhow's carrying off to their hills 962 of the inhabitants of Looshai villages, which they had completely devastated. This force had crossed the frontier in the interval of the first retirement, and was not aware of the return of the contingent, hence its surprise; a brief struggle took place, in which the three chiefs and 53 of their followers were made prisoners, and 54 muskets taken, four of your force being wounded. The Looshai captives were all released and their property restored to them; by this feat Kamhow's power has received a shock from which it will not readily recover, but not before it was required. For years past he has merely simulated friendship whilst playing a fast and loose game, one of alternate pretended submission, raid upon your distant villages, and repudiation of participation or responsibility.

Not long ago the Burmese authorities complained of the ravages committed by his dependents upon the village of Beetop, in the Kubban valley; about the same time his tribe committed a raid upon the village of Lengsole in your territory, on which occasion one man was killed and seven were carried into captivity, and as recently as 15th December last they committed a raid upon three other of your villages, killed four women and seven men and carried 67 into captivity, making a total of 74 of your subjects, still held in captivity by Kamhow.

All doubts as to the criminality of this tribe have been set at rest by the recent escape of one Kora Sunnaputty, who has been brought face to face with the Chief, "Kokatung," and accused him, and his non-denial.

The amount of good this success has done for the future peace of the country cannot be over-estimated. It has checked a career of devastation upon the neighbouring tribes, which in all probability would have terminated in the complete absorption of the Looshais, and the occupation of their country by a powerful and ruthless tribe, who would have preyed upon our outlying gardens as the former have done, and given us all our work over again.

I can only say I feel great pleasure and satisfaction in having been associated in an act so replete of mercy to our fallen and contrite enemies, who, I have every reason to believe, will now prove peaceful and friendly neighbours.

In addition to the 54 muskets taken from Kamhow's force, the captives and refugees have brought with them 171 making a total of 225 extracted from the hands of the raiding tribes.

Your commander, Major Sewahie Chumba, and his second in command, Major Tungal, have kept their men well in hand, and have shown much judgment and consideration in their intercourse with the Looshais, and deserve my best thanks. Gokool interpreter has also been most useful to me and deserves commendation.

No. 63, dated Munnipoor, 17th April 1872.

From Major General *W. F. Nuthall*, Political Agent, Munnipoor, to *C. U. Aitchison*, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I HAVE to request the favour of your attaching the accompanying revised return of captives and refugees to my Despatch, No. 59, of 12th instant, as it is therein referred to.

REVISED RETURN of Captives and Refugees rescued and of Prisoners taken by the Munnipoor Contingent during the Expedition against the Looshais.

DATE.	Male.	Female.	Children.	Total.	Muskets	REMARKS.
CAPTIVES.						
18th December 1871 -	1	1	3	5	–	The family of a Koonja Kookie chief, subjects of Munnipoor, carried off in Raja Nursing's time, escaped from Vonolel's village.
31st - ditto - -	–	–	1	1	–	Koonja Kookie carried off two years ago from avillage south of Shoogoonoo sent in by Poiboi.
10th January 1872 -	56	52	99	207	24	Koonja Kookie, subject of Munnipoor, carried into captivity years ago from villages in the vicinity of Seeboo, by Vonolel's clan of Looshais and escaped from Lenkoom's village to our camp at Seeboo.
11th - ditto - -	3	2	2	7	–	
13th - ditto - -	2	3	2	7	–	
27th - ditto - -	3	1	1	5	–	
14th February 1872 -	130	140	122	392	–	Koonja Kookies, subjects of Munnipoor, formerly inhabitants of Lungtool Hills, escaped from Poiboi's northern villages.
26th - ditto - -	–	–	1	1	–	Koonja Kookies, subjects of Munnipoor, formerly inhabitants of Lungtool Hills, carried into captivity from the village of Numfow in January 1871. Brought by Damboom.
28th - ditto - -	3	1	1	5	–	Koonja Kookies, subjects of Munnipoor, inhabitants of Lungtool Hills, captives, escaped from the same villages as those above between 10th and 27th January 1872.
4th March 1872 -	6	3	4	13	–	Koonja Kookies, subjects of Munnipoor, inhabitants of Lungtool Hills, from Poiboi's northern villages.
7th - ditto - -	–	3	2	5	–	
Total - -	204	206	236	649	24	
REFUGEES.						
13th February 1872 -	133	122	118	373	18	Sooties who had taken refuge with the Looshais at a time of scarcity.
7th March „ -	302	308	347	957	44	Pytias, vassals of the Looshais from Poiboi's villages rescued from Kamhow's force; amongst these are two children taken from Numfow in January 1872, and two women of Moontha and one woman of Noondang taken in the raids of 1868-69.
14th - ditto - -	44	35	31	110	15	Sooties, vassals of Kamhow's tribe of Sooties.
14th - ditto - -	192	204	276	672	70	Looshais from Boomhang's villages, which were destroyed by Kamhow's force.
Total - -	671	669	772	2,112	147	
PRISONERS.						
7th March 1872 -	56	–	–	56	54	Kamhow's force intercepted carrying Looshais into captivity; see this date above.
ABSTRACT.						
Captives - - -	204	206	236	649	24	
Refugees - - -	671	669	772	2,112	147	
Prisoners - - -	56	–	–	56	54	
GRAND TOTAL	931	875	1,008	2,817	225	

(signed) *W. F. Nuthall*, Major General,
Political Agent, Munnipoor.

No. 65, dated Munnipoor, 19th April 1872.

From Major General *W. F. Nuthall*, Officiating Political Agent, Munnipoor, to *C. U. Aitchison*, C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

In my letter No. 90, dated 17th July 1871, I solicited the permission of Government, on behalf of the Maharaja, to allow him to obtain for the use of himself and of the princes a few single-barrelled sporting rifles from England.

He wishes to avail himself of the opportunity of Dr. Brown being in England to obtain 12 Henry Martini rifles, and solicits the sanction of Government to their importation.

I think it most desirable that his adherents about the palace should be efficiently armed, and beg to recommend the application to favourable consideration.

No. 68, dated Munnipoor, the 25th April 1872.

From Major General *W. F. Nuthall*, Officiating Political Agent at Munnipoor, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

As it seemed to me desirable that more daylight should be thrown upon the past relations of the Maharaja with the tribe of Sootis, known by the name of their chief (deceased) Kamhow, immediately after the despatch of my letter, No. 61, of the 16th instant, to your address, I called upon the Maharaja to furnish me with as full a report as possible on this subject, and I have now the pleasure to forward the same for submission to Government.

2. In the letter above quoted I have given the statement of one Kora Sunnaputty, a captive, who was carried off in a raid on 15th December last by a force under the Sooti chief, Kokatung (now a prisoner in Munnipoor), and recently escaped from the above tribe.

3. That statement was not made in my presence; and as the Munnipoor authorities, although usually correct in the relation of general facts, are often at fault in detail, especially in figures, owing to the habit of trusting to memory instead of to record, I requested the Maharaja to send for Kora that I might take his depositions myself in presence of Kokatung. He did so, and the deposition is herewith forwarded.

4. I also forward the statement of Kikoul, chief of an embassy which arrived here from the late Kamhow's sons on the 10th instant. Kokatung is their uncle, and they are evidently anxious to obtain his release. Kikoul has returned and has been informed that no proposition of any kind or sort can be entertained whilst a single subject of the Maharaja remains in their hands, and that, if the captives are not released, the Raja will take measures to punish them as the Looshais have been.

5. The documents accompanying need no further comment from me. They carry with them a complete refutation of the representations made to Government regarding the "friendly alliance" of the Sooti tribe, and will, I trust, increase the desire of the right Honourable the Governor General in Council to give me fair play in the exercise of my office.

6. In conclusion, I desire to remark that in our action with Kamhow's tribe and intercourse with the Looshai chiefs since Brigadier General Bourchier left the field, I have kept steadily in view what I understand to be our future policy with the latter, viz., "after making them feel our power and punishing them, to endeavour to gain an effectual influence over them by conciliatory measures," and "bind them to us by ties so strong and lasting that the tribe, instead of being a source of danger and difficulty to us, would become our strong frontier defence."

7. Such a policy could never have been carried out had the Sooti tribe (Kamhows) been allowed to subjugate the Looshais and occupy their country. They had taken the first step towards that end, and, had they not been rudely checked, their power would have extended, raids would have been renewed on our outlying gardens, and we should have had all our work over again.

REPORT by Major General *W. F. Nuthall*, Officiating Political Agent, Munnipoor, upon the past relations of the Maharaja of Munnipoor with Kamhow, Chief of the Sooti Tribe.

In Regent Nursing's time Kamhow made several raids upon the Maharajah's villages and took possession of Molbee (the present residence of Kokatung) and Heeroway, then within Munnipoor territory.

In 1855, Kamhow attacked and burnt Numfow.

Next year (1856) the Maharaja, in consultation with the then Political Agent, Colonel McCulloch, made preparations and proceeded with a force against Kamhow, but, owing to failure of supplies and want of communication, he was obliged to retire.

On return from this expedition the Maharaja established a thannah in the hills near Numfow, and placed 200 sepoys (including Koonjai Kookies) there.

In 1857, Kamhow raided on Chasat, and carried off the Chasat Raja's wife, named Toonghoolmah, with her two boys (Toonghool and Yakapow) and one girl, killing eight men.

In 1858, on the 6th Pous, Kamhow raided on Sitole, but was unable to destroy any property, or to carry off any men, as at that time there was a Munnipoor guard under Moyna Subadar. They drove the raiders off without loss on either side.

In the same year, on the 3rd Cheyet, a fight took place between Kamhow's men and the Munnipoor force at Kubbok village, in which one Noongum, a chief of Kamhow, and 12 men were killed, two sepoys of the Munnipoor force under command of Sewai Chumba, Major, were also killed.

In 1862 (15th Cheyet) the present messenger, Kikoul, with some men came to take tribute from our village Khengbum. He, with one of his followers, were arrested by Ooyna and Athokpa, Subadars, who were at that time in the Numfow and Shoogoonoo Thannahs, and brought them to Munnipoor as prisoners. They were put in prison here. Hence Kikoul understanding the Munnipooree language. He is a Muntri of Yatol.

In 1865 (8th Pous) Kamhow destroyed Chengbolekhool. Twenty-nine men were killed; only three of the villagers escaped.

In the same year, 1865, Kamhow sent two of his Muntris, named Khygumba and Looplakpa, with seven men, to ask for the Maharaja's pardon and future friendship, as well as for the release of Kikoul and his men. They also wanted to open trade with us.

Kikoul was released and Athokpa Subadar was sent along with the Muntris to hold a conference, with Kamhow. He saw that chief and his son Yatol, also the Rajas of Mombeem and Lyang. After that up to the death of Kamhow no raids were committed upon our villages.

Kamhow died about three years ago. A year after that, *i. e.*, in 1869, a raid was made on Bombong. Eleven men killed, and 11 carried off as captives.

About two years ago another raid was made on Monkow Khoolkha, and the villagers ran away towards Kubban.

Two villages of Fukloway (Numfow District) were attacked in 1871 (15th Pous); one man killed, and seven carried off as captives. Athokpa Subadar was deputed to inquire as to the tribe by whom this raid was committed, whether by the Pooees or Kamhows.

It was ascertained from Yatol that the sons of the Mumbeem Raja committed this; but as they were Yatol's uncle's sons, he (Yatol) asked for pardon and promised to restore the captives and to pay a fine for those killed.

On the return of Athokpa Subadar in November 1871, there came with him two men from Mumbeem Raja, two Muntris from Yatol, and one from Kokatung, named Sowome. They saw the Maharaja and the Political Agent. Some presents were given to them, and they were ordered to join the force at Tseklapi in the middle of December.

During our stay at Seeboo they committed raids upon Tobeekung, Tooyel, and Ngajan, and carried off 67 persons and killed 11 persons, and never joined as allies.

DEPOSITION of *Kora Sunnaputty* of the Village of Tobeekool or Tobeekung, in the presence of *Kokatung* and *Kikoul*, Emissary from *Kamhow's* Tribe.

ON the night of the 15th December last my village was suddenly attacked by a force of about 700 of Kamhow's tribe, many of whom were armed with muskets. They came in three columns, and completely invested the village, so that we could not escape. In the attack they killed 11 persons (five women and six men) and carried off their heads. They made 69 persons captives (52 female and 17 males) and took us to their hills. Most of the females captured were of the families of men who were absent, employed in carrying the supplies for the Maharaja's force. They plundered the village of all property and then set fire to it. They also plundered three other neighbouring villages (Noongsang, Ngajan, and Tooyel), the inhabitants of which escaped at the time the attack was made on my village, and set fire to them. (Here Kikoul interrupts deponent, and says the villages were not set on fire, but only plundered.)

Kokatung, who is now present, was the leader of the force, and two other chiefs, whom I have seen in gaol here (Toongum and Kamlel), were also present. We were taken to Kamhow's tribe. After arrival there, one of our villagers, an old woman, named Motabnooma, was sacrificed, together with two Metnas, two pigs, and a goat, and their heads were placed over the tomb of Kamhow. This took place in the village of Doodin, Kamhow's village. The old woman was killed in the house behind Kamhow's. Her left eye and cheek had been torn by a bear, so I easily recognised the head. The captives were distributed amongst the tribe. There are at present 11 (two boys and nine women) in Kamhow's house. In the village of Tunkal, where Yatol (Kamkow's eldest son) resides, there are 10, and in the village of Mumbeem there are 10. I being a senior of my village, was taken from

place

place to place, and at last made over to Kokatung, and lived at his house in Molbee village, from which I escaped. There is a woman of my village in that house, and there are the heads of three of my villagers over a tomb in that village. All my children, three boys and two girls, are in their hands. Kamhow's tribe have about 1,700 fighting men and 1,300 muskets.

DEPOSITION of *Kikoul*, Emissary from *Kamhow's* Tribe.

I AM sent by Yatol, eldest son of the late chief Kamhow, to plead for the Maharaja's pardon for the raids made upon his territory. Yatol will give up all captives, subjects of the Maharaja. They are now being collected for that purpose. Yatol's mother and Kokatung's mother are sisters. Kamhow left six sons; their names and places of residence are as follows:—

(1.) Yatol - - - - - Village Tunkal.
(2.) Lailtung - - - - „ Chiyang.
(3.) Tomlel - - - - - „ Tolyang.
(4.) Tungopow - - - - } Reside in Doodin, Kamhow's village,
(5.) Howpoom - - - - } and the last-named lives with his mother,
(6.) Kooching Jam - - - } and is Raja.

All the above are married and have families except the last. Kokatung resides in the village of Molbee. He has four sons and one daughter. Tungopow and Howpoom were with Kokatung at the attack on the Raja's villages. So also were two sons of Raja Yapow, of Mumbeem, brother to the late Kamhow. The names of Yapow's sons are Kung-ke-lay and Thomkotung. Mumbeem village is about one day's journey from Yatol's and half a day's journey from Doodin. This village consists of about 400 houses.

(signed) *W. F. Nuthall*, Major General,
Officiating Political Agent at Munnipoor.

No. 85, dated Munnipoor, the 27th May 1872.

From Major General *W. F. Nuthall*, Officiating Political Agent at Munnipoor, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

IT affords me great pleasure to report, for the information of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General in Council, that 120 of the Sooti tribes, known as Kamhows, have just arrived in the Munnipoor valley, and placed themselves under the protection of the Maharaja.

2. This affords clear evidence of the accuracy of my views as to the power of this mischievous tribe having received a rude check and been crippled for future harm.

3. There is so much cholera just now at the capital (the Maharaja lies prostrate with it) that I do not consider it advisable to allow them to come here at present in order to take down their statements of recent events in their tribe.

4. I have every expectation that a complete disintegration of the tribe will take place.

OFFICE MEMORANDUM, No. 617, dated Fort William, 11th May 1872.

From Colonel *H. K. Burne*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to Foreign Department.

IN returning to the Foreign Department the enclosures of memorandum, No. 850, dated 8th April 1872, from that department, the undersigned has the honour to forward, for the information of the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council, the accompanying letter* from the Quartermaster General submitting, as requested, papers expressing the views of Brigadier General Bourchier, C.B., in regard to the proceedings of Major General W. Nuthall, Political Agent at Munnipoor, during the Looshai Expedition, with the opinion of his Excellency the Commander in Chief thereon.

*No. 500L., dated 6th May 1872. To be returned.

The undersigned has the honour, with reference to the accompanying extract† from a General Order, No. 480 of 1872, issued in the Military Department, to request that the necessary communication may be made through the Foreign Department to the Raja of Munnipoor in such terms as may seem appropriate to the circumstances.

†"The approbation of the Government of India will be communicated through the proper department to the Raja of Munnipoor for the ready assistance rendered by him to the British Government in furtherance of the object of the expedition.

No. 500L., dated Army Head Quarters, Calcutta, 6th May 1872.

From Colonel *P. S. Lumsden*, Quartermaster General, to Colonel *H. K. Burne*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

WITH reference to Military Department docket, No. 1001, of the 19th March 1872, Field Operations / Looshai, forwarding, for the Commander in Chief's information, certain correspondence between the Political Agent and the Maharaja of Munnipoor, I am directed by his Excellency to submit the annexed expression of the views of Brigadier General G. Bourchier, C.B., as set forth in his letter, No. 1232, of 20th April 1872, regarding the proceedings of Major General Nuthall, commanding the Contingent, and to state that the Commander in Chief concurs entirely in the opinions expressed by Brigadier General Bourchier, as far as opinion can be formed from the correspondence referred to.

No. 21, dated 29 March 1872.
No. 281E., dated 27 April 1872.
Enclosures of which are herewith returned.

2. I am further to submit communications as per margin, conveying Brigadier General Bourchier's opinion of the conduct of the Contingent in seizing an armed party of Kamhow's tribe and making prisoners of them, as required in Military Department Letter, No. 876, of 15th April 1872, Field Operations / Looshai.

No. 1232, dated 20th April 1872.

From Brigadier General *G. Bourchier*, C.B., Commanding Cachar Column, Looshai Expeditionary Force, to Colonel *P. S. Lumsden*, Quartermaster General.

I BEG to acknowledge, on the 11th April 1872, the receipt of your letter, No. 477, dated 4th instant, calling upon me for any observations I may have to offer on the retirement of the Munnipoor Contingent from Cheeboo and the alleged causes which led to this result. Real weakness and a press of business has delayed my reply, which I regret.

2. No one can feel more than I do for the mortification Major General Nuthall must experience at the failure of the Munnipoor Contingent, and the losses they sustained, but in justice to myself, and to show how implicitly I obeyed the orders of his Excellency the Commander in Chief, I must revert to the orders I gave Major General Nuthall, the spirit in which he received them, and the utter disregard he paid to them, and remark that, instead of his having had no control over the circumstances connected with the failure, he is alone responsible for the movements which resulted in it.

3. In your letter No. 163, dated 7th October, I was directed to decide upon the best plan for the co-operation of the Munnipoor Contingent, about the same time I received from the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, Foreign Office Memorandum, No. 2108 P., and Major General Nuthall's views regarding its employment contained in his letter No. 106, dated 31st August 1871.

4. On the 15th September I had addressed Major General Nuthall, begging for all the information he could give regarding the points enumerated in your letter No. 3980; but as time was precious, and I had received no reply up to the 17th October, I culled from General Nuthall's letter to the Foreign Secretary the part he wished to play, and after consulting with Mr. Edgar and Colonel McCulloch submitted my proposal in Letter No. 1060, dated 17th October 1871, to your address. Both these officers fully concurred in my views.

5. General Nuthall wished, with 2,000 men, 600 coolies, and a maximum supply of 1,500 maunds of rice as supplies for his troops and coolies for 24 days at most, to co-operate with me near Tipai Mookh, which, as I before stated, would have resulted in my having to feed his troops or leave his men to starve.

6. My right was well supported along the Cachar frontier by detachments at the outposts, my left was *en l'air*, and I recommended that a strong line of outposts should be posted along the southern frontier of Munnipoor, and a handy force of about 500 men to be held in readiness near Moirang to watch Kamhow.

7. This was approved by Government and His Excellency the Commander in Chief, by whom I was directed to call upon Major General Nuthall to carry out such co-operations as I desired, and no more.

8. On the 19th October, as reported to you in my No. 1064, of the same date, I informed Major General Nuthall that I was invested with supreme powers, civil and military, with regard to the expedition, and as to deciding to what extent the Munnipoor Contingent was to be employed; I gave him the details as quoted above, and on the 29th October I informed him he must consider the orders he had received as definite and final, and that I left the selection of the southern posts to him.

9. On the 7th November I informed him that my views had received the approval of His Excellency the Commander in Chief.

10. At

10. At Cachar, between the 20th and 23rd November, I received a most annoying and aggravating letter from Major General Nuthall, styling my correspondence "logostic," and "such as would be addressed to an inexperienced subaltern or ignorant civilian;" of this I have never even taken the slightest notice, but it was patent to the whole of my staff that he was determined not to obey the orders which he had received; in fact, he stated that he expected to be attacked when he, too, took up his position on the frontier.

I need not point out that he was not ordered to go to Cheeboo, which is beyond the frontier, but only to Tsek-la-pi.

11. I have before stated that I had directed on the 19th October that the posts on the southern frontier should be established, but no report of any difficulty in carrying this out, or that the measure had not been carried out, was made to me until I received Major General Nuthall's letter, No. 143, dated 15th December 1871, about the beginning of 1872.

12. Before leaving Cachar I addressed General Nuthall on the 23rd November stating that I would not tie the 500 men who were to be held in readiness for service down to Moirang, but that the Commander was at liberty to move as far south as Tsek-la-pi, but without orders no further.

13. As I knew 500 serviceable muskets had been sent up to Munnipoor for issue to the Contingent, and this part of the force, at any rate, would be fairly armed, I had named 500 as the number of men to General Nuthall for the force at Moirang, but he, in defiance of the instructions I had issued, assembled by the 12th January at Cheeboo a force consisting of—

Munnipoor troops - - - - - - - -	1,554
Kookie Contingent - - - - - - - -	530
Coolies - - - - - - - - - -	1,749
TOTAL - - -	3,833

with 1,000 maunds of rice, a supply for little more than 10 days. Could anything have been more suicidal? Major General Nuthall ought to have known that to mass and push such a force to the front with a scarcity of provisions, no organised commissariat or medical establishments, with Native officers in command who could not walk, but required to be carried in doolies, and the men and coolies without warm clothing, was to court destruction from sickness, exposure, and want of food. Had General Nuthall been in my neighbourhood, as he proposed, instead of being far away on my left flank, the success of my operations would have been cruelly imperilled.

14. The result of Major General Nuthall's having advanced a force so ill-equipped far further south than I had ordered, and before I had penetrated the country, and could give him, by my advance, any support, was the reduction of his military force from 2,084 on the 12th January to 850 rank and file on the 27th idem, chiefly from exposure, fever, and want, besides the greater portion of his coolies being prostrated from the same causes.

15. That my ideas regarding the state of the Munnipoor troops were not imaginary, I would call attention to the first paragraph of General Nuthall's letter, No. 20, dated 2nd February, to me, regarding his two senior officers and their mode of travelling; to paragraph 11, regarding the equipment of his coolies; and paragraph 12, regarding the amount of system, order, and supervision which prevailed. Colonel McCulloch had warned me that to trust my communications even to these troops was madness. *See* printed enclosures of Military Department, No. 1,001. dated 19 March 1872.

Mr. Edgar, who knew them, was in dread of being hampered with them, and, to quote Major General Nuthall's letter, dated 12th February 1872, to the Raja, to have employed in close proximity to my column a force which he acknowledges "to have no discipline and very little drill" would have been to risk utterly the success of the British expedition.

16. With all our resources and means our energies in every department were taxed to the utmost to counteract sickness, feed the troops, and overcome the physical obstacles of the country; could I therefore have rationally hoped for success had I given the Contingent any definite share in my offensive operations, with such an organisation and discipline.

17. Had Major General Nuthall seen that the orders I gave for the employment of the Contingent, and no more, were carried out, the fearful mortality would not have occurred, and when I arrived at Poiboi's villages I might have advanced the force nearer to my left flank, where it would have been useful in checking Poiboi's troops or watching Kamhow, who, however, proved himself our best ally, but just when I might thus have employed them, broken down by sickness and exposure, they had returned to Munnipoor.

18. I trust I may be forgiven for pointing out that the employment of a Contingent such as General Nuthall even describes the Munnipoor force to be, is a source of the greatest anxiety to a military commander, and from the first I made up my mind not to depend upon it in any way for my own safety or success. I secured my rear at every point, and their return from Cheeboo did not in the least affect my position or safety.

No. 21, dated 29th March 1872.

From Brigadier General *G. Bourchier*, C.B., commanding Eastern Frontier District, to Colonel *P. S. Lumsden*, Quartermaster General.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a letter, No. 43,* dated 12th March 1872, from the Officiating Political Agent, Munnipoor, as also the report thereon by the Political Officer attached to the Cachar column, Mr. Edgar.

*Given at page 484. of Return.

2. On first perusing General Nuthall's letter, it seemed a most consummate act of treachery on the part of the Munnipoor Contingent, and I therefore requested a report on the subject. Kamhow has never been doubted by the Munnipoor State, and my orders to the Contingent to watch his attitude were with a view to prevent his taking advantage of our advance, and attacking Vonolell's tribes, committing barbarities which would have a colour of being perpetrated under cover of our force or to prevent his joining the eastern tribes against which I was acting; when the Munnipoor Contingent retired from Cheeboo, Kamhow did attack Vonolell's villages and got beaten.

3. As the column has now closed its operations, I have informed General Nuthall that I do not consider any operations of the Munnipoor State need be made the subject of report to me.

No. 281 E., dated Shillong, 27th April 1872.

From Brigadier General *G. Bourchier*, C.B., Commanding Eastern Frontier District, to Colonel *P. S. Lumsden*, Quartermaster General.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 495,* Looshai Field Operations, with annexures, now returned, requesting me to report on the proceedings of the Munnipoor Contingent, as described by the Political Agent in his letters, Nos. 43 and 46, dated 13th and 16th March.

*Dated 8 April 1872.

2. My letter to your address No. 21, of 29th March 1872, accompanied by Mr. Edgar's report, will have given our opinion on the occurrences detailed in No. 43; and, with regard to the last paragraph, I cannot recommend any reward being given to the two Majors of the Contingent, who, both in my opinion and in Mr. Edgar's, committed a great act of treachery.

3. With regard to General Nuthall's letter, No. 46, dated 16th March, I send you Mr. Edgar's report thereon. The captives from Munnipoor in late raids were insignificantly small, and the refugees, as enumerated by thousands by General Nuthall, are Kookies, who resided in Looshai land under surveillance, and took the opportunity of the expedition to leave the country for Munnipoor. It was far better that they should go there and recruit the Raja's population after their losses at Cheeboo, than that they should have come into Cachar, or gone to Kamhow; perhaps, it would have been better if they had remained with Poiboi and strengthened his tribe.

4. I cannot believe on any great importation of arms into Looshai land; those I have seen (and I have seen many hundreds) are arms of very ancient dates, with flint locks, of every kind and description of barrel, the locks bearing, it is true, the Tower mark of years gone by, but in no way indicating any fresh importation.

From Major General *W. F. Nuthall*, Political Agent at Munnipoor, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, No. 86; dated Munnipoor, the 28th May 1872.

HAVING just received a copy of the Government "Gazette" containing the Looshai Expeditionary Despatches, with the remarks of the Right Honourable the Commander in Chief and his Excellency the Governor General in Council thereon, I have been much gratified with the very just praise accorded to the Maharaja of Munnipoor for his exertion to meet the wishes of Government.

2. At the same time it has not escaped me that I am probably the only officer holding any position of responsibility, and by whose measures successes have been achieved, who has been unnoticed, and I naturally feel much pained to think that this should be the end of a career of 35 years' devoted service, 24 of which have been passed in such climates as Arracan, Burmah, Assam, and the jungles of Munnipoor.

3. I suppose I may assume that this omission has been intentional, and has arisen from Brigadier General Bourchier's representations, and I therefore bow to the decision of Government, whatever that may have been; but I must appeal for a patient hearing, and solicit the favour of your assuring His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General in Council that, even with our present after-knowledge, there is not one step which I allowed the officer commanding the Contingent to take, or which I counselled, from which I would desire to recede, nor, were it all to come over again, would I wish to see anything altered, excepting the very ungenerous and inconsiderate attitude assumed towards me by Brigadier General Bourchier throughout, as evinced in the offensive and discourteous tone of his

early

early letters to me before we took the field, and subsequently in his denial to any right, on my part, to exercise my judgment in counselling movements of the Contingent, although we were actually over 250 miles apart, and it occupied over a month to receive a reply to any communication to him.

4. I fear that the "head and front of my offending" may be found in the following comment on my application for the military command: "I know you must feel very much not having been employed in a military capacity, but your having accepted civil employ barred that entirely, and what should I have thought of it after the work I went through last season?"

5. I have said, "I must appeal for a patient hearing," and at the end of my long career of service in India, I am sure that this at least will be accorded to me, but I will endeavour to be as brief as possible.

6. I most earnestly solicit, then, to draw the attention of Government to the very disingenuous way in which my name has been introduced by Brigadier General Bourchier in his Despatch published in the Government "Gazette," and which will, of course, be read by all my friends, both here and at home, and naturally lead to the association of the same with the omission of Government to notice my services.

7. I am alluded to in two places in that Despatch; in paragraph 2 A. and in paragraph 43.

8. The first, I most respectfully submit, publishes to the world a misrepresentation of facts; and, in the second, Brigadier General Bourchier has gone out of his way to cause me humiliation by wantonly casting a slur upon my professional reputation.

9. Paragraph 2 A. states: "In a similar manner General Nuthall was, in October last, requested to move the Raja of Munnipoor to put detachments on the southern frontier. Flanked again by a force of about 500 men near the Moirang Lake. Their posts were never established, or intimation given that any difficulty in doing so existed, until the receipt of a communication from him, dated 15th December 1871."

10. In October, Brigadier General Bourchier certainly sent me a programme of the manner in which he intended to employ the Contingent; but his orders for the force to take the field and occupy frontier posts were not conveyed to me until the 23rd of November (not in October as he states), and I hold that I should not have been justified in allowing a man to be moved, and awakening the enemy to our intentions, before the receipt of those orders, which were acted upon early in December.

11. Copy of the letter conveying the orders alluded to (*see* paragraph 2) is herewith attached, and affords, I submit, the most conclusive proof of the above misstatement as to time.

12. Now as to the facts. The order states: "The line of posts extending from Koongshangkool to Kowpoom, at such points as you may select, should be occupied as soon as possible." This was done to the very letter of the instructions, though not, perhaps, as Brigadier General Bourchier intended, but the arrangement was left to me, and I acted for the best. His instructions clearly specify the two places between which the detachments were to be placed, and, in accordance therewith, a detachment of 130 rank and file with a cavalry picquet was placed at Koongshangkool, and a detachment of 110 rank and file with a similar picquet at Kowpoom. The intermediate detachments were—

At Limetak, 50 rank and file and a cavalry picquet.
At Bissenpoor, 50 „ „ „
At Moirang, 100 „ „ „
In the Tungching range of hills an auxiliary force of Kookies.

All the above detachments were newly placed, excepting that at Kowpoom, the previous strength of which was doubled.

Enclosed is a sketch of the line of posts.

13. My reason for the angular disposition of the detachments therein shown was simply to render them the more effective for the purpose for which I had been informed they were required, viz., "for the protection of the frontier."

14. Instead of being placed in isolated positions, in dense jungles, and almost inaccessible hill country, where it would be next to impossible to keep them supplied, where they could learn nothing of what was going on around them, and the enemy could slip past them at any moment, they were now placed in a line of country where it was practicable to keep up a system of daily patrolling from post to post; they could rapidly support each other or concentrate; they could be easily supplied (the great difficulty on this kind of service), and it was next to impossible for the enemy to pass them undetected; advantages which Brigadier General Bourchier would have sacrificed for the sake of having them in a direct and rigid line.

15. This arrangement of the posts I reported to him, as he says, on the 15th December (copy attached), and, for reasons which he can best explain, he has construed that arrangement, and reported it, as a total omission to establish the posts.

16. His reply to my communication of 15th December showed me that he was either unable or unwilling to understand how the posts had been arranged. I therefore again entered more explicitly into the subject in a letter dated 16th January, extract from which I have the honour to forward herewith, as it will be quite sufficient to show the Government that he must have been fully aware of the disposition above explained when he made such an inaccurate and inexcusable report.

17. Under any circumstances, I respectfully submit that, having left the selection of the posts for the detachments to me, Brigadier General Bourchier, who has never seen the country and could have no possible knowledge of it, had no right whatever subsequently to raise objections to my selections. His doing so shows a most unworthy desire to find fault without good reason; and if this sort of thing can be carried out with success against an officer of my standing, how much more are subordinate officers likely to suffer from such a capricious temperament.

18. I did not authorise a step to be taken by the Contingent, for which I cannot show Brigadier General Bourchier's authority; and the differences he has had with me (for they have been entirely on his part) have been in instances where such authority has been subsequently repudiated.

Note, for instance, his assertion in paragraph 2 of his despatch: "that the head-quarters of the contingent were never established near the Moirang Lake." The instructions conveyed to me in his letter, No. 1125, dated 23rd November, clearly state as follows: "It was never my intention that the officer commanding the contingent should be tied down to Moirang, but that it should be moved to the south of the Munnipoor Valley, but not further than the point marked Tseklapi in your map."

19. My Report of 15th December, above alluded, is dated Camp "Tseklapi," and in that I have stated how the head-quarters and posts had then been established at that place, Kowpoon, Koomootchumpaboong *alias* Koongshangkool, and intermediate places.

20. Brigadier General Bourchier has apparently been most successful in injuring me in the opinion of Government. I do not know, of course, what else he may have written; but there can be no better proof than the above, of the means which have been used, and the way in which the Government have been deceived.

21. In the army especially, where the characters of officers are so much at the mercy of the confidential reports of their seniors, the *suppressio veri* should surely not be held less venial than the *suggestio falsi*, and I submit that accuracy in such matters cannot be made too strictly a point of honour.

22. The other paragraph against which I have to complain is as follows:—

> "43. Here I received intimation that from sickness and mortality among the Munnipoor Contingent, General Nuthall had retired from Cheeboo. As it happened, having thoroughly secured our communications, and the whole country in our rear being at our mercy, this did not matter, otherwise this was exactly the time when the contingent might have assisted us by holding Poiboi's villages while I advanced on Lalboorah."

23. With respect to the above, I beg to draw attention to the unfair manner in which my name has been here first introduced as though I had been in command of the contingent and were responsible for the retirement (the world will know no better), and the fact then commented upon as likely to have led to inconvenience, if not harm, Brigadier General Bourchier well knowing he never intended to employ the contingent out of Munnipoor territory, having written to me that the "Commander in Chief considered guarding the frontier the best way the contingent could be employed."

24. I respectfully submit that as political officer with the force my name had no more right to be associated with a movement which I did not counsel (but actually tried to prevent), than would the name of either Mr. Edgar or Captain Lewin with any movement of the columns commanded by Brigadier Generals Bourchier and Brownlow.

25. My province was simply to advise, as was theirs, although I was in a much more onerous position; and if by such advice I endeavoured to prevent the usefulness of the contingent being sacrificed to a want of knowledge of the geography of the country in which we were acting (for it had never been previously visited by any European), without transgressing the intention of His Excellency the Right Honourable the Commander in Chief as to the manner in which the force should be applied, which I honestly aver to be the case, surely such action on my part is not deserving the tacit censure which has been passed upon me by the Government, and the misrepresentation and injury which I have publicly suffered at the hands of Brigadier General Bourchier.

26. I am now about to leave India after an almost uninterrupted course of 35 years' duty in military, civil, and political employ, in all of which I have gained credit. I may probably never have to ask another favour of the Government, and in doing so now, I merely appeal for a simple act of justice; a redress of the wrongs I have above represented in such manner as the Government may deem expedient.

27. A court of inquiry would set at rest any doubts as to my conduct of affairs relating to the contingent, or official intercourse with Brigadier General Bourchier; and, although in very impaired health, I would gladly go to any part of India to appear before one for the opportunity of clearing away the errors and prejudice which have brought upon me the undeserved reproach of a Government it has been the aim and end of my life to serve with honesty and fidelity.

EXTRACT from LETTER, No. 13, dated 16th January 1872, from Major General *W. F. Nuthall*, Political Agent at Munnipoor, to Brigadier General *G. Bourcheir*, C.B.

Para. 16. You doubtless meant that these detachments should be placed in accessible positions as nearly as possible in a direct line between the above two places. But I inspected the country (a country which has been uninhabited for years) and learnt that there was not a tract or path of any kind in that direction or towards it, nothing but the most dense jungle, ravines, and morass, identical with, and parallel to, that between Mynadhur and Tipai Mookh, which, with all your superior means at command, you found so difficult

to

to penetrate; and I saw that to place detachments in such a jungle, without even a road communicating with them, would be to cut them off from all effective use (to place them, in fact, as within the walls of a prison), and to make a road for the purpose would not only abstract from labour (already scarce) required for the conveyance of supplies for the troops, but would create a future source of danger to the frontier, by providing the Looshais with a road to make use of in attacking the villages to the south of the valley, the most exposed part of the whole line of frontier from Burmah to Sylhet, owing to the proximity of Poiboi's villages. Moreover, the Raja, on political grounds, objected to the construction of such a road, and his objections seemed to me quite as valid as those urged by Mr. Edgar in his letter, No. C., dated 13th March 1871, to the Commissioner of Dacca, against the construction of a similar road along the southern frontier of Cachar. He says (para. 24), "Hitherto we have enjoyed a practical immunity from raids during the rains, but this has not been, because the Looshais cannot get about at this season. On the contrary, this is the best time for collecting rubber, and they constantly come during the rains in pursuit of game along the high hills that surround our gardens with their rank, and, in the rainy season, almost impenetrable vegetation, and the treacherous streams and strips of marsh that intersect them. Our paths would enable them to overcome the difficulty, and would, when the guards were withdrawn, deprive us of the protection we now have for eight months of the year. The danger would, of course, be equally great, if instead of thoroughly defending the whole of the exposed line, we were to select for complete protection certain portions, while, during the cold weather, attacks would be almost certainly directed to the portions left undefended."

17. Influenced by these considerations, and in exercise of the discretion committed to me in your letter, No. 1063, of 19th October, and since repeated, that the selection of the spots for a line of posts was "entirely left to me," I concurred with the officer commanding the contingent that it would be all-sufficient to strengthen and add to the posts already existing along the southern frontier from Kowpoom to Koongshankool, *viâ* Bishenpoor, and the following were determined upon, and arranged accordingly:—

———	Rank and File.	Cavalry.	Stockade.	———
Kowpoom	110	2	—	
Limetak	50	2	—	
Bishenpoor	50	10	—	
Moirung	100	10	—	
Koongshangkool, or thereabout.	100	10	- -	There is really no such place as Koongshangkool. It is a corruption of Koomoochumpaboong.
Koomoo chumbapoong *in support of the above.*	30	- -	- -	
Muttarook	50	10	Stockade.	
Tseklapi	100	10	"	
Kurtagyee	150	- -	"	
Pookie	170	- -	"	

To the east, on the road from Shoogonoo, towards Kamhan's tribes:—

Shoogonoo	- -	24	Stockade.
Mandangoway	- -	150	"
Kengyang	- -	150	"
Koogamaroo	- -	150	"

The *Italics* have since been added.—*W. F. N.*

(True Extract.)

(signed) *W. F. Nuthall*, Major General,
Political Agent, Munnipoor.

No. 1005; dated Fort William, the 17th May 1872.

OFFICE MEMORANDUM, from Captain *O. R. Newmarch*, Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

ENQUIRY having been made of the Military Department as to the adjustment of the value of the arms and ammunition supplied by the State to the Raja of Munnipoor, the undersigned has the honour to state that if the Government in the Foreign Department see no objection to the measure, it is proposed to make no recovery of their value, but to treat the issue as a free gift to the Raja, in consideration of the co-operation of his contingent with the British forces during the late expedition.

No. 1282 P.; dated Simla, the 7th June 1872.

From *C. U. Aitchison*, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Officiating Political Agent at Munnipoor.

I AM desired to request that you will deliver to the Maharajah of Munnipoor the accompanying letter (copy of which is enclosed for your perusal), conveying the cordial thanks of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General for the ready and valuable assistance which he rendered in the course of the late expedition into the Looshai country.

2. A communication regarding your own part in those operations will follow shortly.

Dated Simla, the 7th June 1872.

From His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General of India, to the Maharaja of Munnipoor.

I HAVE received from my agent at your durbar, and from his Excellency the Commander in Chief, a gratifying account of the assistance which the Munnipoor Contingent was able to render during the late operations into the Looshai country.

My friend, it is with the greatest pleasure that I have received these accounts, and that I now send my sincere thanks for the ready way in which you placed the resources of Munnipoor at the disposal of the representative of the British Government in order to further the objects of the expedition, for the valuable service which you rendered by personally encouraging your troops when depressed by disease and scarcity of supplies, and for the reception which has been given to the numerous captives who have been released.

As a material token of the gratification which your ready co-operation has caused me to feel, I beg you to consider as a present the 500 muskets which the Political Agent procured for you from the officer at Cachar towards the close of last year, and I also hope, ere many months are over, to be able to send you 12 sporting rifles, manufactured on the latest and most improved principles, which I have ordered from England, for the use of yourself, your princes, and the chief officers of your State.

(No. 1283 P.)

COPY of the above, and of the covering letter to the Political Agent, Munnipoor, forwarded to the Military Department, with reference to the recent communication from that Department, No. 617, dated 11th ultimo, and also with reference to the correspondence closing with communication from this department, No. 2108 P., dated 4th October 1871, regarding the delivery of 500 muskets to the Maharaja.

No. 1520 P.; dated Simla, the 10th July 1872.

From *C. U. Aitchison*, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Officiating Political Agent at Munnipoor.

IN continuation of the letter from this office, No. 1282 P., dated 7th June, I am desired to acknowledge receipt of Major General Nuthall's letter, No. 86, dated 28th May, vindicating his conduct in the direction of the movements of the Munnipoor Contingent from the remarks in Brigadier Bourchier's Despatch, No. 696, dated 19th March last.

2. In reply, I am desired to state that, on a review of the whole correspondence regarding the operations of the Munnipoor Contingent, his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General in Council deems it inexpedient further to pursue the matter which forms the subject of General Nuthall's complaints.

No. 1521 P.; dated Simla, the 10th July 1872.

From *H. Le Poer Wynne*, Esq., Under Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Officiating Political Agent at Munnipoor.

IN continuation of letter, No. 1520 P., of to-day's date, I am instructed to acknowledge receipt of Major General Nuthall's letter, No. 85, dated 27th May, in which he reported the arrival of 120 more of Kamhow's tribe, the Sootis, and their act in placing themselves under the protection of the Maharajah of Munnipoor.

(No. 1522 P.)

EXTRACT, paragraph 1, of the letter above acknowledged, forwarded to the Bengal Government for information.

No. 84; dated Munnipoor, the 27th May 1872.

From Major General *W. F. Nuthall*, Political Agent at Munnipoor, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

HIS EXCELLENCY the Viceroy and Governor General in Council has been pleased to express approbation of the ready assistance afforded by the Maharajah of Munnipoor towards the Looshai Expedition.

2. The expenses incurred by the British Government in that expedition will have enabled the Government to form some opinion as to the extent of those incurred by the Maharajah in placing and maintaining in the field such a force as he provided.

3. If it is the intention of Government to recognise these services in any substantial form, I beg permission to mention that I know nothing would be more acceptable and more gratifying to the Maharajah than a free gift of the arms which were granted to him for the purposes of the expedition, and an exchange of the former large-bore arms which were granted to him a few years back, and of which he has about 1,970, for an equivalent either in number or value, of those last granted (with short barrels), so that he may have all of one kind, the Victoria pattern.

4. These are considerably lighter than the large-bore muskets (known as Brown Bess), and were found very convenient for hill work, and were much appreciated by the men of the contingent; but the great advantage in the exchange would be their increased accuracy, and the removal of the inconvenience of having to obtain two kinds of ammunition, with the chance of getting them mixed on service. Moreover, in the present day, the ammunition for the "Brown Bess" must be made expressly for it, and involves much unnecessary expense in the weight of the bullet and charge of powder, besides cost of carriage.

5. The Raja will gladly defray all expenses of carriage.

6. In conclusion, I venture to express a hope that some little mark of the approbation of Government may be conferred on Majors Sewai Chumba and Tungal; also on Gokool, Interpreter and Commissariat Officer.

7. All three were recipients of khilluts from Government for services during the mutiny of 1857, which are now worn out, and I believe few things would be more acceptable to them than their renewal.

No. 1579 P.; dated Simla, the 19th July 1872.

OFFICE MEMORANDUM from *C. U. Aitchison*, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

THE undersigned is desired to forward to the Military Department an extract, paragraph 3, from a letter from the late Officiating Political Agent, Munnipoor, dated 27th May, No. 84 relative to the reward to be given to the Maharajah of Munnipoor for his services during the Looshai Expedition, and to request that it may be stated whether it will be possible without inconvenience, to comply with the request of the Maharajah to exchange the large-bore arms, of which he is reported to have 1,970 in stock, for an equal number of those of the Victoria pattern.

2. The request, that the Maharajah might receive as a gift the 500 rifles given him for the purposes of the expedition, has already been complied with, as will be seen from a reference to a docket from this department, No. 1263 P., dated 7th June 1871.

No. 1580 P.; dated Simla, the 19th July 1872.

From *H. Le Poer Wynne*, Esq., Under Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Officiating Political Agent at Munnipoor.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your predecessor's letter, No. 84, dated 27th May 1872, recommending, 1st, that as a mark of the approbation with which the Government of India views the assistance afforded by the Maharajah of Munnipoor in the recent Looshai Expedition, his Highness may be presented with the arms which were granted to him for the purposes of the expedition; 2nd, that he may be allowed to exchange the large-bore arms, of which he is reported to have 1,970, at present in stock, for an equal number of those of the Victoria pattern; and 3rd, that dresses of honour may be conferred on Majors Sewai Chumba and Tungal, and on Gokool, Interpreter.

2. With reference to the first of these requests, I am to refer you to the letter from this office, No. 1282 P., dated 7th June, which covered a copy of one to the Maharajah, presenting him with the arms in question.

3. The Military Department has been asked whether it will be possible, without much inconvenience, to comply with the second request.

4. The Viceroy and Governor General in Council is pleased to comply with the third request; and khilluts, comprising the articles mentioned in the margin, will be accordingly forwarded from the Presidency Office, for presentation to Majors Sewai Chumba and Tungal, and to Gokool, Interpreter.

A pair of shawl chudders:
A piece of gold-worked Neemoo Asteen; and
A piece of gold worked Gosooharah for the head.
For each of the officers.

(Separate—Military Department—No. 95 of 1872.)

To His Grace the Duke of *Argyll*, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

My Lord Duke, Simla, 3 June 1872.

IN continuation of our Despatch, No. 82, dated 3rd May 1872, we have the honour to forward the accompanying copy of a report by Major J. Macdonald, Deputy Surveyor General, detailing the survey operations conducted by the party of surveyors attached to the right column of the Looshai Expeditionary Force.

We are, &c.

(signed) *Northbrook.*
Napier of Magdala.
&c. &c.

From Colonel *P. S. Lumsden*, C.S.I., Quartermaster-General, to Colonel *H. K. Burne*, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, No. 506 L. (Looshai); dated Calcutta, the 10th May 1872.

IN continuation of this office No. 497 L., dated 26th April 1872, I am directed by the Right Honourable the Commander-in-Chief to submit, for the information of Government, the accompanying copy of a report, dated 20th March 1872, by Major J. Macdonald, Deputy Surveyor-General, detailing the survey operations conducted by the party of surveyors attached to the right column of the Looshai Expeditionary Force, and referred to in clause 7 of paragraph 29 of Brigadier-General C. H. Brownlow's Despatch, dated Calcutta, the 3rd April 1872.

From Major *J. Macdonald*, Deputy Surveyor-General, on Special Duty, Right Column, Looshai Field Force, to Brigadier-General *C. H. Brownlow*, C.B., Commanding Right Column, Looshai Field Force; dated Kurnafoolee, the 20th March 1872.

I HAVE the honour to submit a brief abstract of the survey operations which have attended the movements of the troops under your command against the Looshais in the Syloo and Howlong Hills.

2. I arrived at Rungamuttee on the 15th November 1871, accompanied by the officers noted in the margin, and immediately made arrangements to commence work from the valve of a line between two trigonometrical stations, "Sitapahar" and "Gillaseree," points which had been cleared and marked by station posts under arrangements made with the Deputy Commissioner, Hill Tracts, previous to our arrival.

Captain H. B. Tanner, deputy superintendent survey, 3rd grade.
Mr. Clifford Barrett, assistant superintendent, 1st grade.
Mr. Gordon Cooke, assistant superintendent, 2nd grade.

3. Between those stations, and the work to the north, there were other intersected points marked on the Great Trigonometrical chart which were included in our work along the river, extending as far as "Oepome" ridge; this very severe work was almost entirely done by Messrs. Barrett and Cooke.

4. My reason for taking the work to Oepome, south of Rutun Pooeah's village was that the station on "Oepome" would ultimately become useful in the event of our having an opportunity to extend the survey over the eastern basin of the Kurnafoolee, towards the spot marked "Blue Mountain" on the published maps. Captain Tanner subsequently had the opportunity, and, aided by Mr. Barrett, he did it with extraordinary promptitude and energy.

5. Simultaneously with the first advance of the column Captain Tanner moved along the "Demagiri" range as far as Sirthay No. 2, from which he returned. It was intended that he should advance eight or nine miles further, but he could not do so with the supplies he took out. At the same time I was advancing to the Rhanjan range, where I fixed a station on the 14th December; I then crossed the drainage of the Koh-i-doom and placed a station at Lal Jeera. I also reached the eastern watershed of the Kurnafoolee at Lal Poethal. Returning to the "Rhanjan," I marched towards the north with Captain Tanner, continuing the work along that range through Kothur Klang, fixing a point at its extremity on Von Konga's village which was ultimately included in our system of triangles, when I returned with Mr. Cooke from our rapid sweep from Sookpilal's country, at the close of the season.

6. Still following the military operations, I made stations at Tourong and Lal Ngora, then carrying the work to the east, set up "Savoonga," "Sri Klang," and "Darloong," as points from which the triangulation might be established across the valleys of the "Kloong Doom" and "Kolodoom," towards the Howlong hills. When the force advanced to Lal Jeeka, we had made a fruitless attempt to reach Darloong, but succeeded ultimately in a march made from "Savoonga," when the force occupied the Howlong village of "Chong Mama." I reached Benkor, where, owing to the civil officer having forgot to arrange for our reception, I could do nothing except to obtain valuable plane table results. I then reached Sellam, where I was successful. I returned to Savoonga on the 26th February. On the 27th the chief of the Syloos tendered his submission, and on the 28th, accompanied by Mr. Cooke, I made a rapid march of 20 miles in a straight line to the north, thence, returning across the valleys of the "Toot Doom" and the "Suhjuck," I ascended the "Sysree" range at two places, getting plane table work 2½ miles north of "Pok Qing," and observations from "Suchet Klang;" returning south through Von Koonga, I completed the whole of the northern scheme of the triangulation.

7. On the 9th February, Captain Tanner and Mr. Barrett left Savoonga to complete the work east and south-east of "Oepome" up to the Loongseh range, Mr. Barrett completing the observations from Lal Leera; Sirthay No. 2 advanced along the Demagiri range and fixed Sirthay No. 3, and finally completed the triangles by observations at Burkul. That all officers concerned have taken a fair share in the personal exertions necessary to complete the arduous duties of triangulating in a difficult mountainous and jungle country is pretty certain. Of the total number of 33 stations from which angles have been observed, Captain Tanner has stood at 18, Mr. Barrett at 19, Mr. Cooke at 20, and I have been at 20. We have all done our best to do justice to the work and share the labour.

8. The total result may be summoned up as 3,000 miles of triangulation, the determination of a great number of heights, and the completion of the plane table-sketching of 1,600 miles of detail. These results would bear favourable comparison with work usually obtained from an equal number of officers working in peaceful times on a settled country. All my executive officers have worked splendidly, and increased the high opinion I had always held of their energy and skill. You have yourself seen how Captain Tanner toiled when he was with you in your expedition against the Southern Howlongs. Nothing could have been finer than the pertinacity with which Mr. Cooke obtained readings at "Pok Qing," making his way to a spot which the guides declared was inaccessible, and doing it without a guide, regardless of a threatening storm, which fortunately did not

burst until the angles were obtained, and the work saved. I cannot speak too highly of Captain Tanner, Mr. Barrett, or Mr. Cooke; all three officers have worked hard and zealously to render their share in the operations a success for the expedition and you.

9. I beg to record my personal obligation to you for having placed the services of your own interpreter "Gilokeah" at my disposal during my last expedition to the north towards "Sookpilal's" territory. The man "Tongsoo" always given to me by the civil officer, is perfectly worthless, and on this occasion was not received by Lal Ngora, who identified him as the thief of one of Lal Jeeka's gyals; it was through Lal Ngora's aid that I got guides across the "Sujjuck" valley and to "Von Koonga," who gave me guides, who placed us in sight of "Pok Qing," though they declared it was inaccessible, and did not take us to the spot; however, they did enough to enable us to utilise the labour.

10. I was unable to descend into the valley of the "Kloong Doon" to visit "Biparee Bazaar." To have done so I must have had another triangle to the east and at least another week of time. I marched at least six miles into Sookpilal's country and fixed the position of his village accurately. I could see no value in working up to the north, unless certain that I could complete the triangulation along the Sirthay ridge up the basin of the "Suhjuck;" and, under the circumstance I was working in, this was not possible, as I was limited in time and food. I could have only succeeded in this by a thorough understanding made early in the season with the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar, that I should find food and coolies at a given date at a certain place. This was a matter in which our civil officer was incapable of giving help, and in which he possessed neither knowledge nor influence. As regards connection with work on Cachar, I have shown three stations, one at "Sellam" (the highest hill of the country), one at "Dar Loong" on the left bank of the "Kloong Doom," another on a ridge of "Ryuk Klang," the hill on which Sookpilal's village is situated, and about 4½ miles south of the village. Enough has been done to facilitate further survey operations and to complete the connection with our western triangles along the basin of the Suhjuck and the watershed of the "Toot Doon" and the "Ryuk Klang" range, which ends at a point already determined by survey "Gootur Mook."

11. This brings me to consider about the boundary of our hill districts. I would respectfully urge the acceptance of the "Oepome" range from where it diverges from the Kurnafoolee western watershed, until it ends at the "Demagiri" falls, thence along the continuation of the "Demagiri" range along "Sirthay," forming the watershed and basin of the "Suhjuck" along the "Kahak" and "Chehpowe" range, until it touches the continuation of the "Lysree Klang" range, on which our "Pok Qing" station is marked. It is easy to define that the waters draining into the "Burra Heran Khal" shall belong to us, and the waters of the Suhjuck shall belong to the Looshais.

12. In conclusion, I beg to record the deep personal obligation I am under to Colonel McPherson, C.B., V.C., and the officers of the 2nd Goorkhas for the help they gave me. All our expeditions were protected by them, and at one time I owed to their kindness that I was able to keep my position and at the front in their company.

(Separate—Military Department—No. 102 of 1872.)

To His Grace the Duke of *Argyll*, K.T., Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

My Lord Duke, Simla, 17 June 1872.

In continuation of our Despatch, No. 95, of the 3rd instant, we now beg to enclose copy of a letter from the officer commanding the Eastern Frontier District, having reference to the accidental omission of the Survey party attached to the Cachar Column, Looshai Expeditionary Force, from the Despatch summing up the results of the Expedition, and acknowledging the services performed by Captain Badgeley and his officers.

We are, &c.
(signed) *Northbrook.*
Napier of Magdala.
&c. &c.

EXTRACT.—Fort William, Military Proceedings for June 1872.

From Colonel *P. S. Lumsden*, C.S.I., Quartermaster General, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, Simla (No. 552 L., "Field Operations"); dated Army Head Quarters, Simla, the 14th June 1872.

IN continuation of this Office No. 506 L., dated 10th May 1872, I am directed by the Right Honourable the Commander in Chief to submit, for the information of Government, the accompanying copy of a letter received from the Officer Commanding the Eastern Frontier District, having reference to the accidental omission of the Survey Party attached to the Cachar Column, Looshai Expeditionary Force, from the Despatch summing up the results of the Expedition, and acknowledging the services performed by Captain Badgeley and his officers. No. 387E. dated 15th May 1872.

From Brigadier General *G. Bourchier*, C.B., Commanding Eastern Frontier District, to Colonel *P. S. Lumsden*, C.S.I., Quartermaster General (No. 387 E.); dated 15 May 1872.

IT has been brought to my notice that the Survey Party were omitted in the Despatch regarding the operations of the Cachar Column, Looshai Expedition. My doing so was an oversight, although I do not consider it was in my province to criticise in any way their operations.

2. I beg, however, to report that I met the greatest kindness on the part of the officers employed, in furnishing me with the result of their observations as to latitude and longitude, and also in providing me with sketches, which were of the greatest use in illustrating the journals I periodically forwarded to you. They were always out at work, and took observations and surveys when we were on the move.

3. Should his Excellency deem it right, I should be obliged if the Government were informed that the omission was unintentional, and that "I received every assistance from Captain Badgeley and his officers," in determining our position by latitude and longitude, and also by their supplying me with sketch maps.

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

The ✝'s indicate the position of Police Posts and Stations nearest the Frontier Sawnge tribes.
The Red Line is the imaginary boundary of the Hill Tracts.
The Blue D.o is the line up to which the Country has been surveyed
The Yellow Line is that suggested by the D.o Comm.r (see last Paragraph 19) in accordance with the latest orders of Gov.t as to an identical line of Posts and of Our Jurisdiction in the Hill tracts. The dotted Continuation of it is made by the Comm.r to the North and South as a Completion of the line outside the Hill Tracts, in the manner laid down by Gov.t The 2 Green Lines are the paths suggested in the D.o Comm.r 12 Paragraph

(signed) H. Ulick Browne
Commissioner.

PLAN OF STOCKADE AND TOWER.



Scale of feet.



A. Ditch
B. Palisade
C. Tower. 30 ft high × 21 ft wide, outside measurement.
D. Inner gate
E. Bridge over ditch
G.G.G. Dwelling houses
H. Married mens cook house
H.L. Bachelors
Ground line .....

To face p. 50
0.10 ... EAST INDIA (CACHAR)



Scale 4 feet to the Inch.
Section thro' A.B.
Ground Plan of Tower, 2nd Floor
Ground Plan of Tower Roof
Step of ladder to Tower, 2nd Floor
Step of ladder to Terrace
Ground
Level
Section thro' C.D.
Scale 4 feet to the Inch.



O. 107. RETURN EAST INDIA (CACHAR)

5.

HAND SKETCH
OF COUNTRY BORDERING ON
MUNNIPOOR

To accompany a letter from Lt. Colonel Mc Culloch.

Torboong Valley 2 days
Chungpeeyol 2 days
Cheeboo Salt Well 1 day
Tumphai 3 days.

Torboong Valley 2 days
Tweela 1 day
Teepai or Tooyai 2 days
Poiboi 2 days.



APPROXIMATE SKETCH

NOWAR BUND.

20 0 20 40 60 Yards

7.


APPROXIMATE SKETCH
OF
MONIER KHALL
GARDEN STOCKADED.
To Cachar via Dhurma Khall
40 80 120 160 200 240 280 Feet
Dense Forest
Picquet
10 men Stockaded
Tea Teelahs and Forest
Tea
and
Swamp
Cooley Lines
Tea House to have Q.F in it for Manager & Officer of Detash!
Cooley Shed
Barracks
Cooley Shed
Surma River
Protected road to Water


APPROXIMATE SKETCH
JHALNA GHURRA
STOCKADED.
100 50 0 100 200 Yards
To Cutta Churra & Cachar
Dense Forest
Tea Garden
Picquet
10 men
Cooley Lines
Cooley Lines
Swamp
Barracks
60 men
Cooley Lines
Cooley Lines
Picquet
10 men
Dallesur River
Tea Teelahs
Dense forest at foot of high hill
Dry Khall
Tea Godown
Tea Garden
Dry Khall
Tea Godown
& Store
Residence
Dry Khall
Picquet
20 men



ROUGH SKETCH SHOWING
THE TRACK OF THE LOOSHAIS
ATTACKING NUGDEEGRAM.

Digitized with financial assistance from

Government of Maharashtra

on 01 February, 2020